1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*

我们在 1998 年的净资产增加了 259 亿美元，使 A 类股与 B 类股的每股账面价值都提升了 48.3%。在过去 34 年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 37,801 美元，年复合增长率为 24.7%。*

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

本报告中使用的所有数据均以 Berkshire 的 A 类股为口径；A 类股是公司在 1996 年之前唯一发行在外的股票的继承者。B 类股的经济权益相当于 A 类股的 1/30。

Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings — but not this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better than it sounds? Well, Berkshire’s progress in 1998 — though more than satisfactory — was not as good as it looks. That’s because most of that 48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.

通常情况下，48.3% 的增长足以让人翻筋斗——但今年不行。还记得 Wagner 吗？有人形容他的音乐“比听起来更好”。Berkshire 在 1998 年的进展——虽然完全令人满意——却没有看上去那么好。这是因为 48.3% 的大部分增幅，来自我们在收购中发行股票。

To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value, which means that any issuing of shares we do — whether for cash or as consideration in a merger — instantly increases our per-share book-value figure, even though we’ve earned not a dime. What happens is that we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up. These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I can’t tell you too often (though you may feel that we try), it’s the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts rather than the per-share gain in book value.

解释一下：我们的股票常年以显著高于账面价值的溢价交易，这意味着只要我们发行股票——不论是为了现金，还是作为并购对价——每股账面价值就会立刻上升，哪怕我们一分钱都没赚到。原因在于：在这些交易里，我们“换回来的每股账面价值”多于“付出去的每股账面价值”。但这类交易不会立刻带来每股内在价值的增长，因为就内在价值而言，我们付出的与得到的大致相当。而且，正如 Charlie Munger（Berkshire 的副董事长、我的合伙人）和我怎么说都不嫌多的（尽管你可能觉得我们说得太多了）：真正重要的，是每股内在价值的增长，而不是每股账面价值的增长。

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms, and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our Owner’s Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and 62.)

尽管 Berkshire 的内在价值在 1998 年确实大幅增长，但其增幅仍远远低于账面价值所记录的 48.3%。不过，内在价值依然显著高于账面价值。（关于这些术语以及其他投资与会计概念更详尽的讨论，请参阅我们的 Owner’s Manual，第 56–64 页，其中我们阐述了以“所有者”为中心的商业原则。内在价值在第 61–62 页有讨论。）

We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses and managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998, General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way — more about both later — and the performance of our operating businesses last year exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.

我们带着公司史上最强的一组业务与管理团队进入 1999 年。我们在 1998 年收购的两家公司——General Re 和 Executive Jet——各方面都属一流（后文会详细谈），而我们去年旗下运营企业的表现也超出我的预期。GEICO 再一次“火力全开”。但不利的一面是：我们重仓投资的几家上市公司出现了明显的经营失速，这种情况是他们和我在年初都未曾预料到的。因此，我们的股票投资组合表现远不如 S&P 500。不过，这些公司的问题几乎肯定只是暂时的，Charlie 和我认为它们的长期前景非常好。

In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a table that we regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在过去三份年报里，我们都提供了一张表格，我们认为它对于估算 Berkshire 的内在价值至关重要。在这张更新后的表格（见下文）中，我们追踪两项关键的价值构成，并将 General Re 以备考（pro-forma）口径纳入，假设我们在全年都持有它。第一列列示我们按每股口径拥有的投资资产（包括现金及等价物，但不包括我们金融产品业务中持有的证券）；第二列显示 Berkshire 运营企业的每股税前盈利（未计入购买会计调整——见第 62–63 页——但已扣除所有利息与总部费用）。第二列不包含来自第一列投资资产的任何股息、利息与已实现资本利得。换句话说，这两列等于把 Berkshire “拆成两半”来看：一家公司只持有投资资产，另一家公司负责经营所有业务并承担全部总部成本。

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

下面是这两个板块按“十年”为单位的增长率：

During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, or 25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re (included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest gain.

在 1998 年，我们的每股投资资产增加了 9,604 美元，增幅 25.2%；但每股运营盈利却下降了 33.9%。这两点都主要由 General Re（如前所述，以备考口径计入）解释：这家公司拥有规模巨大的投资资产，使我们的每股投资资产指标显著上升；但 General Re 在 1998 年出现了承保亏损，从而拖累了运营盈利。若我们当年未收购 General Re，每股运营盈利本会呈现小幅增长。

Though certain of our acquisitions and operating strategies may from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire’s capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who can’t).

尽管我们某些收购与经营策略，可能不时会让两列数据中的一列受益更大，但我们始终致力于把两列数字都做大。不过，有一点可以确定：我们未来的增长速度将远远低于过去。Berkshire 的资本基数如今实在太大，已经不可能再让我们赚到那种真正“离谱”的回报。如果你不信，你可以去做销售——但最好别做数学（别忘了：世界上其实只有三种人：会数数的，和不会数数的）。

Currently we are working to compound a net worth of $57.4 billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course, our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three times Berkshire’s. Net worth, though, measures the capital that managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become huge.

我们目前要做复利增长的净资产是 574 亿美元，是美国公司中规模最大的（当然，如果 Exxon 和 Mobil 的并购发生，我们的纪录就会被超越）。但净资产领先，并不代表 Berkshire 在价值上压过所有企业：对所有者而言，关键是市值；例如 General Electric 和 Microsoft 的估值就超过 Berkshire 的三倍。尽管如此，净资产衡量的是管理层必须“配置与运用”的资本规模，而在 Berkshire 这个数字确实已经大到惊人。

Nonetheless, Charlie and I will do our best to increase intrinsic value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far short of that — including years showing negative returns — and those will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands just won’t do. Today’s markets are not friendly to our search for “elephants,” but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.

尽管如此，Charlie 和我仍会尽最大努力，在未来把每股内在价值的平均增速做到 15%——我们认为这几乎是“可能结果的天花板”。我们也许会有一些年份超过 15%，但肯定也会有一些年份远低于 15%——包括出现负收益的年份——这些都会把长期平均数拉下来。同时，你需要理解：未来五年平均 15% 的增长意味着什么——这意味着我们必须把净资产增加 580 亿美元。要挣到这难度极高的 15%，我们就必须想出“大点子”：卖爆米花的小摊可不够。如今的市场并不利于我们寻找“象”（大型收购标的），但你可以确信，我们会始终把注意力放在这场狩猎上。

Whatever the future holds, I make you one promise: I’ll keep at least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party. To that end, I’ve already selected a “power spot” at the office for my urn.

不管未来如何，我给你一个承诺：只要我还在世，我会把至少 99% 的净资产放在 Berkshire。那会是多久？我的榜样是 Fort Wayne 的那位忠诚民主党人——他要求被葬在 Chicago，这样还能继续为党“出力”。为此，我已经在办公室里给我的骨灰罐选好了一个“风水宝地”。

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Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth: We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998 bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another 2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8 doesn’t refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting, working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5 million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the assets we manage.

我们的财务增长也伴随着雇员规模的增长：我们现在的工资单上有 47,566 名员工；1998 年的收购为我们带来了 7,074 名员工，而内部增长又增加了 2,500 名。为了“平衡”一线员工增加的 9,500 人，我们把总部员工人数从 12 人扩编到了 12.8 人。（这个 0.8 不是指我或 Charlie：我们新招了一位会计，每周工作四天。）尽管公司正在朝着“官僚臃肿”的可怕趋势发展，但我们去年的税后总部开销大约只有 350 万美元，折算下来，远低于我们所管理资产价值的 1 个基点（1 个基点 = 0.01%）。

Taxes

税收

One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury. The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means we shouldered all of the U.S. Government’s expenses for more than a half-day.

我们规模变大，有一个受益者是美国财政部。Berkshire 与 General Re 因 1998 年盈利已缴或即将缴纳的联邦所得税合计 27 亿美元。这意味着，我们承担了美国政府超过半天的全部开支。

Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S. taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last year, no one else — neither corporations nor 270 million citizens — would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can truly say that they “gave at the office.”

把这个想法再往前推一步：如果另外只有 625 个美国纳税人，去年向财政部缴纳的税额能与我们和 General Re 一样多，那么其他任何人——无论企业还是 2.7 亿公民——都不必缴纳联邦所得税或任何其他联邦税（例如社保税或遗产税）。我们的股东完全可以说，他们确实是在“办公室里做了贡献”（gave at the office）。

Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does not bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals, have prospered in America as we would have in no other country. Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely escaped taxes, I’m sure we would be worse off financially (and in many other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write checks to us — say, because we are disabled or unemployed.

给 IRS 开出一串零的支票，并不会让 Charlie 或我感到困扰。Berkshire 作为一家企业，以及我们个人，都在美国获得了在其他任何国家都难以获得的繁荣。事实上，如果我们生活在世界其他地方并完全躲开税收，我确信我们在财务上（以及许多其他方面）反而会更糟。总的来说，我们觉得自己极其幸运：人生发到我们手里的是一副能让我们给政府写大额支票的牌，而不是那种需要政府定期给我们写支票的牌——比如因为残疾或失业。

Berkshire’s tax situation is sometimes misunderstood. First, capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35% rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire’s tax on a long-term capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an identical gain.

Berkshire 的税务情况有时会被误解。首先，资本利得对我们并没有特殊吸引力：公司对“应税收入”缴纳 35% 的税率，无论这收入来自资本利得还是来自日常经营。这意味着，Berkshire 对一笔长期资本利得所缴的税，比个人对同样一笔利得所缴的税高出整整 75%。

Some people harbor another misconception, believing that we can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income. Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries. However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.

还有一种常见误解：有人以为我们收到的股息可以有 70% 免税。确实，70% 的股息扣除率适用于大多数公司；当 Berkshire 在非保险子公司名下持有股票时，也适用这一比例。但我们几乎所有的股票投资都归属于保险公司持有，在这种情况下，股息扣除率是 59.5%。这仍然意味着：对我们而言，1 美元股息显著比 1 美元普通经营收入更“值钱”，但并不像人们常以为的那么夸张。

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Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year. In connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way to show our admiration.

去年，为了财政部，Berkshire 可谓“全力以赴”。与 General Re 的合并相关，我们向政府开出了一张 3,000 万美元的支票，用于支付一笔与本次交易新发行股票挂钩的 SEC 费用。我们听说这笔支付创下了 SEC 的纪录。Charlie 和我非常钦佩委员会为美国投资者所做的一切。不过，我们宁愿用别的方式来表达这种钦佩。

GEICO (1-800-847-7536)

Combine a great idea with a great manager and you’re certain to obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does. His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.

把一个伟大的点子和一个伟大的经理人结合在一起，你就一定会得到伟大的结果。在 GEICO，这个组合正生机勃勃。点子是“低成本车险”，它得以实现，是因为我们采用了直达客户的营销方式；经理人是 Tony Nicely。很简单：在商业世界里，没有任何人能比 Tony 把 GEICO 经营得更好。他的直觉几乎从不出错，精力无穷，执行无可挑剔。在保持承保纪律的同时，Tony 正在打造一个以越来越快速度提升市场份额的组织。

This pace has been encouraged by our compensation policies. The direct writing of insurance — that is, without there being an agent or broker between the insurer and its policyholder — involves a substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business — which, as it renews, will deliver significant profits — so we leave it out of our compensation formulas. What’s included then? We base 50% of our associates’ bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our “seasoned” book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders — and here we have stepped on the gas.

这种增长速度，也得到了我们薪酬政策的鼓励。直接承保（direct writing）——也就是保险公司与投保人之间不通过代理人或经纪人——需要相当可观的前期投入。因此，第一年的新业务会在“很大程度上”亏损。在 GEICO，我们不希望这种成本吓退同事们对新业务的积极开拓——因为这些新业务在续保后会带来显著利润——所以我们在薪酬考核公式里把这部分成本剔除掉了。那我们把什么纳入考核？我们将同事奖金与利润分享的 50% 绑定在“成熟保单簿”的盈利上，也就是与我们合作超过一年的保单；另外 50% 与保单持有人数量的增长挂钩——在这一项上，我们已经把油门踩到底了。

In 1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by the new business and in-force figures below:

1995 年（也就是被 Berkshire 收购的前一年），GEICO 的营销支出是 3,300 万美元，电话坐席顾问有 652 人。去年，公司花了 1.43 亿美元做营销，坐席人数增长到 2,162 人。这些投入对公司造成的效果，可以从下面的新单与在保数据看出来：

In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spending at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing to invest in GEICO’s new-business activity, as long as we can concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly serve its policyholders.

1999 年，我们还会再次提高营销预算，至少投入 1.90 亿美元。事实上，只要我们能够同时建设好必要的基础设施，确保公司能妥善服务投保人，Berkshire 对 GEICO 的新业务投入并不存在上限。

Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerned about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments, no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent — and if that calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.

由于第一年的成本压力，那些在意季度或年度利润的公司，会回避类似投入——不管这种投入在长期价值建设上有多么理性。我们的算法不同：我们只衡量一件事——每花 1 美元，是否能创造超过 1 美元的价值；只要这笔账算下来划算，我花得越多就越高兴。

There is far more to GEICO’s success, of course, than low prices and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair, fast and friendly — and ours is. Here’s an impartial scorecard on how we shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance Department recently reported that GEICO’s complaint ratio in 1997 was not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less than half the average of the other four.

当然，GEICO 的成功远不止低价与广告轰炸。理赔处理也必须做到公平、快速、友好——而我们做到了。这里有一份客观的“成绩单”：在 New York——我们业务量最大的州——州保险部门最近报告称，GEICO 在 1997 年的投诉率不仅是五大车险公司中最低的，而且还不到另外四家平均水平的一半。

GEICO’s 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we had anticipated — and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in 1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down — at the least to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better than those of the industry.

GEICO 在 1998 年的利润率为 6.7%，这比我们预期的还要好——甚至比我们希望的还要好。我们的结果反映了一个全行业现象：近些年来，车祸发生频率与事故严重程度都出人意料地下滑。我们对此的回应是：1998 年将费率下调 3.3%，并将在 1999 年进一步下调。这些举措很快会把利润率拉下来——至少会回落到 4%（这是我们的目标），甚至可能明显更低。无论如何，我们相信我们的利润率仍将显著优于行业水平。

With GEICO’s growth and profitability both outstanding in 1998, so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary — which went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year — may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a company-funded pension plan.)

在 1998 年，GEICO 的增长与盈利都极为出色，相应地，利润分享与奖金发放也同样突出。事实上，我们发放了 1.03 亿美元的利润分享，相当于工资的 32.3%——这笔钱发给了所有在公司工作满一年以上的 9,313 名员工——这一比例很可能是全美任何大型公司中最高的。（此外，员工还享有公司出资的养老金计划。）

The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that the profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though, may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come. For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we promoted 4,612 people.

考虑到我们的利润分享计算中，“盈利”这一指标未来几乎必然会下降，32.3% 可能会成为一个阶段性的峰值。不过，“增长”这一指标很可能会提高。总体而言，我们预计这两个基准合起来，会在未来几十年持续推动非常可观的利润分享发放。对员工来说，增长也会通过其他方式兑现：去年我们提拔了 4,612 人。

Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Our market share improved significantly in 1998 — but only from 3% to 3½%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should be giving us their business.

尽管 GEICO 的数据令人惊叹，但我们要做的还很多。我们在 1998 年的市场份额确实显著提高——但也只是从 3% 提升到 3.5%。我们现在每拥有 1 位保单持有人，外面还有另外 10 位本该把业务交给我们。

Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. About 40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.

正在读这段话的你们当中，可能就有人属于那 10 位。大约 40% 的人去查询我们的报价后会发现，选择我们能省钱。这个比例不是 100%，因为各家保险公司承保判断不同：有的公司会对居住在某些地区或从事某些职业的驾驶者给予比我们更多的“加分”。不过，我们相信，与任何一家面向所有客户的全国性保险公司相比，我们更经常能给出低价。此外，在 40 个州，我们还能给股东提供特别折扣——通常是 8%。所以打个电话来查一查，看看我们能不能帮你省钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. But I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publicly-owned companies.

你可能觉得，这一节里打一条广告就够了。但我还有另一条要讲——这次是写给上市公司管理层的。

At Berkshire we feel that telling outstanding CEOs, such as Tony, how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of our managers wouldn’t work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving. (Generally, they don’t have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or when to swing.

在 Berkshire，我们认为去教导像 Tony 这样杰出的 CEO 该怎么经营公司，是愚蠢到了极点。我们的大多数经理人如果总被“后座指挥”（backseat driving），根本不会为我们工作。（通常他们也不需要给任何人打工，因为大约 75% 左右的人本身就已经实现了财务自由。）此外，他们是商业世界里的 Mark McGwires，不需要我们教他们怎么握棒、什么时候挥棒。

Nevertheless, Berkshire’s ownership may make even the best of managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own 100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family have or will ever have; and 3) you can’t sell or merge it for at least a century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted.

尽管如此，Berkshire 的所有权结构，甚至可能让最优秀的经理人更有效率。第一，我们消除了 CEO 工作中通常伴随的那些仪式化、低产出的活动。我们的经理人完全掌控自己的日程安排。第二，我们给每个人一个简单的使命：像这样去经营你的企业——1）你拥有它 100% 的产权；2）它是你和家人在这个世界上拥有或将永远拥有的唯一资产；3）你至少一个世纪内都不能卖掉它或与别人合并。作为推论，我们告诉他们：不要让任何决策哪怕一丁点受到会计处理的影响。我们希望经理人思考“什么重要”，而不是思考“将来会怎么被记账”。

Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a similar mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder base — which it will have for decades to come — that has the longest investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe. Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter’s earnings. We certainly don’t ignore the current results of our businesses — in most cases, they are of great importance — but we never want them to be achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive strengths.

几乎没有多少上市公司的 CEO 能在类似的授权下工作，主要因为他们的股东盯着短期前景与报表利润。但 Berkshire 的股东群体——并且未来几十年仍会如此——拥有上市公司世界里最长的投资期限。事实上，我们的大多数股份都由一些投资者持有，他们预计自己去世时仍会持有这些股票。因此，我们可以要求 CEO 为“长期价值最大化”而管理，而不是为下季度的利润而管理。我们当然不会忽视当期经营结果——在多数情况下它们非常重要——但我们从不希望当期结果以牺牲我们持续打造更强竞争优势为代价。

I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire’s approach. Charlie and I haven’t taught Tony a thing — and never will — but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his talents to what’s important. He does not have to devote his time or energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or “Street” expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching achievements.

我认为 GEICO 的故事就展示了 Berkshire 方法的好处。Charlie 和我从没教过 Tony 任何东西——未来也永远不会——但我们创造了一个环境，让他可以把所有才能用在真正重要的事情上。他不必把时间与精力耗在董事会会议、媒体采访、路演、投行推介或与分析师的沟通上。此外，他也不必花一秒钟去想融资、信用评级，或华尔街对每股收益的“预期”。因为我们的所有权结构，他也知道这种运营框架会持续几十年不变。在这种自由的环境里，Tony 与他的公司能够把近乎无限的潜力转化为相匹配的成就。

If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in a GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to no one except Charlie.

如果你正在经营一家大型、盈利良好、并且会在类似 GEICO 这种环境里蓬勃发展的企业，去看看我们第 21 页的收购标准，然后给我打个电话。我保证会很快答复，并且除了 Charlie 之外，不会向任何人提起你的来电。

Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)

To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA), you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli, CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.

要理解 Executive Jet Aviation（EJA）的巨大潜力，你需要先了解它的业务：它向客户出售喷气式飞机的“分割份额”（fractional shares），并为众多共同拥有者运营这支机队。EJA 的 CEO Rich Santulli 在 1986 年开创了分割所有权行业，他洞察到一种使用飞机的重要新方式，然后把胆识与才华结合起来，把这个点子做成了一门大生意。

In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion — say /1 8th — of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. (“Dead-head” hours don’t count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.

在分割所有权方案中，你购买 EJA 提供的多种喷气式飞机中的某一款的一部分——比如 1/8。这样你每年就获得 100 小时的飞行时间额度。（“空飞/调机”时间 dead-head 不计入你的额度，而且你还可以把小时数在五年内进行平均使用。）此外，你还要支付每月的管理费，以及按实际飞行小时数计算的使用费。

Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another at least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.

随后，只要提前几小时通知，EJA 就会在美国 5,500 个机场中任何一个你指定的机场，把你的飞机——或者至少同等级别的一架——安排给你使用。实际上，“叫飞机”就像打电话叫出租车一样。

I first heard about the NetJets® program, as it is called, about four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet Rich to investigate signing up for my family’s use. It took Rich about 15 minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000. Since then, my family has learned firsthand — through flying 900 hours on 300 trips — what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs. Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying equal amounts of cash and stock.

我第一次听说 NetJets®（这个项目的名称），大约是在四年前，当时是 H.H. Brown 的负责人 Frank Rooney 告诉我的。Frank 用过并且非常满意这项服务，于是建议我去见 Rich，看看是否要为家人签约使用。Rich 大概只花了 15 分钟，就把我“卖”下了一架 Hawker 1000 的四分之一份额（每年 200 小时）。从那以后，我家人通过亲身体验——300 次出行、累计 900 小时飞行——切实体会到 EJA 的运营有多友好、高效、安全。简单说，他们爱上了这项服务。事实上，他们的热情迅速高涨，以至于我在完全不知道我们未来可能收购这家公司之前，就已经为 EJA 拍过一支“见证式”广告。当然，我也跟 Rich 说过：如果他哪天有兴趣出售，请给我打电话。幸运的是，他去年 5 月真的给我打来了电话，我们很快达成了一笔 7.25 亿美元的交易，用现金和股票各付一半。

EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has more than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 “core” aircraft that are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich’s pilots — now numbering about 650 — receive extensive training at least twice a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I’ve sold the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as my personal flying, with NetJets’ crews.

EJA 是其行业中规模遥遥领先的运营商，拥有 1,000 多位客户和 163 架飞机（其中包括 23 架“核心”飞机——由 EJA 自己拥有或租赁——以确保即使在需求最旺的时候也能提供一流服务）。安全当然是任何飞行运营的头等大事。Rich 旗下的飞行员——目前约 650 人——每年至少两次在 FlightSafety International 接受强化训练；FlightSafety 是 Berkshire 的另一家子公司，也是全球飞行员培训的领导者。关于我们飞行员的“最终结论”是：我已经把 Berkshire 的专机卖掉了，以后无论公务还是私人飞行，我都会使用 NetJets 的机组。

Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for all concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing, Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors, in contrast, are producers of a “house” brand that they must prescribe for one and all.

成为行业领导者对各方都有重大优势。客户受益在于：我们随时在全国各地布置着一支“机队舰队”，这种覆盖让我们能够提供无可匹敌的服务。与此同时，我们也因这种覆盖而受益：它能降低空飞（dead-head）成本。对客户还有一个很强的吸引力：我们能提供 Boeing、Gulfstream、Falcon、Cessna 和 Raytheon 等多家厂商的机型；而我们的两家竞争对手由制造商持有，只能提供自家飞机。换句话说，NetJets 就像一位医生，可以根据每个病人的需要推荐最合适的药；相反，我们的竞争对手更像只生产并必须推销“自有品牌”的厂家，只能给所有人开同一种药。

In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, own fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own /1 16th of three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single plane.

在很多情况下，我们的客户——无论企业还是个人——会同时持有多种不同机型的份额，从而能用“对的飞机”执行“对的任务”。例如，一个客户可能分别持有三种不同喷气机各 1/16 的份额（每种提供 50 小时飞行时间），合计下来就像拥有了一支“虚拟机队”，而成本只相当于买一架飞机的很小一部分。

Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit from fractional ownership. Already, some of America’s largest companies use NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of dead-head hours.

值得强调的是，分割所有权受益的不只是小企业。实际上，美国一些最大的公司已经在把 NetJets 作为自有机队的补充。这样做能为它们省下大笔钱：既能更经济地满足业务高峰期的额外需求，也能承担一些航程任务——如果用全资自有飞机去飞，会导致不成比例的空飞小时数。

When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argument is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later. That’s an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled the issue: “Alice, you aren’t buying it; your heirs are.”

当一架飞机主要用于私人用途时，最有力的一条理由是：要么客户现在就签约，要么以后多半会是他的孩子来签。这个“算式”，我在 40 年前就向我那位可爱的 Alice 姨妈解释过。当时她问我，自己买不买得起一件皮草大衣。我一句话就把问题解决了：“Alice，你不是在买它；是你的继承人在买。”

EJA’s growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% of all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane — which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it’s to make economic sense — there must be a large multiple of that number for whom fractional ownership works.

EJA 的增长堪称爆炸式：1997 年，全球所有新订购的公务喷气机里，有 31% 都被它拿下。不过，Rich 和我都相信，飞机分割所有权的潜力才刚刚被触及皮毛。如果成千上万的拥有者觉得“全资买下一架飞机”是划算的——而要让它在经济上说得过去，这架飞机必须每年飞 350–400 小时——那么显然，会有一个远远更大的群体，分割所有权对他们更合适。

In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most of our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich spends his time at EJA because it’s his baby — and he wants to see how far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and figuratively: to the ends of the earth.

除了是个出色的企业家，Rich 也很有趣。像我们大多数经理人一样，他在经济上完全没有工作的必要。Rich 之所以把时间投入在 EJA，是因为那是他的“孩子”——他想看看自己能把它带到多远。我们俩其实都已经知道答案——无论字面还是比喻意义上：直到地球尽头。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spent more than nine times my salary at Borsheim’s and EJA. Just think how Berkshire’s business would boom if you’d only spring for a raise.

现在给 Berkshire 的董事们一个小暗示：去年我在 Borsheim’s 和 EJA 花的钱，是我工资的九倍还多。想想看——要是你们肯给我涨薪，Berkshire 的生意得旺成什么样。

General Re

On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition of General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124 countries.

12 月 21 日，我们完成了对 General Re Corp. 的 220 亿美元收购。除了 100% 持有 General Reinsurance Corporation（美国最大的财产与意外险再保险公司）之外，该公司还持有（包括它已达成协议将买入的股票在内）全球历史最悠久的再保险公司 Cologne Re 的 82% 股权。这两家公司合在一起，覆盖所有险种的再保险业务，并在 124 个国家运营。

For many decades, General Re’s name has stood for quality, integrity and professionalism in reinsurance — and under Ron Ferguson’s leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more. Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re’s and Cologne Re’s managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can teach us.

几十年来，General Re 这个名字在再保险行业一直代表着质量、诚信与专业；在 Ron Ferguson 的领导下，这份声誉被进一步擦亮。Berkshire 对 General Re 与 Cologne Re 的管理团队的能力“完全加不了任何东西”。相反，他们能教我们的很多。

Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire’s ownership will benefit General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re’s management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow the company to exploit its strengths.

尽管如此，我们相信 Berkshire 的所有权会在关键方面让 General Re 受益，并且我们预计：十年之后，它的盈利将显著高于在没有这次合并的情况下所能达到的水平。我们之所以乐观，是因为我们能够给予 General Re 的管理层一种经营自由：让他们以最能发挥公司优势的方式来运作。

Let’s look for a moment at the reinsurance business to understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.

我们先简单看一下再保险业务，以理解为什么 General Re 单靠自己做不到在 Berkshire 旗下能做到的事。再保险的大部分需求来自原保险公司：它们希望摆脱由于重大且异常损失而导致的盈利大幅波动。实质上，再保险公司拿到的保费，就是为了承担客户保险公司想甩掉的波动性。

Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by both its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are called “retrocessions”) or rejecting good business simply because it threatens to bring on too much volatility.

但讽刺的是，上市的再保险公司，无论在股东眼里还是在信用评估者眼里，都会被拿“自身业绩的平滑程度”来打分。盈利的大起大落会伤害信用评级与市盈率（p/e ratios），即便造成这种波动的业务从长期看仍然有望带来令人满意的利润。正是这种市场现实，有时会迫使再保险公司做出代价高昂的动作：其中包括把相当一部分已承保业务再转分出去（这类交易被称为“retrocessions”，即再转分保），或者仅仅因为担心带来过多波动而拒绝那些本来很好的业务。

Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as it carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time. Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile earnings can’t impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the perfect structure for writing — and retaining — reinsurance in virtually any amount. In fact, we’ve used this strength over the past decade to build a powerful super-cat business.

与之相反，Berkshire 乐于接受波动——只要这种波动伴随着“长期利润增加”的预期。此外，我们的资本实力堪比 Fort Knox（金库堡垒），这意味着盈利波动不可能损害我们顶级的信用评级。因此，我们拥有一种近乎完美的结构：几乎可以在任何规模上承保——并留存——再保险业务。事实上，过去十年我们就一直在运用这种优势，打造出一项强大的“超级巨灾”（super-cat）业务。

What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force, technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re’s outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by the constraints that have limited its growth.

不过，General Re 带给我们的，是渠道力量、技术能力和管理团队——它们能让我们把这种“结构性优势”运用到行业的每一个角落。尤其是，General Re 与 Cologne Re 现在可以加速进军国际市场；而行业增长的大头几乎肯定会发生在那里。正如合并委托书（proxy statement）里所阐述的，Berkshire 也会给 General Re 带来税务与投资方面的好处。但这次合并最有说服力的原因，其实很简单：General Re 那支卓越的管理团队，现在可以不再受那些限制其增长的约束，专注做他们最擅长的事。

Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re’s investment portfolio, though not for Cologne Re’s. We will not, however, be involved in General Re’s underwriting. We will simply ask the company to exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its geographical coverage — making these moves in recognition of Berkshire’s financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings. As we’ve long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.

Berkshire 将接管 General Re 的投资组合管理，但不接管 Cologne Re 的投资组合。不过，我们不会参与 General Re 的承保工作。我们只会要求公司延续过去的纪律，同时提高业务留存比例、扩展产品线、扩大地域覆盖——并且这些动作要充分考虑到 Berkshire 的财务实力以及我们对盈利大幅波动的容忍度。正如我们长期以来所说：我们宁要“起伏的 15% 回报”，也不要“平滑的 12% 回报”。

Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re’s new potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.

随着时间推移，Ron 和他的团队会把 General Re 的新潜力发挥到极致。我和 Ron 相识多年，我们两家公司都曾开展过大量业务，并彼此进行过再保险安排。事实上，General Re 在 1976 年把 GEICO 从濒死状态救回来这件事上，扮演了关键角色。

Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.

Ron 和 Rich Santulli 都计划出席年度股东大会，我希望你有机会跟他们打个招呼。

The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance

财产与意外险（Property-Casualty）保险的经济学

With the acquisition of General Re — and with GEICO’s business mushrooming — it becomes more important than ever that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

随着我们收购 General Re——以及 GEICO 的业务迅猛扩张——你比以往任何时候都更需要理解：如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素有三点：（1）这项业务能产生多少 float（浮存金）；（2）float 的成本是多少；（3）最重要的是：这两项因素的长期前景如何。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，float 是“我们持有但不拥有”的钱。在保险业务中，float 产生于这样一个事实：保费先收进来，赔付却在之后才发生；两者之间的时间间隔有时会延续很多年。在这段期间，保险公司把这笔钱拿去投资。通常，这种“愉快的活动”也带着一个阴影：保险公司收进来的保费，往往不足以覆盖它最终必须支付的赔付与费用。于是公司会出现“承保亏损”（underwriting loss），而这就是 float 的成本。保险业务之所以有价值，是因为它长期的 float 成本低于公司若通过其他方式获取资金所要付出的成本；但如果 float 的成本高于市场资金利率，这门保险生意就是个“烂柠檬”。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

这里需要提醒一句：由于损失成本必须靠估计，保险公司在计算承保结果时拥有极大的自由裁量权，这使得投资者非常难以算出一家公司的“真实 float 成本”。估计误差往往是无心的，但有时也未必；而且幅度可能非常巨大。这些误算会直接流入盈利结果。有经验的观察者通常能识别大规模的准备金计提错误，但公众往往只能接受公司呈现出来的数字；有些时候，我对那些被知名审计机构“默认背书”的数字之离谱，感到震惊。至于 Berkshire，Charlie 和我在向你呈现承保结果时会尽量保守，因为我们发现：保险业里的几乎所有“意外”，都是不愉快的意外。

The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General Re’s huge float. For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下面这张表显示了自我们 32 年前进入保险业以来，Berkshire 的保险业务所产生的 float。数据按每隔五年列示一次，并包含最后一年；最后一年包含了 General Re 那巨额的 float。为了制作这张表，我们按如下方式计算 float——相对于保费规模，我们产生的 float 非常可观：把“净赔付准备金”“理赔费用准备金”“再保险分入下的代持资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）”以及“未赚保费准备金”相加，然后再减去“代理人余额”“预付取得成本”“预付税款”以及“适用于分入再保险的递延费用”（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。（听懂了吗？）

Impressive as the growth in our float has been — 25.4% compounded annually — what really counts is the cost of this item. If that becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a blessing.

尽管我们的 float 增长令人印象深刻——年复合增长 25.4%——但真正关键的是它的成本。如果成本变得过高，float 的增长就会从祝福变成诅咒。

At Berkshire, the news is all good: Our average cost over the 32 years has been well under zero. In aggregate, we have posted a substantial underwriting profit, which means that we have been paid for holding a large and growing amount of money. This is the best of all worlds. Indeed, though our net float is recorded on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had more economic value to us than an equal amount of net worth would have had. As long as we can continue to achieve an underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.

在 Berkshire，这方面的消息全是好消息：过去 32 年里，我们的平均成本远低于零。总体而言，我们取得了可观的承保利润，这意味着：我们不仅持有了一大笔不断增长的资金，而且别人还“付钱让我们持有它”。这就是最理想的局面。事实上，尽管我们的净 float 在资产负债表上被记作负债，但它对我们的经济价值，比同等规模的净资产（net worth）还要更大。只要我们能持续取得承保利润，float 的价值就会继续高于净资产。

During the next few years, Berkshire’s growth in float may well be modest. The reinsurance market is soft, and in this business, relationships change slowly. Therefore, General Re’s float — /2 3rds of our total — is unlikely to increase significantly in the near term. We do expect, however, that our cost of float will remain very attractive compared to that of other insurers.

在接下来的几年里，Berkshire 的 float 增长很可能会比较温和。再保险市场偏“软”（soft，指费率与条款对承保人不利、竞争激烈），而且在这个行业里，客户关系变化缓慢。因此，General Re 的 float——占我们总 float 的 2/3——短期内不太可能显著增长。不过，我们确实预期：与其他保险公司相比，我们的 float 成本将继续保持非常有吸引力。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告盈利的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 62 and 63, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下面这张表展示了 Berkshire 报告盈利的主要来源。在这种呈现方式里，购买会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments）并不分摊到具体适用的业务上，而是汇总后单独列示。这样做能让你看到：如果我们当初没有“买下”这些企业，它们的盈利在报表上会是什么样子。基于第 62–63 页讨论过的原因，我们认为这种展示方式，对投资者与管理者都比采用 GAAP（一般公认会计准则）更有用；因为 GAAP 要求把收购溢价逐个业务地摊销/冲销。我们在表中展示的总盈利，当然与经审计财报中的 GAAP 总数完全一致。

You can be proud of our operating managers. They almost invariably deliver earnings that are at the very top of what conditions in their industries allow, meanwhile fortifying their businesses’ long-term competitive strengths. In aggregate, they have created many billions of dollars of value for you.

你们完全可以为我们的运营经理人感到自豪。他们几乎总能在各自行业条件允许的范围内，把盈利做到接近“天花板”，同时还在不断巩固企业的长期竞争优势。总体而言，他们已经为你们创造了数十亿美元的价值。

An example: In my 1994 letter, I reported on Ralph Schey’s extraordinary performance at Scott Fetzer. Little did I realize that he was just warming up. Last year Scott Fetzer, operating with no leverage (except for a conservative level of debt in its finance subsidiary), earned a record $96.5 million after-tax on its $112 million net worth.

举个例子：在我 1994 年的股东信里，我曾报告过 Ralph Schey 在 Scott Fetzer 的非凡表现。当时我完全没想到，他那还只是“热身”。去年，Scott Fetzer 在几乎没有杠杆的情况下经营（除了其金融子公司维持着一个相当保守水平的负债），用 1.12 亿美元的净资产，创造了创纪录的 9,650 万美元税后利润。

Today, Berkshire has an unusually large number of individuals, such as Ralph, who are truly legends in their industries. Many of these joined us when we purchased their companies, but in recent years we have also identified a number of strong managers internally. We further expanded our corps of all-stars in an important way when we acquired General Re and EJA.

如今，Berkshire 拥有数量异常多的行业传奇人物，就像 Ralph 一样。很多人是在我们收购他们的公司时加入的，但近些年我们也在内部识别并培养出了一批强将。随着我们收购 General Re 和 EJA，我们的“全明星阵容”又在关键意义上进一步扩容。

Charlie and I have the easy jobs at Berkshire: We do very little except allocate capital. And, even then, we are not all that energetic. We have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive. Therefore, Charlie and I mainly just wait for the phone to ring.

Charlie 和我在 Berkshire 的工作其实最轻松：我们做得很少，主要就是配置资本。即便如此，我们也谈不上多么勤奋。不过我们有一个“借口”：在资本配置这件事上，忙碌程度与成就并不相关。事实上，在投资与收购领域，过度亢奋的频繁动作往往适得其反。因此，Charlie 和我大多数时候就是——等电话响。

Our managers, however, work very hard — and it shows. Naturally, they want to be paid fairly for their efforts, but pay alone can’t explain their extraordinary accomplishments. Instead, each is primarily motivated by a vision of just how far his or her business can go — and by a desire to be the one who gets it there. Charlie and I thank them on your behalf and ours.

但我们的经理人非常勤奋——而且结果说明了一切。当然，他们希望自己的努力得到公平回报，但仅靠薪酬并不能解释他们的卓越成就。真正驱动他们的，是一种愿景：他们清楚自己的业务能走多远——并且强烈渴望成为那个把企业带到那里的“关键人物”。Charlie 和我代表你们，也代表我们自己，向他们致谢。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.

关于我们各项业务的更多信息，见第 39–53 页，其中也包括按 GAAP 口径披露的分部盈利。此外，在第 65–71 页，我们又用非 GAAP 口径把 Berkshire 的财务数据重新拆分为四个板块；这种呈现方式更贴近 Charlie 和我理解公司时所采用的框架。

Normally, we follow this section with one on “Look-Through” Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near yearend, though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998 number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in next year’s report.

通常我们会在这一节之后，接着写一节“Look-Through（穿透式）盈利”。但由于 General Re 的收购发生在年末，无论是用历史口径还是备考口径去计算 1998 年的数字，都显得不太相关。我们将在明年的年报里恢复对穿透式盈利的计算。

Investments

投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.

下面我们列示了我们的普通股投资。市值超过 7.5 亿美元的持仓会单独列出。

During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in American Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In particular, my decision to sell McDonald’s was a very big mistake. Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck off to the movies during market hours.

在这一年里，我们略微增持了 American Express——这是我们三大重仓之一——另外两项重仓保持不变。但我们削减或大幅削减了许多小仓位。在这里，我得坦白（唉）：我在 1998 年采取的组合操作，实际上降低了我们当年的收益。尤其是，我决定卖出 McDonald’s，是一个非常大的错误。总体而言，如果我在交易时间经常偷偷溜去看电影，你们去年反而会更好。

At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalents (including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never makes us happy. But it’s better to have the money burning a hole in Berkshire’s pocket than resting comfortably in someone else’s. Charlie and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet, a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets. Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.

在年末，我们持有超过 150 亿美元的现金等价物（包括一年内到期的高等级证券）。现金从来不会让我们开心。但让钱在 Berkshire 的口袋里“烫手”，也好过让它舒舒服服地躺在别人那里。Charlie 和我会继续寻找大型股票投资，或者更理想的是，寻找一笔真正重大的企业收购，把我们的流动资产消化掉。不过，就目前而言，我们看不到任何机会正在地平线上出现。

Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely take place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes in the process. This “clean sweep” approach reflects a basic principle that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don’t back into decisions.

当我们确定 General Re 的合并一定会发生后，我们要求该公司处置其持有的股票资产。（如前所述，我们不管理 Cologne Re 的投资组合，而其中包含大量股票。）随后，General Re 清掉了大约 250 只普通股的持仓，在此过程中产生了 9.35 亿美元的税费。这种“彻底清仓”的做法，体现了 Charlie 和我在商业与投资中遵循的一条基本原则：我们不倒推着做决策（We don’t back into decisions）。

Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosing our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment. Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we wanted our owners to know of this investment’s potential impact on Berkshire’s net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.

去年，我偏离了一贯的做法——我们通常不披露投资（除非法律要求）——而是告诉了你们我们做了三项非常规投资。这样披露背后有几个原因。第一，我们收到监管机构关于我们白银持仓的询问，使我们认为他们希望我们公开确认这项投资。第二，我们持有的零息债券规模非常大，我们希望所有者了解这项投资对 Berkshire 净资产可能带来的影响。第三，我们也只是想提醒你：我们确实会在某些时候做出非常规的重大承诺。

Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner’s Manual on page 61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions. Therefore — unless we again take a position that is particularly large — we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain others.

但通常情况下，正如 Owner’s Manual 第 61 页所讨论的，我们认为谈论具体投资动作并无优势。因此——除非我们再次建立某个特别巨大的头寸——我们将不会再向你通报任何特定“非常规”持仓的具体操作。不过，我们可以告诉你：我们已经清掉了去年讨论过的某些头寸，同时也新增了另一些。

Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard to investments may disappoint “piggybackers” but will benefit owners: Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.

我们对投资的“永不评论——即便传言不实也不回应”的政策，可能会让那些想“搭便车”的人失望，但会让所有者受益：如果我们公开讨论我们的行动，你持有的 Berkshire 股票反而会更不值钱。顺便说一句，我们也要提醒你：媒体对我们投资动作的猜测，在大多数情况下仍然是错误的。任何依赖这类评论的人，后果自负。

Accounting — Part 1

会计——第一部分

Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious flaw in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the pro-forma statement of income — which detailed how the combined 1997 earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger — there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been increased by $63 million.

我们对 General Re 的收购，把会计程序中的一个严重缺陷照得清清楚楚。眼尖的股东在阅读我们的合并委托书（proxy statement）时，可能已经注意到第 60 页上一项不寻常的内容：在备考（pro-forma）损益表中——该表说明若两家公司合并，其合并后的 1997 年盈利会如何变化——有一项写着“薪酬费用将增加 6,300 万美元”。

This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie or I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in General Re’s accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are replacing General Re’s longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers was General Re’s stock price; now their payoff will come from the business performance they deliver.

我们赶紧说明：这并不意味着 Charlie 或我发生了什么人格大转变。（他仍然坐经济舱出行，仍然引用 Ben Franklin。）这也不代表 General Re 的会计做法有什么问题——他们一直严格遵循 GAAP。相反，这项备考调整之所以出现，是因为我们将用一项现金激励计划替换 General Re 长期以来的股票期权计划；新的现金计划会把 General Re 管理层的激励薪酬直接与其经营业绩挂钩。过去，这些经理人“在意”的是 General Re 的股价；现在，他们的回报将来自他们所交付的业务表现。

The new plan and the terminated option arrangement have matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years remain outstanding.)

新的计划与被终止的期权安排，在经济结果上是对等的——也就是说，在同样的业绩水平下，它们给员工带来的奖励应该是相同的。只是，以前员工对“未来新发放期权”可能获得的收益预期，现在会改为现金支付。（以往年度授予的期权仍然有效、仍在存续。）

Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan we are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that the use of options has mushroomed. This lop-sided choice has a big downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured, can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholders.

尽管两套方案在经济上等价，但我们正在推行的现金计划，会产生截然不同、甚至天壤之别的会计结果。这种“爱丽丝梦游仙境”式的结果，源于现行会计准则在计算盈利时忽略了股票期权的成本——尽管在许多公司里，期权已经是巨大且不断增长的一项费用。换句话说，会计准则给管理层提供了一个选择：用一种形式支付员工并把成本计入费用；或用另一种形式支付员工并把成本当作不存在。难怪期权使用会迅速膨胀。不过，这种明显偏向一边的选择，对所有者有很大坏处：期权如果设计得当，确实可以成为补偿与激励顶级管理者的一种合适、甚至理想的方式；但更多时候，期权在奖励分配上极其任性，激励效率低下，而且对股东而言成本高得离谱。

Whatever the merits of options may be, their accounting treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, at-the-market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged this cost on its books?

不管期权本身有什么优点，它的会计处理方式都是荒唐的。想一想我们今年准备在 GEICO 的广告上花 1.90 亿美元。假设我们不是用现金买广告，而是用“十年期、平价（at-the-market）的 Berkshire 期权”支付给媒体。那还有人会说 Berkshire 没有为广告付出成本吗？或者说，这项成本不该在账上计入费用吗？

Perhaps Bishop Berkeley — you may remember him as the philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was around — would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an option-issuing company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.

也许 Bishop Berkeley——你可能记得他是那位思考“森林里树倒下时如果没人在场，是否真的发生了声音”的哲学家——会相信：会计师没看见的费用就不存在。但 Charlie 和我对“被隐身的成本”很难保持哲学式的淡定。我们考虑投资一家会大量发行期权的公司时，会对其报表盈利做一个合理的向下调整：我们直接减掉一笔金额，等于公司若把同等数量、同等结构的期权拿到公开市场出售，本可以获得的收入。同样地，如果我们在评估一项收购，我们会把“替换目标公司期权计划的成本”计入评估；一旦交易达成，我们就会立刻把这项成本从“隐藏处”拉出来摊在阳光下。

Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time be mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee options are sometimes forfeited — that lessens the damage done to shareholders — whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit. But there’s an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly than the public variety.

读到这里，如果你不同意我对期权的看法，你脑子里大概已经在反驳：我把“给员工发的期权成本”等同于“理论上可以公开出售并交易的期权成本”，这不合理。确实，有人会指出：员工期权有时会被没收（forfeited）——这会减轻股东受的伤害——而公开发行的期权不会被没收。也确实，公司在员工期权被行权时可以获得税前扣除；公开交易的期权没有这种好处。但这些点也有对冲：给员工的期权经常会被重新定价（repriced），这种“改造”会让它们比公开市场的期权贵得多。

It’s sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to an employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of the nontransferable option: Giving an employee a company car that can only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee, but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.

还有人会说：给员工的期权不可转让，因此对员工而言，它的价值低于可以自由出售的公开交易期权。但这一事实并不会降低“不可转让期权”的成本：给员工一辆只能用于特定用途的公司车，会降低它对员工的价值，但丝毫不会降低雇主为此付出的成本。

The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options in recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%, with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock purchase we might otherwise have made.

近些年，Charlie 和我在处理期权时做的盈利修正，经常会把报表披露的每股数字砍掉 5%；砍掉 10% 也并不罕见。有时候，向下调整的幅度大到足以影响我们的组合决策，导致我们要么卖出某只股票，要么放弃原本可能会买入的标的。

A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages to which we have not yet received an answer: “If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?”

几年前我们在这里提出过三个问题，但至今还没得到答案：“如果期权不是一种薪酬，那它是什么？如果薪酬不是一项费用，那费用是什么？如果费用不应该计入盈利计算，那它到底应该被计入到哪里？”

Accounting — Part 2

会计——第二部分

The role that managements have played in stock-option accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB’s attempts to replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight, pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.

管理层在股票期权会计问题上扮演的角色，几乎谈不上“良性”：近些年来，令人沮丧的是，不少 CEO 与审计师都激烈反对 FASB 试图用真实取代期权会计“虚构”的努力，而几乎没有人站出来公开支持 FASB。反对者甚至把 Congress 拉进战局，声称夸大的数字符合国家利益。

Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been even worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here, many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington: “The scandal isn’t in what’s done that’s illegal but rather in what’s legal.”

不过我认为，管理层在“重组会计”和“并购会计”上的表现更糟。在这些领域，许多管理层是有意去操纵数字、欺骗投资者。而正如 Michael Kinsley 谈到 Washington 时说的那样：“丑闻不在于那些违法的事，而在于那些合法的事。”

It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accounting from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what one charlatan dubbed “bold, imaginative accounting” (the practice of which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America’s most-admired companies then shunned deception.

过去，要分辨会计里的好人和坏人相对容易：例如 1960 年代末，就出现过一场“放纵的盛宴”，某个江湖骗子把它称作“大胆而富有想象力的会计”（顺带一提，他因此一度被 Wall Street 喜爱，因为他从不让市场预期落空）。但当时的大多数投资者都知道谁在玩花招。而且值得称道的是，那时几乎所有美国最受尊敬的公司都回避欺骗。

In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise high-grade managers — CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your children or as trustees under your will — have come to the view that it’s okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street’s desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty.

近些年来，正直正在被侵蚀。许多大型公司仍然规规矩矩，但数量可观且仍在增加的一批原本高水准的管理者——那些你愿意让他们做你孩子配偶、或在遗嘱里指定为受托人的 CEO——开始认为：为了满足他们所理解的 Wall Street 欲望，操纵盈利是可以接受的。事实上，很多 CEO 觉得这种操纵不仅“可以”，甚至是他们的职责。

These managers start with the assumption, all too common, that their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don’t produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired “earnings” or set the stage for them in the future.

这些管理者往往从一个（过于普遍的）假设出发：他们的工作在任何时候都是尽可能把股价推到最高（我们对此前提坚决反对）。为了抬高股价，他们会令人钦佩地追求运营卓越。但当经营并未带来他们希望的结果时，这些 CEO 就会诉诸不那么体面的会计伎俩——要么“制造”出想要的“盈利”，要么为未来制造这种盈利铺路。

Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that their shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals — that is, their stock — is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what everybody else does. Once such an everybody’s-doing-it attitude takes hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad accounting drives out good.

为这种行为辩护时，这些管理者常说：如果他们用于做交易的“货币”——也就是股票——没有被充分定价，股东就会受伤；他们还会辩称，自己用会计花招去搞到想要的数字，不过是在做“人人都在做的事”。一旦“大家都这么干”的心态形成，道德顾虑就会消失。你可以把这种行为称作“格雷欣定律之子”（Son of Gresham）：坏会计把好会计挤出去。

The distortion du jour is the “restructuring charge,” an accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share.

当下最流行的扭曲手法，是“重组费用”（restructuring charge）。这种会计分录当然可能是正当的，但太多时候它只是操纵盈利的工具。在这种魔术般的手法里，本该分摊到多年期间的很大一块成本，被一次性扔进某一个季度——通常是那个本来就注定要让投资者失望的季度。有些情况下，这笔费用的目的是清理过去对盈利的虚假陈述；另一些情况下，则是为未来的虚假陈述“打地基”。无论是哪一种，这些费用的金额与时点，都遵循一个冷酷的命题：Wall Street 不介意某个季度每股盈利少 5 美元，只要这能确保未来的季度盈利总能稳定地比预期高出每股 5 美分。

This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behavior suggests a corresponding “bold, imaginative” approach to — golf scores. In his first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers — double, triple, quadruple bogeys — and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having established this “reserve,” he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro that he wishes to “restructure” his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds, then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94, 92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 — which, after all, came from a “discontinued” swing — and will classify our hero as an 80 shooter (and one who never disappoints).

这种“把所有东西都倒进一个季度”的做法，让人联想到一种相对应的“大胆、富有想象力”的——高尔夫记分方式。一个球手在赛季第一轮时，应该无视自己的真实表现，干脆在记分卡上填满极其糟糕的数字——双柏忌、三柏忌、四柏忌——然后交出一个比如 140 杆的成绩。建立了这个“储备”之后，他就去球具店告诉教练，说自己想要“重组”一下并不完美的挥杆动作。接下来，当他用新挥杆上场时，他只记录打得好的洞，不记录打得差的洞。那些来自旧挥杆的残余“坏洞”，则统统记到之前建立的储备里。这样打完五轮后，他的记录就会是 140、80、80、80、80，而不是真实的 91、94、89、94、92。在 Wall Street，他们会忽略那张 140——毕竟那来自一个“已终止”的挥杆——并把我们的英雄归类为“能打 80 杆的人”（而且还是从不让人失望的那种）。

For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a variant of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier scorekeeping sins with this “big bath,” he may mumble a few apologies but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add, will have acquired a loyal patron.)

对于那些更喜欢“一开始就作弊”的人，还有一个策略变体。球手独自上场，带着一个配合默契的球童-审计师（caddy-auditor），应该把打得差的洞先不记账，先交出四张 80 杆的成绩单，享受大家对他这种运动天赋与稳定性的喝彩，然后再交出第五张写着 140 杆的记分卡。用这次“巨额洗澡”（big bath）纠正自己早先记分上的罪过之后，他也许会含糊地道歉几句，但绝不会把过去因为在会所里比记分卡而赢来的那些钱退回去。（至于球童嘛，我们就不用说了——他会因此得到一个忠实的金主。）

Unfortunately, CEOs who use variations of these scoring schemes in real life tend to become addicted to the games they’re playing — after all, it’s easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the practice tee — and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior brings to mind Voltaire’s comment on sexual experimentation: “Once a philosopher, twice a pervert.”

不幸的是，在现实中使用这类记分法变体的 CEO，往往会对这种游戏上瘾——毕竟，摆弄记分卡比在练习场一站就是几个小时要容易得多——而且再也鼓不起勇气戒掉。他们的行为让人想起 Voltaire 对性实验的评论：“一次是哲学家，两次就是变态。”

In the acquisition arena, restructuring has been raised to an art form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies that lead to increased future “earnings.”

在并购领域，“重组”已经被玩成了一门艺术：如今管理层经常利用并购，以不诚实的方式重新排列资产与负债的价值，从而让他们未来的盈利既能被“抹平”，又能被“吹大”。事实上，在交易时点，大型审计师事务所有时还会主动指出一些“小会计魔术”（甚至“大魔术”）的可能性。在这种“讲台上的推动”之下，一流的人也常常会屈身使用三流的手段。CEO 当然不容易拒绝那些“审计师背书”的策略——这些策略会带来未来“盈利”的增长。

An example from the property-casualty insurance industry will illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of reserves — though it is uncanny how often an actuarial “revelation” of this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets up the possibility of ‘earnings” flowing into income at some later date, as reserves are released.

财产与意外险（property-casualty）行业的一个例子，可以说明这里面能玩出什么花样。当一家 p-c 保险公司被收购时，收购方有时会在同一时间提高其赔付准备金（loss reserves），而且往往幅度不小。这种上调也许只是反映此前准备金不足——只不过很神奇的是，这类精算上的“顿悟”常常恰好发生在交易签字的同时。无论如何，这一动作都会为将来某个时点“释放准备金”时，把“盈利”流入利润表创造条件。

Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are to disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at least one of those virtues must have been lacking — or, alternatively, that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of “earnings.”

Berkshire 一直完全避开这些做法：如果我们要让你失望，我们宁愿是“盈利”让你失望，而不是“会计”让你失望。在我们所有的收购中，我们都把赔付准备金数字原封不动地保留为收购时看到的样子。毕竟，我们始终是与那些既懂保险业务、又在财务披露上诚实的管理者合作。当出现那种交易——负债在一开始就被立即且大幅提高——简单逻辑告诉你：上述两种美德至少有一种是缺失的；或者，另一种可能是：收购方正在为未来注入“盈利”打地基。

Here’s a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view in corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man who’d made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly merger discussion (which in the end didn’t produce a deal). The veteran acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination, only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: “But won’t that mean a huge charge,” he asked, “perhaps as much as $1 billion?” The “sophisticate” wasted no words: “We’ll make it bigger than that — that’s why we’re doing the deal.”

这里有一个真实故事，能说明这在美国企业界是一种多么普遍的想法。前不久，两家大型银行的 CEO 进行了一次友好的合并讨论（最终没有成交）。其中一位是经验丰富的收购老手，做过很多并购，他正在阐述这次合并可能带来的各种好处；另一位 CEO 带着怀疑打断了他：“但那不会意味着要计提一笔巨额费用吗？”他问道，“可能高达 10 亿美元？”这位“老练人士”一句废话都没有：“我们会把它做得比那还大——这就是我们要做这笔交易的原因。”

A preliminary tally by R. G. Associates, of Baltimore, of special charges taken or announced during 1998 — that is, charges for restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs — identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997 earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune’s famous list totaled $324 billion.

巴尔的摩的 R. G. Associates 对 1998 年已计提或已宣布的各类“特殊费用”做了一项初步统计——包括重组费用、在研研发（in-process R&D）、并购相关项目以及资产减值（write-downs）——结果发现这类项目不少于 1,369 笔，总额高达 721 亿美元。这个数字之惊人，从一个对比就能看出来：Fortune 著名榜单中 500 家公司的 1997 年总盈利为 3,240 亿美元。

Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their pay. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.”)

显然，如今不少高管对“准确披露”抱有的轻蔑态度，是商业上的耻辱。而审计师方面，正如我们已经暗示的，也几乎没做什么积极的事情。审计师本应把投资公众视为自己的客户，但他们往往反而对选择他们、给他们发工资的管理层卑躬屈膝。（“吃谁的面包，就唱谁的歌。”）

A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman, Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to “earnings management.” He correctly observed, “Too many corporate managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks.” And then he laid on a real indictment: “Managing may be giving way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion.”

不过，一条重大消息是：由主席 Arthur Levitt 领导的 SEC，似乎决心促使美国企业界改正这种行为。Levitt 在去年 9 月的一次里程碑式演讲中呼吁终结“盈余管理”（earnings management）。他准确指出：“太多企业经理人、审计师与分析师，都在参与一场点头会意的游戏。”随后他给出了严厉的指控：“管理可能正在让位于操纵；诚信可能正在输给幻象。”

I urge you to read the Chairman’s speech (you can find it on the Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt’s job will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for him to take on.

我建议你去读一读主席的这篇演讲（你可以在网上 www.sec.gov

找到），并支持他推动美国企业界向所有者讲真话的努力。Levitt 的工作将会是 Herculean（赫拉克勒斯式的艰巨任务），但很难想出还有哪件事比这更值得他去承担。

Reports to Shareholders

致股东报告

Berkshire’s Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, has become a prime source for information about the company. While we continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.

Berkshire 的网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com已成为获取公司信息的主要来源。我们仍会向所有股东寄送年报，但季报现在只寄给提出申请的人，其他股东可以在我们的网站上阅读。在这份年报中，我们再次随信附上一张回执卡，想在 1999 年继续收到纸质季报的股东可以寄回这张卡。

Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting: 1) We want to give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed; and 2) We want to make Berkshire’s information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.

Charlie 和我在信息披露上有两个简单目标：1）我们希望给你们提供的信息，是在角色互换时我们也希望你们提供给我们的信息；2）我们希望让所有股东能够在同一时间获得 Berkshire 的信息。互联网极大地帮助了我们实现第二个目标。

In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levitt deplored what he called “selective disclosure.” His remarks were timely: Today, many companies matter-of-factly favor Wall Street analysts and institutional investors in a variety of ways that often skirt or cross the line of unfairness. These practices leave the great bulk of shareholders at a distinct disadvantage to a favored class.

在他 9 月演讲的另一部分里，Arthur Levitt 谴责了他称之为“选择性披露”（selective disclosure）的行为。他的观点非常及时：今天，很多公司会理所当然地在各种方面偏袒 Wall Street 的分析师与机构投资者，而这些做法经常游走在不公平的边缘，甚至直接越线。这些做法让绝大多数普通股东在信息上处于明显劣势，相对于那群“被偏爱的人”。

At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as the equal of our large institutional investors. We, of course, warmly welcome institutions as owners and have gained a number of them through the General Re merger. We hope also that these new holders find that our owner’s manual and annual reports offer them more insights and information about Berkshire than they garner about other companies from the investor relations departments that these corporations typically maintain. But if it is “earnings guidance” or the like that shareholders or analysts seek, we will simply guide them to our public documents.

在 Berkshire，我们把只持有一股 B 类股的股东，视为与大型机构投资者完全平等。我们当然也热烈欢迎机构成为我们的所有者，通过 General Re 的合并，我们也新增了一批机构股东。我们也希望这些新股东会发现：我们的 owner’s manual 与年报，相比其他公司常设的投资者关系部门所提供的内容，能给他们更多洞见与信息。但如果股东或分析师想要的是“盈利指引”（earnings guidance）之类的东西，我们只会把他们引导回我们的公开文件。

This year we plan to post our quarterly reports on the Internet after the close of the market on May 14, August 13, and November 12. We also expect to put the 1999 annual report on our website on Saturday, March 11, 2000, and to mail the print version at roughly the same time.

今年我们计划在以下日期的收盘后，把季度报告发布到互联网上：5 月 14 日、8 月 13 日和 11 月 12 日。我们也预计会在 2000 年 3 月 11 日（周六）把 1999 年年报发布到网站上，并在差不多同一时间邮寄纸质版本。

We promptly post press releases on our website. This means that you do not need to rely on the versions of these reported by the media but can instead read the full text on your computer.

我们会在网站上及时发布新闻稿。这意味着你不必依赖媒体转述的版本，而可以直接在电脑上读到全文。

Despite the pathetic technical skills of your Chairman, I’m delighted to report that GEICO, Borsheim’s, See’s, and The Buffalo News are now doing substantial business via the Internet. We’ve also recently begun to offer annuity products on our website. This business was developed by Ajit Jain, who over the last decade has personally accounted for a significant portion of Berkshire’s operating earnings. While Charlie and I sleep, Ajit keeps thinking of new ways to add value to Berkshire.

尽管你们的董事长技术水平十分可怜，我还是很高兴地报告：GEICO、Borsheim’s、See’s 和 The Buffalo News 现在都通过互联网做出了可观的生意。我们最近也开始在网站上提供年金（annuity）产品。这个业务由 Ajit Jain 开发；在过去十年里，他个人贡献了 Berkshire 运营盈利中相当重要的一部分。当 Charlie 和我睡觉的时候，Ajit 还在不断思考新的办法，为 Berkshire 增加价值。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠

About 97.5% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1998 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 54-55.

在 1998 年的 Berkshire “股东指定捐赠”项目中，约 97.5% 的合资格股份参与其中，总捐赠额为 1,690 万美元。该项目的完整说明见第 54–55 页。

Cumulatively, over the 18 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $130 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $12.5 million in 1998, including in-kind donations of $2.0 million.

在该项目实施的 18 年里，Berkshire 按照股东指示累计捐赠了 1.30 亿美元。Berkshire 其余的慈善捐赠由各子公司自行完成；它们基本沿用被收购前就已形成的慈善捐赠模式（唯一的变化是：原先由子公司承担的“前任所有者个人慈善”，现在由前任所有者自己承担）。总体而言，我们的子公司在 1998 年捐赠了 1,250 万美元，其中包括 200 万美元的实物捐赠（in-kind donations）。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1999, will be ineligible for the 1999 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

若要参与未来的项目，你必须持有以“实际所有人”名义登记的 A 类股，而不是以经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持名义（nominee name）登记。若截至 1999 年 8 月 31 日仍未按此方式登记，则将不具备参加 1999 年项目的资格。当你收到我们的捐赠指定表格后，请尽快寄回，避免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定将不予受理。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

This year’s Woodstock for Capitalists will be held May 1-3, and we may face a problem. Last year more than 10,000 people attended our annual meeting, and our shareholders list has since doubled. So we don’t quite know what attendance to expect this year. To be safe, we have booked both Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 14,000 and the Holiday Convention Centre, which can seat an additional 5,000. Because we know that our Omaha shareholders will want to be good hosts to the out-of-towners (many of them come from outside the U.S), we plan to give those visitors first crack at the Aksarben tickets and to subsequently allocate these to greater Omaha residents on a first-come, first-served basis. If we exhaust the Aksarben tickets, we will begin distributing Holiday tickets to Omaha shareholders.

今年的“资本家的伍德斯托克”（Woodstock for Capitalists）将于 5 月 1–3 日举行，而我们可能会遇到一个问题：去年有超过 10,000 人参加了年会，而我们的股东名单此后翻了一倍。因此，我们不太确定今年会来多少人。为谨慎起见，我们同时预订了 Aksarben Coliseum（可容纳约 14,000 人）以及 Holiday Convention Centre（可额外容纳 5,000 人）。因为我们知道 Omaha 的股东会希望热情接待外地来宾（其中不少来自美国以外），我们计划让这些访客优先获得 Aksarben 的入场券，然后再按“先到先得”的原则向大 Omaha 地区居民分配。如果 Aksarben 的票发完了，我们将开始向 Omaha 股东发放 Holiday 的票。

If we end up using both locations, Charlie and I will split our pre-meeting time between the two. Additionally, we will have exhibits and also the Berkshire movie, large television screens and microphones at both sites. When we break for lunch, many attendees will leave Aksarben, which means that those at Holiday can, if they wish, make the five-minute trip to Aksarben and finish out the day there. Buses will be available to transport people who don’t have cars.

如果我们最终需要同时使用两个场地，Charlie 和我会把会前时间分配到两边。此外，两处都会有展览、Berkshire 电影、大屏幕电视与麦克风。午餐休息时，很多与会者会离开 Aksarben，这意味着 Holiday 那边的股东如果愿意，可以在五分钟内赶到 Aksarben，并在那里把下午的议程听完。我们会安排巴士，接送没有车的人。

The doors will open at both locations at 7 a.m. on Monday, and at 8:30 we will premier the 1999 Berkshire movie epic, produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last from 9:30 until 3:30, interrupted only by the short lunch break.

两个场地都会在周一早上 7 点开门；8:30 将首映 1999 年 Berkshire 的“电影史诗”，由我们的 CFO Marc Hamburg 制作。会议将从 9:30 持续到 3:30，中间只会被短暂的午餐休息打断。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the badge you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, these will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

随本报告附上的委托书材料里，有一份附件说明你如何获取参加年会及其他活动所需的入场证（badge）。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。按照惯例，我们会安排巴士从较大的酒店开往会场。会议结束后，巴士将返回酒店，并会前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim’s 以及机场。即便如此，你大概率还是会觉得有辆车更方便。

The full line of Berkshire products will be available at Aksarben, and the more popular items will also be at Holiday. Last year we set sales records across-the-board, moving 3,700 pounds of See’s candy, 1,635 pairs of Dexter shoes, 1,150 sets of Quikut knives and 3,104 Berkshire shirts and hats. Additionally, $26,944 of World Book products were purchased as well as more than 2,000 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo. Charlie and I are pleased but not satisfied with these numbers and confidently predict new records in all categories this year. Our 1999 apparel line will be unveiled at the meeting, so please defer your designer purchases until you view our collection.

Aksarben 会提供全线 Berkshire 产品，Holiday 也会有热销品。去年我们各类商品销售全面刷新纪录：See’s 糖果卖出 3,700 磅，Dexter 鞋卖出 1,635 双，Quikut 刀具卖出 1,150 套，Berkshire 衬衫与帽子卖出 3,104 件。此外，World Book 产品销售额为 26,944 美元，印有 Berkshire Hathaway 标识的高尔夫球也卖出 2,000 多个。Charlie 和我对这些数字既高兴又“不满足”，并且非常自信地预测：今年所有品类都会再创新纪录。我们的 1999 年服装系列会在年会上发布，所以请你先别买设计师品牌，等看完我们的“系列”再说。

Dairy Queen will also be on hand and will again donate all proceeds to the Children’s Miracle Network. Last year we sold about 4,000 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be manned by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In almost all cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount. Check out whether we can save you some money.

Dairy Queen 也会到场，并再次把全部收入捐给 Children’s Miracle Network。去年我们卖出了大约 4,000 根 Dilly® 冰淇淋棒、软糖棒和香草/橙子棒。另外，GEICO 会设一个展位，由来自全国各地的一批顶级电话顾问值守，随时为你提供车险报价。在几乎所有情况下，GEICO 都能给你提供股东专属折扣。来查一查，看看我们能不能帮你省点钱。

The piece de resistance of our one-company trade show will be a 79-foot-long, nearly 12-foot-wide, fully-outfitted cabin of a 737 Boeing Business Jet (“BBJ”), which is NetJets’ newest product. This plane has a 14-hour range; is designed to carry 19 passengers; and offers a bedroom, an office, and two showers. Deliveries to fractional owners will begin in the first quarter of 2000.

我们这场“单一公司贸易展”的压轴展品，将是一段长 79 英尺、宽近 12 英尺、设备齐全的 737 Boeing Business Jet（“BBJ”）客舱——这是 NetJets 的最新产品。这架飞机的航程可达 14 小时；设计载客 19 人；并配备卧室、办公室以及两个淋浴间。面向分割所有权客户的交付将于 2000 年第一季度开始。

The BBJ will be available for your inspection on May 1-3 near the entrance to the Aksarben hall. You should be able to minimize your wait by making your visit on Saturday or Sunday. Bring along your checkbook in case you decide to make an impulse purchase.

BBJ 客舱将在 5 月 1–3 日期间，陈列在 Aksarben 会场入口附近，供你参观。你若选择周六或周日去看，等待时间应该会更短。带上支票本，以防你一时冲动就想买。

NFM's multi-stored complex, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation did $300 million in business during 1998 and offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can’t-be-beat prices. During the April 30th to May 4th period, shareholders presenting their meeting badge will receive a discount that is customarily given only to its employees.

NFM 的多层综合卖场位于一块 75 英亩的地块上，距离 Aksarben 约一英里；平日营业时间为上午 10 点到晚上 9 点，周六与周日为上午 10 点到下午 6 点。该业务在 1998 年实现了 3 亿美元的营业额，商品种类无与伦比——家具、电子产品、家电、地毯和电脑——价格都是“无可匹敌”的低。4 月 30 日至 5 月 4 日期间，出示年会入场证的股东将获得通常只提供给员工的折扣。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 2nd. On annual meeting weekend last year, the store did an incredible amount of business. Sales were double those of the previous year, and the store’s volume on Sunday greatly exceeded volume for any day in Borsheim’s history. Charlie attributes this record to the fact that he autographed sales tickets that day and, while I have my doubts about this proposition, we are not about to mess with a winning formula. Please give him writer’s cramp. On last year’s Sunday, Borsheim’s wrote 2,501 tickets during the eight hours it was open. For those of you who are mathematically challenged, that is one ticket every 11½ seconds.

Borsheim’s 通常周日不营业，但会在 5 月 2 日为股东开放，时间是上午 10 点到下午 6 点。去年年会周末，这家店的生意好得惊人：销售额是前一年的两倍，而且周日的销量远超 Borsheim’s 历史上任何一天。Charlie 把这个纪录归功于当天他在销售小票上签名；虽然我对这个说法存疑，但我们可不打算去破坏一套正在赢的配方。请你们尽量把他签到手抽筋。去年那个周日，Borsheim’s 在 8 小时营业期间开出了 2,501 张小票。对数学不太灵光的人来说，这相当于每 11.5 秒就打一张单。

Shareholders who wish to avoid Sunday’s crowd can visit Borsheim’s on Saturday (10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.). Be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim’s CEO, can quote you a ”shareholder-weekend” price. Susan joined us in 1983 as a $4-per-hour salesperson and was made CEO in 1994. This move ranks as one of my best managerial decisions.

想避开周日人潮的股东，可以在周六（10:00–17:30）或周一（10:00–20:00）去 Borsheim’s。务必表明你是 Berkshire 的所有者，这样 Borsheim’s 的 CEO Susan Jacques 才能给你报一个“股东周末价”。Susan 在 1983 年加入我们时只是一个时薪 4 美元的销售员，1994 年被任命为 CEO。这个任命可以算作我做过的最好的管理决策之一。

Bridge players can look forward to a thrill on Sunday, when Bob Hamman — the best the game has ever seen — will turn up to play with our shareholders in the mall outside of Borsheim’s. Bob plays without sorting his cards — hey, maybe that’s what’s wrong with my game. We will also have a couple of other tables at which another expert or two will be playing.

桥牌爱好者周日可以期待一次刺激体验：Bob Hamman——这项游戏有史以来最强的高手——会来到 Borsheim’s 外面的商场，与我们的股东一起打牌。Bob 打牌时从不把牌分类整理——嘿，也许这就是我打得差的原因。我们还会另外摆上几桌，让一两位其他高手也加入对局。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open especially for Berkshire shareholders on the Sunday night before the meeting. Though Gorat’s served from 4 p.m. until about 1 a.m. last year, its crew was swamped, and some of our shareholders had an uncomfortable wait. This year fewer reservations will be accepted, and we ask that you don’t come on Sunday without a reservation. In other years, many of our shareholders have chosen to visit Gorat’s on Friday, Saturday or Monday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1 (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. The cognoscenti will continue to order rare T-bones with double orders of hash browns.

Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将在股东大会前一个周日晚上再次专门为 Berkshire 股东开放。虽然去年 Gorat’s 从下午 4 点一直营业到凌晨 1 点左右，但服务团队忙到“爆表”，不少股东等待得很不舒服。今年接受的预约会更少，我们也请你不要在没有预约的情况下周日跑去。往年很多股东会选择在周五、周六或周一去 Gorat’s。你可以从 4 月 1 日开始（不要更早）拨打 402-551-3733 预约。懂行的人还是会继续点“全生 T 骨牛排 + 双份薯丝饼（hash browns）”。

The Omaha Golden Spikes (neé the Omaha Royals) will meet the Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my “flutterball.” It’s a real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.

Omaha Golden Spikes（前身是 Omaha Royals）将在 5 月 1 日（周六）晚上于 Rosenblatt Stadium 对阵 Iowa Cubs。你们的董事长——去年一记“变速/曲球”让全场沸腾——今年会再次登板投球。今年我计划推出我的“飘飘球”（flutterball）。很多人把我们的年会当成金融活动，而不是我认为的体育经典——这事真让我恼火。等全世界见识了我的飘飘球，这种误解就会被彻底消除。

Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000 shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us. Come and meet your fellow capitalists.

我们的委托书（proxy statement）里包含了如何获得比赛门票的说明，以及大量其他信息，帮助你更好地享受这次行程。我尤其鼓励通过 Gen Re 合并新加入的 60,000 名股东来参加。来吧，来见见你的资本家同伴们。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It wouldn’t be right to close without a word about the 11.8 people who work with me in Berkshire’s corporate office. In addition to handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate hundreds of inquiries. Here’s a sample of what went on in 1998:

如果在结尾不提一句在 Berkshire 总部办公室和我一起工作的 11.8 个人，那就不太合适了。除了处理我们拥有数十家企业所带来的繁杂税务、监管与行政事务之外，这个小团队还高效、愉快地推进各种专项工作，其中一些项目会引来数以百计的咨询。下面是 1998 年发生事项的一个样本：

6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive contributions.

6,106 名股东指定了 3,880 家慈善机构来接受捐赠。

Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200 baseball tickets. * Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.

Kelly Muchemore 处理了大约 17,500 张年会入场证，同时还处理了 3,200 张棒球赛门票的订单与支票。* Kelly 和 Marc Hamburg 策划并导演了 Aksarben 的盛大活动，这项工作要求他们安排各子公司的展示、制作我们的电影，并且有时还要帮大家解决旅行与住宿问题。

Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting, and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of my job. * Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This year the number will be 325,000.)

Debbie Bosanek 满足了 46 家媒体机构（其中 13 家来自美国以外）对年会报道的各种需求；与此同时，她也一如既往地在我工作的方方面面给予我高水平的协助。* Debbie 和 Marc 汇总了年报数据，并监督制作与分发 165,000 份年报。（今年这个数字会是 325,000。）

Marc handled 95% of the details — and much of the substance — connected with our completing two major mergers. * Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands of requests for annual reports and financial information that came through the office.

Marc 处理了两项重大合并交易相关的 95% 细节——以及相当一部分实质内容。* Kelly、Debbie 和 Deb Ray 高效应对了来自办公室的数以万计的年报与财务信息请求。

You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are getting what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my thanks.

你和我只为 11.8 个人付钱，但我们得到的产出，在大多数地方至少要 100 个人才能做到。对这 11.8 位，我致以感谢。

March 1, 1999

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1999-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Taxes

GEICO (1-800-847-7536)

Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)

General Re

The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance

Sources of Reported Earnings

Investments

Accounting — Part 1

Accounting — Part 2

Reports to Shareholders

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

The Annual Meeting

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