2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2017 was $65.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 23%. Over the last 53 years (that is, since present management took over), pershare book value has grown from $19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔在2017年的净资产增长了653亿美元，这使得我们A类股和B类股的每股账面价值增长了23%。在过去的53年里（即自现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长到211,750美元，年复合增长率达到19.1%。*

*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for the A shares.

*本报告中使用的所有每股数据均适用于伯克希尔的A类股。B类股的数据为A类股所示数据的1/1500。

The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: A large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire.

这种开场白的格式在过去30年里一直是标准形式。但2017年远非标准年份：我们收益的一大部分并非来自伯克希尔自身的任何成就。

The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real – rest assured of that. But only $36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code. (Details of Berkshire’s tax-related gain appear on page K-32 and pages K-89 – K-90.)

尽管如此，这650亿美元的收益是真实存在的——请对此放心。但其中只有360亿美元来自伯克希尔的经营活动。其余的290亿美元是在12月份国会改写美国税法时送给我们的。（关于伯克希尔与税收相关的收益详情，请参见K-32页和K-89至K-90页。）

After stating those fiscal facts, I would prefer to turn immediately to discussing Berkshire’s operations. But, in still another interruption, I must first tell you about a new accounting rule – a generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) – that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.

在陈述了这些财务事实之后，我本想立即转入对伯克希尔经营活动的讨论。但是，又有一个插曲，我必须首先告诉你们一项新的会计准则——一项公认会计原则（GAAP）——它将在未来的季度和年度报告中严重扭曲伯克希尔的净利润数据，并常常误导评论员和投资者。

The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks (not including our shares of Kraft Heinz), and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period. Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless.

这项新规要求，我们所持股票的未实现投资收益和损失的净变动，必须被包含在我们向您报告的所有净利润数据中。这一要求将导致我们基于GAAP准则的净利润出现真正剧烈且反复无常的波动。伯克希尔拥有价值1700亿美元的可交易股票（不包括我们持有的卡夫亨氏股份），这些持股的价值在一个季度报告期内就可能轻易地波动100亿美元或更多。将如此量级的剧烈波动包含在报告的净利润中，将会淹没那些真正描述我们经营业绩的重要数据。出于分析目的，伯克希尔的“净利润”将变得毫无用处。

The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains (or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases, we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they – just like our unrealized gains – fluctuate randomly.

这项新规加剧了我们长期以来在处理已实现收益（或损失）方面所面临的沟通问题，而会计准则强制我们将这些收益（或损失）计入净利润。在过去的季度和年度新闻稿中，我们曾反复提醒您不要关注这些已实现收益，因为它们——就像我们的未实现收益一样——是随机波动的。

That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).

这主要是因为，我们出售证券是在我们认为这样做是明智之举时，而不是为了以任何方式影响收益。因此，我们有时会在投资组合整体表现不佳的时期报告巨额的已实现收益（反之亦然）。

With the new rule about unrealized gains exacerbating the distortion caused by the existing rules applying to realized gains, we will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments you need in order to make sense of our numbers. But televised commentary on earnings releases is often instantaneous with their receipt, and newspaper headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Consequently, media reports sometimes highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage many readers or viewers.

随着关于未实现收益的新规加剧了适用于已实现收益的现有规则所造成的扭曲，我们将每个季度不遗余力地解释您需要进行的调整，以便理解我们的数据。但是，电视上对盈利报告的评论往往是即时的，而报纸头条几乎总是关注GAAP净利润的同比变化。因此，媒体报道有时会突出一些数字，从而不必要地惊吓或鼓励许多读者或观众。

We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.

我们将通过延续我们的惯例，即在周五下午股市收盘后很晚，或在周六清晨发布财务报告，来试图缓解这个问题。这将为您提供最充裕的分析时间，并让投资专业人士有机会在周一开市前发表有见地的评论。尽管如此，我预计在那些对会计一窍不通的股东中，仍会出现相当大的困惑。

At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on – and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.

在伯克希尔，最重要的是我们常态化每股盈利能力的增长。这个指标是我和我的长期合作伙伴查理·芒格所关注的——我们也希望您同样关注。我们2017年的成绩单如下。

Acquisitions

收购业务

There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we will review 2017 acquisition activity.

为伯克希尔增加价值的基石有四个：(1) 大规模的独立收购；(2) 与我们现有业务相契合的补强型收购；(3) 我们众多不同业务的内生性销售增长和利润率提升；以及 (4) 我们庞大的股票和债券投资组合所带来的投资收益。在本节中，我们将回顾2017年的收购活动。

In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.

在寻找新的独立业务时，我们寻求的关键品质是：持久的竞争优势；能干且高标准的管理层；运营所需净有形资产能带来良好回报；具有吸引人回报的内生性增长机会；以及最后，一个合理的收购价格。

That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers.

这最后一项要求，成了我们在2017年评估几乎所有交易时的一个障碍，因为那些尚可但远谈不上出色的公司的价格创下了历史新高。事实上，对于一群乐观的买家大军而言，价格似乎无关紧要。

Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life.

为何会出现收购狂潮？部分原因是，CEO这个职位本身就会筛选出“积极进取”型的人。如果华尔街分析师或董事会成员敦促这类CEO考虑可能的收购，这有点像告诉你正值青春期的孩子一定要有正常的性生活。

Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.) If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.

一旦CEO渴望达成一笔交易，他或她永远不会缺少为这笔收购辩护的预测。下属们会欢呼雀跃，憧憬着更大的管辖范围和通常随公司规模增长而提高的薪酬水平。投资银行家们闻到了巨额费用的味道，也会拍手叫好。（别问理发师你是否需要理发。）如果目标公司的历史业绩不足以证明收购的合理性，巨大的“协同效应”就会被预测出来。电子表格永远不会令人失望。

The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.

2017年，极其廉价的债务唾手可得，这进一步助长了收购活动。毕竟，即使是一笔高价交易，如果通过债务融资，通常也能提升每股收益。相比之下，在伯克希尔，我们以全股权为基础来评估收购，因为我们知道我们对整体债务的偏好非常低，而且将我们大部分债务分配给任何单一业务通常是错误的（某些例外情况除外，例如专门用于克莱顿贷款组合的债务或我们受监管公用事业的固定资产承诺）。我们也从不考虑协同效应，而且也很少发现协同效应。

Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.

多年来，我们对杠杆的厌恶抑制了我们的回报。但查理和我睡得很安稳。我们两人都认为，为了得到你不需要的东西，拿你拥有且需要的东西去冒险，是疯狂的。50年前，当我们各自经营着一个由信任我们的少数亲友出资的合伙企业时，我们就持有这种观点。今天，在大约一百万“合伙人”加入伯克希尔之后，我们依然持有这种观点。

Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe that from time to time Berkshire will have opportunities to make very large purchases. In the meantime, we will stick with our simple guideline: The less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.

尽管我们近期遭遇了收购荒，但查理和我相信，伯克希尔时不时会有机会进行非常大规模的收购。与此同时，我们将坚守我们简单的准则：他人行事越不审慎，我们自己的行事就必须越加审慎。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We were able to make one sensible stand-alone purchase last year, a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying J (“PFJ”). With about $20 billion in annual volume, the company is far and away the nation’s leading travel-center operator.

去年，我们完成了一笔合理的独立收购，即购入了Pilot Flying J（简称“PFJ”）38.6%的合伙权益。该公司年销售额约200亿美元，是美国遥遥领先的旅行中心运营商。

PFJ has been run from the get-go by the remarkable Haslam family. “Big Jim” Haslam began with a dream and a gas station 60 years ago. Now his son, Jimmy, manages 27,000 associates at about 750 locations throughout North America. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest in PFJ to 80% in 2023; Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%. Berkshire is delighted to be their partner.

PFJ从一开始就由非凡的哈斯拉姆家族经营。60年前，“大吉姆”·哈斯拉姆怀揣一个梦想，从一个加油站起家。现在，他的儿子吉米管理着遍布北美约750个网点的27,000名员工。伯克希尔有一份合同协议，将在2023年将其在PFJ的合伙权益提高到80%；届时哈斯拉姆家族成员将拥有剩余的20%。伯克希尔很高兴能成为他们的合作伙伴。

When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it’s been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.

当您在州际公路上开车时，不妨顺道进去看看。PFJ既销售汽油也销售柴油，而且食物也很不错。如果您奔波了一整天，也请记住，我们的店里还有5200个淋浴间。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Let’s move now to bolt-on acquisitions. Some of these were small transactions that I will not detail. Here is an account, however, of a few larger purchases whose closings stretched between late 2016 and early 2018.

现在我们来谈谈补强型收购。其中一些是小规模交易，我将不作详述。不过，这里要介绍几笔较大的收购，其交割时间横跨2016年底至2018年初。

*Clayton Homes acquired two builders of conventional homes during 2017, a move that more than doubled our presence in a field we entered only three years ago. With these additions – Oakwood Homes in Colorado and Harris Doyle in Birmingham – I expect our 2018 site built volume will exceed $1 billion.

克莱顿房屋公司在2017年收购了两家传统房屋建造商，此举使我们在三年前才进入的这个领域的业务规模增加了一倍以上。随着这两家公司——科罗拉多州的Oakwood Homes和伯明翰的Harris Doyle——的加入，我预计我们2018年的现场建造业务额将超过10亿美元。

Clayton’s emphasis, nonetheless, remains manufactured homes, both their construction and their financing. In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled another 26,706 units to independent retailers. All told, Clayton accounted for 49% of the manufactured-home market last year. That industry-leading share – about three times what our nearest competitor did – is a far cry from the 13% Clayton achieved in 2003, the year it joined Berkshire.

尽管如此，克莱顿的重点仍然是预制房屋，包括其建造和融资。2017年，克莱顿通过自己的零售业务售出了19,168套房屋，并向独立零售商批发了另外26,706套。总而言之，克莱顿去年占据了预制房屋市场49%的份额。这一行业领先的份额——大约是我们最接近的竞争对手的三倍——与克莱顿在2003年加入伯克希尔时所达到的13%相比，已是天壤之别。

Both Clayton Homes and PFJ are based in Knoxville, where the Clayton and Haslam families have long been friends. Kevin Clayton’s comments to the Haslams about the advantages of a Berkshire affiliation, and his admiring comments about the Haslam family to me, helped cement the PFJ deal.

克莱顿房屋公司和PFJ都位于诺克斯维尔，克莱顿家族和哈斯拉姆家族在那里是世交。凯文·克莱顿向哈斯拉姆家族阐述了隶属于伯克希尔的优势，以及他向我表达的对哈斯拉姆家族的钦佩之情，这些都有助于促成PFJ这笔交易。

*Near the end of 2016, Shaw Industries, our floor coverings business, acquired U.S. Floors (“USF”), a rapidly growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF’s managers, Piet Dossche and Philippe Erramuzpe, came out of the gate fast, delivering a 40% increase in sales in 2017, during which their operation was integrated with Shaw’s. It’s clear that we acquired both great human assets and business assets in making the USF purchase.

2016年底，我们的地板业务公司萧氏工业收购了U.S. Floors公司（简称“USF”），这是一家快速增长的豪华乙烯基地砖分销商。USF的经理皮特·多斯彻和菲利普·埃拉穆斯佩开局迅猛，在2017年实现了40%的销售增长，期间他们的业务也与萧氏工业进行了整合。很明显，通过收购USF，我们既获得了优秀的人才资产，也获得了优良的业务资产。

Vance Bell, Shaw’s CEO, originated, negotiated and completed this acquisition, which increased Shaw’s sales to $5.7 billion in 2017 and its employment to 22,000. With the purchase of USF, Shaw has substantially strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire.

萧氏工业的CEO万斯·贝尔发起、谈判并完成了这次收购，使萧氏工业2017年的销售额增至57亿美元，员工人数达到22,000人。通过收购USF，萧氏工业大大巩固了其作为伯克希尔一个重要且持久的盈利来源的地位。

*I have told you several times about HomeServices, our growing real estate brokerage operation. Berkshire backed into this business in 2000 when we acquired a majority interest in MidAmerican Energy (now named Berkshire Hathaway Energy). MidAmerican’s activities were then largely in the electric utility field, and I originally paid little attention to HomeServices.

我已经多次向你们提到过HomeServices，我们不断增长的房地产经纪业务。伯克希尔是在2000年无意中进入这个行业的，当时我们收购了中美能源公司（现名伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司）的多数股权。当时中美能源的业务主要集中在电力公用事业领域，我起初并未太关注HomeServices。

But, year-by-year, the company added brokers and, by the end of 2016, HomeServices was the second-largest brokerage operation in the country – still ranking, though, far behind the leader, Realogy. In 2017, however, HomeServices’ growth exploded. We acquired the industry’s third-largest operator, Long and Foster; number 12, Houlihan Lawrence; and Gloria Nilson.

但是，年复一年，该公司不断增加经纪公司，到2016年底，HomeServices已成为全美第二大经纪公司——尽管与行业领导者Realogy相比，仍有很大差距。然而，在2017年，HomeServices实现了爆炸式增长。我们收购了行业第三大运营商Long and Foster、排名第12的Houlihan Lawrence以及Gloria Nilson。

With those purchases we added 12,300 agents, raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices is now close to leading the country in home sales, having participated (including our three acquisitions pro-forma) in $127 billion of “sides” during 2017. To explain that term, there are two “sides” to every transaction; if we represent both buyer and seller, the dollar value of the transaction is counted twice.

通过这些收购，我们增加了12,300名经纪人，使我们的总人数达到40,950人。HomeServices现在在房屋销售方面已接近全国领先地位，2017年参与了价值1270亿美元的“交易方”业务（包括我们三项收购的备考数据）。解释一下这个术语，每笔交易都有两个“交易方”；如果我们同时代表买方和卖方，那么交易的美元价值就会被计算两次。

Despite its recent acquisitions, HomeServices is on track to do only about 3% of the country’s homebrokerage business in 2018. That leaves 97% to go. Given sensible prices, we will keep adding brokers in this most fundamental of businesses.

尽管最近进行了这些收购，HomeServices在2018年预计也只能占到全国房屋经纪业务的约3%。这意味着还有97%的市场有待开拓。只要价格合理，我们将继续在这个最基础的行业中增加经纪公司。

*Finally, Precision Castparts, a company built through acquisitions, bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a German maker of corrosion resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Please allow me to skip a further explanation. I don’t understand manufacturing operations as well as I do the activities of real estate brokers, home builders or truck stops.

最后，精密机件公司，一家通过收购建立起来的公司，收购了Wilhelm Schulz GmbH，这是一家德国的耐腐蚀配件、管道系统和组件制造商。请允许我跳过进一步的解释。我对制造业的运营不如对房地产经纪、房屋建造或卡车停靠站的业务那么了解。

在2020年的报表中减记了110亿美元，不熟悉的业务+买入价太高（17倍的PE，324亿美元）。

Fortunately, I don’t need in this instance to bring knowledge to the table: Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision, is an extraordinary manufacturing executive, and any business in his domain is slated to do well. Betting on people can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets.

幸运的是，在这种情况下，我不需要贡献什么专业知识：精密机件的CEO马克·多尼根是一位杰出的制造业高管，他所管辖的任何业务都注定会表现出色。押注于人有时比押注于实物资产更可靠。

Let’s now move on to operations, beginning with property-casualty (“p/c”) insurance, a business I do understand and the engine that for 51 years has powered Berkshire’s growth.

现在我们来谈谈运营，首先从财产意外险（“p/c”）业务开始，这是我确实了解的业务，也是51年来驱动伯克希尔增长的引擎。

Insurance

保险业务

Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, let me remind you of how and why we entered the field. We began by purchasing National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for $8.6 million in early 1967. With our purchase we received $6.7 million of tangible net worth that, by the nature of the insurance business, we were able to deploy in marketable securities. It was easy to rearrange the portfolio into securities we would otherwise have owned at Berkshire itself. In effect, we were “trading dollars” for the net worth portion of the cost.

在讨论我们2017年的保险业务业绩之前，请允许我先带各位回顾一下我们是如何以及为何进入这个领域的。我们始于1967年初，以860万美元收购了国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity）及其一家规模较小的姊妹公司。通过这次收购，我们获得了670万美元的有形净值，根据保险业务的性质，我们可以将这笔资金投资于有价证券。我们很轻易地就将这个投资组合调整为伯克希尔自身原本就会持有的证券。实际上，对于收购成本中的净值部分，我们只是在做“等价交换”。

The $1.9 million premium over net worth that Berkshire paid brought us an insurance business that usually delivered an underwriting profit. Even more important, the insurance operation carried with it $19.4 million of “float” – money that belonged to others but was held by our two insurers.

伯克希尔所支付的190万美元净值溢价，为我们带来了一项通常能够实现承保盈利的保险业务。更重要的是，这项保险业务还为我们带来了1940万美元的“浮存金”——即那些属于他人，但由我们两家保险公司持有的资金。

Ever since, float has been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends, interest and gains from their deployment belong to Berkshire. (If we experience investment losses, those, of course, are on our tab as well.)

从那时起，浮存金对伯克希尔就变得至关重要。当我们投资这些资金时，其产生的所有股息、利息和收益都归伯克希尔所有。（当然，如果我们出现投资亏损，也同样由我们承担。）

Float materializes at p/c insurers in several ways: (1) Premiums are generally paid to the company upfront whereas losses occur over the life of the policy, usually a six-month or one-year period; (2) Though some losses, such as car repairs, are quickly paid, others – such as the harm caused by exposure to asbestos – may take many years to surface and even longer to evaluate and settle; (3) Loss payments are sometimes spread over decades in cases, say, of a person employed by one of our workers’ compensation policyholders being permanently injured and thereafter requiring expensive lifetime care.

浮存金在财产意外险公司中通过几种方式产生：（1）保费通常是预先支付给保险公司的，而损失则发生在保单有效期内，通常为六个月或一年；（2）虽然某些损失（如汽车维修）会很快得到赔付，但其他一些损失——例如因接触石棉造成的伤害——可能需要很多年才会显现，评估和理赔则需要更长时间；（3）在某些情况下，例如我们工伤赔偿保单持有人的雇员遭受永久性伤害，此后需要昂贵的终身护理，赔付款项有时会分摊到数十年支付。

Float generally grows as premium volume increases. Additionally, certain p/c insurers specialize in lines of business such as medical malpractice or product liability – business labeled “long-tail” in industry jargon – that generate far more float than, say, auto collision and homeowner policies, which require insurers to almost immediately make payments to claimants for needed repairs.

通常，浮存金会随着保费收入规模的增长而增加。此外，某些财产意外险公司专注于医疗事故险或产品责任险等业务——在行业术语中被称为“长尾”业务——这些业务产生的浮存金远多于汽车碰撞险和房屋所有者保险等险种，后者要求保险公司几乎立即向索赔人支付维修费用。

Berkshire has been a leader in long-tail business for many years. In particular, we have specialized in jumbo reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other p/c insurers. As a result of our emphasizing that sort of business, Berkshire’s growth in float has been extraordinary. We are now the country’s second largest p/c company measured by premium volume and its leader, by far, in float.

多年来，伯克希尔一直是长尾业务的领导者。我们尤其专注于巨额再保险保单，通过这些保单，我们承接了其他财产意外险公司已经发生的长尾损失。由于我们侧重于此类业务，伯克希尔的浮存金增长一直非常惊人。按保费收入衡量，我们现在是全美第二大财产意外险公司，而在浮存金规模上，我们遥遥领先。

Here’s the record:

Our 2017 volume was boosted by a huge deal in which we reinsured up to $20 billion of long-tail losses that AIG had incurred. Our premium for this policy was $10.2 billion, a world’s record and one we won’t come close to repeating. Premium volume will therefore fall somewhat in 2018.

我们2017年的保费收入因一笔巨额交易而大幅增加，在该交易中，我们为美国国际集团（AIG）已发生的最高达200亿美元的长尾损失提供了再保险。我们为此保单收取的保费为102亿美元，创下了世界纪录，而且我们未来也很难再有类似规模的交易。因此，2018年的保费收入将有所下降。

Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will be modest – at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment decisions.

至少在未来几年内，浮存金可能会缓慢增长。当我们最终经历浮存金下降时，降幅将是温和的——任何单一年份最多下降3%左右。与银行存款或包含退保选项的人寿保险保单不同，财产意外险的浮存金是不能被提取的。这意味着财产意外险公司在金融普遍承压时期不会经历大规模的“挤兑”，这一特性对伯克希尔至关重要，也是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。

Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.

查理和我绝不会以依赖陌生人善意的方式来运营伯克希尔——甚至也不会依赖那些自身可能面临流动性问题的朋友。在2008-2009年的危机期间，我们乐于持有美国国库券——大量的国库券——这使我们不必依赖银行或商业票据等金融资源。我们有意将伯克希尔打造成能够从容抵御经济中断的模式，包括像长期市场关闭这样的极端情况。

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The downside of float is that it comes with risk, sometimes oceans of risk. What looks predictable in insurance can be anything but. Take the famous Lloyds insurance market, which produced decent results for three centuries. In the 1980’s, though, huge latent problems from a few long-tail lines of insurance surfaced at Lloyds and, for a time, threatened to destroy its storied operation. (It has, I should add, fully recovered.)

浮存金的缺点是它伴随着风险，有时是巨大的风险。保险业中看似可预测的事情，结果可能完全相反。以著名的劳合社（Lloyds）保险市场为例，它在三个世纪里都取得了不错的业绩。然而，在20世纪80年代，劳合社的一些长尾保险业务中巨大的潜在问题浮出水面，并一度威胁要摧毁其传奇般的运营。（我应该补充一句，它现在已经完全恢复了。）

Berkshire’s insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, who operate in a culture that has long prioritized those qualities. That disciplined behavior has produced underwriting profits in most years, and in such instances, our cost of float was less than zero. In effect, we got paid then for holding the huge sums tallied in the earlier table.

伯克希尔的保险业务经理们是保守而谨慎的承保人，他们在一个长期以来都将这些品质放在首位的文化中运营。这种严谨自律的行为在大多数年份都创造了承保利润，在这种情况下，我们的浮存金成本低于零。实际上，我们是因为持有之前表格中列出的巨额资金而获得了报酬。

I have warned you, however, that we have been fortunate in recent years and that the catastrophe-light period the industry was experiencing was not a new norm. Last September drove home that point, as three significant hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico.

然而，我曾警告过各位，我们近几年一直很幸运，行业所经历的巨灾稀少期并非新常态。去年九月，三场大飓风袭击了德克萨斯州、佛罗里达州和波多黎各，印证了这一点。

My guess at this time is that the insured losses arising from the hurricanes are $100 billion or so. That figure, however, could be far off the mark. The pattern with most mega-catastrophes has been that initial loss estimates ran low. As well-known analyst V.J. Dowling has pointed out, the loss reserves of an insurer are similar to a self-graded exam. Ignorance, wishful thinking or, occasionally, downright fraud can deliver inaccurate figures about an insurer’s financial condition for a very long time.

我目前的猜测是，这些飓风造成的保险损失约为1000亿美元。然而，这个数字可能与实际相差甚远。大多数特大巨灾的规律是，最初的损失估计都偏低。正如知名分析师V.J. Dowling所指出的，保险公司的损失准备金就像一场自我评分的考试。无知、一厢情愿，或者偶尔的彻头彻尾的欺诈，都可能在很长一段时间内提供关于保险公司财务状况的不准确数据。

We currently estimate Berkshire’s losses from the three hurricanes to be $3 billion (or about $2 billion after tax). If both that estimate and my industry estimate of $100 billion are close to accurate, our share of the industry loss was about 3%. I believe that percentage is also what we may reasonably expect to be our share of losses in future American mega-cats.

我们目前估计伯克希尔因这三场飓风造成的损失为30亿美元（税后约20亿美元）。如果这个估计和我对行业1000亿美元损失的估计都接近准确，那么我们所占的行业损失份额约为3%。我相信，这个百分比也是我们可以合理预期的未来美国特大巨灾中我们所占的损失份额。

It’s worth noting that the $2 billion net cost from the three hurricanes reduced Berkshire’s GAAP net worth by less than 1%. Elsewhere in the reinsurance industry there were many companies that suffered losses in net worth ranging from 7% to more than 15%. The damage to them could have been far worse: Had Hurricane Irma followed a path through Florida only a bit to the east, insured losses might well have been an additional $100 billion.

值得注意的是，这三场飓风造成的20亿美元净成本，使伯克希尔的公认会计原则（GAAP）净值减少了不到1%。而在再保险行业的其他地方，有许多公司的净值损失从7%到超过15%不等。他们遭受的损失本可能严重得多：假如飓风“艾尔玛”（Irma）在佛罗里达州的路径稍微偏东一点，保险损失很可能就会再增加1000亿美元。

We believe that the annual probability of a U.S. mega-catastrophe causing $400 billion or more of insured losses is about 2%. No one, of course, knows the correct probability. We do know, however, that the risk increases over time because of growth in both the number and value of structures located in catastrophe-vulnerable areas.

我们认为，美国发生造成4000亿美元或以上保险损失的特大巨灾的年概率约为2%。当然，没有人知道确切的概率。然而，我们确实知道，随着位于巨灾易发地区的建筑数量和价值的增长，这种风险会随时间推移而增加。

No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a $400 billion mega-cat. Our share of such a loss might be $12 billion or so, an amount far below the annual earnings we expect from our non-insurance activities. Concurrently, much – indeed, perhaps most – of the p/c world would be out of business. Our unparalleled financial strength explains why other p/c insurers come to Berkshire – and only Berkshire – when they, themselves, need to purchase huge reinsurance coverages for large payments they may have to make in the far future.

在为一场4000亿美元的特大巨灾做财务准备方面，没有公司能与伯克希尔相提并论。我们在此类损失中承担的份额可能约为120亿美元，这个数额远低于我们非保险业务的预期年收益。与此同时，财产意外险行业的大部分——实际上，可能是绝大部分——公司将会倒闭。我们无与伦比的财务实力解释了为什么其他财产意外险公司在自己需要为遥远未来可能要支付的巨额赔款购买大额再保险时，会找到伯克希尔——而且只找伯克希尔。

Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits, which totaled $28.3 billion pre-tax. I have regularly told you that I expect Berkshire to attain an underwriting profit in a majority of years, but also to experience losses from time to time. My warning became fact in 2017, as we lost $3.2 billion pre-tax from underwriting.

在2017年之前，伯克希尔已连续14年录得承保利润，税前总计283亿美元。我曾多次告诉各位，我预计伯克希尔在大多数年份会实现承保利润，但也会不时地经历亏损。我的警告在2017年成为现实，我们的承保业务税前亏损了32亿美元。

A large amount of additional information about our various insurance operations is included in the 10-K at the back of this report. The only point I will add here is that you have some extraordinary managers working for you at our various p/c operations. This is a business in which there are no trade secrets, patents, or locational advantages. What counts are brains and capital. The managers of our various insurance companies supply the brains and Berkshire provides the capital.

关于我们各项保险业务的大量补充信息包含在本报告末尾的10-K文件中。在此我只想补充一点，在我们的各项财产意外险业务中，有一批杰出的经理人为你们工作。这是一个没有商业秘密、专利或区位优势的行业。重要的是头脑和资本。我们旗下各家保险公司的经理人提供头脑，而伯克希尔提供资本。

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For many years, this letter has described the activities of Berkshire’s many other businesses. That discussion has become both repetitious and partially duplicative of information regularly included in the 10-K that follows the letter. Consequently, this year I will give you a simple summary of our dozens of non-insurance businesses. Additional details can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-50.

多年来，这封信一直在描述伯克希尔旗下众多其他业务的活动。这部分讨论已经变得有些重复，并且与信后附带的10-K报告中定期包含的信息部分重叠。因此，今年我将对我们数十家非保险业务做一个简单的总结。更多细节可以在K-5至K-22页和K-40至K-50页找到。

Viewed as a group – and excluding investment income – our operations other than insurance delivered pretax income of $20 billion in 2017, an increase of $950 million over 2016. About 44% of the 2017 profit came from two subsidiaries. BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (of which we own 90.2%). You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-44.

作为一个整体来看——并且不包括投资收益——我们除保险以外的业务在2017年实现了200亿美元的税前利润，比2016年增加了9.5亿美元。2017年约44%的利润来自两家子公司：我们的铁路公司BNSF，以及伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（我们拥有其90.2%的股份）。您可以在K-5至K-10页和K-40至K-44页阅读有关这些业务的更多信息。

Proceeding down Berkshire’s long list of subsidiaries, our next five non-insurance businesses, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically) Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts had aggregate pre-tax income in 2017 of $5.5 billion, little changed from the $5.4 billion these companies earned in 2016.

沿着伯克希尔长长的子公司名单往下看，我们接下来的五家非保险业务，按盈利排名（但此处按字母顺序排列）：克莱顿房屋公司（Clayton Homes）、国际金属加工公司（International Metalworking Companies）、路博润（Lubrizol）、马蒙（Marmon）和精密机件（Precision Castparts），它们在2017年的税前总利润为55亿美元，与这些公司在2016年赚取的54亿美元相比变化不大。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.1 billion last year, up from $1.7 billion in 2016.

再接下来的五家，同样按此方式排名和列出（森林河公司（Forest River）、约翰斯·曼维尔公司（Johns Manville）、MiTek、萧氏工业（Shaw）和TTI），去年赚取了21亿美元，高于2016年的17亿美元。

The remaining businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – recorded little change in pre-tax income, which was $3.7 billion in 2017 versus $3.5 billion in 2016.

伯克希尔拥有的其余业务——而且数量众多——其税前利润几乎没有变化，2017年为37亿美元，而2016年为35亿美元。

Depreciation charges for all of these non-insurance operations totaled $7.6 billion; capital expenditures were $11.5 billion. Berkshire is always looking for ways to expand its businesses and regularly incurs capital expenditures that far exceed its depreciation charge. Almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America’s economic soil remains fertile.

所有这些非保险业务的折旧费用总计为76亿美元；资本支出为115亿美元。伯克希尔一直在寻找扩张业务的方法，并经常产生远超其折旧费用的资本支出。我们近90%的投资都在美国进行。美国的经济土壤依然肥沃。

Amortization charges were an additional $1.3 billion. I believe that in large part this item is not a true economic cost. Partially offsetting this good news is the fact that BNSF (like all other railroads) records depreciation charges that fall well short of the sums regularly needed to keep the railroad in first-class shape.

摊销费用另外还有13亿美元。我认为，在很大程度上，这个项目并非真正的经济成本。部分抵消这个好消息的是，BNSF（像所有其他铁路公司一样）记录的折旧费用远低于维持铁路一流状态所需定期投入的资金。

Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held $116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills (whose average maturity was 88 days), up from $86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets.

伯克希尔的目标是大幅增加其非保险业务集团的收益。为实现这一目标，我们将需要进行一次或多次大规模的收购。我们当然有资源这样做。截至年底，伯克希尔持有1160亿美元的现金和美国国库券（平均到期日为88天），高于2016年底的864亿美元。这笔巨额的流动资金只能赚取微不足道的收益，并且远超查理和我希望伯克希尔持有的水平。当我们将伯克希尔的过剩资金重新部署到更具生产力的资产中时，我们的笑容将会更加灿烂。

这里的假设是保险业务本身是个同质化竞争的业务，很难赚到钱。

Investments

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $17.6 billion. The shares had a yearend market value of $25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

下文我们列出了截至年底市值最大的十五项普通股投资。我们排除了对卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）的持股——325,442,152股——因为伯克希尔属于一个控股集团，因此必须采用“权益法”对该项投资进行核算。在伯克希尔的资产负债表上，其持有的卡夫亨氏股份按通用会计准则（GAAP）计算的账面价值为176亿美元。这些股份在年底的市值为253亿美元，成本基础为98亿美元。

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.

不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。

** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.

这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的计税基础；在少数情况下，通用会计准则（GAAP）下的“成本”有所不同，因为根据GAAP规则要求进行了减记。

Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me, manages more than $12 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly portfolio summaries. Included in the $25 billion that the two manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.

表中的一些股票由托德·库姆斯（Todd Combs）或泰德·韦斯勒（Ted Weschler）负责，他们与我一同管理伯克希尔的投资。他们每人独立于我，管理着超过120亿美元的资金；我通常是通过查看月度投资组合摘要来了解他们所做的决定。在他们两人管理的250亿美元中，包含了来自伯克希尔某些子公司的超过80亿美元的养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资不包括在前述伯克希尔持股的表格中。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be) our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.

查理和我将伯克希尔拥有的流通普通股视为对企业的一部分所有权，而不是基于其“图表”形态、分析师的“目标价”或媒体专家的意见来买卖的股票代码。相反，我们只是相信，如果我们所投资的公司业务成功（我们相信大部分都会如此），那么我们的投资也同样会成功。有时我们的回报可能很普通；偶尔也会有巨大的收获。而有时我也会犯下代价高昂的错误。总的来说——并且随着时间的推移——我们应该能获得不错的回报。在美国，股票投资者有顺风相助。

From our stock portfolio – call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned businesses – Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures, as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports.

从我们的股票投资组合——可以称之为我们在一组多元化的上市公司中所持有的“少数股权”——中，伯克希尔在2017年收到了37亿美元的股息。这个数字既包含在我们的通用会计准则（GAAP）数据中，也包含在我们季度和年度报告中提到的“营业利润”中。

That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains.

然而，这个股息数字远远低估了我们股票持仓所产生的“真实”收益。几十年来，我们一直在我们的“与所有者相关的经营原则”（第19页）的第六条原则中申明，我们期望所投资公司的未分配利润，能通过后续资本利得的方式，为我们带来至少等值的收益。

Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into commensurate capital gains for Berkshire.

我们对资本利得（和损失）的确认将会是不均衡的，特别是当我们开始遵循新的GAAP规则，该规则要求我们必须在收益中持续记录未实现的利得或损失。然而，我深信，随着时间的推移，并且将我们所投资的公司作为一个整体来看，它们所保留的利润最终将为伯克希尔转化为相应的资本利得。

The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”

我刚才描述的这种价值创造与留存收益之间的联系，在短期内是无法察知的。股价会暴涨暴跌，似乎与其内在价值的逐年累积毫无关联。然而，随着时间的推移，本·格雷厄姆那句经常被引用的格言被证明是正确的：“短期来看，市场是投票机；但长期来看，它就变成了称重机。”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure longterm growth in value. For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four truly major dips. Here are the gory details:

伯克希尔本身就提供了一些生动的例子，说明了短期内的价格随机波动会如何掩盖长期的价值增长。在过去的53年里，公司通过再投资其收益并让复利发挥其魔力来创造价值。年复一年，我们不断前进。然而，伯克希尔的股价也曾遭受过四次真正的大幅下跌。以下是具体细节：

This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.

这张表格为我反对使用借贷资金持有股票的观点，提供了我能拿出的最强有力的论据。根本无法预料股票在短期内会下跌多深。即使你的借款额度很小，你的仓位没有立即受到市场暴跌的威胁，你的心神也很可能被骇人听闻的头条新闻和令人窒息的评论所动摇。而一颗慌乱的心是无法做出正确决定的。

In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow.

在未来的53年里，我们的股票（以及其他股票）将会经历类似表格中那样的大幅下跌。没有人能告诉你这些下跌何时会发生。信号灯随时可能从绿灯直接跳到红灯，中间不会有黄灯的过渡。

When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If:

然而，当市场大跌发生时，对于那些没有被债务所拖累的人来说，这反而提供了非凡的机会。那时就应该牢记吉卜林的诗《如果》（If）中的这几句话：

“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . .

“如果在众人惊慌失措之时，你能保持清醒的头脑 . . .

If you can wait and not be tired by waiting . . .

如果你能耐心等待，而不因等待而疲惫 . . .

If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim . . .

如果你能思考——而不把思考当作你的目标 . . .

If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you . . .

如果在所有人都怀疑你时，你仍能坚信自己 . . .

Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it.”

那么这个世界以及其中的一切，都将属于你。”

把思考当目标，把学习当目标是一回事。

“The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson

“十年赌约”已结束，并带来了一个意想不到的投资教训

Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007. (The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 – 26.) Now I have the final tally – and, in several respects, it’s an eye-opener.

去年，在赌约进行到90%的时候，我曾向各位详细报告了我于2007年12月19日立下的一个十年赌约。（去年年报中的完整讨论重印在第24-26页。）现在，我拿到了最终的结果——并且，在几个方面，它都令人大开眼界。

I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum that – if things turned out as I expected – would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to publicize my conviction that my pick – a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund – would, over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and incentivized those “helpers” may be.

我立下这个赌约有两个原因：（1）希望将我318,250美元的支出，杠杆化为一笔不成比例的巨额资金，如果事情如我所料，这笔钱将在2018年初捐赠给奥马哈的Girls Inc.；（2）为了宣传我的信念，即我的选择——一项几乎零成本、无人管理的标普500指数基金投资——随着时间的推移，其回报将优于大多数投资专家所能取得的业绩，无论这些“帮手”多么备受推崇、激励机制多么完善。

Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays?

探讨这个问题至关重要。美国投资者每年向投资顾问支付惊人的费用，通常还会因此产生多层次的连带成本。总的来看，这些投资者的钱花得值吗？实际上，还是从总体来看，投资者从他们的支出中获得了任何回报吗？

Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds.

Protégé Partners，我赌约的对手方，挑选了五只“基金中的基金”，并预期它们的表现会超越标普500指数。这并非一个小样本。这五只“基金中的基金”又转而持有了超过200只对冲基金的权益。

Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence.

基本上，Protégé这家深谙华尔街之道的咨询公司，挑选了五位投资专家，而这五位专家又雇佣了数百名其他的投资专家，每位专家都管理着自己的对冲基金。这个组合是一支精英团队，充满了智慧、激情和自信。

The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could – and did – rearrange their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge funds whose managers had lost their touch.

这五只“基金中的基金”的管理者还拥有一个额外的优势：他们可以——并且确实——在这十年间调整他们的对冲基金投资组合，投资于新的“明星基金”，同时退出那些基金经理已“风光不再”的头寸。

Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500 exceeded loss years.)

Protégé一方的每个参与者都受到了高度激励：“基金中的基金”的管理者和他们所挑选的对冲基金经理都能从收益中获得巨额分成，即使这些收益仅仅是因为市场整体上行而产生的。（自我们接管伯克希尔以来的43个十年期中，标普500指数上涨的年份100%超过了下跌的年份。）

Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because fixed fees averaging a staggering 21⁄2% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds.

必须强调的是，这些业绩激励只是巨大而美味的蛋糕上的一层糖霜：即使这些基金在这十年里给投资者带来了亏损，它们的管理者仍然可以变得非常富有。这是因为“基金中的基金”的投资者每年都要支付平均高达资产2.5%左右的固定管理费，其中一部分归属于五只“基金中的基金”的管理者，其余的则归属于那200多位底层对冲基金的管理者。

Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:

以下是这场赌约的最终记分卡：

Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, have received their annual audits from Protégé. The 2016 figures for funds A, B and C were revised slightly from those originally reported last year. Fund D was liquidated in 2017; its average annual gain is calculated for the nine years of its operation.

脚注：根据我与Protégé Partners的协议，这些“基金中的基金”的名称从未被公开披露。然而，我收到了Protégé提供的它们的年度审计报告。基金A、B和C的2016年数据与去年最初报告的数据相比略有修订。基金D于2017年被清算，其年均收益是根据其运营的九年计算的。

The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund.

这五只“基金中的基金”开局迅猛，在2008年每一只的表现都超过了指数基金。随后，灾难降临了。在接下来的每一年里，“基金中的基金”作为一个整体，其表现都落后于指数基金。

Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch. If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade.

我要强调的是，在这十年期间，股票市场的表现并无任何异常。如果在2007年底对投资“专家”进行一项调查，请他们预测普通股的长期回报，他们的猜测平均值很可能接近标普500指数实际达到的8.5%。在那样的环境下赚钱本应是轻而易举的。事实上，华尔街的“帮手们”赚取了惊人的财富。然而，当这个群体大发其财时，他们的许多投资者却经历了一个“失落的十年”。

Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.

业绩起起伏伏，费用恒久不变。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential.

这场赌约揭示了另一个重要的投资教训：虽然市场通常是理性的，但它们偶尔也会做出疯狂的事情。抓住那时出现的机会，并不需要超凡的智慧、经济学学位，或熟悉像阿尔法（alpha）和贝塔（beta）这样的华尔街术语。投资者那时真正需要的，是能够无视大众的恐惧或狂热，并专注于几个简单基本面的能力。愿意在相当长的一段时间内看起来毫无新意——甚至看起来很愚蠢——也至关重要。

Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate $1 million prize by purchasing $500,000 face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us $318,250 – a bit less than 64¢ on the dollar – with the $500,000 payable in ten years.

最初，Protégé和我各自出资，通过购买面值为50万美元的零息美国国债（有时被称为“剥离债券”或“strips”）来为最终100万美元的奖金提供资金。这些债券我们每人花费了318,250美元——相当于面值的不到64美分——十年后可兑付50万美元。

As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.

顾名思义，我们购买的债券不支付利息，但（由于是折价购买）如果持有至到期，可实现4.56%的年化回报率。Protégé和我最初的打算，不过是每年统计回报，并在2017年底债券到期时，将100万美元分配给获胜的慈善机构。

After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012, our bonds – now with about five years to go before they matured – were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%.

然而，在我们购买之后，债券市场发生了一些非常奇怪的事情。到2012年11月，我们的债券——此时距离到期还有大约五年——其售价已达到其面值的95.7%。以这个价格计算，它们的年化到期收益率不到1%。或者，准确地说，是0.88%。

Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb – a really dumb – investment compared to American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 – which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately weighted by market value – has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth).

鉴于如此可怜的回报率，与美国股票相比，我们的债券已经成了一项愚蠢——一项非常愚蠢——的投资。长期来看，标普500指数——它反映了美国商业的一个巨大横截面，并按市值进行了适当加权——其股东权益（净资产）的年回报率远超10%。

In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 21⁄2% annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow. Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would, over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And – as has been the case since 1776 – whatever its problems of the minute, the American economy was going to move forward.

2012年11月，当我们考虑这一切时，标普500指数的现金股息收益率为每年2.5%，大约是我们美国国债收益率的三倍。这些股息支付几乎肯定会增长。除此之外，组成500指数的公司还留存了巨额利润。这些企业会利用其留存收益来扩大业务，并且也常常用来回购自己的股票。无论哪种方式，随着时间的推移，都会大幅增加每股收益。而且——正如自1776年以来一直如此——无论当下有何问题，美国经济终将向前发展。

Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares. The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving $2,222,279 last month rather than the $1 million it had originally hoped for.

面对2012年底债券和股票之间非同寻常的估值错配，Protégé和我同意卖掉我们五年前购买的债券，并用所得款项购买了11,200股伯克希尔“B”股。结果是：奥马哈的Girls Inc.上个月收到了2,222,279美元，而不是最初期望的100万美元。

Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean achievement.

应该强调的是，自2012年置换以来，伯克希尔的表现并非绝佳。但并不需要绝佳的表现：毕竟，伯克希尔的收益只需超过那每年0.88%的债券门槛——这算不上什么Herculean般的丰功伟绩。

The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 didn’t produce at least $1 million.

这次从债券到伯克希尔的转换，唯一的风险是2017年底恰好遇上一个异常疲软的股票市场。Protégé和我觉得这种可能性（虽然总是存在）非常低。两个因素决定了这一结论：2012年底伯克希尔的合理价格，以及在赌约结束前的五年里，伯克希尔几乎肯定会实现的巨额资产增长。即便如此，为了消除这次转换为慈善机构带来的所有风险，我同意，如果在2017年底出售这11,200股伯克希尔股票未能产生至少100万美元，我将补足任何差额。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.

投资是一项放弃今天的消费，以期在未来能够进行更多消费的活动。“风险”就是这一目标无法实现的可能性。

By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a longterm investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold.

按照这个标准，2012年那些所谓的“无风险”长期债券，其风险远高于对普通股的长期投资。当时，即便在2012年至2017年间年均通货膨胀率仅为1%，也会降低Protégé和我卖出的那笔政府债券的购买力。

I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.

我想在此迅速承认，在未来任何一天、一周甚至一年内，股票的风险都将比短期美国国债更高——高得多。然而，随着投资者投资期限的拉长，一个多元化的美国股票投资组合的风险会逐渐变得比债券更低，前提是购买这些股票时的市盈率相对于当时普遍的利率水平是合理的。

It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.

对于拥有长期投资期限的投资者——包括养老基金、大学捐赠基金和有储蓄意识的个人——来说，用其投资组合中债券与股票的比例来衡量其投资“风险”，是一个可怕的错误。通常情况下，投资组合中的高等级债券反而会增加其风险。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet, the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals and conferred with Wall Street analysts.

从我们的赌约中得到的最后一个教训是：坚持做重大的、“简单的”决策，避免频繁交易。在这十年的赌约期间，所涉及的200多家对冲基金经理几乎肯定做出了成千上万次的买卖决策。这些经理中的大多数无疑都对他们的决策进行了深思熟虑，他们相信每一个决策都将证明是有利的。在投资过程中，他们研究10-K年报，访谈管理层，阅读行业期刊，并与华尔街分析师商讨。

Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings (95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years.

与此同时，Protégé和我，既不依赖研究、洞察力，也不依赖才智，在这十年间只做了一个投资决策。我们只是简单地决定，以超过100倍“收益”（95.7的售价 / 0.88的收益率）的价格卖掉我们的债券投资，而这些“收益”在接下来的五年里是不可能增加的。

We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security – Berkshire – that, in turn, owned a diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy.

我们进行这次出售，是为了将资金转移到单一证券——伯克希尔——而伯克希尔又拥有一个由稳健企业构成的多元化组合。在留存收益的推动下，即使我们经历一个平平的经济环境，伯克希尔的价值增长也不太可能低于每年8%。

After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8% was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.

在做了那番幼儿园水平般的分析之后，Protégé和我进行了转换，然后就放松了，我们相信，随着时间的推移，8%肯定会战胜0.88%。而且会大胜。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting falls on May 5th and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo! will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both the interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.

今年的年度股东大会将于5月5日举行，并再次由雅虎（Yahoo!）进行网络直播，网址为 https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。直播将于中部夏令时间上午8:45开始。雅虎将在会前和午餐休息期间采访公司的董事、经理、股东和名人。采访和会议都将进行普通话同声传译。

Our partnership with Yahoo! began in 2016 and shareholders have responded enthusiastically. Last year, real-time viewership increased 72% to about 3.1 million and replays of short segments totaled 17.1 million.

我们与雅虎的合作始于2016年，股东们反响热烈。去年，实时观看人数增长了72%，达到约310万人次，短片片段的重播总数达到了1710万次。

For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:15 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting, which usually runs from 15 to 45 minutes. Shopping will end at 4:30.

对于亲临现场参会的股东，CenturyLink会场大门将于周六早上7:00开放，以方便大家在8:30股东电影开始前购物。问答环节将于9:15开始，持续到下午3:30，中午会有一小时的午餐休息时间。最后，我们将在下午3:45开始正式的股东会议，会议通常持续15到45分钟。购物活动将于下午4:30结束。

On Friday, May 4th, our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink will be open from noon until 5 p.m. We added that extra shopping time in 2015, and serious shoppers love it. Last year about 12,000 people came through the doors in the five hours we were open on Friday.

5月4日（周五），我们在CenturyLink的伯克希尔参展商将从中午开放至下午5点。我们在2015年增加了这段额外的购物时间，深受“购物达人”们的喜爱。去年，在周五开放的五个小时里，约有12,000人入场。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. (Your Chairman discourages freebies.) Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies.

您的购物场所将是与会场相连、面积达194,300平方英尺的大厅，我们数十家子公司的产品将在此出售。（你们的主席不鼓励免费赠品。）请向众多负责各自展位的伯克希尔经理们问好。也请务必参观精彩的BNSF铁路模型布局，它向我们所有的公司致敬。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our sixth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; even with Brooks running shoes, our times would be embarrassing.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.

我们的跑鞋公司Brooks将再次在会上推出一款特别版纪念鞋。购买之后，您可以在周日穿上它参加我们第六届年度“伯克希尔5公里”赛跑，比赛于早上8点从CenturyLink出发。完整的参与详情将包含在随参会凭证寄送给您的《参观指南》中。参赛者将会发现自己与众多伯克希尔的经理、董事和同事们并肩奔跑。（不过，查理和我会睡个懒觉；即使穿着Brooks跑鞋，我们的成绩也会很尴尬。）5公里赛跑的参与人数逐年增长。请帮助我们再创纪录。

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 43% from 2016.

购物区将设有一个GEICO展位，由来自全国各地的多位公司顶级顾问值守。在去年的会议上，我们的保单销售创下了纪录，比2016年增长了43%。

So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.

所以，请过来询价。在大多数情况下，GEICO能为您提供股东折扣（通常是8%）。在我们运营的51个司法管辖区中，有44个允许提供此项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果您已有资格享受其他折扣，例如某些团体可享受的折扣，那么此股东折扣不可累加。）请带上您现有保险的详细信息，来比较一下我们的价格。我们能为你们中的许多人省下一大笔钱。然后把省下的钱用来购买伯克希尔的其他产品吧。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry more than 40 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Berkshire shareholders are a bookseller’s dream: When Poor Charlie’s Almanack (yes, our Charlie) made its debut some years ago, we sold 3,500 copies at the meeting. The book weighed 4.85 pounds. Do the math: Our shareholders left the building that day carrying about 8 1⁄2 tons of Charlie’s wisdom.

请务必光临Bookworm书店。这家位于奥马哈的零售商将销售超过40种书籍和DVD，其中包括几本新书。伯克希尔的股东是书商的梦想：几年前，当《穷查理宝典》（是的，就是我们那位查理）首次亮相时，我们在会上卖出了3500本。这本书重4.85磅。算一下就知道：那天，我们的股东们总共带走了约8吨半查理的智慧。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that most airlines substantially increase prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2 1⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

随本报告附上的委托书材料中有一份附件，解释了如何获取您参加会议及其他活动所需的凭证。请注意，大多数航空公司都会在伯克希尔周末期间大幅提高票价。如果您从远方前来，请比较一下飞往堪萨斯城和飞往奥马哈的费用。两个城市之间的车程约2个半小时，飞到堪萨斯城可能会为您省下一大笔钱。一对夫妇可能节省1000美元或更多。请把省下的钱花在我们这里。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. Last year, the one-week volume for the store was a staggering $44.6 million. Bricks and mortar are alive and well at NFM.

在内布拉斯加家具城（Nebraska Furniture Mart，简称NFM），它位于道奇街和太平洋街之间的第72街，占地77英亩，我们将再次举办“伯克希尔周末”折扣活动。要在NFM获得伯克希尔折扣，您必须在5月1日（周二）至5月7日（周一）期间（含首尾两日）购物，并且必须出示您的参会凭证。去年，该店在一周内的销售额达到了惊人的4460万美元。实体店在NFM依然生机勃勃。

The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.

在此期间的特价甚至适用于几家著名制造商的产品，这些制造商通常有铁打的禁止折扣规定，但本着我们股东周末的精神，他们为您破了例。我们感谢他们的合作。在“伯克希尔周末”期间，NFM的营业时间为周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日上午11点至晚上8点。周六下午5:30至晚上8:00，NFM将举办一场野餐会，欢迎各位参加。

NFM will again extend its shareholder’s discount offerings to our Kansas City and Dallas stores. From May 1st through May 7th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to those NFM stores will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.

NFM还将把股东折扣优惠扩展到我们位于堪萨斯城和达拉斯的门店。从5月1日到5月7日，股东向这些NFM门店出示参会凭证或其他伯克希尔持股证明（如券商结单），即可享受与光临奥马哈店的股东相同的折扣。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).

在波仙珠宝（Borsheims），我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月4日（周五）下午6点至9点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场是主活动，将于5月6日（周日）上午9点至下午4点举行。周六，我们将营业至下午6点。请记住，买得越多，省得越多（至少我女儿带我逛店时是这么说的）。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.

整个周末，波仙珠宝都将人潮涌动。因此，为方便起见，股东优惠价将从4月30日（周一）持续至5月12日（周六）。在此期间，请出示您的参会凭证或显示您拥有我们股票的券商结单，以证明您的股东身份。

On Sunday afternoon, on the upper level above Borsheims, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. Ajit, Charlie, Bill Gates and I will likely drop by as well.

周日下午，在波仙珠宝楼上，我们请来了两位世界顶级的桥牌专家——鲍勃·哈曼（Bob Hamman）和莎伦·奥斯伯格（Sharon Osberg），与我们的股东们一起打牌。如果他们建议打牌赌钱，就换个话题。阿吉特、查理、比尔·盖茨和我也可能会顺道过去看看。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.) I will participate on an advisory basis only.

我的朋友邢延华（Ariel Hsing）周日也将在购物中心接受乒乓球挑战。我认识Ariel时她才九岁，即便那时我也无法从她手上得一分。Ariel曾代表美国参加2012年奥运会。如果你不怕出丑，可以从下午1点开始，去和她切磋一下球技。比尔·盖茨去年和Ariel打得相当不错，所以他可能准备好再次挑战她。（我的建议是：赌Ariel赢。）我只会在一旁提供建议。

Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, serving from 12 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 2nd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.

Gorat牛排馆将于5月6日（周日）专门为伯克希尔股东开放，营业时间从中午12点到晚上10点。如需在Gorat预订，请于4月2日（但不要提前）致电402-551-3733。点一份T骨牛排配薯饼，以显示您是一位资深食客。

We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们将邀请同样的三位财经记者在会上主持问答环节，向查理和我提出股东们通过电子邮件提交给他们的问题。这三位记者及其电子邮件地址是：卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis），她那个时代最杰出的商业记者，邮箱是 loomisbrk@gmail.com；来自CNBC的贝基·奎克（Becky Quick），邮箱是 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及来自《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金（Andrew Ross Sorkin），邮箱是 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

每位记者将从收到的问题中选出他或她认为对股东最有趣、最重要的六个问题。记者们告诉我，如果你的问题简明扼要、避免在最后一刻发送、与伯克希尔相关，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题，那么你的问题被选中的机会最大。（请在邮件中告知记者，如果你的问题被选中，是否愿意被提及姓名。）

An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

另外一部分问题将由三位关注伯克希尔的分析师提出。今年的保险业专家是来自Dowling & Partners的加里·兰塞姆（Gary Ransom）。有关我们非保险业务的问题将由来自Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb的乔纳森·布兰特（Jonathan Brandt）和来自晨星公司（Morningstar）的格雷格·沃伦（Gregg Warren）提出。鉴于我们举办的是股东大会，我们希望分析师和记者们提出的问题能够增进我们股东对自己投资的理解和认识。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.

查理和我都不会事先得到任何关于问题的线索。有些问题肯定会很棘手，而这正是我们所喜欢的。我们不允许提出包含多个部分的问题，因为我们希望让尽可能多的提问者有机会向我们提问。我们的目标是，当您离开会场时，能比来时更了解伯克希尔，并且在奥马哈度过一段愉快的时光。

All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. After the 54th, all questions come from the audience. Charlie and I have often tackled more than 60 by 3:30.

总而言之，我们预计至少会有54个问题，其中分析师和记者每人6个，现场观众18个。在第54个问题之后，所有问题都将来自现场观众。查理和我常常在下午3:30前回答超过60个问题。

The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

现场观众中的提问者将通过抽签选出。抽签将于年会当天上午8:15举行，共11场。可以说，在会场和主分会场安装的11个麦克风处，每个地方都会进行一场抽签。

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze that information before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).

既然谈到我们股东获取知识这个话题，请允许我提醒各位，查理和我都认为，所有股东都应能同时获得伯克希尔发布的新信息，并且在可能的情况下，在任何交易发生前，都应有足够的时间来消化和分析这些信息。这就是为什么我们尽量在周五晚些时候或周六早些时候发布财务数据，以及为什么我们的年会总是在周六举行（这一天也能缓解交通和停车问题）。

We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.

我们不遵循与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交谈的普遍做法，而是像对待所有其他股东一样对待他们。对我们来说，没有人比那些将自己大部分积蓄托付给我们的、财力有限的股东更重要。在我日常经营公司时——以及在我写这封信时——我脑海中浮现的就是这位股东的形象。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

我有充分的理由，时常赞扬我们运营经理们的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营自己的业务时，就好像这是他们家族唯一的资产一样。我也相信，在所有大型上市公司中，我们经理们的思维方式是最以股东为导向的。我们的大多数经理在财务上并没有工作的必要。对他们而言，打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦与他们的薪水同样重要。

If managers (or directors) own Berkshire shares – and many do – it’s from open-market purchases they have made or because they received shares when they sold their businesses to us. None, however, gets the upside of ownership without risking the downside. Our directors and managers stand in your shoes.

如果经理（或董事）持有伯克希尔的股票——很多人确实持有——那要么是他们通过公开市场购买的，要么是他们将自己的企业卖给我们时获得的股票。然而，没有人只享受所有权带来的好处，而不承担其风险。我们的董事和经理们与你们站在同一立场。

We continue to have a wonderful group at headquarters. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 32,700-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,935 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.

我们总部依然拥有一支出色的团队。这支团队高效地处理着大量的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）及其他监管要求，提交长达32,700页的联邦所得税申报表，监督3,935份州税申报表的提交，回复无数股东和媒体的询问，发布年报，筹备全国规模最大的年会，协调董事会的活动，核对这封信中的事实——这样的清单还可以一直列下去。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help at the annual meeting in whatever way they are needed. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.

他们愉快且以令人难以置信的效率处理所有这些业务任务，让我的生活轻松愉快。他们的努力超出了与伯克希尔严格相关的活动范围：例如，去年，他们接待了40所大学（从200个申请者中选出）的学生，这些学生来到奥马哈与我进行问答交流。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的行程，甚至为我准备午餐的汉堡和薯条（当然，上面要淋满亨氏番茄酱）。此外，在年会上，无论哪里需要帮助，他们都会愉快地伸出援手。他们为在伯克希尔工作而自豪，我也为他们感到骄傲。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I’ve saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire’s board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors of Berkshire and also designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation.

我把最好的留到了最后。2018年初，伯克希尔董事会选举阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）为伯克希尔的董事，并任命他们各自为副董事长。阿吉特现在负责保险业务，格雷格则负责我们其余的业务。查理和我会专注于投资和资本配置。

You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and Berkshire’s blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all.

您和我都非常幸运，能有阿吉特和格雷格为我们工作。他们每个人都在伯克希尔工作了数十年，伯克希尔的血液流淌在他们的血管里。他们每个人的品格都与他们的才华相匹配。而这，已经说明了一切。

Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to your visit.

5月5日，请来到奥马哈——这个资本主义的摇篮——与伯克希尔大家庭见面吧。我们所有人都期待您的光临。

February 24, 2018

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Acquisitions

Insurance

Investments

“The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson

The Annual Meeting

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