A Managerial Story You Will Never Read Elsewhere
一个你在别处永远读不到的管理故事
Berkshire’s collection of managers is unusual in several important ways. As one example, a very high percentage of these men and women are independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the businesses that they run. They work neither because they need the money nor because they are contractually obligated to — we have no contracts at Berkshire. Rather, they work long and hard because they love their businesses. And I use the word “their” advisedly, since these managers are truly in charge — there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures. We simply ask our managers to run their companies as if these are the sole asset of their families and will remain so for the next century.
Berkshire 的管理者群体在几个重要方面都非常与众不同。举例来说,其中有相当高比例的男女管理者本身就已独立富有——他们在自己经营的业务中赚到了大钱。他们工作既不是因为需要钱,也不是因为合同要求——Berkshire 没有雇佣合同。相反,他们之所以长期、高强度地工作,是因为他们热爱自己的生意。我刻意用了“他们的”这个词,因为这些管理者确实是真正在当家作主——奥马哈没有“汇报展示”(show-and-tell)的演示,没有需要总部批准的预算,也没有针对资本开支的命令条文。我们只是要求管理者以一种方式经营公司:把它当作家族唯一的资产,并且在未来一百年里都将如此。
Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshire’s shareholders, treating both groups as we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. Though “working” means nothing to me financially, I love doing it at Berkshire for some simple reasons: It gives me a sense of achievement, a freedom to act as I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I like and trust. Why should our managers — accomplished artists at what they do — see things differently?
Charlie 和我努力以对待 Berkshire 股东的方式来对待我们的管理者:如果角色互换,我们希望被怎样对待,就怎样对待他们。尽管“工作”在财务上对我毫无意义,但我仍然喜欢在 Berkshire 工作,原因很简单:它让我有成就感;让我拥有按自己认为合适的方式行事的自由;并让我每天都有机会与我喜欢且信任的人共事。我们的管理者——在各自领域成就卓著的“艺术家”——为什么会有不同的想法呢?
In their relations with Berkshire, our managers often appear to be hewing to President Kennedy’s charge, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” Here’s a remarkable story from last year: It’s about R. C. Willey, Utah’s dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this reason R. C. Willey’s stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles -- and while doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954, when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.
在与 Berkshire 的关系中,我们的管理者常常表现得像是在践行肯尼迪总统那句号召:“不要问你的国家能为你做什么;要问你能为你的国家做什么。”去年有个非同寻常的故事:它关于 R. C. Willey——犹他州占主导地位的家居陈设零售商,我们在 1995 年从 Bill Child 及其家族手中买下了它。Bill 和他的多数管理者都是 Mormon(摩门教徒),因此 R. C. Willey 的门店从来不在星期天营业。这种做法对生意来说很难:星期天是很多顾客最爱购物的一天。尽管如此,Bill 仍坚持自己的原则——并在坚持的同时,把企业从 1954 年他接手时每年 25 万美元的销售额,做到了 1999 年的 3.42 亿美元。
Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week. Nevertheless, this was Bill’s business to run. So, despite my reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his religious convictions.
Bill 认为 R. C. Willey 可以在犹他州以外的市场成功经营,并在 1997 年建议我们在 Boise 开一家新店。我对把“不在星期天营业”的政策带到新地区非常怀疑,因为在那里我们将面对已扎根的竞争对手——他们一周七天都开门营业。然而,这毕竟是 Bill 的生意该由他来经营。所以,尽管我心存保留,我还是告诉他:既要遵从他的商业判断,也要遵从他的宗教信念。
Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personally buy the land and build the store — for about $9 million as it turned out — and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to take the blow personally.
随后 Bill 提出了一个真正不同寻常的方案:他个人出资买地、建店——最后花了大约 900 万美元——如果新店证明成功,他就按成本价把物业卖给我们;反过来,如果销售达不到他的预期,我们可以直接退出这门生意,一分钱都不用付给他。当然,如果是这种结果,他就会留下一个巨额投入的“空楼”在那里。我告诉他,我很感激这个提议,但我认为:如果 Berkshire 要拿到上行收益,也应该承担下行风险。Bill 说不行:如果因为他的宗教信念导致失败,他要自己承担打击。
The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Bill thereupon turned the property over to us — including some extra land that had appreciated significantly — and we wrote him a check for his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied up over the two years.
这家店在去年 8 月开业,立刻大获成功。于是 Bill 把这处物业交给了我们——其中还包括一块额外的土地,而那块土地已经显著升值——我们给他开了一张支票,金额等于他的成本。更夸张的是:Bill 拒绝在这两年里他占用的资金上收取一分钱利息。
If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I haven’t heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning.
如果有哪位经理人在别的上市公司也做过类似的事,我从未听说过。你们现在就能理解:为什么能与 Bill Child 这样的人做合伙人,会让我每天早晨“踢踏舞”般地去上班。
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A footnote: After our “soft” opening in August, we had a grand opening of the Boise store about a month later. Naturally, I went there to cut the ribbon (your Chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for something). In my talk I told the crowd how sales had far exceeded expectations, making us, by a considerable margin, the largest home furnishings store in Idaho. Then, as the speech progressed, my memory miraculously began to improve. By the end of my talk, it all had come back to me: Opening a store in Boise had been my idea.
补充一则脚注:我们在 8 月进行了 Boise 门店的“软开业”(soft opening)之后,大约一个月后又办了隆重的正式开业仪式。按理说,我当然要亲自去剪彩(我得强调一下:你们的董事长还是能派上点用场的)。我在讲话中告诉大家,销售额远超预期,使我们以相当大的优势成为 Idaho 最大的家居陈设商店。然后,随着演讲继续,我的记忆竟奇迹般地开始恢复。到演讲结束时,我全都想起来了:在 Boise 开店原来是我的主意。