USAir
When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: “There’s really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline.” Unwilling to accept Branson’s proposition on faith, your Chairman decided in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25% preferred stock of USAir.
当 Richard Branson——Virgin Atlantic Airways 的富有老板——被问到如何成为百万富翁时，他迅速回答：“这事没什么难的。先从亿万富翁开始，然后买一家航空公司。”不愿仅凭 Branson 的说法就照单全收，你们的 Chairman 在 1989 年决定亲自做个验证：他用 3.58 亿美元投资了 USAir 的一只 9.25% 优先股。
I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company’s then-CEO, and I still do. But my analysis of USAir’s business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company’s long history of profitable operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir’s revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely-competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline’s past record might be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
我喜欢并敬佩当时的 CEO Ed Colodny，现在依然如此。但我对 USAir 业务的分析既肤浅又错误。我被这家公司长期盈利的历史所迷惑，也被“持有一项优先级更高的证券似乎能提供保护”这一点所迷惑，从而忽略了关键问题：USAir 的收入将越来越多地受到一个放松监管、竞争极其激烈的市场的冲击，而它的成本结构却仍是监管时代的遗留产物——当年监管保护了利润。这些成本如果不加控制，就预示着灾难的到来，不管过去的记录看起来多么令人安心。（如果历史能提供所有答案，那么 Forbes 400 里就会全是图书管理员。）
To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements in its labor contracts—and that’s something most airlines have found it extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception. Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between the company’s costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.
然而，要让成本结构回归合理，USAir 必须在劳工合同上做出重大改进——而这件事对大多数航空公司而言都极其困难，除非它们能可信地威胁破产，甚至真的进入破产程序。USAir 也不例外。我们买入优先股之后不久，公司成本与收入之间的不平衡就开始爆炸式扩大。在 1990—1994 年期间，USAir 累计亏损 24 亿美元，这种表现把其普通股的账面权益彻底抹平。
For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by 75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.
在这段时期的大部分时间里，公司仍向我们支付了优先股股息，但在 1994 年支付被暂停。稍后，当形势看起来格外黯淡时，我们把这项投资的账面价值减记了 75%，降到 8,950 万美元。此后，在 1995 年的大部分时间里，我都提出愿意按票面价值的 50% 出售我们的股份。幸好，我没有卖成。
Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right: Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat unusual provision stipulating that “penalty dividends”—to run five percentage points over the prime rate—would be accrued on any arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was omitted for two years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 13.25% and 14%.
在我对 USAir 的诸多错误之中，有一件事我做对了：在进行这笔投资时，我们在优先股合同里写入了一条相当不寻常的条款，规定对任何拖欠款项都要计提“penalty dividends”（惩罚性股息）——其利率比 prime rate（最优惠贷款利率）高出 5 个百分点。这意味着，当我们 9.25% 的股息连续两年被暂停时，未支付的金额会以 13.25% 到 14% 的利率复利增长。
Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996, when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9 million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company’s CEO, a huge thank-you for extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment. Even so, USAir’s performance has recently been helped significantly by an industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has basic cost problems that must be solved.
在这种惩罚性条款面前，USAir 有强烈动机尽快补缴拖欠款项。而在 1996 年下半年，当 USAir 转为盈利后，它确实开始补缴，向我们支付了 4,790 万美元。我们要对公司 CEO Stephen Wolf 表达由衷的感谢——他让这家航空公司交出足以支持这笔支付的业绩。即便如此，USAir 最近的表现也在很大程度上受益于行业的顺风，这种顺风可能具有周期性特征。公司仍然存在必须解决的基础性成本问题。
In any event, the prices of USAir’s publicly-traded securities tell us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par value of $358 million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over the years collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including $30 million received in 1997).
无论如何，USAir 公开交易证券的市场价格告诉我们：我们的优先股现在大概已经值其 3.58 亿美元的票面价值，上下会有些偏差。此外，多年来我们累计收到了 2.405 亿美元的股息（其中包括 1997 年收到的 3,000 万美元）。
Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid, I tried once more to unload our holdings—this time for about $335 million. You’re lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
1996 年初，在任何累计股息尚未支付之前，我又一次试图把我们的持仓卖掉——这次报价大约 3.35 亿美元。你们算走运：我又一次没能成功，从而没能在“胜利的边缘”把失败硬拽出来。
In another context, a friend once asked me: “If you’re so rich, why aren’t you smart?” After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you may conclude he had a point.
在另一个场合，一位朋友曾问我：“既然你这么有钱，为什么还不聪明？”回头看看我在 USAir 上那惨不忍睹的表现，你们也许会觉得他说得有点道理。