2013-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2013-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*

2012年，Berkshire 为股东实现总收益241亿美元。我们拿出其中13亿美元回购公司股票，因此当年净资产增加了228亿美元。我们的 Class A 与 Class B 两类股票的每股账面价值均上涨14.4%。过去48年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），账面价值已从19美元增长到114,214美元，按年复合增长率计算为19.7%＊。

All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

本报告中的每股数据均对应 Berkshire 的 A 股；B 股的数字为 A 股的 1/1500。

A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.

去年 Berkshire 有不少好事发生，但先把坏消息说在前面。

+ When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.

1965年我管理的合伙企业接管 Berkshire 时，我无论如何也想不到，在我们取得241亿美元收益的一年里，按照本页对照的口径，结果竟然会是“低于平均”的。

But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.

但结果确实不理想。48年中第9次，Berkshire 的账面价值增幅低于 S&P 的涨幅（该计算口径包含股息与价格上涨）。需要说明的是，在这9次中的8次，S&P 的涨幅达到或超过15%。在逆风环境中，我们的表现更好。

To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of fiveyear wins will end.

迄今我们从未出现过连续五年跑输的情形，在滚动五年期上已43次跑赢 S&P（记录见第103页）。但过去四年里，S&P 每年都在上涨，该期间的表现超过了我们。若2013年市场继续走高，我们的“五年连胜”纪录将告终。

One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value – for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy – at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.

有一件事你可以确定：无论 Berkshire 的业绩如何，我的合伙人、公司副董事长 Charlie Munger 和我都不会更换衡量的“尺子”。我们的职责是让内在商业价值增长——我们以账面价值作为一个明显低估的代理——而且要快于 S&P 的市场涨幅。若能做到这一点，尽管股价逐年难以预测，但从长期看 Berkshire 的股价也会跑赢 S&P。反之，如果做不到，我们的管理层就没有为投资者带来任何增值；投资者自己买一只低成本指数基金也能获得 S&P 的回报。

Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.

我与 Charlie 认为，从长期看 Berkshire 的内在价值增长很可能会以小幅优势超过 S&P 的回报。我们对此有信心，因为我们拥有一批出色的企业、一支卓越的经营经理团队，以及以股东为导向的文化。不过，我们的相对表现几乎可以肯定会在市场下跌或横盘时更好；而在市场特别强劲的年份，预计我们会落后。

+ The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.

2012年的第二个遗憾，是我未能完成一笔大型收购。我追逐过几头“大象”，但最终空手而归。

Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.

不过，我们的运气在今年年初发生了变化。2月，我们同意收购一家将持有 H. J. Heinz 全部股权的控股公司50%的股份。另一半将由 Jorge Paulo Lemann（著名的巴西企业家与慈善家）领导的一小组投资者持有。

We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.

合作伙伴再好不过了。Jorge Paulo 是我多年的朋友，也是一位非凡的经营者。他的团队与 Berkshire 将各自投入约40亿美元作为控股公司的普通股权益。Berkshire 还将以优先股形式投资80亿美元，票面股息为9%。该优先股还有两项显著提升其价值的条款：未来某个时点将以大幅溢价被赎回；同时配有权证，允许我们以象征性价格购买该控股公司5%的普通股。

Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.

我们约120亿美元的总投资，基本用上了 Berkshire 去年赚取的相当一部分资金。但我们仍然持有充裕的现金，而且正以不俗的速度继续产生现金流。于是重返“狩猎场”；我和 Charlie 又穿上“探险装”，继续寻找“大象”。

Now to some good news from 2012:

下面来说些2012年的好消息：

+ Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – our five most profitable non-insurance companies – were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “powerhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.

去年我告诉你们，BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、Marmon Group 与 MidAmerican Energy——我们最赚钱的五家非保险子公司——2012年很可能实现超过100亿美元的税前利润。他们兑现了承诺。尽管美国增长乏力、全球许多地区经济走弱，我们这“五大王牌”的合计利润达到101亿美元，较2011年多出约6亿美元。

Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.

在这五家里，八年前只有 MidAmerican（当时税前利润为3.93亿美元）属于 Berkshire。此后，我们又以全现金方式收购了其中三家。在收购第五家 BNSF 时，我们约70%的对价以现金支付，其余部分通过发行股票完成，使在外流通股数增加了6.1%。因此，这五家公司为 Berkshire 带来的年收益增加97亿美元，而摊薄幅度仅为轻微。这符合我们的目标：不只是做大，而是提升每股成果。

Unless the U.S. economy tanks – which we don’t expect – our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.

除非美国经济大幅下滑（我们并不预期），我们的五大王牌在2013年应会再次贡献更高的收益。掌舵它们的五位出色 CEO 会确保做到这一点。

+ Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.

尽管我在2012年没能拿下一笔大型并购，我们各子公司的经理人表现却好得多。我们在“bolt-on”式收购上创下纪录，花约23亿美元把26家公司并入现有业务。这些交易均未要求 Berkshire 发行任何股份。

Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.

Charlie 和我钟爱这类收购：通常风险低，对总部毫无负担，并能扩大我们已被验证的经理人施展才能的疆界。

+ Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.

去年我们的保险业务表现耀眼。在为 Berkshire 提供730亿美元可供投资的“免费资金”的同时，也交出了16亿美元的承保利润，已连续第十年承保盈利。这真是既要又要（鱼与熊掌兼得）。

GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.

GEICO 领跑，在不牺牲承保纪律的前提下持续吞噬市场份额。自我们在1995年取得控制权以来，GEICO 在个人汽车保险市场的份额已从2.5%升至9.7%；同期保费规模从28亿美元增至167亿美元。未来增长空间仍然很大。

The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.

GEICO 非凡表现的功劳属于 Tony Nicely 及其27,000名同事。当然也要把我们的 Gecko 算进去。风雨无阻、夜色难挡——这只小蜥蜴始终在前行，告诉美国人上 GEICO.com 可以省下大笔费用。

When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.

当我细数上天的恩赐时，我会把 GEICO 算两遍。

+ Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.

我们的新投资经理 Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler，已经证明自己聪明干练、品行端正，不仅在资产组合管理之外的诸多方面助力 Berkshire，而且与我们的文化高度契合。能有这两位，真是捡到宝。2012年他们各自都以两位数的优势跑赢 S&P 500，也把我远远甩在了身后。

Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.

因此，我们把每人管理的资金提高到接近50亿美元（其中一部分来自我们子公司的养老金）。Todd 和 Ted 年轻有为，在 Charlie 和我退场很久之后，仍会管理 Berkshire 庞大的投资组合。等他们接手时，你们大可放心。

+ Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.

Berkshire 年末员工总数创纪录地达到288,462人（详见第106页），较上年增加17,604人。而我们总部团队人数仍维持在24人，不必兴师动众。

+ Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo – all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.

Berkshire 的“四大”投资——American Express、Coca-Cola、IBM 和 Wells Fargo——全年表现都不错。我们在每一家公司的持股权益都有所提升。我们增持了 Wells Fargo（持股从2011年年末的7.6%升至8.7%）和 IBM（从5.5%升至6.0%）。同时，Coca-Cola 与 American Express 的回购也抬升了我们的持股比例：在 Coca-Cola 的权益从8.8%增至8.9%，在 American Express 的权益从13.0%增至13.7%。

Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

未来我们在这四家公司的持股比例大概率还会继续上升。Mae West 说得对：“太多的好东西也会很美妙。”

The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.

这四家公司各自拥有出色的业务，由既有才干又以股东为导向的经理人经营。对 Berkshire 而言，我们更愿意在一家优秀企业里持有非控股但可观的份额，而不是去拥有一家平庸企业的100%股权。我们在资本配置上的灵活性，让我们相较于那些只局限于收购自己能运营公司的企业，具备显著优势。

Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.

按年末的持股数量计算，我们分享“四大”在2012年的利润为39亿美元。但在对你们披露的收益里，我们只计入已收取的股息——约11亿美元。别搞错：那未计入报表的28亿美元利润对我们而言，价值丝毫不逊于已经记录的部分。

The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases – which enhance our share of future earnings – and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).

这四家公司所保留的利润，往往用于回购（从而提升我们未来收益的占比），也用于支持通常颇为合算的业务机会。长期看，我们预计能从这四家被投企业获得大幅更高的利润。若判断正确，Berkshire 的股息收入将随之增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本利得也会增长（这四项在年末合计为267亿美元）。

+ There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capitalallocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan’s new country song, “Every Storm Runs Out of Rain.”

去年不少 CEO 在做资本配置决策时高喊“充满不确定性”而扼腕叹息（尽管他们的许多业务在利润和现金上都创了新高）。在 Berkshire，我们并不认同这种恐惧；相反，2012年我们在厂房与设备上的支出创纪录地达到98亿美元，其中约88%投在美国。这比我们2011年的支出（此前纪录）还高出19%。不管专家们怎么说，Charlie 和我都喜欢把大笔资金投向值得的项目。相反，我们更愿意听 Gary Allan 新乡村歌曲《Every Storm Runs Out of Rain》里的那句歌词。

We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.

我们会把油门继续踩到底，2013年资本开支几乎肯定会再创纪录。美国机遇处处可见。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).

给各位 CEO 的一点想法：当然，眼前的未来充满不确定；自 1776 年以来，美国一直直面未知。只是有时人们会盯着那些始终存在的无数不确定性，有时又会忽略它们（通常因为最近一段时间风平浪静）。

American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)

从长期看，美国商业会表现良好。股票也同样会表现出色，因为它们的命运与企业业绩相系。周期性挫折当然会出现，但投资者与经理人参与的是一场对他们极为有利的游戏。（20 世纪中，Dow Jones Industrials 从 66 上涨至 11,497，惊人的 17,320% 增幅，尽管期间经历了四场代价高昂的战争、一次大萧条以及多次经济衰退。而且别忘了，整个世纪里股东还获得了可观的股息。）

Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.

既然这场基本游戏如此有利，Charlie 和我认为，按照塔罗牌的指向、“专家”的预测或商业活动的起伏来进进出出，是严重的错误。与留在场内的风险相比，场外的风险要大得多。

My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day’s headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.

我的亲身经历就是一个鲜明例子：1942 年春天，当美国在太平洋战区屡遭重大损失、每天的头条都是新的挫败时，我完成了人生第一笔股票买入。即便如此，彼时没有人谈论“不确定性”；我所认识的每一位美国人都相信我们终将取胜。

The country’s success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.

国家自那段险恶岁月以来取得的成就令人惊叹：按通胀调整，人均 GDP 在 1941 至 2012 年间增长超过四倍。整个时期里，每一个明天都充满不确定。但美国的命运始终清晰：不断增长的富足。

If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you.

如果你是一位 CEO，正因为短期担忧而搁置某个规模大、能盈利的项目，请联系 Berkshire。让我们替你减负。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

总之，Charlie 和我希望通过以下方式提升每股内在价值：(1) 提升众多子公司的获利能力；(2) 通过“bolt-on”式收购进一步增加它们的收益；(3) 参与被投企业的增长；(4) 当 Berkshire 股价较内在价值存在有意义的折价时回购股份；以及 (5) 偶尔进行一笔大型并购。我们也将尽量通过极少、甚至不发行 Berkshire 新股来为你最大化成果。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.

这些“积木”建立在坚如磐石的基础上。一个世纪之后，BNSF 与 MidAmerican Energy 仍将继续在美国经济中扮演重要角色。并且，无论对企业还是个人，保险始终不可或缺——而在这一领域，没有哪家公司能带来比 Berkshire 更强大的资源。基于这些与其他优势，Charlie 和我对你们公司的前景非常看好。

Intrinsic Business Value

内在商业价值

As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of which was qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.

尽管 Charlie 和我经常谈论内在商业价值，但我们无法精确告诉你 Berkshire 每股（或任何其他股票）的那个数字是多少。不过，在我们 2010 年的年度报告中，已阐明三大要素——其中之一为定性因素——我们认为它们是合理评估 Berkshire 内在价值的关键。该部分的讨论已在第 104–105 页全文重印。

Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to $113,786, and our per-share pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments also increased 15.7% to $8,085.

以下是两个定量要素的最新数据：2012 年我们的每股投资增加 15.7% 至 113,786 美元；来自非保险与非投资业务的每股税前收益同样增长 15.7% 至 8,085 美元。

Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.

自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合 19.4% 的速度增长，而每股收益指标以 20.8% 的速度增长。Berkshire 股价在这 42 年里以与这两项价值指标非常接近的速度上涨，这绝非巧合。Charlie 和我希望两方面都实现增长，但我们的重心始终会放在夯实经营性收益上。

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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们来审视公司运营的四大板块。它们各自的资产负债表与损益特征差异巨大，混在一起只会妨碍分析。因此，我们将把它们作为四个独立业务来呈现——这也是 Charlie 和我看待它们的方式。

Insurance

保险

Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

先看保险，这是 Berkshire 的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collectnow, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains quite stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:

财产意外险（“P/C”）保险公司先收取保费、后支付赔款。在极端情况下（例如某些工伤赔偿事故），赔付期可延续数十年。这种“先收、后付”的模式使我们持有大量资金——我们称之为“float”（浮存金）——最终将付诸他人。与此同时，我们可以将这笔浮存金用于 Berkshire 的投资收益。虽然单个保单与赔案此起彼伏，但相对于保费规模，我们持有的浮存金金额相当稳定。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。我们的增长情况如何，见下表所示：

Last year I told you that our float was likely to level off or even decline a bit in the future. Our insurance CEOs set out to prove me wrong and did, increasing float last year by $2.5 billion. I now expect a further increase in 2013. But further gains will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 2% in any year.

去年我告诉你们，我们的浮存金未来很可能趋于持平，甚至略有下降。我们的保险业务的 CEO 们决意证明我错了，而且确实做到了：去年浮存金增加了25亿美元。现在我预计 2013 年还会进一步上升。但要取得更多增量将会很艰难。利好的一面是，GEICO 的浮存金几乎可以肯定会增长；然而，在 National Indemnity 的再保险部门，我们有若干 run-off 合同，其浮存金在缓慢下滑。即便将来某个时候我们的浮存金出现下降，也会非常渐进——极限情况下，任何一年的降幅都不会超过 2%。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That’s like your taking out a loan and having the bank pay you interest.

如果我们的保费高于费用与最终损失之和，我们就会产生承保利润，这会叠加在浮存金所带来的投资收益之上。当取得这样的利润时，我们既能使用“免费资金”，更妙的是还因持有它而获得报酬。这就好比你去借钱，结果银行还倒贴你利息。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the eleven years ending in 2011. (Their financials for 2012 are not yet available.) There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry never ceases searching for new ones.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都想达成这种美好结果，这就引发了激烈竞争；多数年份里竞争之猛烈，导致整个财险行业处于显著的承保亏损状态。实质上，这种亏损就是行业为持有其浮存金所支付的“成本”。例如，State Farm 作为全美规模最大的保险公司，同时管理良好，在截至 2011 年的 11 年中有 8 年出现了承保亏损（其 2012 年的财务数据尚未公布）。在保险业里，有很多亏钱的方式，而且行业从未停止发明新的方式。

As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for ten consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $18.6 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. If we do, our float will be better than free money.

正如本报告第一部分所述，我们已经连续十年实现了承保盈利，该期间累计税前收益为186亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们在多数年份仍将保持承保盈利。若能如此，我们的浮存金将“好过免费资金”。

So how does our attractive float affect the calculations of intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to look at float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe Berkshire’s will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.

那么，如此诱人的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算？在计算 Berkshire 的账面价值时，我们的全部浮存金被作为负债扣除，就好像我们明天就要把它全部支付出去且无法补充一样。但这并非审视浮存金的正确方式；它应被视为一笔“可循环的资金池”。如果浮存金既无成本又可长期持续——我相信 Berkshire 的浮存金正是如此——那么这项负债的真实经济价值要远低于其会计口径的负债。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the floatgenerating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

对这一被高估的负债，部分的对冲来自于 155 亿美元计入账面价值、归属于我们保险公司的“商誉”资产。从实质上讲，这些商誉代表着我们为保险业务“产出浮存金”的能力所支付的价款。然而，商誉的入账成本与其真实价值并无必然关系。举例说，如果一家保险业务持续发生巨大且长期的承保亏损，那么无论最初成本是多少，账上任何相应的商誉都应被视为毫无价值。

Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation producing float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.

幸运的是，Berkshire 并非如此。Charlie 和我认为，我们保险业务商誉的真实经济价值——也就是我们乐于为一项能产出同等质量浮存金的保险业务所支付的价格——远高于其历史账面价值。我们的浮存金之价值，正是我们相信 Berkshire 的内在商业价值显著高于其账面价值的原因之一——而且是极其重要的一个原因。

Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: There is very little “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue.

我再强调一次：对整个财险行业而言，零成本的浮存金并非可普遍指望的结果；保险世界里“Berkshire 级别”的浮存金少之又少。在截至 2011 年的 45 年中，有 37 年行业保费不足以覆盖赔款加费用。因此，数十年来该行业在有形股本上的总体回报远低于美国企业的平均回报——这种令人遗憾的表现几乎可以肯定会延续。

A further unpleasant reality adds to the industry’s dim prospects: Insurance earnings are now benefitting from “legacy” bond portfolios that deliver much higher yields than will be available when funds are reinvested during the next few years – and perhaps for many years beyond that. Today’s bond portfolios are, in effect, wasting assets. Earnings of insurers will be hurt in a significant way as bonds mature and are rolled over.

还有一项不太愉快的现实令行业前景更显黯淡：保险公司的收益当前正受益于“遗留”的债券组合，这些组合的收益率远高于未来几年（或更长时间）资金再投资所能获得的水平。就效果而言，如今的债券组合是一类“消耗性资产”。随着债券到期并被滚动续作，保险公司的盈利将受到实质性冲击。

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Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.

Berkshire 出色的经济性之所以存在，只因为我们有一些杰出的经理人在经营几项非凡的保险业务。让我来介绍几个主要单元。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because it has so many streams of earnings. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.

按浮存金规模排在第一的是 Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group，由 Ajit Jain 负责。Ajit 承保那些别人既无意愿也无资本承接的风险。他所领导的业务在产能、速度、决断力以及——最重要的——头脑方面，达到了保险业中独一无二的组合水准。然而，他从不让 Berkshire 暴露于与我们资源不相称的风险之下。事实上，在规避风险方面，我们比大多数大型保险公司更为保守。举例说，若发生某种特大灾害使整个保险业遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——约为历史上任何损失的三倍——凭借多元的收益来源，Berkshire 作为一个整体当年仍很可能录得可观利润；与此同时，其他所有大型保险与再保险公司将深陷亏损，其中一些甚至面临资不抵债。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $35 billion and a significant cumulative underwriting profit, a feat that no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. He has thus added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. If you meet Ajit at the annual meeting, bow deeply.

自 1985 年白手起家以来，Ajit 打造出一家拥有 350 亿美元浮存金且累计承保利润可观的保险业务——这是一项其他任何保险公司 CEO 都难以企及的成就。由此，他为 Berkshire 的价值增添了数以十亿美元计的体量。如果你在年度股东会上遇到 Ajit，请深鞠一躬。

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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们还有一家再保险劲旅 General Re，由 Tad Montross 负责管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

归根结底，稳健的保险经营需要遵循四条纪律：(1) 理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险暴露；(2) 以保守方式评估各项暴露实际造成损失的概率及一旦发生的可能成本；(3) 设定一种平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本与经营费用之后仍能产生利润的保费；以及 (4) 若无法取得合理保费，就必须愿意转身放弃业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司能通过前三项测试，却在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法对竞争对手热衷承保的业务转身说“不”。那句老话——“别人都在做，我们也得做”——在任何行业都预示麻烦，而在保险业尤甚。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has achieved consistent and profitable growth since we acquired the company in 1998.

Tad 严格遵循了这四条“戒律”，结果一目了然。在他的领导下，General Re 庞大的浮存金不仅“免费”，甚至还能赚钱；我们预计平均而言这种状态将得以延续。我们对 General Re 的国际寿险再保险业务尤为看好，自 1998 年收购以来该业务一直保持持续且盈利的增长。

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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 62 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 51 years of service in 2012.

最后是 GEICO，这家保险公司是我 62 年前“入行磨砺”之处。GEICO 由 Tony Nicely 掌舵，他在 18 岁加入公司，并于 2012 年完成了 51 年的服务。

I rub my eyes when I look at what Tony has accomplished. Last year, it should be noted, his record was considerably better than is indicated by GEICO’s GAAP underwriting profit of $680 million. Because of a change in accounting rules at the beginning of the year, we recorded a charge to GEICO’s underwriting earnings of $410 million. This item had nothing to do with 2012’s operating results, changing neither cash, revenues, expenses nor taxes. In effect, the writedown simply widened the already huge difference between GEICO’s intrinsic value and the value at which we carry it on our books.

看到 Tony 的成绩，我都要揉揉眼睛。需要说明的是，去年他的实际表现远好于 GAAP 下 GEICO 披露的 6.8 亿美元承保利润所反映的水平。由于年初会计规则变更，我们在 GEICO 的承保收益中确认了 4.10 亿美元的费用。该项目与 2012 年经营结果毫无关系：既不改变现金、收入、费用，也不影响税项。实质上，这笔减记只是扩大了 GEICO 的内在价值与我们账面计价之间本已巨大的差距。

GEICO earned its underwriting profit, moreover, despite the company suffering its largest single loss in history. The cause was Hurricane Sandy, which cost GEICO more than three times the loss it sustained from Katrina, the previous record-holder. We insured 46,906 vehicles that were destroyed or damaged in the storm, a staggering number reflecting GEICO’s leading market share in the New York metropolitan area.

此外，即便公司经历了历史上最大的一笔单一损失，GEICO 仍然实现了承保利润。原因是 Hurricane Sandy，其造成的损失是此前纪录保持者 Katrina 的三倍多。此次风暴中我们承保的 46,906 辆车辆被毁或受损——这个惊人的数字反映了 GEICO 在 New York 大都会区的领先市场份额。

Last year GEICO enjoyed a meaningful increase in both the renewal rate for existing policyholders (“persistency”) and in the percentage of rate quotations that resulted in sales (“closures”). Big dollars ride on those two factors: A sustained gain in persistency of a bare one percentage point increases intrinsic value by more than $1 billion. GEICO’s gains in 2012 offer dramatic proof that when people check the company’s prices, they usually find they can save important sums. (Give us a try at 1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com. Be sure to mention that you are a shareholder; that fact will usually result in a discount.)

去年，GEICO 在两项指标上都取得了显著提升：对现有保单持有人的续保率（“persistency”）以及报价转化为成交的比例（“closures”）。这两项指标关系到真金白银：续保率哪怕长期仅提升 1 个百分点，也会将内在价值提高逾 10 亿美元。GEICO 在 2012 年的进步就是有力证据——人们只要核对公司的价格，通常会发现自己可以省下不小的金额。（欢迎拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 GEICO.com 试试。务必说明你是股东；这一事实通常能带来折扣。）

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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies have consistently delivered an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

除三大保险业务之外，我们还拥有一组规模较小的公司，其中大多活跃在保险生态的“偏门角落”。总体而言，这些公司始终保持承保盈利；此外，如下表所示，它们也为我们提供了可观的浮存金。Charlie 和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。

Late in 2012, we enlarged this group by acquiring Guard Insurance, a Wilkes-Barre company that writes workers compensation insurance, primarily for smaller businesses. Guard’s annual premiums total about $300 million. The company has excellent prospects for growth in both its traditional business and new lines it has begun to offer.

2012 年底，我们通过收购 Guard Insurance 扩充了这支队伍。Guard 位于 Wilkes-Barre，主要为中小企业承保工伤赔偿保险，年保费总额约 3 亿美元。无论在其传统业务还是其新近开拓的险种上，公司都具备出色的增长前景。

*After a $410 million charge against earnings arising from an industry-wide accounting change.

＊由于全行业会计变更导致对收益计提 4.10 亿美元费用之后。

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world. It was our lucky day when, in March 1967, Jack Ringwalt sold us his two property-casualty insurers for $8.6 million.

在大型保险业务当中，Berkshire 在我心中可谓全球最佳。1967 年 3 月，Jack Ringwalt 以 860 万美元将两家财险公司卖给我们，那一天对我们而言非常幸运。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管、资本密集型业务

We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们拥有两项主要业务——BNSF 与 MidAmerican Energy。它们具备一些与我们其他业务截然不同的重要共同特征。因此，在本信中我们为其单设一节，并在 GAAP 口径的资产负债表与利润表中单独列示它们的合并财务数据。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each business has earning power that even under terrible conditions amply covers its interest requirements. In last year’s tepid economy, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.6x. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as deeply flawed.) At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: the company’s recession-resistant earnings, which result from our exclusively offering an essential service, and its great diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.

这两家公司的关键特征，是在寿命极长且受监管的资产上进行巨额投资；其中一部分由大量长期债务融资，且并未得到 Berkshire 的担保。实际上并不需要我们的信用支持，因为各自业务的盈利能力即便在极端不利的情形下，也足以覆盖其利息支出。举例而言，在去年的低迷环境中，BNSF 的利息覆盖倍数为 9.6 倍。（我们对“覆盖倍数”的定义是税前利润/利息费用，而非市场常用但我们认为存在严重缺陷的 EBITDA/利息。）与此同时，在 MidAmerican，有两项关键因素确保其在任何情况下都能偿付债务：其一是公司具备抗衰退的盈利能力，源于我们专注提供不可或缺的服务；其二是收益来源高度多元，避免受任何单一监管机构的严重冲击。

Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:

我们的这两家子公司每天都以重要方式为美国经济“供能”：

+ BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact making BNSF the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.

BNSF 承运了全美约 15% 的城际货运（按吨英里计），无论这些货物最终是由卡车、铁路、水运、航空还是管道来运输。事实上，我们运输的货物吨英里数超过任何其他企业，使 BNSF 成为美国经济循环系统中最重要的“动脉”。

BNSF also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.

BNSF 在运输方式上也极其节能环保：每加仑柴油可将一吨货物运送约 500 英里；若由卡车承担同等运输任务，耗油量约为其四倍。

+ MidAmerican’s electric utilities serve regulated retail customers in ten states. Only one utility holding company serves more states. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: first, from a standing start nine years ago, we now account for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity. Second, when we complete three projects now under construction, we will own about 14% of U.S. solar-generation capacity.

MidAmerican 的电力公用事业向十个州的受监管零售客户提供服务；只有一家公用事业控股公司覆盖的州数更多。除此之外，我们在可再生能源领域处于领先地位：其一，自九年前从零起步以来，如今我们占据全美风电装机容量的 6%；其二，待目前在建的三个项目完工后，我们将拥有约占全美 14% 的光伏发电装机容量。

Projects like these require huge capital investments. Upon completion, indeed, our renewables portfolio will have cost $13 billion. We relish making such commitments if they promise reasonable returns – and on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

这类项目需要巨额资本投入。事实上，完工时我们的可再生能源资产组合累计投入将达 130 亿美元。只要能带来合理回报，我们乐于做出这样的承诺——在这方面，我们对未来的监管抱有高度信心。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. And it is in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a manner that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我们的信心既来自过往经验，也来自这样一个事实：社会永远需要在交通与能源领域进行大规模投资。政府出于自身利益，应当以有利于资金持续流向关键项目的方式来对待资本提供者。而从我们的自利角度出发，我们也必须以能赢得监管者及其所代表公众认可的方式来运营。

定性分析，聪明的假设。

Our managers must think today of what the country will need far down the road. Energy and transportation projects can take many years to come to fruition; a growing country simply can’t afford to get behind the curve.

我们的管理者必须从今天起思考国家在很远的未来需要什么。能源与交通项目往往需要多年才能见效；一个在增长中的国家绝不能落后于形势。

We have been doing our part to make sure that doesn’t happen. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting on our laurels: BNSF will spend about $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, roughly double its depreciation charge and more than any railroad has spent in a single year.

我们一直在尽自己的责任，确保这种落后不会发生。无论你听到多少关于美国基础设施正在崩坏的说法，都不适用于 BNSF 或美国铁路整体。美国的铁路体系从未像今天这样良好——这得益于行业的巨额投入。当然，我们并未因此而自满：2013 年 BNSF 将在铁路上投入约 40 亿美元，大约是其折旧额的两倍，也超过任何一家铁路公司在单一年份的投入规模。

In Matt Rose, at BNSF, and Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, we have two outstanding CEOs. They are extraordinary managers who have developed businesses that serve both their customers and owners well. Each has my gratitude and each deserves yours. Here are the key figures for their businesses:

在 BNSF 的 Matt Rose 与 MidAmerican 的 Greg Abel 身上，我们拥有两位杰出的 CEO。他们是非凡的管理者，把业务发展得既服务客户又造福股东。我向两位致以谢意，也请你们同样如此。以下是他们业务的关键数据：

Sharp-eyed readers will notice an incongruity in the MidAmerican earnings tabulation. What in the world is HomeServices, a real estate brokerage operation, doing in a section entitled “Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses?”

眼尖的读者会注意到 MidAmerican 的收益表中有一处不协调：一家名为 HomeServices 的房地产经纪业务，怎么会出现在题为“受监管、资本密集型业务”的章节里？

Well, its ownership came with MidAmerican when we bought control of that company in 2000. At that time, I focused on MidAmerican’s utility operations and barely noticed HomeServices, which then owned only a few real estate brokerage companies.

其实，这是我们在 2000 年收购 MidAmerican 控股权时“顺带”得到的。当时我的注意力放在 MidAmerican 的公用事业业务上，几乎没有留意 HomeServices，而那时它只是拥有寥寥数家房地产经纪公司。

Since then, however, the company has regularly added residential brokers – three in 2012 – and now has about 16,000 agents in a string of major U.S. cities. (Our real estate brokerage companies are listed on page 107.) In 2012, our agents participated in $42 billion of home sales, up 33% from 2011.

不过自那以后，公司持续收购住宅经纪商——仅 2012 年就新增 3 家——如今在一系列美国主要城市拥有大约 16,000 名经纪人。（我们的房地产经纪公司名单见第 107 页。）2012 年，我们的经纪人参与的住宅交易额达 420 亿美元，较 2011 年增长 33%。

Additionally, HomeServices last year purchased 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which together license 544 brokerage companies throughout the country and receive a small royalty on their sales. We have an arrangement to purchase the balance of those operations within five years. In the coming years, we will gradually rebrand both our franchisees and the franchise firms we own as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices.

此外，HomeServices 去年收购了 Prudential 与 Real Living 的特许经营业务 67% 的权益，这两项业务合计向全美 544 家经纪公司授权，并从其销售额中收取少量特许权使用费。我们已安排在五年内收购剩余权益。未来几年，我们将把自有的特许经营公司及我们的被特许经营商逐步统一更名为 Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices。

Ron Peltier has done an outstanding job in managing HomeServices during a depressed period. Now, as the housing market continues to strengthen, we expect earnings to rise significantly.

在低迷时期，Ron Peltier 对 HomeServices 的管理表现出色。如今随着住房市场持续走强，我们预计其盈利将显著上升。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务与零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

Berkshire 在这一部分的业务几乎包罗万象。下面先看看该板块整体的资产负债表与收益表摘要。

Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP. In particular, they exclude some purchase-accounting items, primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets. We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the real expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table.

我们的收入与费用数据中，符合 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles（“GAAP”）的部分在第 29 页。相较之下，上文的经营费用数字为非 GAAP（non-GAAP）。具体而言，它们剔除了部分购并会计（purchase accounting）项目，主要是某些无形资产的摊销。我们以这种方式呈现数据，是因为我与 Charlie 认为，经过调整的数字更准确地反映了汇总在该表中的各项业务的真实费用与利润。

I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are small and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others never lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real expenses. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when calculating earnings – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.

我不打算逐一解释所有调整——其中一些细小而晦涩——但严肃的投资者应当理解无形资产的差异性：有些资产确会随时间消耗，而另一些则从不减值。以软件为例，摊销费用显然是真实费用。至于其他无形资产的摊销，如客户关系的摊销，则源于购并会计规则，显然并非真实费用。GAAP 会计并不区分这两类摊销；换言之，在计算收益时两者都被计作费用——尽管从投资者视角看，它们截然不同。

In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $600 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real” – and indeed that is the portion we have included in the table above – and the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made.

在第 29 页符合 GAAP 的数据中，本节所含公司计提的 6 亿美元摊销被作为费用扣除。我们认为其中约 20% 属于“真实”费用——事实上，上表仅包含了这一部分——其余部分则不然。由于我们进行了大量收购，这一差异已变得十分显著。

“Non-real” amortization expense also looms large at some of our major investees. IBM has made many small acquisitions in recent years and now regularly reports “adjusted operating earnings,” a non-GAAP figure that excludes certain purchase-accounting adjustments. Analysts focus on this number, as they should.

在我们的若干重要被投企业中，“非真实”的摊销费用也相当可观。IBM 近年进行了许多小型收购，如今定期披露 “adjusted operating earnings”（调整后营业利润）这一非 GAAP 指标，剔除了某些购并会计调整。分析师关注这一数字，这是合理的。

A “non-real” amortization charge at Wells Fargo, however, is not highlighted by the company and never, to my knowledge, has been noted in analyst reports. The earnings that Wells Fargo reports are heavily burdened by an “amortization of core deposits” charge, the implication being that these deposits are disappearing at a fairly rapid clip. Yet core deposits regularly increase. The charge last year was about $1.5 billion. In no sense, except GAAP accounting, is this whopping charge an expense.

然而，Wells Fargo 的一项“非真实”摊销并未被公司强调，据我所知也从未被分析师报告提及。Wells Fargo 报告的利润被一项“核心存款摊销”（amortization of core deposits）严重拖累——其含义是这些存款正以相当快的速度消失。可事实是核心存款在持续增长。去年这一摊销约为 15 亿美元。除 GAAP 会计外，从任何意义上说，这笔巨额摊销都不是费用。

And that ends today’s accounting lecture. Why is no one shouting “More, more?”

今天的会计课就到这里。怎么没人喊“再来点”？

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The crowd of companies in this section sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation.

本节的这些公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机，无所不包。以未加杠杆净有形资产的收益来衡量，其中一些业务的经济性极佳，税后回报从 25% 到超过 100% 不等；另一些业务产生 12–20% 的良好回报；但也有少数回报很差，那是我在资本配置工作中犯下一些严重错误的结果。

More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the compelling logic of his position, I have sometimes reverted to my old habit of bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible. Fortunately, my mistakes have usually occurred when I made smaller purchases. Our large acquisitions have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well.

50 多年前，Charlie 告诉我：以公道的价格买入一家杰出的企业，远胜于以极佳的价格买入一家普通的企业。尽管这个观点的逻辑极具说服力，我有时仍会回到过去“捡便宜”的老习惯，结果从尚可到糟糕不等。幸运的是，我的错误通常发生在较小规模的收购上。我们的大型并购整体表现良好，少数案例更是出色非常。

Viewed as a single entity, therefore, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employ $22.6 billion of net tangible assets and, on that base, earned 16.3% after-tax.

因此，作为一个整体来看，这一组公司构成了一项优秀的业务。它们动用 226 亿美元净有形资产，并在此基础上实现了 16.3% 的税后回报。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the price paid is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for intangible assets. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulatedindustry segments is far greater. It is there that the huge winners reside.

当然，即便业务经济性出众，若付出的价格过高，也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资。我们的多数业务相对净有形资产支付了相当可观的溢价，这一成本反映在我们披露的庞大无形资产数字中。总体而言，我们在该板块投入的资本获得了不错的回报。此外，这些业务的内在价值合计显著高于其账面价值。尽管如此，在保险与受监管行业板块，内在价值与账面价值之间的差距要大得多——真正的大赢家就在那儿。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Marmon provides an example of a clear and substantial gap existing between book value and intrinsic value. Let me explain the odd origin of this differential.

Marmon 提供了一个账面价值与内在价值之间存在明确且巨大的差距的例子。让我解释一下这个差额的古怪来源。

Last year I told you that we had purchased additional shares in Marmon, raising our ownership to 80% (up from the 64% we acquired in 2008). I also told you that GAAP accounting required us to immediately record the 2011 purchase on our books at far less than what we paid. I’ve now had a year to think about this weird accounting rule, but I’ve yet to find an explanation that makes any sense – nor can Charlie or Marc Hamburg, our CFO, come up with one. My confusion increases when I am told that if we hadn’t already owned 64%, the 16% we purchased in 2011 would have been entered on our books at our cost.

去年我告诉你们，我们又增持了 Marmon 的股份，把持股比例提高到 80%（高于我们在 2008 年取得的 64%）。我也提到，GAAP 会计要求我们把 2011 年的那次购买按远低于实际支付的金额入账。到现在我已经有一年的时间来琢磨这条怪异的会计规则，但仍找不到任何说得通的解释——Charlie 和我们的 CFO Marc Hamburg 也同样无解。当我得知，如果我们当时并未已持有 64%，那么 2011 年购买的那 16% 就可以按我们的成本入账时，我的困惑更甚。

In 2012 (and in early 2013, retroactive to yearend 2012) we acquired an additional 10% of Marmon and the same bizarre accounting treatment was required. The $700 million write-off we immediately incurred had no effect on earnings but did reduce book value and, therefore, 2012’s gain in net worth.

在 2012 年（以及 2013 年年初，追溯至 2012 年年末），我们又收购了 Marmon 的 10% 股权，并且被要求采用同样怪异的会计处理。我们立即确认了 7 亿美元的减记，这对收益没有影响，但确实降低了账面价值，从而减少了 2012 年净资产的增幅。

The cost of our recent 10% purchase implies a $12.6 billion value for the 90% of Marmon we now own. Our balance-sheet carrying value for the 90%, however, is $8 billion. Charlie and I believe our current purchase represents excellent value. If we are correct, our Marmon holding is worth at least $4.6 billion more than its carrying value.

我们最近这 10% 的购买成本意味着，我们如今持有的 Marmon 90% 股权的价值为 126 亿美元。然而，我们资产负债表上这 90% 的账面计价仅为 80 亿美元。Charlie 和我认为此次增持物超所值。若我们的判断正确，我们所持 Marmon 的价值至少比账面计价高出 46 亿美元。

Marmon is a diverse enterprise, comprised of about 150 companies operating in a wide variety of industries. Its largest business involves the ownership of tank cars that are leased to a variety of shippers, such as oil and chemical companies. Marmon conducts this business through two subsidiaries, Union Tank Car in the U.S. and Procor in Canada.

Marmon 是一家多元化企业，由约 150 家公司组成，分布在众多行业。其最大的一项业务是拥有罐车，并将其租赁给各类托运人，如石油与化工公司。Marmon 通过两家子公司开展这项业务：美国的 Union Tank Car 与加拿大的 Procor。

Union Tank Car has been around a long time, having been owned by the Standard Oil Trust until that empire was broken up in 1911. Look for its UTLX logo on tank cars when you watch trains roll by. As a Berkshire shareholder, you own the cars with that insignia. When you spot a UTLX car, puff out your chest a bit and enjoy the same satisfaction that John D. Rockefeller undoubtedly experienced as he viewed his fleet a century ago.

Union Tank Car 历史悠久，曾属于 Standard Oil Trust，直至那个帝国在 1911 年被拆分。看火车经过时，留意罐车上的 UTLX 标识。作为 Berkshire 的股东，你拥有带有这一徽记的车辆。看到 UTLX 罐车时，不妨稍微挺起胸膛，体会一下一个世纪前 John D. Rockefeller 审视他车队时无疑也有的那份满足。

Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars having a net book value of $4 billion. A new car, it should be noted, costs upwards of $100,000. Union Tank Car is also a major manufacturer of tank cars – some of them to be sold but most to be owned by it and leased out. Today, its order book extends well into 2014.

罐车由托运人或出租人持有，而不是铁路公司。到年末，Union Tank Car 与 Procor 合计拥有 97,000 辆罐车，净账面价值为 40 亿美元。需要说明的是，一辆新罐车的成本超过 10 万美元。Union Tank Car 还是一家主要的罐车制造商——部分用来销售，但大多数自持并出租。如今，其在手订单已排到 2014 年之后很久。

At both BNSF and Marmon, we are benefitting from the resurgence of U.S. oil production. In fact, our railroad is now transporting about 500,000 barrels of oil daily, roughly 10% of the total produced in the “lower 48” (i.e. not counting Alaska and offshore). All indications are that BNSF’s oil shipments will grow substantially in coming years.

在 BNSF 与 Marmon 两家企业，我们都受益于美国石油产量的复苏。事实上，我们的铁路如今每天运输约 50 万桶原油，约占 “lower 48”（i.e. 不含阿拉斯加与近海）总产量的 10%。各项迹象表明，未来几年 BNSF 的石油运输量将大幅增长。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Space precludes us from going into detail about the many other businesses in this segment. Companyspecific information about the 2012 operations of some of the larger units appears on pages 76 to 79.

篇幅所限，我们无法详述该板块中众多其他业务的情况。部分大型单元在 2012 年的经营信息见第 76–79 页。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.

这一板块是我们最小的一个，包含两家租赁公司 XTRA（拖车）与 CORT（家具），以及 Clayton Homes，这是一家全美领先的制造房屋生产商与融资商。除这些 100% 持有的子公司外，我们还在此类目中纳入了一组金融资产，以及我们在 Berkadia Commercial Mortgage 的 50% 权益。

We include Clayton in this sector because it owns and services 332,000 mortgages, totaling $13.7 billion. In large part, these loans have been made to lower and middle-income families. Nevertheless, the loans have performed well throughout the housing collapse, thereby validating our conviction that a reasonable down payment and a sensible payments-to-income ratio will ward off outsized foreclosure losses, even during stressful times.

我们把 Clayton 划入这一板块，是因为它持有并服务 332,000 笔抵押贷款，合计 137 亿美元。这些贷款很大一部分发放给中低收入家庭。即便在房地产崩盘期间，这些贷款仍表现良好，从而印证了我们的信念：合理的首付与适当的还款收入比，即便在压力时期，也能避免过度的止赎损失。

Clayton also produced 25,872 manufactured homes last year, up 13.5% from 2011. That output accounted for about 4.8% of all single-family residences built in the country, a share that makes Clayton America’s number one homebuilder.

Clayton 去年还生产了 25,872 套制造房屋，较 2011 年增长 13.5%。这一产量约占全美新建独栋住宅的 4.8%，使 Clayton 成为美国第一大住宅建造商。

CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. Our expenditures for new rental equipment at XTRA totaled $256 million in 2012, more than double its depreciation expense. While competitors fret about today’s uncertainties, XTRA is preparing for tomorrow.

CORT 与 XTRA 也都是各自行业的领军者。2012 年，我们在 XTRA 的新租赁设备上的支出合计 2.56 亿美元，是其折旧费用的两倍多。当竞争对手为当下的不确定性而焦虑时，XTRA 正在为明天做准备。

Berkadia continues to do well. Our partners at Leucadia do most of the work in this venture, an arrangement that Charlie and I happily embrace.

Berkadia 继续表现出色。我们的合作伙伴 Leucadia 在这项合资中承担了大部分工作，这种安排让 Charlie 和我乐于接受。

Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:

以下是该板块的税前利润汇总：

Investments

投资

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

下方列示我们在年末市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资。

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

这是我们的实际买入价，同时也是我们的税务计税基础；由于必须进行的增值或减值调整，少数情况下 GAAP 所称的“成本”与之不同。

One point about the composition of this list deserves mention. In Berkshire’s past annual reports, every stock itemized in this space has been bought by me, in the sense that I made the decision to buy it for Berkshire. But starting with this list, any investment made by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler – or a combined purchase by them – that meets the dollar threshold for the list ($1 billion this year) will be included. Above is the first such stock, DIRECTV, which both Todd and Ted hold in their portfolios and whose combined holdings at the end of 2012 were valued at the $1.15 billion shown.

关于这张清单的构成，有一点值得说明。过去在 Berkshire 的年报中，此处逐项列示的每只股票都由我“买入”，也就是由我为 Berkshire 作出买入决策。但从这份清单开始，凡是由 Todd Combs 或 Ted Weschler 买入——或两人合计买入——且达到列示金额门槛（今年为 10 亿美元）的投资，都会被纳入。上方所示的第一只股票是 DIRECTV，Todd 与 Ted 的投资组合中都持有该股，两人合计的 2012 年年末持仓市值为 11.5 亿美元。

Todd and Ted also manage the pension funds of certain Berkshire subsidiaries, while others, for regulatory reasons, are managed by outside advisers. We do not include holdings of the pension funds in our annual report tabulations, though their portfolios often overlap Berkshire’s.

此外，Todd 与 Ted 还管理 Berkshire 若干子公司的养老金，而另一些出于监管原因由外部顾问管理。我们在年报统计中不包含这些养老金的持仓，尽管它们的投资组合常与 Berkshire 自身的持仓有所重叠。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We continue to wind down the part of our derivatives portfolio that involved the assumption by Berkshire of insurance-like risks. (Our electric and gas utility businesses, however, will continue to use derivatives for operational purposes.) New commitments would require us to post collateral and, with minor exceptions, we are unwilling to do that. Markets can behave in extraordinary ways, and we have no interest in exposing Berkshire to some out-of-the-blue event in the financial world that might require our posting mountains of cash on a moment’s notice.

我们继续压缩那部分让 Berkshire 承担类似保险风险的衍生品头寸。（不过，我们的电力与天然气公用事业出于运营目的仍会使用衍生品。）新的承诺将要求我们缴纳保证金，除极少数例外，我们不愿这样做。市场可能以非同寻常的方式运行，我们无意让 Berkshire 暴露于金融世界里那种突如其来的事件之下，从而被迫在顷刻之间缴纳堆积如山的现金保证金。

Charlie and I believe in operating with many redundant layers of liquidity, and we avoid any sort of obligation that could drain our cash in a material way. That reduces our returns in 99 years out of 100. But we will survive in the 100th while many others fail. And we will sleep well in all 100.

Charlie 和我主张以多重冗余的流动性来运营，并回避任何可能实质性抽走我们现金的义务。这样做在 100 年里有 99 年会降低我们的回报。但在第 100 年，许多人会倒下，而我们会活下来。而在这 100 年里我们都能睡个安稳觉。

The derivatives we have sold that provide credit protection for corporate bonds will all expire in the next year. It’s now almost certain that our profit from these contracts will approximate $1 billion pre-tax. We also received very substantial sums upfront on these derivatives, and the “float” attributable to them has averaged about $2 billion over their five-year lives. All told, these derivatives have provided a more-than-satisfactory result, especially considering the fact that we were guaranteeing corporate credits – mostly of the high-yield variety – throughout the financial panic and subsequent recession.

我们卖出的、为公司债提供信用保护的衍生品将于明年全部到期。如今几乎可以确定，我们在这些合约上的税前利润将接近 10 亿美元。我们在这些衍生品上还预先收取了可观的金额，与其相对应的“浮存金”在五年期限内平均约为 20 亿美元。总的来说，这些衍生品带来的结果绰绰有余，尤其要考虑到我们是在整个金融恐慌及随后的衰退期间为公司信用——多为高收益类别——提供担保。

In our other major derivatives commitment, we sold long-term puts on four leading stock indices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts were initiated between 2004 and 2008 and even under the worst of circumstances have only minor collateral requirements. In 2010 we unwound about 10% of our exposure at a profit of $222 million. The remaining contracts expire between 2018 and 2026. Only the index value at expiration date counts; our counterparties have no right to early termination.

在我们另一项重要的衍生品承诺中，我们卖出了针对 U.S.、U.K.、Europe 与 Japan 四个主要股票指数的长期看跌期权。这些合约签订于 2004 至 2008 年，即便在最糟情形下也仅有很小的保证金要求。2010 年我们平掉了约 10% 的头寸，获利 2.22 亿美元。剩余合约将在 2018 至 2026 年间到期。只有到期日的指数点位才算数；我们的对手方无权提前终止。

Berkshire received premiums of $4.2 billion when we wrote the contracts that remain outstanding. If all of these contracts had come due at yearend 2011, we would have had to pay $6.2 billion; the corresponding figure at yearend 2012 was $3.9 billion. With this large drop in immediate settlement liability, we reduced our GAAP liability at yearend 2012 to $7.5 billion from $8.5 billion at the end of 2011. Though it’s no sure thing, Charlie and I believe it likely that the final liability will be considerably less than the amount we currently carry on our books. In the meantime, we can invest the $4.2 billion of float derived from these contracts as we see fit.

我们在签下这些尚未到期的合约时共收取了 42 亿美元权利金。若这些合约都在 2011 年年末到期，我们需要支付 62 亿美元；而 2012 年年末的相应数字为 39 亿美元。随着这一即期结算负债的大幅下降，我们将 2012 年年末的 GAAP 负债从 2011 年年末的 85 亿美元降至 75 亿美元。尽管并非板上钉钉，Charlie 和我认为，最终负债很可能远低于我们目前账上所计金额。与此同时，我们可以按自己的判断来投资这些合约带来的 42 亿美元浮存金。

We Buy Some Newspapers . . . Newspapers?

我们买了些报纸……报纸？

During the past fifteen months, we acquired 28 daily newspapers at a cost of $344 million. This may puzzle you for two reasons. First, I have long told you in these letters and at our annual meetings that the circulation, advertising and profits of the newspaper industry overall are certain to decline. That prediction still holds. Second, the properties we purchased fell far short of meeting our oft-stated size requirements for acquisitions.

在过去十五个月里，我们以3.44亿美元的成本收购了28家日报。这可能有两个方面让你困惑。第一，我长期在这些信件和我们的年度会议上告诉你，整个报业的发行量、广告和利润肯定会下降。这个判断依然有效。第二，我们购买的标的远远达不到我们常常强调的并购规模要求。

We can address the second point easily. Charlie and I love newspapers and, if their economics make sense, will buy them even when they fall far short of the size threshold we would require for the purchase of, say, a widget company. Addressing the first point requires me to provide a more elaborate explanation, including some history.

第二点很好解释。Charlie 和我热爱报纸，只要其经济性说得通，即使它们远远达不到我们收购（比如某个零部件公司）时会要求的规模门槛，我们也会买。至于第一点，则需要我做更详细的说明，包括一点历史。

News, to put it simply, is what people don’t know that they want to know. And people will seek their news – what’s important to them – from whatever sources provide the best combination of immediacy, ease of access, reliability, comprehensiveness and low cost. The relative importance of these factors varies with the nature of the news and the person wanting it.

简单说，新闻就是人们还不知道、但想要知道的东西。人们会从能在“及时性、可获得性、可靠性、全面性和低成本”上提供最佳组合的任何来源去获取与自己相关的重要信息。这些因素的相对重要性，会因新闻的性质和读者的不同而变化。

Before television and the Internet, newspapers were the primary source for an incredible variety of news, a fact that made them indispensable to a very high percentage of the population. Whether your interests were international, national, local, sports or financial quotations, your newspaper usually was first to tell you the latest information. Indeed, your paper contained so much you wanted to learn that you received your money’s worth, even if only a small number of its pages spoke to your specific interests. Better yet, advertisers typically paid almost all of the product’s cost, and readers rode their coattails.

在电视和互联网出现之前，报纸是各种各样新闻的首要来源，这使其对相当大比例的人群不可或缺。无论你关注国际、国内、地方、体育还是金融行情，你的报纸通常都是最先告诉你最新信息的。事实上，报纸包含了太多你想了解的内容，即便只有少数版面契合你的特定兴趣，你也物有所值。更妙的是，广告商通常承担了几乎全部的产品成本，读者则“搭了便车”。

Additionally, the ads themselves delivered information of vital interest to hordes of readers, in effect providing even more “news.” Editors would cringe at the thought, but for many readers learning what jobs or apartments were available, what supermarkets were carrying which weekend specials, or what movies were showing where and when was far more important than the views expressed on the editorial page.

此外，广告本身也向大量读者传递了至关重要的信息，实际上提供了更多“新闻”。编辑可能会对此皱眉，但对许多读者而言，了解有哪些工作或公寓可选、哪些超市有周末特价、哪些电影何时何地上映，比社论版表达的观点重要得多。

In turn, the local paper was indispensable to advertisers. If Sears or Safeway built stores in Omaha, they required a “megaphone” to tell the city’s residents why their stores should be visited today. Indeed, big department stores and grocers vied to outshout their competition with multi-page spreads, knowing that the goods they advertised would fly off the shelves. With no other megaphone remotely comparable to that of the newspaper, ads sold themselves.

反过来，本地报纸对广告主也不可或缺。若 Sears 或 Safeway 在 Omaha 开店，他们需要一个“扩音器”告诉市民为什么今天就该去逛店。事实上，大百货商店和杂货商用多版面广告争相盖过竞争对手的声量，因为他们知道，被宣传的商品会迅速脱销。在没有任何其他可与报纸相提并论的“扩音器”的情况下，广告几乎是“自带销量”的。

As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, its profits were certain to be extraordinary; whether it was managed well or poorly made little difference. (As one Southern publisher famously confessed, “I owe my exalted position in life to two great American institutions – nepotism and monopoly.”)

只要一座城市里只有一家报纸，它的利润就几乎必然非同寻常；管理得好或差，影响都不大。（正如一位南方出版人著名的自白：“我之所以位高权重，归功于两大美国制度——裙带关系与垄断。”）

Over the years, almost all cities became one-newspaper towns (or harbored two competing papers that joined forces to operate as a single economic unit). This contraction was inevitable because most people wished to read and pay for only one paper. When competition existed, the paper that gained a significant lead in circulation almost automatically received the most ads. That left ads drawing readers and readers drawing ads. This symbiotic process spelled doom for the weaker paper and became known as “survival of the fattest.”

多年来，几乎所有城市都变成“一报城市”（或者拥有两家竞争报纸，但合并为一个经济实体运营）。这种收缩不可避免，因为大多数人只愿意阅读并为一份报纸付费。一旦存在竞争，在发行量上取得显著领先的那份报纸几乎自然而然地获得最多广告。于是广告吸引读者、读者又吸引广告。这种共生过程注定了弱者的结局，被称作“最胖者生存”。

Now the world has changed. Stock market quotes and the details of national sports events are old news long before the presses begin to roll. The Internet offers extensive information about both available jobs and homes. Television bombards viewers with political, national and international news. In one area of interest after another, newspapers have therefore lost their “primacy.” And, as their audiences have fallen, so has advertising. (Revenues from “help wanted” classified ads – long a huge source of income for newspapers – have plunged more than 90% in the past 12 years.)

如今世界已经改变。股市行情和全国性体育赛事的细节，在印刷机开动前就已成“旧闻”。互联网提供了关于职位与住房的大量信息。电视向观众密集投送政治、国内与国际新闻。于是，一块又一块的兴趣领域里，报纸丧失了“首要地位”。随着受众下滑，广告也随之下降。（“help wanted” 分类广告——报业长期的重要收入来源——在过去12年里收入下降逾90%。）

Newspapers continue to reign supreme, however, in the delivery of local news. If you want to know what’s going on in your town – whether the news is about the mayor or taxes or high school football – there is no substitute for a local newspaper that is doing its job. A reader’s eyes may glaze over after they take in a couple of paragraphs about Canadian tariffs or political developments in Pakistan; a story about the reader himself or his neighbors will be read to the end. Wherever there is a pervasive sense of community, a paper that serves the special informational needs of that community will remain indispensable to a significant portion of its residents.

不过，在提供本地新闻方面，报纸仍然无可匹敌。如果你想了解自己城市正在发生什么——无论是市长、税收还是高中橄榄球——一份尽职尽责的本地报纸是不可替代的。读者读到关于加拿大关税或巴基斯坦政治进展的两三段，眼神可能就开始涣散；但涉及他本人或邻居的报道会从头读到尾。只要社区归属感普遍存在，满足该社区特殊信息需求的报纸就会对相当一部分居民不可或缺。

Even a valuable product, however, can self-destruct from a faulty business strategy. And that process has been underway during the past decade at almost all papers of size. Publishers – including Berkshire in Buffalo – have offered their paper free on the Internet while charging meaningful sums for the physical specimen. How could this lead to anything other than a sharp and steady drop in sales of the printed product? Falling circulation, moreover, makes a paper less essential to advertisers. Under these conditions, the “virtuous circle” of the past reverses.

不过，即使是有价值的产品，也可能因为错误的商业战略而自我毁灭。而在过去十年里，几乎所有大型报纸都在上演这一幕。出版商——包括 Berkshire 在 Buffalo 的报纸——在互联网上免费提供内容，同时对纸质版收取相当的费用。除了导致纸质产品销量又快又稳地下滑，这还能有什么结果？发行量下降还会使报纸对广告主的重要性降低。在这种条件下，过去的“良性循环”开始反转。

The Wall Street Journal went to a pay model early. But the main exemplar for local newspapers is the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, published by Walter Hussman, Jr. Walter also adopted a pay format early, and over the past decade his paper has retained its circulation far better than any other large paper in the country. Despite Walter’s powerful example, it’s only been in the last year or so that other papers, including Berkshire’s, have explored pay arrangements. Whatever works best – and the answer is not yet clear – will be copied widely.

The Wall Street Journal 很早就采用了付费模式。但本地报纸的主要示范是 Arkansas Democrat-Gazette，由 Walter Hussman, Jr. 出版。Walter 同样较早采用付费形式，在过去十年里，他的报纸在保持发行量方面的表现远胜全国其他大型报纸。尽管 Walter 的示范效应强大，直到最近一年左右，其他报纸（包括 Berkshire 的）才开始探索付费安排。无论哪种方式效果最佳——答案尚不明确——都会被广泛复制。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable information to tightly-bound communities and having a sensible Internet strategy will remain viable for a long time. We do not believe that success will come from cutting either the news content or frequency of publication. Indeed, skimpy news coverage will almost certainly lead to skimpy readership. And the less-than-daily publication that is now being tried in some large towns or cities – while it may improve profits in the short term – seems certain to diminish the papers’ relevance over time. Our goal is to keep our papers loaded with content of interest to our readers and to be paid appropriately by those who find us useful, whether the product they view is in their hands or on the Internet.

Charlie 和我相信，只要报纸能向紧密联系的社区提供全面而可靠的信息，并配合合理的互联网策略，它们就能在很长时间里保持生命力。我们不认为削减新闻内容或出版频率会带来成功。事实上，内容稀薄几乎必然导致读者稀薄。而一些大城镇或城市正在尝试的“非每日出版”——尽管短期可能改善利润——从长期看几乎注定会削弱报纸的相关性。我们的目标是，让报纸持续装载读者感兴趣的内容，并让认为我们有用的人给予恰当的付费，无论他们阅读的是纸质版还是网络版。

Our confidence is buttressed by the availability of Terry Kroeger’s outstanding management group at the Omaha World-Herald, a team that has the ability to oversee a large group of papers. The individual papers, however, will be independent in their news coverage and editorial opinions. (I voted for Obama; of our 12 dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate, 10 opted for Romney.)

我们的信心，还来自 Omaha World-Herald 的 Terry Kroeger 所领导的杰出管理团队的支持——这支团队有能力统筹管理大量报纸。不过，各份报纸在新闻报道与社论观点上将保持独立。（我把票投给了 Obama；在我们 12 家公开支持总统候选人的日报中，有 10 家选择了 Romney。）

Our newspapers are certainly not insulated from the forces that have been driving revenues downward. Still, the six small dailies we owned throughout 2012 had unchanged revenues for the year, a result far superior to that experienced by big-city dailies. Moreover, the two large papers we operated throughout the year – The Buffalo News and the Omaha World-Herald – held their revenue loss to 3%, which was also an above-average outcome. Among newspapers in America’s 50 largest metropolitan areas, our Buffalo and Omaha papers rank near the top in circulation penetration of their home territories.

我们的报纸当然无法置身于压低收入的各种力量之外。尽管如此，我们在 2012 年整年持有的六家小型日报全年收入保持不变，这一结果远胜大城市日报。此外，我们全年经营的两家大型报纸——The Buffalo News 与 Omaha World-Herald——把收入降幅控制在 3%，这同样优于行业平均。在全美 50 个最大都会区的报纸中，我们的 Buffalo 与 Omaha 报纸在本土市场的发行渗透率名列前茅。

This popularity is no accident: Credit the editors of those papers – Margaret Sullivan at the News and Mike Reilly at the World-Herald — for delivering information that has made their publications indispensable to community-interested readers. (Margaret, I regret to say, recently left us to join The New York Times, whose job offers are tough to turn down. That paper made a great hire, and we wish her the best.)

这种受欢迎绝非偶然：要感谢这些报纸的编辑——The News 的 Margaret Sullivan 与 The World-Herald 的 Mike Reilly——他们提供的信息使出版物对关注社区的读者不可或缺。（遗憾的是，Margaret 近期离开我们加入 The New York Times——那里的邀约确实难以拒绝。那份报纸做出了一次很棒的聘任，我们祝她一切顺利。）

Berkshire’s cash earnings from its papers will almost certainly trend downward over time. Even a sensible Internet strategy will not be able to prevent modest erosion. At our cost, however, I believe these papers will meet or exceed our economic test for acquisitions. Results to date support that belief.

Berkshire 从报纸业务获得的现金收益几乎可以肯定会随时间下行。即使是合理的互联网策略，也难以完全避免温和的流失。不过，以我们的成本来看，我相信这些报纸将达到或超过我们对并购的经济性检验。截至目前的结果支持这一判断。

Charlie and I, however, still operate under economic principle 11 (detailed on page 99) and will not continue the operation of any business doomed to unending losses. One daily paper that we acquired in a bulk purchase from Media General was significantly unprofitable under that company’s ownership. After analyzing the paper’s results, we saw no remedy for the losses and reluctantly shut it down. All of our remaining dailies, however, should be profitable for a long time to come. (They are listed on page 108.) At appropriate prices – and that means at a very low multiple of current earnings – we will purchase more papers of the type we like.

不过，Charlie 和我仍遵循经济原则第 11 条（详见第 99 页），不会继续经营任何注定长期亏损的业务。我们从 Media General 成批收购的一份日报，在其原东家手中长期大幅亏损。分析其经营结果后，我们认为无解，只得忍痛关停。至于其余的日报，我们预计未来很长时期都将盈利。（名单见第 108 页。）在合适的价格——也就是当前收益的一个很低倍数——我们还会继续收购我们喜欢的那类报纸。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A milestone in Berkshire’s newspaper operations occurred at yearend when Stan Lipsey retired as publisher of The Buffalo News. It’s no exaggeration for me to say that the News might now be extinct were it not for Stan.

Berkshire 报业的一块里程碑，出现在年末——The Buffalo News 的发行人 Stan Lipsey 光荣退休。毫不夸张地说，若非 Stan，如今 The News 也许早已不复存在。

Charlie and I acquired the News in April 1977. It was an evening paper, dominant on weekdays but lacking a Sunday edition. Throughout the country, the circulation trend was toward morning papers. Moreover, Sunday was becoming ever more critical to the profitability of metropolitan dailies. Without a Sunday paper, the News was destined to lose out to its morning competitor, which had a fat and entrenched Sunday product.

Charlie 和我在 1977 年 4 月收购了 The News。那时它是一份晚报，工作日占优，但没有周日版。全国范围内，发行趋势正转向晨报；而且，周日对都会区日报的盈利性愈发关键。没有周日版，The News 注定要败给其晨报对手——后者拥有份量十足且根深蒂固的周日版。

We therefore began to print a Sunday edition late in 1977. And then all hell broke loose. Our competitor sued us, and District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. authored a harsh ruling that crippled the introduction of our paper. His ruling was later reversed – after 17 long months – in a 3-0 sharp rebuke by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we lost circulation, hemorrhaged money and stood in constant danger of going out of business.

于是我们在 1977 年底开始印刷周日版。接着，风波骤起。竞争对手起诉我们，District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. 作出严苛裁决，几乎使我们的新版本步履维艰。17 个月后的 Second Circuit Court of Appeals 以 3–0 的判决强烈驳回了该裁定。在上诉期间，我们流失发行、亏损惨重，企业命悬一线。

Enter Stan Lipsey, a friend of mine from the 1960s, who, with his wife, had sold Berkshire a small Omaha weekly. I found Stan to be an extraordinary newspaperman, knowledgeable about every aspect of circulation, production, sales and editorial. (He was a key person in gaining that small weekly a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.) So when I was in big trouble at the News, I asked Stan to leave his comfortable way of life in Omaha to take over in Buffalo.

这时登场的是 Stan Lipsey——我在 1960 年代结识的一位朋友，他与妻子曾把一家 Omaha 的小型周报卖给 Berkshire。我发现 Stan 是一位非凡的报人，对发行、印制、销售与编辑的每个环节都了然于心。（1973 年，那份小周报获得 Pulitzer Prize，他是关键人物。）于是当 The News 陷入困境时，我请 Stan 放弃在 Omaha 安逸的生活，赴 Buffalo 接手。

He never hesitated. Along with Murray Light, our editor, Stan persevered through four years of very dark days until the News won the competitive struggle in 1982. Ever since, despite a difficult Buffalo economy, the performance of the News has been exceptional. As both a friend and as a manager, Stan is simply the best.

他毫不犹豫。与我们的主编 Murray Light 一道，Stan 经历了四年艰难岁月，直到 1982 年 The News 赢得这场竞争。从那以后，尽管 Buffalo 的经济环境不易，The News 的表现始终出类拔萃。无论作为朋友还是管理者，Stan 都无可挑剔。

同样是2013年，张一鸣的商业计划书正在挑战Google的搜索引擎，并且推荐引擎更擅长地方小报所从事的业务（属于长尾性质的信息需求）。

Dividends

股息

A number of Berkshire shareholders – including some of my good friends – would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.

不少 Berkshire 的股东——其中包括我的一些好朋友——希望 Berkshire 支付现金股息。让他们困惑的是，我们乐于收取 Berkshire 持有的大多数股票所支付的股息，但自身却一分钱也不派发。于是让我们来看看，何时派息对股东有意义，何时则不然。

A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business – projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.

一家盈利企业可以用多种方式分配其收益（这些方式并非互斥）。公司管理层应首先审视现有业务所提供的再投资机会——提升效率、地域扩张、延伸并改进产品线，或以其他方式拓宽公司与竞争对手之间的经济“护城河”。

I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.

我要求我们子公司经理人持续不断聚焦“拓宽护城河”的机会，他们也确实找到了许多在经济上说得通的项目。但有时我们的经理人也会失手。失败的常见原因在于，他们先给出自己想要的答案，再倒推去寻找支持性的理由。当然，这一过程多半是下意识的；危险之处恰在于此。

Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.

你们的董事长也不能免罪。在 Berkshire 的 1986 年年报中，我描述了我们在最初的纺织业务上如何经过二十年的管理努力与资本改良，最终却徒劳无功。我希望这门生意成功，并以愿望驱动自己作出了一系列糟糕的决策。（我甚至还收购了另一家新英格兰的纺织公司。）但让愿望成真只发生在 Disney 的电影里；在商业中那是毒药。

Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolton acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.

尽管过去有这些失误，我们对可用资金的首要任务始终是审视其能否被明智地投放到我们各项业务中。我们在 2012 年创纪录的 121 亿美元固定资产投资与“bolt-on”收购，证明了这对 Berkshire 而言是资本配置的一片沃土。而我们在此拥有优势：因为我们涉足经济的诸多领域，所能选择的范围远比大多数公司广。在决定该做什么时，我们可以“浇灌鲜花，跳过野草”。

Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?

即便在现有业务中投下可观资本之后，Berkshire 仍会持续产生大量的增量现金。因此我们的下一步，是寻找与现有业务无关的并购。在这里，我们的检验很简单：Charlie 和我是否认为这笔交易很可能使我们的股东按每股计更为富有，胜过并购发生之前？

I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.

我在并购上犯过不少错误，未来也还会犯错。不过，总体而言，我们的成绩令人满意——这意味着，与其把用于并购的资金改为用于回购或派息，我们的股东如今因这些并购而更加富有。

But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.

但是，套用那句标准免责声明，过去的业绩并不保证未来的结果。这一点对 Berkshire 尤其成立：鉴于我们当前的体量，要做出既有意义又合理的并购，现在比我们过去大多数年份都更为困难。

Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.

尽管如此，一笔大型交易仍能为我们带来显著提升每股内在价值的可能性。BNSF 就是明证：其当前价值远高于我们的账面计价。若当时把这笔收购所需资金改为用于派息或回购，你我都会更差。尽管类似 BNSF 的大交易将属少见，海里仍有一些“鲸鱼”。

The third use of funds – repurchases – is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.

第三种资金用途——回购——当公司股价较保守估算的内在价值存在有意义的折价时，是明智之举。事实上，有纪律的回购是聪明用钱的最可靠方式：当你用 80 美分或更低的价格买一美元，想出错都难。我们在去年的报告中解释了回购标准；若机会出现，我们会大举回购本公司股票。我们最初表示不会支付超过账面价值 110% 的价格，但事实证明不切实际。因此，在 12 月当有一大笔可购股份以约账面价值 116% 的价格出现时，我们将上限提高到了 120%。

But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.

但别忘了：在回购决策中，价格至关重要。若在内在价值之上回购，就会毁灭价值。董事们与我相信，只要回购价格不超过我们设定的 120% 上限，持续持股的股东就能获得有意义的好处。

And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.

说回到股息。这里我们需要做一些假设并用到一点数学。数字需要仔细阅读，但它们对于理解支持或反对派息的理由至关重要。所以请耐心看下去。

We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth – $240,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.

先假设你我平等持有一家净资产为 200 万美元的企业。该企业在有形净资产上的收益率为 12%——即 24 万美元——并且合理预期对再投资收益亦能取得同样的 12%。此外，总有外部投资者愿意以净资产的 125% 价格买入我们的企业。因此，我们各自所持的价值现在为 125 万美元。

You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the onethird payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).

你希望我们两位股东每年领取公司三分之一的利润，将三分之二用于再投资。你认为，这一安排能很好平衡你对当期收入与资本增长的需求。于是你建议我们把当年 8 万美元利润派发出去，留存 16 万美元以提升企业未来盈利。第一年，你的股息将为 4 万美元；随着利润增长且维持三分之一派息，你的股息也会随之增长。总体而言，股息与股票价值每年将增长 8%（净资产赚取 12%，减去按净资产 4% 的派发）。

After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after – with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.

十年后，我们公司的净资产将达到 4,317,850 美元（最初 200 万美元按 8% 复利），你在下一年度的股息将为 86,357 美元。我们每个人持有的股份价值将为 2,698,656 美元（各自持有公司净资产的一半，再乘以 125%）。从此我们皆大欢喜——股息与股票价值继续以每年 8% 的速度增长。

There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.

然而，还有另一种做法会让我们更开心。在这种情形下，我们把全部利润留在公司里，而每年各自卖出 3.2% 的持股。由于卖出价格为账面价值的 125%，这种做法起初同样会带来 4 万美元现金，而且这个数额会逐年增长。我们称这种选择为“sell-off”（“卖出换现”）方案。

Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.

在这种“sell-off”（卖出换现）情形下，十年后我们公司的净资产将增至 6,211,696 美元（200 万美元按 12% 复利）。由于我们每年都会卖出股份，我们的持股比例会下降，十年后我们各自将持有公司 36.12%。即便如此，你在那时对应的公司净资产份额将为 2,243,540 美元。而且请记住，归属于我们每个人的每一美元净资产都可以按 1.25 美元出售。因此，你剩余股份的市值将为 2,804,425 美元，较我们采用派息方案时你股份的价值高出约 4%。

Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! – you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.

此外，按“卖出换现”政策，你每年的现金收入将比派息情形高出 4%。Voila! —— 你每年可支配的现金更多，资本价值也更高。

This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.

当然，这一计算假设我们的假想公司能在净资产上平均每年赚取 12%，且其股东平均可以按账面价值的 125% 出售股份。就此而言，S&P 500 在净资产上的收益显著高于 12%，其市价也远高于其净资产的 125%。对 Berkshire 而言，这两个假设看起来也算合理，尽管当然并无法保证。

Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history – admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated – the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.

更进一步，积极的一面是，这些假设还有被超越的可能。若真如此，“卖出换现”政策的论据就更强了。回顾 Berkshire 的历史——诚然，那样的历史难以重演——“卖出换现”政策将为股东带来远胜于派息政策的结果。

Aside from the favorable math, there are two further – and important – arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them – perhaps even most of them – are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.

除了有利的数学结果外，“卖出换现”还有两个重要理由。其一，股息会把一种特定的套现政策强加给所有股东。若政策是派发 40% 的利润，那些希望 30% 或 50% 的人就会被迫从命。我们的 60 万股东在对现金的需求上可谓五花八门。但可以肯定的是，其中相当一部分——甚至可能大多数——处于净储蓄状态，按理更应偏好不派发任何现金。

The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)

相反，“卖出换现”让每位股东可在现金收入与资本累积之间自行抉择。某位股东可以选择套现相当于年度收益的 60%，而其他股东选择 20% 或干脆不套现。当然，在派息情形下，股东也可以把股息再投入买更多股份。但那样做会吃亏：既要缴税，又得为把股息再投入而支付 25% 的溢价。（请牢记，在公开市场买入该股发生在账面价值的 125%。）

The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior – usually far inferior – to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.

派息方式的第二个劣势同样重要：对所有需要纳税的股东而言，其税务后果劣于——通常大幅劣于——“卖出换现”方案。派息方案下，股东每年收到的全部现金都要纳税；而“卖出换现”只对现金收入中的“收益部分”征税。

Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4 1⁄4% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.

让我用自己的案例为这场“数学练习”收尾——我都能听见你们在我收起“牙钻”时的喝彩了。过去七年，我每年捐出约 4 1⁄4% 的 Berkshire 持股。通过这一过程，我最初持有的 712,497,000 股 B 等值股份（经拆股调整）已降至 528,525,623 股。显然，我在公司的持股比例已显著下降。

Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 41⁄2% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).

然而，我在这门生意中的投资实际上增加了：我当前在 Berkshire 的权益对应的账面价值，远高于七年前我所持股份对应的账面价值。（实际数字：2005 年为 282 亿美元，2012 年为 402 亿美元。）换言之，尽管我对公司的持股大幅下降，如今在 Berkshire 为我“干活”的资金却多得多。同样成立的是，我在 Berkshire 的内在商业价值与公司正常获利能力中的份额，也远高于 2005 年。随着时间推移，我预计这种价值积累将继续——尽管表现会明显不规则——即便我现在每年捐出的股份已超过 4 1⁄2%（之所以提高，是因为我最近把对若干基金会的终身承诺翻了一番）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.

归根结底，股息政策必须清晰、一致且理性。反复无常的政策会让所有者困惑，也会吓跑潜在投资者。Phil Fisher 在 54 年前的《Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits》第七章里说得极好——这本书对严肃投资者而言，仅次于《The Intelligent Investor》和 1940 年版《Security Analysis》。Phil 解释说，你可以成功经营一家主打汉堡的餐馆，或者一家乐于供应中餐的餐馆；但你不能随心所欲地在两者之间切换，还指望留住任一类粉丝。

Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.

大多数公司坚持稳定分红，通常力争每年提高、并极不情愿削减。我们的“四大”持股公司遵循这一合乎情理、易于理解的做法，并在某些情况下相当积极地回购股份。

We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.

我们赞赏他们的举措，并希望他们坚持走现在的路。我们喜欢提高股息，更热爱在合适价格进行回购。

At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.

不过在 Berkshire，我们始终坚持另一种我们自知为理性的做法——也希望你通过刚才的段落已充分理解。只要我们认为关于账面价值积累与市价溢价的假设仍然合理，我们就会坚持这一政策。若这两项中的任何一项前景出现实质性恶化，我们会重新审视我们的行动。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 4th at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova will be in charge. (Though that’s a new name, it’s the same wonderful Carrie as last year; she got married in June to a very lucky guy.) All of our headquarters group pitches in to help her; the whole affair is a homemade production, and I couldn’t be more proud of those who put it together.

年度大会将于5月4日（周六）在 CenturyLink Center 举行。由 Carrie Sova 负责统筹。（虽然名字变了，但还是去年的那位出色的 Carrie；她在6月嫁给了一位非常幸运的先生。）我们总部团队全部上阵协助她；整场活动都是“自制出品”，对所有促成此事的人，我再骄傲不过。

The doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our second International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. The target will be the porch of a Clayton Home, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. Last year I successfully fought off all challengers. But now Berkshire has acquired a large number of newspapers and with them came much tossing talent (or so the throwers claim). Come see whether their talent matches their talk. Better yet, join in. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands).

7:00 a.m. 开门，7:30 举行第二届 International Newspaper Tossing Challenge。目标是 Clayton Home 的门廊，距离投掷线精确35英尺。去年我成功击退了所有挑战者。但如今 Berkshire 收购了许多报纸，随之“招来”不少投掷高手（至少他们这么说）。来看看他们的本事是否配得上他们的口号；更好的是，亲自上阵。报纸为36至42页，必须自己折叠（不许用橡皮筋）。

At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

8:30 放映一部全新的 Berkshire 影片。一小时后进入问答环节（中间在 CenturyLink 的餐台用午餐），一直持续到3:30。短暂休息后，3:45 由我和 Charlie 正式召开年度大会。如果你打算在当天的提问时段离场，请选在 Charlie 发言的时候。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,090 pairs of Justin boots, (that’s a pair every 30 seconds), 10,010 pounds of See’s candy, 12,879 Quikut knives (24 knives per minute) and 5,784 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.

当然，离场的最佳理由是去购物。我们会助你一臂之力——把与会场相连的194,300平方英尺大厅铺满数十家 Berkshire 子公司的产品。去年你们给力，多数摊位刷新了销售纪录。短短九小时，我们卖出1,090双 Justin 靴（平均30秒一双）、10,010磅 See’s 糖果、12,879把 Quikut 刀（每分钟24把），以及5,784双 Wells Lamont 手套（永远的热销品）。但你们还能更棒。记住：谁说“金钱买不来快乐”，只是没在我们的大会上逛过。

Last year, Brooks, our running shoe company, exhibited for the first time and ran up sales of $150,000. Brooks is on fire: Its volume in 2012 grew 34%, and that was on top of a similar 34% gain in 2011. The company’s management expects another jump of 23% in 2013. We will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.

去年，我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 首次参展，现场销售达15万美元。Brooks 正在起势：2012年销量增长34%，延续了2011年同样的34%增幅。管理层预计2013年再增23%。大会上我们还将推出一款特别纪念鞋。

On Sunday at 8 a.m., we will initiate the “Berkshire 5K,” a race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your credentials for the meeting. We will have plenty of categories for competition, including one for the media. (It will be fun to report on their performance.) Regretfully, I will forego running; someone has to man the starting gun.

周日早上8:00，我们将发枪“Berkshire 5K”，起点在 CenturyLink。参赛细则见与你的入场证一同发放的 Visitor’s Guide。我们设置了许多竞赛组别，其中包括媒体组。（报道他们的成绩会很有趣。）很遗憾，我就不跑了；总得有人掌握发令枪。

I should warn you that we have a lot of home-grown talent. Ted Weschler has run the marathon in 3:01. Jim Weber, Brooks’ dynamic CEO, is another speedster with a 3:31 best. Todd Combs specializes in the triathlon, but has been clocked at 22 minutes in the 5K.

提醒一下：我们“土生土长”的高手不少。Ted Weschler 全马最好成绩3:01。Brooks 精力充沛的 CEO Jim Weber 也很快，最好成绩3:31。Todd Combs 擅长铁人三项，但5K 跑进22分钟。

That, however, is just the beginning: Our directors are also fleet of foot (that is, some of our directors are). Steve Burke has run an amazing 2:39 Boston marathon. (It’s a family thing; his wife, Gretchen, finished the New York marathon in 3:25.) Charlotte Guyman’s best is 3:37, and Sue Decker crossed the tape in New York in 3:36. Charlie did not return his questionnaire.

这还只是开始：我们的董事们也步履飞快（也就是说，我们的某些董事）。Steve Burke 的 Boston 全马跑到惊人的2:39。（这算“家族传统”；他妻子 Gretchen 的 New York 全马成绩是3:25。）Charlotte Guyman 的最好成绩是3:37，Sue Decker 在 New York 跑了3:36。Charlie 没有交回他的问卷。

GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 将在购物区设展位，由多位全国顶尖顾问坐镇。路过就来报价。在多数情况下，GEICO 能给你股东折扣（通常为8%）。我们经营覆盖的51个司法辖区中，有44个允许这一特别优惠。（补充一点：若你已符合其他优惠（如特定群体优惠），折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保单的细节，看看我们是否能为你省钱。我相信，至少一半的你们可以省到。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. Carol Loomis, who has been invaluable to me in editing this letter since 1977, has recently authored Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything. She and I have cosigned 500 copies, available exclusively at the meeting.

别忘了去 Bookworm。一共约35种书和DVD，包括几本新作。自1977年以来在本信编辑上对我帮助极大的 Carol Loomis，近期撰写了 Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything。我们已共同签名500本，仅在大会现场发售。

The Outsiders, by William Thorndike, Jr., is an outstanding book about CEOs who excelled at capital allocation. It has an insightful chapter on our director, Tom Murphy, overall the best business manager I’ve ever met. I also recommend The Clash of the Cultures by Jack Bogle and Laura Rittenhouse’s Investing Between the Lines. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

William Thorndike, Jr. 的 The Outsiders 是一本关于擅长资本配置的 CEO 的杰出著作，其中关于我们董事 Tom Murphy 的一章见解独到——他是我所遇到的总体最出色的企业管理者。我还推荐 Jack Bogle 的 The Clash of the Cultures 以及 Laura Rittenhouse 的 Investing Between the Lines。若需邮寄购书，附近提供寄送服务。

The Omaha World-Herald will again have a booth, offering a few books it has recently published. Redblooded Husker fans – is there any Nebraskan who isn’t one? – will surely want to purchase Unbeatable. It tells the story of Nebraska football during 1993-97, a golden era in which Tom Osborne’s teams went 60-3.

The Omaha World-Herald 也将再次设展，带来其近期出版的几本书。铁杆 Husker 球迷——内布拉斯加州还有谁不是？——必定会想买 Unbeatable。该书讲述了1993–97年间 Nebraska 橄榄球的黄金年代，那时 Tom Osborne 的球队战绩为60胜3负。

If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.

若你是大手笔——或渴望成为大手笔——周六中午到下午5点，去 Omaha 机场东侧的 Signature Aviation 逛逛。那里有一队 NetJets 飞机，保证让你心跳加速。坐公交来，乘公务机走。人生偶尔潇洒一下。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.

随本报告附上的委托书材料附件，说明了如何获取进入大会及其他活动所需的证件。航空公司有时会在 Berkshire 周末抬价。若你从外地前来，不妨比较飞 Kansas City 与飞 Omaha 的费用。两城自驾约2 ½小时，或许能省下不少钱，尤其是你原本打算在 Omaha 租车的话。把省下的钱在我们这儿花掉吧。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $35.9 million of business during its annual meeting sale, an all-time record that makes other retailers turn green. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 30th and Monday, May 6th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（位于72街、Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地77英亩），我们将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”折扣价。去年该店在年会促销期间成交3,590万美元，创历史纪录，让其他零售商羡慕不已。要享受 Berkshire 折扣，你必须在4月30日（周二）至5月6日（周一）期间（含首尾两日）下单，并出示你的大会证件。本期特价甚至适用于几家通常严禁打折的知名厂商的产品——但为了我们的股东周末，它们破例一次。我们对此表示感谢。NFM 营业时间为周一至周六10:00–21:00，周日10:00–18:00。今年周六17:30–20:00，NFM 还将举办野餐会，诚邀各位参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 3rd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 5th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.

在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是 5 月 3 日（周五）6 p.m. 至 9 p.m. 的鸡尾酒会。第二场、也是主活动，将于 5 月 5 日（周日）9 a.m. 至 4 p.m. 举行。周六我们营业至 6 p.m.。近年来，我们三天的销售额远超整个 12 月（珠宝商通常的最佳月份）。

Around 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Last year my sales totaled $1.5 million. This year I won’t quit until I hit $2 million. Because I need to leave well before sundown, I will be desperate to do business. Come take advantage of me. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” price.

周日下午约 1 p.m. 起，我会在 Borsheims 亲自当店员。去年我卖了 150 万美元。今年不到 200 万美元我不收工。因为我必须在日落前很久离开，我会拼命做生意。来“占我便宜”吧。找我要“Crazy Warren”价格。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 29th through Saturday, May 11th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末 Borsheims 都会人潮涌动。为方便大家，股东价将从 4 月 29 日（周一）持续至 5 月 11 日（周六）。期间请出示大会证件，或能证明你是 Berkshire 持有人之券商对账单，以便识别股东身份。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.

周日，在 Borsheims 外的商场里，蒙眼的 Patrick Wolff（两届美国国际象棋冠军）将一次对战六位来挑战的对手——他们可是睁大眼睛的。旁边，来自 Dallas 的杰出魔术师 Norman Beck 会让观众目不暇接。此外，周日下午我们还请到世界顶尖桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 与 Sharon Osberg，和股东们切磋牌艺。别和他们赌钱。

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one. (I once saw Bill Gates polish off two of the giant variety after a full-course dinner; that’s when I knew he would make a great director.)

5 月 5 日（周日），Gorat’s 与 Piccolo’s 将再次仅对 Berkshire 股东开放。两家都会营业至 10 p.m.，其中 Gorat’s 1 p.m. 开门，Piccolo’s 4 p.m. 开门。这两家是我的最爱，周日晚我会两家都去。记住：预订 Gorat’s 请在 4 月 1 日当天（此前不行）拨打 402-551-3733；预订 Piccolo’s 请拨打 402-342-9038。在 Piccolo’s 记得点一份超大号 root beer float 当甜点。点小号的都是“胆小鬼”。（我曾见 Bill Gates 在吃完全套餐后干掉了两杯超大号的；那一刻我就知道他会成为一位出色的董事。）

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

大会的问答环节仍由三位相同的财经记者主持，他们将根据股东事先电邮给他们的问题向我和 Charlie 提问。三位记者及其邮箱如下：Fortune 的 Carol Loomis（cloomis@fortunemail.com）；CNBC 的 Becky Quick（BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com）；The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin（arsorkin@nytimes.com）。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

从提交的问题中，每位记者会各自挑选六个他们认为最有趣、最重要的问题。记者们告诉我：若你的问题简明扼要、别在最后一刻才发、与 Berkshire 相关，且每封邮件不超过两问，被选中的概率将最高。（邮件中请注明：若问题被选中，是否希望提及你的姓名。）

Last year we had a second panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. All were insurance specialists, and shareholders subsequently indicated they wanted a little more variety. Therefore, this year we will have one insurance analyst, Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb will join the analyst panel to ask questions that deal with our non-insurance operations.

去年我们还设了第二组由三位跟踪 Berkshire 的分析师组成的小组。三位都是保险专家，随后股东表示希望多一点多样性。因此，今年我们只设一位保险分析师——Nomura Securities 的 Cliff Gallant。Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 将加入分析师小组，提问与我们非保险业务相关的问题。

Finally – to spice things up – we would like to add to the panel a credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably one who is short the stock. Not yet having a bear identified, we would like to hear from applicants. The only requirement is that you be an investment professional and negative on Berkshire. The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.

最后——为增添趣味——我们还想在小组中增加一位对 Berkshire 持证的“看空者”，最好是做空该股的人。由于尚未确定人选，欢迎报名。唯一要求是你是投资专业人士，并对 Berkshire 持负面观点。三位分析师将带来他们各自关于 Berkshire 的问题，并与记者及观众交替提问。

Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that will further educate shareholders about their investment.

我与 Charlie 相信，所有股东应同时获得 Berkshire 的新信息，并有足够时间加以分析。这就是我们尽量在周五收盘后发布财务信息、并把年会安排在周六的原因。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交流。我们希望记者与分析师提出的问题，能进一步帮助股东了解他们的投资。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 11 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.

我和 Charlie 对将被提问的问题连一点风声都不会提前知道。我们知道记者与分析师会抛出一些“硬菜”，而我们正喜欢如此。总计我们预计至少 54 个问题：每位分析师与记者各 6 个，观众 18 个。若时间有余，我们会增加观众提问。观众提问者将通过抽签产生，抽签将于 8:15 a.m. 在会场及主溢出会场设置的 11 个麦克风处进行。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

我经常赞扬我们运营经理人的成就，是有充分理由的。他们是真正的 All-Stars，把各自的业务当成家族唯一资产来经营。我相信，在大型公众公司中，很难再找到比他们更以股东为导向的心态。多数人并无经济上的“必须工作”，而在生意上打出“全垒打”的喜悦，对他们的意义不亚于薪水。

Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

同样重要的，还有与我在公司办公室并肩工作的 23 位同事（都在同一层，我们打算就这么保持下去！）。

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 21,500-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

这支团队高效处理大量 SEC 及其他监管要求，申报长达 21,500 页的联邦所得税申报，以及各州与海外申报，回应无数股东与媒体问询，编制年报，筹备全美规模最大的年度大会，协调董事会工作——等等等等。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.

他们愉快而高效地完成所有这些事务，让我的生活轻松愉悦。他们的付出超越了与 Berkshire 严格相关的活动：去年他们对接了 48 所大学（从 200 份申请中选出），组织学生来 Omaha 与我进行一天 Q&A。他们还处理我收到的各种请求、安排出行，甚至帮我买汉堡当午餐。没有哪位 CEO 比我更幸福；我真切地觉得每天都像踢踏着去上班。

This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 4th and chime in.

这支总部团队与我们的运营经理人，值得我最深的感谢，也同样值得你们的致意。5 月 4 日来 Omaha——资本主义的摇篮——共襄盛会吧。

March 1, 2013

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2013-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2013-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

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Insurance

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

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We Buy Some Newspapers . . . Newspapers?

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The Annual Meeting

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