2000-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%. Over the last 35 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,987, a rate of 24.0% compounded annually.*
我们在 1999 年的净资产增加了 3.58 亿美元，使 Class A 与 Class B 股票的每股账面价值都增长了 0.5%。在过去 35 年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 37,987 美元，年复合增长率为 24.0%。*
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
本报告中使用的所有数据均以 Berkshire 的 A 股为基准。A 股是公司在 1996 年之前唯一流通的股票，后来 B 股成为其继任者。B 股在经济权益上等同于 A 股的 1/30。
The numbers on the facing page show just how poor our 1999 record was. We had the worst absolute performance of my tenure and, compared to the S&P, the worst relative performance as well. Relative results are what concern us: Over time, bad relative numbers will produce unsatisfactory absolute results.
对页上的数字清楚显示了我们 1999 年的业绩有多糟糕。那一年是我任期内最差的绝对表现；与 S&P 相比，也是最差的相对表现。我们真正关心的是相对结果：长期来看，糟糕的相对成绩会带来令人不满意的绝对结果。
Even Inspector Clouseau could find last year’s guilty party: your Chairman. My performance reminds me of the quarterback whose report card showed four Fs and a D but who nonetheless had an understanding coach. “Son,” he drawled, “I think you’re spending too much time on that one subject.”
就连 Clouseau 探长也能找出去年“罪魁祸首”：你们的董事长本人。我的表现让我想起那位四门功课得了四个 F 和一个 D 的四分卫，但他有个通情达理的教练。教练慢悠悠地说：“孩子，我看你把太多时间花在那一门课上了。”
My “one subject” is capital allocation, and my grade for 1999 most assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior performance of Berkshire’s equity portfolio — and responsibility for that portfolio, leaving aside the small piece of it run by Lou Simpson of GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the market in 1999 because they’ve had disappointing operating results. We still like these businesses and are content to have major investments in them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it’s no sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride.
我的“那一门课”是资本配置，而我在 1999 年的成绩毫无疑问就是个 D。那一年最拖累我们的是 Berkshire 的股票投资组合表现不佳——除了 GEICO 的 Lou Simpson 管理的一小部分之外，组合责任完全在我。我们几个最大的被投企业在 1999 年大幅跑输市场，因为它们的经营业绩令人失望。我们依然喜欢这些生意，也愿意长期持有它们的重大投资。但它们的失误伤害了我们去年的表现，而且也不能保证它们会很快恢复步伐。
The fallout from our weak results in 1999 was a more-than-commensurate drop in our stock price. In 1998, to go back a bit, the stock outperformed the business. Last year the business did much better than the stock, a divergence that has continued to the date of this letter. Over time, of course, the performance of the stock must roughly match the performance of the business.
1999 年业绩疲弱带来的后果，是我们股价出现了“超比例”的下跌。稍微回头看，1998 年股价跑赢了公司经营；而去年公司的经营表现远好于股价，这种背离一直持续到写这封信的时候。当然，从长期来看，股票的表现必须大体上与企业的表现相匹配。
Despite our poor showing last year, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect that the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value over the next decade will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P. We can’t guarantee that, of course. But we are willing to back our conviction with our own money. To repeat a fact you’ve heard before, well over 99% of my net worth resides in Berkshire. Neither my wife nor I have ever sold a share of Berkshire and — unless our checks stop clearing — we have no intention of doing so.
尽管我们去年表现不佳，Charlie Munger（Berkshire 的副董事长、我的合伙人）和我仍预计：在未来十年里，Berkshire 内在价值的增长将会“略微”超过持有 S&P 的收益。当然，我们无法保证这一点。但我们愿意用自己的钱为这种信念背书。再重复一个你们以前听过的事实：我超过 99% 的净资产都在 Berkshire。我的妻子和我从未卖出过一股 Berkshire 的股票——并且除非我们的支票不再兑现——我们也无意这么做。
Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P “modestly.” For Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are available to us today.
请注意，我说的是希望“略微”战胜 S&P。对 Berkshire 来说，显著地大幅领先该指数的时代已经过去了。当年之所以能做到，是因为我们那时无论买企业还是买股票，都能用远比现在更有吸引力的价格买到；同时我们当时的资本基数也小得多，这使我们能够考虑的投资机会范围远比今天广。
Our optimism about Berkshire’s performance is also tempered by the expectation — indeed, in our minds, the virtual certainty — that the S&P will do far less well in the next decade or two than it has done since 1982. A recent article in Fortune expressed my views as to why this is inevitable, and I’m enclosing a copy with this report.
我们对 Berkshire 业绩的乐观也被一个预期所约束——事实上，在我们心里几乎可以说是确定无疑：未来十年或二十年，S&P 的表现会远远不如它自 1982 年以来的那段时期。Fortune 近期的一篇文章表达了我对“为什么这不可避免”的看法，我随本报告附上了该文的复印件。
Our goal is to run our present businesses well — a task made easy because of the outstanding managers we have in place — and to acquire additional businesses having economic characteristics and managers comparable to those we already own. We made important progress in this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordan’s Furniture and contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares. Deals of that kind aren’t always possible, but that is the method of acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer.
我们的目标是把现有业务经营好——这项工作之所以轻松，是因为我们已经配备了杰出的管理者——并收购更多在经济特性与管理层素质上可与我们现有企业相媲美的公司。1999 年，我们在这方面取得了重要进展：收购了 Jordan’s Furniture，并签约购买 MidAmerican Energy 的大部分股权。我们会在报告后面更详细地讨论这些公司，但我想在这里强调一点：这两笔交易我们都用现金完成，没有发行任何 Berkshire 股票。这样的交易方式并非总能实现，但这是 Charlie 和我极其偏爱的收购方式。
Guides to Intrinsic Value
内在价值指南
I often talk in these pages about intrinsic value, a key, though far from precise, measurement we utilize in our acquisitions of businesses and common stocks. (For an extensive discussion of this, and other investment and accounting terms and concepts, please refer to our Owner’s Manual on pages 55 - 62. Intrinsic value is discussed on page 60.)
我在这些页面里经常谈到“内在价值”（intrinsic value）。它是我们在收购企业与普通股时使用的一项关键衡量指标——但必须承认，它远非精确。（如需更全面地了解这一概念以及其他投资与会计术语、概念，请参阅第 55–62 页的《Owner’s Manual》。其中第 60 页专门讨论了内在价值。）
In our last four reports, we have furnished you a table that we regard as useful in estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but excluding assets held in our financial products operation) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire’s operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on page 61), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在过去四份报告中，我们都给各位提供了一张表格，我们认为它有助于估算 Berkshire 的内在价值。在这份更新后的表格（如下）里，我们追踪价值的两个关键组成部分。第一栏列出我们每股所拥有的投资（包括现金及等价物，但不包括我们金融产品业务中持有的资产）；第二栏显示 Berkshire 经营性企业的每股税前收益（未计入购买会计调整，相关内容见第 61 页），但已扣除全部利息与公司层面的费用。第二栏不包含第一栏所示投资带来的任何股息、利息与已实现资本利得。换句话说，这两栏展示的是：如果把 Berkshire 拆成两部分——一部分仅持有我们的投资，另一部分经营所有业务并承担所有公司成本——它会是什么样子。
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
以下是这两个部分按“十年”为单位的增长率：
In 1999, our per-share investments changed very little, but our operating earnings, affected by negatives that overwhelmed some strong positives, fell apart. Most of our operating managers deserve a grade of A for delivering fine results and for having widened the difference between the intrinsic value of their businesses and the value at which these are carried on our balance sheet. But, offsetting this, we had a huge — and, I believe, aberrational — underwriting loss at General Re. Additionally, GEICO’s underwriting profit fell, as we had predicted it would. GEICO’s overall performance, though, was terrific, outstripping my ambitious goals.
1999 年，我们的每股投资几乎没有变化；但我们的经营收益却崩塌了——一些强劲的正面因素被压倒性的负面因素所吞没。我们的大多数经营管理者都值得拿到 A：他们交出了出色的经营成果，并进一步拉大了“其业务的内在价值”与“资产负债表上账面列示价值”之间的差距。可与之对冲的是，General Re 出现了巨额承保亏损——而且我认为这是反常的。此外，GEICO 的承保利润也下降了，正如我们此前所预测的那样。不过，GEICO 的整体表现依然极其出色，甚至超过了我设定的雄心勃勃的目标。
We do not expect our underwriting earnings to improve in any dramatic way this year. Though GEICO’s intrinsic value should grow by a highly satisfying amount, its underwriting performance is almost certain to weaken. That’s because auto insurers, as a group, will do worse in 2000, and because we will materially increase our marketing expenditures. At General Re, we are raising rates and, if there is no mega-catastrophe in 2000, the company’s underwriting loss should fall considerably. It takes some time, however, for the full effect of rate increases to kick in, and General Re is therefore likely to have another unsatisfactory underwriting year.
我们不指望今年的承保利润会出现任何戏剧性的改善。尽管 GEICO 的内在价值应当会以一个令人非常满意的幅度增长，但它的承保表现几乎肯定会转弱。原因是：作为一个整体，汽车保险公司在 2000 年会做得更差；并且我们将大幅增加营销支出。至于 General Re，我们正在提高费率；如果 2000 年没有发生“超级巨灾”（mega-catastrophe），公司的承保亏损应该会显著下降。不过，费率上调的效果需要时间才能完全体现出来，因此 General Re 很可能还会经历又一个不尽如人意的承保年度。
You should be aware that one item regularly working to widen the amount by which intrinsic value exceeds book value is the annual charge against income we take for amortization of goodwill — an amount now running about $500 million. This charge reduces the amount of goodwill we show as an asset and likewise the amount that is included in our book value. This is an accounting matter having nothing to do with true economic goodwill, which increases in most years. But even if economic goodwill were to remain constant, the annual amortization charge would persistently widen the gap between intrinsic value and book value.
你们应该知道：有一个项目会持续扩大“内在价值高于账面价值”的差距——那就是我们每年计入利润表的商誉摊销费用（amortization of goodwill），目前这项费用大约是 5 亿美元。这笔费用会减少我们在资产端列示的商誉，也同样减少计入账面价值的金额。这纯粹是会计处理问题，与真正的经济商誉（true economic goodwill）无关；后者在大多数年份里是增长的。但即便经济商誉保持不变，每年的摊销费用也会持续地把“内在价值”与“账面价值”的差距越拉越大。
Though we can’t give you a precise figure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value, or even an approximation, Charlie and I can assure you that it far exceeds our $57.8 billion book value. Businesses such as See’s and Buffalo News are now worth fifteen to twenty times the value at which they are carried on our books. Our goal is to continually widen this spread at all subsidiaries.
尽管我们无法给出 Berkshire 内在价值的精确数字，甚至连一个近似值都给不出，Charlie 和我仍可以向各位保证：它远远超过我们 578 亿美元的账面价值。像 See’s 和 Buffalo News 这样的企业，如今的价值已经是我们账上入账价值的 15 到 20 倍。我们的目标，是在所有子公司里持续扩大这种“真实价值”与“账面列示价值”的差距。
A Managerial Story You Will Never Read Elsewhere
一个你在别处永远读不到的管理故事
Berkshire’s collection of managers is unusual in several important ways. As one example, a very high percentage of these men and women are independently wealthy, having made fortunes in the businesses that they run. They work neither because they need the money nor because they are contractually obligated to — we have no contracts at Berkshire. Rather, they work long and hard because they love their businesses. And I use the word “their” advisedly, since these managers are truly in charge — there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures. We simply ask our managers to run their companies as if these are the sole asset of their families and will remain so for the next century.
Berkshire 的管理者群体在几个重要方面都非常与众不同。举例来说，其中有相当高比例的男女管理者本身就已独立富有——他们在自己经营的业务中赚到了大钱。他们工作既不是因为需要钱，也不是因为合同要求——Berkshire 没有雇佣合同。相反，他们之所以长期、高强度地工作，是因为他们热爱自己的生意。我刻意用了“他们的”这个词，因为这些管理者确实是真正在当家作主——奥马哈没有“汇报展示”（show-and-tell）的演示，没有需要总部批准的预算，也没有针对资本开支的命令条文。我们只是要求管理者以一种方式经营公司：把它当作家族唯一的资产，并且在未来一百年里都将如此。
Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshire’s shareholders, treating both groups as we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed. Though “working” means nothing to me financially, I love doing it at Berkshire for some simple reasons: It gives me a sense of achievement, a freedom to act as I see fit and an opportunity to interact daily with people I like and trust. Why should our managers — accomplished artists at what they do — see things differently?
Charlie 和我努力以对待 Berkshire 股东的方式来对待我们的管理者：如果角色互换，我们希望被怎样对待，就怎样对待他们。尽管“工作”在财务上对我毫无意义，但我仍然喜欢在 Berkshire 工作，原因很简单：它让我有成就感；让我拥有按自己认为合适的方式行事的自由；并让我每天都有机会与我喜欢且信任的人共事。我们的管理者——在各自领域成就卓著的“艺术家”——为什么会有不同的想法呢？
In their relations with Berkshire, our managers often appear to be hewing to President Kennedy’s charge, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” Here’s a remarkable story from last year: It’s about R. C. Willey, Utah’s dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this reason R. C. Willey’s stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles -- and while doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954, when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.
在与 Berkshire 的关系中，我们的管理者常常表现得像是在践行肯尼迪总统那句号召：“不要问你的国家能为你做什么；要问你能为你的国家做什么。”去年有个非同寻常的故事：它关于 R. C. Willey——犹他州占主导地位的家居陈设零售商，我们在 1995 年从 Bill Child 及其家族手中买下了它。Bill 和他的多数管理者都是 Mormon（摩门教徒），因此 R. C. Willey 的门店从来不在星期天营业。这种做法对生意来说很难：星期天是很多顾客最爱购物的一天。尽管如此，Bill 仍坚持自己的原则——并在坚持的同时，把企业从 1954 年他接手时每年 25 万美元的销售额，做到了 1999 年的 3.42 亿美元。
Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week. Nevertheless, this was Bill’s business to run. So, despite my reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his religious convictions.
Bill 认为 R. C. Willey 可以在犹他州以外的市场成功经营，并在 1997 年建议我们在 Boise 开一家新店。我对把“不在星期天营业”的政策带到新地区非常怀疑，因为在那里我们将面对已扎根的竞争对手——他们一周七天都开门营业。然而，这毕竟是 Bill 的生意该由他来经营。所以，尽管我心存保留，我还是告诉他：既要遵从他的商业判断，也要遵从他的宗教信念。
Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personally buy the land and build the store — for about $9 million as it turned out — and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to take the blow personally.
随后 Bill 提出了一个真正不同寻常的方案：他个人出资买地、建店——最后花了大约 900 万美元——如果新店证明成功，他就按成本价把物业卖给我们；反过来，如果销售达不到他的预期，我们可以直接退出这门生意，一分钱都不用付给他。当然，如果是这种结果，他就会留下一个巨额投入的“空楼”在那里。我告诉他，我很感激这个提议，但我认为：如果 Berkshire 要拿到上行收益，也应该承担下行风险。Bill 说不行：如果因为他的宗教信念导致失败，他要自己承担打击。
The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Bill thereupon turned the property over to us — including some extra land that had appreciated significantly — and we wrote him a check for his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied up over the two years.
这家店在去年 8 月开业，立刻大获成功。于是 Bill 把这处物业交给了我们——其中还包括一块额外的土地，而那块土地已经显著升值——我们给他开了一张支票，金额等于他的成本。更夸张的是：Bill 拒绝在这两年里他占用的资金上收取一分钱利息。
If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I haven’t heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning.
如果有哪位经理人在别的上市公司也做过类似的事，我从未听说过。你们现在就能理解：为什么能与 Bill Child 这样的人做合伙人，会让我每天早晨“踢踏舞”般地去上班。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A footnote: After our “soft” opening in August, we had a grand opening of the Boise store about a month later. Naturally, I went there to cut the ribbon (your Chairman, I wish to emphasize, is good for something). In my talk I told the crowd how sales had far exceeded expectations, making us, by a considerable margin, the largest home furnishings store in Idaho. Then, as the speech progressed, my memory miraculously began to improve. By the end of my talk, it all had come back to me: Opening a store in Boise had been my idea.
补充一则脚注：我们在 8 月进行了 Boise 门店的“软开业”（soft opening）之后，大约一个月后又办了隆重的正式开业仪式。按理说，我当然要亲自去剪彩（我得强调一下：你们的董事长还是能派上点用场的）。我在讲话中告诉大家，销售额远超预期，使我们以相当大的优势成为 Idaho 最大的家居陈设商店。然后，随着演讲继续，我的记忆竟奇迹般地开始恢复。到演讲结束时，我全都想起来了：在 Boise 开店原来是我的主意。
The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance
财产/意外险（Property/Casualty）保险的经济学
Our main business — though we have others of great importance — is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.
我们的主营业务——尽管我们还有其他同样重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解 Berkshire，你必须理解如何评估一家保险公司。关键决定因素是：（1）这项业务产生的 float（浮存金）规模；（2）它的成本；以及（3）最关键的一点：这两项因素的长期前景。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
先从最基本的说起：float 是“我们持有但并不拥有”的钱。在保险业务中，float 的产生源于这样一个时间差：保费先收进来，赔付后付出去，而这个间隔有时会延续很多年。在这段时间里，保险公司会把这笔钱拿去投资。这件“愉快的事”通常也伴随着一个代价：保险公司收取的保费，往往不足以覆盖它最终必须支付的损失与费用。于是保险公司就会出现“承保亏损”（underwriting loss），而这正是 float 的成本。一家保险公司之所以有价值，是因为它长期的 float 成本低于公司若要通过其他方式获得资金所需承担的成本；但如果它的 float 成本高于市场资金利率，那么这门生意就是个“烂柠檬”（lemon）。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. In 1999 a number of insurers announced reserve adjustments that made a mockery of the “earnings” that investors had relied on earlier when making their buy and sell decisions. At Berkshire, we strive to be conservative and consistent in our reserving. Even so, we warn you that an unpleasant surprise is always possible.
这里需要一个提醒：由于赔付成本必须依赖估计，保险公司在计算承保结果时拥有极大的裁量空间，这使得投资者很难计算一家公司的真实 float 成本。估计误差——多数时候是无心的，但有时也并非如此——可能非常巨大。这些误差会直接流入利润表，影响盈余。经验丰富的观察者通常能识别出大规模的准备金计提错误，但公众一般只能接受对方呈现的数字；有些时候，我甚至对一些知名审计机构“默许”的数字感到吃惊。1999 年，一些保险公司宣布调整准备金，使得投资者此前依赖的那些“盈利”数字显得荒诞可笑——而投资者正是基于那些数字做出买卖决策的。在 Berkshire，我们努力在准备金计提上保持保守与一致。即便如此，我们仍要提醒你：令人不快的意外永远有可能发生。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 33 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)
下面这张表（按时间间隔列示）展示了我们自 33 年前收购 National Indemnity Company、进入保险业以来，Berkshire 各个保险板块所产生的 float。National Indemnity Company 的传统业务线计入“Other Primary”板块。为了编制这张表，我们用如下方法计算 float——相对于保费规模，我们产生的 float 非常大：将净赔付准备金（net loss reserves）、理赔调整准备金（loss adjustment reserves）、分入再保险持有资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）以及未赚保费准备金（unearned premium reserves）相加，然后再减去代理人余额（agents balances）、预付取得成本（prepaid acquisition costs）、预付税款（prepaid taxes）以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。——（都记住了吗？）
Growth of float is important — but its cost is what’s vital. Over the years we have usually recorded only a small underwriting loss — which means our cost of float was correspondingly low — or actually had an underwriting profit, which means we were being paid for holding other people’s money. Indeed, our cumulative result through 1998 was an underwriting profit. In 1999, however, we incurred a $1.4 billion underwriting loss that left us with float cost of 5.8%. One mildly mitigating factor: We enthusiastically welcomed $400 million of the loss because it stems from business that will deliver us exceptional float over the next decade. The balance of the loss, however, was decidedly unwelcome, and our overall result must be judged extremely poor. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect float cost to fall in 2000, but any decline will be tempered by our aggressive plans for GEICO, which we will discuss later.
float（浮存金）的增长很重要——但真正关键的是它的成本。多年来，我们通常只记录到很小的承保亏损——这意味着我们的 float 成本也相应很低——有时甚至实现了承保利润，这表示我们是在“拿着别人的钱还被付费”。事实上，截至 1998 年我们的累计承保结果是盈利的。但在 1999 年，我们发生了 14 亿美元的承保亏损，使得 float 成本达到 5.8%。有一个略微的减轻因素：我们“欣然接受”其中 4 亿美元的亏损，因为这部分亏损来自一类业务，而这类业务会在未来十年给我们带来非常出色的 float。不过，剩余的亏损就完全不受欢迎了，我们的整体结果必须被评价为极其糟糕。如果不发生超级巨灾（mega-catastrophe），我们预计 2000 年的 float 成本会下降，但这种下降会被我们对 GEICO 的激进计划所抵消一部分——我们会在后文讨论。
There are a number of people who deserve credit for manufacturing so much “no-cost” float over the years. Foremost is Ajit Jain. It’s simply impossible to overstate Ajit’s value to Berkshire: He has from scratch built an outstanding reinsurance business, which during his tenure has earned an underwriting profit and now holds $6.3 billion of float.
多年来，有不少人应当因为“制造”出如此多“零成本” float 而获得褒奖。其中最首要的是 Ajit Jain。Ajit 对 Berkshire 的价值怎么强调都不为过：他从零开始建立了一家卓越的再保险业务；在他任内，这项业务实现了承保盈利，并且如今持有 63 亿美元的 float。
In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can’t evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium is inadequate. It is rare to find a person possessing any one of these talents. For one person to have them all is remarkable.
在 Ajit 身上，我们拥有这样一位承保人：他有足够的智力去为大多数风险做出正确的定价；有足够的现实感去把那些无法评估的风险直接忘掉；有足够的勇气在保费合适时承接规模巨大的保单；也有足够的纪律性在保费不足时拒绝哪怕最小的风险。能找到具备其中任何一项才能的人都很罕见；一个人同时具备全部这些才能，则堪称非凡。
Since Ajit specializes in super-cat reinsurance, a line in which losses are infrequent but extremely large when they occur, his business is sure to be far more volatile than most insurance operations. To date, we have benefitted from good luck on this volatile book. Even so, Ajit’s achievements are truly extraordinary.
由于 Ajit 专注于“超级巨灾再保险”（super-cat reinsurance）——这种业务的损失发生频率很低，但一旦发生就会极其巨大——他的业务波动性必然远高于大多数保险经营。截至目前，我们在这本高度波动的业务上受益于好运气。即便如此，Ajit 的成就仍然是真正意义上的卓越。
In a smaller but nevertheless important way, our “other primary” insurance operation has also added to Berkshire’s intrinsic value. This collection of insurers has delivered a $192 million underwriting profit over the past five years while supplying us with the float shown in the table. In the insurance world, results like this are uncommon, and for their feat we thank Rod Eldred, Brad Kinstler, John Kizer, Don Towle and Don Wurster.
规模更小但仍然重要的是，我们的“other primary”（其他直保）保险业务同样为 Berkshire 的内在价值做出了贡献。这组保险公司在过去五年里实现了 1.92 亿美元的承保利润，同时为我们提供了表中所示的 float。在保险行业里，这样的结果并不常见；为此我们感谢 Rod Eldred、Brad Kinstler、John Kizer、Don Towle 以及 Don Wurster。
As I mentioned earlier, the General Re operation had an exceptionally poor underwriting year in 1999 (though investment income left the company well in the black). Our business was extremely underpriced, both domestically and internationally, a condition that is improving but not yet corrected. Over time, however, the company should develop a growing amount of low-cost float. At both General Re and its Cologne subsidiary, incentive compensation plans are now directly tied to the variables of float growth and cost of float, the same variables that determine value for owners.
正如我前面提到的，General Re 在 1999 年的承保年度异常糟糕（尽管投资收益让公司整体仍然盈利得很好）。我们的业务定价严重偏低，无论在美国国内还是国际市场都是如此；这种状况正在改善，但尚未完全纠正。不过从长期来看，这家公司应当能够形成并持续扩张一大块“低成本 float”。在 General Re 以及其 Cologne 子公司，激励薪酬计划现在已经直接与 float 增长与 float 成本这两个变量挂钩——而这两个变量，正是决定所有者价值的同一组变量。
Even though a reinsurer may have a tightly focused and rational compensation system, it cannot count on every year coming up roses. Reinsurance is a highly volatile business, and neither General Re nor Ajit’s operation is immune to bad pricing behavior in the industry. But General Re has the distribution , the underwriting skills, the culture, and — with Berkshire’s backing — the financial clout to become the world’s most profitable reinsurance company. Getting there will take time, energy and discipline, but we have no doubt that Ron Ferguson and his crew can make it happen.
即使一家再保险公司拥有高度聚焦、理性的薪酬体系，也不能指望年年都一帆风顺。再保险是波动性极强的行业，General Re 和 Ajit 的业务都不可能对行业里糟糕的定价行为免疫。但 General Re 拥有渠道能力（distribution）、承保技能、企业文化，并且在 Berkshire 的背书之下还拥有财务实力（financial clout），有潜力成为全球最赚钱的再保险公司。实现这一点需要时间、精力与纪律，但我们毫不怀疑 Ron Ferguson 和他的团队能够做到。
GEICO (1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com)
GEICO made exceptional progress in 1999. The reasons are simple: We have a terrific business idea being implemented by an extraordinary manager, Tony Nicely. When Berkshire purchased GEICO at the beginning of 1996, we handed the keys to Tony and asked him to run the operation exactly as if he owned 100% of it. He has done the rest. Take a look at his scorecard:
GEICO 在 1999 年取得了非凡的进展。原因很简单：我们有一个极好的商业构想，由一位杰出的管理者 Tony Nicely 在执行。当 Berkshire 在 1996 年初收购 GEICO 时，我们把钥匙交给 Tony，并要求他像拥有 100% 所有权那样来经营这项业务。剩下的事情他全都完成了。看看他的成绩单：
In 1995, GEICO spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last year the company spent $242 million, and the counselor count grew to 2,631. And we are just starting: The pace will step up materially in 2000. Indeed, we would happily commit $1 billion annually to marketing if we knew we could handle the business smoothly and if we expected the last dollar spent to produce new business at an attractive cost.
1995 年，GEICO 在营销上的支出是 3,300 万美元，并配备了 652 名电话顾问（telephone counselors）。去年，公司营销支出达到 2.42 亿美元，顾问人数增至 2,631。我们其实才刚刚开始：2000 年的节奏还会显著加快。事实上，如果我们确信能够平稳地处理新增业务，并且预期最后花出去的那 1 美元也能以有吸引力的成本带来新业务，那么我们很乐意每年投入 10 亿美元用于营销。
Currently two trends are affecting acquisition costs. The bad news is that it has become more expensive to develop inquiries. Media rates have risen, and we are also seeing diminishing returns — that is, as both we and our competitors step up advertising, inquiries per ad fall for all of us. These negatives are partly offset, however, by the fact that our closure ratio — the percentage of inquiries converted to sales — has steadily improved. Overall, we believe that our cost of new business, though definitely rising, is well below that of the industry. Of even greater importance, our operating costs for renewal business are the lowest among broad-based national auto insurers. Both of these major competitive advantages are sustainable. Others may copy our model, but they will be unable to replicate our economics.
目前有两股趋势正在影响获客成本。坏消息是：获取咨询线索（inquiries）变得更贵了。媒体报价上涨；同时我们也在看到“边际收益递减”——也就是说，当我们和竞争对手都加大广告投放时，每一条广告带来的咨询量对所有人都会下降。不过，这些负面因素部分被另一个事实抵消：我们的成交转化率（closure ratio，即把咨询转化为成交的比例）在持续改善。总体而言，我们认为新增业务成本确实在上升，但仍明显低于行业平均。更重要的是：在“续保业务”的运营成本上，我们是全国性综合汽车保险公司里最低的。这两项核心竞争优势是可持续的。别人也许能模仿我们的模式，但他们无法复制我们的经济性（economics）。
The table above makes it appear that GEICO’s retention of policyholders is falling, but for two reasons appearances are in this case deceiving. First, in the last few years our business mix has moved away from “preferred” policyholders, for whom industrywide retention rates are high, toward “standard” and “non-standard” policyholders for whom retention rates are much lower. (Despite the nomenclature, the three classes have similar profit prospects.) Second, retention rates for relatively new policyholders are always lower than those for long-time customers — and because of our accelerated growth, our policyholder ranks now include an increased proportion of new customers. Adjusted for these two factors, our retention rate has changed hardly at all.
上面的表格看起来像是 GEICO 的保单续保（retention）在下降，但这里“表象具有欺骗性”，原因有二。第一，过去几年我们的客户结构从“preferred”（行业整体续保率较高）转向“standard”和“non-standard”（续保率显著更低）。——尽管名字不同，这三类客户的盈利前景其实相近。第二，相对新客户的续保率总是低于老客户；而由于我们增长加速，我们的保单客户中“新客户占比”更高。把这两个因素调整掉后，我们的续保率几乎没有变化。
We told you last year that underwriting margins for both GEICO and the industry would fall in 1999, and they did. We make a similar prediction for 2000. A few years ago margins got too wide, having enjoyed the effects of an unusual and unexpected decrease in the frequency and severity of accidents. The industry responded by reducing rates — but now is having to contend with an increase in loss costs. We would not be surprised to see the margins of auto insurers deteriorate by around three percentage points in 2000.
我们去年告诉各位：GEICO 和整个行业的承保利润率（underwriting margins）会在 1999 年下滑——事实的确如此。我们对 2000 年也做同样的预测。几年前行业利润率变得过宽，因为事故发生频率与严重程度出现了一次不寻常且意外的下降。行业随之降价；但现在不得不面对赔付成本上升。我们不会惊讶于：2000 年汽车保险公司的利润率大约恶化 3 个百分点左右。
Two negatives besides worsening frequency and severity will hurt the industry this year. First, rate increases go into effect only slowly, both because of regulatory delay and because insurance contracts must run their course before new rates can be put in. Second, reported earnings of many auto insurers have benefitted in the last few years from reserve releases, made possible because the companies overestimated their loss costs in still-earlier years. This reservoir of redundant reserves has now largely dried up, and future boosts to earnings from this source will be minor at best.
除了事故频率与严重程度变坏之外，还有两个负面因素会在今年伤害行业。第一，费率上调生效得很慢：既有监管审批延迟，也因为保险合同必须按期限履行，新费率要等旧合同到期后才能逐步落地。第二，许多车险公司的已披露盈利在过去几年受益于“准备金释放”（reserve releases）：这是因为它们在更早以前高估了损失成本，所以后来可以把多计提的准备金回转到利润里。但这座“冗余准备金水库”如今基本已干涸，未来从这一来源对盈利的推动，即使有，也至多是很小的。
In compensating its associates — from Tony on down — GEICO continues to use two variables, and only two, in determining what bonuses and profit-sharing contributions will be: 1) its percentage growth in policyholders and 2) the earnings of its “seasoned” business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year. We did outstandingly well on both fronts during 1999 and therefore made a profit-sharing payment of 28.4% of salary (in total, $113.3 million) to the great majority of our associates. Tony and I love writing those checks.
在对员工进行薪酬激励方面——从 Tony 往下——GEICO 继续只使用两个变量，而且仅仅两个，用来决定奖金与利润分享（profit-sharing）的贡献：1）保单持有人（policyholders）的百分比增长；2）“成熟业务”（seasoned business）的盈利，也就是持有超过一年的保单所产生的盈利。1999 年我们在这两方面都做得极其出色，因此我们向绝大多数员工支付了相当于工资 28.4% 的利润分享（合计 1.133 亿美元）。Tony 和我非常喜欢开这些支票。
At Berkshire, we want to have compensation policies that are both easy to understand and in sync with what we wish our associates to accomplish. Writing new business is expensive (and, as mentioned, getting more expensive). If we were to include those costs in our calculation of bonuses — as managements did before our arrival at GEICO — we would be penalizing our associates for garnering new policies, even though these are very much in Berkshire’s interest. So, in effect, we say to our associates that we will foot the bill for new business. Indeed, because percentage growth in policyholders is part of our compensation scheme, we reward our associates for producing this initially-unprofitable business. And then we reward them additionally for holding down costs on our seasoned business.
在 Berkshire，我们希望薪酬政策既容易理解，又能与我们希望员工完成的目标保持一致。获取新业务成本很高（而且如前所述，正在变得更高）。如果我们把这些成本纳入奖金的计算——就像我们接手 GEICO 之前的管理层所做的那样——我们实际上是在“惩罚”员工去争取新保单，尽管新增保单本来就非常符合 Berkshire 的利益。所以，本质上，我们是在对员工说：新增业务的账单由我们买单。事实上，由于“保单持有人百分比增长”本身就是薪酬体系的一部分，我们是在奖励员工去做这项“初期不赚钱”的业务；随后，我们又会因为他们在成熟业务上控制成本而给予额外奖励。
Despite the extensive advertising we do, our best source of new business is word-of-mouth recommendations from existing policyholders, who on the whole are pleased with our prices and service. An article published last year by Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine gives a good picture of where we stand in customer satisfaction: The magazine’s survey of 20 state insurance departments showed that GEICO’s complaint ratio was well below the ratio for most of its major competitors.
尽管我们做了大量广告，我们新增业务最好的来源仍然是老客户的口碑推荐（word-of-mouth）。总体而言，现有客户对我们的价格与服务感到满意。去年 Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine 发表的一篇文章很好地反映了我们在客户满意度方面的地位：该杂志对 20 个州保险监管部门的数据进行了调查，结果显示 GEICO 的投诉率（complaint ratio）显著低于其多数主要竞争对手。
Our strong referral business means that we probably could maintain our policy count by spending as little as $50 million annually on advertising. That’s a guess, of course, and we will never know whether it is accurate because Tony’s foot is going to stay on the advertising pedal (and my foot will be on his). Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a major percentage of the $300-$350 million we will spend in 2000 on advertising, as well as large additional costs we will incur for sales counselors, communications and facilities, are optional outlays we choose to make so that we can both achieve significant growth and extend and solidify the promise of the GEICO brand in the minds of Americans.
我们强劲的转介绍业务意味着：理论上，我们也许每年只花 5,000 万美元做广告，就能维持现有的保单数量。当然，这只是猜测；我们永远不会知道它是否准确，因为 Tony 的脚会一直踩在广告油门上（而我的脚会踩在他的脚上）。不过，我想强调的是：我们在 2000 年计划投入的 3 亿到 3.5 亿美元广告费中的相当一部分，以及我们为销售顾问、通信与设施将额外承担的大量成本，都是我们“可选择”的支出。我们之所以选择投入，是为了同时实现显著增长，并在美国人心中延伸、强化 GEICO 品牌所承诺的价值。
Personally, I think these expenditures are the best investment Berkshire can make. Through its advertising, GEICO is acquiring a direct relationship with a huge number of households that, on average, will send us $1,100 year after year. That makes us — among all companies, selling whatever kind of product — one of the country’s leading direct merchandisers. Also, as we build our long-term relationships with more and more families, cash is pouring in rather than going out (no Internet economics here). Last year, as GEICO increased its customer base by 766,256, it gained $590 million of cash from operating earnings and the increase in float.
就我个人而言，我认为这些支出是 Berkshire 能做的最佳投资。通过广告，GEICO 正在与大量家庭建立直接关系——这些家庭平均每年会持续不断地向我们支付 1,100 美元。这使我们成为全国领先的直销商（direct merchandisers）之一——不管别的公司卖的是什么产品。另外，随着我们与越来越多家庭建立长期关系，现金是在不断涌入，而不是流出（这里可没有“互联网经济学”那一套）。去年，GEICO 的客户基数增加了 766,256 人，同时从经营利润以及 float 增加中获得了 5.90 亿美元现金。
In the past three years, we have increased our market share in personal auto insurance from 2.7% to 4.1%. But we rightfully belong in many more households — maybe even yours. Give us a call and find out. About 40% of those people checking our rates find that they can save money by doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some giving more credit than we do to drivers who live in certain geographic areas or work at certain occupations. Our closure rate indicates, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount — usually 8% — to our shareholders. Just be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that our sales counselor can make the appropriate adjustment.
在过去三年里，我们在个人车险（personal auto insurance）市场的份额从 2.7% 提升到 4.1%。但我们理应进入更多家庭——也许包括你家。给我们打个电话试试。大约 40% 的人查询我们的报价后发现，和我们做生意可以省钱。这个比例不是 100%，因为各家保险公司的承保判断不同：有些公司会比我们更愿意给特定地区居住者或特定职业人群更高的“优惠”。不过，从我们的成交率（closure rate）来看：与任何一家面向所有客户、全国经营的保险公司相比，我们更频繁地给出最低价。并且在 40 个州，我们还能给股东提供特别折扣——通常是 8%。你只要确保表明自己是 Berkshire 的股东，我们的销售顾问就能做出相应的价格调整。
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It’s with sadness that I report to you that Lorimer Davidson, GEICO’s former Chairman, died last November, a few days after his 97th birthday. For GEICO, Davy was a business giant who moved the company up to the big leagues. For me, he was a friend, teacher and hero. I have told you of his lifelong kindnesses to me in past reports. Clearly, my life would have developed far differently had he not been a part of it. Tony, Lou Simpson and I visited Davy in August and marveled at his mental alertness — particularly in all matters regarding GEICO. He was the company’s number one supporter right up to the end, and we will forever miss him.
我怀着悲伤告诉各位：GEICO 前董事长 Lorimer Davidson 于去年 11 月去世，离他 97 岁生日只过去了几天。对 GEICO 来说，Davy 是一位商业巨人，他把公司带进了“大联盟”。对我而言，他是朋友、老师与英雄。我在以往报告里讲过他对我一生的种种善意。毫无疑问，如果生命中没有他，我的人生轨迹会完全不同。8 月，Tony、Lou Simpson 和我去看望了 Davy，并对他头脑的敏锐感到惊叹——尤其是在所有与 GEICO 相关的事情上。他直到最后一刻仍是公司最坚定的支持者，我们将永远怀念他。
Aviation Services
航空服务
Our two aviation services companies — FlightSafety International (“FSI”) and Executive Jet Aviation (“EJA”) — are both runaway leaders in their field. EJA, which sells and manages the fractional ownership of jet aircraft, through its NetJets® program, is larger than its next two competitors combined. FSI trains pilots (as well as other transportation professionals) and is five times or so the size of its nearest competitor.
我们旗下两家航空服务公司——FlightSafety International（“FSI”）与 Executive Jet Aviation（“EJA”）——在各自领域都是“断层式领先者”（runaway leaders）。EJA 通过 NetJets® 项目销售并管理喷气式飞机的分时所有权（fractional ownership），其规模超过排名其后的两家竞争对手之和。FSI 负责培训飞行员（以及其他运输行业专业人士），规模约为最近竞争对手的五倍左右。
Another common characteristic of the companies is that they are still managed by their founding entrepreneurs. Al Ueltschi started FSI in 1951 with $10,000, and Rich Santulli invented the fractional-ownership industry in 1986. These men are both remarkable managers who have no financial need to work but thrive on helping their companies grow and excel.
这两家公司还有一个共同特征：至今仍由其创始企业家亲自管理。Al Ueltschi 在 1951 年以 1 万美元创办了 FSI；Rich Santulli 则在 1986 年发明了“分时所有权”这一行业。这两位都是杰出的管理者：他们在财务上早已不需要工作，却仍然乐于推动公司成长并做到更卓越。
Though these two businesses have leadership positions that are similar, they differ in their economic characteristics. FSI must lay out huge amounts of capital. A single flight simulator can cost as much as $15 million and we have 222. Only one person at a time, furthermore, can be trained in a simulator, which means that the capital investment per dollar of revenue at FSI is exceptionally high. Operating margins must therefore also be high, if we are to earn a reasonable return on capital. Last year we made capital expenditures of $215 million at FSI and FlightSafety Boeing, its 50%-owned affiliate.
尽管两家公司都拥有类似的行业领导地位，但它们的经济特性并不相同。FSI 必须投入极其巨额的资本。一台飞行模拟器的成本最高可达 1,500 万美元，而我们拥有 222 台。并且，一台模拟器在同一时间只能训练一个人，这意味着：FSI 每 1 美元收入所对应的资本投入异常之高。因此，要想获得合理的资本回报，运营利润率也必须相当高。去年，我们在 FSI 以及其 50% 持股的联营公司 FlightSafety Boeing 上的资本开支为 2.15 亿美元。
At EJA, in contrast, the customer owns the equipment, though we, of course, must invest in a core fleet of our own planes to ensure outstanding service. For example, the Sunday after Thanksgiving, EJA’s busiest day of the year, strains our resources since fractions of 169 planes are owned by 1,412 customers, many of whom are bent on flying home between 3 and 6 p.m. On that day, and certain others, we need a supply of company-owned aircraft to make sure all parties get where they want, when they want.
相比之下，在 EJA，设备（飞机）由客户持有。当然，为了确保卓越服务，我们也必须投资一支自有机队作为“核心机队”。举例说，感恩节后的那个星期天是 EJA 全年最忙的一天，会极大地拉紧我们的资源：169 架飞机的分时份额由 1,412 位客户持有，其中很多人都想在下午 3 点到 6 点之间飞回家。在那一天以及某些类似的日子里，我们需要有一批公司自有的飞机供给，来确保所有人都能在他们想要的时间到达他们想要去的地方。
Still, most of the planes we fly are owned by customers, which means that modest pre-tax margins in this business can produce good returns on equity. Currently, our customers own planes worth over $2 billion, and in addition we have $4.2 billion of planes on order. Indeed, the limiting factor in our business right now is the availability of planes. We now are taking delivery of about 8% of all business jets manufactured in the world, and we wish we could get a bigger share than that. Though EJA was supply-constrained in 1999, its recurring revenues — monthly management fees plus hourly flight fees — increased 46%.
不过，我们飞行的大多数飞机都由客户拥有，这意味着：这个业务即使税前利润率（pre-tax margins）不算很高，也能带来不错的股东权益回报（returns on equity）。目前，我们的客户拥有的飞机价值超过 20 亿美元；此外，我们还有 42 亿美元的飞机订单在手。事实上，当下限制我们业务的关键因素是飞机供给。我们现在接收交付的飞机，大约占全球所有新生产公务机（business jets）的 8%，而我们希望能拿到更高的份额。尽管 1999 年 EJA 受制于供给，但它的经常性收入（recurring revenues）——即月度管理费加上按小时计费的飞行费——仍增长了 46%。
The fractional-ownership industry is still in its infancy. EJA is now building critical mass in Europe, and over time we will expand around the world. Doing that will be expensive — very expensive — but we will spend what it takes. Scale is vital to both us and our customers: The company with the most planes in the air worldwide will be able to offer its customers the best service. “Buy a fraction, get a fleet” has real meaning at EJA.
分时所有权（fractional ownership）行业仍处在婴儿期。EJA 目前正在欧洲建立关键规模（critical mass），并将随着时间在全球扩张。做到这一点会很昂贵——非常昂贵——但我们会投入所需的资金。规模对我们和客户都至关重要：全球范围内“在空中运营飞机最多”的公司，才能为客户提供最佳服务。“买一份额，得一整支机队”（Buy a fraction, get a fleet）在 EJA 这里是真有其含义的。
EJA enjoys another important advantage in that its two largest competitors are both subsidiaries of aircraft manufacturers and sell only the aircraft their parents make. Though these are fine planes, these competitors are severely limited in the cabin styles and mission capabilities they can offer. EJA, in contrast, offers a wide array of planes from five suppliers. Consequently, we can give the customer whatever he needs to buy — rather than his getting what the competitor’s parent needs to sell.
EJA 还有一个重要优势：它的两大竞争对手都是飞机制造商的子公司，只销售其母公司生产的机型。尽管这些飞机都很优秀，但这些竞争对手在客舱风格与任务能力（mission capabilities）的选择上受到严重限制。相比之下，EJA 提供来自五家供应商的多种机型。因此，我们能让客户买到“他需要的”，而不是被迫接受“竞争对手母公司需要卖出去的”。
Last year in this report, I described my family’s delight with the one-quarter (200 flight hours annually) of a Hawker 1000 that we had owned since 1995. I got so pumped up by my own prose that shortly thereafter I signed up for one-sixteenth of a Cessna V Ultra as well. Now my annual outlays at EJA and Borsheim’s, combined, total ten times my salary. Think of this as a rough guideline for your own expenditures with us.
去年在本报告中，我描述了我的家人对我们自 1995 年以来持有的一架 Hawker 1000 的四分之一份额（每年 200 飞行小时）的喜爱。我被自己写出来的文字说得热血沸腾，以至于不久后又签了另一份：再买一架 Cessna V Ultra 的十六分之一份额。现在，我在 EJA 和 Borsheim’s 的年度花费加在一起，已经是我工资的十倍。你们可以把这当成一个粗略的“消费指引”，来决定自己在我们这里该花多少钱。
During the past year, two of Berkshire’s outside directors have also signed on with EJA. (Maybe we’re paying them too much.) You should be aware that they and I are charged exactly the same price for planes and service as is any other customer: EJA follows a “most favored nations” policy, with no one getting a special deal.
过去一年里，Berkshire 的两位外部董事也加入了 EJA。（也许我们给他们的薪酬太高了。）你们需要知道：他们和我在飞机与服务上的收费标准，与其他任何客户完全一致。EJA 执行“最惠客户”（most favored nations）政策，没有任何人能拿到特殊优惠。
And now, brace yourself. Last year, EJA passed the ultimate test: Charlie signed up. No other endorsement could speak more eloquently to the value of the EJA service. Give us a call at 1-800-848-6436 and ask for our “white paper” on fractional ownership.
现在，做好心理准备。去年，EJA 通过了终极考验：Charlie 也签约了。没有任何背书能比这更有力地说明 EJA 服务的价值。拨打 1-800-848-6436，向我们索取关于分时所有权的“白皮书”（white paper）。
Acquisitions of 1999
1999 年的收购
At both GEICO and Executive Jet, our best source of new customers is the happy ones we already have. Indeed, about 65% of our new owners of aircraft come as referrals from current owners who have fallen in love with the service.
在 GEICO 和 Executive Jet 这两家公司，我们获取新客户的最佳来源，都是那些已经很满意的老客户。事实上，大约 65% 的新飞机业主（new owners of aircraft）是由现有客户转介绍而来——他们爱上了我们的服务，于是推荐给朋友。
Our acquisitions usually develop in the same way. At other companies, executives may devote themselves to pursuing acquisition possibilities with investment bankers, utilizing an auction process that has become standardized. In this exercise the bankers prepare a “book” that makes me think of the Superman comics of my youth. In the Wall Street version, a formerly mild-mannered company emerges from the investment banker’s phone booth able to leap over competitors in a single bound and with earnings moving faster than a speeding bullet. Titillated by the book’s description of the acquiree’s powers, acquisition-hungry CEOs — Lois Lanes all, beneath their cool exteriors — promptly swoon.
我们的收购通常也以类似方式展开。在其他公司，高管们可能会把精力都投入到与投资银行家一起追逐并购机会中，使用一种已经标准化的拍卖流程。在这种流程里，投行会准备一本“材料书”（book），它总让我想起少年时看的 Superman 漫画：在华尔街版本里，一家原本温顺不起眼的公司，会从投行的电话亭里摇身一变，拥有“一跃越过竞争对手”的能力，盈利增长“比子弹还快”。在这本书对被收购方“超能力”的描述刺激之下，那些饥渴的并购型 CEO——外表冷静、内心都是 Lois Lane——立刻就会神魂颠倒。
What’s particularly entertaining in these books is the precision with which earnings are projected for many years ahead. If you ask the author-banker, however, what his own firm will earn next month, he will go into a protective crouch and tell you that business and markets are far too uncertain for him to venture a forecast.
这些材料书最有趣的一点，是它们对未来很多年的盈利预测精确得令人发笑。但如果你反过来问写书的那位银行家：你们投行下个月能赚多少钱？他立刻会摆出一种防御姿态，告诉你商业与市场充满不确定性，他可不敢做预测。
Here’s one story I can’t resist relating: In 1985, a major investment banking house undertook to sell Scott Fetzer, offering it widely — but with no success. Upon reading of this strikeout, I wrote Ralph Schey, then and now Scott Fetzer’s CEO, expressing an interest in buying the business. I had never met Ralph, but within a week we had a deal. Unfortunately, Scott Fetzer’s letter of engagement with the banking firm provided it a $2.5 million fee upon sale, even if it had nothing to do with finding the buyer. I guess the lead banker felt he should do something for his payment, so he graciously offered us a copy of the book on Scott Fetzer that his firm had prepared. With his customary tact, Charlie responded: “I’ll pay $2.5 million not to read it.”
有个故事我实在忍不住要讲：1985 年，一家大型投行受托出售 Scott Fetzer，把它大范围推介出去——但毫无结果。我读到这次“挥棒落空”的消息后，写信给当时以及现在仍担任 Scott Fetzer CEO 的 Ralph Schey，表示我有兴趣买这家公司。我从未见过 Ralph，但不到一周我们就谈成了。遗憾的是，Scott Fetzer 与那家投行的委托协议规定：只要公司出售，投行就能拿到 250 万美元的费用，即使它在寻找买家这件事上完全没有贡献。我猜主办银行家觉得拿钱总得做点事，于是很大方地给我们一份他们为 Scott Fetzer 做的那本材料书。Charlie 一如既往地“风度十足”地回应：“我愿意花 250 万美元，只求别让我读它。”
At Berkshire, our carefully-crafted acquisition strategy is simply to wait for the phone to ring. Happily, it sometimes does so, usually because a manager who sold to us earlier has recommended to a friend that he think about following suit.
在 Berkshire，我们“精心设计”的收购策略其实很简单：等电话响。幸运的是，它有时确实会响——通常是因为之前卖给我们的某位经理人，向他的朋友推荐：你也可以考虑走同样的路。
Which brings us to the furniture business. Two years ago I recounted how the acquisition of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983 and my subsequent association with the Blumkin family led to follow-on transactions with R. C. Willey (1995) and Star Furniture (1997). For me, these relationships have all been terrific. Not only did Berkshire acquire three outstanding retailers; these deals also allowed me to become friends with some of the finest people you will ever meet.
这就把我们带到了家具生意上。两年前，我讲过：1983 年我们收购 Nebraska Furniture Mart，以及我随后与 Blumkin 家族建立的关系，如何促成了后续与 R. C. Willey（1995）和 Star Furniture（1997）的交易。对我而言，这些关系都非常美妙。Berkshire 不仅收购了三家杰出的零售商；这些交易也让我结识并成为朋友——这些人是你这一生里会遇到的最优秀的人之一。
Naturally, I have persistently asked the Blumkins, Bill Child and Melvyn Wolff whether there are any more out there like you. Their invariable answer was the Tatelman brothers of New England and their remarkable furniture business, Jordan’s.
当然，我一直不断地问 Blumkin 家族、Bill Child 以及 Melvyn Wolff：外面还有没有更多像你们这样的公司？他们的回答始终如一：新英格兰的 Tatelman 兄弟，以及他们那家非凡的家具企业 Jordan’s。
I met Barry and Eliot Tatelman last year and we soon signed an agreement for Berkshire to acquire the company. Like our three previous furniture acquisitions, this business had long been in the family — in this case since 1927, when Barry and Eliot’s grandfather began operations in a Boston suburb. Under the brothers’ management, Jordan’s has grown ever more dominant in its region, becoming the largest furniture retailer in New Hampshire as well as Massachusetts.
去年我见到了 Barry 和 Eliot Tatelman，我们很快就签署了一份协议，由 Berkshire 收购这家公司。和我们此前三次家具收购一样，这门生意长期由家族经营——这一次可以追溯到 1927 年，当时 Barry 和 Eliot 的祖父在波士顿郊区开始经营。由兄弟俩管理以来，Jordan’s 在其所在区域的统治力持续增强，成为 New Hampshire 与 Massachusetts 两州最大的家具零售商。
The Tatelmans don’t just sell furniture or manage stores. They also present customers with a dazzling entertainment experience called “shoppertainment.” A family visiting a store can have a terrific time, while concurrently viewing an extraordinary selection of merchandise. The business results are also extraordinary: Jordan’s has the highest sales per square foot of any major furniture operation in the country. I urge you to visit one of their stores if you are in the Boston area — particularly the one at Natick, which is Jordan’s newest. Bring money.
Tatelman 兄弟不只是卖家具或管理门店。他们还为顾客呈现一种令人眼花缭乱的娱乐体验，称为 “shoppertainment”（购物娱乐）。一家人去到门店，可以玩得很开心，同时还能看到极其丰富的商品选择。经营成果同样惊人：Jordan’s 的每平方英尺销售额在全美所有大型家具经营者中最高。如果你在波士顿地区，我强烈建议你去他们任意一家门店看看——尤其是 Natick 那家，它是 Jordan’s 最新的门店。记得带钱。
Barry and Eliot are classy people — just like their counterparts at Berkshire’s three other furniture operations. When they sold to us, they elected to give each of their employees at least 50¢ for every hour that he or she had worked for Jordan’s. This payment added up to $9 million, which came from the Tatelmans’ own pockets, not from Berkshire’s. And Barry and Eliot were thrilled to write the checks.
Barry 和 Eliot 都是非常有格调的人——就像 Berkshire 另外三家家具企业的管理者一样。他们把公司卖给我们时，选择给每位员工发一笔钱：员工在 Jordan’s 工作的每一个小时，至少给 50 美分。这笔款项总计 900 万美元，完全来自 Tatelman 兄弟自己的口袋，而不是 Berkshire 的钱。并且，Barry 和 Eliot 写这些支票时非常开心。
Each of our furniture operations is number one in its territory. We now sell more furniture than anyone else in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas, Nebraska, Utah and Idaho. Last year Star’s Melvyn Wolff and his sister, Shirley Toomim, scored two major successes: a move into San Antonio and a significant enlargement of Star’s store in Austin.
我们旗下每一家家具企业在各自区域都是第一名。现在，在 Massachusetts、New Hampshire、Texas、Nebraska、Utah 和 Idaho，我们卖出的家具都比任何人多。去年，Star 的 Melvyn Wolff 和他的妹妹 Shirley Toomim 取得了两项重大成果：进入 San Antonio 市场，以及对 Star 在 Austin 的门店进行大幅扩建。
There’s no operation in the furniture retailing business remotely like the one assembled by Berkshire. It’s fun for me and profitable for you. W. C. Fields once said, “It was a woman who drove me to drink, but unfortunately I never had the chance to thank her.” I don’t want to make that mistake. My thanks go to Louie, Ron and Irv Blumkin for getting me started in the furniture business and for unerringly guiding me as we have assembled the group we now have.
在家具零售行业里，没有任何一家企业能与 Berkshire 组建出来的这套“家具帝国”相提并论。这对我来说很有趣，对你们来说很赚钱。W. C. Fields 曾说过：“是一个女人把我逼得去喝酒，但不幸的是，我从来没有机会感谢她。”我不想犯同样的错误。所以，我要感谢 Louie、Ron 和 Irv Blumkin：是他们把我带进家具生意，并且在我们组建今天这支团队的过程中，一直准确无误地指引着我。
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Now, for our second acquisition deal: It came to us through my good friend, Walter Scott, Jr., chairman of Level 3 Communications and a director of Berkshire. Walter has many other business connections as well, and one of them is with MidAmerican Energy, a utility company in which he has substantial holdings and on whose board he sits. At a conference in California that we both attended last September, Walter casually asked me whether Berkshire might be interested in making a large investment in MidAmerican, and from the start the idea of being in partnership with Walter struck me as a good one. Upon returning to Omaha, I read some of MidAmerican’s public reports and had two short meetings with Walter and David Sokol, MidAmerican’s talented and entrepreneurial CEO. I then said that, at an appropriate price, we would indeed like to make a deal.
现在说我们的第二笔收购交易：它来自我的一位挚友 Walter Scott, Jr.——他是 Level 3 Communications 的董事长，也是 Berkshire 的董事。Walter 还有许多其他商业联系，其中之一就是 MidAmerican Energy：这是一家公用事业公司（utility company），他在其中持有相当可观的股份，并且担任董事。去年 9 月，我们在加州共同参加一场会议时，Walter 很随意地问我：Berkshire 是否可能有兴趣在 MidAmerican 进行一笔大额投资。从一开始，“与 Walter 做合伙人”这个想法就让我觉得很不错。回到 Omaha 后，我读了 MidAmerican 的一些公开报告，并与 Walter 以及 MidAmerican 那位才华横溢、富有企业家精神的 CEO——David Sokol——进行了两次简短会面。随后我表示：只要价格合适，我们确实愿意做这笔交易。
Acquisitions in the electric utility industry are complicated by a variety of regulations including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Therefore, we had to structure a transaction that would avoid Berkshire gaining voting control. Instead we are purchasing an 11% fixed-income security, along with a combination of common stock and exchangeable preferred that will give Berkshire just under 10% of the voting power of MidAmerican but about 76% of the equity interest. All told, our investment will be about $2 billion.
电力公用事业行业的并购交易，会因多种监管规定而变得复杂，其中包括 1935 年的《Public Utility Holding Company Act》（公用事业控股公司法）。因此，我们必须设计一种交易结构，以避免 Berkshire 获得表决权控制权（voting control）。相应地，我们将购买一项 11% 的固定收益证券（fixed-income security），同时再买入普通股（common stock）与可交换优先股（exchangeable preferred）的组合：这将使 Berkshire 获得 MidAmerican 略低于 10% 的表决权，但大约 76% 的经济权益（equity interest）。合计下来，我们的投资规模约为 20 亿美元。
Walter characteristically backed up his convictions with real money: He and his family will buy more MidAmerican stock for cash when the transaction closes, bringing their total investment to about $280 million. Walter will also be the controlling shareholder of the company, and I can’t think of a better person to hold that post.
Walter 一如既往地用真金白银为自己的信念背书：在交易交割时，他和家人还将以现金再购买更多 MidAmerican 股票，使他们的总投资达到约 2.8 亿美元。Walter 也将成为公司的控股股东（controlling shareholder），而我想不出还有谁比他更适合担任这个角色。
Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.
尽管公用事业行业有很多监管约束，我们仍有可能在这一领域做出更多投入。如果我们这么做，涉及的金额可能会很大。
Acquisition Accounting
收购会计
Once again, I would like to make some comments about accounting, in this case about its application to acquisitions. This is currently a very contentious topic and, before the dust settles, Congress may even intervene (a truly terrible idea).
我再一次想谈谈会计——这一次谈的是它在收购交易中的应用。这是一个目前争议非常激烈的话题；在尘埃落定之前，国会甚至可能会介入（这真是个非常糟糕的主意）。
When a company is acquired, generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) currently condone two very different ways of recording the transaction: “purchase” and “pooling.” In a pooling, stock must be the currency; in a purchase, payment can be made in either cash or stock. Whatever the currency, managements usually detest purchase accounting because it almost always requires that a “goodwill” account be established and subsequently written off — a process that saddles earnings with a large annual charge that normally persists for decades. In contrast, pooling avoids a goodwill account, which is why managements love it.
当一家公司被收购时，按当前的公认会计准则（GAAP），通常允许用两种截然不同的方法记录这笔交易：“purchase（购买法）”与“pooling（权益结合法）”。在 pooling 里，必须以股票作为支付手段；在 purchase 里，支付既可以是现金，也可以是股票。不管用什么支付，管理层通常都厌恶 purchase 会计，因为它几乎总会要求确认一个“goodwill（商誉）”科目，并在之后逐年摊销（written off）——这一过程会让利润表背上一个巨额的年度费用，而且往往持续几十年。相反，pooling 可以避免确认商誉科目，这也是管理层喜欢它的原因。
Now, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) has proposed an end to pooling, and many CEOs are girding for battle. It will be an important fight, so we’ll venture some opinions. To begin with, we agree with the many managers who argue that goodwill amortization charges are usually spurious. You’ll find my thinking about this in the appendix to our 1983 annual report, which is available on our website, and in the Owner’s Manual on pages 55 - 62.
现在，Financial Accounting Standards Board（FASB）提议取消 pooling，很多 CEO 已经准备开战。这会是一场重要的争论，所以我们也说几句。首先，我们同意许多管理者的观点：商誉摊销费用通常是“虚假的”（spurious）。你们可以在我们 1983 年年报的附录里看到我的想法（该年报可在我们网站上获得），也可以在第 55–62 页的《Owner’s Manual》里找到相关讨论。
For accounting rules to mandate amortization that will, in the usual case, conflict with reality is deeply troublesome: Most accounting charges relate to what’s going on, even if they don’t precisely measure it. As an example, depreciation charges can’t with precision calibrate the decline in value that physical assets suffer, but these charges do at least describe something that is truly occurring: Physical assets invariably deteriorate. Correspondingly, obsolescence charges for inventories, bad debt charges for receivables and accruals for warranties are among the charges that reflect true costs. The annual charges for these expenses can’t be exactly measured, but the necessity for estimating them is obvious.
如果会计规则强制要求一种摊销，而在通常情况下它会与现实相冲突，这是非常令人不安的：多数会计费用都对应着某种真实正在发生的事，即便它们无法精确度量。举例来说，折旧（depreciation）费用无法精确校准固定资产价值的下降幅度，但它至少描述了一件确实发生的事情：实体资产必然会逐渐损耗。相应地，存货的报废/跌价费用（obsolescence charges）、应收账款的坏账费用（bad debt charges）以及保修责任的应计费用（accruals for warranties）都属于能反映真实成本的费用。这些费用每年的金额无法被“精确测量”，但需要对它们进行估计这一点是显而易见的。
In contrast, economic goodwill does not, in many cases, diminish. Indeed, in a great many instances — perhaps most — it actually grows in value over time. In character, economic goodwill is much like land: The value of both assets is sure to fluctuate, but the direction in which value is going to go is in no way ordained. At See’s, for example, economic goodwill has grown, in an irregular but very substantial manner, for 78 years. And, if we run the business right, growth of that kind will probably continue for at least another 78 years.
相反，经济商誉（economic goodwill）在很多情况下并不会减少。事实上，在非常多的情形——也许是大多数——它还会随着时间推移而增值。从性质上说，经济商誉很像土地：两者的价值都必然会波动，但价值最终朝哪个方向走，绝不是注定的。以 See’s 为例，它的经济商誉在 78 年里一直增长——增长并不规则，但幅度非常可观。而且，如果我们把这门生意经营得当，这种增长很可能还会至少再持续 78 年。
To escape from the fiction of goodwill charges, managers embrace the fiction of pooling. This accounting convention is grounded in the poetic notion that when two rivers merge their streams become indistinguishable. Under this concept, a company that has been merged into a larger enterprise has not been “purchased” (even though it will often have received a large “sell-out” premium). Consequently, no goodwill is created, and those pesky subsequent charges to earnings are eliminated. Instead, the accounting for the ongoing entity is handled as if the businesses had forever been one unit.
为了摆脱“商誉费用”的虚构，管理层转而拥抱“权益结合法（pooling）”的虚构。这种会计惯例基于一个富有诗意的想象：两条河流汇合后，它们的水流变得不可区分。在这种概念下，被并入更大企业的公司并没有被“购买”（尽管它往往获得了很高的“卖出溢价”）。因此，不会产生商誉，也就消除了那些恼人的、后续计入利润的费用。取而代之的是：存续主体的会计处理被当作这些业务从来就是一个整体来处理。
So much for poetry. The reality of merging is usually far different: There is indisputably an acquirer and an acquiree, and the latter has been “purchased,” no matter how the deal has been structured. If you think otherwise, just ask employees severed from their jobs which company was the conqueror and which was the conquered. You will find no confusion. So on this point the FASB is correct: In most mergers, a purchase has been made. Yes, there are some true “mergers of equals,” but they are few and far between.
诗意说到这里就够了。并购的现实通常截然不同：毫无疑问，交易中存在收购方（acquirer）与被收购方（acquiree），无论交易结构如何设计，后者都已经被“买下”了。你如果不信，去问问那些被裁员的员工：谁是征服者、谁是被征服者？你会发现他们一点都不糊涂。所以在这一点上，FASB 的判断是对的：在大多数合并中，确实发生了购买。是的，确实存在一些真正的“平等合并”（mergers of equals），但非常少见。
Charlie and I believe there’s a reality-based approach that should both satisfy the FASB, which correctly wishes to record a purchase, and meet the objections of managements to nonsensical charges for diminution of goodwill. We would first have the acquiring company record its purchase price — whether paid in stock or cash — at fair value. In most cases, this procedure would create a large asset representing economic goodwill. We would then leave this asset on the books, not requiring its amortization. Later, if the economic goodwill became impaired, as it sometimes would, it would be written down just as would any other asset judged to be impaired.
Charlie 和我认为，有一种基于现实的方法，既能满足 FASB（它正确地希望把交易记录为购买），也能回应管理层对“荒谬的商誉减值费用”的反对。我们的做法是：首先，让收购方以公允价值（fair value）记录其购买价格——无论支付方式是股票还是现金。在大多数情况下，这会形成一个规模很大的资产，代表经济商誉。然后，我们会把这项资产保留在账上，不要求摊销。之后，如果经济商誉发生减值（impairment）——有时确实会发生——就像对待任何其他发生减值的资产一样，把它减记（written down）。
If our proposed rule were to be adopted, it should be applied retroactively so that acquisition accounting would be consistent throughout America — a far cry from what exists today. One prediction: If this plan were to take effect, managements would structure acquisitions more sensibly, deciding whether to use cash or stock based on the real consequences for their shareholders rather than on the unreal consequences for their reported earnings.
如果我们提出的规则被采纳，它应该追溯适用（retroactively），使美国的收购会计处理在全国范围内保持一致——而这与今天的状况相差甚远。我们可以做一个预测：如果这一方案生效，管理层会更理性地设计收购结构，决定用现金还是股票时，会基于对股东真实后果的考量，而不是基于对“报表盈利”的虚幻影响。
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In our purchase of Jordan’s, we followed a procedure that will maximize the cash produced for our shareholders but minimize the earnings we report to you. Berkshire purchased assets for cash, an approach that on our tax returns permits us to amortize the resulting goodwill over a 15-year period. Obviously, this tax deduction materially increases the amount of cash delivered by the business. In contrast, when stock, rather than assets, is purchased for cash, the resulting writeoffs of goodwill are not tax-deductible. The economic difference between these two approaches is substantial.
在我们收购 Jordan’s 的交易中，我们采用了一种做法：它能最大化为股东创造的现金流，却会最小化我们向你们报告的会计利润。Berkshire 用现金收购的是“资产”（assets），这种结构在税务申报中允许我们在 15 年内摊销由此产生的商誉（goodwill）。显然，这项税务扣除会显著增加该业务能交付的现金。相反，如果我们用现金买的是“股票”（stock），而不是资产，那么由此产生的商誉摊销在税务上不可抵扣（not tax-deductible）。这两种做法在经济上的差异非常巨大。
From the economic standpoint of the acquiring company, the worst deal of all is a stock-for-stock acquisition. Here, a huge price is often paid without there being any step-up in the tax basis of either the stock of the acquiree or its assets. If the acquired entity is subsequently sold, its owner may owe a large capital gains tax (at a 35% or greater rate), even though the sale may truly be producing a major economic loss.
从收购方的经济角度看，最糟糕的交易结构是“以股换股”的收购（stock-for-stock acquisition）。在这种情况下，往往支付了非常高的价格，但无论是被收购方的股票，还是其资产，都不会获得税基的上调（step-up in tax basis）。如果日后把这家被收购企业卖掉，其所有者可能需要缴纳一笔巨额资本利得税（税率可能达到 35% 或更高），即便这次出售在真实经济意义上可能造成了重大亏损。
We have made some deals at Berkshire that used far-from-optimal tax structures. These deals occurred because the sellers insisted on a given structure and because, overall, we still felt the acquisition made sense. We have never done an inefficiently-structured deal, however, in order to make our figures look better.
在 Berkshire，我们做过一些交易，采用的税务结构并不理想。这些交易之所以发生，是因为卖方坚持某种结构，并且从整体上看，我们仍认为收购是合理的。但我们从未为了让报表数字更好看，而去做一笔结构低效的交易。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告利润的来源
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on page 61, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下面的表格展示了 Berkshire 报告利润的主要来源。在这种呈现方式中，购买会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments）不会被分摊到具体业务中去，而是汇总后单独列示。这样处理能让你看到：如果我们当初没有收购这些企业，它们的利润本来会以什么方式被报告出来。基于第 61 页所讨论的原因，我们认为这种呈现方式对投资者与管理者更有用；相比之下，通用会计准则（GAAP）要求把购买溢价（purchase-premiums）按业务逐一摊销/冲销。需要说明的是：我们在表中展示的“总利润”，当然与审计财务报表中按 GAAP 口径的总利润完全一致。
Almost all of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses had excellent results in 1999. The exception was Dexter Shoe, and there the shortfall did not occur because of managerial problems: In skills, energy and devotion to their work, the Dexter executives are every bit the equal of our other managers. But we manufacture shoes primarily in the U.S., and it has become extremely difficult for domestic producers to compete effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of the 1.3 billion pairs of shoes purchased in this country came from abroad, where extremely low-cost labor is the rule.
我们几乎所有的制造、零售与服务类企业在 1999 年都取得了极佳的业绩。例外是 Dexter Shoe，而那里的业绩不及预期并非因为管理问题：在技能、精力以及对工作的投入程度上，Dexter 的管理层完全不逊于我们其他公司的经理人。但我们主要在美国本土生产鞋，而如今国内生产商要有效竞争已经变得极其困难。1999 年，在美国购买的 13 亿双鞋中，大约 93% 来自海外，那里的超低劳动力成本是常态。
Counting both Dexter and H. H. Brown, we are currently the leading domestic manufacturer of shoes, and we are likely to continue to be. We have loyal, highly-skilled workers in our U.S. plants, and we want to retain every job here that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally. In doing that, we have incurred significant severance and relocation costs that are included in the earnings we show in the table.
把 Dexter 与 H. H. Brown 合在一起看，我们目前是美国本土最大的鞋类制造商，而且很可能会继续保持这一地位。我们在美国工厂拥有忠诚且高度熟练的员工，我们也希望尽可能保住这里的每一个岗位。尽管如此，为了让业务仍然可持续，我们正在把更多产量转向国际采购（sourcing）。在这个过程中，我们发生了可观的遣散与搬迁成本（severance and relocation costs），这些成本已经计入我们在表格中展示的利润。
A few years back, Helzberg’s, our 200-store jewelry operation, needed to make operating adjustments to restore margins to appropriate levels. Under Jeff Comment’s leadership, the job was done and profits have dramatically rebounded. In the shoe business, where we have Harold Alfond, Peter Lunder, Frank Rooney and Jim Issler in charge, I believe we will see a similar improvement over the next few years.
几年前，Helzberg’s——我们拥有约 200 家门店的珠宝业务——需要做一些经营调整，把利润率恢复到合理水平。在 Jeff Comment 的领导下，这项工作完成了，利润大幅反弹。在鞋业这边，由 Harold Alfond、Peter Lunder、Frank Rooney 以及 Jim Issler 负责，我相信我们在未来几年也会看到类似的改善。
See’s Candies deserves a special comment, given that it achieved a record operating margin of 24% last year. Since we bought See’s for $25 million in 1972, it has earned $857 million pre-tax. And, despite its growth, the business has required very little additional capital. Give the credit for this performance to Chuck Huggins. Charlie and I put him in charge the day of our purchase, and his fanatical insistence on both product quality and friendly service has rewarded customers, employees and owners.
See’s Candies 值得特别一提：去年它实现了创纪录的 24% 经营利润率。自 1972 年我们以 2,500 万美元收购 See’s 以来，它已经赚取了 8.57 亿美元的税前利润。而且，尽管业务规模增长，它几乎不需要额外的资本投入。把这份业绩归功于 Chuck Huggins 吧。我们收购当天 Charlie 和我就让他负责，而他对产品质量与友好服务近乎偏执的坚持，让顾客、员工与股东都得到了回报。
Chuck gets better every year. When he took charge of See’s at age 46, the company’s pre-tax profit, expressed in millions, was about 10% of his age. Today he’s 74, and the ratio has increased to 100%. Having discovered this mathematical relationship — let’s call it Huggins’ Law — Charlie and I now become giddy at the mere thought of Chuck’s birthday.
Chuck 每年都在变得更好。他在 46 岁接手 See’s 时，公司税前利润（以“百万美元”为单位）大约相当于他年龄的 10%。如今他 74 岁，这个比率提高到了 100%。我们发现了这个数学关系——就叫它 “Huggins’ Law（哈金斯定律）”吧——Charlie 和我现在只要一想到 Chuck 的生日，就兴奋得不行。
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Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 39 - 54, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 63 - 69, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company.
关于我们各项业务的更多信息见第 39–54 页；在那里你也能看到按 GAAP 口径披露的各业务板块利润（segment earnings）。此外，在第 63–69 页，我们又以非 GAAP 口径把 Berkshire 的财务数据重新编排为四个板块——这种呈现方式与 Charlie 和我理解公司、思考公司的方式相一致。
Look-Through Earnings
“穿透式收益”
Reported earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees — though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason for our thinking is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
报告利润（reported earnings）不足以衡量 Berkshire 的经济进步，其中一个原因是：前面那张表所列的数字，只包含我们从被投企业收到的股息（dividends）——而这些股息通常只占我们按持股比例应享有利润的一小部分。我们并不介意这种“钱留在企业里”的分配方式，因为总体而言，我们认为被投企业未分配的利润（undistributed earnings）对我们更有价值，胜过分配出来的那一部分。理由很简单：我们的被投企业往往有机会以很高的回报率再投资其利润。既然如此，我们为什么要它们把利润分给我们呢？
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
因此，为了更接近 Berkshire 的经济现实、而不是只看报告利润，我们采用“look-through（穿透式）收益”的概念。我们对它的计算由三部分组成：（1）上一节所报告的经营收益（operating earnings），加上；（2）我们按持股比例应享有的、主要被投企业的“留存经营收益”（retained operating earnings）——这些收益按 GAAP 会计口径并不会反映在我们的利润中——再减去；（3）一个税费扣减：如果这些被投企业留存收益当初不是留存、而是分配给我们，Berkshire 需要为此支付的所得税。这里在统计“经营收益”时，我们会剔除购买会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments），以及资本利得（capital gains）和其他重大的一次性项目（major non-recurring items）。
The following table sets forth our 1999 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 13, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
下表列示了我们 1999 年的穿透式收益。不过我得提醒你：这些数字最多只能算近似，因为它们建立在一系列判断之上。（这些被投企业支付给我们的股息，已包含在第 13 页列示的经营收益中，主要体现在 “Insurance Group: Net Investment Income（保险集团：净投资收益）”这一项之下。）
Investments
投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $750 million at the end of 1999 are itemized.
下面我们列示 Berkshire 的普通股投资。对于 1999 年末市值超过 7.5 亿美元的持仓，我们会逐项列出。
We made few portfolio changes in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, several of the companies in which we have large investments had disappointing business results last year. Nevertheless, we believe these companies have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. This attribute, which makes for good long-term investment results, is one Charlie and I occasionally believe we can identify. More often, however, we can’t — not at least with a high degree of conviction. This explains, by the way, why we don’t own stocks of tech companies, even though we share the general view that our society will be transformed by their products and services. Our problem — which we can’t solve by studying up — is that we have no insights into which participants in the tech field possess a truly durable competitive advantage.
1999 年我们对投资组合做的调整很少。正如我前面提到的，我们重仓持有的几家公司去年经营结果令人失望。尽管如此，我们相信这些公司拥有重要的竞争优势，并且这种优势会随时间延续。正是这种属性，才会带来良好的长期投资结果——Charlie 和我有时觉得自己能识别出这种优势。但更多时候，我们做不到——至少做不到“高度确信”。顺便说一句，这也解释了为什么我们不持有科技公司的股票，尽管我们同样认同一种普遍看法：科技公司的产品与服务将重塑我们的社会。我们的问题——靠“多学习”也解决不了——在于：我们对科技领域里哪些参与者拥有真正持久的竞争优势，没有洞见。
Our lack of tech insights, we should add, does not distress us. After all, there are a great many business areas in which Charlie and I have no special capital-allocation expertise. For instance, we bring nothing to the table when it comes to evaluating patents, manufacturing processes or geological prospects. So we simply don’t get into judgments in those fields.
我们缺乏科技方面的洞见，并不会让我们苦恼。毕竟，在许多商业领域，Charlie 和我都没有什么特殊的资本配置专长。比如，评估专利、制造工艺或地质前景时，我们完全“带不来任何东西”。所以，我们干脆不在这些领域做判断。
If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter. If others claim predictive skill in those industries — and seem to have their claims validated by the behavior of the stock market — we neither envy nor emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand. If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted hope for rationality. Fortunately, it’s almost certain there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do well within the circle we’ve staked out.
如果说我们有一项优势，那就是：能识别自己是在能力圈（circle of competence）之内运作得很稳，还是正在逼近边界。去预测那些处在快速变化行业中的公司，其长期经济性究竟如何，这显然早已超出我们的边界。即使有些人声称自己在这些行业具备预测能力——并且他们的说法似乎还被股市表现“验证”了——我们也既不羡慕，也不效仿。相反，我们只坚持做自己理解的事。如果我们偶尔偏离了，那也会是无意的，而不是因为我们心浮气躁，用“希望”替代了理性。幸运的是，几乎可以肯定：Berkshire 会不时遇到机会，在我们划定的这个能力圈之内做得很好。
Right now, the prices of the fine businesses we already own are just not that attractive. In other words, we feel much better about the businesses than their stocks. That’s why we haven’t added to our present holdings. Nevertheless, we haven’t yet scaled back our portfolio in a major way: If the choice is between a questionable business at a comfortable price or a comfortable business at a questionable price, we much prefer the latter. What really gets our attention, however, is a comfortable business at a comfortable price.
眼下，我们已经拥有的那些优质企业，其股票价格并不那么吸引人。换句话说，我们对企业本身的感觉，比对它们股票的感觉要好得多。这就是为什么我们没有加仓现有持仓。尽管如此，我们也还没有大幅减仓：如果只能在“价格舒服但生意存疑”与“生意舒服但价格存疑”之间二选一，我们更偏好后者。真正能让我们眼前一亮的，是“生意舒服且价格也舒服”。
Our reservations about the prices of securities we own apply also to the general level of equity prices. We have never attempted to forecast what the stock market is going to do in the next month or the next year, and we are not trying to do that now. But, as I point out in the enclosed article, equity investors currently seem wildly optimistic in their expectations about future returns.
我们对自己持有证券价格的保留态度，也适用于整个股市的总体定价水平。我们从未试图预测股市下个月或明年的走势，现在也不打算这么做。但正如我在随信附上的那篇文章里指出的那样，股票投资者目前对未来回报的预期似乎过度乐观，到了近乎失控的程度。
We see the growth in corporate profits as being largely tied to the business done in the country (GDP), and we see GDP growing at a real rate of about 3%. In addition, we have hypothesized 2% inflation. Charlie and I have no particular conviction about the accuracy of 2%. However, it’s the market’s view: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) yield about two percentage points less than the standard treasury bond, and if you believe inflation rates are going to be higher than that, you can profit by simply buying TIPS and shorting Governments.
我们认为企业利润的增长在很大程度上与国内的商业活动（GDP）相绑定；我们预计 GDP 的实际增速大约是 3%。此外，我们假设通胀为 2%。Charlie 和我对“2%”这个数字并没有特别强的确信，不过这反映的是市场的看法：Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities（TIPS）的收益率大约比普通国债低 2 个百分点；如果你认为未来通胀会高于这个水平，你可以通过“买入 TIPS、做空普通国债”来获利。
If profits do indeed grow along with GDP, at about a 5% rate, the valuation placed on American business is unlikely to climb by much more than that. Add in something for dividends, and you emerge with returns from equities that are dramatically less than most investors have either experienced in the past or expect in the future. If investor expectations become more realistic — and they almost certainly will — the market adjustment is apt to be severe, particularly in sectors in which speculation has been concentrated.
如果企业利润确实会随 GDP 一起增长，增速大约在 5% 左右，那么市场给美国企业的估值水平，未来不太可能以远高于这个速度上升。再加上股息因素，你得到的股票回报率就会显著低于大多数投资者过去经历过的、或者未来所期待的水平。如果投资者的预期变得更现实——几乎可以肯定会发生——市场调整很可能会很剧烈，尤其是在投机最集中的板块。
Berkshire will someday have opportunities to deploy major amounts of cash in equity markets — we are confident of that. But, as the song goes, “Who knows where or when?” Meanwhile, if anyone starts explaining to you what is going on in the truly-manic portions of this “enchanted” market, you might remember still another line of song: “Fools give you reasons, wise men never try.”
Berkshire 终有一天会在股市中遇到可以部署巨额现金的机会——对此我们很有信心。但就像歌里唱的：“谁知道在何时、何地？”与此同时，如果有人开始向你解释这场“被施了魔法”的市场里、那些真正狂热的部分到底发生了什么，你不妨再想起另一句歌词：“傻子会给你理由，智者从不尝试。”
Share Repurchases
股票回购
Recently, a number of shareholders have suggested to us that Berkshire repurchase its shares. Usually the requests were rationally based, but a few leaned on spurious logic.
最近，一些股东建议 Berkshire 回购股份。多数请求的出发点是理性的，但也有少数依赖了站不住脚的逻辑（spurious logic）。
There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to repurchase its shares: First, the company has available funds — cash plus sensible borrowing capacity — beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively-calculated. To this we add a caveat: Shareholders should have been supplied all the information they need for estimating that value. Otherwise, insiders could take advantage of their uninformed partners and buy out their interests at a fraction of true worth. We have, on rare occasions, seen that happen. Usually, of course, chicanery is employed to drive stock prices up, not down.
一家公司只有在“同时满足一组事实”时，回购才是明智之举：第一，公司拥有可用资金——现金加上审慎的举债能力——而且这些资金超过企业短期内的需求；第二，公司发现自己的股票在市场上的交易价格低于其“保守计算的”内在价值。对此我们再加一个附带条件：股东应当已经获得了估算该内在价值所需的全部信息。否则，内部人就可能利用信息不充分的合伙人，以远低于真实价值的价格把他们“买出去”。我们在极少数情况下确实见过这种事发生。当然，通常耍花招（chicanery）是为了把股价往上抬，而不是往下压。
The business “needs” that I speak of are of two kinds: First, expenditures that a company must make to maintain its competitive position (e.g., the remodeling of stores at Helzberg’s) and, second, optional outlays, aimed at business growth, that management expects will produce more than a dollar of value for each dollar spent (R. C. Willey’s expansion into Idaho).
我所说的企业“需求”（needs）有两类：第一，为维持竞争地位而必须进行的支出（例如 Helzberg’s 的门店翻新）；第二，为了业务增长而进行的“可选择”投入，管理层预期这种投入能做到“每花 1 美元，创造超过 1 美元的价值”（比如 R. C. Willey 扩张到 Idaho）。
When available funds exceed needs of those kinds, a company with a growth-oriented shareholder population can buy new businesses or repurchase shares. If a company’s stock is selling well below intrinsic value, repurchases usually make the most sense. In the mid-1970s, the wisdom of making these was virtually screaming at managements, but few responded. In most cases, those that did made their owners much wealthier than if alternative courses of action had been pursued. Indeed, during the 1970s (and, spasmodically, for some years thereafter) we searched for companies that were large repurchasers of their shares. This often was a tipoff that the company was both undervalued and run by a shareholder-oriented management.
当可用资金超过上述两类需求时，一家以增长为导向的股东群体所拥有的公司，就可以选择：收购新业务，或回购股票。如果公司的股价明显低于内在价值，回购通常是最合理的选择。上世纪 70 年代中期，回购的正确性几乎是在对管理层“尖叫”，但响应者寥寥。在多数情况下，那些做了回购的公司，比起采取其他行动，让股东变得富有得多。事实上，在 1970 年代（以及其后若干年间的零星时期），我们一直在寻找那些大量回购自家股票的公司。这常常是一个信号：公司不仅被低估，而且由真正“股东导向”的管理层在经营。
That day is past. Now, repurchases are all the rage, but are all too often made for an unstated and, in our view, ignoble reason: to pump or support the stock price. The shareholder who chooses to sell today, of course, is benefitted by any buyer, whatever his origin or motives. But the continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value. Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around.
那个时代已经过去了。如今，回购成了潮流，但太多时候回购是出于一个未明说、且在我们看来并不高尚的理由：拉抬或支撑股价。今天选择卖出的股东，当然会从任何买家那里受益，不管买家是谁、动机是什么。但“持续持有的股东”会因为公司以高于内在价值的价格回购而受损。用 1.10 美元去买 1 美元钞票，对继续留下来的股东来说，从来不是一门好生意。
Charlie and I admit that we feel confident in estimating intrinsic value for only a portion of traded equities and then only when we employ a range of values, rather than some pseudo-precise figure. Nevertheless, it appears to us that many companies now making repurchases are overpaying departing shareholders at the expense of those who stay. In defense of those companies, I would say that it is natural for CEOs to be optimistic about their own businesses. They also know a whole lot more about them than I do. However, I can’t help but feel that too often today’s repurchases are dictated by management’s desire to “show confidence” or be in fashion rather than by a desire to enhance per-share value.
Charlie 和我承认：我们只能对一部分上市股票有把握地估算其内在价值，而且即便如此，我们也只能给出一个价值区间，而不是某个貌似精确的数字。尽管如此，在我们看来，如今许多公司进行回购，实际上是在“多付钱”给离开的股东，而代价由留下来的股东承担。为这些公司辩护一句：CEO 对自家生意更乐观是很自然的；并且他们对业务了解得远比我多。然而，我仍忍不住觉得：今天的回购往往是由管理层想“展示信心”、或者想跟风时髦所驱动，而不是为了提升每股价值（per-share value）。
Sometimes, too, companies say they are repurchasing shares to offset the shares issued when stock options granted at much lower prices are exercised. This “buy high, sell low” strategy is one many unfortunate investors have employed — but never intentionally! Managements, however, seem to follow this perverse activity very cheerfully.
有时，公司还会说回购是为了抵消员工行权（exercise）那些在更低价格授予的期权（stock options）时所发行的股票。这种“高买低卖”的策略，很多倒霉的投资者都做过——但从来不是故意的！而管理层却似乎非常愉快地、持续进行这种反常操作（perverse activity）。
Of course, both option grants and repurchases may make sense — but if that’s the case, it’s not because the two activities are logically related. Rationally, a company’s decision to repurchase shares or to issue them should stand on its own feet. Just because stock has been issued to satisfy options — or for any other reason — does not mean that stock should be repurchased at a price above intrinsic value. Correspondingly, a stock that sells well below intrinsic value should be repurchased whether or not stock has previously been issued (or may be because of outstanding options).
当然，期权授予与回购这两件事本身都可能有道理——但如果有道理，也绝不是因为它们在逻辑上彼此相关。理性地说，公司是否回购股票、是否发行股票，都应该各自站得住脚。仅仅因为公司为了满足期权（或任何其他原因）发行了股票，并不意味着公司就应该在高于内在价值的价格回购股票。相应地，如果一只股票明显低于内在价值，不管过去是否发行过股票（也可能正是因为存在未行权期权而发行），都应该回购。
You should be aware that, at certain times in the past, I have erred in not making repurchases. My appraisal of Berkshire’s value was then too conservative or I was too enthused about some alternative use of funds. We have therefore missed some opportunities — though Berkshire’s trading volume at these points was too light for us to have done much buying, which means that the gain in our per-share value would have been minimal. (A repurchase of, say, 2% of a company’s shares at a 25% discount from per-share intrinsic value produces only a ½% gain in that value at most — and even less if the funds could alternatively have been deployed in value-building moves.)
你们也应该知道：过去某些时候，我曾犯过“不回购”的错误。那时要么我对 Berkshire 价值的评估过于保守，要么我对某些资金替代用途过于兴奋。因此，我们错过了一些机会——不过，在那些时点 Berkshire 的成交量太小，即使我们想买也买不了多少，这意味着我们本可以提升的每股价值也很有限。（比如，一家公司以相对每股内在价值 25% 的折价回购 2% 的股份，最多也只会让每股内在价值提升约 0.5%；如果这些资金原本还能用于其他创造价值的举措，提升幅度还会更小。）
Some of the letters we’ve received clearly imply that the writer is unconcerned about intrinsic value considerations but instead wants us to trumpet an intention to repurchase so that the stock will rise (or quit going down). If the writer wants to sell tomorrow, his thinking makes sense — for him! — but if he intends to hold, he should instead hope the stock falls and trades in enough volume for us to buy a lot of it. That’s the only way a repurchase program can have any real benefit for a continuing shareholder.
我们收到的一些来信明显暗示：写信的人并不关心内在价值，而是希望我们高调宣布回购意向，从而让股价上涨（或至少别再下跌）。如果写信的人打算明天就卖出，他的想法对他来说当然有道理——但如果他打算继续持有，那他反倒应该希望股价下跌，并且成交量足够大，让我们能买到很多股票。对于持续持有的股东而言，这才是回购计划能带来真实收益的唯一方式。
We will not repurchase shares unless we believe Berkshire stock is selling well below intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Nor will we attempt to talk the stock up or down. (Neither publicly or privately have I ever told anyone to buy or sell Berkshire shares.) Instead we will give all shareholders — and potential shareholders — the same valuation-related information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed.
除非我们相信 Berkshire 的股票价格显著低于（以保守方式计算的）内在价值，否则我们不会回购。我们也不会试图把股价“说上去”或“说下来”。（无论公开还是私下，我从未对任何人说过该买或该卖 Berkshire 的股票。）我们会做的，是向所有股东——以及潜在股东——提供同样的、与估值相关的信息；就像如果角色互换，我们也希望得到同样的信息。
Recently, when the A shares fell below $45,000, we considered making repurchases. We decided, however, to delay buying, if indeed we elect to do any, until shareholders have had the chance to review this report. If we do find that repurchases make sense, we will only rarely place bids on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). Instead, we will respond to offers made directly to us at or below the NYSE bid. If you wish to offer stock, have your broker call Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. When a trade occurs, the broker can either record it in the “third market” or on the NYSE. We will favor purchase of the B shares if they are selling at more than a 2% discount to the A. We will not engage in transactions involving fewer than 10 shares of A or 50 shares of B.
最近，当 A 股跌破 45,000 美元时，我们曾考虑进行回购。不过我们决定：即便最终要买，也先推迟到股东有机会读完这份报告之后再行动。如果我们认为回购确实合理，我们也只会很少在纽约证券交易所（NYSE）上直接挂单。相反，我们会对直接递给我们的卖盘作出回应，只要其价格不高于 NYSE 的买价（bid）。如果你想把股票卖给我们，让你的券商致电 Mark Millard，电话 402-346-1400。成交发生时，券商可以把交易记录在“第三市场”（third market）或 NYSE。若 B 股相对 A 股的折价超过 2%，我们会更倾向于买入 B 股。我们不会进行少于 A 股 10 股或 B 股 50 股的交易。
Please be clear about one point: We will never make purchases with the intention of stemming a decline in Berkshire’s price. Rather we will make them if and when we believe that they represent an attractive use of the Company’s money. At best, repurchases are likely to have only a very minor effect on the future rate of gain in our stock’s intrinsic value.
请把这一点弄清楚：我们绝不会为了阻止 Berkshire 股价下跌而回购。我们只会在我们认为回购代表公司资金的一种有吸引力用法时、并且仅在那时才回购。即便在最佳情况下，回购对我们股票内在价值未来增长速度的影响也很可能只是非常微小的。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠
About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1999 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $17.2 million. A full description of the program appears on pages 70 - 71.
在 Berkshire 的 1999 年股东指定捐赠计划中，约 97.3% 的符合资格股份参与了该项目，捐赠总额为 1,720 万美元。该计划的完整说明见第 70–71 页。
Cumulatively, over the 19 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $147 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $13.8 million in 1999, including in-kind donations of $2.5 million.
在该计划运行的 19 年里，累计来看，Berkshire 已按股东指示捐赠了 1.47 亿美元。Berkshire 其余的慈善捐赠由各子公司自行完成，它们基本延续了在被收购前既有的慈善模式（唯一的变化是：子公司原来的所有者会自己承担其个人慈善捐赠的责任）。合计而言，我们的子公司在 1999 年捐赠了 1,380 万美元，其中包括 250 万美元的实物捐赠（in-kind donations）。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2000, will be ineligible for the 2000 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.
如果你想参加未来的捐赠计划，你必须持有以“实际所有人姓名”登记的 A 股，而不是登记在券商、银行或托管机构的代持名下（nominee name）。如果你的股份在 2000 年 8 月 31 日没有完成上述登记，那么你将不具备参加 2000 年计划的资格。当你收到我们寄出的捐赠表格后，请尽快寄回，以免被搁置或遗忘。逾期收到的指定指示将不被接受。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
This year’s Woodstock Weekend for Capitalists will follow a format slightly different from that of recent years. We need to make a change because the Aksarben Coliseum, which served us well the past three years, is gradually being closed down. Therefore, we are relocating to the Civic Auditorium (which is on Capitol Avenue between 18th and 19th, behind the Doubletree Hotel), the only other facility in Omaha offering the space we require.
今年的“资本家的伍德斯托克周末”（Woodstock Weekend for Capitalists）将采用一个与近年略有不同的形式。我们需要做出改变，因为 Aksarben Coliseum（过去三年一直很好地承办了我们的活动）正在逐步关闭。因此，我们将迁至 Civic Auditorium（位于 Capitol Avenue 的 18 街与 19 街之间，在 Doubletree Hotel 后面），这是奥马哈唯一另一处能够提供我们所需空间的场地。
The Civic, however, is located in downtown Omaha, and we would create a parking and traffic nightmare if we were to meet there on a weekday. We will, therefore, convene on Saturday, April 29, with the doors opening at 7 a.m., the movie beginning at 8:30 and the meeting itself commencing at 9:30. As in the past, we will run until 3:30 with a short break at noon for food, which will be available at the Civic’s concession stands.
不过，Civic 位于奥马哈市中心；如果我们在工作日在那里开会，会造成停车与交通的噩梦。因此，我们将于 4 月 29 日（星期六） 召开会议：早上 7 点开门，8:30 播放影片，9:30 正式开会。和以往一样，我们会开到 下午 3:30；中午会有一个短暂的用餐休息，食物可在 Civic 的小卖部购买。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
随本报告附上的委托书（proxy）材料里，有一份附件说明你如何获取进入大会及其他活动所需的“入场凭证”（credential）。至于机票、酒店与租车预订，我们再次委托 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。按惯例，我们会从规模较大的酒店安排巴士前往会场。大会结束后，巴士会返回酒店，并分别前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim’s 以及机场。即便如此，你可能仍会觉得有辆车更方便。
We have scheduled the meeting in 2002 and 2003 on the customary first Saturday in May. In 2001, however, the Civic is already booked on that Saturday, so we will meet on April 28. The Civic should fit our needs well on any weekend, since there will then be more than ample parking in nearby lots and garages as well as on streets. We will also be able to greatly enlarge the space we give exhibitors. So, overcoming my normal commercial reticence, I will see that you have a wide display of Berkshire products at the Civic that you can purchase. As a benchmark, in 1999 shareholders bought 3,059 pounds of See’s candy, $16,155 of World Book Products, 1,928 pairs of Dexter shoes, 895 sets of Quikut knives, 1,752 golf balls with the Berkshire Hathaway logo and 3,446 items of Berkshire apparel. I know you can do better.
我们已经把 2002 年与 2003 年的会议安排在每年 5 月的“惯例第一个星期六”。但在 2001 年，Civic 在那个星期六已经被预订了，所以我们将于 4 月 28 日 开会。无论哪个周末，Civic 都应当能很好满足我们的需要，因为周末时，附近停车场与车库以及路边停车位都会非常充裕。我们还能够大幅扩大给参展商的展位空间。因此，尽管我通常在商业推销上比较矜持，这次我会让你在 Civic 看到更大规模的 Berkshire 产品展示，并且你可以现场购买。拿 1999 年作个基准：股东们买走了 3,059 磅 See’s 糖果、16,155 美元的 World Book 产品、1,928 双 Dexter 鞋、895 套 Quikut 刀具、1,752 颗印有 Berkshire Hathaway 标志的高尔夫球，以及 3,446 件 Berkshire 服装。我知道你们能买得更多。
Last year, we also initiated the sale of at least eight fractions of Executive Jet aircraft. We will again have an array of models at the Omaha airport for your inspection on Saturday and Sunday. Ask an EJA representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes.
去年，我们还启动了至少 8 份 Executive Jet 飞机分时所有权（fractions）的销售。今年我们会继续在奥马哈机场展示多种机型，供你在周六与周日现场查看。在 Civic 里找 EJA 的代表，询问如何去看这些飞机。
Dairy Queen will also be on hand at the Civic and again will donate all proceeds to the Children’s Miracle Network. Last year we sold 4,586 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally, GEICO will have a booth that will be staffed by a number of our top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special shareholder’s discount. Bring the details of your existing insurance, and check out whether we can save you some money.
Dairy Queen 也会到 Civic 现场，并将再次把全部销售收入捐给 Children’s Miracle Network。去年我们卖出了 4,586 支 Dilly® 冰淇淋棒、巧克力棒和香草/橙子棒。此外，GEICO 也会设立展位，派出来自全美各地的一批顶尖客服顾问驻场，随时为你提供车险报价。多数情况下，GEICO 能给你提供股东特别折扣。带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮你省点钱。
Finally, Ajit Jain and his associates will be on hand to offer both no-commission annuities and a liability policy with jumbo limits of a size rarely available elsewhere. Talk to Ajit and learn how to protect yourself and your family against a $10 million judgment.
最后，Ajit Jain 及其同事也会到场，向大家提供两类产品：零佣金年金（no-commission annuities），以及一份超高保额的责任险（liability policy with jumbo limits）——这种保额规模在别处很少能买到。和 Ajit 聊聊，了解如何保护你和你的家人，防范一份 1,000 万美元 的判决（$10 million judgment）。
NFM’s newly remodeled complex, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation offers an unrivaled breadth of merchandise — furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and computers — all at can’t-be-beat prices. In 1999 NFM did more than $300 million of business at its 72nd Street location, which in a metropolitan area of 675,000 is an absolute miracle. During the Thursday, April 27 to Monday, May 1 period, any shareholder presenting his or her meeting credential will receive a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We have offered this break to shareholders the last couple of years, and sales have been amazing. In last year’s five-day “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM’s volume was $7.98 million, an increase of 26% from 1998 and 51% from 1997.
NFM（Nebraska Furniture Mart）新近翻修的园区，占地 75 英亩，位于 72nd Street（Dodge 与 Pacific 之间），营业时间为：工作日 上午 10 点到晚上 9 点，周六周日 上午 10 点到下午 6 点。这家卖场的商品宽度无可匹敌——家具、电子产品、家电、地毯和电脑——价格也低到没法被打败。1999 年，NFM 在 72nd Street 这一个地点就做了超过 3 亿美元 的生意；而当地都会区人口只有 67.5 万，这简直是个奇迹。在 4 月 27 日（周四）到 5 月 1 日（周一） 期间，任何出示大会入场凭证的股东，都能获得通常只给员工的折扣。过去几年我们也给股东提供过这种优惠，销量非常惊人：去年为期五天的“Berkshire Weekend”，NFM 的销售额是 798 万美元，比 1998 年增长 26%，比 1997 年增长 51%。
Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a champagne and dessert party from 6 p.m.-10 p.m. on Friday, April 28. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 30. On that day, Charlie and I will be on hand to sign sales tickets. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the largest crowds, which will form on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 7 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so be prepared to be blown away by both our prices and selection.
Borsheim’s——全美最大的珠宝店（仅次于 Tiffany’s 曼哈顿店）——将举办两场“仅限股东”的活动。第一场是 4 月 28 日（周五）晚 6 点到 10 点 的香槟与甜点派对。第二场、也是主活动，是 4 月 30 日（周日）上午 9 点到下午 6 点 的盛大庆典。当天 Charlie 和我会到场，为销售单据签名。股东价从周四到周一都有效；如果你想避开最大的人潮（通常会出现在周五晚上和周日），就挑其他时间来，并表明你是股东。周六我们营业到 晚上 7 点。Borsheim’s 的毛利率比主要竞争对手低足足 20 个百分点，所以请做好心理准备：我们的价格与选择会让你大开眼界。
In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will again have Bob Hamman — the best bridge player the game has ever seen — available to play with our shareholders on Sunday. We will also have a few other experts playing at additional tables. In 1999, we had more demand than tables, but we will cure that problem this year.
在 Borsheim’s 外面的商场里，我们会再次邀请 Bob Hamman——这项运动有史以来最好的桥牌选手——在周日与股东们对局。我们还会安排几位其他高手在更多的牌桌上同时开局。1999 年我们的需求超过了牌桌数量，但今年我们会解决这个问题。
Patrick Wolff, twice US chess champion, will again be in the mall playing blindfolded against all comers. He tells me that he has never tried to play more than four games simultaneously while handicapped this way but might try to bump that limit to five or six this year. If you’re a chess fan, take Patrick on — but be sure to check his blindfold before your first move.
两届美国国际象棋冠军 Patrick Wolff 也会再次出现在商场里，蒙眼同时对战所有来者。他告诉我：他以前从未在这种“障碍模式”下同时下超过四盘棋，但今年可能会把上限提高到五盘或六盘。如果你是棋迷，就去挑战 Patrick——不过第一步落子前，务必检查一下他的眼罩。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 30, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until about midnight. Please remember that you can’t come to Gorat’s on Sunday without a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 3 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. I make a “quality check” of Gorat’s about once a week and can report that their rare T-bone (with a double order of hash browns) is still unequaled throughout the country.
Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将在 4 月 30 日（周日） 再次只对 Berkshire 股东专门开放，供餐时间从 下午 4 点 一直到 大约午夜。请记住：没有预订，你周日是进不了 Gorat’s 的。要预订，请在 4 月 3 日 致电 402-551-3733（但别早于这一天）。如果周日订满了，你可以试试你在城里的其他晚上。我大约每周都会去 Gorat’s 做一次“质量抽检”，可以向你们汇报：他们家的 三分熟 T 骨牛排（再配一份双倍哈希薯饼）依旧是全美无出其右。
The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden Spikes will play the Iowa Cubs. Come early, because that’s when the real action takes place. Those who attended last year saw your Chairman pitch to Ernie Banks.
照例的棒球赛将在 周六晚上 7 点 在 Rosenblatt Stadium 举行。今年 Omaha Golden Spikes 将对阵 Iowa Cubs。早点来，因为真正的“好戏”通常在赛前就开始了。去年到场的人，见证了你们董事长给 Ernie Banks 投球。
This encounter proved to be the titanic duel that the sports world had long awaited. After the first few pitches — which were not my best, but when have I ever thrown my best? — I fired a brushback at Ernie just to let him know who was in command. Ernie charged the mound, and I charged the plate. But a clash was avoided because we became exhausted before reaching each other.
那次相遇，确实是一场体育界期待已久的“史诗级对决”。前面几球——并不是我投得最好的，但我什么时候投过最好的？——之后，我特意朝 Ernie 投了一记“贴身球”（brushback），只是为了让他知道谁才掌控局面。Ernie 冲向投手丘，我则冲向本垒。但最终没有发生冲突，因为我们还没跑到对方面前就已经累得不行了。
Ernie was dissatisfied with his performance last year and has been studying the game films all winter. As you may know, Ernie had 512 home runs in his career as a Cub. Now that he has spotted telltale weaknesses in my delivery, he expects to get #513 on April 29. I, however, have learned new ways to disguise my “flutterball.” Come and watch this matchup.
Ernie 对去年自己的表现不满意，整个冬天一直在研究比赛录像。你们可能知道，Ernie 作为 Cub 球员职业生涯一共打出 512 支本垒打。现在他发现了我投球动作里一些“明显的弱点”，他预计会在 4 月 29 日 打出第 513 支。不过，我已经学会了新的方法来伪装我的“飘飘球”（flutterball）。来现场看这场对决吧。
I should add that I have extracted a promise from Ernie that he will not hit a “come-backer” at me since I would never be able to duck in time to avoid it. My reflexes are like Woody Allen’s, who said his were so slow that he was once hit by a car being pushed by two guys.
我还得补充一句：我已经让 Ernie 承诺，他不会把球直接打回投手方向（come-backer）朝我飞来，因为我根本来不及躲开。我的反射神经就像 Woody Allen 说的那样慢：他说自己慢到有一次竟然被两个人推着走的车撞到了。
Our proxy statement contains instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. Join us at the Capitalist Caper on Capitol Avenue.
我们的委托书（proxy statement）里包含如何获取比赛门票的说明，也包含大量其他信息，能帮助你在奥马哈玩得更尽兴。欢迎来 Capitol Avenue 参加我们的 Capitalist Caper。
March 1, 2000
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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