1997-05-05 Warren Buffett.Share of mind
51. “It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts”
“决定胜负的不是市场份额，而是心智份额”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1 again.
WARREN BUFFETT：再次请1号区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City. Could you explain a little more about what you call the “mind of the consumer” and the “nature of the product” and explain how you actually apply these concepts to find the companies with the growing demand and the best investment potential? And thank you for being two of the greatest professors I’ve ever had.
观众：来自 New York City 的 Mike Assail（音）。能否进一步解释你所说的“消费者心智”和“产品的本质”，并说明你们如何把这些概念真正应用到选股中，去寻找需求在增长、投资潜力最好的公司？另外，谢谢你们两位——这是我遇到过的最出色的两位“教授”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. (Applause) You know, what you really — when you get into consumer products, you’re really interested in finding out — or thinking about — what is in the mind of how many people throughout the world about a product now, and what is likely to be in their mind five or ten or 20 years from now? Now, virtually every person on the globe — maybe, well, let’s get it down to 75 percent of the people on the globe — have some notion in their mind about Coca-Cola. They have — the word “Coca-Cola” means something to them. You know, RC Cola doesn’t mean anything to virtually anyone in the world, you know, it does to the guy who owns RC, you know, and the bottler. But everybody has something in their mind about Coca-Cola. And overwhelmingly, it’s favorable. It’s associated with pleasant experiences. Now, part of that is by design. I mean, it is where you are happy. It is at Disneyland, at Disney World. And it’s at ballparks.
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。（掌声）你知道，当你研究消费品时，真正要做的——或者说要思考的——是：当下全世界有多少人对某个产品在“心里”形成了什么印象？而在5年、10年、20年后，他们“心里”又大概率会是什么印象？如今，几乎全球每一个人——好吧，我们保守点，说全球75%的人——心里都对 Coca-Cola 有某种概念。对他们而言，“Coca-Cola”这个词是有含义的。相反，RC Cola 对世界上几乎所有人都没有意义——当然，对 RC 的所有者、对装瓶商是有意义的。但几乎所有人“心里”对 Coca-Cola 都有点什么——而且绝大多数是正面的。它和愉快的体验相连，这其中有一部分是精心设计的，也就是说，它总是出现在你开心的场景里：在 Disneyland、在 Disney World、在球场。
真正有效的护城河，不是 P&L 表上的某一行，而是用户脑子里的那点“偏见”：一旦形成正确的“心智绑定”，价格、竞争者动作、渠道威胁都只能在外圈打转。
And it’s every place that you’re likely to have a smile on your face, including the Berkshire Hathaway meeting I might add. (Laughter) And that position in the mind is pretty firmly established. And it’s established in close to 200 countries around the world with people. A year from now, it will be established in more minds. And it will have a slightly, slightly, slightly different overall position. In ten years from now, the position can move just a little bit more. It’s share of mind. It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts. Disney, same way. Disney means something to billions of people. And if you’re a parent of a couple young children and you got 50 videos in front of you that you can buy, you’re not going to sit down and preview an hour and a half of each video before deciding what one to stick in front of your kids. You know, you have got something in your mind about Disney. And you don’t have it about the ABC Video Company. Or you don’t even have it about other — you don’t have it about 20th Century.
它出现在一切能让你面带微笑的地方——顺带一提，也包括 Berkshire Hathaway 的股东会。（笑）这种“心智中的位置”已经相当牢固；它在全球接近200个国家的人群心中建立起来。再过一年，会有更多人的心里形成这种位置；整体印象会一丁点、一丁点地变化；十年后，又会再小幅推进。这就是“心智份额”。关键不是市场份额，而是心智份额。Disney 也是同样的道理。对数十亿人而言，Disney 这个名字“有意义”。如果你是家里有两三个小孩的父母，面前摆着50张可买的录像带，你不会先把每一盘都预览一个半小时再决定给孩子看哪一盘。你“心里”对 Disney 已经有定见了；但对 ABC Video Company 没有这种定见；对其他公司——比如 20th Century——你也没有这种定见。
share of mind的建立跟产品，以及产品所处的场景是有关系的，Disney从一个人的童年注入，可以留存非常长的时间。
You know, you don’t have it about Paramount. So that name, to billions of people, including lots of people outside this country, it has a meaning. And that meaning overwhelmingly is favorable. It’s reinforced by the other activities of the company. And just think of what somebody would pay if they could actually buy that share of mind, you know, of billions of people around the world. You can’t do it. You can’t do it by a billion dollar advertising budget or a $3 billion advertising budget or hiring 20,000 super salesmen. So you’ve got that. Now, the question is what does that stand for five or ten or 20 years from now? You know they’ll be more people. You know they’ll be more people that have heard of Disney. And you know that there will always be parents that are interested in having something for their kids to do. And you know that kids will love the same sort of things. And, you know, that — (Munger accidentally knocks over his microphone) — what’s? (Laughter) He emphasizes the key points when we get to those.
你看，对 Paramount 你同样没有这种定见。可这个名字（Disney）对数十亿人——包括美国以外的很多人——是“有含义”的，而且这种含义压倒性地正面；公司其它活动又在不断强化这种含义。想一想：如果有人真能把这种“覆盖全球数十亿人的心智份额”买下来，他会愿意出多少钱？这是买不到的。即使用10亿美元、30亿美元的广告预算，或者雇2万名超级销售，也买不到。因此，你已经拥有的是“心智资产”。接下来该问的是：5年、10年、20年后，它还能代表什么？你知道人口会更多；你知道会有更多人听说 Disney；你也知道永远都会有父母在意“给孩子点什么可做的事情”；你知道孩子们喜欢的东西大体相似。然后，你看——（Munger 不小心碰倒了话筒）——怎么了？（笑）每当我们说到关键点，他就会来个强调。
(Laughter) But that is what you’re trying to think about with a consumption product. That’s what Charlie and I were thinking about when we bought See’s Candy. I mean, here we were. It’s 1972. You know, we know a fair amount about candy. I know more than when I sat down this morning. (Laughs) I mean, I had about 20 pieces already. (Laughter) But, you know, what — whose, you know — does their face light up on Valentine’s Day, you know, when you hand them a box of candy and say, you know, it’s some nondescript thing and say, “Here, honey, I took the low bid,” you know, or something of the sort, and — (Laughter) No. I mean, you want something — you know, you’ve got tens of millions of people — or at least many millions of people — that remember that the first time they handed that box of candy, it wasn’t that much thereafter that they got kids for the first time or something. So it’s — the memories are good.
（笑）但这正是你在做消费品时要思考的事。我们买下 See’s Candy 时，Charlie 和我想的就是这些。也就是说，当时是 1972 年。你知道，我们对糖果了解不少。今天早上坐下来之前我知道得还没这么多（笑）。我是说，我刚才已经吃了大概 20 颗了（笑）。但是，你想想——在 Valentine’s Day，你把一盒糖递给对方，同时说这是一件来路不明的东西，或者来一句“亲爱的，我选了最低价”（笑）——对方的表情会亮起来吗？不会。我的意思是，你想要的是——有上千万，至少几百万人还记得：第一次把那盒糖送给心上人，没过多久他们就迎来了人生第一次有了孩子，或类似的美好时刻。所以——这些记忆是美好的。
The association’s good. Total process. It isn’t just the candy. It’s the person who takes care of you at Christmastime when they’ve been on their feet for eight hours, and people have been yelling at them because they’ve been in line with 50 people in line, and that person still smiles at them. The delivery process. It’s the shop in which they get all kinds of things, the treat we give them. It’s all part of the marketing personality. But that position in the mind is what counts with a consumer product. And that means you have a good product — a very good product — it means you may need tons of infrastructure, because you’ve got to have that — I had a case of Cherry Coke awaiting me at the top of the Great Wall when I got there in China. Now that — you’ve got to have something there so that the product is there when people want it. And that happened — in World War II, General Eisenhower, you know, said to Mr. Woodruff that he wanted a Coca-Cola within arm’s length of every American serviceman in the world.
这种联想是好的。是一个“全流程”。它不只是糖果本身。是 Christmas 时那个照顾你的店员——他们已经站了八个小时，顾客在有 50 人的长队里大喊大叫，可他们仍然对顾客微笑。还包括配送流程。包括门店里人们能买到各种东西、以及我们给他们的小礼遇。这一切共同构成了品牌的“营销人格”。但在消费品领域，真正关键的是“心智中的位置”。这意味着你得有一个好产品——一个非常好的产品——也意味着你可能需要庞大的基础设施，因为你必须做到这一点——我在 China 登上 Great Wall 的长城顶时，就有一箱 Cherry Coke 正在等我。要做到这一点——你必须确保在消费者想要时，产品就在那里。类似的事在 World War II 期间也发生过：General Eisenhower 对 Mr. Woodruff 说，他希望让全世界每一位美国军人“伸手可及”就能喝到一瓶 Coca-Cola。
And they built a lot of bottling plants to take care of that. That sort of positioning can be incredible. It seems to work especially well for American products. I mean, people want certain types of American products worldwide, you know, our music, our moves, our soft drinks, our fast food. You can’t imagine, at least I can’t, a French firm or a German firm or a Japanese firm having that — selling 47 or 48 percent of the world’s soft drinks. I mean, it just doesn’t happen that way. It’s part of something you could broadly call an American culture. And the world hungers for it. And Kodak, for example, probably does not have quite the same — and George Fisher’s doing a great job with the company. This goes back before that. But Kodak probably does not have the same place in people’s mind worldwide quite as it had 20 years ago. I mean, people didn’t think of Fuji in those days, we’ll say, as being in quite the same place. And, then, Fuji took the Olympics, as I remember, in Los Angeles.
他们为此建了许多装瓶厂。这种“占位”能力是惊人的。它似乎对美国产品格外有效。我的意思是，全世界的人都想要某些美国产品：我们的音乐、电影、软饮、快餐。你很难想象，至少我无法想象，一家法国、德国或日本公司能做到那样——卖出全球 47% 或 48% 的软饮。这种事并不是那样发生的。这是你可以笼统称为美国文化的一部分，而全世界对此“饥渴”。再比如 Kodak，也许如今在全球消费者心中的地位，已经不完全等同于 20 年前了——且先不说 George Fisher 把公司带得很好，那些变化发生在他之前。换句话说，人们在当年并不把 Fuji 视为与 Kodak 地位相当的品牌。随后，Fuji（据我记得）在 Los Angeles 的 Olympics 上拿下了赞助。
心智的本质是文化，正确的文化才能建立正确的心智。
And they just — they put them — they pushed their way to more of a parity with a Kodak. And you don’t want to ever let them do that. And that’s why you can see a Coca-Cola or a Disney and companies like that doing things that you think, well, this doesn’t make a hell of a lot of sense. You know, if they didn’t spend this $10 million, wouldn’t they still sell as much Coca-Cola? But, you know, that — I quoted from that 1896 report of Coca-Cola and the promotion they were doing back then to spread the word. You never know which dollar’s doing it. But you do know that everybody in the world, virtually, has heard of your product. Overwhelmingly, they’ve got a favorable impression on them and the next generation’s going to get it. So that’s what you’re doing with consumer products. With See’s Candy, you know, we are no better — we want — no better than the last person who’s been served their candy or the last product they’ve been served.
他们就这样——一步步地——把自己推到了更接近 Kodak 的位置。而你绝不应该让他们做到这一点。这也就是为什么你会看到像 Coca-Cola、Disney 这样的公司，去做一些你会觉得“好像不太合算”的事。你知道的，如果他们不花这 1000 万美元，难道就卖不出同样多的 Coca-Cola 吗？但是你看——我引用过 1896 年 Coca-Cola 的那份报告，当时他们就在做推广来“扩散名声”。你永远不知道究竟是哪一美元起了作用。但你确定的是，几乎全世界每个人都听说过你的产品；他们对它的印象在压倒性的多数情况下是正面的，而且下一代也会继承这种印象。这就是做消费品的要义。对于See’s糖果来说，我们的声誉仅仅取决于最后一个购买糖果的顾客，或是最后一次提供的产品质量。
But as long as we do the job on that, people can’t catch us. You know, we can charge a little more for it because people are not interested in taking the low bid. And they’re not interested in saving a penny a bottle on colas. Remember we’ve talked about in these meetings, private labels, in the past. And private label has stalled out in the soft drink business. They want the real thing. And 900 and some odd million eight-ounce servings will be served today of Coca-Cola product around the world. Nine-hundred million, you know. And it’ll go up next year, the year after. And I don’t know how you displace companies like that. I mean, if you gave me a hundred billion dollars — and I encourage if any of you are thinking about that to step forward — (laughter) — if you gave — and you told me to displace the CocaCola Company as the leader in the world in soft drinks, you know, I wouldn’t have the faintest idea of how to do it. And those are the kind of businesses we like. Charlie?
但只要我们把这件事做好，别人就追不上我们。你知道，我们可以多收一点价，因为人们并不想要“最低报价”。他们也不在乎每瓶可乐能不能便宜一分钱。还记得我们在过去的股东会上谈过的“自有品牌”吗？在软饮行业，“自有品牌”的发展已经停滞了。消费者要的是真正的那一款。而今天，全世界会消费 9 亿多份 8 盎司的 Coca-Cola 产品。9 亿多，你懂的。明年、后年还会继续增长。我不知道你要怎么把这样的公司从龙头位置上拉下来。我的意思是，就算你给我 1000 亿美元——如果你们当中有人在考虑，不妨现在就站出来（笑）——如果你给了我这笔钱，并让我把 Coca-Cola 从全球软饮领导者的位置上“挤下来”，老实说，我一点头绪都没有。而我们喜欢的，正是这种类型的生意。Charlie？
渠道方（Walmart、Costco）随时可以推自己的“自有品牌”，并在一堆产品中横跳（横向选择，做不好就做下一个），这种方式理论上搞不过专注于一个产品的品牌。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the See’s Candy example has an interesting teaching lesson for all of us. Warren said we were — it’s the first time we really stepped up for brand quality. And it was a very hard jump for us. We’d been used to buying dollar bills for fifty cents. And the interesting thing was that if they had demanded an extra $100,000 for the See’s Candy company, we wouldn’t have bought it. And that was after Warren had been trained under the greatest professor of his era, and had worked 90 hours a week.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我认为 See’s Candy 这个例子，对我们所有人都有一个很有意思的启示。Warren 说过，那是我们第一次真正为了“品牌质量”而“抬价出手”。对我们来说，这一步跨得很艰难。我们过去习惯于“花 50 美分去买 1 美元”。有意思的是，如果当时他们再多要 10 万美元，我们可能就不会买 See’s Candy 了——而那可是 Warren 在当时那个时代最伟大的教授门下学成，并且每周工作 90 小时之后的决定。
WARREN BUFFETT: And eaten a lot of chocolates, too. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：而且还吃了很多巧克力。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Absorbing everything in the world. I mean, we just didn’t have minds well enough trained to make an easy decision right. And by accident, they didn’t ask the extra $100,000 for it. And we did buy it. And as it succeeded, we kept learning. I think that shows that the name of the game is continuing to learn. And even if you’re very well-trained and have some natural aptitude, you still need to keep learning. And that brings along the delicate problem people sometimes talk about: two aging executives. (Laughter) I don’t know what the hell that means as an adjective because I don’t know anybody that is going in the other direction. (Laughter and applause) But you people who hold shares are betting, for a while at least, until younger successors come along, you’re betting to some extent on what we’ll now tactfully continue to call “aging executives” continuing to learn.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对。尽可能吸收世上一切有用的东西。我的意思是，我们当时的大脑训练得还不够好，没法轻松地把正确决定做出来。碰巧的是，他们并没有再多要那额外的 10 万美元，于是我们就买下了它。随着它成功，我们也不断学习。我认为这说明“游戏的本质就是持续学习”。即便你受过良好训练、还有点天赋，也仍需要持续学习。而这就引出了人们偶尔会谈到的微妙问题：两位“日渐年长的高管”。（笑）我也不知道把“年长”当作形容词到底是什么意思，因为我不认识有人在朝相反方向走的。（笑与掌声）不过，各位持股人现在押注的——至少在更年轻的接班人到来之前——在某种程度上，正是我们这些“日渐年长的高管”会继续学习。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, if we hadn’t have bought See’s, with some subsequent developments after that because that made us aware of other things, we wouldn’t have bought Coca-Cola in 1988. I mean, you can give See’s a significant part of the credit for the, I guess, $11 billion-plus profit we’ve got in Coca-Cola at the present time. And you say, “Well, how could you be so dumb as not to be able to recognize a Coca-Cola?” Well, I don’t know, but —
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。嗯，如果我们当初没有买 See’s，后来也就不会由此开了眼界、注意到别的东西，那么我们在 1988 年就不会去买 Coca-Cola。换句话说，如今我们在 Coca-Cola 上获得的——我想——超 110 亿美元的利润，See’s 理应记上一大功。你可能会说：“你怎么会蠢到连 Coca-Cola 这样的生意都没认出来？”嗯，我也不知道，但——
转移注意力的方向非常困难，Attention Is All You Need。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You were only drinking about 20 cans a day.
CHARLIE MUNGER：你那时一天也就喝大约 20 听而已。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Right. It wasn’t that I hadn’t been exposed to it, or — (Laughter) It’s amazing. But it just made us start thinking more. I mean, we saw how decisions we made in relation to See’s played out in a marketplace and that sort of thing. And we saw what worked and didn’t work. And it made us appreciate a lot what did work and shy away from things that didn’t work. But it led — it definitely led to a Coca-Cola. And we’ve had the good luck to buy some businesses themselves in their entirety that taught us a lot. You know, we bought — and it’s worked in the other direction. I mean, we were in the windmill business, one time. I was. Charlie stayed out of the windmill business. But I was in the windmill business and pumps and — third-level department — or second-level — department stores. And I just found out how tough it was and how it didn’t — you could apply all kinds of energy to them. And it didn’t do any good.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，没错。并不是我没接触过它，或者——（笑）这很有意思。但这件事促使我们开始思考更多东西。我的意思是，我们看到了与 See’s 相关的那些决策在市场中的后续表现之类的事；我们看清了哪些有效、哪些无效；这让我们更懂得珍惜有效的东西，并远离无效的东西。而这些——确实把我们引向了 Coca-Cola。我们也有好运，曾整买下一些企业本身，从中学到了很多。你知道，我们也有反面的经历。比如，我们有一段时间做过风车生意。我做过；Charlie 则没有。可我做过风车、做过水泵，还有——三流的百货店——或者说二流的百货店。结果我发现这些生意有多难做，你对它们投入再多精力也没用；根本不起作用。
It made a great deal of sense to figure out what pond to jump in. And what pond you jumped in was probably more important than how well you could swim. Charlie?
明白“该跳进哪一个池塘”这件事意义重大。你跳进哪个池塘，很可能比你“游得多好”还要重要。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s necessary that people be as ignorant as we were, as long as we were. (Laughter) I think American education could be better, but not in the hands of any of the people who are now teaching. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我不认为人们有必要像我们那样“久长地无知”。（笑）我觉得美国的教育可以更好，但前提是别交到当下这些教书人的手里。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there any group we’ve forgotten to offend? I mean — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我们是不是还有哪个群体没得罪到？我是说——（笑）
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Refer To：《2008-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome 企业类型——极佳、良好与糟糕 Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to ...1992-02-28 Warren Buffett.H. H. Brown
Refer To：《1992-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 H. H. Brown We made a sizable acquisition in 1991—the H. H. Brown Company—and behind this business is an interesting history. In 1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray ...