2014-04-23 Warren Buffett.On Coke pay plan

2014-04-23 Warren Buffett.On Coke pay plan


BECKY: We are at Smith and Wollensky today. Warren Buffett has just had lunch with the winners of the annual Glide Foundation Auction. This is an auction that went off last year. Warren, this was the 14th annual auction. You have now raised $15.6 million for the Glide Foundation. I know that the new auction goes up on June 1st, looking for next year. But how was lunch this year?
BECKY:我们今天在 Smith and Wollensky。Warren Buffett 刚刚与年度 Glide Foundation Auction 的竞标获胜者共进午餐。这是去年进行的一次拍卖。Warren,这是第 14 届拍卖了。你到现在为止已经为 Glide Foundation 筹集了 1560 万美元。我知道新的拍卖将于 6 月 1 日开始,针对明年。那么今年的午餐怎么样?

WARREN BUFFETT: Lunch was great. I always have a good time and there were eight people and— I knew a couple of ’em from before, they’re all gonna come to the annual meeting, and it— it— it’s a treat for me.
WARREN BUFFETT:午餐很棒。我总是过得很愉快,一共有八个人——我之前认识其中一两位——他们都会来参加年度股东大会,对我来说这是一种享受。

BECKY: They didn’t want to be identified. But— they snuck outta here with— despite (LAUGH) all the media that’s here .
BECKY:他们不想公开身份。不过——尽管(笑)这里媒体众多——他们还是悄悄离开了。

BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, they— they— they were— they weren’t looking for publicity. But we had— we had— we had a very good time.
BUFFETT:是的,是的,他们——他们并不想出风头。但我们——我们——过得非常愉快。

BECKY: Okay, I’m glad to hear it. While you were in there, there was a little bit of news that was happening out here. We’ve been hearing about the Coke shareholders meeting. It turns out that the votes are in. Eighty-three percent of shareholders voted in favor of Coke’s plan. The— compensate— equity plan. That means 17 percent voted no. How did you vote your shares?
BECKY:好的,很高兴听到这些。你在里面的时候,这里传来一些新闻。我们一直在关注 Coke 的股东大会。结果出来了:83% 的股东投票支持 Coke 的方案——即补偿性股权计划。这意味着有 17% 反对。你是如何投票的?

BUFFETT: We abstained. So that would’ve been 9 percent. I don’t know whether or not it’s— whether they took that out before calculating the 83 percent and 17 percent. But we— we— we abstained.
BUFFETT:我们弃权了。所以那应该算作 9%。我不确定他们在计算 83% 和 17% 时是否剔除了弃权票。但我们——我们——弃权了。

BECKY: That was 83 percent for the votes that were cast. Why— why did you abstain?
BECKY:那 83% 是在已投票数中的占比。为什么——为什么要弃权?

BUFFETT: Well, we abstained because— we didn’t agree with the plan. We thought it was excessive. And— I love Coke. I love the management, I love the directors. But— so I didn’t want to vote no. It’s kind of un-American to vote no at a Coke meeting. So (LAUGH) that’s— but we— I didn’t want to express any disapproval of management. But we did disapprove of— of the plan.
BUFFETT:嗯,我们弃权是因为——我们不同意这个计划。我们认为它过于慷慨。而且——我热爱 Coke。我喜欢管理层,也喜欢董事们。但是——我不想投反对票。在 Coke 的会议上投反对票有点不合“美国精神”。所以(笑)——但是我们——我不想表达对管理层的不认可。但我们确实不赞成——这个计划。

The plan— compared to past plans was a significant change. And— there’s already a 9 percent or so overhang in terms of options outstanding relative to the amount of sh— shares outstanding, 8 percent— 8 percent— 8 percent to 9 percent. And— this authorization of another 500 million shares. Not all of which would’ve gone on options. But that’s another 11 percent of the company. And— and— I thought it was too much. And— I talked to my partner Charlie Munger, and he thought it was too much. So we abstained.
这个计划——与过去的计划相比是一个显著的变化。而且——就已发行股份而言,现有未行使的期权已经大约相当于 9% 的“悬挂供给”,8%——8% 到 9%。此外——还授权增发 5 亿股。并非全部用于期权,但这又相当于公司 11%。所以——我认为这太多了。我也和我的合伙人 Charlie Munger 交流过,他也认为太多。因此我们弃权。

BECKY: Your math, does it match up with David Winters who is— is the activist who’s been very vocal about this. By his math— he thinks it would be something like— a dilution of 16 percent to— existing shareholders— that are there. And—and Muhtar Kent has up from the company and he thinks it’s more like 1 percent of—
BECKY:你的测算和 David Winters(在此问题上高调发声的激进投资者)的数据一致吗?按他的计算——他认为这会对现有股东造成大约 16% 的摊薄。而——公司的 Muhtar Kent 则认为更像是 1%——

BUFFETT: Well, it— it— it’s closer to the 1 than it is to the 16— in terms of dilution because they would repurchase— the— they would use the proceeds they received in the options to repurchase shares. So— so— they said the breakdown between giving performance shares— in terms of what they call option equivalent, it would be 40 percent down and 60 percent options. If they repurchase the shares, it would not be— it would not be as low as 1 percent. It— it would be far from the— from the higher numbers.
BUFFETT:嗯——在摊薄幅度上,它更接近 1% 而不是 16%,因为他们会回购——会用期权行权所得的现金回购股票。所以——他们说在以所谓“期权等价”口径分解时,绩效股与期权大约是 40% 对 60%。如果他们进行回购,摊薄不会——不会低至 1%,但——也远达不到高位的那些数字。

BECKY: Well, David Winters— was just out with a statement, I guess he jumped the gun a little bit, because he criticized you. He said— in his statement, that we are surprised Warren Buffett had the opportunity to take a stand against excessive management compensation and failed to seize it. Why are you telling us this now instead of before the vote?
BECKY:不过,David Winters——刚刚发表了声明,我猜他有点操之过急,他批评了你。他在声明中说,他们惊讶于 Warren Buffett 有机会站出来反对过度的管理层薪酬却没有把握。你为什么现在才告诉我们,而不是在投票之前?

BUFFETT: I— I— I— I would not want to be in a position of— of— campaigning for either side in respect of— we were gonna cast our vote, it would become known how we cast our vote. But— but— I have enormous respect for Muhtar Kent. He is the man to be running Coca-Cola. And— we never sold a share of Coke— never had any plans to s— sell any Coke. I— I respect the Coke organization. I just don’t like the plan.
BUFFETT:我——我——我——我不想处在那种为任一方“拉票”的位置上——我们会投票,结果也会被知道。但——但——我对 Muhtar Kent 非常尊重。他是领导 Coca-Cola 的合适人选。而且——我们从未卖出过一股 Coke——也从未有过——卖出 Coke 的计划。我——我尊重 Coke 的组织。我只是不喜欢这个计划。

BECKY: Did you talk to Muhtar Kent about— your thoughts on this?
BECKY:你有没有就此和 Muhtar Kent 交流你的想法?

BUFFETT: I— I did, but it was only after the— the— the proxy was out. So and— and— and he did not have— he did not know my views ahead of time.
BUFFETT:我——我谈过,但那是在——委托书已经发出之后。而且——而且——他并不知道我事先的看法。

BECKY: Your— your son is on the board of Coca-Cola. He voted in favor of this plan.
BECKY:你的——你的儿子在 Coca-Cola 的董事会。他投票支持这个计划。

BUFFETT: That— that’s true. The— I— I’ve been on boards for 55 years— 19 public boards— I’ve never heard of a vote against the compensation plan voted by compensation committee. What happens in a board, I— I think people sometimes have a mistaken notion of how boards act. But— the compensation com— committee comes in, they’ve worked for a few hours, maybe a few days, they’ve had consultants. And— and they say, “We’ve approved this plan.” I’ve never yet heard at any of the 19 boards I was on, anybody say in the meeting they were against it. And I’ve had— heard a few say it outside of the meeting. But— but taking on a committee that’s reported, you’ve assigned— the job to the committee, and they — taking them on it is— is— is a little bit like belching at the dinner table. I mean, you can’t do it too often. (LAUGH) If you do, you find you’re eating in the kitchen pretty soon.
BUFFETT:那——那是真的。嗯——我在董事会里待了 55 年——在 19 家上市公司的董事会——我从没听说过有人在薪酬委员会已经通过的薪酬计划上投反对票。董事会里会发生什么事,我——我认为人们有时对董事会的运作方式存在误解。通常——薪酬委——委员会走进来,他们已经工作了几个小时,或许几天,还请了顾问。然后——他们会说,“我们已经批准了这个计划。”在我待过的 19 个董事会里,我从未在会议上听到有人当场说自己反对它。我倒是——在会外听过有少数人这么说过。但是——要当场挑战已经提交报告的委员会,你既然——把这项工作指派给了委员会,而你——在会上去顶撞——这有点像在餐桌上打嗝。我的意思是,你不能太常这么干。(笑)要是你老这么干,很快就会发现你被安排去厨房吃饭了。

BECKY: Did you ever vote for something when you were on a board that you disagreed with?
BECKY:你在董事会时有没有投过自己并不赞同的东西的票?

BUFFETT: Sure.
BUFFETT:有的。

BECKY: Like what?
BECKY:比如哪些?

BUFFETT: Well, I’ve voted for compensation plans that I haven’t agreed with. But I— I’ve even sort of muttered a yes on— on some mergers that (LAUGH) I didn’t think made any sense. But that— it happens.
BUFFETT:嗯,我投通过过一些我并不赞同的薪酬计划。而且——我甚至还嘀咕着说过“同意”的一些并购案(笑),而那些并购在我看来毫无意义。但是——这种事会发生的。

BECKY: You know, I— I’m still trying to get my head around this. You— went ahead and— abstained to vote on this. But did you look at this compensation plan or did you look at the— equity plan before David Winters pointed it out?
BECKY:你知道,我——我还在理清这件事。你——最终对这项议案选择了——弃权。但在 David Winters 指出之前,你有没有看过这份薪酬计划,或者看过这份——股权计划?

BUFFETT: I— I— I read the full details actually after— after that. I— I— I— I just hadn’t learned the material yet. But in 2002, Coke had a plan that involved 240 million shares. That lasted six years. They had a plan in 2008, six years later, that was 280 million shares. And that lasted six years. And then this plan, when I read about it was for 500 million shares. Which they would equate to 340 million. But still, 340 or 500. And they were gonna use it, they said, in four years. And that— that really struck me as quite excessive. So— I— I didn’t actually read that until after Winters wrote the letter. But I would’ve felt the same way.
BUFFETT:我——我——我实际上是在那之后才把细节全读完的。我——我——我——只是当时还没掌握那些材料。不过在 2002 年,Coke 有过一个涉及 2.4 亿股的计划,持续了六年。六年后的 2008 年又有一个 2.8 亿股的计划,也持续了六年。然后这一次的计划,我读到时是 5 亿股。他们会把它折算成 3.4 亿股的“期权等价”。但无论是 3.4 亿还是 5 亿——他们说打算在四年内用完。而这——这让我觉得相当过度。所以——我——我确实是在 Winters 写信之后才把它读完。但我的感受不会有任何不同。
Warning
在此以后KO的业绩一路下滑,直到Muhtar Kent被换掉。
BECKY: This is a situation now ,though, that the company again, had 83 percent of the votes that were cast voting in favor of it. What do you think they’ll do now?
BECKY:不过现在的情况是,公司再次获得了已投票中 83% 的支持票。你认为他们接下来会怎么做?

BUFFETT: Well, I— I— I don’t know the answer to that. They— they have the stock authorized. They said in the report that they expected it to last four years. I hope it lasts a lot longer than that, because I think that would be excessive to issue that number of shares that are options, or performance shares equivalence— in a four-year period.
BUFFETT:嗯,我——我——我不知道这个问题的答案。他们——他们已经获得了增发授权。他们在报告中说预期这会维持四年。我希望它能比那更久,因为我认为在四年里发出那么多期权或绩效股等价的股份,是过度的。

BECKY: So if they simply extended the number of years that they were to take to issue those, you’d be okay with the plan?
BECKY:所以如果他们只是简单地把发放这些股份的年限拉长一点,你就会认可这个计划?

BUFFETT: Sure. I mean, it’s— it really just depends on how much you’re issuing all the time. How much of the future upside you’re giving away each year. And— right now, something between 8 and 9 percent of the upside of a stock is covered by options already issued. That’s out there. And they’ve been issuing options year after year after year. I mean, so anybody who’s worked there for ten years has got— probably got ten years worth of options. It isn’t like incentives are lacking. But you can give away too much of a company.
BUFFETT:当然。我的意思是——这真的取决于你一直在发多少。每年你把公司未来上涨空间中的多少比例让渡出去。而——目前,股票上行收益中的大约 8% 到 9% 已经被既有期权覆盖了。这些都在那里。而他们年复一年地发放期权。也就是说,任何在那里工作了十年的人——大概拥有十年份额的期权。并不是激励不足的问题。但你确实可能把公司给出去太多。

BECKY: Will you sell any shares of Coca-Cola? Have you sold any shares of Coca-Cola?
BECKY:你会卖出 Coca-Cola 的任何股份吗?你卖出过 Coca-Cola 的股份吗?

BUFFETT: No, no, no. And no intention whatsoever of selling shares. I— I love the company and I— and I think that the exact— the— the right CEO is running it. And I think it’s— it’s got a fine future.
BUFFETT:没有,没有,没有。而且完全没有任何出售股份的打算。我——我热爱这家公司,而且——我认为现在恰恰——是合适的 CEO 在领导它。我也认为——它有一个很好的未来。

BECKY: And you— you’ve said in the past that people should buy companies that could be run by a ham sandwich. And you’ve even said Coca-Cola is one of those companies that could be run by a ham sandwich—
BECKY:而且你——你以前说过,人们应该买那种“哪怕是一个火腿三明治都能经营”的公司。你甚至说过 Coca-Cola 就是那种“火腿三明治也能经营”的公司之一——

BUFFETT: I don’t think I said that. (LAUGH)
BUFFETT:我不认为我说过这话。(笑)

BECKY: I’m quoting it from “The Snowball,” I think. It was— it was a quote from “The Snowball.”
BECKY:我想我是引用自《The Snowball》。那是——那是《The Snowball》里的引述。

BUFFETT: Well, then (author) Alice Schroeder said it, yeah. (LAUGH)
BUFFETT:那好吧,那就是(作者)Alice Schroeder 说的。(笑)

BECKY: So Alice Schroeder said that you have said that.
BECKY:所以是 Alice Schroeder 说你说过这话。

BUFFETT: No, no. In fact, I’m quite sure I never said that. I— I think I know who said it, but I’m not gonna name him. (LAUGHTER)
BUFFETT:不,不。事实上,我很确定我从没说过。我——我想我知道是谁说的,但我不会点名他。(笑声)

BECKY: I guess that’s what it gets back to the question, though— is it important to have a great manager running that company?
BECKY:我想这又回到那个问题——让一位出色的经理来管理那家公司重要吗?

BUFFETT: It’s— it’s— it’s hugely important. Just— hugely important. And— and actually— the— the— Coca-Cola for a while, after Roberta— Roberto (Goizueta) left with—was not doing so well, and Muhtar is— is— is the right person to be running it and it makes a big difference who’s running it.
BUFFETT:这——这——这非常重要。就是——极其重要。而且——事实上——Coca-Cola 在 Roberta——Roberto (Goizueta) 离开后的那段时间表现并不好,而 Muhtar——确实——是领导它的合适人选,由谁来掌舵会带来巨大的差异。

BECKY: Let me ask you about another stock that you own, IBM. That company came out with— a disappointing— earnings report, revenue was down for another quarter. And that surprised the Street. Some people have suggested that—there were rumors floating around - that you have soured on the stock. Have ya?
BECKY:让我问问你持有的另一只股票,IBM。那家公司公布了——令人失望的——财报,营收又一个季度下滑。这让华尔街感到意外。有些人认为——坊间有传言——你对这只股票已经转为看淡。是这样吗?

BUFFETT: That’s not true. No. I’ve— I’ve actually bought a few shares this year.
BUFFETT:不对。不是。我——我其实今年还买入了一些股票。

BECKY: You’ve bought stock in IBM this year?
BECKY:你今年买了 IBM 的股票?

BUFFETT: And I’ve— I’ve never sold a share, so.
BUFFETT:而且我——我从来没卖出过一股,所以——

BECKY: Since the earnings report that came out?
BECKY:是在财报发布之后买的吗?

BUFFETT: No, not since the earnings report this year. But the earnings report should not have been a surprise. It was actually roughly what they said in their earnings call a quarter earlier, their— their revenues were down 2 percent I think on— on a cost-of-currency basis. And— and I expected that. And— and I don’t think they said any different.
BUFFETT:不,不是在今年这次财报之后。但这份财报本不该让人意外。实际上它大致符合他们在前一季度财报电话会上所说的内容,我记得他们的营收按恒定汇率口径下降了 2%。而——我对此有预期。而且——我不认为他们之前说过不同的话。

They said earlier they expected to earn about 250. They— they signaled the charge they were gonna make ahead of time— for— layoffs essentially. So I— I— it did not strike me as a big surprise— what they reported. Now, it may be a surprise a year from now or two years from now. But I— I have not been surprised by what they’ve reported.
他们早些时候说预计能赚大约 250。他们——他们也提前释放了将计提的一笔费用——本质上与——裁员有关。所以我——我——对他们的这次披露并不感到意外。至于一年后或两年后会不会有意外——那另当别论。但就这次披露而言——我并不惊讶。

BECKY: Would you buy additional shares of IBM? You bought some earlier this year. Would you continue to buy?
BECKY:你会继续加仓 IBM 吗?你今年早些时候买过。你会继续买吗?

BUFFETT: Depends on the price. (LAUGH)
BUFFETT:要看价格。(笑)

BECKY: The price today, I think it’s trading at about a hundred—
BECKY:今天的价格,我想大概在一百——

BUFFETT: $191.
BUFFETT:191 美元。

BECKY: $191.63 (LAUGH) on the last trade. I think your— your— average cost was somewhere closer to $173. I look back and— in the annual report, I think you’ve seen a gain of about 12 percent. You bought it at a cost of around $11.68 billion. It’s now worth closer to $13.05 billion. So, what is the right price?
BECKY:最后一笔成交是 191.63 美元(笑)。我想你——你的——平均成本更接近 173 美元。我回看——年报里写的——我想你大概有 12% 的收益。你买入成本大约是 116.8 亿美元。现在市值更接近 130.5 亿美元。那么,什么价位才算合适?

BUFFETT: These are just figures you carry around in your head all the time. (LAUGH)
BUFFETT:这些数字你显然随时都装在脑子里。(笑)

BECKY: No, I had to look down at my notes for that.
BECKY:不,我得低头看笔记才行。

BUFFETT: We could buy it. But— I mean, I— I don’t— I don’t announce anything we’re gonna buy or sell. But I— I— I— I— I wouldn’t rule it out. I paid that much for the stock.
BUFFETT:我们可以买。但——我的意思是,我——我不会——不会提前宣布我们要买什么或卖什么。不过我——我——我——我——我不会排除这种可能。我之前就是按这个价位买的。

BECKY: Okay, all right, so earlier this year, you actually were buying shares of that. Can I ask you also about just activist investing in general. First of all, David Winters. What do you think of David Winters because— one person this morning actually called him a gadfly. Is he Evelyn Y. Davis?
BECKY:好吧,好——所以今年早些时候你确实在买它的股票。我也想问一下更一般意义上的激进投资。首先是 David Winters。你怎么看 David Winters?因为——今天早上有人把他称作“牛虻”。他是 Evelyn Y. Davis 那样的人吗?

BUFFETT: Oh no, he’s not a gadfly. I mean— he’s got $2.5 million. I— I think he’s owned the stock for many years. And incidentally, we’ve heard from— other shareholders after he made his letter public that owned large blocks of stock that felt the same way. I don’t know how they voted. But— the—
BUFFETT:哦不,他不是“牛虻”。我的意思是——他管理着 250 万的仓位。我——我想他持有这只股票很多年了。而且顺带说一句,在他公开那封信之后,我们也听到——其他一些大股东——表达了相同的看法。我不知道他们如何投票。但——这——

BECKY: Coca-Cola shareholders?
BECKY:Coca-Cola 的股东?

BUFFETT: Coca-Cola shareholders. And— and I’m being— yeah, that’s an issue that comes to the shareholders to vote on. I mean, the— you’re expected to cast your vote— on the issue. And— and he disagreed with it. I disagreed. I didn’t vote against it, I abstained. But it’s a perfectly proper thing. But if you’re s— going to give away a part of the company— shareholders should probably vote on it.
BUFFETT:Coca-Cola 的股东。并且——我认为——是的,这是提交给股东投票的问题。也就是说——你应该就此投出你的一票。而——他不同意。我也不同意。我没有投反对票,我选择弃权。但这是完全正当的事情。因为如果你要——把公司的一部分让渡出去——股东大概应该投票决定。

BECKY: We—we have seen — activist investors take all kinds of— of new pages and create new playbooks. Bill Ackman just teaming up with Valeant to go after Allergan. He’s said that he’s already heard from another public company who has identified a target they’d like him to help out with, too. Does any of this strike you as strange? Does it seem like fair behavior? Does it sound like front-running?
BECKY:我——我们已经看到——激进投资者在不断——翻出新招、写出新剧本。Bill Ackman 刚刚与 Valeant 联手去拿下 Allergan。他还说已经接到另一家上市公司的联系——那家公司也锁定了一个目标,希望他去帮忙。你觉得这些做法奇怪吗?看起来公平吗?听起来像是“抢跑”吗?

BUFFETT: I don’t know. It— it— it’s— I don’t know the arrangement he had with Valeant. I mean—
BUFFETT:我不清楚。这——这——这——我不了解他与 Valeant 之间的安排。我的意思是——

BECKY: He and Valeant got together. It was Valeant’s idea. Valeant put some money into this deal with him. They agreed to go after it together. And then he bought the stake of 9.7 percent—
BECKY:他和 Valeant 携手行动。这是 Valeant 的主意。Valeant 为这笔交易投了一些钱。他们同意一起推进。然后他买入了 9.7% 的持股——

BUFFETT: Yeah.
BUFFETT:是的。

BECKY: —9.6 percent.
BECKY:——9.6%。

BUFFETT: Yeah. My guess is he had legal advice on it and—
BUFFETT:是的。我的猜测是他就此征求过法律意见,而且——

BECKY: He did—
BECKY:他确实——

BUFFETT: And—
BUFFETT:并且——

BECKY: Robert Khuzami told him he thought it was fine.
BECKY:Robert Khuzami 告诉他,他认为这样没有问题。

BUFFETT: Yeah, and I think if Valeant had bought it itself, I don’t think they have a problem. I think that-
BUFFETT:是的,而且我认为如果是 Valeant 自己去买,我不觉得他们会有问题。我想——

BECKY: Well, except that Valeant can’t buy— that big of a stake in another— in another maker. I think they were limitations to how much stock they could actually buy.
BECKY:嗯,除了 Valeant 不能——在另一家——另一家制造商里买那么大的持股。我想他们在实际可购股数上是受限的。

BUFFETT: Yeah. I don’t know the answer to that one. (LAUGH)
BUFFETT:是的。这个我不清楚答案。(笑)

BECKY: Does it strike you that activist investors are getting stronger and stronger? Are there—
BECKY:你是否感觉到激进投资者越来越强势了?是不是有——

BUFFETT: Oh, they are.
BUFFETT:哦,确实如此。

BECKY: —CEOs—
BECKY:——CEO——

BUFFETT: They are. They are. The CEOs are terrified of activists. I can— I can tell you that. (LAUGH) They’re all talking to investment bankers and lawyers and saying, “What do we do about this?”
BUFFETT:是的,确实如此。CEO 们都很惧怕激进投资者。这点——我可以告诉你。(笑)他们都在和投行家、律师商量,“我们该怎么办?”

BECKY: Who is in the right? Or is it tough to paint all activist investors with one brush?
BECKY:那究竟谁更有理?或者说,把所有激进投资者一概而论是不是不太合适?

BUFFETT: I don’t think you can generalize about it. I think there— there are companies that— that— where management has not done a good job, and I’m not— referring to anything specific here. But I mean — certainly if people want to step up and buy a lot of the stock in a company, I— it’s hard to argue with their right to do that.
BUFFETT:我不认为可以一概而论。我觉得确实——确实有些公司——管理层做得并不好,我这里不是——指具体哪一家。但我的意思是——当然,如果有人想站出来在一家公司里买入大量股票,我——很难质疑他们这样做的权利。

BECKY: There have been— major Dow components that have been mentioned as potential takeover targets, even an IBM, some people have suggested. Do you think that would be for the good of shareholders or to the detriment?
BECKY:已经有——道琼斯成分股被提到可能成为收购目标,甚至有人提到 IBM。你觉得那样对股东是利还是弊?

BUFFETT: (THROAT CLEAR) Well, I think it would be case by case. But I— I— I— I’m not looking for anybody to do that in IBM.
BUFFETT:(清嗓)嗯,我认为要具体情况具体分析。不过我——我——我——我不希望有人在 IBM 身上这么做。

BECKY: Okay. Also I’d like to talk to you a little bit about that David Einhorn. He was just out talking about how he sees a potential tech bubble building once again. He talked about the cool-kid stocks. And I guess you can—(infer) from that he means companies like a Facebook .
BECKY:好的。另外我还想谈谈 David Einhorn。他刚刚表示再次看到潜在的科技泡沫在形成。他谈到了所谓的“cool-kid stocks”。我想你可以——(推断)他指的是像 Facebook 这样的公司。

Or some of these big— internet companies that have soared very rapidly. He’s shorting a basket of these stocks now because he thinks it looks like it did— back before 2001. You were somebody who didn’t understand valuations with the technology companies back then. Do you see similar characteristics to the technology stocks today?
或者是一些这些——大体量、股价飙升很快的互联网公司。他现在在做空一篮子此类股票,因为他认为眼下看起来很像——2001 年之前。你当年也是对科技公司的估值“看不懂”的那类人。你觉得今天的科技股有类似特征吗?

BUFFETT: I don’t think it’s like two-thousand — (THROAT CLEAR) the— the period prior to 2001. I don’t— there are a lotta s— companies whose valuations I don’t understand. But that’s always been true. And— and then you get into a period like right before 2001 where you could almost sell anything and capitalize eyeballs and all of that. I— I— I don’t think it’s reached that point, and certainly I don’t think the general market level is going to bubble up.
BUFFETT:我不认为这像两千年——(清嗓)也就是——2001 年之前的那段时期。我——我确实有很多公——公司估值看不懂。但这一直都是真的。而——在 2001 年之前那阵子,你几乎什么都能卖,把“眼球”之类的都资本化。我——我——我不认为现在到了那一步,而且我当然也不认为整体市场层面会泡沫化上涨。

BECKY: Well, that— that’s an interesting point. We’re not far off of all-time highs. It’s probably less than a percent for both the Dow and the S&P 500. You don’t feel like things are getting too frothy here?
BECKY:嗯,那——这是个有意思的观点。我们距离历史新高不远。道指和标普500 可能都不到 1% 的差距。你不觉得这里有点过热了吗?

BUFFETT: No, no. I think we’re— in a range— and it’s— it’s a big zone, it’s a big zone always of reasonableness. But— but stocks ought to be higher every ten years. I mean, there’s a plow back of earnings that goes back year after years. Stocks will become worth more decade after decade, not in any precise manner, not in an even manner or anything of the sort. But ten years, 20 years, 30 years from now, stocks will be worth more than they are today.
BUFFETT:不,不。我认为我们——仍在一个区间里——这是个很大的区间,一直都在“合理”的大区间里。但是——股票每十年本就应该更高。我的意思是,利润会年复一年地再投资。股票在一个又一个十年里会更有价值,不是以某种精确方式、也不是均匀上升或类似的路径。但十年、二十年、三十年之后,股票会比今天更值钱。

BECKY: You’ve gotten concerned about valuations in the past, though. What— what would be a warning signal to you? What would be something that would— would really start to make you think twice about buying more stocks?
BECKY:不过你过去也对估值感到担忧。对你来说——什么会是警示信号?什么情况——会让你在继续买入股票前认真三思?

BUFFETT: It would be valuation. I mean, the— the— the— if the numbers got— if prices got to nosebleed levels compared to earnings for many stocks generally, then I would say we— you know, we’re in one of those periods when stocks got ahead of themselves.
BUFFETT:会是估值。我的意思是——如——果那些数字——如果相对于盈利而言,很多股票的价格总体上达到了“流鼻血”的高度,那么我会说——你知道,我们正处在那种股票自顾自跑到前头的时期。

BECKY: Is that—
BECKY:也就是说——

BUFFETT: But stocks— stocks do get worth more over time because companies retained a lot of what they earned.
BUFFETT:但股票——长期确实会更值钱,因为公司会保留相当多的盈利。

BECKY: But is that just P/E ratios for forward earnings? Is that the best way of measuring it?
BECKY:但这只是看基于未来盈利的市盈率吗?这是衡量它的最佳方式吗?

BUFFETT: Yeah, and it— in the end, a stock today is worth all of the cash you can distribute between now and Judgment Day. And the higher the price goes, it— if the distribution doesn’t change (LAUGH) at some point it gets ahead of itself.
BUFFETT:是的,而且——归根到底,一只股票今天的价值,就是从现在到“审判日”之间能分配的全部现金流之和。而价格越往上走,——如果分配能力不变(笑),那在某个点上它就会跑得太快了。

BECKY: Let me ask you also just about the annual meeting coming up. In your annual letter to shareholders, you said that you’d be looking for a bear who could sit and ask questions at the annual meeting. I take it you don’t have a bear who’s going to be coming this year. I’ve heard it’s Morningstar, the analyst there, who will be handling it. What happened?
BECKY:我再问问即将到来的年度股东大会。在你的年度股东信里,你说会找一位“熊派”坐在台前提问。我理解为今年不会有熊派过来。听说这次会由 Morningstar 的分析师来负责提问。发生了什么?

BUFFETT: Well, we gave up about a week ago— hearing from any credentialed bear that was short the stock. So, about a week ago we were getting close to the annual meeting, and — we had— we’ve got a sixth seat down there in front (LAUGH) in terms of questioners. So— Morningstar had written me— previously in saying they hoped that when a vacancy showed up that they can have their analyst come. And so I wrote ’em and said— “Come this year.”
BUFFETT:嗯,大约一周前我们就放弃了——寻找任何持证、并且做空本公司股票的熊派。差不多一周前,离年会很近了,而且——我们在前排安排了第六个提问席位(笑)。所以——Morningstar 之前写信给我,说如果出现空位,希望能让他们的分析师来。于是我回信说——“那就今年来吧。”

BECKY: There are no bears on Berkshire? Are we to understand that no one applied for this?
BECKY:没有做空 Berkshire 的熊派吗?我们是不是可以理解为没有人申请这个位置?

BUFFETT: Well, I— I— somewhere they publish short interest, so I don’t know whether we can trace any of those people down. But— we did not find anybody that— that had— a real bear interest in it.
BUFFETT:嗯,我——我——某些地方会公布卖空数据,但我不知道我们是否能把那些人找出来。不过——我们确实没找到——对这件事真正有熊派立场的人。

BECKY: All right.
BECKY:好的。

BUFFETT: They’re probably out there, but— maybe they didn’t want to surface.
BUFFETT:他们大概是有的,只是——也许不想现身。

BECKY: All right. Well, Warren, I want to thank you very much for your time today.
BECKY:好的。那么,Warren,非常感谢你今天抽出时间。

BUFFETT: Thank you.
BUFFETT:谢谢。

BECKY: We really appreciate it.
BECKY:我们非常感激。

BUFFETT: Okay, thank you—
BUFFETT:好的,谢谢——

BECKY: And—we hope to talk to you again soon.
BECKY:而且——我们希望很快能再次和你对话。

BUFFETT: Good, good.
BUFFETT:好,好。

BECKY: Again, Warren Buffett and— Bill on the show, we will send it back to you. But— the news is that Warren Buffett abstained Berkshire shares. He is the largest shareholder in Coca-Cola. So that’s— abstaining— I think something like 9.6 percent—
BECKY:再次说明,Warren Buffett 和——Bill 也在节目中,我们现在把现场交还给你们。不过——新闻是 Warren Buffett 用 Berkshire 的持股选择了弃权。他是 Coca-Cola 的最大股东。所以这——弃权——我想大概相当于 9.6%——

BILL GRIFFETH: Nine— yup.
BILL GRIFFETH:九——没错。

BUFFETT: Well, maybe more like 9.1. We have— we have 400 million shares and they have 4.4 billion outstanding.
BUFFETT:嗯,也许更接近 9.1。我们——我们有 4 亿股,而他们已发行股份是 44 亿股。

BECKY: Right, greater than 9 percent, maybe 9.1 percent of the shares outstanding that vote on— the equity plan did pass by the votes that were cast by 83 percent. But guys, I’ll send it back over to you—
BECKY:对,超过 9%,也许是 9.1% 的流通股进行了弃权。该股权激励计划在已投票的选票中以 83% 的支持通过了。各位,我把画面交还给你们——

BILL: Very interesting, Becky.
BILL:很有意思,Becky。

MICHELLE CARUSO-CABRERA: But still, he disagreed with the plan.
MICHELLE CARUSO-CABRERA:但归根结底,他是不赞成这个计划的。

BILL: Well— exactly—
BILL:嗯——确实——

MICHELLE: It’s startling. Yeah. (LAUGH)
MICHELLE:这挺让人吃惊的。是的。(笑)

BILL: Thank you, Becky.
BILL:谢谢你,Becky。

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