2011-02-26 Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow
Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow
内在价值——今天与明天
Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.
尽管Berkshire的内在价值无法精确计算，但其三大关键支柱中的两项是可量化的。Charlie和我在自行估算Berkshire价值时高度依赖这些量化指标。
The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.
第一项价值组成是我们的投资：股票、债券与现金等价物。年末按市值计合计为1,580亿美元。
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保险浮存金（在保险业务中我们暂时持有、但不属于我们的资金）为我们的投资提供了660亿美元的资金。只要保险承保能打平，这笔浮存金就是“免费”的，也就是我们收到的保费等于发生的赔付与费用。当然，承保结果具有波动性，时而盈利、时而亏损。然而，从我们的整体历史看，我们显著盈利；我也预计未来平均将达到打平或更好。若能做到这一点，我们的全部投资——无论由浮存金还是由留存收益所资助——都可以被视为Berkshire股东价值的组成部分。
BRK的股票持仓和保险浮存金处于相同的位置，是装在口袋里为购买企业准备的现金（现金等价物），并且只解释了浮存金。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.
Berkshire第二项价值组成是来自投资与保险承保之外来源的盈利。这部分盈利由我们68家非保险公司贡献，详见第106页。Berkshire早年更侧重投资端；然而在过去二十年里，我们日益强调来自非保险业务的盈利增长，这一做法将会延续。
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.
下列表格展示了这种转变。第一张表按十年区间列示了自1970年（我们进入保险业务后三年）起的每股投资数据。与少数股东权益相关的投资被予以剔除。
Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.
尽管在这40年期间，我们每股投资资产的复合年增长率达到可观的19.9%，但随着我们把资金用于收购经营性业务，增速已显著放缓。
The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.
这种转向带来的回报体现在下表中，该表再次以每股口径并在扣除适用的少数股东权益后，展示了我们非保险业务盈利的增长情况。
For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.
在这四十年中，我们每股税前非保险盈利的复合年增速为21.0%。同一时期，Berkshire的股价年均上涨22.1%。从长期看，你可以预期我们的股价大体会与Berkshire的投资与盈利同步前行。市场价格与内在价值常常走在截然不同的路径上——有时持续很久——但最终会相遇。
There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.
内在价值的计算还包含第三个更主观、可能正也可能负的要素：未来对留存收益的配置效率。我们与许多其他企业一样，未来十年可能留存的利润将与我们当前使用的资本相当，甚至超出。一些公司会把这些留存的美元“变成50美分”，另一些公司则能把它们“变成2美元”。
This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.
要对一家公司的内在价值做出合理估计，我们（或任何人）都必须将“他们会如何使用这笔钱”的因素，与“我们现在拥有什么”的计算一并评估。原因在于：当管理层再投资属于外部投资者那一份公司利润时，外部投资者只能袖手旁观。如果一位CEO有望把这件事做好，那么再投资前景会提升公司的当下价值；若CEO的能力或动机存疑，则今天的价值必须打折。结果的差异可能巨大：20世纪60年代末，将一美元交到 Sears Roebuck 或 Montgomery Ward 的CEO手中，与将一美元托付给 Sam Walton，命运迥异。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.
Charlie 和我希望我们的非保险业务每股盈利能够以一个不错的速度持续增长。但随着基数越来越大，这项工作也变得愈发困难。我们既需要现有业务保持良好表现，也需要继续完成更多重要的收购。对此我们已经做好准备，我们的 “elephant gun（大象枪）” 已经重新装填完毕，而我的扳机手指也已经开始发痒了。
Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.
在一定程度上抵消我们庞大体量这一“锚”的，是我们所拥有的几项重要优势。首先，我们拥有一批真正出色的管理者，他们对自己所管理的业务以及对 Berkshire 都有着非同寻常的投入与承诺。我们的许多 CEO 本身已经财务自由，他们之所以工作，只是因为热爱自己所做的事情。他们更像志愿者，而不是雇佣兵。由于没有人能够给他们提供一份更让他们享受的工作，他们也就很难被挖走。
硅谷也是这个说法。
At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.
在 Berkshire，管理者可以专心经营自己的业务：他们不用被总部的各种会议折腾，不用为融资操心，也不用应付华尔街的纠缠。他们每两年只会收到我写的一封信（全文重印在本报告第 104–105 页），需要时再主动给我打电话。而且，每个人的风格也不一样：过去一年里，有些经理我一次都没通话，但也有一位几乎是天天和我交流。我们的信任建立在人身上，而不是建立在流程上。“严选人才，宽松管理” 的准则对他们和我都非常合适。
Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.
Berkshire 的 CEO 形形色色，有的拿着 MBA 文凭，有的却连大学都没念完；有的人习惯做预算、按章行事，有的人则更多凭经验和直觉行事。我们的团队就像一支由全明星组成的棒球队，球员们击球姿势千差万别，但整体战斗力却极强，而我们几乎很少需要调整阵容。
Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.
我们的第二个优势与我们如何分配各业务赚来的资金有关。在满足这些业务本身的资金需求之后，我们仍然会有相当可观的剩余资金。大多数公司只会在自己所在的行业内进行再投资，这往往把它们的资本配置“宇宙”限制在一个既狭小又远逊于整个外部世界机会集合的范围内。对于那少数可投的机会，竞争自然变得异常激烈。卖方于是掌握绝对优势，就像一个派对上只有一位女生、而到场却有一大群男生那样——这种严重失衡的局面，对那个女生当然好得很，但对那群男生而言就糟糕透了。
局部泛化的缺点。
At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.
在 Berkshire，资本的投向不受任何“体制性限制”。Charlie 和我唯一的约束，是我们是否有能力看懂某个潜在标的的未来前景。如果我们能跨过这道门槛——而很多情况下我们做不到——那接下来，我们就可以把这个机会与成千上万个其他机会逐一比较。
When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.
1965 年我接手 Berkshire 时，并没有好好利用这一优势。那时 Berkshire 只做纺织，而在此前的十年里纺织业务已经亏了很多钱。我能做的最愚蠢的事情，就是继续追逐那些看似能改善和扩张现有纺织业务的“机会”——结果多年间我干的正是这件蠢事。最后，在一次“灵光乍现”的高峰操作中，我居然还去收购了另一家纺织公司。Aaaaaaargh！（惨叫）直到后来我才幡然醒悟，先把方向转向保险，然后再进入其他行业。
There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.
在这种“世界都是我们可选珍珠”的优势之外，其实还有一个额外加成：除了把一个业务与众多其他业务进行比较之外，我们还会把这些业务机会拿来和可交易证券（股票、债券等）的机会相比较——而大多数管理层并不会这样做。很多时候，企业的估值在可预期的股票或债券投资回报面前，显得荒唐地偏高。在这种时候，我们就会选择去买证券，然后耐心等待更好的机会出现。
Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.
在资本配置上的灵活性，是我们迄今取得进展的主要原因之一。举例来说，我们可以把 See’s Candies 或 Business Wire 赚到的钱（这两家都是我们管理最出色的企业之一，但可再投资机会有限），拿出来作为收购 BNSF 所需股权资金的一部分。
Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.
我们的最后一项优势，是渗透在 Berkshire 全公司的、极难复制的企业文化。而在商业世界里，文化至关重要。
To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.
首先，代表你们的董事们，在思考方式和行为上都像真正的所有者。他们拿到的只是象征性报酬：没有期权，没有限制性股票，而且几乎也拿不到什么现金。我们也不给他们提供在其他大型上市公司几乎标配的董事及高管责任险。如果他们在使用你们资金的过程中犯了错，他们自己也要一起承担损失。撇开我个人的持股不谈，董事及其家人所持有的 Berkshire 股票价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事会会以极大的兴趣和真正所有者的眼光，来审视 Berkshire 的一举一动及其经营结果。你和我都非常幸运，能有他们充当我们的受托人。
This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.
这种“所有者导向”同样在我们的经理人当中普遍存在。在许多案例里，这些人主动找到 Berkshire，希望我们收购他们及其家族长期持有的企业。他们带着所有者的心态来到我们这里，而我们则提供一种环境，鼓励他们一直保持这种心态。拥有一批真正热爱自己业务的经理人，是一项非同小可的优势。
Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.
文化会自我繁衍。Winston Churchill 曾说过：“是你塑造了你的房子，然后房子又反过来塑造你。”这句话对企业同样适用。官僚程序会催生更多官僚主义，奢华的公司宫殿则会养出一套颐指气使的作风。（正如有人打趣说的：“当你坐进车子的后座，它却没有自动开动时，你就知道自己已经不再是 CEO 了。”）在 Berkshire 的“全球总部”，我们的全年租金支出是 270,212 美元。此外，总部在家具、艺术品、可乐机、餐厅、高科技设备——等等一切项目上的投资，加起来也只不过是 301,363 美元。只要 Charlie 和我始终把你们的钱当作我们自己的钱来对待，Berkshire 的经理人也就很可能同样谨慎地使用这些资金。
Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.
我们的薪酬制度、年度股东大会，乃至年度报告，全部都围绕着一个目标来设计：强化 Berkshire 的企业文化，并让这种文化自动排斥乃至“排除”那些价值观不同的经理人。这样的文化每年都在不断增强，即使在 Charlie 和我离开舞台很久之后，它依然会保持完整。
We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.
要想取得尚可的成绩，我们需要用上刚才所说的全部优势。我们的经理人一定会交出答卷，这一点你可以放心。但 Charlie 和我在资本配置方面能否不拖后腿，在某种程度上还要取决于收购领域的竞争环境。无论如何，你们都会得到我们的最大努力。
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