2016-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was \$15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from \$19 to \$155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*
2015年，Berkshire的净资产增长了154亿美元，使我们A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增长了6.4%。在过去的51年里（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到155,501美元，年复合增长率为19.2%。*
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
本报告中所使用的每股数据均适用于Berkshire的A类股。B类股的数据为A类股的1/1500。
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
在这51年中的前一半时间里，Berkshire的净资产大致等于真正重要的数字：企业的内在价值。这两个数值之所以当时接近，是因为我们大多数的资源都投资于可流通证券，而这些证券会定期按照市场报价（扣除若出售将产生的税负）进行重估。用华尔街的术语来说，我们的资产负债表当时很大程度上是“按市值计价”的。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.
然而到了1990年代初，我们的重点转向了对企业的直接控股，这一转变使得资产负债表的相关性减弱了。这种脱节是因为对被控公司适用的会计规则与评估可流通证券的规则大不相同。我们所拥有的“失败者”的账面价值会被减记，而“成功者”的价值却从不会被向上重估。
We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
我们对这两种结果都有过经验：我曾做过一些愚蠢的收购，为那些公司的经济商誉支付了代价，后来这些商誉被冲销，从而减少了Berkshire的账面价值。我们也确实拥有过一些成功案例——其中有几个非常巨大——但我们从未将它们的账面价值提高过一分钱。
Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.
随着时间推移，这种不对称的会计处理方式（我们对此是认同的）必然会扩大内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。如今，我们那些“成功者”所包含的庞大且不断增长的未记录收益清楚地表明，Berkshire的内在价值远高于其账面价值。这也是为什么只要股价低至账面价值的120%，我们会非常乐意回购股票。以这样的价格进行回购，将立刻且实质性地提升Berkshire持续股东的每股内在价值。
The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate market value gain – tabulated on the facing page – materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.
我们所持有企业价值的未记录增长，解释了为什么Berkshire的总市值增幅（详见对页表格）显著超过了账面价值的增幅。这两个指标在短期内会出现波动。例如，去年账面价值表现更好。然而从长期来看，市值的增长应会继续其历史趋势，即超过账面价值的增长。
The Year at Berkshire
Berkshire年度概况
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:
Charlie Munger 是 Berkshire 的副董事长，也是我的合伙人，我们预期 Berkshire 的正常化盈利能力每年都会提高。（当然，由于美国经济疲软或可能出现的保险特大灾害，实际年度盈利有时会下降。）在某些年份，正常化增幅会很小；在其他年份则会相当可观。去年表现良好。以下是要点：
‹ The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about \$5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.
‹ Berkshire 在 2015 年最重要的发展并非财务层面，尽管这带来了更好的收益。在 2014 年表现欠佳后，我们的 BNSF 铁路去年大幅提升了对客户的服务。为实现这一成果，我们在年度资本支出上投入约 58 亿美元，这一数字远超任何美国铁路的记录，几乎是我们年度折旧费用的三倍。这笔钱花得物有所值。
BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.
BNSF 承担约 17% 的美国城际货运（以收入吨英里计），无论是铁路、公路、航空、水运还是管道运输。从这一点来看，在七大美国铁路公司（其中有两家总部位于加拿大）中，我们稳居第一，运送的货运吨英里比最接近的竞争对手多 45%。因此，保持一流服务不仅对我们的托运人福祉至关重要，也对美国经济的顺畅运转至关重要。
For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record \$6.8 billion\* (a gain of \$606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.
对大多数美国铁路而言，2015 年是令人失望的一年。总体吨英里下降，盈利也走弱。然而，BNSF 保持了运量，并将税前收入提升至创纪录的 68 亿美元*（较 2014 年增加 6.06 亿美元）。BNSF 的管理者 Matt Rose 和 Carl Ice 值得我以及各位的感谢。
* Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.
整封信中，除非另有说明，所有收益均以税前数据表示。
‹ BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance businesses – earned \$13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of \$650 million over 2014.
‹ BNSF 是我们的“Powerhouse Five”中最大的一家，该集团还包括 Berkshire Hathaway Energy、Marmon、Lubrizol 和 IMC。合计来看，这些公司——我们最盈利的五家非保险业务——在 2015 年的收益为 131 亿美元，比 2014 年增加 6.5 亿美元。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning \$393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the \$12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
在这五家公司中，只有当时盈利 3.93 亿美元的 Berkshire Hathaway Energy 在 2003 年已被我们拥有。随后，我们以全现金方式收购了另外四家中的三家。然而，在收购 BNSF 时，我们以现金支付约 70% 的成本，其余部分发行了 Berkshire 股票，使流通股数增加 6.1%。换句话说，在十二年期间，这五家公司为 Berkshire 带来的年度盈利增加 127 亿美元，而仅造成了轻微的稀释。这符合我们不仅要提高盈利，还要确保每股业绩也能增长的目标。
‹ Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than \$32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.
‹ 明年，我将讨论“Powerhouse Six”。新成员将是 Precision Castparts Corp.（“PCC”），这是我们在一个月前以逾 320 亿美元现金收购的企业。PCC 完美契合 Berkshire 模式，将显著提升我们的正常化每股盈利能力。
Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.
在 CEO Mark Donegan 的领导下，PCC 已成为全球首屈一指的航空航天零部件供应商（其中大多数用于原始设备，尽管备件对公司也很重要）。Mark 的成就让我想起 IMC 的 Jacob Harpaz 定期展现的魔力，这位以色列卓越的切削工具制造商。两位把极其普通的原材料转化为全球主要制造商使用的非凡产品，他们都是各自领域的达·芬奇。
PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.
PCC 的产品通常通过多年合同交付，是大多数大型飞机中的关键组件。公司的 30,466 名员工服务于其他行业，他们在 13 个国家的 162 家工厂工作。在打造业务的过程中，Mark 进行了许多收购，并将继续进行更多收购。我们期待他运用 Berkshire 的资本。
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers – they each handle about \$9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.
个人致谢：若没有我们自己的 Todd Combs 的建议和协助，PCC 收购案就不会成行。几年前他把这家公司介绍给我，并且让我了解了该业务及 Mark。虽然 Todd 和 Ted Weschler 主要是投资经理——他们各自为我们管理约 90 亿美元——但他们在其他方面也愉快而出色地为 Berkshire 增添了重大价值。聘请他们二人是我做过的最佳决定之一。
‹ With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 101⁄4 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 1⁄4.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.
‹ 随着对 PCC 的收购，若这些企业均为独立公司，Berkshire 将拥有 10+1⁄4 家能跻身《财富》500 强的公司。（我们对 Kraft Heinz 的 27% 持股计作那 1⁄4。）这意味着仍有不到 98% 的美国商业巨头尚未与我们联系。我们的接线员随时恭候。
‹ Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned \$5.7 billion last year, up from \$5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than \$700 million, two that earned between \$400 million and \$700 million, seven that earned between \$250 million and \$400 million, six that earned between \$100 million and \$250 million, and eleven that earned between \$50 million and \$100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.
‹ 我们几十家规模较小的非保险业务去年赚取了 57 亿美元，高于 2014 年的 51 亿美元。在这一组企业中，有一家去年盈利超过 7 亿美元，两家盈利在 4 亿至 7 亿美元之间，七家盈利在 2.5 亿至 4 亿美元之间，六家盈利在 1 亿至 2.5 亿美元之间，还有十一家盈利在 5,000 万至 1 亿美元之间。我们对它们都爱不释手：随着岁月推移，这一业务组合的数量和盈利都将继续增长。
‹ When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested \$16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.
‹ 当你听到有人谈论美国日渐老化的基础设施时，请放心，他们说的可不是 Berkshire。去年，我们在物业、厂房和设备上投资了 160 亿美元，其中 86% 完全投向了美国。
I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.
我之前向你们提到过 BNSF 在 2015 年创纪录的资本支出。每到年底，我们铁路的有形设施都将比十二个月前有所改善。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested \$16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.
Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”）的情况也类似。该公司在可再生能源上投资了 160 亿美元，目前拥有美国 7% 的风力发电和 6% 的太阳能发电。事实上，我们受监管的公用事业拥有并运营的 4,423 兆瓦风电容量是排名第二的公用事业的六倍。
We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.
我们并未就此止步。去年，BHE 为支持巴黎气候变化大会，对未来可再生能源的发展作出了重大承诺。兑现这些承诺，将对环境和 Berkshire 的经济利益都大有裨益。
‹ Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from \$41 billion to \$88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
‹ Berkshire 庞大且不断扩张的保险业务在 2015 年再次实现了承保盈利——这已是连续第 13 年——同时扩大了我们的浮存金。在这些年份里，我们的浮存金——并不属于我们但可为 Berkshire 的利益而投资的资金——从 410 亿美元增长到 880 亿美元。尽管这一增长以及浮存金的规模都未体现在 Berkshire 的收益中，但浮存金使我们能够持有资产，从而带来可观的投资收入。
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled \$26 billion during the 13-year period, including \$1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.
与此同时，在这 13 年中，我们的承保利润累计达 260 亿美元，其中 2015 年贡献 18 亿美元。毫无疑问，Berkshire 最大的未记录财富存在于其保险业务中。我们花了 48 年时间打造这一多元化体系，它无法被复制。
‹ While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost \$634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from \$300,000 to \$143 million.
‹ 当 Charlie 和我正在寻找新的企业收购目标时，我们的众多子公司也在定期进行补强式收购。去年，我们签订了 29 项补强交易，计划总花费 6.34 亿美元。这些交易的成本从 30 万美元到 1.43 亿美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.
只要价格合理，Charlie 和我都鼓励进行补强式收购。（递到我们面前的大多数交易显然并不合理。）这些收购将资本投入到与我们现有业务契合、并由我们经验丰富的经理团队管理的运营中。这意味着我们无需额外投入精力，却能为 Berkshire 带来更多收益，二者兼得令我们颇感欣喜。在未来的几年里，我们还将完成数十笔补强收购。
‹ Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of \$4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us \$9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of \$27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.)
‹ 我们与 Jorge Paulo Lemann、Alex Behring 及 Bernardo Hees 的 Heinz 合伙事业去年通过与 Kraft 合并，规模翻倍以上。在此交易之前，我们以 42.5 亿美元的成本持有 Heinz 约 53% 的股份。现在，我们以 98 亿美元的成本持有 Kraft Heinz 3.254 亿股（约占 27%）。这家新公司年销售额 270 亿美元，能够为你提供 Heinz 番茄酱或芥末，与 Kraft 方面的 Oscar Mayer 热狗相得益彰。再配上一杯 Coke，你就享用到了我最喜欢的一顿餐。（我们将在年度股东大会上展示 Oscar Mayer Wienermobile——带上你的孩子们吧。）
Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a \$6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.
尽管我们并未出售任何 Kraft Heinz 股票，按照 “GAAP”（美国公认会计准则）的规定，在合并完成时我们必须将这项投资上调 68 亿美元。于是，资产负债表上的 Kraft Heinz 持股价值比我们的成本高出数十亿美元，又比其市值低了数十亿美元，这种结果恐怕只有会计师才会欣赏。
Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us \$720 million annually and are carried at \$7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for \$8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.
Berkshire 还持有 Kraft Heinz 的优先股，每年为我们贡献 7.2 亿美元股息，在资产负债表上的账面价值为 77 亿美元。按照优先股条款允许的最早日期，该持股几乎肯定会在六月被以 83.2 亿美元赎回。这对 Kraft Heinz 是好消息，对 Berkshire 则是坏消息。
Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.
Jorge Paulo 及其伙伴是再好不过的合作对象。我们与他们一样热衷于收购、建设并长期持有满足基本需求与欲望的大型企业。然而，在追求这一目标的过程中，我们走的是不同的路径。
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.
他们的方法——且已取得非凡成功——是收购那些存在大量可削减冗余成本机会的公司，并且极为迅速地采取措施完成整合。他们的行动显著提升了生产率，这是过去 240 年美国经济增长的关键因素。如果每小时工作产出所需的商品和服务无法提高——这正是衡量生产率提升的指标——经济终将停滞。在美国许多企业中，仍蕴藏着可观的生产率提升空间，这为 Jorge Paulo 及其伙伴提供了机遇。
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)
在 Berkshire，我们同样追求效率并厌恶官僚主义。然而，为了实现目标，我们采取的是避免臃肿的方法，收购诸如 PCC 这类长期由注重成本且高效的管理者运营的公司。完成收购后，我们的角色仅仅是营造一种环境，使这些首席执行官——以及他们的继任者（通常志同道合）——能够最大化管理成效并充分享受工作乐趣。（采取这种放手式管理，我遵循了著名的“曼格箴言”：“如果你想确保自己一辈子痛苦，就务必带着改变对方行为的目的去结婚。”）
We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.
我们将在 Berkshire 继续实行极度——事实上几乎闻所未闻的——去中心化运营。但我们也会寻找与 Jorge Paulo 合作的机会，可以像他团队收购 Tim Horton’s 那样担任融资伙伴，或像 Heinz 那样同时提供股权和融资支持。我们也可能偶尔与其他伙伴合作，正如我们在 Berkadia 已成功做到的那样。
这个逻辑说不通。
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.
然而，Berkshire 只会与进行友好收购的伙伴合作。当然，某些敌意收购亦有其合理性：一些 CEO 忘记了他们应当为股东服务，另一些管理者则极为无能。在这两种情况下，董事会可能看不到问题，或仅仅是不愿做出必要的变革。这时就需要新的面孔。不过，我们会把这些“机会”留给其他人。在 Berkshire，我们只去受欢迎的地方。
‹ Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about \$500 million.
‹ 去年，Berkshire 在其“四大”投资——American Express、Coca-Cola、IBM 以及 Wells Fargo——中的每一家都提高了持股比例。我们增持了 IBM （持股由 2014 年底的 7.8% 升至 8.4%）和 Wells Fargo （由 9.4% 升至 9.8%）的股票。在另外两家公司 Coca-Cola 和 American Express，由于它们回购股票，我们的持股比例也有所上升：在 Coca-Cola 的权益由 9.2% 升至 9.3%，在 American Express 的权益由 14.8% 升至 15.6%。如果你认为这些看似微小的变化并不重要，不妨看看这组数据：就这四家公司合计而言，我们的持股比例每提高一个百分点，Berkshire 在其年度收益中的份额就会增加约 5 亿美元。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四家被投资公司拥有出色的业务，并由既有才华又以股东利益为导向的管理者经营。它们的有形股本回报率从优秀到惊人不等。在 Berkshire，我们更喜欢持有一家优秀公司非控股但可观的股份，而不是完全拥有一家平庸公司的全部股权。有一部分“希望钻石”总好过独占整颗“水钻”。
If Berkshire’s year-end holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to \$4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about \$1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly \$3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
若以 Berkshire 年末持股量为基准，我们在“四大”公司 2015 年收益中的份额为 47 亿美元。然而，在向各位报告的收益中，我们仅计入了它们支付给我们的股息——去年约为 18 亿美元。但请别误会：这几家公司我们未报告的近 30 亿美元收益，对我们而言与 Berkshire 账面确认的部分一样珍贵。
The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.
被投资公司保留的收益常被用于回购其自身股票——这一举措无需我们花费一分钱，却能提高 Berkshire 在未来收益中的份额。这些公司的留存收益也为通常颇具优势的商业机会提供资金。所有这些都让我们有理由相信，这四家公司合计的每股收益将随着时间显著增长。如果增益确实实现，Berkshire 所获股息将提高，我们的未实现资本利得也将随之增加。
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.
我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意被动投入巨额资金于非控股业务——让我们相较于那些只限于收购并自营公司的同行具有显著优势。Woody Allen 曾打趣说，双性恋的好处在于能把你在周六夜找到约会对象的几率翻倍。同理——嗯，并非完全同理——我们对运营型业务与被动投资兼收并蓄，使我们能够把 Berkshire 取之不尽的现金流找到合理用途的机会倍增。此外，拥有庞大的可流通证券投资组合也为我们提供了储备资金，一旦出现“大象级”收购机会即可动用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.
这是大选年，各候选人滔滔不绝地谈论我国所面临的问题（当然，只有他们才能解决）。在这种持续的负面鼓噪下，许多美国人如今相信，他们的子女的生活水平将不如自己。
That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
这种看法完全错误：今天在美国诞生的婴儿是历史上最幸运的一代。
American GDP per capita is now about \$56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.
目前美国的人均 GDP 约为 56,000 美元。正如我去年所提，按实际值计算，这一数字是我出生的 1930 年的惊人六倍，远远超出了我父母或同代人的想象。如今的美国公民并没有比 1930 年的美国人更聪明，也没有更努力地工作；相反，他们的工作效率更高，因此产出更多。这一强大的趋势必将持续：美国的经济魔力依然蓬勃旺盛。
Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.
一些评论人士对我们目前每年 2% 的实际 GDP 增长率大加哀叹——没错，我们都希望看到更高的增速。但让我们用这个备受诟病的 2% 做个简单计算。你将看到，这个增速同样能带来惊人的成果。
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 × 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering \$19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation. Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be \$76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.
美国人口每年增长约 0.8%（出生减去死亡贡献 0.5%，净移民贡献 0.3%）。因此 2% 的总体增长率带来约 1.2% 的人均增长率。听起来或许不够惊艳，但在大约 25 年的单代人周期中，这一增速会使人均实际 GDP 增加 34.4%。（复利效应使得这一增幅超出了简单相乘 25×1.2% 的结果。）反过来，这 34.4% 的增幅将为下一代带来惊人的 19,000 美元的人均实际 GDP 增加。若平均分配，相当于一个四口之家每年增加 76,000 美元。今天的政客们无需为明日的孩子流泪。
Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few – transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.
事实上，当今的大多数孩子都过得不错。我所在的中上阶层社区里的所有家庭，都普遍享有比我出生时的 John D. Rockefeller 先生所能达到的更高生活水平。他那无与伦比的财富也买不到我们如今视为理所当然的东西，无论是在交通、娱乐、通信还是医疗服务领域，举几项即可。Rockefeller 无疑拥有权力与名望；然而，他的生活质量却不及我邻居们今日的水平。
Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.
虽然下一代可分享的“蛋糕”将远大于今日，但如何分配仍将激烈争夺。正如当下所见，围绕新增商品与服务产出的斗争将在劳动力盛年者与退休者、健康者与病弱者、继承者与 Horatio Algers 式的白手起家者、投资者与工人之间展开，尤其是在市场高度评价的技能人才与同样正直勤劳却缺乏市场所看重技能的美国人之间。这类冲突自古存在——并将永远持续。国会将成为战场；金钱和选票将成为武器。游说仍将是一个增长行业。
The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)
然而，利好消息是，即便属于“失利”一方的人们，未来几乎肯定——也理应——享有远多于过去的商品与服务，其质量也将显著提升。没有任何制度能像市场那样有效生产人们所需——更甚者，提供人们尚未意识到自己需要的东西。我的父母年轻时无法想象电视机的存在，而我在五十多岁时也不认为自己需要个人电脑。这两种产品一旦人们见识其功能，便迅速改变了生活。我如今每周花十小时在线打桥牌，而写这封信时，“搜索”对我至关重要。（不过，我还没准备好使用 Tinder。）
For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.
在过去 240 年里，唱衰美国始终是重大错误，而现在也绝非开始的时候。美国商业与创新的“金鹅”将持续产下更多、更大的金蛋。美国的社会保障承诺将得到兑现，甚至可能更加慷慨。毫无疑问，美国的孩子们将过上远胜于其父母的生活。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries;(2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees;(4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
鉴于这一顺风因素，Berkshire（当然，还有许多其他企业）几乎必定会蓬勃发展。接任 Charlie 和我的管理层将遵循我们的简单蓝图，提升 Berkshire 的每股内在价值：(1) 持续提升众多子公司的基本盈利能力；(2) 通过补强式收购进一步增加它们的盈利；(3) 受益于被投资公司的增长；
(4) 当 Berkshire 股价相对于内在价值出现显著折让时回购股票；以及 (5) 偶尔进行一次大型收购。管理层还将通过极少、甚至从不发行 Berkshire 股票来努力为你最大化成果。
Intrinsic Business Value
内在商业价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.
尽管 Charlie 和我经常谈论内在商业价值，但我们无法准确告诉你 Berkshire 股份的具体数值（事实上，任何股票都如此）。然而，我们可以做出合理估算。在 2010 年年度报告中，我们列出了三项要素——其中一项为定性因素——我们认为这是估算 Berkshire 内在价值的关键。该讨论完整转载于第 113-114 页。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to \$159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses – including insurance underwriting income – increased 2.1% to \$12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax.
以下是两项量化因素的最新情况：2015 年，我们的每股现金及投资增长 8.3%，达到 159,794 美元（Kraft Heinz 持股按市值计），众多业务（包括保险承保收入）的每股收益增长 2.1%，至 12,304 美元。在第二项因素中，我们排除了所持投资产生的股息和利息，因为将其计入会导致价值重复计算。在计算该收益时，我们扣除了所有公司管理费用、利息、折旧、摊销以及少数股东权益，但未扣除所得税。也就是说，这些收益为税前数据。
I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.
我在上段使用斜体，是因为我们首次将保险承保收入计入业务收益。当初提出 Berkshire 两大量化估值支柱时，我们并未这么做，因为当时保险业绩受巨灾险种极大影响：若无风吹地动，我们能赚大钱，但一场特大灾害就会出现亏损。为保持谨慎，我们当时始终假设承保业务长期盈亏平衡，并在年度计算第二项价值因素时忽略其任何盈亏。
Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed \$1,118 per share to the \$12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged \$1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.
如今，我们的保险业绩较十几二十年前更为稳定，因为我们已降低巨灾险比重，并大幅扩展了基本险种。去年，我们的承保收入为每股 1,118 美元，计入本节第二段所述的 12,304 美元每股收益。在过去十年中，年度承保收入平均为每股 1,434 美元，我们预计大多数年份会盈利。但你仍应认识到，任何特定年度的承保业务都可能亏损，且幅度或许相当可观。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings.
自 1970 年以来，我们的每股投资以年复合 18.9% 的速度增长，而我们的收益（包括首末两年的承保结果）年复合增长率为 23.7%。在随后 45 年里，Berkshire 股价的增速与这两项价值指标极为接近，这绝非巧合。Charlie 和我乐见这两个领域均有增长，但我们的主要目标是提升经营性收益。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)
现在，让我们来审视公司运营的四大板块。它们各自的资产负债表结构和收益特征截然不同。因此，我们将它们作为四家独立企业来呈现，这也是 Charlie 和我看待它们的方式（尽管将它们置于同一屋檐下在经济上具有重要且持久的优势）。我们的意图是向你提供——若角色互换、由你负责报告、我们则为缺席股东时——我们希望获得的信息。（别激动；我们并未考虑真的做角色互换。）
Insurance
保险
Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for \$8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.
首先让我们看看保险业务。财产意外险（“P/C”）行业自 1967 年以来一直是推动我们扩张的发动机，那一年我们以 860 万美元收购了 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine。如今，以净资产计，National Indemnity 已成为全球最大的财产意外险公司。此外，其内在价值远高于我们账面记录的价值。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我们被 P/C 业务吸引的原因之一在于其财务特性：P/C 保险公司先收保费，后支付赔款。在极端情况下，例如某些工伤事故索赔，赔付可能持续数十年。这种“先收、后付”的模式使 P/C 公司持有大量资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些资金最终会支付给他人。与此同时，保险公司可将浮存金用于自身投资。虽然单个保单和赔案来来去去，但保险公司所持浮存金的规模通常与保费规模保持相对稳定。因此，随着我们的业务增长，浮存金也随之增加。如下一张表所示，我们的浮存金增长显著：
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised.
进一步增加浮存金将十分困难。值得庆幸的是，GEICO 以及我们的若干专业子公司几乎肯定会以不俗的速度增长。然而，National Indemnity 的再保险部门签有多份逐年终止合同，其浮存金正逐渐减少。若未来浮存金确实出现下滑，也将十分缓慢——年降幅最高不超过 3%。我们的保险合同性质决定了，我们绝不会面临对现金资源造成重大影响的即时或短期付款要求。这一架构是刻意设计的，是 Berkshire 经济堡垒实力的关键组成部分，绝不会被削弱。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
若我们的保费收入超过费用及最终赔付总额，便可实现承保利润，叠加于浮存金带来的投资收益之上。当取得此类利润时，我们既能动用免费的资金，更妙的是还能因持有这笔资金而获利。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.
遗憾的是，所有保险公司都渴望实现这一美好结果，导致竞争异常激烈，以至于财产意外险行业整体有时会出现显著的承保亏损。实际上，这种亏损正是行业为持有浮存金所支付的代价。竞争态势几乎注定，即便所有公司都享有浮存金收益，保险业相较于其他美国企业仍会继续其在有形净资产回报方面低于正常水平的惨淡纪录。当今世界长期处于低利率环境，也几乎可以确保未来多年浮存金收益将持续下降，从而加剧保险公司的盈利难题。可以断言，整个行业未来十年的业绩将不及过去十年，尤其是专注于再保险的公司。
As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled \$26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
如本报告前文所述，Berkshire 已连续 13 年实现承保盈利，该时期税前收益累计 262 亿美元。这并非偶然：严格的风险评估是所有保险经理人的日常核心工作，他们深知浮存金虽珍贵，但若承保业绩不佳，其益处将荡然无存。所有保险公司口头上都这么说，而在 Berkshire，这是一条“旧约”式的铁律。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge \$24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
那么，浮存金如何影响我们的内在价值？在计算 Berkshire 的账面价值时，我们将全部浮存金视作负债扣减，仿佛这些资金明日即需付出且无法再补充。但将浮存金完全视为负债并不正确，它更应被视为一个循环基金。每天，我们支付旧索赔及相关费用——仅 2015 年就向逾 600 万名索赔人支付 245 亿美元——浮存金因而减少。同样地，我们每日承保新业务，不久便会产生新的索赔，从而补充浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing \$1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing \$1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
若我们的循环浮存金既无成本又能长期存在——我相信确实如此——则其真实负债价值远低于会计负债价值。欠下 1 美元却实际上永远不会流出——因为新业务几乎肯定会补位——与明天即将流出且无法再补充的 1 美元，二者天差地别。然而，在 GAAP 下，这两种负债却被视为等同。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a \$15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
对这一被高估负债的部分抵消，是我们因收购保险公司而确认的 155 亿美元“商誉”资产，它提高了账面价值。在很大程度上，这部分商誉代表了我们为保险业务浮存金创造能力所付出的代价。然而，商誉成本与其真实价值并无直接关系。例如，若一家保险公司长期承受巨大承保亏损，账面列示的任何商誉均应视为毫无价值，无论其最初成本如何。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire \$15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，这并非 Berkshire 的写照。Charlie 和我认为，我们保险业务商誉的真实经济价值——若购买拥有同等质量浮存金的保险业务，我们乐于支付的价格——远高于其历史账面价值。事实上，我们保险业务账面列示的 155 亿美元商誉几乎全部早在 2000 年就已存在，但此后我们的浮存金却增加了两倍。其当今价值正是我们相信 Berkshire 内在商业价值大幅高于账面价值的关键原因之一——而且是重要原因。
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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
伯克希尔引人注目的保险经济学之所以得以存在，正是因为我们拥有出色的管理者，他们运营着纪律严明、难以复制的商业模式。让我来介绍这些主要部门。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先按浮存金额计的是由 Ajit Jain 管理的 Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group。Ajit 承保那些无人愿意或有能力承担的风险。他的业务在保险行业中独树一帜，兼具承保能力、速度、果断和最重要的智慧。然而，他从不让伯克希尔承担与我们资源不相称的不当风险。
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a \$250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
事实上，与大多数大型保险公司相比，伯克希尔在风险规避方面要保守得多。例如，如果保险业因某次特大灾害而遭受 2,500 亿美元的损失——约为历史最大损失的三倍——伯克希尔整体上仍可能因多元化的收益来源而在当年录得可观利润。我们也将继续拥有充裕现金，并在可能陷入混乱的保险市场中寻找大规模承保机会。与此同时，其他主要保险和再保险公司将深陷亏损，甚至面临资不抵债的风险。
When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.
1986 年的一个周六，当 Ajit 走进伯克希尔办公室时，他在保险业尚无一天经验。然而，当时负责保险业务的 Mike Goldberg 还是将再保险业务交到了他手中。凭借这一决定，Mike 可谓一举成圣：此后，Ajit 为伯克希尔股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们还有另一家再保险巨头——由 Tad Montross 管理的 General Re。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
从根本上说，稳健的保险业务必须遵循四项纪律：(1) 了解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险敞口；(2) 保守评估每项风险敞口实际造成损失的可能性及其潜在成本；(3) 设定保费，使平均而言在预计损失成本和运营费用覆盖之后仍能实现盈利；(4) 如果无法获得合适的保费，就必须愿意放弃业务。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司能通过前三项测试，却在第四项上失败。他们无法拒绝竞争对手热切承保的业务。那句老话“别人都在做，所以我们也得做”在任何行业都预示麻烦，而在保险业尤甚。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad 坚守了保险业的四条戒律，其成果有目共睹。在他的领导下，General Re 拥有的大量浮存金的成本远低于零，我们预计平均而言这种状况将持续下去。我们尤其看好 General Re 的国际寿险再保险业务，自 1998 年收购该公司以来，该业务一直稳定增长且保持盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
还记得在我们收购 General Re 不久后，它陷入一系列问题，曾令评论人士——甚至一度包括我自己——认为我犯下大错。那样的日子早已过去。如今，General Re 已成为一颗明珠。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him, his every action has made great sense.
最后，让我们谈谈 GEICO，这家保险公司是我 65 年前初入行的地方。GEICO 由 Tony Nicely 管理，他 18 岁加入公司，并在 2015 年完成了 54 年的服务生涯。Tony 于 1993 年出任首席执行官，此后公司一路高歌猛进。我认为没有比 Tony 更出色的管理者了。在我与他相识的 40 年里，他的每一个决定都极具远见。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
1951 年 1 月，我第一次接触 GEICO 时，它相对于行业巨头所享有的巨大成本优势令我震撼。我立刻明白，GEICO 必将成功，因为它理应成功。
No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
没有人喜欢购买汽车保险，但几乎人人都喜欢开车。因此，所需的保险对于大多数家庭来说是一笔不小的开支。节省费用对他们至关重要——而只有低成本的运营才能实现这一点。事实上，正在阅读这封信的至少 40% 的人可以通过投保 GEICO 来省钱。所以请立即停止阅读——就是现在！——访问 geico.com 或拨打 800-368-2734。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross.
GEICO 的成本优势让公司得以年复一年地蚕食市场份额。（2015 年我们以 11.4% 的市场份额收官，而 1995 年伯克希尔收购 GEICO 控制权时仅为 2.5%。）公司的低成本构筑了一道持久的护城河，竞争对手难以逾越。
All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)
与此同时，我们的小壁虎从不厌倦地告诉美国人 GEICO 能为他们节省多少钱。我喜欢听这小家伙传递的信息：“15 分钟即可为您的汽车保险省下 15% 或更多。”（当然，总有人爱抱怨。我的一位朋友说，他很庆幸只有少数动物会说话，因为那些会说话的动物似乎除了保险什么都不谈。）
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned \$4 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from \$943 million to \$9.9 billion.
除了旗下三大保险业务，我们还拥有一批规模较小、主要从事商业险种承保的公司。整体来看，这些公司构成了一个庞大、持续增长且富有价值的业务板块，在承保方面持续实现盈利，其表现通常远优于竞争对手。事实上，在过去 13 年里，这一板块的承保利润达 40 亿美元，占其保费收入的约 13%，同时浮存金从 9.43 亿美元增至 99 亿美元。
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed \$1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.
不到三年前，我们成立了 Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance（“BHSI”），并将其纳入该业务板块。我们的首要决策是任命 Peter Eastwood 负责该公司。此举堪称全垒打：BHSI 现已实现年保费收入 10 亿美元，并在 Peter 的领导下注定会成为全球领先的财产意外险公司之一。
Here’s a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:
以下为各部门承保收益及浮存金的概览：
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
伯克希尔拥有卓越的管理团队、卓著的财务实力，以及由宽广护城河守护的多样化商业模式，这在保险业中堪称独一无二。对于伯克希尔股东而言，这些优势的集合是一项巨大的资产，并且会随着时间推移愈发珍贵。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管、资本密集型业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings.
我们拥有两项主要业务——BNSF 和 BHE——它们具有将其与其他业务区分开的重要特征。因此，在本信中我们专门为其设立章节，并在 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中单独列示其合并财务数据。去年，这两家公司合计贡献了伯克希尔 37% 的税后经营收益。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是，它们在受监管且使用寿命极长的资产上进行了巨额投资，其中部分以大量长期债务融资，而这些债务并未由伯克希尔提供担保。事实上，我们的信用并不需要介入，因为即使在极度不利的经济环境下，每家公司也具有远高于其利息支出需求的盈利能力。例如，在铁路业表现令人失望的去年，BNSF 的利息保障倍数仍超过 8 倍。（我们对“保障倍数”的定义是息税前利润与利息的比值，而非业内常用、我们认为存在严重缺陷的 EBITDA/利息。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
与此同时，BHE 依靠两大因素确保在任何情况下都能偿付债务。第一，与所有公用事业公司一样：由于提供独家且不可或缺的服务，企业收益具有抗衰退特性。第二，是少数公用事业才能享有的优势：收入来源高度且不断扩大的多元化，使 BHE 免受任何单一监管机构的严重冲击。这些多元利润来源，再加上隶属于实力雄厚母公司的内在优势，使 BHE 及其公用事业子公司显著降低了债务成本。这一经济现实惠及我们和客户双方。
All told, BHE and BNSF invested \$11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to key components of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
总体而言，BHE 与 BNSF 去年在厂房和设备上投入了 116 亿美元，这是对美国基础设施关键组成部分的大规模投入。只要有望获得合理回报，我们乐于进行此类投资——在这方面，我们对未来的监管抱有高度信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心既源于过往经验，也基于这样一个认知：社会对交通和能源的巨额投资需求将永无止境。政府以保障资金持续流向关键工程的方式对待资本提供者，符合其自身利益。同样地，以获得监管机构及其所代表公众认可的方式开展运营，也符合我们的自身利益。
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is 10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低价是让这些群体满意的有力方式。在爱荷华州，BHE 的平均零售电价为每千瓦时 6.8 美分。该州另一家主要电力公司 Alliant 的平均电价为 9.5 美分。邻近各州的同行业可比数据为：内布拉斯加 9.0 美分、密苏里 9.3 美分、伊利诺伊 9.3 美分、明尼苏达 9.7 美分。全国平均水平为 10.4 美分。我们的超低价格为捉襟见肘的客户节省了真金白银。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.
在 BNSF，由于各大铁路公司货物构成和平均运输距离差异显著，价格比较要困难得多。不过，作为一个相当粗略的衡量标准，我们去年的每吨英里收入略低于 3 美分，而其他四家总部位于美国的大型铁路公司向客户收取的运输成本至少高出 40%，范围介于 4.2 美分至 5.3 美分之间。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that figure to 58% in 2017.)
BHE 和 BNSF 在采用环保技术方面一直走在前列。在风力发电领域，没有任何州能与爱荷华州相比，在那里，去年我们通过风力发电产生的兆瓦时数相当于零售客户全部售电量的 47%。（我们已承诺的额外风电项目将在 2017 年把这一比例提高到 58%。）
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.
与其他一级铁路一样，BNSF 仅用一加仑柴油就能将一吨货物运送近 500 英里。这使得铁路的燃油效率是卡车的四倍！此外，铁路还能大幅缓解公路拥堵以及由更高车流量带来的纳税人资助的维护支出。
Here are the key figures for BHE and BNSF:
以下是 BHE 和 BNSF 的关键数据：
I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.
我目前预计2016年BHE的税后收益将增加，但BNSF的收益将下降。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务及零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
在伯克希尔的这一板块，我们的业务范围几乎无所不包。不过，让我们先来看一下整个集团的资产负债表摘要和收益表。
* Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in theFinance and Financial Products results.
2013 年的收益已重新列报，剔除了 Marmon 的租赁业务，该业务现计入“金融及金融产品”板块业绩。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
符合 GAAP 的收入与费用数据见第 38 页。相比之下，上述营业费用为非 GAAP 数据，因为其中排除了一些收购会计项目（主要是部分无形资产的摊销）。之所以如此呈现数据，是因为 Charlie 和我认为，经调整后的数字较 GAAP 口径更能准确反映表中所列业务的真实经济成本与利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they could not differ more.
我不会逐一解释所有调整——其中有些既细小又晦涩——但认真的投资者应当了解无形资产的多样特性。有些无形资产会随时间真正贬值，另一些则完全不会。例如软件，摊销费用确实是切实的支出；而诸如客户关系等其他无形资产计提的摊销费用，则源于收购会计规则，显然并不符合经济现实。GAAP 会计并不区分这两种费用类型，在计算收益时两者都被计作费用——然而从投资者视角看，它们截然不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.
在第 38 页的 GAAP 口径数据中，已将 11 亿美元摊销费用计入支出。我们认为其中约 20% 属“真实”费用，其余则不然。过去在 Berkshire 并不存在的“非真实”摊销费用，如今因我们进行了大量收购而变得可观。随着未来继续收购，这类费用很可能进一步上升。
The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)
第 55 页的表格列示了按 GAAP 计算的无形资产现状。目前可摊销无形资产尚余 68 亿美元，其中 41 亿美元将在未来五年内摊销。最终，这些“资产”的每一美元都将被冲销。届时，即便真实收益不变，报告收益也会提高。（我留给继任者的“礼物”。）
I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?
我建议各位忽略 GAAP 摊销费用中的一部分。但这么说我也颇感不安，因为如今经理人往往要求所有者无视一些显而易见的真实支出项目。“基于股票的薪酬”就是最恶劣的例子。其名称已说明一切：它是“薪酬”。如果薪酬不是费用，那什么才是？如果真实且经常性的费用不应计入收益计算，那又该归到何处？
Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring “earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.
华尔街分析师经常也参与到这场骗局中，鹦鹉学舌般地重复管理层提供的、剔除薪酬成本的虚假“盈利”数据。也许这些有错的分析师确实不懂得更好做法；也许他们害怕失去对管理层的“接触”；或许他们愤世嫉俗，告诉自己既然大家都在玩这个游戏，自己为何不随波逐流。不管他们的理由是什么，这些分析师都在传播误导性数字，可能会欺骗投资者。
Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.
折旧费用是个更复杂的话题，但几乎总是真实成本。在伯克希尔，折旧绝对是真实成本。我也希望能在投入低于折旧费用的情况下保持企业竞争力，但 51 年来我仍未找到办法。事实上，我们在铁路业务中记录的折旧费用远低于仅仅维持铁路正常运行所需的资本支出，这种不匹配导致 GAAP 盈利高于真实经济盈利。（所有铁路公司都有这种盈利被高估的情况。）当首席执行官或投行人士吹捧 EBITDA 等未扣除折旧的指标来评估价值时，注意他们说话时鼻子会变长。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.
当然，我们对外披露的盈利数据将继续遵循 GAAP。然而，要贴近现实，你应记得把我们报告的大多数摊销费用加回；同时，也应扣减一部分，以反映 BNSF 折旧费用不足的情况。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes.
让我们回到我们众多的制造、服务和零售业务，这些业务的产品范围从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机不等。
Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
该板块中的部分企业若以未加杠杆的有形净资产收益衡量，拥有极佳的经济特性，税后利润率从 25% 到甚至超过 100% 不等。其他企业的回报也相当不错，大约在 12% 至 20% 之间。
A few, however – these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation – have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.
然而，也有少数企业——这些都是我在资本配置工作中的严重失误——回报非常低劣。在大多数情况下，是我对公司或其所处行业的经济动力评估错误，如今我们正在为我的误判付出代价。其他时候，则是我在评估现任或后来任命的管理者的忠诚度或能力时出现差池。我今后还会犯错，毋庸置疑。但若幸运的话，这些错误只会发生在我们规模较小的业务上。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of \$25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.
作为一个整体来看，该集团企业构成了一项卓越的业务。2015 年，它们平均使用 256 亿美元的有形净资产，尽管持有大量闲置现金且几乎未使用杠杆，却在这些资本上取得了 18.4% 的税后收益率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts enter the fold.
当然，即便一家企业的经济特性再优秀，如果购入价过高也可能成为糟糕的投资。我们在多数业务上都为有形净资产支付了可观溢价，这一成本体现在我们账面上庞大的商誉及其他无形资产。不过，总体而言，我们在这一板块投入的资本获得了可观回报。随着 Duracell 和 Precision Castparts 的加入，该集团的收益应在 2016 年大幅增长。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 88-91.
我们在该板块拥有的公司实在太多，无法逐一评论。此外，这些公司的竞争对手——包括现有和潜在的——都会阅读本报告。在部分业务中，如果别人了解我们的数据，可能会对我们不利。因此，对于某些规模不足以影响伯克希尔整体评估的业务，我们仅披露必要信息。不过，你仍可在第 88-91 页找到许多业务的详细资料。
Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融产品
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that’s paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire’s enduring advantages.
我们的三项租赁业务分别由 CORT（家具）、XTRA（半挂车）及 Marmon（主要是罐车，也包括货车、罐式集装箱和起重机）经营。这些公司均为各自行业的领军者，随着美国经济走强，它们的收益大幅提升。在这三家公司中，我们在新设备上的投入均超过了许多竞争对手，而这已带来丰厚回报。凭借实力行事是伯克希尔持久的优势之一。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased it in 2003.
作为美国第二大住宅建造商，Clayton Homes 在 Kevin Clayton 的带领下再次取得行业领先的业绩。去年，公司售出 34,397 套住房，占美国人购买的成品房约 45%。相比之下，伯克希尔 2003 年收购该公司时，其市场份额仅为 14%，位列行业第三。
Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing \$150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton’s homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton’s remaining sales are made to 1,395 independent retailers.
成品房让更低收入的美国人亦能实现购房梦想：约 70% 价格在 15 万美元及以下的新房来自我们的行业。Clayton 约 46% 的房屋通过我们自有并经营的 331 家门店销售，其余大部分则销往 1,395 家独立零售商。
Key to Clayton’s operation is its \$12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only the homes of our competitors.
Clayton 运营的核心是一项 128 亿美元的按揭贷款组合。我们发放的成品房按揭贷款约占全美总量的 35%。其中约 37% 源于我们的零售业务，其余主要由独立零售商发放，这些零售商有的销售我们的房屋，也有的只销售竞争对手的房屋。
Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire’s backing, however, Clayton steadfastly financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.
Clayton 之外的贷款机构来来去去。然而，凭借伯克希尔的支持，Clayton 在 2008-2009 年恐慌期间始终为购房者提供融资。事实上，在那段时间里，Clayton 还动用宝贵资本为不销售我们房屋的经销商提供融资。当时我们向 Goldman Sachs 和 General Electric 提供的资金曾登上头条；而伯克希尔悄然注入 Clayton 的资金不仅让数以千计的家庭得以拥有住房，也使许多非 Clayton 经销商得以存续。
Our retail outlets, employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of alternative sources for financing – most of it coming from local banks – and always secure acknowledgments from customers that this information has been received and read. (The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on page 119.)
我们的零售门店以简洁语言和大号字体持续告知购房者其他融资渠道——大多来自当地银行——并始终要求客户签收确认已收到并阅读这些信息。（我们使用的表格以实际尺寸刊载于第 119 页。）
Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008, which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and (2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to unwitting institutions around the world.
住房按揭发放做法对借款人和社会都极为重要。毫无疑问，房地产贷款中的鲁莽行径在引发2008年金融恐慌并最终造成大衰退方面起了主要作用。在危机爆发前几年，一种破坏性且常伴腐败的按揭创建模式大行其道：① 比如加州的一家发起机构放贷之后，② 立即把贷款卖给例如纽约的一家投资或商业银行；该银行又将大量按揭打包作为抵押，为眼花缭乱的复杂按揭证券阵列提供担保，并③ 将其卖给全球不知情的机构。
As if these sins weren’t sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings. (When Wall Street gets “innovative,” watch out!) While that was going on, I described this “doubling-up” practice as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security being offered.
仿佛上述罪行不足以制造一团糟，富有想象力的投行人士有时还炮制第二层再切分融资，其价值取决于基础发行中质量更差的部分。（当华尔街“创新”时，要当心！）那时我曾形容这种“双层堆叠”操作，要求投资者为评估一只待售证券而阅读成千上万页令人头昏的文字。
Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to understand. (It’s also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more complex structures. But rate them they did.)
这些融资中的发起方和打包方均无自身风险，唯数量和加价驱动。许多购房借款人也加入狂欢，在贷款申请中公然造假，而按揭发起人则视而不见。自然，最糟糕的信用创造了最高利润。油嘴滑舌的华尔街推销员靠制造连客户都看不懂的产品，每年赚得数百万。（大型评级机构是否有能力评估更复杂的结构同样值得质疑，但它们还是照评不误。）
Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, “The one major weakness that I’ve seen in the implementation was this decision by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages.” Today, some legislators and commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.
在那场恐慌期间，也许是国会中最懂金融的 Barney Frank 最近评估2010年《多德-弗兰克法案》时表示：“我在实施过程中看到的一个主要弱点，是监管机构决定不要求所有住房按揭实行风险保留。”如今，一些立法者和评论员仍主张由发起方保留1%至5%的风险，以使其利益与最终放贷人或按揭担保人保持一致。
At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a price – a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of \$157 million.
在 Clayton，我们的风险保留过去是、现在仍是100%。凡是我们发起的按揭，我们都持有（极少数符合政府担保条件的贷款除外）。因此，当我们在授信上犯错时就要付出代价——而且是远超最初售房利润的高昂代价。去年，我们不得不对8,444笔成品房按揭进行止赎，成本达1.57亿美元。
The average loan we made in 2015 was only \$59,942, small potatoes for traditional mortgage lenders, but a daunting commitment for our many lower-income borrowers. Our buyer acquires a decent home – take a look at the home we will have on display at our annual meeting – requiring monthly principal-and-interest payments that average \$522.
2015年我们发放的平均贷款仅为59,942美元，这对传统按揭机构而言微不足道，却是我们众多低收入借款人的沉重承诺。购房者将拥有一处体面住所——欢迎在股东大会上参观我们展示的样板房——其月均本息还款额为522美元。
Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get overextended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people earning multiples of our typical borrower’s income.
当然，有些借款人会失业，也会出现离婚或去世的情况。还有人会因信用卡债务过度透支而理财不当。届时我们会亏损，借款人也会损失首付款（虽然在他们居住期间，按揭月供可能远低于同类住房的租金）。尽管我们的借款人 FICO 分数和收入不高，他们在大衰退期间的还款表现仍远好于许多收入是我们典型借款人几倍的按揭资产池。
The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we’ve done well with our mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with short-term fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which bears fixed rates. (Incidentally, we would have enjoyed similar margins had we simply bought long-term bonds and financed the position in some short-term manner.)
我们的借款人强烈渴望拥有自己的住房，这是我们的按揭组合表现良好的原因之一。同样重要的是，我们用浮息债务或短期定息债务为大量贷款组合融资。因此，近年来极低的短期利率让我们的融资成本与按固定利率计息的按揭组合收益之间的利差不断扩大。（顺便说一句，如果我们只是购买长期债券并以某种短期方式融资，也能享受到类似的利差。）
Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however, we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least \$20 billion in cash-equivalents that earn short-term rates. More often, our short-term investments are in the \$40 billion to \$60 billion range. If we have, say, \$60 billion invested at ¼% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton’s \$13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms, Berkshire is – and always will be – heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.
通常而言，像 Clayton 这样以固定利率长期放贷、短期融资的做法风险很大，多年来已有一些重要金融机构因此破产。然而在伯克希尔，我们拥有天然对冲，因为我们的各项业务始终持有至少 200 亿美元的现金等价物并赚取短期利率。更多时候，我们的短期投资规模在 400 亿至 600 亿美元之间。举例来说，若我们以 0.25% 或更低利率投资 600 亿美元，一旦短期利率大幅上升，我们获得的收益将远超为 Clayton 130 亿美元按揭组合融资所产生的更高成本。用银行业术语说，伯克希尔一直都是、也将始终是高度资产敏感型，因此会从利率上升中受益。
Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.
让我谈一个我尤为自豪的主题——监管。大衰退后，按揭发起人、服务商和打包机构都遭受了严格审查，并被罚以数十亿美元的罚款和赔偿。
The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and internal controls.
这种审查当然也延伸至 Clayton，其按揭业务在发起、服务、催收、广告、合规和内部控制等方面持续接受审查和评估。
At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were \$38,200 and our refunds to customers \$704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year, 95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.
在联邦层面，我们受联邦贸易委员会、住房与城市发展部以及消费者金融保护局监管。还有数十个州对我们施加监管。过去两年中，来自 25 个州的各级联邦和州机构共对 Clayton 及其按揭业务进行了 65 次检查和审查。结果如何？这期间我们被罚款总额为 38,200 美元，向客户退款 704,678 美元。此外，尽管去年我们不得不对 2.64% 的成品房按揭进行止赎，但到年末，95.4% 的借款人仍按时还款，正朝着无债务拥有住房的目标迈进。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Marmon’s rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the company’s purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.
截至年末，Marmon 的铁路车辆队规模扩大至 133,220 辆，其中 9 月 30 日从通用电气收购的 25,085 辆车辆贡献显著。如果把我们的车队连成一列火车，机车头将在奥马哈，而车尾则位于缅因州波特兰。
At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each year. Though “tank cars” sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product; chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that car.
到年底，我们 97% 的铁路车辆已出租，每年约有 15%–17% 的车队需要续租。虽然“罐车”听起来像是运输原油的车辆，但我们的车队中仅约 7% 用于运输原油；我们运载的主要是化学品和精炼石油产品。当火车经过时，请留意标有 UTLX 或 Procor 的标志，那就是我们的罐车。看到这些品牌时，不妨挺起胸膛；那辆车你也拥有一部分。
Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:
以下是该板块的收益概览：
* Excludes capital gains or losses
不包括资本收益或损失
Investments
投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the “equity” method.
下面列出了截至年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们未列入持有的 Kraft Heinz 股份，因为我们属于控股集团，并按“权益法”进行核算。
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of writeups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP“成本”因依照会计准则进行的资产增值或减值而有所不同。
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
以该金额签订销售合同持有。
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At year-end these shares were worth $11.8 billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5 billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly.
伯克希尔还有一项未列入表中的重要股票持仓：在 2021 年 9 月之前的任何时间，我们都可用 50 亿美元购买 7 亿股美国银行股票。截至年末，这些股票价值 118 亿美元。我们很可能会在期权到期前购入；若愿意，还可用 50 亿美元、票面利率 6% 的美国银行优先股来支付。与此同时，你应当认识到，美国银行实际上是我们的第四大股票投资——而且我们十分重视这一持仓。
Productivity and Prosperity
生产力与繁荣
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
前文我提到，我们在 Kraft Heinz 的伙伴如何消除低效，从而提升每工时产出。自 1776 年建国以来，这类改进一直是美国生活水平显著提升的秘诀。不幸的是，用“秘密”来形容再贴切不过：真正理解生产力与繁荣之间关系的美国人太少。为揭示这种联系，让我们先看美国最具代表性的例子——农业——然后再考察伯克希尔旗下的三个具体领域。
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
1900 年，美国劳动力为 2,800 万人，其中有 1,100 万人从事农业，占总劳动力的惊人 40%。当时的主要作物与今天一样是玉米。约 9,000 万英亩土地用于玉米种植，亩产 30 蒲式耳，年产总量 27 亿蒲式耳。
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
随后，拖拉机问世，并接连出现多项创新，彻底改变了播种、收割、灌溉、施肥和种子品质等决定农业生产率的关键环节。如今，我们种植玉米的面积约为 8,500 万英亩，但亩产已提升至 150 蒲式耳以上，年产总量达 130-140 亿蒲式耳。农民在其他作物上也取得了类似的增产成果。
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.
产量的提高只是故事的一半：实物产出的巨大增长伴随着农业劳动力（即“人力投入”）的大幅减少。如今，只有约 300 万人从事农业，仅占 1.58 亿劳动力总数的 2%。因此，改进的耕作方式使数以千万计的现代劳动者能将时间和才能投入其他事业，这种人力资源再配置让今天的美国人得以享用大量原本无缘的非农产品和服务。
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
回顾这 115 年历程，不难认识到农业创新带来了多么巨大的福祉——不仅惠及农民，更造福整个社会。若当初遏制了这些生产率提升，我们今天的美国将无法与现在相提并论。（幸好马儿不会投票。）然而，在日常生活中，对于那些被效率更高的机器取代的农场工人而言，“更大利益”的说法听来必定空洞刺耳。我们将在本节后文探讨生产率提高的这一负面效应。
For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.
不过，现在让我们来看看三个提高效率的案例，它们对伯克希尔的子公司产生了重大影响。这类转变在美国商业界屡见不鲜。
‹ In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
‹ 1947 年，二战结束不久，美国劳动力总数为 4,400 万人，其中约 135 万人在铁路行业工作。当年一级铁路运输的货运收入吨英里总量为 6550 亿。
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about \$90 billion annually in current dollars.
到 2014 年，一级铁路的货运吨英里已增至 1.85 万亿，同比增长 182%，而雇员仅剩 18.7 万人，较 1947 年减少 86%。(其中一部分变化涉及客运相关员工，但大多数人员减少发生在货运领域。) 由于生产率的惊人提升，按通胀调整后的单位吨英里运费自 1947 年以来下降了 55%，按当前美元计每年为托运人节省约 900 亿美元。
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.) Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.
还有一个惊人的数据：如果现在运输同样数量的货物仍需 1947 年那样多的人员，我们将需要 300 多万铁路工人来处理当前的货运量。(当然，如此高的用工水平会大幅推高运费，因此现实中不可能达到今天的运量。) 我们的 BNSF 由 Burlington Northern 与 Santa Fe 于 1995 年合并而成。1996 年，即合并后首个完整运营年度，公司以 4.5 万名员工运输了 4.11 亿吨英里货物。去年，相应数据为 7.02 亿吨英里(增 71%)和 4.7 万名员工(仅增 4%)。生产率的大幅提升让股东与托运人双双受益。BNSF 的安全状况也得到改善：可报告伤害事故率由 1996 年的每 20 万工时 2.04 起降至目前的 0.95，降幅超过 50%。
‹ A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.
‹ 一百多年前，汽车发明问世，并催生了为汽车及其驾驶员提供保障的保险行业。最初，这一业务通过传统保险代理机构承保——与办理火险业务的机构相同。这种以代理为核心的模式手续费和其他承保费用高昂，大约占到保费收入的 40 美分。当地实力雄厚的代理掌握主导权，因为它们代表多家保险公司，可以在佣金谈判时让保险公司相互竞争。当时呈现类似卡特尔的定价局面，相关各方都过得不错——除了消费者。
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
随后，美国人的创造力开始发挥作用：伊利诺伊州 Merna 的农民 G. J. Mecherle 想出了建立专属销售队伍的主意，只销售同一家公司的保险产品。他的“孩子”被命名为 State Farm Mutual。该公司削减佣金和费用——从而得以降低价格——很快便成为行业巨头。数十年来，State Farm 一直稳坐汽车险和住宅险的销量冠军宝座。同样采用直接销售模式的 Allstate 长期位居第二。State Farm 和 Allstate 的承保费用率均约为 25%。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
20 世纪 30 年代初，另一个竞争者——类似互助公司的美国军人汽车协会（USAA）——开始直接面向客户为军官承保汽车保险。这一营销创新源于军人群体的需求，他们需要一种保险，无论调往何处都能随行生效。而这类业务对当地保险代理机构兴趣不大，因为他们更青睐长期定居者带来的稳定续保。
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with \$100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
事实证明，USAA 的直接销售模式成本低于 State Farm 和 Allstate，由此为客户提供了更大的价格优惠。这促使 USAA 员工 Leo 与 Lillian Goodwin 萌生念头，想把这种直销模式的目标市场扩展至军官之外。1936 年，他们以 10 万美元资本创立了 Government Employees Insurance Co.（后来简化为 GEICO）。
Their fledgling did \$238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did \$22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
这家新公司在 1937 年第一个完整经营年度实现了 23.8 万美元的汽车保险业务。去年，GEICO 的业务量达到 226 亿美元，超过 USAA 的两倍。（早起的鸟儿有虫吃，第二只老鼠却能吃到奶酪。）2015 年，GEICO 的承保费用率为保费的 14.7%，仅有 USAA 的比例更低。（GEICO 的运营效率与 USAA 不相上下，但为了促进增长在广告上花费更多。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
凭借低成本带来的价格优势，GEICO 几年前从 Allstate 手中夺得了汽车保险业的第二名也就不足为奇了。GEICO 也正在缩小与 State Farm 的差距，尽管后者的业务规模仍遥遥领先。我计划在 2030 年 8 月 30 日——我 100 岁生日那天——宣布 GEICO 登顶第一。请把这一天记在日历上。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO 现有约 34,000 名员工，为 1,400 万名保单持有人提供服务。我只能猜想，若采用代理系统，要服务相同数量的保单持有人需多少人手。我认为至少需要 60,000 名员工，既包括保险公司直接雇用的人员，也包括代理机构的人手。
‹ In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
‹ 在电力业务方面，我们的 Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”）正处于经济模式变革之中。过去，当地电力公司的生存并不取决于效率。事实上，即便运营“粗放”，财务上也能过得去。
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
原因在于，公用事业通常是必需品的唯一供应者，被允许将价格设定在可保证其投入资本获得规定收益的水平。业内曾流传一句笑话：公用事业是唯一能通过重新装修老板办公室就自动赚更多钱的行业。有些首席执行官确实按这种思路来经营。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
这一切都在改变。如今，社会已经认定由联邦补贴的风能与太阳能发电符合美国的长期利益。联邦税收抵免被用来实施这一政策，在某些地区使可再生能源具备价格竞争力。这些税收抵免或其他政府对可再生能源的强制性扶持，最终可能侵蚀现有电力公司的经济效益，尤其是那些高成本运营者。BHE 长期以来对效率的重视——即便当年公司并不需要依靠效率来获得核准收益——使我们在当今市场上尤具竞争力（更重要的是，在未来市场上亦然）。
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
BHE 于 1999 年收购了其在爱荷华州的公用事业公司。此前一年，该公司雇用 3,700 名员工，发电量为 1,900 万兆瓦时。如今，我们仅雇用 3,500 名员工，却能生产 2,900 万兆瓦时电力。效率的大幅提升让我们在 16 年间未曾涨价，而行业电价在此期间上涨了 44%。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
我们在爱荷华州的公用事业公司的安全纪录同样出色。2015 年每一百名员工的可报告伤害仅为 0.79 起，而在我们收购前一年，前任业主的这一数字为 7.0 起。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006 年，BHE 收购了主要在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的 PacifiCorp。收购前一年，PacifiCorp 员工 6,750 人，发电量 5,260 万兆瓦时。去年，这两个数字分别为 5,700 名员工和 5,630 万兆瓦时。安全表现同样显著改善，每百名员工事故率已从 2005 年的 3.4 起降至 2015 年的 0.85 起。在安全方面，BHE 现位居行业前 10%。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)
这些杰出表现解释了为何当 BHE 提出收购某辖区的电力公司时，会受到监管机构的欢迎。监管者知道，BHE 将以高效、安全、可靠的方式运营，并带来充足资金支持一切有意义的项目。（自我们接手以来，BHE 从未向伯克希尔分红。美国没有任何一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司能与 BHE 对再投资的热情相提并论。）
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The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我刚才阐述的那些生产率提升——以及美国取得的无数其他进步——为社会带来了非凡的福祉。这正是全国人民整体上已享受并将继续享受大量商品和服务增益的根本原因。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
然而，这一观点也有其负面影响。首先，近年来实现的生产率提升在很大程度上惠及了富裕阶层。其次，生产率的提高常常带来剧烈震荡：当创新或新效率颠覆既有格局时，资本和劳动力都可能为此付出惨痛代价。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
对于资本家（无论是私人业主还是数量庞大的公众股东），我们无需为其流泪。照顾好自己本就是他们的职责。当正确决策能为投资者带来巨额回报时，他们也不该被错误选择造成的损失所豁免。此外，那些广泛分散投资并坚持长期持有的投资者必将繁荣：在美国，成功投资的收益始终远超失败资产的损失。（在整个 20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数——某种形式的指数基金——从 66 点飙升至 11,497 点，而其成份公司同时持续提高分红。）
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
长期受雇的工人面临的却是另一番景象。当创新与市场体系相互作用并提升效率时，许多工人可能变得多余，其技能被淘汰。有些人可以在别处找到体面的工作；但对另一些人来说，这并非可行之路。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
当低成本竞争将制鞋业推向亚洲时，我们昔日繁荣的 Dexter 工厂关门，缅因州一座小镇的 1,600 名员工因此失业。许多人已过再学习其他行业的年龄。我们损失了全部投资，这笔损失我们承担得起，但许多工人却失去了无法替代的生计。同样的情形在我们最初的新英格兰纺织厂上演——在苦撑 20 年后最终关停。举一个令人心酸的例子，我们位于新贝德福德的工厂有许多年长工人只会说葡萄牙语，几乎不会英语，他们根本没有第二条出路。
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
面对这种冲击，解决之道并不是限制或禁止提升生产率的举措。如果我们当年强令 1100 万人永远从事农业，美国人的生活水平绝不可能达到今日的高度。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
真正的解决方案应是多种安全网，旨在为那些愿意工作却因市场力量而被低估其特定技能的人提供体面的生活。（我个人支持改革并扩大“劳动所得抵税额”，以确保美国对愿意工作的群体发挥作用。）让绝大多数美国人不断繁荣的代价，不应是让不幸者陷入贫困。
Important Risks
重要风险
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
我们与所有上市公司一样，必须按美国证监会要求在年度 10-K 报告中列示“风险因素”。然而，我想不出有哪一次阅读 10-K 的“风险”章节真正帮助我评估一家企业。这并不是说列出的风险不真实；真正重要的风险往往众所周知。此外，10-K 的风险清单很少有助于评估：(1) 威胁事件实际发生的概率；(2) 若事件发生可能造成的成本范围；以及 (3) 潜在损失出现的时间。一项要在 50 年后才会浮现的威胁或许是社会问题，但对今天的投资者而言并非财务问题。
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.
Berkshire 涉猎的行业之多，我未曾见过任何公司可比。我们的每项业务都有其可能出现的问题与机遇。这些列举起来容易，评估却极难：Charlie、我以及各子公司 CEO 往往在这些可能性带来的概率、时机及成本（或收益）估算上存在巨大分歧。
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view, for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
举几个例子。首先是显而易见的威胁：未来十年，BNSF 与其他铁路公司一样肯定会失去大量煤炭运量。将来的某个时点——在我看来不会很快——随着无人驾驶汽车出现，GEICO 的保费规模可能减少，这也可能冲击我们的汽车经销业务。我们纸质报纸的发行量将继续下降，这一点在收购时已计入。迄今，可再生能源对我们的公用事业有所助益，但情况可能改变，尤其当电力储能能力显著提升时。在线零售威胁着我们零售商及部分消费品牌的商业模式。这些只是我们面临的负面可能性中的一小部分——即便最随意的商业新闻读者也早知其事。
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
然而，这些问题都非关乎 Berkshire 长期福祉的核心要务。当我们于 1965 年接管公司时，其风险可用一句话概括：“我们全部资本所在的北方纺织业务注定持续亏损并最终消失。” 但这一进程并未成为丧钟。我们只是进行了调整，并将继续如此。
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
Berkshire 的管理者每天都在思考如何在不断变化的世界中更好地竞争。Charlie 和我同样全力关注持续资金流应投向何处。在这方面，我们相比单一行业公司具备重大优势，后者的选择受限得多。我坚信，Berkshire 拥有足够的资金、人才和文化，能够穿越我上文列举的诸多逆境——以及更多逆境——并以愈来愈强的盈利能力脱颖而出。
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.
然而，伯克希尔面临一项清晰、迫在眉睫且持久的危险，Charlie 和我对此束手无策。对伯克希尔构成威胁的，也是我国公民面临的主要威胁：对美国发动一次“成功的”（以施袭者的定义）网络、生物、核或化学攻击。这是伯克希尔与所有美国企业共同承担的风险。
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government – and luck! – for this result.
在任何给定年份，发生此类大规模破坏的概率都可能非常低。自从我投递头版标题称美国投下首颗原子弹的《华盛顿邮报》以来，已经过去 70 多年。此后，我们曾几度险象环生，但避免了灾难性毁灭。对此，我们要感谢政府——也要感谢运气！
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
然而，在较长时期内，短期内的小概率事件几乎必然会发生。（如果某事件在一年内发生的几率为三十分之一，那么它在一百年内至少发生一次的概率为 96.6%。）更糟糕的是，永远会有人、组织甚至国家希望对我国造成最大破坏。在我的一生中，他们能够实现这一目的的手段呈指数级增长。“创新”亦有其阴暗面。
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
美国企业及其投资者无法摆脱这一风险。如果美国发生导致大规模毁灭的事件，所有股票投资的价值几乎必然被摧毁殆尽。
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
没人知道“次日”将是什么景象。然而，我认为爱因斯坦 1949 年的评估依然贴切：“我不知道第三次世界大战将使用什么武器，但第四次世界大战将以棍子和石头作战。”
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I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
我撰写本节内容，是因为今年股东大会上将审议一项关于气候变化的股东提案。提案方希望我们就气候变化可能给我们的保险业务带来的风险提供一份报告，并说明我们如何应对这些威胁。
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.
在我看来，气候变化极有可能对地球构成重大问题。我说“极有可能”而非“确定”，因为我并非科学专家，也记得许多“专家”曾对千年虫问题做出的可怕预言。不过，如果巨大灾难似乎有可能发生，并且及时行动哪怕只有一丝阻止危险的机会，那么任何人要求 100% 证据都是愚蠢的。
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.
此问题与帕斯卡关于上帝存在的“赌注”颇为相似。回想起来，帕斯卡认为，即使上帝存在的概率极小，也应当按其存在来行事，因为回报可能是无限的，而不信则可能遭受永恒痛苦。同理，如果地球有 1% 的概率正走向重大灾难，而拖延意味着越过无法回头的临界点，那么现在不行动就是愚蠢的。把这称为“诺亚法则”：如果方舟可能对生存至关重要，就应在今天开始建造，无论天空多么晴朗。
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
提案方认为气候变化对伯克希尔尤其构成威胁是可以理解的，因为我们是一家覆盖各种风险的大型保险公司。提案方可能担心天气变化导致财产损失激增。若我们签发十年或二十年的固定价格保单，此类担忧确实有道理。但保险保单通常按一年期签发，并每年重新定价以反映风险变化。损失概率上升会立即转化为保费提高。
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about \$30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase to about \$1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
回想 1951 年我首次对 GEICO 产生兴趣时，该公司每份保单的平均年度赔付约为 30 美元。如果我当时预测，到 2015 年每份保单的赔付成本将增至约 1,000 美元，你会作何反应？你可能会问，如此激增的赔付额难道不会带来灾难？答案是否定的。
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing \$600 million of business annually rather than one doing \$23 billion.
多年来，通胀令事故车辆及人员修复成本大幅上升。但这些增加的成本很快通过提高保费得到匹配。因此，悖论般地，赔付成本的不断上升让保险公司变得更加值钱。如果成本一直保持不变，伯克希尔如今拥有的将是一家年业务量 6 亿美元的汽车保险公司，而非 230 亿美元。
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weather-related events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely – though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
迄今为止，气候变化并未使飓风或其他保险涵盖的天气事件更加频繁或更加昂贵。因此，美国巨灾险费率近年来持续下行，这也是我们退出该业务的原因。如果巨灾变得更频繁、成本更高，那么对伯克希尔保险业务的可能——尽管并非确定——影响将是规模更大、利润更高。
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
作为公民，你可能会因气候变化而夜不能寐；作为低洼地区的房主，你或许应考虑搬迁。但当你仅以大型保险公司的股东身份思考时，气候变化不应在你的忧虑清单上。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to [https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream] at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
Charlie 和我终于决定迈入 21 世纪。今年的年度股东大会将全程通过网络向全球直播。要观看大会，请在 4 月 30 日（星期六）中部夏令时间上午 9 点登录 [https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。Yahoo]! 的直播将以半小时的管理层、董事和股东访谈开场，随后在 9:30 由 Charlie 和我开始回答提问。
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
这一新安排有两个目的。首先，它可能会使大会的到场人数趋于平稳或略有下降。去年逾 4 万名参会者的纪录已使我们场地承受极限：CenturyLink 中心主场馆迅速满员，溢出人群占满了备用厅，甚至在毗邻的奥马哈希尔顿酒店又启用两间大型会议室。尽管 Airbnb 大举介入，所有主要酒店依旧客满。对预算有限的访客而言，Airbnb 尤为有用。
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t look that impressive when we were at our best.)
我们决定直播的第二个原因更为重要。Charlie 今年 92 岁，我 85 岁。若我们与诸位合伙经营一家小企业，负责日常运营，你们会偶尔来看看，确保我们还没神游天外。而股东则不必非得来奥马哈，只为确认我们神采奕奕。（在评价时请宽容些：即使在我们最佳状态时，外表也并不算多么出众。）
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry – and want to stay that way.
观众还可以见识我们的“延年益寿”饮食。在大会期间，Charlie 和我各自会摄入足够的可口可乐、See’s 太妃糖和 See’s 花生脆糖，其热量足以满足一名 NFL 进攻锋线球员一周所需。很久以前我们就发现了一个基本真理：当你真的饿了又想保持这种饥饿感时，没有什么比啃胡萝卜和西兰花更合适的了。
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
计划亲临大会的股东应在早上 7 点 CenturyLink 中心开门时入场并开始购物。Carrie Sova 将再度统筹所有活动。她在上月底刚迎来第二个孩子，但丝毫未受影响。Carrie 沉着机敏，善于激发团队最佳表现。来自全国各地的数百名伯克希尔员工及总部全体同事将协助她，为我们的股东打造既有趣又充实的周末。
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed – so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
去年我们延长了在 CenturyLink 的购物时间，销售额随之飙升——因此我们理所当然沿用这一新时间表。4 月 29 日星期五中午至下午 5 点可前来购物，4 月 30 日星期六展区和商店将从早上 7 点开放至下午 4:30。
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
周六早晨，我们将举行第五届国际投报挑战赛。目标仍是距离投掷线恰好 35 英尺的 Clayton Home 门廊。我少年时——短暂涉足“正当劳作”——共投递过约 50 万份报纸，所以自认在这项比赛中颇为拿手。来挑战我吧！羞辱我吧！让我跌跌份！报纸为 36 至 42 页，必须自行折叠（禁止用橡皮筋）。
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged most accurate – four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set – will compete against me at 7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything home.
比赛于 7:15 开始，参赛者先进行预赛投掷。命中率最高的八投——其中 4 投来自 12 岁及以下选手，另外 4 投来自年长选手——将在 7:45 与我对决。年幼挑战者人人有奖，可年长选手得先打败我才能把奖品带回家。
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for \$78,900, fully installed on land you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his order book.
别忘记看看这栋 Clayton 房屋本身。售价 78,900 美元，安装完毕后放置在你提供的土地上即可。往年大会当天就已售出多套。Kevin Clayton 将携订单簿现场待命。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
上午 8:30 将播放一部全新的 Berkshire 电影。一小时后进入问答环节，（期间包括在 CenturyLink 摊位用午餐的休息）将持续至下午 3:30。短暂休息后，Charlie 和我将在 3:45 召开年度股东大会。正式议程通常仅持续约半小时，若你想抓紧最后时间购物，大可放心缺席。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
购物地点位于紧邻会场、面积 194,300 平方英尺的大厅，数十家 Berkshire 子公司的产品将在此展售。别忘了向各自主持展位的 Berkshire 经理们打招呼，并务必欣赏精彩的 BNSF 铁路沙盘模型，向旗下所有子公司致敬。你的孩子（以及你本人！）一定会被它迷住。
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000 pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
今年大厅里将新增一项非常特别的展品：全球最大航空发动机的等比例模型，其众多关键部件由 Precision Castparts 制造。真机重量约 20,000 磅，直径 10 英尺，长度 22 英尺。会议上的剖切模型将让你清楚看到诸多助力飞行的 PCC 部件。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 将再次推出大会专属纪念鞋。购入一双后，请在周日上午 8 点于 CenturyLink 起跑的第四届“Berkshire 5K”赛事中穿上。参赛详情将随大会证件寄送的访客指南中说明。参赛者将与众多 Berkshire 的经理、董事及同事同跑。（不过 Charlie 和我会睡个懒觉；太妃糖和花生脆糖消耗体力。）5K 参赛人数年年增长，来帮我们再创纪录吧。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on our other products.
购物区将设有 GEICO 展位，由来自全国各地的顶级顾问驻守。顺便去索取报价吧。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能为你提供股东折扣（通常为 8%）。在我们经营的 51 个司法管辖区中，有 44 个允许提供此特别优惠。（补充一点：若你已符合其他折扣条件，如某些团体优惠，则此折扣不可叠加。）请带上现有保险详情来比较我们的报价。我们能为许多人省下一笔真金白银，再把省下的钱用来购买我们的其他产品吧。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
一定要去 Bookworm 书店看看。那里将陈列约 35 部书籍和 DVD，其中不乏新作。Andy Kilpatrick 将介绍并乐意签名他那本全方位解读 Berkshire 的最新版本，全书 1,304 页、重 9.8 磅。（我对这本书的推荐语是：“简直太简略了。”）也别错过 Peter Bevelin 的新书；Peter 长期以来都是 Berkshire 的敏锐观察者。
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the then publisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price remains \$20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for sale at the meeting.
我们还将推出新版 Berkshire 50 周年纪念册，比去年会议上销售的版本多出 20 页，去年那版卖出了 12,000 册。此后，Carrie 和我又发现了一些引人入胜的新材料，例如 Grover Cleveland 写给朋友、时任《The Buffalo News》出版人 Edward Butler 的几封十分私人的信件。原版内容一字未改也未删，售价仍为 20 美元。Charlie 和我将共同签名 100 本，并随机放入大会待售的 5,000 本之中。
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water, an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best managerial duo – both in what they accomplished and how they did it – that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll never need a second exemplar.
我的朋友 Phil Beuth 写了《Limping on Water》一书，这是他在 Capital Cities Communications 的自传体回忆录，也详细描写了公司领袖 Tom Murphy 与 Dan Burke。就成就与方式而论，这两位是 Charlie 和我见过的最佳管理搭档。一个人将成为什么样，很大程度取决于他选择仰慕并效仿谁。以 Tom Murphy 为楷模，你就无需再找第二个榜样。
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules, a book that will debut at the annual meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd. and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
最后，Jeremy Miller 撰写的《Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules》将在年度大会上首发。Miller 先生深入研究并剖析了 Buffett Partnership Ltd. 的运作，阐释了 Berkshire 文化如何自 BPL 起源演变。若你热衷于投资理论与实践，一定会喜欢这本书。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to \$1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
随本报告附送的委托书材料中有附件，说明了如何获取出入大会及其他活动所需的凭证。部分航空公司偶尔会抬高 Berkshire 周末的机票价格。如果你远道而来，不妨比较飞往 Kansas City 与 Omaha 的费用。两城驾车约 2.5 小时；若你原本打算在 Omaha 租车，Kansas City 也许能为你省下一大笔。两人同行节省金额可能达 1,000 美元甚至更多，把这笔钱花在我们的产品上吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store did a record \$44,239,493 of business. If you repeat that figure to a retailer, he is not going to believe you. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store – the highest-volume home furnishings store in the United States except for our new Dallas store – is about \$9 million.)
内布拉斯加家具商场（Nebraska Furniture Mart，简称 NFM）坐落于道奇街和太平洋街之间的 72 街，占地 77 英亩，我们将再次推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。去年的大会周，商场创下了 44,239,493 美元的销售纪录。若把这个数字告诉其他零售商，他们绝对不信。（NFM 奥马哈店——除我们位于达拉斯的新店外，全美销量最高的家居商场——一周平均销售约 900 万美元。）
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
若要在 NFM 享受伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 26 日（周二）至 5 月 2 日（周一）期间购物，并出示大会凭证。该期间的特价甚至适用于几家通常严禁打折的知名品牌，他们为了股东周末而特意破例。我们感谢他们的配合。“伯克希尔周末”期间，NFM 营业时间为周一至周五上午 10 点至晚上 9 点、周六上午 10 点至晚 9 点 30 分、周日上午 10 点至晚 8 点。周六下午 5 点 30 分至 8 点，NFM 将举办一场野餐，诚邀各位参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
在 Borsheims 我们将再次举办两场仅限股东的活动。第一场是 4 月 29 日（周五）下午 6 点至晚 9 点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场主宴会将于 5 月 1 日（周日）上午 9 点至下午 4 点举行。周六商店将营业至下午 6 点。去年周五至周日期间，商店平均每 15 秒就开出一张销售单。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
整个周末，Borsheims 的人流将非常庞大。为方便大家，股东价将从 4 月 25 日（周一）持续至 5 月 7 日（周六）。期间请出示大会凭证或显示你持有本公司股票的券商对账单，以证明股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to have Ajit and Charlie there also.
周日，在 Borsheims 外的商场内，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师 Norman Beck 将为观众献上令人称奇的表演。在商场上层，我们邀请了世界顶级桥牌专家 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg，于周日下午与股东切磋。我也将加入他们，并希望 Ajit 和 Charlie 也能到场。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友 Ariel Hsing 也将在周日出现在商场，与挑战者对战乒乓球。我在她 9 岁时就认识她，那时我一分未得。如今她已是普林斯顿大学大三学生，并在 2012 年代表美国参加过奥运会。如果你不怕出糗，不妨从下午 1 点开始挑战她。比尔·盖茨和我将率先上场，尽力先“消耗”她一下。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m.
until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before). As for my other favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
Gorat’s 将在 5 月 1 日星期日再次专门对 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间为下午 1 点至晚上 10 点。欲在 Gorat’s 订座，请于 4 月 1 日拨打 402-551-3733（勿提前致电）。至于我另一家最喜爱的餐厅 Piccolo’s，很遗憾它已经歇业。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their email addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at [loomisbrk@gmail.com]; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com]; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at [arsorkin@nytimes.com].
大会的问答环节仍将由同三位财经记者主持，他们将转达股东通过电邮提交给他们、并向 Charlie 与我提出的问题。三位记者及其邮箱分别是：当代顶尖商业记者 Carol Loomis，邮箱 [loomisbrk@gmail.com]；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，邮箱 [BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com]；以及 The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱 [arsorkin@nytimes.com]。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
在提交的问题中，每位记者将挑选出他们认为最有趣且最重要的六个。记者们表示，若想让问题被选中，请保持简洁、避免在最后时刻提交、确保问题与 Berkshire 相关，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题。（若你的问题被提及，请在邮件中说明是否希望记者提到你的姓名。）
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
同时，跟随 Berkshire 的三位分析师也将提出一组问题。今年负责保险领域的将是 Nomura Securities 的 Cliff Gallant。针对我们非保险业务的问题将由 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 和 Morningstar 的 Gregg Warren 提出。我们希望分析师与记者的提问能增进股东对其投资的理解与认知。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us.
Charlie 和我对即将面对的问题毫无先知。有些问题必定尖锐，我们乐见如此。不允许多重问题；我们希望尽可能多的提问者都有机会向我们发问。
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
总体而言，我们预计将有至少 54 个问题——每位分析师与记者各 6 个，现场观众 18 个。（去年合计 64 个。）观众提问者将通过 11 次抽签选出，抽签将在大会当天上午 8:15 进行。设于主会场与主要溢出厅的 11 支麦克风将各自主持一次抽签。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
谈到股东获取信息，我想提醒大家：Charlie 和我认为，所有股东都应同时获取 Berkshire 发布的新信息，并且在任何交易发生前，如有可能，都应有充分时间消化与分析。这就是我们努力在周五晚或周六早公布财务数据，以及把年度大会安排在周六的原因。我们不与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交谈，而是与他们及所有其他股东一视同仁。对我们而言，没有人比那位将可观储蓄托付给我们的普通股东更为重要。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我经常称颂我们运营经理人的成就，这样做绝非没有理由。他们是名副其实的全明星，将所管理的业务视作家族唯一资产来经营。我也相信，在大型上市公司中，很难再找到像我们经理人这样以股东为中心的思维方式。我们的大多数经理早已无须为生计而工作，对他们而言，在经营上击出“本垒打”的喜悦与薪水同样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal income tax return – that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! – oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
同样重要的是与我在总部共事的 24 位男女同事。这支团队高效应对美国证监会及其他监管机构的众多要求，提交长达 30,400 页的联邦所得税申报表——比前一年多 6,000 页！——监督 3,530 份州税申报，回复无数股东及媒体询问，制作年报，筹备全国规模最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会活动，核查本信内容，等等不胜枚举。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q\&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
他们愉快而高效地完成所有这些工作，让我的生活轻松惬意。他们的付出超越了与伯克希尔直接相关的事务：例如，去年他们与 40 所大学（从 200 所申请学校中选出）对接，安排学生来奥马哈与我进行一整天的问答。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的出行，甚至在午餐时间为我送来汉堡和薯条（当然要涂满 Heinz 番茄酱）。没有哪位 CEO 的待遇比我更好；我每天都兴奋得像要踏着踢踏舞去上班。事实上，我的工作一年比一年有趣。
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by \$16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25 next year.
2015 年，伯克希尔的收入增加了 160 亿美元。然而，请仔细看看对页的两张照片。上面一张出自去年的年报，拍摄于我们圣诞午宴时的总部全体人员。下面一张是今年的圣诞合影，同样 25 个人、一模一样的站位。2015 年，我们没有任何新成员加入，也没有人离开。很可能你明年还会看到同样 25 个人的照片。
Can you imagine another very large company – we employ 361,270 people worldwide – enjoying that kind of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people – and they have stayed with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about “restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
你能想象另一家拥有如此庞大规模的公司——我们在全球雇用 361,270 名员工——却能在总部保持这种人员稳定吗？在伯克希尔，我们聘用了出色的人才——而他们一直留在我们身边。此外，除非确实需要，否则绝不招聘任何人。这就是为何你从未在伯克希尔看到所谓“重组费用”。
On April 30th, come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – and meet my gang. They are the best.
4 月 30 日，来奥马哈——资本主义的摇篮——见见我的团队吧。他们是最棒的。
February 27, 2016
Warren E. Buffett
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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