2019-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

Morning session 早晨会议

1. Welcome and Munger’s insurgency campaign

欢迎和芒格的叛乱运动

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。

Good morning and welcome to Berkshire Hathaway.

早上好，欢迎来到伯克希尔哈撒韦。

And for those of you who have come from out of state, welcome to Omaha. The city is delighted to have you here at this event.

对于那些来自外州的朋友们，欢迎来到奥马哈。这个城市很高兴在这个活动中欢迎你们。

And for those of you who came from outside of the country, welcome to the United States.

对于那些来自国外的人，欢迎来到美国。

So, we’ve got people here from all over the world. We’ve got some overflow rooms that are taking care of people. And we will just have a few preliminaries and then we will move right into the Q&A period.

因此，我们这里的人来自世界各地。我们还安排了一些分会场。我们先进行一些预热，然后马上进入问答环节。

We’ll break about noon for about an hour. We’ll come back and do more Q&A until about 3:30. Then we’ll adjourn for a few minutes, and then we’ll conduct the meeting.

我们将在中午左右休息约一个小时。我们会回来进行更多的问答，直到大约 3:30。然后我们会休息几分钟，然后进行会议。

I understand that in the room adjacent, that Charlie has been conducting a little insurgency campaign.

我了解到在隔壁的房间，查理一直在进行一场小规模的叛乱活动。

I don’t know whether you’ve seen these, but these are the buttons that are available for those of you — you keep asking questions about succession. And Charlie wants to answer that question by getting your vote today. So, it says — this one says, “Maturity, experience, why accept second best? Vote for Charlie.” (Laughter)

我不知道你们是否见过这些，但这些是为你们准备的按钮——你们一直在问关于继任的问题。查理想通过今天的投票来回答这个问题。所以，上面写着——这个写着：“成熟，经验，为什么要接受次优？投票给查理。”（笑声）

I, however, have appointed the monitors who have — collect the votes, so I feel very secure. (Laughter)

我已经任命了监票人来收集选票，所以我感到非常安心。（笑声）

2. Berkshire directors introduced

伯克希尔董事介绍

WARREN BUFFETT: The first thing I’d like to do — Charlie is my partner of 60 years, a director and vice chairman, and we make the big decisions jointly. It’s just that we haven’t had any big decisions. So, (laughter) we haven’t — we’re keeping him available for the next big one.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想做的第一件事——查理是我的合作伙伴，已经有 60 年了，他是董事和副主席，我们共同做出重大决策。只是我们还没有遇到什么重大决策。所以，（笑声）我们还在为下一个重大决策做好准备。

But now at the formal meeting today, we’ll elect 14 directors, and you’re looking at two of them. And I’d like to introduce the 12 that will be on the ballot at 3:45.

但现在在今天的正式会议上，我们将选举 14 名董事，而你们正在看其中的两位。我想介绍一下将在 3:45 投票的 12 位候选人。

And I’m going to proceed alphabetically. And if they’ll stand. If you’ll withhold your applause because some of them get sensitive if certain people get more applause than others, and (Laughter) they’ll — and if you’ll withhold it till I’m finished, then you can applaud or not, as you see fit, having looked at these directors. (Laughter)

我将按字母顺序进行。如果他们能站起来。如果你们能暂时不鼓掌，因为有些人会对某些人获得的掌声多于其他人而感到敏感，（笑声）他们会——如果你们能等我说完再鼓掌，那么你们可以根据自己的判断来决定是否鼓掌，看看这些董事。（笑声）

So, we’ll start on my left. Greg Abel, who’s both a chairman and a director. Greg? Yeah, oh, there we are. Right, OK. And going along alphabetically, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Sue Decker, Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman— (applause) — Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, who is also a vice chairman, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer. Now you can applaud. (Applause)

那么，我们从我的左边开始。格雷格·阿贝尔，他既是董事长也是董事。格雷格？是的，哦，我们在这里。好的，接下来按字母顺序，霍华德·巴菲特，史蒂夫·伯克，苏·德克，比尔·盖茨，桑迪·戈特斯曼——（掌声）——夏洛特·古伊曼，阿吉特·贾因，他也是副董事长，汤姆·墨菲，罗恩·奥尔森，沃尔特·斯科特，梅瑞尔·维特默。现在你们可以鼓掌了。（掌声）

3. Berkshire’s Q1: Pay attention to operating earnings

伯克希尔第一季度：关注运营收益

WARREN BUFFETT: Now, this morning we posted on our website the quarterly, the 10Q that’s required to be filed with the SEC. We published it at 7 o’clock Central Time. And we also published an accompanying press release.

沃伦·巴菲特：今天早上，我们在网站上发布了季度报告，即需要向证券交易委员会提交的 10Q。我们在中部时间早上 7 点发布了它。我们还发布了一份随附的新闻稿。

And if we’ll put slide one up — these figures as usual require some explanation. As we’ve mentioned in the annual report, the new GAAP rule of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require that we mark our securities to market and then report any unrealized gains in our earnings.

如果我们展示第一张幻灯片——这些数字通常需要一些解释。正如我们在年度报告中提到的，新实施的公认会计原则（GAAP）要求我们将证券按市场价值计量，并在收益中报告任何未实现的收益。

And you can see, I’ve warned you about the distortions from this sort of thing. And, you know, the first quarter of 2019 actually was much like the first quarter of 2018, and I hope very much that newspapers do not read headlines saying that we made $21.6 billion in the first quarter this year against a loss of last year.

你可以看到，我已经警告过你们这种事情带来的扭曲。而且，你知道，2019 年第一季度实际上与 2018 年第一季度非常相似，我非常希望报纸不要报道标题说我们在今年第一季度赚了 216 亿美元，而去年则亏损。

These — the bottom line figures are going to be totally capricious, and what I worry about is that not everybody studied accounting in school, or they can be very smart people but that doesn’t mean that they’ve spent any real time on accounting.

这些最终的财务数字可能会非常随意，我担心的是，并不是所有人都在学校学习过会计，或者他们可能非常聪明，但这并不意味着他们花过足够的时间去研究会计。

And I really regard these bottom line figures, particularly if they’re emphasized in the press, as doing — as potentially being harmful to our shareholders, and really not being helpful. So, I encourage you now, and I encourage all the press that’s here, focus on what we call our operating earnings, which were up a bit. And forget about the capital gains or losses in any given period.

我认为这些最终的财务数字，特别是当它们在媒体上被强调时，可能对我们的股东有害，而并没有帮助。所以我现在鼓励你们，也鼓励在场的所有媒体，关注我们所谓的经营利润，这部分是有所增长的。而至于任何特定时期的资本收益或损失，可以忽略不计。

Now, they’re enormously important over time. We’ve had substantial capital gains in the future; we have substantial unrealized capital gains at the present time; we expect to have more capital gains in the future.

现在，它们在长时间内非常重要。我们在未来有了可观的资本收益；目前我们有可观的未实现资本收益；我们预计未来会有更多的资本收益。

They are an important part of Berkshire, but they have absolutely no predictive value or analytical value on a quarterly basis or an annual basis. And I just hope that nobody gets misled in some quarter when stocks are down and people say, “Berkshire loses money,” or something of the sorts. It’s really a shame that the rules got changed in that way, but we will report.

它们是伯克希尔的重要组成部分，但在季度或年度基础上，它们绝对没有预测价值或分析价值。我只希望在某个季度股票下跌时，没有人会被误导，听到有人说“伯克希尔亏损”或类似的话。规则以这种方式改变真是遗憾，但我们会如实报告。

But we will also explain, and we will do our best to have the press understand the importance of focusing on operating earnings, and that we do not attract shareholders who think that there’s some enormous gain because in the first quarter the stock market was up.

但我们也会解释，并尽力让媒体理解专注于经营收益的重要性，以及我们并不吸引那些认为第一季度股市上涨就会有巨大收益的股东。

There’s one other footnote to these figures that I should point out. It’s already been picked up by the wires from our 7 o’clock filing.

关于这些数字，我还应该指出一个注释。早在我们早上7点的文件中，新闻社已经报道了这一点。

We report on Kraft Heinz, of which we own about 27 percent or so. We report on what they call the equity method. Now, most stocks, when you get dividends, that goes into our earnings account, and their undistributed earnings don’t affect us. They affect us in a real way, but they don’t affect us in an accounting way.

我们对卡夫亨氏的报告采用了所谓的权益法，我们拥有其大约 27% 的股份。通常情况下，股票分红会计入我们的收益账户，而他们未分配的收益不会在会计上影响我们。虽然这些未分配收益对我们有实际影响，但不会在财务报表上体现。

We are part of a control group at Kraft Heinz, so instead of reporting dividends, we report what they call equity earnings.

我们属于卡夫亨氏的控制股东群体，因此我们不是报告分红，而是报告所谓的权益收益。

Kraft Heinz has not filed their 10K for the 2018 year with the SEC. And therefore, they have not released the first quarter of 2019 earnings. Now, normally, we would include our percentage share of those earnings, and we’ve done that every quarter up till this quarter. But because we do not have those figures, we’ve just — we’ve not included anything.

卡夫亨氏尚未向美国证券交易委员会提交 2018 年的 10K 报告。因此，他们也没有发布 2019 年第一季度的财报。通常情况下，我们会包括我们对这些收益的百分比份额，并且在此之前的每个季度我们都这样做了。但由于我们没有这些数据，我们就没有包含任何内容。

We received 40 cents times — $130 million of dividends in the first quarter from our shares, but that reduces our carrying basis and it is not reflected in the earnings. So, that’s an unusual item which we have mentioned, specifically pointed out in our press release as well as included in our own.

我们在第一季度从我们的股份中收到了每股 40 美分，总计 1.3 亿美元的股息，但这会减少我们的账面基础，并且没有反映在收益中。因此，这是一项我们提到的特殊项目，特别在我们的新闻稿中指出，并包含在我们自己的报告中。

But there is nothing in here, plus or minus, for Kraft earnings, Kraft Heinz earnings this year, whereas there was last year. And when we have the figures, obviously we will report them. Let’s see what beyond that I want to tell you.

但这里没有关于卡夫收益、卡夫亨氏今年收益的任何信息，而去年是有的。当我们有了数据，显然会向大家报告。让我看看还有什么我想告诉你的。

4. Berkshire signs 20-year lease for its Omaha headquarters

伯克希尔签署 20 年租约用于其奥马哈总部

WARREN BUFFETT: I think — oh yes, I’d wanted to mention to you, the Kiewit Company, which has been our landlord since 1962 — 57 years — has owned the building in which Berkshire is headquartered.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想——哦，是的，我想提一下，自 1962 年以来一直是我们房东的基维特公司——57 年——拥有伯克希尔总部所在的建筑。

Kiewit Company is moving their headquarters and, in the process, will be doing something with the building. And they very generously, as they always have been, they came and said, “What kind of a lease would you like? Since we’re leaving, and we’ve always sort of worked these things out as we’ve gone along.” And so Bruce Grewcock, who runs Kiewit, said, “You just sort of — you name your terms and what you’d like. So, you — no matter with happens with the building, you’re all set.”

Kiewit公司正在搬迁总部，在此过程中，他们也会处理现有的大楼。他们一如既往地非常慷慨，来到我们这里说：“你们想要什么样的租约？我们要搬走了，以前我们总是按照双方的需求协商解决。”Kiewit的负责人Bruce Grewcock说：“你们可以提你们的条件和需求。无论这栋大楼发生什么变化，你们都不用担心，一切都会安排妥当。”

So, I was about to sign a ten-year lease for the present space, but Charlie said, “Ten years might be long enough for me but,” he said he would like me to sign one for 20 years, considering.

所以，我正准备为现在的空间签一个十年的租约，但查理说：“十年对我来说可能够长，但，”他说他希望我签一个 20 年的租约，考虑一下。

And — so we are entering a 20-year lease, and I confess to you that we now occupy one full floor, as we have for decades, and the new lease provides for two floors. So, I just want you to know that your management is loosening up just a little bit. (Laughter)

我们正在签订一份为期 20 年的租约，我向你们坦白，我们现在占用一整层楼，正如我们几十年来一直做的那样，而新租约则提供了两层楼。所以，我只是想让你们知道，你们的管理层正在稍微放松一下。（笑声）

And whether or not we fill them is another question. But we will have that, and I would like to say to Omaha that I think the fact that Berkshire has signed up for 20 years is very good news for the city over time. It — (Applause) OK.

至于我们是否会填补这些空缺是另一个问题。但我们会有这个，我想对奥马哈说，我认为伯克希尔签约 20 年的事实对这座城市来说是个好消息，随着时间的推移。这——（掌声）好的。

5. Berkshire employees pitch in for annual meeting

伯克希尔员工为年度会议贡献力量

WARREN BUFFETT: And now I would like to tell you something about the people that make all of this possible. This is totally a — this is a homegrown operation.

沃伦·巴菲特：现在我想告诉你们一些关于让这一切成为可能的人的事情。这完全是一个本土的操作。

We started with a few people, meeting in the lunchroom at National Indemnity many years ago. And I think we will probably set another record for attendance today. Yesterday afternoon, 16,200 people came in five hours, and that broke the previous record by a couple thousand.

我们最初只有几个人，多年前在国家赔偿公司的午餐室里聚会。我想我们今天可能会再次创下出席人数的记录。昨天下午，有 16,200 人在五个小时内到场，这打破了之前的记录，增加了几千人。

On Tuesday, the Nebraska Furniture Mart did $9.3 million worth of business. And if any of you are in the retail business, you’ll know that that’s the yearly volume for some furniture stores, and here in Omaha, the 50th or so largest market in the country, maybe even a little less, $9.3 billion (million) I think probably exceeds anything any home furnishing store’s ever done in one day.

在周二，内布拉斯加家具城的营业额达到了930万美元。如果你们从事零售业务，就会知道这相当于一些家具店一整年的销售额。而在奥马哈，这个大约是全美第50大市场，甚至可能更小的市场里，930万美元的日销售额可能已经超过了任何一家家居用品商店在一天内的销售记录。

And we have people pitching, and we have all the people, virtually all of the people from the home office, some of them, you know, are — they’ll take on any task. We have a bunch of people from National Indemnity, for example, that come over, and they’ve been some of the monitors around.

我们有很多人进行推介，几乎所有来自总部的人都在这里，其中一些人愿意承担任何任务。例如，我们有一群来自国家赔偿公司的员工，他们过来担任监控工作。

And in terms of the exhibit hall, more than 600 people from our various subsidiaries give up a weekend to come to Omaha, work very hard, and tomorrow, 4:00 or 4:30, or I should say today at 4:00 or 4:30, they will start packing up things and heading back home. And they come in, and I saw them all yesterday, and they were a bunch of very, very happy, smiling faces. And, you know, they work hard all year, and then they come in and help us out on this meeting.

在展览大厅方面，我们各个子公司的 600 多人放弃了一个周末来到奥马哈，努力工作。明天，或者我应该说今天，4:00 或 4:30，他们将开始打包东西，回家。他们来了，我昨天见到了他们，都是一张张非常非常开心、面带微笑的脸。你知道，他们全年都在努力工作，然后在这个会议上来帮助我们。

And then, finally, if we could get a spotlight, I think Melissa Shapiro is someplace here — she runs the whole show. I mean, we — Melissa, where are you? (Applause)

然后，最后，如果我们能有一个聚光灯，我想梅丽莎·夏皮罗在这里的某个地方——她负责整个节目。我是说，我们——梅丽莎，你在哪里？（掌声）

Melissa’s name was Melissa Shapiro before she got married, then she married a guy named Shapiro, so now she’s Melissa Shapiro Shapiro. So — (Laughter) but she can handle that sort of thing. She handles everything, and never — totally unflappable. Totally organized. Everything gets done. Everybody likes her when they get through. So, I — it’s marvelous to get a chance to work with people like this.

梅丽莎结婚前的名字是梅丽莎·夏皮罗，然后她嫁给了一个叫夏皮罗的家伙，所以现在她是梅丽莎·夏皮罗·夏皮罗。所以——（笑声）但她能应对这种事情。她处理一切，从不——完全不慌张。完全有条理。所有事情都能完成。每个人在和她接触后都喜欢她。所以，我——能有机会和这样的人一起工作真是太棒了。

I think it’s a special quality that — at Berkshire. I think other people would hire some group to put on the meeting and all be very professional and all of that. But I don’t think you can get — I don’t think you can buy the enthusiasm and energy and help-the-next-guy feeling that you’ve seen out on that exhibition floor, and you’ll see as you meet people here at the hall, and as you meet the people around Omaha. They’re very, very happy that you’re here.

我认为这是一个特殊的品质——在伯克希尔。我认为其他人会雇佣一些团队来举办会议，所有的一切都非常专业。但我认为你无法获得——我认为你无法购买那种热情、活力和帮助他人的感觉，这在展览大厅里你已经看到了，随着你在这里与人们见面，以及在奥马哈周围与人们见面时，你会看到。他们非常非常高兴你在这里。

6. Q&A Begins

问答开始

WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I would like to start on the questions. We’ll do it just as we’ve done it in recent years. We’ll start with the press group. They’ve received emails from a great many people — perhaps they can tell you how many — and selected the questions they think would be most useful to the Berkshire shareholders.

沃伦·巴菲特：那么，我想开始回答问题。我们将按照近年来的方式进行。我们将从媒体小组开始。他们收到了很多人的电子邮件——也许他们可以告诉你具体有多少——并选择了他们认为对伯克希尔股东最有用的问题。

Yahoo is webcasting this as they’ve done for several years now, they’ve done a terrific job for us.

雅虎正在进行网络直播，就像他们多年来一直做的那样，他们为我们做得非常出色。

So, this meeting is going out, both in English and in Mandarin, and I hope our results translate well, or our — (laughs) our comments translate well. Sometimes we have trouble with English. But we’re going to — we’ll start in with Carol Loomis, my friend of 50 years, but you’ll never know it by the questions she’s going to ask me. (Laughter)

所以，这次会议将以英语和普通话进行，我希望我们的结果能够很好地传达，或者我们的——（笑）我们的评论能够很好地传达。有时候我们在英语上会遇到困难。但我们将——我们将从我认识 50 年的朋友卡罗尔·卢米斯开始，但你永远不会通过她要问我的问题知道这一点。（笑声）

CAROL LOOMIS: I’m going to start, very briefly — this is for the benefit of people who send us questions next year. There are kind of two things that you get wrong a lot of the time. You can’t send two-part questions or three-part, et cetera. We need a one-part question. And the other thing is the questions all need to have some relevance to Berkshire, because Warren said when he started it that his hope was that shareholders would come out of the questions with a further education about the company. So, keep those in mind for next year.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：我将简要开始——这是为了帮助明年向我们提问的人。有两件事情你们经常搞错。你们不能发送两部分或三部分的问题等。我们需要一个单一的问题。另一件事是，所有问题都需要与伯克希尔相关，因为沃伦在开始时说，他希望股东能通过这些问题进一步了解公司。所以，请记住这些，留到明年。

7. Munger: “I predict we’ll get a little more liberal in repurchasing shares”

芒格：“我预测我们在回购股票方面会变得更加宽松一些。”

CAROL LOOMIS (RETIRED FORTUNE MAGAZINE EDITOR): Many people — a number of people — wrote me about repurchases of stock. And, hence, the question I picked for my first one.

卡罗尔·卢米斯（退休《财富》杂志编辑）：许多人——一些人——给我写信询问股票回购。因此，我选择了这个问题作为我的第一个问题。

The question, this particular question comes from Ward Cookie (PH), who lives in Belgium and who was still emailing me this morning in reference to the first quarter report.

这个问题，特别是这个问题来自于住在比利时的沃德·库基（PH），他今天早上还在给我发邮件，提到第一季度报告。

And he asked, “My question concerns your repurchase of Berkshire shares. In the third quarter of last year, you spent almost 1 billion buying Berkshire B stock at an average price of $207.

他问：“我的问题是关于你们回购伯克希尔股票的。在去年的第三季度，你们花了近 10 亿美元以平均每股 207 美元的价格购买伯克希尔 B 股。”

“But then you got to a period between December 26th and April 11th when the stock languished for almost four months under 207. And yet, you purchased what I think of as a very limited amount of stock, even as you were sitting on an enormous pile of 112 billion.

但是在 12 月 26 日到 4 月 11 日之间，你经历了一个时期，股票在 207 以下徘徊了将近四个月。然而，即使你手中有高达 1120 亿的巨额资金，你仍然购买了我认为非常有限的股票。

“My question is why you did not repurchase a lot more stock? Unless, of course, there was for a time an acquisition of, say, 80 billion to 90 billion on your radar.”

“我的问题是，为什么你没有回购更多的股票？当然，除非在某个时候你们考虑过收购，比如说 800 亿到 900 亿。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the question — whether we had 100 billion or 200 billion would not make a difference — or 50 billion — would not make a difference in our approach to repurchase of shares.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，问题是——我们拥有 1000 亿还是 2000 亿并不会影响我们的股票回购方式——或者 500 亿——也不会影响。

We repurchase shares — we used to have a policy of tying it to book value. But that became — really became obsolete. It did not —

我们回购股票——我们曾经有一个将其与账面价值挂钩的政策。但这变得——真的变得过时了。它没有——

PB1.2。

The real thing is to buy stock — repurchase shares — only when you think you’re doing it at a price where the remaining shareholders have had — are worth more the moment after you repurchased it than they were the moment before.

真正的做法是仅在你认为以一个价格购买股票——回购股份——时进行，这个价格使得剩余股东在你回购之后的那一刻比在你回购之前的那一刻更有价值。

It’s very much like if you were running a partnership and you had three partners in it and the business was worth 3 million, and one of the partners came and said, “I’d like you to buy back my share of the partnership for a billion” — I started out with millions, so I’ll stay with millions — “for $1.1 million?” And we said, “Forget it.” And if he said, “1 million?” we’d probably say, “Forget it,” unless — and if he said, “900,000,” we’d take it because, at that point, the remaining business would be worth 2-million-1, and we’d have two owners, and our interest in value would have gone from a million to a million and fifty-thousand.

这就像你在经营一个合伙企业，里面有三个合伙人，企业价值 300 万，而其中一个合伙人来问：“我希望你们以 10 亿回购我的合伙份额”——我一开始是几百万，所以我会保持在几百万——“以 110 万美元？”我们说：“算了。”如果他说：“100 万美元？”我们可能会说：“算了，”除非——如果他说：“90 万美元，”我们会接受，因为到那时，剩下的企业价值将是 210 万，而我们将有两个所有者，我们的价值权益将从 100 万变为 105 万。

So, it’s very simple arithmetic. Most companies adopt repurchase programs and they just say, “We’re going to spend so much.” That’s like saying, you know, “We’re going to buy XYZ stock, and we’re going to spend so much here.” “We’re going to buy a company.” “We’re going to spend whatever it takes.”

所以，这非常简单的算术。大多数公司采用回购计划，他们只是说：“我们将花费这么多。”这就像是在说，“我们要购买 XYZ 股票，我们将在这里花费这么多。” “我们要收购一家公司。” “我们将花费任何必要的费用。”

We will buy stock when we think it is selling below a conservative estimate of its intrinsic value. Now, the intrinsic value is not a specific point, it’s probably a range in my mind that might have a band maybe of 10 percent. Charlie would have a band in his mind, and it would probably be 10 percent. And ours would not be identical, but they’d be very close. And sometimes he might figure a bit higher than I do, a bit lower.

我们会在认为股票的售价低于其内在价值的保守估计时购买。现在，内在价值并不是一个具体的点，而是在我心中可能是一个范围，可能有 10%的波动区间。查理心中也会有一个区间，可能也是 10%。我们的估计不会完全相同，但会非常接近。有时他可能会算得比我高一点，或者低一点。

But we want to be sure, when we repurchase shares, that those people who have not sold shares are better off than they were before we repurchased them. And it’s very simple.

但我们想确保，当我们回购股票时，那些没有卖出股票的人比我们回购之前的情况更好。这非常简单。

And in the first quarter of the year, they’ll find we bought something over a billion worth of stock, and that’s nothing like my ambitions. But it — what that means is that we feel that we’re OK buying it, but we don’t salivate over buying it.

在今年第一季度，他们会发现我们购买了超过十亿美元的股票，这与我的雄心壮志相去甚远。但这意味着我们觉得购买它没问题，但我们并不对购买它感到兴奋。

We think that the shares we repurchased in the first quarter leave the shareholders better off than if we hadn’t — the remaining shareholders — better off than if we hadn’t bought it. But we don’t think the difference is dramatic.

我们认为，我们在第一季度回购的股份使得股东的利益比我们没有回购时更好——剩余的股东比我们没有回购时更好。但我们认为这种差异并不显著。

And you will — you could easily see periods where we would spend very substantial sums if we thought the stock was selling at, say, 25 or 30 percent less than it was worth, and we didn’t have something else that was even better.

而你会——你可以很容易地看到，在某些时期，如果我们认为股票的售价比其实际价值低了，比如说 25%或 30%，而我们没有其他更好的选择，我们会花费相当可观的金额。

But we have no ambition in any given quarter to spend a dime unless we think you’re going to be better off for us having done so. Charlie?

但我们在任何一个季度都没有花一分钱的雄心，除非我们认为这样做会让你更好。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I predict that we’ll get a little more liberal in repurchasing shares. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我预测我们在回购股票方面会变得更加宽松一点。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I was going to give you equal time, but then — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我本来打算给你平等的发言时间，但后来——（笑声）

8. BNSF may adopt “precision-scheduled railroading”

BNSF 可能采用“精确调度铁路运输”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jon Brandt.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔恩·布兰特。

JONATHAN BRANDT (RESEARCH ANALYST, RUANE, CUNNIFF & GOLDFARB): Hi, Warren and Charlie. Thanks for having me, as always.

乔纳森·布兰特（研究分析师，鲁安、卡尼夫与戈尔德法布）：嗨，沃伦和查理。感谢你们一如既往地邀请我。

Every major North American railroad other than Burlington Northern has adopted at least some aspects of precision-scheduled railroading, generally to good effect to their bottom line.

除伯灵顿北方铁路外，所有主要的北美铁路都已采用至少一些精确调度铁路的方面，通常对他们的利润产生了良好的效果。

Some believe that point-to-point schedule service and minimal in-transit switching is good for both returns on capital and customer service.

有人认为，点对点的调度服务和最小的中转切换对资本回报和客户服务都有好处。

Others believe precision railroading has done little for on-time performance, and its rigidity has jeopardized the compact that railroads have had with both regulators and customers.

其他人认为精准铁路运输对准时性能贡献不大，其僵化性危及了铁路与监管机构和客户之间的协议。

Do you and current BNSF management believe that it’s now a good idea for BNSF to adopt precision railroading playbook? Or do you agree with its critics?

你和当前的BNSF管理层是否认为，现在是BNSF采用精确铁路操作手册的好时机？或者你同意批评者的观点？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, precision railroading, as it’s labeled, was probably invented by a fellow named Hunter Harrison. I think maybe he was at the Illinois Central Railroad at the time; there’s a book that came out about Hunter, who died maybe a year ago or thereabouts. And it describes the — his procedure toward railroading. It’s an interesting read if you’re interested in railroading.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，所谓的精确铁路运输，可能是由一个名叫亨特·哈里森的人发明的。我想他当时可能在伊利诺伊中央铁路工作；有一本关于亨特的书出版了，他大约在一年前去世。这本书描述了他对铁路运输的处理方式。如果你对铁路运输感兴趣，这本书很有意思。

And he took that to Canadian National, CN. There are six big railroads in North America, and he took that to CN, and he was very successful.

他把这个带到了加拿大国家铁路公司（CN）。北美有六大铁路公司，他把这个带到了 CN，并且非常成功。

And actually, Bill Gates is probably the largest holder of CN, and I think he’s done very well with that stock.

实际上，比尔·盖茨可能是 CN 的最大持有者，我认为他在这只股票上表现得非常好。

And then later, Canadian Pacific was the subject of an activist, and when they — as they proceeded, they got Hunter to join them and brought in an associate, Keith Creel, who — and they instituted a somewhat similar program. Now the same thing has happened at CSX.

后来，加拿大太平洋铁路公司成为了一个激进投资者的目标，在他们的进展中，他们邀请了亨特（Hunter）加入，并带来了他的助手基思·克里尔（Keith Creel），他们推行了一个相似的计划。现在同样的事情也发生在了CSX公司。

And all of those companies dramatically improved their profit margins, and they had varying degrees of difficulty with customer service in the implementing of it.

所有这些公司都显著提高了他们的利润率，并且在实施客户服务时遇到了不同程度的困难。

But I would say that we watch very carefully — Union Pacific is doing a somewhat modified version. But the — we are not above copying anything that is successful. And I think that there’s been a good deal that’s been learned by watching these four railroads, and we will — if we think we can serve our customers well and get more efficient in the process, we will adopt whatever we observe.

但我想说我们会非常仔细地观察——联合太平洋正在进行一种稍微修改过的版本。但是——我们并不排斥复制任何成功的东西。我认为通过观察这四家铁路公司，我们学到了很多，如果我们认为可以更好地服务客户并在此过程中提高效率，我们会采纳我们观察到的任何东西。

But we don’t have to do it today or tomorrow, but we do have to find something that gets at least equal, and hopefully better, customer satisfaction and that makes our railroad more efficient. And there’s been growing evidence that — from the actions of these other four railroads — there’s been growing evidence that we can learn something from what they do. Charlie?

但我们不必今天或明天就做到这一点，但我们确实需要找到一些能够至少达到相同水平，最好是更高的客户满意度，并使我们的铁路更加高效的东西。而且，越来越多的证据表明——来自其他四家铁路公司的行动——我们可以从他们的做法中学到一些东西。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I doubt that anybody is very interested in un-precision in railroading. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我怀疑没有人对铁路运输中的不精确感兴趣。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Jonny, has Charlie answered your question? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，乔尼，查理回答你的问题了吗？（笑声）

JONATHAN BRANDT: Yes, thank you.

乔纳森·布兰特：是的，谢谢。

9. BNSF trying to improve energy efficiency

BNSF 正在努力提高能源效率

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station number 1, from the shareholder group up on my far right.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第一站，来自我右侧远处的股东团体。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Bill Moyer and I’m from Vashon Island, Washington. And I’m part of a team called “The Solutionary Rail Project.”

观众成员：早上好。我叫比尔·莫耶，来自华盛顿州的瓦肖岛。我是一个名为“The Solutionary Rail Project.”的团队的一员。

Interestingly, only 3.5 percent of the value of freight in the U.S. moves on trains. Berkshire Hathaway is incredibly well positioned with its investments in the northern and southern trans-con through BNSF to grab far more of that freight traffic off of the roads and get diesel out of our communities, as well as harness transmission corridors for your Berkshire renewable energy assets, for which you’re obviously very proud.

有趣的是，美国只有 3.5%的货运价值是通过火车运输的。伯克希尔·哈撒韦凭借其在 BNSF 的北部和南部横贯铁路的投资，处于一个极其有利的位置，可以从公路上获取更多的货运流量，并将柴油排除在我们的社区之外，同时利用传输走廊为您的伯克希尔可再生能源资产服务，您对此显然非常自豪。

Would you consider meeting with us to look at a proposal for utilizing your assets and leveraging a public/private partnership to electrify your railroads and open those corridors for a renewable energy future?

您是否考虑与我们会面，讨论利用您的资产和公私合营伙伴关系来为您的铁路电气化，并为可再生能源的未来开放这些走廊的提案？

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I — we’ve examined a lot of things in terms of LNG. I mean, they’re — obviously, we want to become more energy efficient, as well as just generally efficient.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我——我们在液化天然气方面研究了很多事情。我的意思是，显然，我们希望变得更加节能，同时也要更加高效。

And I’m not sure about the value of freight. You mentioned 3 1/2 percent. I believe — I mean, I’m not sure what figure you’re using as the denominator there.

我不太确定货运的价值。你提到 3.5%，不过我不确定你使用的基数是什么。

Because if you look at movement of traffic by ton miles, rails are around 40 percent of the U.S. — we’re not talking local deliveries or all kinds of things like that — but they’re 40 percent, roughly, by rail.

因为如果你看按吨英里计算的交通运输量，铁路占美国大约40%的份额——我们不包括本地交付和其他类似的运输方式——大约40%是通过铁路完成的。

And BNSF moves more ton miles than any other entity. We move 15 percent-plus of all the ton miles moved in the United States.

BNSF 的货运吨英里数超过任何其他实体。我们在美国运输的货运吨英里超过 15%。

But if you take trucking, for example, on intermodal freight, we’re extremely competitive on the longer hauls, but the shorter the haul, the more likely it is that the flexibility of freight, where a truck can go anyplace and we have rails. So, the equation changes depending on distance hauled and other factors, but distance hauled is a huge factor.

但是以多式联运货运为例，我们在长途运输方面竞争力极强，但运输距离越短，货运的灵活性就越明显，因为卡车可以去任何地方，而我们有铁路。因此，方程式会根据运输距离和其他因素而变化，但运输距离是一个重要因素。

We can move a ton mile 500 — we can move 500-plus ton miles of freight for one gallon of diesel. And that is far more efficient than trucks.

我们可以用一加仑柴油运输超过500吨英里的货物，而这比卡车运输效率要高得多。

So, the long-haul traffic, and the heavy traffic, is going to go to the rails, and we try to improve our part of the equation on that all the time.

因此，长途运输和繁重交通将转向铁路，我们会不断努力改善我们在这方面的作用。

But if you’re going to transport something ten or 20 or 30 miles between a shipper and a receiver, and they’re — you’re not going to move that by rail.

但是如果你要在发货人和收货人之间运输十、二十或三十英里，而你又不打算通过铁路运输。

So, we look at things all the time, I can assure you.

所以，我们一直在观察事物，我可以向你保证。

Carl Ice is in — well, he’s probably here now, and he’ll be in the other room — and he’s running the railroad. You’re free to talk to him, but I don’t see any breakthrough like you’re talking about. I do see us getting more efficient year-by-year-by-year.

卡尔·艾斯在这里——好吧，他现在可能在这里，他会在另一个房间——他在管理铁路。你可以和他谈谈，但我没有看到你所说的突破。我确实看到我们年复一年地变得更加高效。

And obviously, if driverless trucks become part of the equation, that moves things toward trucking. But on long-haul, heavy stuff, and there’s a lot of it, you’re looking at the railroad that carries more than any other mode of transportation. And BNSF is the leader. Charlie?

显然，如果无人驾驶卡车成为其中的一部分，这将使事情朝着卡车运输发展。但在长途运输重货方面，铁路运输的量超过了任何其他运输方式。而 BNSF 是行业的领导者。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, over the long term, our questioner is on the side of the angels. Sooner or later, we’ll have it more electrified. I think Greg (Abel) will decide when it happens.

查理·芒格：好吧，从长远来看，我们的提问者站在天使的一边。迟早，我们会有更多的电气化。我认为格雷格（阿贝尔）会决定何时发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But we’re all working on the technology but —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但我们都在研究这项技术，不过——

And we’re considerably more efficient than ten, 20, 30 years ago, if you look at the numbers. But it —

而如果你看看数字，我们的效率比十年前、二十年前、三十年前要高得多。但这——

One interesting figure, I think right after World War II, when the country probably had about 140 million people against our 330 million now, so we had 40 percent of the population. We had over a million-and-a-half people employed in the railroad industry. Now there’s less than 200,000 and we’re carrying a whole lot more freight.

一个有趣的数据是，我记得二战刚结束时，当时美国的人口大约是1.4亿，而现在是3.3亿，相当于当时的40%。当时铁路行业雇用了超过150万人，而现在只有不到20万人，但我们运送的货物量却大大增加了。

充满噪音的环境中，少有人知道哪些信息不是噪音。

Now, obviously there’s some change in passengers. But the efficiency of the railroads compared to — and the safety — compared to what it was even immediately after World War II has improved dramatically. Charlie, anything more?

现在，显然乘客有所变化。但与二战后相比，铁路的效率和安全性都有了显著改善。查理，还有其他要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

10. Bank CEOS who make bad mistakes should lose all their net worth

犯重大错误的银行首席执行官应该失去他们的全部净资产

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK (CNBC): This is a question that comes from Mike Hebel. He says, “The Star Performers Investment Club has 30 partners, all of whom are active or retired San Francisco police officers. Several of our members have worked in the fraud detail, and have often commented after the years-long fraudulent behavior of Wells Fargo employees, should have warranted jail sentences for several dozen, yet Wells just pays civil penalties and changes management.

贝基·奎克（CNBC）：这是来自迈克·赫贝尔的问题。他说：“明星表演者投资俱乐部有 30 位合伙人，所有人都是现役或退休的旧金山警察。我们的一些成员曾在欺诈部门工作，并且在经历了多年的富国银行员工的欺诈行为后，常常评论说，这应该对几十人判处监禁，但富国银行只是支付民事罚款并更换管理层。”

“As proud shareholders of Berkshire, we cannot understand Mr. Buffett’s relative silence compared to his vigorous public pronouncement many years ago on Salomon’s misbehavior. Why so quiet?”

作为伯克希尔的自豪股东，我们无法理解巴菲特先生与他多年前对所罗门不当行为的强烈公开声明相比，为什么会如此沉默。为什么这么安静？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say this. The — (applause) — problem, well, as I see it — although, you know, I have read no reports internally or anything like that — but it looks like to me like Wells made some big mistakes in what they incentivized. And as Charlie says, there’s nothing like incentives, but they can incentivize the wrong behavior. And I’ve seen that a lot of places. And that clearly existed at Wells.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我想这样说。——（掌声）——问题，嗯，我的看法是——虽然你知道，我没有阅读任何内部报告或类似的东西——但在我看来，富国银行在激励方面犯了一些大错误。正如查理所说，没有什么比激励更重要，但他们可能会激励错误的行为。我在很多地方都见过这种情况。这在富国银行显然存在。

The interesting thing is, to the extent that they set up fake accounts, a couple million of them, that had no balance in them, that could not possibly have been profitable to Wells. So, you can incentivize some crazy things.

有趣的是，他们设立了几百万个虚假账户，这些账户没有余额，显然不可能给富国银行带来利润。因此，你可以激励一些疯狂的事情。

The problem is — I’m sure is that — and I don’t really have any inside information on it at all — but when you find a problem, you have to do something about it. And I think that’s where they probably made a mistake at Wells Fargo.

问题是——我确信是——我对此并没有任何内部信息——但是当你发现一个问题时，你必须采取行动。我认为这就是他们在富国银行可能犯错的地方。

They made it at Salomon. I mean, John Gutfreund would never have played around with the government. He was the CEO of Salomon in 1991. He never would have done what the bond trader did that played around with the rules that the federal government had about government bond bidding.

他们在所罗门公司达成了这一点。我的意思是，约翰·古特弗伦德绝不会与政府玩弄权术。他在 1991 年是所罗门的首席执行官。他绝不会像那位债券交易员那样玩弄联邦政府关于国债竞标的规则。

But when he heard about it, he didn’t immediately notify the Federal Reserve. And he heard about it in late April, and May 15th, the government bond auction came along. And Paul Mozer did the same thing he’d done before, and gamed the auction.

但当他听说这件事时，他并没有立即通知联邦储备委员会。他是在四月下旬听说的，而在五月十五日，政府债券拍卖来了。保罗·莫泽做了他之前做过的事情，操纵了拍卖。

And at this point, John Gutfreund — you know, the destiny of Salomon was straight downhill from that point forward. Because, essentially, he heard about a pyromaniac, and he let him keep the box of matches.

在这一点上，约翰·古特弗伦德——你知道，从那时起，所罗门的命运就一路下滑。因为，基本上，他听说了一个纵火狂，并让他保留了那盒火柴。

And at Wells, my understanding, there was an article in The Los Angeles Times maybe a couple years before the whole thing was exposed, and, you know, somebody ignored that article.

在富国银行，我的理解是，《洛杉矶时报》上有一篇文章，可能是在整个事件曝光前的几年，有人忽视了那篇文章。

And Charlie has beaten me over the head all the years at Berkshire because we have 390,000 employees, and I will guarantee you that some of them are doing things that are wrong right now. There’s no way to have a city of 390,000 people and not need a policeman or a court system. And some people don’t follow the rules. And you can incentivize the wrong behavior. You’ve got to do something about it when it happens.

查理这些年来在伯克希尔一直对我说，因为我们有 390,000 名员工，我可以保证其中一些人现在正在做错事。没有办法在一个有 390,000 人的城市里不需要警察或法院系统。有些人不遵守规则。而且你可以激励错误的行为。当这种情况发生时，你必须采取措施。

Wells has become, you know, exhibit one in recent years. But if you go back a few years, you know, you can almost go down — there’s quite a list of banks where people behaved badly. And where they — I would not say — I don’t know the specifics at Wells — but I’ve actually written in the annual report that they talk about moral hazard if they pay a lot of people.

近年来，富国银行（Wells Fargo）已经成为一个典型案例。但如果你回顾过去几年，你几乎可以列出一个相当长的银行名单，在这些银行中，有人表现不佳。我不清楚富国银行的具体情况，但我在年度报告中写到过，他们提到如果给很多人支付高额报酬，就会出现道德风险。

The shareholders of Wells have paid a price. The shareholders of Citicorp paid a price. The shareholders of Goldman Sachs, the shareholders of Bank of America, they paid billions and billions of dollars, and they didn’t commit the acts. And of course, nobody did go — there were no jail sentences. And that is infuriating.

富国银行的股东付出了代价。花旗集团的股东付出了代价。高盛的股东、美国银行的股东，他们付出了数十亿、数十亿美元，而他们并没有犯下这些行为。当然，没有人被判刑。这令人愤怒。

But the lesson that was taught was not that the government bailed you out because the government got its money back, but the shareholders of the various banks paid many, many billions of dollars.

但所教的教训并不是政府救助你，因为政府收回了它的钱，而是各个银行的股东支付了数十亿美元。

And I don’t have any advice for anybody running a business except, when you find out something is leading to bad results or bad behavior, you know, you — if you’re in the top job, you’ve got to take action fast.

我对任何经营企业的人没有任何建议，除了当你发现某些事情导致了不良结果或不良行为时，你知道，如果你处于最高职位，你必须迅速采取行动。

And that’s why we have hotlines. That’s why we get — when we get certain anonymous letters, we turn them over to the audit committee or to outside investigators.

这就是我们设立热线的原因。这就是为什么当我们收到某些匿名信件时，我们会将其交给审计委员会或外部调查人员。

And we will have — I will guarantee you that we will have some people who do things that are wrong at Berkshire in the next year or five years, ten years, and 50 years. It’s — you cannot have 390,000 people — and it’s the one thing that always worries me about my job, but — because I’ve got to hear about those things, and I’ve got to do something about them when I do hear about them. Charlie?

我可以保证，在接下来的 1 年、5 年、10 年和 50 年里，伯克希尔会有一些人做错事。你不能有 39 万人——这也是我对我工作的唯一担忧，因为我必须听到这些事情，并且当我听到时，我必须采取行动。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think people ought to go to jail for honest errors of judgment. It’s bad enough to lose your job. And I don’t think that any of those top officers was deliberately malevolent in any way. I just — we’re talking about honest errors in judgment.

查理·芒格：我认为人们不应该因为诚实的判断错误而入狱。失去工作已经够糟糕了。我不认为那些高层官员有任何故意恶意的行为。我只是——我们在谈论诚实的判断错误。

And I don’t think (former Wells Fargo CEO) Tim Sloan even committed honest errors of his judgment, I just think he was an accidental casualty that deserve the trouble. I wish Tim Sloan was still there.

我认为（前富国银行首席执行官）蒂姆·斯隆甚至没有犯下诚实的判断错误，我只是觉得他是一个意外的牺牲品，值得遭受这些麻烦。我希望蒂姆·斯隆仍然在那儿。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there’s no evidence that he did a thing. But he stepped up to take a job that — where he was going to be a piñata, basically, for all kinds of investigations.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没有证据表明他做了什么。但他主动承担了一个工作——基本上就是要成为各种调查的靶子。

And rightfully, Wells should be checked out on everything they do. All banks should. I mean, they get a government guarantee and they receive trillions of dollars in deposits. And they do that basically because of the FDIC. And if they abuse that, they should pay a price.

而且，富国银行应该对他们所做的一切进行审查。这所有的银行都应该。我是说，他们获得了政府的担保，并且收到了数万亿的存款。他们之所以能够这样做，基本上是因为联邦存款保险公司。如果他们滥用这一点，他们就应该付出代价。

If anybody does anything like a Paul Mozier did, for example, with Salomon, they ought to go to jail. Paul Mozier only went to jail for four months. But if you’re breaking laws, you should be prosecuted on it.

如果有人做了类似保罗·莫齐尔与所罗门所做的事情，他们应该入狱。保罗·莫齐尔只入狱四个月。但如果你违反法律，就应该受到起诉。

If you do a lot of dumb things, I wish they wouldn’t go away — the CEOs wouldn’t go away — so rich under those circumstances. But people will do dumb things. (Applause)

如果你做了很多愚蠢的事情，我希望那些CEO在这种情况下不要走得那么富有。但人们总会做一些愚蠢的事情。（掌声）

I actually proposed — think it may have been in one of the annual reports even. I proposed that, if a bank gets to where it needs government assistance, that basically the responsible CEO should lose his net worth and his spouse’s net worth. If he doesn’t want the job under those circumstances, you know (Applause)

我实际上提议过——我想这可能是在某个年度报告中提到的。我提议，如果一家银行需要政府援助，那么负责的首席执行官应该失去他的净资产和配偶的净资产。如果他在这种情况下不想继续担任这个职位，你知道的（掌声）

And I think that the directors — I think they should come after the directors for the last five years — I think I proposed — of everything they’d received.

我认为董事们应该为过去五年的所作所为负责——我想我提议过——追讨他们在这段时间内获得的所有报酬。

But it’s the shareholders who pay. I mean, if we own 9 percent of Wells, whatever this has cost, 9 percent of it is being borne by us. And it’s very hard to tie it directly.

但最终是股东在买单。我的意思是，如果我们拥有富国银行 9%的股份，那么无论这花费了多少，9%的成本都是由我们承担的。而且很难直接将其联系起来。

One thing you should know, incidentally though, is that the FDIC, which was started — I think it was started January 1st, 1934 — but it was a New Deal proposal.

你应该知道的一件事是，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）是于 1934 年 1 月 1 日成立的，但这是一个新政提案。

And the FDIC has not cost the United States government a penny. It now has about $100 billion in it. And that money has all been put in there by the banks. And that’s covered all the losses of the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of financial institutions.

而且联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）没有让美国政府花费一分钱。它现在大约有 1000 亿美元。这些钱都是由银行存入的。这些资金覆盖了数百家金融机构的所有损失。

And I think the impression is that the government guarantee saved the banks, but the government money did not save the banks. The banks’ money, as an industry, not only has paid every loss, but they’ve accumulated an extra $100 billion, and that’s the reason the FDIC. assessments now are going back down. They had them at a high level. And they had a higher level for the very big banks.

很多人认为是政府担保拯救了银行，但实际上并不是政府资金拯救了银行。银行业作为一个整体，不仅偿还了所有损失，还额外积累了1000亿美元的资金，这也是为什么联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）的评估费用现在开始下降的原因。此前，他们的评估费用曾处于较高水平，尤其是对大型银行的收费更高。

When you hear all the talk about — the political talk — about the banks, they had not cost the federal government a penny. There were a lot of actions that took place that should not have taken place. And there’s a lot fewer now, I think, than there were in the period leading up to 2008 and ’09. But some banks will make big mistakes in the future. Charlie?

当你听到关于银行的政治讨论时，它们并没有让联邦政府花费一分钱。发生了很多不该发生的事情。我认为现在发生的事情比 2008 年和 2009 年之前要少得多。但未来一些银行会犯大错误。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.

查理·芒格：我对此没有什么要补充的。

11. “We will spend a lot of money” on buybacks if price is right

“如果价格合适，我们将花很多钱”用于回购。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jay Gelb from Barclays. Barclays just had a proxy contest of sorts, didn’t it?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。来自巴克莱的杰伊·盖尔布。巴克莱刚刚经历了一场代理权争夺战，是吗？

JAY GELB (INSURANCE ANALYST, BARCLAYS): That’s right, Warren. (Laughs)

杰伊·盖尔布（巴克莱保险分析师）：没错，沃伦。（笑）

I also have a question on Berkshire Hathaway — I’m sorry — on share buybacks.

我还有一个关于伯克希尔哈撒韦的问题——抱歉——关于股票回购的。

Warren, in a recent Financial Times article, you were quoted as saying that the time may come when the company buys back as much as $100 billion of its shares, which equates to around 20 percent of Berkshire’s current market cap. How did you arrive at that $100 billion figure? And over what time frame would you expect this to occur?

沃伦，在最近的一篇《金融时报》文章中，您被引用说，公司可能会在未来某个时候回购高达 1000 亿美元的股票，这相当于伯克希尔当前市值的约 20%。您是如何得出这个 1000 亿美元的数字的？您预计这将在什么时间范围内发生？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I probably arrived at that $100 billion figure in about three seconds when I got asked the question. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。当我被问到这个问题时，我大概在三秒钟内就得出了那个 1000 亿美元的数字。（笑声）

It was a nice round figure and we could do it. And we would like to do it if the stock was — we’ve got the money to buy in $100 billion worth of stock.

这是一个不错的数字，我们可以做到。如果股票价格合适，我们愿意这样做——我们有资金购买价值 1000 亿美元的股票。

And bear in mind, if we’re buying in $100 billion stock, it probably would be that the company wasn’t selling at 500 billion. So, it might buy well over 20 percent.

请记住，如果我们购买价值 1000 亿美元的股票，那么这家公司可能并没有以 5000 亿美元的价格出售。因此，它可能会购买超过 20%的股份。

We will spend a lot of money. We’ve been involved in companies where the number of shares has been reduced 70 or 80 percent over time. And we like the idea of buying shares at a discount.

我们将花很多钱。我们参与过一些公司，这些公司的股份数量随着时间的推移减少了 70%或 80%。我们喜欢以折扣价购买股份的想法。

We do feel, if shareholders — if we’re going to be repurchasing shares from shareholders who are partners, and we think it’s cheap, we ought to be very sure that they have the facts available to evaluate what they own.

我们确实认为，如果我们要从股东——也就是我们的合伙人——手中回购股票，并且我们认为股价被低估了，那么我们应该非常确保股东能够获得足够的信息来评估他们所持有的股票。

I mean, just as if we had a partnership, it would not be good if there were three partners and two of them decided that they would sort of freeze out the third, maybe in terms of giving him material information that they knew that that third party didn’t know.

我的意思是，就像我们有一个合伙关系一样，如果有三个合伙人，而其中两个决定把第三个合伙人排除在外，比如在提供他们知道而第三方不知道的实质信息方面，这样是不好的。

So, it’s very important that our disclosure be the same sort of disclosure that I would give to my sisters who are the imaginary — they’re not imaginary — but they’re the shareholders to whom I address the annual report every year.

因此，我们的披露非常重要，应该与我每年向其提交年度报告的股东（虽然他们并不是真正的股东，而是我想象中的姐妹们）所做的披露相同。

Because I do feel that you, if you’re going to sell your stock, should have the same information that’s important, that’s available to me and to Charlie.

因为我确实觉得，如果你要出售你的股票，你应该拥有与我和查理一样重要的信息。

But we will — if our stock gets cheap, relative to intrinsic value, we would not hesitate.

但如果我们的股票相对于内在价值变得便宜，我们不会犹豫。

We wouldn’t be able to buy that much in a very short period of time, in all likelihood. But we would certainly be willing to spend $100 billion. Charlie?

我们在很短的时间内不太可能买到那么多。但我们肯定愿意花费 1000 亿美元。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think when it gets really obvious, we’ll be very good at it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为当事情变得非常明显时，我们会非常擅长这件事。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Let me get that straight. What’d you say, exactly?

沃伦·巴菲特：让我弄清楚。你到底说了什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: When it gets really obvious, we’ll be very good at it.

查理·芒格：当事情变得非常明显时，我们会非常擅长它。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah. I was hoping that’s what you said. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，是的。我希望你是这么说的。（笑声）

Yeah, we will be good at it. We don’t have any trouble being decisive. We don’t say yes very often. But if it’s something obvious — I mean, Jay, if you and I are partners, you know, and our business is worth a million dollars and you say you’ll sell your half to me for 300,000, you’ll have your 300,000 very quickly.

是的，我们会擅长这件事。我们在果断方面没有任何问题。我们不常说“是”。但如果是显而易见的事情——我的意思是，杰伊，如果你我是合作伙伴，你知道，我们的生意价值一百万美元，而你说你愿意以三十万卖给我你的一半，那么你很快就会拿到你的三十万。

12. Buying one share in an oil-rich duck hunting club

购买一个石油丰富的鸭子狩猎俱乐部的一股股份

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station two.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Patrick Donahue from Eden Prairie, Minnesota, and I’m with my ten-year-old daughter, Brooke Donahue.

观众成员：早上好。我叫帕特里克·多纳休，来自明尼苏达州的伊登草原，我和我十岁的女儿布鲁克·多纳休在一起。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie.

观众：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. It’s Brooke, is it?

沃伦·巴菲特：嗨。是布鲁克吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It is. 观众成员：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: First, I’m a proud graduate of Creighton University. And I need to say a personal thank you for coming over the years to share your insights. And it’s been a tradition since I graduated in 1999 to come to the annual meeting, and thank you for a lifetime of memories.

观众成员：首先，我是克雷顿大学的自豪毕业生。我需要对您多年来的到来和分享见解表示个人感谢。自从我 1999 年毕业以来，参加年度会议已经成为一种传统，感谢您带来的终生回忆。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Brooke is a proud Berkshire shareholder and read the letter and had some questions regarding investments that have been made in the past. And she had made some interesting comments about what she thought was a lot of fun.

观众成员：布鲁克是一个自豪的伯克希尔股东，她阅读了信件，并对过去所做的投资有一些问题。她对她认为非常有趣的事情发表了一些有趣的评论。

So, our question for both of you is: outside of Berkshire Hathaway, what is the most interesting or fun personal investment you have ever made? (Laughter)

所以，我们对你们俩的问题是：除了伯克希尔·哈撒韦，你们做过的最有趣或最有意思的个人投资是什么？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, they’re always more fun when you make a lot of money off of them. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，当你从中赚很多钱时，总是更有趣。（笑声）

Well, one time, I bought one share of stock in the Atled Corp. That’s spelled A-T-L-E-D. And Atled had 98 shares outstanding and I bought one. And not what you call a liquid security. (Laughter)

好吧，有一次，我在 Atled 公司买了一股股票。Atled 的拼写是 A-T-L-E-D。Atled 总共有 98 股流通在外，我买了一股。这可不是你所说的流动性很强的证券。（笑声）

And Atled happened to be the word “delta” spelled backwards. And a hundred guys in St. Louis had each chipped in 50 or $100 or something to form a duck club in Louisiana and they bought some land down there.

而“Atled”恰好是“delta”这个词的反向拼写。在圣路易斯有一百个人每人出资 50 或 100 美元，或者其他金额，成立了一个位于路易斯安那州的鸭子俱乐部，他们在那儿买了一些土地。

Two guys didn’t come up with their — there were a hundred of them — two of them defaulted on their obligation to come up with a hundred dollars — so there were 98 shares out. And they went down to Louisiana and they shot some ducks.

两个家伙没有兑现他们的承诺——总共有一百个——其中两个没有履行他们出一百美元的义务——所以只剩下 98 股。他们去了路易斯安那州，打了一些鸭子。

But apparently somebody shot — fired a few shots into the ground and oil spurted out. And — (laughter) — those Delta duck club shares — and I think the Delta duck club field is still producing. I bought stock in it 40 years ago for $29,200 a share.

但显然有人开枪——向地面开了几枪，油喷了出来。然后——（笑声）——那些德尔塔鸭子俱乐部的股份——我认为德尔塔鸭子俱乐部的油田仍在生产。我在 40 年前以每股 29,200 美元的价格购买了它的股票。

And it had that amount in cash and it was producing a lot, and they sold it. If they kept it, that stock might’ve been worth 2 or $3 million a share, but they sold out to another oil company.

它有那么多现金，并且产生了很多收益，他们把它卖掉了。如果他们保留它，那股票可能值每股 200 万或 300 万美元，但他们卖给了另一家石油公司。

That was certainly — that was the most interesting —

那确实是——那是最有趣的——

Actually, I didn’t have any cash at the time. And I went down and borrowed the money. I bought it for my wife. And I borrowed the money. And the loan officer said, “Would you like to borrow some money to buy a shotgun as well?” (Laughter)

实际上，那时我没有现金。我下去借了钱。我是为我的妻子买的。我借了钱。贷款专员问：“你想借点钱买一把猎枪吗？”（笑声）

Charlie, tell them about the one you missed. (Laughter)

查理，告诉他们你错过的那个。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I got two investments that come to mind. When I was young and poor, I spent a thousand dollars once buying an oil royalty that paid me 100,000 a year for a great many years. But I only did that once in a lifetime.

查理·芒格：嗯，我想到了两个投资。当我年轻且贫穷时，我曾花一千美元购买了一份石油特许权，这让我每年赚取十万美元，持续了很多年。但我一生中只做过一次这样的投资。

On a later occasion, I bought a few shares of Belridge Oil, which went up 30 times rather quickly. But I turned down five times as much as I bought. It was the dumbest decision of my whole life. So, if any of you have made any dumb decisions, look up here and feel good about yourselves. (Laughter)

后来我买了几股Belridge Oil的股票，它很快涨了30倍。但我拒绝了购买更多的机会，本可以买五倍的量。这是我一生中最愚蠢的决定。所以，如果你们中有人做过愚蠢的决定，看看我，就会对自己感觉好一些。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I could add a few, but — Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：我可以再加几个，但——安德鲁？

13. Buffett speaks for himself on politics, not for Berkshire

巴菲特在政治问题上代表自己，而不是代表伯克希尔。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN (NEW YORK TIMES/CNBC): Warren and Charlie, this is a question — actually, we got a handful of questions on this topic. This is probably the best formulation of it.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金（纽约时报/CNBC）：沃伦和查理，这是一个问题——实际上，我们在这个话题上收到了几个问题。这可能是最好的表述。

Warren, you have been a long-time, outspoken Democrat. With all the talk about socialism versus capitalism taking place among Democratic presidential candidates, do you anticipate an impact on Berkshire in the form of more regulations, higher corporate taxes, or even calls for breakups among the many companies we own if they were to win?

沃伦，你一直是一个长期、直言不讳的民主党人。在民主党总统候选人之间关于社会主义与资本主义的讨论中，你是否预见到如果他们获胜，伯克希尔会受到更多监管、更高企业税或甚至对我们拥有的众多公司进行拆分的呼声的影响？

And how do you think about your own politics as a fiduciary of our company, and at the same time, as someone who has said that simply being a business leader doesn’t mean you’ve put your citizenship in a blind trust?

你如何看待自己作为我们公司的受托人同时又是一个曾表示仅仅作为商业领袖并不意味着你将自己的公民身份置于盲目信托中的人的政治立场？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I have said that you do not put your citizenship in a blind trust. But you also don’t speak on behalf of your company. You do speak as a citizen if you speak. And therefore, you have to be careful about when you do speak, because it’s going to be assumed you’re speaking on behalf of your company.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我曾说过，你不能把你的公民身份放在一个盲目信托中。但你也不能代表你的公司发言。如果你发言，你是作为一个公民在发言。因此，你必须小心何时发言，因为人们会认为你是在代表你的公司发言。

Berkshire Hathaway certainly, in 54 years, has never — and will never — made a contribution to a presidential candidate. I don’t think we’ve made a contribution to any political candidate. But I don’t want to say, for 54 years, that — (Applause)

伯克希尔·哈撒韦在 54 年里肯定从未——也永远不会——向任何总统候选人捐款。我认为我们没有向任何政治候选人捐款。但我不想说，54 年来——（掌声）

We don’t do it now. We operate in several regulated industries. And our railroad and our utility, as a practical matter, they have to have a presence in Washington or in the state legislatures in which they operate.

我们现在不这样做。我们在几个受监管的行业中运营。实际上，我们的铁路和公用事业必须在华盛顿或它们运营的州立法机构中有一定的存在。

So, we have some — a few — I don’t know how many — political action committees which existed when we bought it — when we bought the companies at subsidiaries.

所以，我们有一些——几个——我不知道有多少——政治行动委员会在我们购买时就已经存在——当我们购买这些子公司时。

And I think, unquestionably, they make some contributions simply to achieve the same access as their competitors. I mean, if the trucking industry is going to lobby, I’m sure the railroad industry’s going to lobby.

我认为，毫无疑问，他们做出一些贡献只是为了获得与竞争对手相同的准入。我是说，如果卡车运输行业要游说，我相信铁路行业也会游说。

But — the general — well, the rule is, I mean, that people do not pursue their own political interests with your money here.

但是——一般来说——我的意思是，规则是，人们在这里不会用你的钱追求他们自己的政治利益。

We’ve had one or two managers over the years, for example, that would do some fundraising where they were fundraising from people who were suppliers of them or something of the sort. And if I ever find out about it, that ends promptly.

我们这些年来有一两个经理，比如，他们会进行一些筹款活动，筹款对象是他们的供应商或类似的人。如果我发现这种情况，那就会立即结束。

My position, at Berkshire, is not to be used to further my own political beliefs. But my own political beliefs can be expressed as a person, not as a representative of Berkshire, when a campaign is important.

我在伯克希尔的职位不应被用来推动我个人的政治信仰。但当一场运动重要时，我可以作为个人表达我自己的政治信仰，而不是作为伯克希尔的代表。

I try to minimize it. But it’s no secret that in the last election, for example, I raised money.

我尽量把它降到最低。但毫无疑问，在上一次选举中，我筹集了资金。

I won’t give money to PACs. I accidentally did it one time. I didn’t know it was a PAC. But I don’t do it.

我不会给政治行动委员会（PAC）捐钱。我曾经不小心捐过一次。我不知道那是一个 PAC。但我不会再这样做。

But I’ve raised substantial sums. I don’t like the way money is used in politics. I’ve written op-ed pieces for the New York Times in the past on the influence of money in politics.

但我已经筹集了相当可观的资金。我不喜欢金钱在政治中的使用方式。我过去曾为《纽约时报》撰写过关于金钱在政治中影响的评论文章。

I spent some time with John McCain many years ago before McCain-Feingold, on ways to try to limit it. But the world has developed in a different way.

我在许多年前与约翰·麦凯恩共度了一段时间，在麦凯恩-费因戈尔德之前，讨论如何尝试限制它。但世界的发展方向有所不同。

14. Buffett: “I’m a card-carrying capitalist” but some regulations are needed

巴菲特：“我是一个坚定的资本主义者”，但需要一些监管。

WARREN BUFFETT: On your question about the — I will just say I’m a card-carrying capitalist. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：关于你的问题——我只想说我是一个坚定的资本主义者。（掌声）

But I — and I believe we wouldn’t be sitting here except for the market system and the rule of law and some things that are embodied in this country. So, you don’t have to worry about me changing in that manner.

但我——我相信如果没有市场体系、法治以及这个国家所体现的一些东西，我们就不会坐在这里。所以，你不必担心我会以那种方式改变。

But I also think that capitalism does involve regulation. It involves taking care of people who are left behind, particularly when the country gets enormously prosperous. But beyond that, I have no Berkshire podium for pushing anything. Charlie?

但我也认为资本主义确实涉及监管。它涉及照顾那些被遗忘的人，特别是在国家变得极其繁荣的时候。但除此之外，我没有伯克希尔的讲台来推动任何事情。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think we’re all in favor of some kind of a government social safety net in a country as prosperous as ours.

查理·芒格：我认为我们都支持在像我们这样繁荣的国家中建立某种政府社会保障网。

What a lot of us don’t like is the vast stupidity with which parts of that social safety net are managed by the government. It’d be much better if — (applause) — we could do it more wisely. But I think it also might be better if we did it more liberally.

我们很多人不喜欢的是政府管理社会安全网某些部分时表现出的巨大愚蠢。如果我们能更明智地去做，那会好得多。（掌声）但我认为如果我们能更自由地去做，可能也会更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, one of the reasons we’re involved in this effort along with J.P. Morgan and Amazon — with (J.P. Morgan CEO) Jamie Dimon and (Amazon CEO) Jeff Bezos — on the medical question, is we do have as much money going — 3.3 or 3.4 trillion — we have as much money going to medical care as we have funding the federal government.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们与摩根大通和亚马逊一起参与这个努力的原因之一——与（摩根大通首席执行官）杰米·戴蒙和（亚马逊首席执行官）杰夫·贝索斯一起——在医疗问题上，我们在医疗保健方面投入的资金与资助联邦政府的资金一样多，达到 3.3 万亿或 3.4 万亿。

And it’s gone from 5 to 17 percent — or 18 percent — while actually the amount going to the federal government has stayed about the same at 17 percent.

它从 5%上升到 17%——或者 18%——而实际上，拨给联邦政府的金额保持在大约 17%左右。

So, we hope there’s some major improvements from the private sector because I generally think the private sector does a better job than the public sector in most things.

所以，我们希望私营部门能有一些重大改进，因为我一般认为私营部门在大多数事情上做得比公共部门更好。

But I also think that if the private sector doesn’t do something, you’ll get a different sort of answer. And I’d like to think that the private sector can come up with a better answer than the public sector in that respect.

但我也认为，如果私营部门不采取行动，你会得到不同的答案。我希望私营部门在这方面能提出比公共部门更好的答案。

I will probably — it depends who’s nominated — but I voted for plenty of Republicans over the years. I even ran for delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1960. But — we are not —

我可能会——这取决于谁被提名——但多年来我投过很多共和党人的票。我甚至在 1960 年竞选过共和党全国代表。但——我们并不是——

I don’t think the country will go into socialism in 2020 or in 2040 or 2060.

我认为这个国家在 2020 年、2040 年或 2060 年都不会走向社会主义。

15. We don’t try to push Berkshire stock higher or lower

我们不试图推动伯克希尔股票上涨或下跌。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg Warren.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格·沃伦。

GREGG WARREN (FINANCIAL SERVICES ANALYST, MORNINGSTAR RESEARCH SERVICES): Warren, my first question, not surprisingly, is on share repurchases.

格雷格·沃伦（晨星研究服务金融服务分析师）：沃伦，我的第一个问题，毫不意外，是关于股票回购的。

Stock buybacks in the open market are a function of both willing buyers and sellers. With Berkshire having two shares of classes, you should have more flexibility when buying back stock. But given the liquidity difference that exists between the two share classes — with an average of 313 Class A shares exchanging hands daily the past five years, equivalent to around $77 million a day, and an average of 3.7 million Class B shares doing the same, equivalent to around 622 million — Berkshire’s likely to have more opportunities to buy back Class B shares than Class A, which is exactly what we saw during the back half of last year and the first quarter of 2019.

公开市场上的股票回购既取决于愿意买入的买家，也取决于愿意卖出的卖家。由于伯克希尔有两种股票类别，回购股票时应该有更多的灵活性。但考虑到这两种股票类别之间存在的流动性差异——过去五年中，平均每天有 313 股 A 类股票交易，约合 7700 万美元，而 B 类股票的平均交易量为 370 万股，约合 6.22 亿美元——伯克希尔在回购 B 类股票的机会可能会比回购 A 类股票更多，这正是我们在去年下半年和 2019 年第一季度所看到的情况。

While it might be more ideal for Berkshire to buy back Class A shares, allowing you to retire shares with far greater voting rights, given that there’s relatively little arbitrage between the two share classes and the number of Class B shares increase every year as you gift your Class A shares to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and your children’s foundations, can we assume that you’re likely to be a far greater repurchaser of Class B shares, going forward, especially given your recent comments to the Financial Times about preferring to have loyal individuals on your shareholder list, which a price tag of $328,000 of Class A shares seems to engender?

尽管伯克希尔回购A类股可能更理想，因为这将允许您注销拥有更多投票权的股份，但鉴于两类股份之间几乎没有套利空间，而且随着您每年将A类股赠与比尔和梅琳达·盖茨基金会以及您子女的基金会，B类股的数量逐年增加，我们是否可以假设未来您更有可能大量回购B类股？尤其是考虑到您最近在《金融时报》上的评论，您更希望股东名单上有忠诚的个人，而每股328,000美元的A类股价格似乎有助于实现这一目标？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we will - when we’re repurchasing shares, if we’re purchasing substantial amounts, we’re going to spend a lot more on the Class B than the Class A, just because the trading volume is considerably higher.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们会的——当我们回购股票时，如果我们购买大量股票，我们将花费更多在 B 类股票上，而不是 A 类股票，因为 B 类股票的交易量明显更高。

We may, from time to time — well, we got offered a couple blocks in history, going back in history from the Yoshi (PH) estate and when we had a transaction exchanging our Washington Post stock for both a television station and shares held — A shares — held by the Washington Post.

我们可能会在某些时候——历史上我们曾收到过一些股份的转让，比如来自Yoshi (PH)遗产的股份，以及当时我们与《华盛顿邮报》进行的交易，用我们的《华盛顿邮报》股票换取了一个电视台和《华盛顿邮报》持有的A类股份。

So, we may see some blocks of A. We may see some blocks of B. But there’s no question. If we are able to spend 25, 50, or a hundred billion dollars in repurchasing shares, more of the money is almost certainly going to be spent on the B than the A.

所以，我们可能会看到一些 A 的区块。我们可能会看到一些 B 的区块。但毫无疑问。如果我们能够花费 250 亿、500 亿或 1000 亿美元回购股票，几乎可以肯定更多的钱会花在 B 上，而不是 A 上。

There’s no master plan on that other than to buy aggressively when we like the price. And as I say, the trading volume in the B is just a lot higher than the A in dollar amounts. Charlie?

除了在我们喜欢价格时积极购买外，没有其他的总体计划。正如我所说，B 的交易量在美元金额上远高于 A。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we care much which class we buy.

查理·芒格：我认为我们并不太在乎我们买哪个类别。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

We would like — we really want the stock — ideally, if we could do it if we were small — once a year we’d have a price and, you know, we’d do it like a private company. And it would be a fair price and people who want to get out could get out. And if other people wanted to buy their interest, fine. And if they didn’t, and we thought the price was fair, we’d have the company repurchase it.

我们希望——我们真的想要这只股票——理想情况下，如果我们是小公司——每年一次我们会有一个价格，你知道，我们会像一家私人公司那样运作。这个价格会是公平的，想要退出的人可以退出。如果其他人想购买他们的股份，那很好。如果他们不想，而我们认为价格是公平的，我们会让公司回购。

We can’t do that. But that’s — we don’t want the stock to be either significantly underpriced or significantly overpriced. And we’re probably unique on the overpriced part of it. But we don’t want it.

我们不能那样做。但我们不希望股票的价格显著低于或显著高于其价值。我们在高估的部分可能是独一无二的。但我们不想要这样。

I do not want the stock selling at twice what’s it worth because I’m going to disappoint people, you know. I mean, we can’t make it — there’s no magic formula to make a stock worth what it’s selling for, if it sells for way too much.

我不想让股票以其价值的两倍出售，因为我会让人失望，你知道的。我的意思是，我们做不到——没有魔法公式可以让股票的价值与其售价相符，如果它的售价高得离谱。

From a commercial standpoint, if it’s selling very cheap, we have to like it when we repurchase it.

从商业角度来看，如果股票的价格非常便宜，我们回购时自然会很喜欢这样的机会。

But ideally, we would hope the stock would sell in a range that more or less is its intrinsic business value. We have no desire to hype it in any way. And we have no desire to depress it so we can repurchase it cheap. But the nature of markets is that things get overpriced and they get underpriced. And we will — if it’s underpriced, we’ll take advantage of it.

但理想情况下，我们希望股票的售价大致在其内在商业价值的范围内。我们没有任何炒作它的意图。我们也不想压低它的价格以便能够便宜回购。但市场的本质是，事物会被高估，也会被低估。如果它被低估，我们会利用这个机会。

16. We welcome change, but we won’t always adapt to it

我们欢迎变化，但我们并不总是会适应它。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，3 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett, (unintelligible). I am Terry (PH) from Shanghai (unintelligible), which aims to catch the best investment opportunities in that era.

观众成员：你好，查理·芒格和沃伦·巴菲特，（听不清）。我是来自上海的特里（音），我们的目标是在那个时代抓住最佳投资机会。

So, my question is, as we all know, 5G is coming. It is said that the mode of all industry will be challenged in 5G era. So, what is the core competence that we should master, if (unintelligible) wants to catch the best investment opportunities in this era? Thank you.

所以，我的问题是，众所周知，5G 即将到来。有人说，在 5G 时代，所有行业的模式都将面临挑战。那么，如果（无法理解）想要在这个时代抓住最佳投资机会，我们应该掌握什么核心竞争力呢？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s no core competence at the very top of Berkshire. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，伯克希尔的最高层没有核心竞争力。（笑声）

The subsidiaries that will be involved in developments relating to 5G, or any one of all kinds of things that are going to happen in this world, you know, the utility of LNG in the railroad, or all those kinds of questions, we have people in those businesses that know a lot more about them than we do.

将参与与 5G 相关发展的子公司，或者在这个世界上即将发生的各种事情，比如液化天然气在铁路中的应用，或者所有这些问题，我们在这些行业中有比我们更了解这些情况的人。

And we count on our managers to anticipate what is coming in their business. And sometimes they talk to us about it. But we do not run that on a centralized basis.

我们依靠我们的经理预测他们业务中即将发生的事情。有时他们会和我们谈论这些。但我们并不是以集中方式来管理这一切。

And Charlie, do you want to have anything to add to that?

查理，你想对此补充些什么吗？

Do you know anything about 5G I don’t know? Well, you probably know a lot about 5G.

你知道一些我不知道的 5G 吗？好吧，你可能对 5G 了解很多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I know very little about 5G.

查理·芒格：不，我对 5G 了解得很少。

But I do know a little about China. And we have bought things in China. And my guess is we’ll buy more. (Laughter)

但我对中国了解一点。我们在中国买过东西。我的猜测是我们会买更多。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But I mean, we basically want to have a group of managers, and we do have a group of managers, who are on top of their businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但我的意思是，我们基本上想要有一组经理，而我们确实有一组经理，他们对自己的业务了如指掌。

I mean, you saw something that showed BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy and Lubrizol all aware of that. Those people know their businesses. They know what changes are likely to be had.

我的意思是，你看到了一些显示 BNSF、伯克希尔哈撒韦能源和 Lubrizol 都对此有所了解的东西。那些人知道他们的业务。他们知道可能会发生什么变化。

Sometimes, they find things that they can cooperate on between their businesses. But we don’t try to run those from headquarters.

有时，他们会发现可以在各自的业务之间合作的事情。但我们不试图从总部来管理这些。

And that may mean — that may have certain weaknesses at certain times. I think, net, it’s been a terrific benefit for Berkshire.

这可能意味着——在某些时候可能会有一些弱点。我认为，总的来说，这对伯克希尔来说是一个巨大的好处。

Our managers, to a great degree, own their businesses. And we want them to feel a sense of ownership. We don’t want them to be lost in some massive conglomerate, where they get directions from this group, which is a subgroup of that group.

我们的经理在很大程度上拥有他们的业务。我们希望他们感受到一种归属感。我们不希望他们迷失在某个庞大的企业集团中，在那里他们从这个小组获得指示，而这个小组又是那个小组的一个子组。

And I could tell you a few horror stories from companies we bought, when they tell us about their experience under such an operation.

我可以给你讲几个我们收购的公司的恐怖故事，当他们告诉我们在这种运营下的经历时。

The world is going to change in dramatic ways. Just think how much it’s changed in the 54 years that we’ve had Berkshire. And some of those changes hurt us.

世界将以戏剧性的方式改变。想想在我们拥有伯克希尔的 54 年里，它变化了多少。其中一些变化对我们造成了伤害。

They hurt us in textiles. They hurt us in shoes. They hurt us in the department store business. Hurt us in the trading stamp business. These were the founding businesses of this operation. But we do adjust. And we’ve got a group, overall, of very good businesses.

他们在纺织品上伤害了我们。他们在鞋子上伤害了我们。他们在百货商店业务上伤害了我们。在交易印花业务上伤害了我们。这些都是这个运营的创始业务。但我们会调整。而且我们整体上有一组非常好的业务。

We’ve got some that will be, actually, destroyed by what happens in this world. But that’s — I still am the card-carrying capitalist. And I believe that that’s a good thing, but you have to make changes.

我们有一些企业可能会被当今世界的变化所摧毁。但即便如此，我依然是一个坚定的资本主义支持者。我相信这是件好事，但你必须适时做出改变。

We had 80 percent of the people working on farms in 1800. And if there hadn’t been a lot of changes, and you needed 80 percent of the people in the country producing the food and cotton we needed, we would have a whole different society.

在 1800 年，我们有 80%的人在农场工作。如果没有很多变化，而你需要 80%的人在这个国家生产我们所需的食物和棉花，我们的社会将会完全不同。

So, we welcome change. And we certainly want to have managers that can anticipate and adapt to it. But sometimes, we’ll be wrong. And those businesses will wither and die. And we’d better use the money someplace else. Charlie? OK, Carol.

所以，我们欢迎变化。我们当然希望有能够预见和适应变化的管理者。但有时，我们会犯错。那些企业将会枯萎和消亡。我们最好把钱用在其他地方。查理？好的，卡罗尔。

Charlie, you haven’t had any peanut brittle lately, you know. (Laughs)

查理，你最近没有吃过花生糖，知道吗？（笑）

17. Kraft Heinz is a good business, but we paid too much

卡夫亨氏是一家好公司，但我们支付的价格太高。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Vincent James of Munich, Germany. “There has been a lot written about the recent impairment charge at Kraft Heinz. You were quoted as stating that you recognize that Berkshire overpaid for Kraft Heinz. Clearly, major retail chains are being more aggressive in developing house brands.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自德国慕尼黑的文森特·詹姆斯。“关于卡夫亨氏最近的减值费用，有很多报道。你曾被引用说你承认伯克希尔为卡夫亨氏支付了过高的价格。显然，主要零售连锁店在发展自有品牌方面变得更加积极。

“In addition, Amazon has announced intentions to launch grocery outlets, being that, as Mr. Bezos has often stated, ‘Your margin is my opportunity.’ The more-fundamental question related to Kraft Heinz may be whether the advantages of the large brands and zero-based budgeting that 3G has applied are appropriate and defensible at all in consumer foods.

此外，亚马逊已宣布计划推出杂货店，因为正如贝索斯先生常说的，“你的利润就是我的机会。” 与卡夫亨氏相关的更根本性问题可能是，3G 所应用的大品牌优势和零基预算在消费食品领域是否适用且具有防御性。

“In other words, will traditional consumer good brands, in general, and Kraft Heinz, in particular, have any moat in their future? My question is, to what extent do the changing dynamics in the consumer food market change your view on the long-term potential for Kraft Heinz?”

换句话说，传统消费品品牌总体上，尤其是卡夫亨氏，未来是否会有任何护城河？我的问题是，消费者食品市场的动态变化在多大程度上改变了你对卡夫亨氏长期潜力的看法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, actually, what I said was, we paid too much for Heinz — I mean Kraft — I’m sorry — the Heinz part of the transaction, when we originally owned about half of Heinz, we paid an appropriate price there. And we actually did well. We had some preferred redeemed and so on.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上，我所说的是，我们为亨氏——我意思是卡夫——抱歉——交易的亨氏部分支付了太多。当我们最初拥有亨氏大约一半的股份时，我们支付了一个合适的价格。我们实际上做得很好。我们赎回了一些优先股等等。

We paid too much money for Kraft. To some extent, our own actions had driven up the prices.

我们为卡夫支付了太多的钱。在某种程度上，我们自己的行为推高了价格。

Now, Kraft Heinz, the profits of that business, 6 billion — we’ll say very, very, very roughly, I’m not making forecasts — but 6 billion pretax on 7 billion of tangible assets, is a wonderful business. But you can pay too much for a wonderful business.

现在，卡夫亨氏，这个业务的利润是 60 亿——我们可以非常非常粗略地说，我并不是在做预测——但在 70 亿的有形资产上，税前利润是 60 亿，这是一个很棒的业务。但你可以为一个很棒的业务支付过高的价格。

We bought See’s Candy. And we made a great purchase, as it turned out. And we could’ve paid more. But there’s some price at which we could’ve bought even See’s Candy, and it wouldn’t have worked. So, the business does not know how much you paid for it.

我们买下了 See's Candy。结果证明我们做了一个很好的购买。我们本可以支付更多。但有一个价格，如果我们以那个价格购买 See's Candy，那就行不通。因此，企业并不知道你为此支付了多少。

I mean, it’s going to earn based on its fundamentals. And we paid too much for the Kraft side of Kraft Heinz.

我的意思是，它将根据其基本面来赚钱。而我们为卡夫亨氏的卡夫部分支付了太多。

Additionally, the profitability has basically been improved in those operations over the way they were operating before.

此外，这些业务的盈利能力基本上得到了改善，与之前的运营方式相比。

But you’re quite correct that Amazon itself has become a brand. Kirkland, at Costco, is a $39 billion brand. All of Kraft Heinz is $26 billion. And it’s been around for — on the Heinz side — it’s been around for 150 years. And it’s been advertised — billions and billions and billions of dollars, in terms of their products. And they go through tens of thousands of outlets.

但你说得很对，亚马逊本身已经成为了一个品牌。好市多的柯克兰品牌价值 390 亿美元。整个卡夫亨氏的品牌价值为 260 亿美元。而在亨氏这一边，它已经存在了 150 年。它的产品广告投入达到了数十亿、数十亿、数十亿美元。它们通过成千上万的销售渠道进行销售。

And here’s somebody like Costco, establishes a brand called Kirkland. And it’s doing 39 billion, more than virtually any food company. And that brand moves from product to product, which is terrific, if a brand travels. I mean, Coca Cola moves it from Coke to Cherry Coke and Coke Zero and so on.

而这里有像好市多这样的公司，建立了一个名为 Kirkland 的品牌。它的销售额达到 390 亿美元，超过几乎所有食品公司。这个品牌在不同产品之间转移，这非常棒，如果一个品牌能够跨越产品。我是说，可口可乐从可乐到樱桃可乐和零度可乐等等。

But to have a brand that can really move — and Kirkland does more business than Coca Cola does. And Kirkland operates through 775 or so stores. They call them warehouses at Costco. And Coca Cola is through millions of distribution outlets.

但要拥有一个真正能推动的品牌——而柯克兰的业务比可口可乐还要多。柯克兰通过大约 775 家商店运营。他们在好市多称这些为仓库。而可口可乐则通过数百万个分销渠道运营。

So, brands — the retailer and the brands have always struggled as to who gets the upper hand in moving a product to the consumers.

所以，零售商和品牌之间一直在争夺谁在将产品推向消费者时占据主导地位。

And there’s no question, in my mind, that the position of the retailer, relative to the brands, which varies enormously around the world. In different countries, you’ve had 35 percent, even, maybe 40 percent, be private-label brands in soft drinks. And it’s never gotten anywhere close to that in the United States. So, it varies a lot.

在我看来，零售商相对于品牌的地位在全球范围内存在巨大差异。在不同的国家，软饮料的自有品牌占比甚至可以达到35%，甚至可能是40%。而在美国，这个比例从未接近过这么高。所以，这方面的情况差别很大。

But basically, retailers — certain retailers — the retail system — has gained some power. And particularly in the case of Amazon and Walmart and their reaction to it, and Costco — and Aldi and some others I can name — has gained in power relative to brands.

基本上，某些零售商——整个零售体系——已经获得了一些权力。尤其是像亚马逊和沃尔玛，以及它们的应对措施，Costco、Aldi，还有一些其他我可以提到的零售商，它们相对于品牌的权力有所增强。

Kraft Heinz is still doing very well, operationally. But we paid too much. If we paid 50 billion, you know, it would’ve been a different business. It’d still be earning the same amount.

卡夫亨氏的运营状况仍然很好。但我们支付的价格太高了。如果我们支付了 500 亿美元，你知道，那将是一个不同的业务。它仍然会赚取相同的金额。

You can turn any investment into a bad deal by paying too much. What you can’t do is turn any investment into a good deal by paying little, which is sort of how I started out in this world.

你可以通过支付过高的价格将任何投资变成一笔坏交易。但你无法通过支付很少的钱将任何投资变成一笔好交易，而这基本上是我在这个世界上开始的方式。

But the idea of buying the cigar butts that are declining or poor businesses for a bargain price is not something that we try to do anymore. We try to buy good businesses at a decent price. And we made a mistake on the Kraft part of Kraft Heinz. Charlie?

但是，购买那些正在衰退或表现不佳的企业的烟蒂以低价入手的想法，我们现在不再尝试了。我们努力以合理的价格购买优秀的企业。我们在卡夫亨氏的卡夫部分犯了一个错误。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it’s not a tragedy that, out of two transactions, one worked wonderfully, and the other didn’t work so well. That happens.

查理·芒格：嗯，从两个交易中，一个运作得很好，另一个运作得不太好，这并不是悲剧。这种情况是会发生的。

WARREN BUFFETT: The reduction of costs, you know — there can always be mistakes made, when you’ve got places, and you’re reorganizing them to do more business with the same number of people.

沃伦·巴菲特：降低成本时，总是可能会出现错误，特别是当你在某些地方进行重组，试图让相同数量的员工完成更多业务时。

And we like buying businesses that are efficient to start with. But the management — the operations — of Kraft Heinz have been improved over the present management overall. But we paid a very high price, in terms of the Kraft part. We paid an appropriate price, in terms of Heinz.

我们喜欢购买一开始就高效的企业。但卡夫亨氏的管理——运营——在现有管理层的整体表现上有所改善。但就卡夫部分而言，我们支付了非常高的价格。就亨氏而言，我们支付了一个合适的价格。

18. Internet competition for Berkshire’s furniture retailers

伯克希尔家具零售商的互联网竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Internet-based furniture retailers, like Wayfair, appear willing to stomach large current losses acquiring customers in the hope of converting them to loyal online shoppers.

乔纳森·布兰特：像 Wayfair 这样的互联网家具零售商似乎愿意忍受巨大的当前损失来获取客户，希望将他们转化为忠实的在线购物者。

I’ve been wondering what this disruptive competition might do to our earnings from home-furnishing retail operations like Nebraska Furniture Mart.

我一直在想这种颠覆性竞争可能对我们在家居零售业务（如内布拉斯加家具市场）的收益产生什么影响。

If we have to transition to more of an online model, might we have to spend more heavily to keep shoppers without a corresponding increase in sales? The sharp decline in first-quarter earnings from home furnishings suggest, perhaps, some widening impact from intensifying competition.

如果我们必须转向更多的在线模式，是否需要投入更多资金来留住购物者，而销售却没有相应的增长？家居用品第一季度收益的急剧下降或许表明，竞争加剧带来的影响正在扩大。

Do you believe Wayfair’s customers first, profits later model is unsustainable? Or do you think our furniture earnings will likely be permanently lower than they were in the past?

你认为 Wayfair 的“客户优先，利润其次”模式不可持续吗？还是你认为我们的家具收入可能会永久低于过去的水平？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think furnishings — the jury’s still out on that, whether the operations which have grown very rapidly in size but still are incurring losses, how they will do over time.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为家具行业——对此仍然没有定论，那些规模迅速增长但仍在亏损的业务，随着时间的推移它们会如何发展。

It is true that in the present market, partly because of some successes, like, most dramatically, Amazon, in the past, that investors are willing to look at losses as long as sales are increasing, and hope that there will be better days ahead.

确实，在当前市场上，部分原因是过去一些成功的案例，比如亚马逊，投资者愿意接受亏损，只要销售在增长，并希望未来会有更好的日子。

We do a quite significant percentage of our sales online in the furniture operation. That might surprise you. We do the highest percentage in Omaha.

我们在家具业务中在线销售的比例相当可观。这可能会让你感到惊讶。我们在奥马哈的比例最高。

And what’s interesting is that we — I won’t give you the exact numbers, but it’s large — we do a significant dollar volume, but a very significant portion of that volume, people come to the store to pick up, so that they will order something from us online, but they don’t seem to mind at all — and they don’t have to do it — but they get a pick up at the store.

有趣的是，我们——我不会给你确切的数字，但数量很大——我们的交易额相当可观，但其中很大一部分是人们来店里取货，他们会在网上向我们下单，但他们似乎一点也不介意——而且他们并不一定要这样做——但他们会在店里取货。

So, you know, you learn what customers like, just like people learned in fast food, you know, that people would buy a lot of food by going through a drive-in, that they don’t want to stop and go into the place. We learn about customer behavior as it unfolds.

所以，你知道，你会了解顾客喜欢什么，就像人们在快餐行业学到的那样，人们通过驾车自取会买很多食物，他们不想停下来走进店里。我们在顾客行为的发展中学习。

But we did do, now — on Tuesday, we did 9.2 million of — or 9.3 million of profitable volume at the Nebraska Furniture Mart. And I think that company had paid-in capital of $2,500. And I don’t think anything’s been added since. So, it’s working so far.

不过，我们确实取得了不错的成绩——在周二，内布拉斯加家具城的盈利销售额达到了920万或930万美元。而我记得这家公司最初的注资只有2,500美元，而且我认为之后没有再追加过任何资金。所以，到目前为止，这一模式运作良好。

The first quarter — It’s interesting — the first quarter was weak at all four of our furniture operations.

第一季度——有趣的是——我们四个家具业务的第一季度都很疲软。

But there are certain other parts of the economy — well, just home building, generally — it’s considerably below what you would’ve expected, considering the recovery we have had from the 2008-9 period. I mean, if you look at single-family home construction, the model has shifted more to people living in apartment rentals.

但经济中的其他某些部分——比如住宅建筑，整体上——远低于你对2008-2009年经济复苏后的预期。比如，单户住宅的建设数量减少，更多的人选择住在公寓租赁房中，模式已经发生了变化。

I think it’s gone from 69-and-a-fraction percent. It got down to 63 percent. It’s bounced up a little bit. But people are just not building — or moving to houses as rapidly as I would have guessed they would have, based on figures prior to 2008 and ’09, and considering the recovery we’ve had, and considering the fact that money is so cheap. And that has some effect on our furniture stores.

我认为它从 69%多一点降到了 63%。现在稍微回升了一些。但人们并没有像我根据 2008 年和 2009 年之前的数据以及考虑到我们所经历的复苏和资金如此便宜的事实所猜测的那样，迅速建造或搬入房屋。这对我们的家具店产生了一些影响。

But I think we’ve got a very good furniture operation, not only with the Nebraska Furniture Mart, but at other furniture operations. And we will see whether the models work over the long run.

但我认为我们的家具业务非常出色，不仅在内布拉斯加家具市场，还有其他家具业务。我们将看看这些模式在长期内是否有效。

But I think, you know, they have a reasonable chance. Some things people — we’re learning that people will buy some things that they’ve always gone to the mall or to a retail outlet to buy, that they will do it online. And others don’t work so well. Charlie?

但我认为，他们有合理的机会。有些东西人们——我们正在学习，人们会在线购买一些他们一直去商场或零售店购买的东西，而其他的则不太奏效。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think that we’ll do better than most furniture retailers.

查理·芒格：我认为我们会比大多数家具零售商做得更好。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that’s a certainty overall, overall. But we’ve got some good operations there.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为这总体上是一个确定的事情。但我们在那儿有一些好的业务。

But we don’t want to become a showroom for the online operations and have people come and look around the place and then order someplace else. So, we have to have the right prices. And we’re good at that at the Furniture Mart.

但我们不想成为在线业务的展示厅，让人们来这里参观，然后去别处下单。因此，我们必须有合适的价格。而我们在家具市场这方面做得很好。

19. Pension funds should avoid “alternative” investments

养老金基金应避免“另类”投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 4 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, my name is Brent Muio. I’m from Winnipeg, Canada.

观众成员：沃伦和查理，我的名字是布伦特·穆伊奥。我来自加拿大温尼伯。

First, thank you for devoting so much time and energy to education. I’m a better investor because of your efforts. But more important, I’m a better partner, friend, son, brother, and soon-to-be first-time father.

首先，感谢您为教育投入了如此多的时间和精力。因为您的努力，我成为了更好的投资者。但更重要的是，我成为了更好的伴侣、朋友、儿子、兄弟，以及即将第一次成为父亲。

There’s nothing more important than these relationships. And my life is better, because you’re willing to pass on your experience and wisdom.

这些关系没有什么比它们更重要。我的生活更美好，因为你愿意传递你的经验和智慧。

My path into finance was unconventional. I worked as an engineer for 12 years, while two years ago, I began a career in finance, working for the Civil Service Superannuation Board, a $7 billion public pension fund in Winnipeg.

我进入金融行业的道路并不寻常。我当了 12 年的工程师，直到两年前，我开始了金融职业，加入了温尼伯的公职退休金委员会，这是一个 70 亿美元的公共养老金基金。

I work on alternative investments, which include infrastructure, private equity, and private credit. I go to work every day knowing that I’m there to benefit the hardworking current and future beneficiaries of the fund.

我从事另类投资，包括基础设施、私募股权和私人信贷。我每天上班时都知道我在那里是为了惠及基金的辛勤工作者和未来受益人。

Like most asset classes, alternative purchase multiples have increased. More of these assets are funded with borrowed money. And the terms and covenants on this debt are essentially nonexistent.

像大多数资产类别一样，替代性资产的购买倍数也在增加。这些资产中更多是通过借款融资的。而这些债务的条款和契约基本上是不存在的，或非常宽松。

With this in mind and knowing the constraints of illiquid, closed-end funds, please give me your thoughts on private, alternative investments, the relevancy in public pension funds, and your view on long-term return expectations.

考虑到这一点，并了解流动性差的封闭式基金的限制，请告诉我您对私人替代投资的看法，这些投资在公共养老金中的相关性，以及您对长期回报预期的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if you leveraged up investments in just common stocks, and you’d figured a way so that you would have staying power, if there were any market dip, I mean, you’d obviously retain extraordinary returns.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，如果你在普通股票上加杠杆投资，并且想出了一种方法让你在市场下跌时仍然有持久的能力，显然你会获得非凡的回报。

I pointed out, in my investing lifetime, you know, if an index fund would do 11 percent, well, imagine how well you would’ve done if you’d leveraged that up 50 percent whatever the prevailing rates were over time.

我指出，在我的投资生涯中，你知道，如果一个指数基金能达到 11%的回报率，那么想象一下，如果你将其杠杆提高到 50%，无论当时的利率是多少，你会做得多么好。

So, a leveraged investment in a business is going to beat an unleveraged investment in a good business a good bit of the time. But as you point out, the covenants to protect debtholders have really deteriorated in the business. And of course, you’ve been in an upmarket for businesses. And you’ve got a period of low interest rates. So, it’s been a very good time for it.

因此，杠杆投资在许多情况下会胜过对一家好企业的不加杠杆的投资。但正如你指出的那样，保护债权人的契约在当前的商业环境中已经严重恶化。当然，企业正处于一个牛市时期，再加上低利率的环境，所以这段时间对杠杆投资来说是非常有利的。

My personal opinion is, if you take unleveraged returns against unleveraged common stocks, I do not think what is being purchased today and marketed today would work well.

我个人的看法是，如果你把无杠杆的回报与无杠杆的普通股进行比较，我认为今天购买和销售的那些资产表现不会太好。

But if you can borrow money, if you can buy assets that will yield 7 or 8 percent, you can borrow enough money at 4 percent or 5 percent, and you don’t have any covenants to meet, you’re going to have some bankruptcies. But you’re going to also have better results in many cases.

但如果你能够借钱，比如购买收益率为 7% 或 8% 的资产，并以 4% 或 5% 的利率借到足够的资金，而且没有任何契约要求，你确实会遇到一些破产的情况。但在许多情况下，你也会获得更好的结果。

It’s not something that interests us at all. We are not going to leverage up Berkshire. If we’d leveraged up Berkshire, we’d have made a whole lot more money, obviously, over the years.

这对我们来说一点都不感兴趣。我们不会加杠杆伯克希尔。如果我们加杠杆伯克希尔，显然这些年来我们会赚很多钱。

But both Charlie and I, probably, have seen some more high-IQ people — really extraordinarily high-IQ people — destroyed by leverage. We saw Long-Term Capital Management, where we had people who could do in their sleep math that we couldn’t do, at least I couldn’t do, you know, working full time at it during the day and, I mean, really, really smart people working with their own money and with years and years of experience of what they were doing.

但查理和我可能都见过一些更高智商的人——真的非常高智商的人——被杠杆摧毁。我们见过长期资本管理公司，那里的员工在睡觉时能做出我们无法做到的数学题，至少我在白天全职工作时做不到，真的，真的聪明的人用自己的钱，凭借多年的经验在做他们所做的事情。

And you know, it all turned to pumpkins and mice in 1998. And actually, it was a source of national concern, just a few hundred people. And then we saw some of those same people, after that happened to them once, go on and do the same thing again.

你知道，这一切在1998年突然变得一团糟。当时，这件事引起了全国的关注，尽管只涉及几百个人。而我们后来看到，其中一些人经历了一次这样的失败后，竟然又继续重复同样的事情。

So, I would not get excited about so-called alternative investments. You can get all kinds of different figures. But there may be — there’s probably at least a trillion dollars committed to buying, in effect, buying businesses. And if you figure they’re going to leverage them, you know, two for one on that, you may have 3 trillion of buying power trying to buy businesses in — well, the U.S. market may be something over 30 trillion now — but there’s all kinds of businesses that aren’t for sale and that thing.

因此，我不会对所谓的另类投资感到兴奋。你可以看到各种不同的数据，但实际上，至少有一万亿美元的资金承诺用于收购企业。而如果你考虑到他们会以二比一的杠杆来操作，那么可能有三万亿美元的购买力试图购买企业。而美国市场可能现在超过了30万亿美元，但有各种各样的企业并不出售等情况存在。

So, the supply-demand situation for buying businesses privately and leveraging them up has changed dramatically from what it was ten or 20 years ago.

因此，私募资金收购企业并对其加杠杆的供需状况与十或二十年前相比已经发生了巨大变化。

And I’m sure it doesn’t happen with your Winnipeg operation, but we have seen a number of proposals from private equity funds, where the returns are really not calculated in a manner than — well, they’re not calculated in a manner that I would regard as honest.

我相信在你们的温尼伯业务中不会发生这种情况，但我们确实看到了一些来自私募股权基金的提案，其中的回报计算方式真的不够诚实。

And so I — it’s not something — if I were running a pension fund, I would be very careful about what was being offered to me.

所以我——这不是一件——如果我在管理一个养老基金，我会非常小心所提供给我的东西。

If you have a choice in Wall Street between being a great analyst or being a great salesperson, salesperson is the way to make it.

如果你在华尔街有选择，成为一名优秀的分析师或优秀的销售员，销售员是成功的途径。

If you can raise $10 billion in a fund, and you get a 1 1/2 percent fee, and you lock people up for ten years, you know, you and your children and your grandchildren will never have to do a thing, if you are the dumbest investor in the world. But —

如果你能筹集到 100 亿美元的基金，并且你收取 1.5%的费用，并且你把人们锁定十年，你知道，你和你的孩子以及你的孙子孙女将永远不需要做任何事情，即使你是世界上最愚蠢的投资者。但是——

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think what we’re doing will work more safely than what he’s doing. And — but I wish him well.

查理·芒格：我认为我们所做的会比他所做的更安全。不过，我祝他一切顺利。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Brent, you sound — actually, you sound like a guy that I would hope would be working for a public pension fund. Because frankly, most of the institutional funds, you know — well, we had this terrible — right here in Omaha — you can get a story of what happened with our Omaha Public Schools’ retirement fund. And they were doing fine until the manager started going in a different direction. And the trustees here — perfectly decent people — and the manager had done OK to that point, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，布伦特，你听起来——实际上，你听起来像是我希望能为公共养老金基金工作的人。因为坦率地说，大多数机构基金，你知道——好吧，我们在奥马哈这里发生了这件可怕的事情——你可以听到我们奥马哈公立学校退休基金发生的故事。他们一直做得很好，直到经理开始走上不同的方向。而这里的受托人——都是非常正派的人——而且到那时经理的表现也还不错，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but they are smarter in Winnipeg than they are here.

查理·芒格：是的，但他们在Winnipeg比这里聪明。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。好吧——（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: That was pretty bad here.

查理·芒格：这里真糟糕。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a fair fight, actually, usually, when a bunch of public officials are listening to people who are motivated to really just get paid for raising the money. Everything else is gravy after that.

沃伦·巴菲特：实际上，这并不是一场公平的斗争，通常情况下，当一群公职人员在听那些只是为了筹集资金而获得报酬的人时，其他一切都是附带的好处。

But if you run a fund, and you get even 1 percent of a billion, you’re getting $10 million a year coming in. And if you’ve got the money locked up for a long time, it’s a very one-sided deal.

但是如果你经营一个基金，得到十亿的 1%，你每年就能获得 1000 万美元的收入。如果你的资金被锁定很长时间，这就是一个非常不对等的交易。

And you know, I’ve told the story of asking the guy one time, in the past, “How in the world can you — why in the world can you ask for 2-and-20 when you really haven’t got any kind of evidence that you are going to do better with the money than you do in an index fund?” And he said, “Well, that’s because I can’t get 3-and-30,” you know. (Laughter)

你知道，我曾经问过一个人，“你怎么能——为什么你能要求 2 和 20 的费用，而你实际上没有任何证据表明你能比指数基金更好地使用这笔钱？”他回答说，“那是因为我不能得到 3 和 30 的费用。”（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: What I don’t like about a lot of the pension fund investments is I think they like it because they don’t have to mark it down as much as it should be in the middle of the panics. I think that’s a silly reason to buy something. Because you’re given leniency in marking it down.

查理·芒格：我不喜欢很多养老金投资的原因是，我认为他们之所以喜欢这些投资，是因为在市场恐慌时，他们不需要按应有的幅度下调其估值。我认为这是一个愚蠢的买入理由，仅仅因为在估值下调上有宽松的规定。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And when you commit the money — in the case of private equity often — you — they don’t take the money, but you pay a fee on the money that you’ve committed.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。而且当你承诺资金时——尤其在私募股权的情况下——他们并不马上取走资金，但你仍需为已承诺的资金支付费用。

And of course, you really have to have that money to come up with at any time. And of course, it makes their return look better, if you sit there for a long time in Treasury bills, which you have to hold, because they can call you up and demand the money, and they don’t count that.

当然，你真的必须随时准备好那笔钱。当然，如果你在国库券中待很长时间，这会让他们的回报看起来更好，因为你必须持有这些国库券，因为他们可以随时打电话给你并要求还钱，而这并不算在内。

They count it in terms of getting a fee on it. But they don’t count it in terms of what the so-called internal rate of return is. It’s not as good as it looks. And I really do think that when you have a group sitting as a state pension fund —

他们按获取费用来计算，但并不将其计入所谓的内部收益率（IRR）中。所以它的表现并没有看起来那么好。而且我确实认为，当一群人负责管理州养老金时——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, all they’re doing is lying a little bit to make the money come in.

查理·芒格：沃伦，他们所做的只是撒一点谎来让钱进来。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, well, that sums it up. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。是的，这就是总结。（笑声）

20. Amazon buy doesn’t mean portfolio managers aren’t “value” investors

亚马逊的购买并不意味着投资组合经理不是“价值”投资者。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question is from Ken Skarbeck in Indianapolis. He says, “With the full understanding that Warren had no input on the Amazon purchase, and that, relative to Berkshire, it’s likely a small stake, the investment still caught me off guard.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自印第安纳波利斯的肯·斯卡贝克。他说：“在完全理解沃伦对亚马逊的投资没有任何参与的情况下，考虑到相对于伯克希尔来说，这可能只是一个小额投资，但这个投资仍然让我感到意外。"

“I’m wondering if I should begin to think differently about Berkshire looking out, say, 20 years. Might we be seeing a shift in investment philosophy away from value-investing principles that the current management has practiced for 70 years?

我在想，是否应该开始以不同的方式看待伯克希尔，展望未来，比如 20 年。我们是否会看到投资理念的转变，远离当前管理层已经实践了 70 年的价值投资原则？

“Amazon is a great company. Yet, it would seem its heady shares ten years into a bull market appear to conflict with being fearful when others are greedy. Considering this and other recent investments, like StoneCo, should we be preparing for change in the price-versus-value decisions that built Berkshire?”

亚马逊是一家伟大的公司。然而，似乎在牛市十年后，其高昂的股价与“他人贪婪时要恐惧”的理念相悖。考虑到这一点以及其他最近的投资，比如 StoneCo，我们是否应该为构建伯克希尔的价格与价值决策的变化做好准备？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s interesting that the term “value investing” came up. Because I can assure you that both managers who — and one of them bought some Amazon stock in the last quarter, which will get reported in another week or ten days — he is a value investor.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。提到“价值投资”这个词很有意思。因为我可以向你保证，那两位经理——其中一位在上个季度购买了一些亚马逊股票，这将在一周或十天后报告——他是一位价值投资者。

The idea that value is somehow connected to book value or low price/earnings ratios or anything — as Charlie has said, all investing is value investing. I mean, you’re putting out some money now to get more later on. And you’re making a calculation as to the probabilities of getting that money and when you’ll get it and what interest rates will be in between.

价值与账面价值或低市盈率等任何事物之间存在某种联系的想法——正如查理所说，所有投资都是价值投资。我的意思是，你现在投入一些资金，以便将来获得更多。你在计算获得这笔钱的概率，以及你何时能获得它，以及在此期间的利率会是多少。

And all the same calculation goes into it, whether you’re buying some bank at 70 percent of book value, or you’re buying Amazon at some very high multiple of reported earnings.

无论你是以账面价值的 70%购买某家银行，还是以非常高的市盈率购买亚马逊，所有的计算都是一样的。

Amazon — the people making the decision on Amazon are absolutely as much value investors as I was when I was looking around for all these things selling below working capital, years ago. So, that has not changed.

亚马逊——在亚马逊做出决策的人绝对和我当年寻找所有这些低于营运资本的东西时一样，都是价值投资者。所以，这一点没有改变。

The two people — one of whom made the investment in Amazon — they are looking at many hundreds of securities. And they can look at more than I can, because they’re managing less money. And their universe — possible universes — is greater.

这两个人——其中一个投资了亚马逊——他们正在查看数百种证券。他们可以查看的证券比我多，因为他们管理的资金较少。他们的投资范围——可能的投资范围——更广。

But they are looking for things that they feel they understand what will be developed by that business between now and Judgement Day, in cash.

但他们正在寻找他们认为能够理解的事情，这些事情将在现在和审判日之间由该企业发展，以现金形式。

And it’s not — current sales can make some difference. Current profit margins can make some difference. Tangible assets, excess cash, excess debt, all of those things go into making a calculation as to whether they should buy A versus B versus C.

而且当前的销售额可能会有所不同。当前的利润率也可能会有所不同。有形资产、过剩现金、过剩债务，这些因素都在计算他们应该购买 A、B 还是 C 时发挥作用。

And they are absolutely following value principles. They don’t necessarily agree with each other or agree with me. But they are very smart. They are totally committed to Berkshire. And they’re very good human beings, on top of it.

他们绝对遵循价值原则。他们不一定彼此同意或同意我的看法。但他们非常聪明。他们完全致力于伯克希尔。而且，他们还是非常优秀的人。

So, I don’t second guess them on anything. Charlie doesn’t second guess me. In 60 years, he’s never second guessed me on an investment.

所以，我对他们的任何事情都不再猜测。查理也从不对我产生怀疑。在过去的 60 年里，他从未对我的投资产生过怀疑。

And the considerations are identical when you buy Amazon versus some, say, bank stock that looks cheap, statistically, against book value or earnings or something of the sort.

当你购买亚马逊股票与某些看起来便宜的银行股票（从账面价值或收益等统计角度来看）时，考虑因素是相同的。

In the end, it all goes back to Aesop, who, in 600 B.C., said, you know, that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

最后，这一切都回到了伊索，他在公元前 600 年说过，你知道，手中的鸟胜过林中的两只。

And when we buy Amazon, we try and figure out whether the — the fellow that bought it — tries to figure out whether there’s three or four or five in the bush and how long it’ll take to get to the bush, how certain he is that he’s going to get to the bush, you know, and then who else is going to come and try and take the bush away and all of that sort of thing. And we do the same thing.

当我们收购亚马逊时，我们会试图弄清楚——买下它的那个人——试图弄清楚灌木丛中是否有三、四或五个，以及到达灌木丛需要多长时间，他有多大的把握能到达灌木丛，你知道的，然后还有谁会来试图把灌木丛夺走，诸如此类的事情。我们也会这样做。

And it really, despite a lot of equations you learn in business school, the basic equation is that of Aesop. And your success in investing depends on how well you were able to figure out how certain that bush is, how far away it is, and what the worst case is, instead of two birds being there, and only one being there, and the possibilities of four or five or ten or 20 being there.

而实际上，尽管你在商学院学到了很多方程式，但基本的方程式是伊索的故事。你在投资中的成功取决于你能多好地判断那丛灌木的确定性、距离有多远，以及最坏的情况是什么，而不是仅仅考虑那里的两只鸟、只有一只鸟，以及可能有四只、五只、十只或二十只鸟的情况。

And that will guide me. That will guide my successors in investment management at Berkshire. And I think they’ll be right more often than they’re wrong. Charlie?

这将指引我。这将指引我在伯克希尔的投资管理继任者。我认为他们的判断正确的次数会多于错误。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well I — Warren and I are a little older than some people, and —

查理·芒格：嗯，我和沃伦比一些人年纪大一点，和——

WARREN BUFFETT: Damn near everybody. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：几乎所有人。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we’re not the most flexible, probably, in the whole world. And of course, if something as extreme as this internet development happens, and you don’t catch it, why, other people are going to blow by you.

查理·芒格：我们可能不是全世界最灵活的。当然，如果像这样的互联网发展发生，而你没有抓住机会，其他人就会超过你。

And I don’t mind not having caught Amazon early. The guy is kind of a miracle worker. It’s very peculiar. I give myself a pass on that.

我不介意没有早早投资亚马逊。这个家伙有点像奇迹工作者。这非常奇特。我对自己在这方面放过一马。

But I feel like a horse’s ass for not identifying Google better. I think Warren feels the same way.

但我为没有更早识别出谷歌而感到像个傻瓜。我想沃伦也有同样的感觉。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: We screwed up.

查理·芒格：我们搞砸了。

WARREN BUFFETT: He’s saying we blew it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：他说我们搞砸了。（笑声）

And we did have some insights into that, because we were using them at GEICO, and we were seeing the results produced. And we saw that we were paying $10 a click, or whatever it might’ve been, for something that had a marginal cost to them of exactly zero. And we saw it was working for us. So —

我们对此有一些见解，因为我们在 GEICO 使用它们，并看到了产生的结果。我们发现我们为每次点击支付 10 美元，或者可能是其他费用，而他们的边际成本恰好为零。我们看到这对我们有效。所以——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We could see in our own operations how well that Google advertising was working. And we just sat there sucking our thumbs. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我们可以看到自己运营中谷歌广告的效果有多好。我们就在那里无所事事。（笑声）

So, we’re ashamed. We’re trying to atone. (Laughter)

所以，我们感到羞愧。我们在努力赎罪。（笑声）

Maybe Apple was atonement. (Laughter)

也许苹果是赎罪的象征。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: When he says, “Sucking our thumbs,” I’m just glad he didn’t use some other example. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：当他说“吮吸拇指”时，我很高兴他没有用其他例子。（笑声）

21. Buffett: Berkshire insurance businesses are worth more than you think

21. 巴菲特：伯克希尔的保险业务价值超出你的想象

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊？

JAY GELB: This question is on Berkshire’s intrinsic value. Warren, in your most-recent annual letter, you discussed a methodology to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. However, a major component of Berkshire’s value that many investors find challenging to estimate is that of the company’s vast and unique insurance business.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于伯克希尔的内在价值。沃伦，在你最近的年度信中，你讨论了一种估算伯克希尔内在价值的方法。然而，许多投资者发现难以估算的伯克希尔价值的一个主要组成部分是公司的庞大而独特的保险业务。

Could you discuss how you value the company’s insurance unit, based on information Berkshire provides, especially since GAAP book value is not disclosed, of the insurance unit?

您能否讨论一下您如何评估公司保险部门的价值，基于伯克希尔提供的信息，特别是因为保险部门的 GAAP 账面价值未披露？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, our insurance business gives us a float that’s other people’s money, which we’re temporarily holding, but which gets regenerated all the time, so as a practical matter, it has a very, very long life. And it’s probably a little more likely to grow than shrink.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们的保险业务为我们提供了一种浮动资金，这些是别人的钱，我们暂时持有，但这些资金会不断再生，因此在实际操作中，它的生命周期非常非常长。而且它可能更有可能增长而不是缩小。

So, we have $124 billion that people have given us. And that’s somewhat like having a bank that just consists of one guy. And people come in and deposit $124 billion and promise not to withdraw it forever.

所以，我们有 1240 亿美元是人们给我们的。这有点像拥有一家只由一个人组成的银行。人们进来存入 1240 亿美元，并承诺永远不取出。

And we’ve got a very good insurance business. It’s taken a very long time to develop it, very long time. In fact, I think we probably have the best property-casualty operation, all things considered, in the world, that I know of, of any size. So, it’s worth a lot of money.

我们有一个非常好的保险业务。发展这个业务花了很长时间，真的很长时间。事实上，我认为在我所知道的任何规模的情况下，我们可能拥有世界上最好的财产意外险业务。因此，这个业务价值很高。

It’s probably — we think it’s worth more to us, and we particularly think it’s worth more while lodged inside Berkshire. We’d have a very, very high value on that. I don’t want to give you an exact number, because I don’t know the exact number. And any number I would have given you in the past would’ve turned out to be wrong, on the low side.

这可能是——我们认为对我们来说更有价值，特别是我们认为它在伯克希尔内部时更有价值。我们会对其赋予非常非常高的价值。我不想给你一个确切的数字，因为我不知道确切的数字。过去我给你的任何数字都可能是错误的，偏低。

We have managed to earn money on money that was given to us for nothing and have (inaudible) earnings from underwriting and then have these large earnings from investing. And it’s an integral part of Berkshire.

我们成功地在那些白白给我们的资金上赚到了钱，并且从承销中获得了（听不清）收益，然后又从投资中获得了大量收益。这是伯克希尔不可或缺的一部分。

There’s a certain irony to insurance that most people don’t think about. But if you really are prepared, and you have a diversified property-casualty insurance business — a lot of property business in it — if you’re really prepared to pay your claims under any circumstances that come along in the next hundred years, you have to have so much capital in the business that it’s not a very good business.

保险有一种人们通常不太考虑的讽刺。但如果你真的做好了准备，并且拥有一个多元化的财产意外保险业务——其中有很多财产业务——如果你真的准备在未来一百年内应对任何情况支付索赔，你必须在业务中拥有如此多的资本，以至于这并不是一个很好的生意。

And if you really think about a worst-case situation, the reinsurance — that’s insurance you buy from other people, as an insurance company, to protect you against the extreme losses, among other things — that reinsurance probably — could likely be — not good at all.

如果你真的考虑最坏的情况，再保险——这是你作为保险公司从其他人那里购买的保险，以保护你免受极端损失等——这种再保险可能——很可能——根本不好。

So, even though you’d think you’re laying off part of the risk, if you really take the worst-case examples, you may well not be laying off the risk. And if you keep the capital required to protect against that worst-case example, you’ll have so much capital in the business that it isn’t worthwhile.

所以，尽管你可能认为自己是在分散部分风险，但如果你真的考虑到最糟糕的情况，你可能并没有真正分散风险。而且，如果你为防范最糟糕的情况而保留足够的资本，那么你在业务中需要投入的资本会如此之多，以至于这项业务不再值得继续。

Berkshire is really the ideal form for writing the business. Because we have this massive amount of assets that, in many cases, are largely uncorrelated with natural disasters. And we can — we don’t need to buy reinsurance from anybody else. And we can use the money in a more efficient way than most insurance companies.

伯克希尔确实是承保这类业务的理想形式。因为我们拥有大量资产，这些资产在很多情况下与自然灾害基本没有关联。而且我们不需要向其他公司购买再保险，我们可以比大多数保险公司更高效地使用这些资金。

It’s interesting. The three — In the last 30 years, the three largest reinsurance companies — and I’m counting Lloyd’s as one company — although it isn’t — it’s a group of brokers assembled in — underwriters assembled at a given location. But people think of Lloyd’s as a massive reinsurance market, which it is, not technically one entity. But if you take the three largest companies — and they’re all in fine shape now, they’re first-class operations — but all three of them came close to extinction sometime in the last 30 years, or reasonably close.

这很有趣。在过去的 30 年里，三家最大的再保险公司——我把劳埃德算作一家公司——尽管它不是——它是一个在特定地点聚集的经纪人和承保人的团体。但人们认为劳埃德是一个庞大的再保险市场，确实如此，但从技术上讲并不是一个实体。不过，如果你考虑这三家最大的公司——它们现在都状况良好，都是一流的运营——但在过去的 30 年里，这三家公司都曾接近灭绝，或者说相当接近。

And we didn’t really have any truly extraordinary natural catastrophes. The worst we had was Katrina in, whatever it was, 2006 or thereabouts, 2005. But we didn’t have any worst-case situation. And all three of those companies, which everybody looks at as totally good on the asset side, if you show a recoverable from them, two of the three actually made some deals with us to help them in some way. And they’re all in fine shape now.

我们实际上并没有经历过真正特别严重的自然灾害。最糟糕的是卡特里娜飓风，大概是在2005年或2006年左右。但我们没有遇到过最糟糕的情况。那三家公司中的每一家，大家都认为它们在资产方面表现非常好，但如果你与它们有可收回的债务，其中两家公司实际上与我们达成了一些协议，以某种方式帮助它们。现在它们的状况都很好。

But it’s really not a good business if you keep your — as a standalone insurer — if you keep enough capital to really be sure you can pay anything that comes along, under any kind of conditions.

但作为一个独立的保险公司来说，如果你保持足够的资本来确保能够应对任何情况下的所有赔付，那么这实际上并不是一个好的业务模式。

And Berkshire can do that. And it can use the money in ways that it likes to use.

而伯克希尔可以做到这一点。它可以以自己喜欢的方式使用这些资金。

So, it’s a very valuable asset. I don’t want to give you a figure on it. But we would not sell it. We certainly wouldn’t want to sell it for its float value. And that float is shown on the balance sheet as a liability. So, it’s extraordinary.

所以，这是一项非常有价值的资产。我不想给你一个具体的数字。但我们不会出售它。我们当然不想以其浮动价值出售它。而这个浮动在资产负债表上被列为负债。所以，这非常特别。

And it’s taken a long time to build. It’d be very, very, very hard for anybody to — I don’t think they could build anything like it. It just takes so long.

这花了很长时间来建立。对任何人来说，想要建造类似的东西将会非常非常非常困难。我认为他们无法建造出这样的东西。这确实需要很长时间。

And we continue to plow new ground. If you went in the next room, you would’ve seen something called “THREE,” which is our movement toward small and medium business owners for commercial insurance. And there’s an online operation.

我们继续开辟新天地。如果你走进隔壁房间，你会看到一个叫“THREE”的东西，这是我们向中小企业主提供商业保险的举措。还有一个在线操作。

And it will take all kind — we’ll do all kinds of mid-course adjusting and that sort of thing — and we’ve only just started up in four states.

这将需要各种方式——我们会进行各种中途调整之类的——而且我们才刚在四个州开始。

But we’ll, you know — ten or 20 years from now, that will be a significant asset of Berkshire, just like Geico has grown from two and a fraction billion of premium to, you know, who knows, but well into the mid-30 billion, just with Tony Nicely. And when I said, in the annual report, that Tony Nicely, who’s here today —

但我们知道——十年或二十年后，这将成为伯克希尔的重要资产，就像盖可保险从二十多亿的保费增长到，谁知道，但肯定超过三百亿，这都是托尼·尼克利的功劳。当我在年报中提到托尼·尼克利时，他今天在这里——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, is there anybody in the world who has a big casualty insurance business that you’d trade our business for theirs?

查理·芒格：沃伦，世界上有没有哪家大的财产保险公司，你愿意用我们的业务去换他们的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, oh, no, it’s taken a long time. And it’s taken some tremendous people. And Tony Nicely has created more than 50 billion — with his associates, and he’s got 39,000 of them, probably more now, because he’s growing this year — he’s created more than $50 billion at GEICO — of value — for Berkshire. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，哦，不，这花了很长时间。而且需要一些了不起的人。托尼·尼克利和他的同事们创造了超过 500 亿美元的价值——他有 39000 个同事，现在可能更多，因为他今年在增长——他在 GEICO 为伯克希尔创造了超过 500 亿美元的价值。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s pretty much what you’d expect. It’s such an easy business, taking in money now in cash and just keeping the books and giving a little of it back.

查理·芒格：基本上就是你会预料到的情况。这是一个非常简单的业务，现在收取现金，保持账目整洁，并返还一小部分资金。

There’s a lot of stupidity that gets into it. And if you’re not way better than average at it, you’re going to lose money in the end. It’s a mediocre business for most people. And it’s good at Berkshire only because we’re a lot better at it. And if we ever stop being a lot better at it, it wouldn’t be safe for us, either.

这其中有很多愚蠢的因素。如果你没有比平均水平好得多，你最终会亏钱。对大多数人来说，这是一项平庸的生意。之所以在伯克希尔表现良好，是因为我们在这方面远远优于他人。如果我们不再在这方面远远优于他人，那对我们来说也不会安全。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Ajit Jain has done a similar thing. He’s done it in a variety of ways within the insurance business. But I would not want to undo — somebody would have to give me more than $50 billion to undo everything he has produced for Berkshire.

沃伦·巴菲特：Ajit Jain 也做了类似的事情，他在保险业务中通过各种方式实现了这一点。但要让我放弃他为伯克希尔创造的一切，别人得给我超过 500 亿美元才行。

And he walked into my office on a Saturday in the mid-1980s. He’d never been in the insurance business before. And I don’t think there’s anybody in the insurance world that doesn’t wish that he’d walked into their office instead of ours, at Berkshire. It’s been extraordinary. It’s truly been extraordinary.

他在 1980 年代中期的一个星期六走进了我的办公室。他之前从未涉足保险行业。我认为在保险界没有人不希望他走进他们的办公室，而不是走进我们在伯克希尔的办公室。这真是非凡的经历。确实是非凡的。

But we have Tom Nerney. We have Tim Kenesey at MedPro. We have Tom Nerney at U.S. Lability.

但我们还有汤姆·纳尼（Tom Nerney）。我们在MedPro有蒂姆·肯尼西（Tim Kenesey），在U.S. Liability有汤姆·纳尼（Tom Nerney）。

We have — at GUARD Insurance — we only bought that a few years ago, and that’s a terrific operation. It’s based in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Who would expect to find a great insurance operation in Wilkes-Barre?

我们在 GUARD 保险公司——我们几年前才收购了它，这是一家很棒的公司。它位于宾夕法尼亚州的威尔克斯-巴里。谁会想到在威尔克斯-巴里会找到一家优秀的保险公司呢？

But we’ve got a great insurance — really great — insurance operation right here in Omaha, about two miles from here. And it was bought by us in 1967. And you know, it changed Berkshire. We built on that base.

但我们在奥马哈这里有一个很棒的保险业务——真的很棒——距离这里大约两英里。它是我们在 1967 年收购的。你知道，它改变了伯克希尔。我们在这个基础上发展。

We’ve got a — we really got a great insurance business. And I won’t give you a number, but it’s probably a bigger number than you’ve got in your head for — and it’s worth more within Berkshire than it would be worth as an independent operation.

我们有一个——我们真的有一个很棒的保险业务。我不会给你一个具体的数字，但它可能比你心中想的数字要大——在伯克希尔，它的价值比作为独立运营时要高得多。

Somebody can say, “Well, this little gem, if it was put out there, would sell at a higher multiple,” or something of the sort. It works much better as being part of a whole, where we have had two tiny operations — two tiny insurance operations — many, many years ago. And they both went broke. The underwriting was bad. But we paid all the claims. We did not walk away. We paid every dime of claims.

有人可能会说：“好吧，这个小宝石，如果放出去，会以更高的倍数出售，”或者类似的话。作为整体的一部分，它的效果要好得多，我们曾经有过两个小型业务——两家小型保险公司——很多年前。它们都破产了。承保情况很糟糕。但我们支付了所有的索赔。我们没有逃避。我们支付了每一分钱的索赔。

And nobody worries about doing any kind of financial transaction with Berkshire. And you know that today — on Saturday — about 9 in the morning, I got a phone call. And we made a deal the next day committing Berkshire to pay out $10 billion, come hell or high water, no outs for, you know, material adverse change or anything like that. And people know we’ll be there with $10 billion.

没有人担心与伯克希尔进行任何形式的金融交易。你知道，今天——星期六——早上 9 点左右，我接到了一个电话。我们在第二天达成了一项协议，承诺伯克希尔无论如何都将支付 100 亿美元，没有任何关于重大不利变化的退出条款。人们知道我们会提供 100 亿美元。

And they know, in the insurance business, when we write a policy that may come — be payable during the worst catastrophe in history, or may be payable 50 years from now, they know Berkshire will pay. And that’s why we’ve got $124 billion of float.

他们知道，在保险业务中，无论我们承保的保单是在历史上最严重的灾难期间赔付，还是在50年后赔付，他们都知道伯克希尔会支付。这也是为什么我们拥有1240亿美元浮存金的原因。

22. “Don’t go overboard on delayed gratification”

“不要过度追求延迟满足”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第五站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey, Warren and Charlie. I’m Neel Noronha. I’m 13 years old and from San Francisco.

观众成员：嘿，沃伦和查理。我是尼尔·诺朗哈。我 13 岁，来自旧金山。

I feel like I see you in our living room a lot. My dad is constantly playing these videos of you at these meetings. And he teaches me a lot of lessons about you guys. But many of them require the delayed gratification skill. (Laughter)

我觉得我在我们的客厅里经常看到你。我的爸爸总是在播放你们在这些会议上的视频。他教了我很多关于你们的课程。但其中许多课程需要延迟满足的技能。（笑声）

I want to know, is there any way that kids can develop the delayed gratification skill? (Laughter and applause)

我想知道，孩子们有没有办法培养延迟满足的能力？（笑声和掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll take it, if you want me to, Warren.

查理·芒格：沃伦，如果你愿意让我接着说，我很乐意。

WARREN BUFFETT: Go to it.

沃伦·巴菲特：去吧。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll take that, because I’m a specialist in delayed gratification. I’ve had a lot of time to delay it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我会接受这个，因为我是延迟满足的专家。我有很多时间来延迟满足。（笑声）

And my answer is that they sort of come out of the womb with the delayed gratification thing, or they come out of the womb where they have to have everything right now. And I’ve never been able to change them at all. So, we identify it. We don’t train it in.

我的回答是，他们要么是天生就有延迟满足的能力，要么是天生就想要立刻得到一切。我从来没有能够改变他们。因此，我们识别出这一点，但不进行训练。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie’s had eight children, so he’s become more and more of a believer in nature versus nurture. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：查理有八个孩子，所以他越来越相信天性与教养的关系。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: You’ll probably see some nice, old woman of about 95 out there, in threadbare clothing. And she’s delaying gratification right to the end and probably has 4,000 A shares. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你可能会看到一个大约 95 岁的可怜的老太太，穿着破旧的衣服。她一直在延迟满足，直到最后，可能还有 4000 股 A 类股票。（笑声）

It’s just these second- and third-generation types that are buying all the jewelry.

都是这些二代和三代的人在买所有的珠宝。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s interesting. If you think about — we’ll take it to a broader point. But if you think of a 30-year government bond paying 3 percent, and you allow for, as an individual, paying some taxes on the 3 percent you’ll receive, and you’ll have the Federal Reserve Board saying that their objective is to have 2 percent inflation, you’ll really see that delayed gratification, if you own a long government bond, is that, you know, you get to go to Disneyland and ride the same number of rides 30 years from now that you would if you did it now.

沃伦·巴菲特：这很有意思。如果你想想看——我们可以把它延伸到一个更广泛的层面。如果你持有一张30年期的政府债券，利率为3%，再考虑到你作为个人需要为这3%的收益缴纳一些税款，同时美联储表示他们的目标是维持2%的通货膨胀率，那么你会发现，如果你持有这张长期政府债券，推迟消费的结果就是30年后你去迪士尼时，能玩的项目数量和现在是一样的。

The low interest rates, for people who invest in fixed-dollar investments, really mean that you really aren’t going to eat steak later on if you eat hamburgers now, which is what I used to preach to my wife and children and anybody else that would listen, many years ago. (Laughs)

低利率对于那些投资于固定美元投资的人来说，实际上意味着如果你现在吃汉堡，以后真的不会吃上牛排，这就是我多年前对我的妻子、孩子和任何愿意倾听的人所宣讲的。（笑）

So, it’s — I don’t necessarily think that, for all families, in all circumstances, that saving money is necessarily the best thing to do in life. I mean, you know, if you really tell your kids they can —whatever it may be — they never go to the movies, or we’ll never go to Disneyland or something of the sort, because if I save this money, 30 years from now, you know, well, we’ll be able to stay a week instead of two days.

所以，我并不认为对于所有家庭，在所有情况下，省钱一定是生活中最好的选择。我的意思是，如果你真的告诉你的孩子们，他们永远不能去看电影，或者我们永远不会去迪士尼乐园之类的事情，因为如果我省下这笔钱，30 年后，我们就能待一周而不是两天。

I think there’s a lot to be said for doing things that bring you and your family enjoyment, rather than trying to save every dime.

我认为做一些能给你和你的家人带来快乐的事情是很重要的，而不是试图节省每一分钱。

So, I — delayed gratification is not necessarily an unqualified course of action under all circumstances. I always believed in spending two or three cents out of every dollar I earn and saving the rest. (Laughter)

所以，我——延迟满足并不一定在所有情况下都是无条件的行动方案。我一直相信在我赚的每一美元中花掉两三分钱，剩下的存起来。（笑声）

But I’ve always had everything I wanted. I mean, one thing you should understand, if you aren’t happy having $50,000 or a hundred-thousand dollars, you’re not going to be happy if you have 50 million or a hundred million.

但我一直拥有我想要的一切。我的意思是，你应该明白，如果你拥有五万美元或十万美元却不快乐，那么即使你拥有五千万或一亿，你也不会快乐。

I mean, a certain amount of money does make you feel — and those around you — feel better, just in terms of being more secure, in some cases.

我意思是，某种程度上的金钱确实会让你和你周围的人感觉更好，至少在某些情况下，能让人感到更安全。

But loads and loads of money — I probably know as many rich people as just about anybody. And I do not — I don’t think they’re happier because they get super rich. I think they are happier when they don’t have to worry about money.

我认识很多富人，可能比大多数人认识的还要多。我并不认为他们因为超级富有而更快乐。我认为他们更快乐是因为他们不必为钱发愁。

But you don’t see a correlation between happiness and money, beyond a certain place. So, don’t go overboard on delayed gratification. (Applause)

但你不会看到幸福与金钱之间的相关性，超过某个程度之后。所以，不要在延迟满足上过度追求。（掌声）

23. Munger on succession: “You’re just going to have to endure us”

芒格谈继任：“你们只需要忍受我们。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: This question comes from a shareholder of yours for more than 20 years, who asked to remain anonymous, but wanted me to start by saying, “Warren and Charlie, I want to preface this question by saying it comes from a place of love for both of you and the beautiful painting you’ve drawn for us in the form of Berkshire.”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：这个问题来自一位持有你们股票超过 20 年的股东，他要求匿名，但希望我先说：“沃伦和查理，我想在提问之前说，这个问题出于对你们两位以及你们为我们描绘的美丽伯克希尔画卷的热爱。”

WARREN BUFFETT: But. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：但是。（笑声）

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: “Now, please update us on succession planning. And as you think about succession, would you ever consider having Greg (Abel) and Ajit (Jain) join you onstage at future annual meetings and allow us to ask questions of them and Ted and Todd, as well, so we can get a better sense of their thinking?”

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：“现在，请更新一下继任计划。当你考虑继任时，你是否会考虑让格雷格（阿贝尔）和阿吉特（贾因）在未来的年度会议上与您同台，并允许我们向他们以及泰德和托德提问，以便我们更好地了解他们的想法？”

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s probably a pretty good idea. And we’ve talked about it. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能是个不错的主意。我们也讨论过这个。（掌声）

We have Greg and Ajit here. And any questions that anybody wants to direct to them, it’s very easy to move them over.

我们这里有格雷格和阿吉特。如果有人想向他们提问，转移他们非常简单。

So, we thought about having four of us up here. And this format is not set in stone at all.

所以，我们考虑让我们四个人在这里。这个格式完全不是固定的。

Because you — I can tell you that, actually, the truth is, Charlie and I are afraid of looking bad. Those guys are better than we are. (Laughs)

实际上，我可以告诉你，真相是，查理和我害怕看起来不够好。那些人比我们强。（笑声）

You could not have two better operating managers than Greg and Ajit. I mean, they are — it is just fantastic, what they accomplished.

你不可能找到比格雷格和阿吉特更好的运营经理。我是说，他们——他们所取得的成就真是太棒了。

They know the businesses better. They work harder, by far. And you are absolutely invited to ask questions to be directed over to them at this meeting. I don’t think —

他们比我们更了解业务，工作也更加努力。你们完全可以在这次会议上向他们提问。我不认为——

Yeah, this format will not be around forever. And if it’s better to get them up on the stage, we’ll be happy to do it.

是的，这种格式不会永远存在。如果把他们请上舞台更好，我们会很乐意这样做。

Ted (Weschler) and Todd (Combs), they’re basically not going to answer investment questions. We regard investment decisions as proprietary, basically. They belong to Berkshire. And we are not an investment advisory organization. So, that is counter to the interests of Berkshire for them to be talking about securities they own. It’s counter to the interests of Berkshire for Charlie or me to be doing it.

泰德（韦施勒）和托德（科姆斯）基本上不会回答投资问题。我们将投资决策视为专有的，基本上。它们属于伯克希尔。我们不是投资顾问机构。因此，让他们谈论他们拥有的证券与伯克希尔的利益相悖。查理或我这样做也与伯克希尔的利益相悖。

We’ve done better because we don’t publish every day what we’re buying and selling. I mean, if somebody’s working on a new product at Apple, or somebody’s working on a new drug or they’re assembling property or something of the sort, they do not go out and tell everybody in the world exactly what they’re doing every day.

我们表现得更好，是因为我们不会每天公布我们在买卖什么。我的意思是，如果苹果公司正在研发一款新产品，或者某公司正在开发一种新药，或正在收购一些资产，他们不会每天向全世界公布他们在做什么。

And we’re trying to generate ideas in investment. And we do not believe in telling the world what we’re doing every day, except to the extent that we’re legally required. But it’s a good idea. Charlie?

我们正在尝试在投资方面产生想法。我们不相信每天都向世界说明我们在做什么，除非法律要求。但这是个好主意。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, one of the reasons we have trouble with these questions is because Berkshire is so very peculiar. There’s only one thing like it.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们在这些问题上遇到困难的原因之一是伯克希尔非常独特。没有其他东西像它一样。

We have a different kind of unbureaucratic way of making decisions. There aren’t any people in headquarters. We don’t have endless committees deliberating forever and making bad decisions. We just — we’re radically different. And it’s awkward being so different. But I don’t want to be like everybody else, because this has worked better. So, I think you’re just going to have to endure us. (Laughter and applause)

我们有一种与众不同的、非官僚化的决策方式。总部几乎没有什么人，我们也没有那些永远在讨论、并做出糟糕决定的无尽委员会。我们就是——完全不同。这种与众不同有时会让人感到不适，但我不想像其他人那样，因为这种方式效果更好。所以，我想你们只好忍受我们了。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We do think that it’s a huge corporate asset, which may only surface very occasionally and depending very much on how the world is around us. But to be the one place, I think, in the world, almost, where somebody can call on a Saturday morning and meet on Sunday morning and have a $10 billion commitment.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们确实认为，这是一项巨大的企业资产，虽然它可能只在某些特定时刻显现出来，并且很大程度上取决于我们周围的世界状况。但我认为，伯克希尔几乎是世界上唯一一个地方，某人可以在周六早上打电话，周日早上就能得到100亿美元的承诺。

And nobody in the world doubts whether that commitment will be upheld. And it’s not subject to any kind of welching on the part of the company that’s doing it. It’s got nothing involved over than Berkshire’s word. And that’s an asset that, every now and then, will be worth a lot of money to Berkshire. And I don’t really think it will be subject to competition.

世界上没有人会怀疑这种承诺是否会得到履行，且不会受到任何违约行为的影响。这完全取决于伯克希尔的信誉。这是一项资产，偶尔会给伯克希尔带来巨大的价值。而且我认为它不会受到竞争的威胁。

So — and Ted and Todd, in particular, are an additional pipeline, and have proven to be an additional pipeline, in terms of facilitating the exercise of that ability. I mean they — things come in through them that, for one reason or another, I might not hear about otherwise.

所以——特别是泰德和托德，他们在这一过程中发挥了额外的作用，成为了一个新的渠道，帮助我们进一步发挥这种能力。我的意思是，通过他们接触到的信息，可能是一些我因为各种原因本来不会听说的事情。

So, they have expanded our universe. In the markets we’ve had in recent years, that hasn’t been important. I can see periods where they would be enormously valuable. Just take the question that was raised by the fellow from Winnipeg about weak covenants and bonds.

因此，他们扩大了我们的投资范围。虽然在近年来的市场环境中，这并不是非常重要，但我能预见在某些时期，他们将会变得非常有价值。就像温尼伯那位提问者提到的有关债券弱契约的问题一样。

I mean, we could have a situation — who knows when, who knows where, or who knows whether — but we could have a situation where there could be massive defaults in the junk-bond-type market. We’ve had those a couple times. And we made a fair amount of money off of them.

我的意思是，我们可能会遇到一种情况——谁知道什么时候，谁知道在哪里，或者是否会发生——但有可能在垃圾债券市场中出现大规模违约的情况。我们以前遇到过几次这种情况，并且从中赚了不少钱。

But Ted and Todd would multiply our effectiveness in a big way, if such a period comes along, or some other types of periods come along. They are very, very, very useful to Berkshire.

但是，如果这样的时期到来，或者其他类型的时期到来，Ted 和 Todd 将大大提高我们的效率。他们对伯克希尔非常非常非常有用。

The call happened to come in on Friday from Brian Moynihan, CEO of Bank of America. And he’s done an incredible job. But we have a better chance of getting more calls and having them properly filtered and everything — appropriately filtered — the next time conditions get chaotic than we did last time. And that’s important.

这次电话是在周五接到的，来自美国银行的首席执行官布莱恩·莫伊尼汉。他的工作非常出色。下次市场混乱时，我们比上次更有机会接到更多的电话，并且能够更好地筛选信息——合适地筛选信息。而这非常重要。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think it’s true that if the world goes to hell in a hand basket, that you people will be in the right company. We’ve got a lot of cash and we know how to behave well in a panic. And if the world doesn’t go to hell, are things so bad now?

查理·芒格：是的，我确实认为，如果世界陷入困境，你们和伯克希尔在一起是做出了正确的选择。我们有大量现金，并且知道如何在恐慌中应对得当。如果世界没有陷入困境，那么现在的情况又有那么糟糕吗？

24. Munger invited to happy hour by the bitcoin people

芒格被比特币人士邀请参加欢乐时光

CHARLIE MUNGER: And I also want to report that your vice chairman is getting new social distinction.

查理·芒格：我还想报告一下，你们的副主席正在获得新的社会地位。

I’ve been invited during this gathering to go to a happy hour put on by the bitcoin people. (Laughter)

我在这个聚会上被邀请去参加比特币人士举办的欢乐时光活动。（笑声）

And I’ve tried to figure out what the bitcoin people do in their happy hour, and I finally figured it out. They celebrate the life and work of Judas Iscariot. (Laughter)

我试着弄清楚比特币的人在他们的快乐时光里做什么，最后我明白了。他们庆祝犹大·伊斯卡里奥特的生活和工作。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Is your invitation still good? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：你的邀请还有效吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Bitcoin — actually — on my honeymoon in 1952, my bride, 19, and I, 21 — stopped in Las Vegas. We just got in — my aunt Alice gave me the car and said, “Have a good time,” and we went west.

沃伦·巴菲特：比特币——实际上——在 1952 年我的蜜月期间，我的妻子 19 岁，我 21 岁——我们在拉斯维加斯停留。我们刚到——我的阿姨爱丽丝把车给了我，说：“玩得开心，”然后我们向西去了。

So, we stopped in the Flamingo, and I looked around, and I saw all of these well-dressed — they dressed better in those days — well-dressed people who had come, in some cases, from thousands of miles away. And this was before jets, so transportation wasn’t as good.

所以，我们在Flamingo停下，我四处看看，看到这些衣着考究的人——那时候他们的穿着更好——这些人有些是从几千英里外来的。这是在喷气式飞机之前，所以交通没有那么便利。

And they came to do something that every damn one of them knew was mathematically dumb. And I told Susie, I said, “We are going to make a lot of money.” (Laughter)

他们来做一些每一个人都知道在数学上是愚蠢的事情。我告诉苏西，我说：“我们会赚很多钱。”（笑声）

I mean, imagine people going to stick money on some roulette number with a zero and a double-zero there and knowing the percent. They all could do it, and they — they just do it. And I have to say, bitcoin has rejuvenated that feeling in me. (Laughter)

我的意思是，想象一下人们去把钱押在某个有零和双零的轮盘数字上，并知道概率。他们都可以这样做，他们——他们就是这样做的。我必须说，比特币让我重新感受到了那种感觉。（笑声）

25. Berkshire will probably increase stakes above 10% if regulations are eased

如果监管放松，伯克希尔可能会将持股比例提高到 10%以上。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren and Charlie. While I understand Berkshire’s need to trim its stake in Wells Fargo and any other banks you hold, each year, in order to bring Berkshire’s ownership stake below the 10 percent threshold required by the Federal Reserve for bank holdings, given the ongoing share repurchase activity that’s taking place in the industry.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦和查理。我理解伯克希尔每年需要减持其在富国银行和其他银行的股份，以使伯克希尔的持股比例降至美联储对银行持股的10%门槛以下，特别是考虑到行业中的持续回购活动。

I was kind of surprised, though, to see you move to trim all of your holdings, where possible, on a regular basis to eliminate the regulatory requirements that come with ownership levels above 10 percent, which in my view limits the investment universe that Berkshire, or at least Warren, can meaningfully invest in longer term, given that Warren manages a large chunk of Berkshire’s $200 billion equity portfolio.

但令我有些惊讶的是，你们定期削减所有可能的持股，以避免因持股超过10%而带来的监管要求。在我看来，这限制了伯克希尔，或者至少是沃伦，能够在长期内进行有意义投资的范围，毕竟沃伦管理着伯克希尔的2000亿美元股票投资组合中的很大一部分。

Could you elaborate more on the regulatory impact for Berkshire of holding more than 10 percent of any company’s stock, as well as how you feel about the Fed’s recent proposal to allow investors like Berkshire to own up to 25 percent shares of a bank without triggering more restrictive rules and oversight?

你能否进一步解释一下伯克希尔持有超过10%公司股份的监管影响，以及你对美联储最近提议允许像伯克希尔这样的投资者持有高达25%的银行股份而不会引发更严格规则和监管的看法？

Basically, if that proposal were to come to fruition, would you be willing to forego that 10 percent threshold self-imposed that you’ve done, and put money to work in names that you’re already fairly comfortable with?

基本上，如果该提案得以实现，你是否愿意放弃你们自我施加的10%门槛，并在你们已经相当熟悉的公司中进行更多投资？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the 10 percent, there’s a couple reasons —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，10%有几个原因——

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s the right answer. Yeah. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那是正确的答案。是的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We will — there’s two factors beyond in the case of banks. There’s the Federal Reserve requirement there. But many people probably don’t even — might not know about this, but if you own over 10 percent of a security — common stock — and you sell it within six months at a profit, you give the money over to the company, the short-swing profit that you give them.

沃伦·巴菲特：在银行的情况下，还有两个因素需要考虑。一个是美联储的要求。但很多人可能不知道，如果你持有超过10%的股票并在六个月内以盈利的方式出售，你必须将这笔短期利润交给公司。

And you match your — any sale against your lowest purchase. And I think if you sell it and then buy it within six months — I’m not as positive about that, because I haven’t reread the rule for a lot of years. But I think if you sell and then buy within six months, and the purchase is below the price at which you made the sale, you owe the money to the company.

你要将任何出售与最低的购买价格相匹配。我记得如果你在六个月内先卖后买——虽然我不太确定，因为我已经很多年没有重新阅读这条规则了——但我认为，如果你先卖后买，而买入价格低于你卖出的价格，你就需要把利润还给公司。

There used to be lawyers that would scan that monthly SEC report that I used to get 30 or 40 years ago. They would scan it to find people that inadvertently had broken that rule, and they would get paid a fee for recovering it for the company.

过去有一些律师会仔细检查我30或40年前收到的每月SEC报告，寻找那些无意中违反了该规则的人，他们会为公司追回这些短期利润，并因此获得一笔费用。

So, it restricts enormous — it restricts significantly your ability to reverse a position or change your mind or something of the sort.

所以，这大大限制了你撤销头寸或改变主意的能力。

Secondly, I think you have to report within two or three business days every purchase you make once you’re in that over 10 percent factor. So, you’re advertising to the world, but the world tends to follow us some, so it really — it has a huge execution cost attached to it.

其次，我认为一旦你的购买超过 10%的比例，你必须在两到三个工作日内报告每一笔交易。因此，你是在向全世界宣传，但世界往往会跟随我们，所以这实际上——它附带了巨大的执行成本。

Nevertheless — and those are both significant minuses, and they’re both things that people generally don’t think about.

然而——这两者都是显著的缺点，而且这两者都是人们通常不会考虑的事情。

We did go over recently, for example, in Delta Airlines, that was actually an accident, but I don’t mind the fact at all that we did.

我们最近确实在达美航空的持股上超过了10%，那实际上是个意外，但我对此完全不介意。

And if the Federal Reserve changes its approach, we won’t have to trim down below that. We don’t want to become a bank holding company and we don’t want to —

如果美联储改变其规则，我们就不需要减持至10%以下。我们不想成为一家银行控股公司，也不希望——

We went in many years ago and got permission with Wells, but then our permission expired, and we went in again a few — a couple years ago. And we spent a year or so, and there were just a million questions that Wells got asked about us and so on.

很多年前我们在富国银行的投资中获得了批准，但之后我们的许可过期了，几年前我们又重新申请了许可。我们花了一年多的时间，富国银行被问了无数关于我们的问题。

So, it’s been a deterrent. It’ll be less of a deterrent in the future, but it does have those two —

所以，这一直是一个障碍。未来它将不再是一个那么大的障碍，但它确实有这两个问题——

The short-swing thing is less onerous to us than it would be to most people who buy and sell stocks, because we don’t really think in terms of doing much.

短期交易的问题对我们来说没有对大多数股票买卖者那么严重，因为我们不太会频繁交易。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But if we didn’t have all these damn rules, we would cheerfully buy more, wouldn’t we?

查理·芒格：但是如果我们没有这些该死的规则，我们会愉快地买更多，不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Sure, sure. Well, any time we buy we do it cheerfully, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：当然，当然。好吧，每次我们购买时，我们都是愉快地进行，但——

Yeah. And we will — you’ll probably see us at more than 10 percent in more things. And if the Fed should change its rules, there will be companies where we drift up over 10 percent simply because they’re repurchasing their shares. That’s been the case with Wells, and it’s been the case with an airline or two in the last year or so.

是的。你可能会看到我们在更多公司中的持股超过10%。如果美联储改变规则，一些公司在回购自己的股票时，我们的持股比例可能会自然上升超过10%。这在富国银行的投资中已经发生过，也在过去一年中一两家航空公司中发生过。

So, if we like 9.5 percent of a company, we’d like 15 percent better, and you may see us behave a little differently on that in the future.

所以，如果我们喜欢持有一家公司的9.5%的股份，我们更喜欢持有15%。你未来可能会看到我们在这方面的行为有所不同。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, one more awkward disadvantage of being extremely rich.

查理·芒格：嗯，极其富有的另一个尴尬劣势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

And it really is. Yeah, and people following you. I mean, the followers problem can be a real problem.

这确实是个问题。被人跟随也是个真正的问题。我是说，跟随者的问题确实可能成为一个大麻烦。

26. Money managers need to set expectations for their investors

资金管理者需要为他们的投资者设定期望。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，6 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I’m Jeff Malloy (PH) from San Francisco. And this is my first shareholders meeting.

观众成员：嗨。我是来自旧金山的杰夫·马洛伊（PH）。这是我第一次参加股东大会。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, I’m 27 years old and aspire to be a great money manager like you two one day.

巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我 27 岁，渴望有一天能像你们一样成为一名出色的资金管理者。

I’m considering starting my own investment fund, but I also recognize that I am young and have a lot to learn. My question to both of you is, how did you know you were ready to manage other people’s money? And what general advice would you give to someone in my shoes? Thank you.

我正在考虑创办自己的投资基金，但我也意识到自己还年轻，还有很多东西要学。我想请问你们二位，你们是如何知道自己已经准备好管理他人的资金的？对于像我这样的人，你们有什么建议吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s a very interesting question, because I’ve faced that. And I sold securities for a while, but in May of 1956, I had a number of members of my family — I’d come back from New York, and they wanted me to help them out with stocks as I had earlier before I’d taken a job in New York. And I said, I did not want to get in the stock sales business, but I wanted to — I enjoyed investing. I was glad to figure out a way to do it, which I did through a partnership form.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，这是一个非常有趣的问题，因为我曾经面临过这个问题。我卖过证券一段时间，但在 1956 年 5 月，我的几个家人——我刚从纽约回来，他们希望我帮他们处理股票，就像我在去纽约工作之前那样。我说，我不想进入股票销售行业，但我想——我喜欢投资。我很高兴找到了一种方法来做到这一点，我通过合伙的形式实现了。

But I would not have done that, if I thought there was any chance, really, that I would lose the money.

但如果我认为有可能会亏损，我绝不会这么做。

And what I was worried about was not how I would behave, but how they would behave, because I needed people who were in sync with me. So, when we sat down for dinner in May of 1956 with seven people who either were related to me, or one was a roommate in college and his mother.

我担心的不是我自己的行为，而是他们的行为，因为我需要与我步调一致的人。所以1956年5月，我们七个人坐下来吃晚饭，他们都是我的亲戚或是我的大学室友及其母亲。

And I showed them the partnership agreement, and I said, “You don’t need to read this.” You know, there’s no way that I’m doing anything in the agreement that is any way that — you know, you don’t need a lawyer to read it or anything of the sort.

我给他们看了合作协议，然后我说：“你们不需要读这个。”你知道，我在协议中做的任何事情都不会有什么问题——你知道，你不需要律师来阅读它或类似的东西。

But I said, “Here are the ground rules as to what I think I can do and how I want to be judged, and if you’re in sync with me, I want to manage your money, because I won’t worry about the fact that you will panic if the market goes down or somebody tells you to do something different. So, we have to be on the same page.”

但我说：“这是我认为我能做的事情的基本规则，以及我希望被评判的方式。如果你和我步调一致，我想管理你们的资金，因为我不会担心如果市场下跌或者有人告诉你做不同的事情时你会感到恐慌。所以，我们必须达成共识。”

“And if we’re on the same page, then I’m not worried about managing your money. And if we aren’t on the same page, I don’t want to manage your money, because you may be disappointed when I think that things are even better to be investing and so on.”

“如果我们步调一致，我不会担心管理你们的资金。如果我们不同步，我就不想管理你们的钱，因为你们可能会在我认为是投资好时机的时候感到失望。”

So, I don’t you want to manage other people’s money until you have a vehicle and can reach the kind of people that will be in sync with you. I think you ought to have your own ground rules as to what your expectations are, when they should you roses and when they should throw bricks at you.

所以，我不认为你想在拥有一个工具并能够接触到与你步调一致的人之前去管理其他人的钱。我认为你应该有自己的基本规则，明确你的期望是什么，什么时候他们应该给你玫瑰，什么时候他们应该向你扔砖头。

And you want to be on the same — and that’s one reason I never — we didn’t have a single institution in the partnership, because institutions meant committees, and committees meant that —

这也是为什么我的合伙企业中没有一家机构投资者，因为机构意味着委员会，而委员会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: You had some aunts that trusted you.

查理·芒格：你有一些信任你的姑姑。

WARREN BUFFETT: What’s that?

沃伦·巴菲特：那是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: You had some aunts who trusted you.

查理·芒格：你有一些信任你的姑姑。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, and a father-in-law who gave me everything he had in the world, you know. And I didn’t mind taking everything he had in the world, as long as he would stick with me and wouldn’t get panicked by headlines and that sort of thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，还有我的岳父，他把他拥有的一切都交给了我。我愿意接受，因为我知道只要他和我站在一起，不会被头条新闻吓到，我就可以管理好这些钱。

And so, it’s enormously important that you don’t take people that have expectations of you that you can’t meet. And that means you turn down a lot of people. It means you probably start very small, and you get an audited record.

所以，关键是不要接受那些对你抱有过高期望的人。这意味着你可能要拒绝很多人，可能要从小规模开始，积累可审计的记录。

And when you’ve got the confidence, where if your own parents came to you and they were going to give you all their money, and you were going to invest for them, I think that’s the kind of confidence that you’ll say, “I may not get the best record, but I’ll be sure that you get a decent record over time,” that’s when you’re ready to go on the —

当你拥有这样的信心时，如果你的父母来找你，准备把他们所有的钱都给你，而你要为他们投资，我认为这就是你会说的那种信心：“我可能无法获得最佳的记录，但我会确保你们随着时间的推移获得一个不错的记录。”那时你就准备好去——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Let me tell you story that I tell young lawyers who frequently come to me and say, “How can I quit practicing law and become a billionaire instead?” (Laughter)

查理·芒格：让我给你讲一个故事，我常常告诉那些经常来找我的年轻律师，他们问我：“我怎么才能辞去法律工作，变成亿万富翁呢？”（笑声）

So, I say, well, it reminds me of a story they tell about Mozart. A young man came to him, and he said, “I want to compose symphonies. I want to talk to you about that.”

所以，我说，这让我想起了一个关于莫扎特的故事。一个年轻人来找他，他说：“我想作交响曲。我想和你谈谈这个。”

And Mozart said, “How old are you?” And the man said, “Twenty-two.” And Mozart said, “You’re too young to do symphonies.” And the guy says, “But you were writing symphonies when you were ten years old.” He says, “Yes, but I wasn’t running around asking other people how to do it.” (Laughter)

莫扎特说：“你多大了？”那人说：“二十二。”莫扎特说：“你太年轻了，不能写交响曲。”那家伙说：“但你十岁的时候就写交响曲。”他说：“是的，但我没有到处问别人怎么做。”（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

We wish you well. (Laughter)

祝你一切顺利。（笑声）

And we, and actually, we really do, because the fact you asked that sort of a question is to some extent indicative of the fact you got the right attitude going in.

而我们，实际上，我们确实如此，因为你问这样一个问题在某种程度上表明你有正确的态度。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It isn’t that easy to be a great investor. I don’t think we’d have made it.

查理·芒格：成为一名伟大的投资者并不容易。我不认为我们自己也能轻易做到。

27. Berkshire doesn’t have to disclose most foreign stock holdings, so it doesn’t

伯克希尔不必披露大多数外国股票持有情况，因此它不披露。

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Franz Traumburger (PH) of Austria and his son, Leon, who are both Berkshire shareholders. And it’s interesting to me that in the years we’ve been doing this, nobody has ever asked this question, as far as I know.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自奥地利的弗朗茨·特劳姆堡（PH）和他的儿子莱昂，他们都是伯克希尔的股东。让我感到有趣的是，在我们进行这个活动的这些年里，至今为止没有人问过这个问题。

Their question is, “Mr. Buffett, I believe it is correct that in its SEC filings — that is the Securities and Exchange Commission — Berkshire does not have to give information about foreign stocks it holds.

他们的问题是：“巴菲特先生，我相信在其向证券交易委员会（SEC）提交的文件中，伯克希尔不必提供其持有的外国股票的信息。”

“Assuming we hold foreign stocks, could you please tell us what our five largest positions are?”

“假设我们持有外国股票，您能告诉我们我们最大的五个头寸是什么吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: No, the fellow wants investment information. We really aren’t in the investment information business. We disclose what we have to disclose, but we could set up an investment advisory firm and probably take in a lot of money, but we haven’t done it. And we aren’t giving away what belongs to our shareholders for nothing.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这位先生想要投资信息。我们实际上并不在投资信息业务中。我们披露我们必须披露的内容，但我们可以成立一家投资顾问公司，可能会赚很多钱，但我们没有这样做。我们也不会无偿地把属于我们股东的东西送出去。

But he’s correct that — I’m 99 percent sure he’s correct, and Marc Hamburg can correct me from our office — but we do not have to report foreign stocks.

但他是对的——我 99%确定他是对的，马克·汉堡可以在我们办公室纠正我——但我们不需要报告外国股票。

And we do have — in certain important countries, there’s lower thresholds at which we have to report our holdings, as a percentage of the company stock outstanding — there’s lower thresholds than there are in the United States.

在某些重要国家，我们确实有较低的报告持股比例的门槛，作为公司流通股票的百分比——这些门槛低于美国的标准。

So, in a sense — in certain stocks. I think when we bought Munich Re stock or bought Tesco stock, or there are certain stocks we’ve had to report at — before we would have had to report in the United States.

所以，从某种意义上说——在某些股票上。我认为当我们购买慕尼黑再保险公司的股票或购买特易购的股票，或者在某些股票上，我们曾经需要在美国报告。

But we will never unnecessarily advise if we plan to buy some land some place, if we plan to develop a business — we are not about giving business information that’s proprietary to Berkshire. We don’t give it unless we’re required by law.

但如果我们计划在某个地方购买土地，或者计划发展业务，我们绝不会不必要地提供建议——我们不会提供属于伯克希尔的商业信息。除非法律要求，否则我们不会提供这些信息。

And he is correct that, I’m virtually certain that we do not have to report our foreign stocks on the SEC filings. And he’ll have to find his own holdings in Austria.

他是对的，我几乎可以肯定我们不需要在 SEC 文件中报告我们的外国股票。他需要自己找到他在奥地利的持股。

But I think this Mozart story may have encouraged that particular question from Austria, what stocks we’re going to own in Austria. OK, Charlie, do you have any comments on that?

但我认为这个莫扎特的故事可能促使了来自奥地利的那个特定问题，即我们将在奥地利拥有哪些股票。好的，查理，你对此有什么评论吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, I didn’t think you would. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我不认为你会这样。（笑）

28. Buffett expects Precision Castparts earnings will “improve fairly significantly”

巴菲特预计精密铸件的收益将“相当显著地改善”

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonny? 沃伦·巴菲特：乔尼？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Precision Castparts’ pre-tax profit margins, while perfectly fine relative to American industry as a whole, continue to be almost 10 percentage points below where they were in the years preceding the acquisition. And I’m guessing they’re lower than contemplated when the purchase price was determined.

乔纳森·布兰特：尽管Precision Castparts的税前利润率相对于整个美国工业仍然表现良好，但它依然比收购前的几年低了将近10个百分点。我猜测，它们的利润率低于最初确定收购价格时的预期。

The annual report hints that unplanned shutdowns, the learning curve on new plane models, and a shift of oil and gas capacity to aerospace, might all be temporarily depressing margins. But it’s unclear what a reasonable, long-term margin expectation is for this unit.

年报提到了意外停产、新飞机型号的学习曲线，以及将石油和天然气产能转移到航空航天领域，可能都在暂时压低利润率。但目前尚不清楚该部门合理的长期利润率预期是什么。

Now, I know you won’t want to issue a specific margin target or forecast, but I do have a question that I hope you can answer.

现在，我知道您不想发布具体的利润目标或预测，但我有一个问题，希望您能回答。

Is the downward trend in earning since 2015 mostly due to these transitory items, or have the competitive structure of the industry and Precision’s relationship with its customers changed to the point that meaningful increases from current margin levels are probably unlikely?

自2015年以来利润的下滑，主要是由于这些暂时性的因素，还是行业的竞争结构和Precision与客户的关系发生了变化，以至于从当前利润率水平大幅提升变得不太可能？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Your prelude is quite correct. I mean, they are below what we projected a few years ago. And my expectation — but I would have told you this a year ago — and they have improved somewhat.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，您的引言是完全正确的。他们确实低于我们几年前的预测。我的预期是——不过我去年也告诉过你这一点——他们确实有所改善。

My expectation is, based on the contracts we have and the fact that the initial years in anything in the aircraft industry, for example, tend to be less profitable as you go further down the learning curve and the volume curve, tend to be lower in the near-term. My expectation is that the earnings of Precision will improve fairly significantly.

我的预期是，基于我们所拥有的合同以及在航空工业中，初始几年往往利润较低，因为随着学习曲线和产量曲线的深入，短期内的利润往往较低。我的预期是，Precision 的收益将会显著改善。

And I think I mentioned maybe to you last year, in those earnings, there is about $400 million a year of purchase amortization, which are economic earnings in my viewpoint.

我想我去年可能提到过，在那些收益中，每年大约有 4 亿美元的购买摊销，从我的观点来看，这些是经济收益。

So — but even including that 400 million a year, which they would be reporting if they were independent, and we don’t report, because we bought them and there’s a purchase amortization charge. Even without that, they are below what I would anticipate by a fair margin within a year or two. That’s the present expectation on my part. Charlie?

但即使包括了这每年4亿美元的摊销，如果他们是独立公司，他们会报告这一部分的收益，但我们因为收购了他们，所以报告中有一项购买摊销费用。即便不算这部分费用，他们的收益仍低于我对未来一两年内预期的水平。那是我目前的预期。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I don’t have anything.

查理·芒格：不，我没有什么。

WARREN BUFFETT: You’ll have that question for me next year, and I think I’ll be giving you a different answer.

沃伦·巴菲特：明年你会问我这个问题，我想我会给你一个不同的答案。

29. The older you get, the better you understand human behavior

你越老，越能理解人类行为。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，7 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is JC. (PH) I am 11 years old, and I came from China. This is my second year at the meeting.

观众成员：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫 JC。我 11 岁，来自中国。这是我第二年参加会议。

Mr. Munger, it’s great to see you again after the Daily Journal meeting in February.

芒格先生，很高兴在二月份的《日报》会议后再次见到您。

Mr. Buffett, you mentioned that the older you get, the more you understood about human nature. Could you elaborate more about what you’ve learned, and how can the differences of human nature help you make a better investment? I would also like Mr. Munger to comment on that, please. Thank you very much. (Applause)

巴菲特先生，您提到随着年龄的增长，您对人性有了更多的理解。您能详细说明一下您所学到的内容，以及人性差异如何帮助您做出更好的投资吗？我也希望芒格先生对此发表评论。非常感谢您。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You should wait for Charlie’s answer, because he’s even older. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你应该等查理的回答，因为他更老。（笑声）

He can tell you more about being old than I can even.

他能告诉你更多关于变老的事情，甚至比我还多。

It’s absolutely true that virtually any yardstick you use, I’m going downhill. And, you know, if I would take an SAT test now, and you could compare it to a score of what I was in my early 20s, I think it’d be quite embarrassing. (Laughs)

这绝对是真的，无论你用什么标准来衡量，我都在下滑。而且，你知道，如果我现在参加一次 SAT 考试，和我二十出头时的分数相比，我觉得会非常尴尬。（笑）

And Charlie and I can give you a lot of examples, and there’s others we won’t tell you about how things decline as you get older.

查理和我可以给你很多例子，还有其他一些我们不会告诉你的关于随着年龄增长事物如何衰退的情况。

But I would say this. It’s absolutely true in my view that you can and should understand human behavior better as you do get older. You just have more experience with it. And I don’t think you can read — Charlie and I read every book we could on every subject we were interested in, you know, when we were very young. And we learned an enormous amount just from studying the lives of other people.

但我想说的是，我认为这绝对是正确的：随着年龄的增长，你可以并且应该更好地理解人类行为。你只是有了更多的经验。我认为你无法通过阅读来做到这一点——查理和我在年轻时阅读了我们感兴趣的每一个主题的每一本书。我们仅仅通过研究其他人的生活就学到了很多。

And — but I don’t think you can get to be an expert on human behavior at all by reading books, no matter what your I.Q. is, no matter who the teacher is. And I think that you really do learn a lot about human behavior. Sometimes you have to learn it by having multiple experiences.

而——但我认为无论你的智商是多少，无论老师是谁，光靠读书是无法真正成为人类行为的专家的。我认为你确实可以通过多次经历来学习很多关于人类行为的知识。

I actually think I, despite all the other shortcomings — and I can’t do mental arithmetic as fast as I used to, and I can’t read as fast as I used to.

我实际上认为，尽管还有其他缺点——我不能像以前那样快速进行心算，也不能像以前那样快速阅读。

But I do think that I know a lot more about human behavior than I did when I was 25 or 30 —

但我确实认为我对人类行为的了解比我 25 或 30 岁时多得多——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ll give you — do you want one mantra? It comes from a Chinese gentleman who just died, Lee Kuan Yew, who was the greatest nation builder probably that ever lived in the history of the world.

查理·芒格：我给你一个口号吗？它来自一位刚去世的中国绅士李光耀，他可能是历史上最伟大的国家建设者。

And he said one thing over and over and over again all his life. “Figure out what works, and do it.” If you just go at life with that simple philosophy from your own national group, you will find it works wonderfully well. Figure out what works, and do it.

他说了一辈子同样的一句话：“找出有效的方法，然后去做。”如果你以自己民族的简单哲学来面对生活，你会发现这非常有效。找出有效的方法，然后去做。

WARREN BUFFETT: And figuring out what works means figuring out how other people —

沃伦·巴菲特：弄清楚什么有效意味着弄清楚其他人如何——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.

查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: — behave.

沃伦·巴菲特：——表现得体。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Of course.

查理·芒格：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie and I have seen the extremes in human behavior, in so many unexpected ways.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我在许多意想不到的方式中看到了人类行为的极端。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Now we get it every night, extremes in human behavior. All you got to do is turn on the television.

查理·芒格：现在我们每天晚上都能看到人类行为的极端。你只需打开电视。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’m glad he used that example. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我很高兴他用了那个例子。（笑声）

30. Ajit Jain on pricing unconventional insurance contracts

Ajit Jain 谈非常规保险合同的定价

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，贝基？

BECKY QUICK: Warren, you mentioned, in response to an earlier question, that Ajit (Jain) and Greg (Abel) are both here to answer questions, and so I thought I’d ask this question that comes from Will in Seattle. He says, his question is for Mr. Ajit Jain and Mr. Warren Buffett.

贝基·奎克：沃伦，你之前提到阿吉特（Jain）和格雷格（Abel）都在现场可以回答问题，所以我想提这个来自西雅图威尔的问题。他说，这个问题是问阿吉特·贾因先生和沃伦·巴菲特先生的。

“You have said that you communicate regularly about unconventional insurance contracts that expose the company to extremely unlikely but highly costly events. I’m curious about how you think about and safely price these unconventional insurance contracts. What analyses and mental checks do you run through your head, to make sure that Berkshire Hathaway will profit without being unduly exposed to catastrophic risk?

“你们提到过，你们经常讨论那些将公司暴露于极不可能但代价极高事件的非常规保险合同。我很好奇你们是如何思考并安全定价这些非常规保险合同的。你们在头脑中进行哪些分析和检查，以确保伯克希尔能够获利而不会过度暴露于灾难性风险？

“Furthermore, Mr. Buffett, would you want a future CEO to continue a similarly close collaboration with the chief underwriter?”

“此外，巴菲特先生，你希望未来的首席执行官继续与首席承保人保持这种紧密的合作关系吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: We will get a microphone to Ajit and a spotlight in just a second. And there he is.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们马上会给阿吉特一个话筒和聚光灯。他已经准备好了。

Ajit, why don’t you answer first, if you’d like to?

阿吉特，如果你愿意，你可以先回答。

AJIT JAIN: Hi. Obviously, the starting point, I mean, these situations where there’s not enough data to hang your hat on, it’s more of an art than a science.

AJIT JAIN：嗨。显然，起点是，我的意思是，在这些没有足够数据可以依赖的情况下，这更多是一种艺术而不是科学。

We start off with as much science as we can use, looking at historical data that relates to the risk in particular, or something that comes close to relating to the risk that we’re looking at.

我们尽可能从科学出发，查看与相关风险相关的历史数据，或者与我们要评估的风险接近的历史数据。

And then beyond that, if there’s not enough historical data we can look at, then clearly, we have to make a judgment in terms of, what are the odds of something like that happening?

然后，如果我们可以查看的历史数据不足，那么显然，我们必须在某种程度上做出判断，即发生这种事情的几率是多少？

We try — we absolutely, in situations like that, we absolutely make sure we cap our exposure. So, that if something bad happens or we’ve got something wrong, we absolutely know that how much money we can lose and whether we can absorb that loss without much pain to the income statement or the balance sheet.

我们会尽量确保在这种情况下控制我们的风险。因此，如果发生不好的事情或者我们犯了错误，我们绝对知道我们可能会损失多少钱，以及我们是否能够承受这种损失，而不会对损益表或资产负债表造成太大影响。

In terms of art, it’s a difficult situation. More often than not, it’s impossible to have a point of view, and we end up passing on it.

至于这门“艺术”，情况非常复杂。大多数时候，我们很难有明确的观点，结果往往是放弃这些交易。

But every now and then, we think we can get a price where the subjective odds we have of something like that happening has a significant margin of safety in it. So, we feel it’s a risk that’s worth taking.

但时不时地，我们认为可以获得一个价格，在这个价格下，我们对类似事情发生的主观概率有一个显著的安全边际。因此，我们觉得这是一个值得冒的风险。

Then finally, the absolute acid test is, I pick up the phone and call Warren. “Warren, here’s a deal. What do you think?” (Laughter) OK. Your turn, Warren.

最后，终极的检验方法是，我会拿起电话打给沃伦：“沃伦，这是个交易，你怎么看？”（笑声）好了，轮到你了，沃伦。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not easy, and you wouldn’t want just anybody doing it for you.

查理·芒格：这并不容易，你也不希望随便一个人来为你做这件事。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. In fact, the only one I would want doing it for us on the kind of things we have sometimes received is Ajit. I mean, it’s that simple. There isn’t anybody like him.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，不。事实上，唯一我希望为我们做这些事情的人就是阿吉特。我的意思是，这就是这么简单。没有人像他一样。

And as Ajit said, we’ll look at a worst case, but we are willing, if we like the odds, and like you say, there’s no way to look these up.

正如 Ajit 所说，我们将考虑一个最坏的情况，但如果我们喜欢这个概率，并且正如你所说，没有办法查找这些。

We can tell you how many 6.0 or greater earthquakes have happened in the last hundred years in Alaska or California or so on. And there’s a lot of things you can look up figures on. Sometimes those are useful, and sometimes they aren’t. But there’s a lot where you can get a lot of data.

我们可以告诉你在过去一百年里阿拉斯加或加利福尼亚等地发生了多少次 6.0 级或更大地震。还有很多事情你可以查找数据。有时候这些数据很有用，有时候则没有。但有很多地方你可以获得大量数据。

And then there’s others that — well, after 9/11, you know, was that going to be the first of several other attacks that were going to happen very quickly? There were planes flying that couldn’t — well they couldn’t land in Hong Kong, as I remember. I think it was Cathay Pacific couldn’t land in Hong Kong the following Monday unless they had a big liability coverage placed with somebody.

9/11之后，大家会问这是否是其他更多攻击的开端。记得有些飞机无法降落在香港，我记得是国泰航空无法在接下来的星期一降落，除非他们找到一家提供巨额责任保险的公司。

I mean, the world had to go on. The people that held mortgages on the Sears Tower all of a sudden wanted coverage. —I think that actually was one — but they were just pouring in, of people that hadn’t been worried about something a week earlier, and now they were worried about things involving huge sums.

世界必须继续运转，持有西尔斯大厦抵押贷款的人突然要求保险——我想这确实是其中之一——但这类请求纷纷涌入，一周前他们还不担心的事情，现在突然让他们感到巨额风险。

And there were really only a couple people in the world that would even listen and had the capacity to take on a lot of the deals we were proposed. And there’s no book to look up. So, you do — there’s a big element of judgment.

当时，世界上只有少数几个人愿意听这些请求，并且有能力处理这些交易。而且没有任何书籍可以查阅。所以，这里面有很大一部分取决于判断。

Ajit and I — I mean, Ajit’s a hundred times better at this than I am, but we do tend to think alike on this sort of thing. You don’t want to think too much alike, but we think alike. I’ve got a willingness to lose a lot of money.

阿吉特和我——我的意思是，阿吉特在这方面比我强一百倍，但我们在这类事情上确实有相似的想法。你不想想得太相似，但我们确实想得相似。我愿意亏很多钱。

And most, well, virtually every insurance company if they get up to higher limits, they’ve got treaties in place, and they can only take this much. So, the world was paralyzed on that.

几乎所有保险公司当达到更高的限额时，都有再保险合同，他们只能承担这么多。所以，当时整个世界都陷入了瘫痪。

We don’t get those, but now obviously. But we do occasionally get inquiries about doing things that really nobody else in the world can do. It’s a little like our investment situation, only transferred over to insurance. We don’t build a business around it, but we are ready when the time comes.

我们不会经常遇到这样的情况，但偶尔我们会接到一些其他人无法处理的询问。这有点像我们的投资策略，只不过应用于保险领域。我们没有围绕它建立业务，但我们时刻准备着。

And Ajit is an asset that no other company in the world has. And we work him. And we actually enjoy a lot talking to each other about these kind of risks, because he’ll ask me to think about what the price should be. And he’ll think about — we don’t tell each other ahead of time. And then I’ll name it, and then he’ll say, “Have you lost your mind, Warren?” (Laughs)

阿吉特是世界上没有其他公司拥有的资产。我们利用他的才能。我们实际上很享受彼此讨论这些风险，因为他会让我思考价格应该是多少。他会考虑——我们不会提前告诉对方。然后我会给出一个价格，他会说：“你疯了吗，沃伦？”（笑）

And then he’ll point something out to me that I’ve overlooked. And it’s a lot of fun, and it’s made us a lot of money.

然后他会指出我忽略的事情。这非常有趣，也为我们赚了很多钱。

And the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway are extraordinarily lucky. You can’t hire people like Ajit. I mean, you get them once in a lifetime. Charlie?

伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东们非常幸运。你无法雇到像阿吉特这样的人。我是说，你一生中只能遇到一次。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think we helped him very much. It’s really difficult.

查理·芒格：我不认为我们帮了他太多。这确实很困难。

WARREN BUFFETT: There will be a time when — I mean, I probably won’t be around then — but there will be a time occasionally, just like in financial markets, when things are happening in the insurance world, and basically, Berkshire will be the only one — virtually the only one — people turn to.

沃伦·巴菲特：会有这样的时刻——我可能那时候已经不在了——但有时就像金融市场一样，在保险界发生的事情让伯克希尔几乎成为唯一的选择。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But in the past, Ajit, talking to you, has added more than $50 billion to the balance sheet at Berkshire, by making these oddball calls.

查理·芒格：过去，阿吉特与你的交流为伯克希尔的资产负债表增加了超过500亿美元，通过这些非同寻常的决策。

WARREN BUFFETT: And if he hadn’t talked to me, it’d be probably 49.9 billion, you know? (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果他没有跟我谈过，那可能就是 499 亿美元，你知道吗？（笑）

But you don’t want to try — don’t try this at home.

但你不想尝试——不要在家尝试这个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that doesn’t mean it’s easy.

查理·芒格：是的，这并不意味着这很简单。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. And it’s not very teachable.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。这并不是很容易教授的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it isn’t very teachable, you’re right.

查理·芒格：不，这并不是很容易教，你说得对。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, it is not something that Berkshire has some secret formula someplace for it. It basically is a very unusual talent with Ajit, and —

沃伦·巴菲特：不，这并不是伯克希尔有什么秘密公式。基本上，这是阿吉特非常不寻常的才能，——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re not holding anything back. It’s hard.

查理·芒格：我们没有保留任何东西。这很难。

31. Despite Kraft Heinz problems, Berkshire could partner with 3G again

尽管卡夫亨氏面临问题，伯克希尔可能会再次与 3G 合作。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊？（掌声）

JAY GELB: This question is on Berkshire’s relationship with 3G Capital. Kraft Heinz’s recent challenges have raised questions about whether Berkshire’s partnership with 3G has become a weakness for Berkshire.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于伯克希尔与3G资本的关系。卡夫亨氏最近的挑战引发了一些问题，是否伯克希尔与3G的合作已经成为伯克希尔的一个弱点。

Warren, what are your thoughts on this? And would Berkshire be open to partnering again with 3G in a major acquisition?

沃伦，你对此有什么看法？伯克希尔会愿意再次与 3G 在重大收购中合作吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they are our partners, and we joined them. We had a one-page agreement, which I haven’t even actually ever reread. I mean, Jorge Paulo, I mean, is a good friend of mine. I think he’s a marvelous human being. And I’m pleased that we are partners. It’s conceivable that something would come up.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，他们是我们的合作伙伴，我们与他们合作。我们有一份一页纸的协议，我甚至从未重新阅读过。我是说，霍尔赫·保罗是我的好朋友。我认为他是一个了不起的人。我很高兴我们是合作伙伴。可以想象会出现一些事情。

They have more of a taste for leverage than we do, and they probably have more of a taste for paying up, but they also are, in certain types of situations, they’d be way better operators than we would.

他们对杠杆的兴趣比我们更大，他们可能更愿意支付，但在某些情况下，他们的操作能力会比我们强得多。

I mean, they go into situations that need improvement, and they have improved them. But I think both they and we, I know we did underestimate, not what the consumer is doing so much, but what the retailer is.

他们进入需要改进的局面，并且确实改善了局面。但我认为他们和我们都低估了的，不是消费者的行为，而是零售商的变化。

And at See’s Candy, we sell directly to the consumer, but at Kraft Heinz, they’re intermediaries. And those intermediaries are trying to make money. We’re trying to make money.

在See's糖果，我们直接向消费者销售，但在卡夫亨氏，有中间商。这些中间商想赚钱，我们也想赚钱。

And the brand is our protection against the intermediaries making all the money.

品牌是我们抵御中介赚取所有利润的保护。

Costco tried to drop Coca-Cola back in, I think 2008, and you can’t drop Coca-Cola, you know, and not disappoint a lot of customers.

2008年左右，Costco曾尝试停止销售可口可乐，但你不能停止销售可口可乐，而不让很多顾客失望。

Snickers bars are the number one candy that Mars makes. And they’ve been number one for 30 or 40 years. And if you walk into a drugstore, and the guy says, “The Snickers are 75 cents or whatever it might be, and I’ve got this special little bar my wife and I make in the back of the store, and it’s only 50 cents, and it’s just as good,” you don’t buy it, you know. When you’re at some other place the next time, you buy the Snickers bar.

士力架是玛氏公司生产的第一款糖果。它们已经连续 30 或 40 年保持第一。如果你走进一家药店，店员说：“士力架 75 美分，或者其他什么价格，我和我妻子在店后面做的这种特别小棒子只要 50 美分，味道一样好，”你是不会买的，你知道的。下次你在其他地方时，你还是会买士力架。

So, brands can be enormously valuable, but many of the brands are dependent, most of them — Geico is not, Geico goes directly to the consumer. If we save the consumer money on insurance, they’re going to buy it from us.

所以，品牌的价值可能非常巨大，但许多品牌，尤其是大多数品牌，都依赖于中间商——Geico就不是，Geico直接面对消费者。如果我们能为消费者节省保险费用，他们就会从我们这里购买。

And our brand, you know — and we’ll spend well over a billion and a half on advertising this year, and you think, my God, we started this in 1936, and we were saying the same thing then about saving 15 percent in 15 minutes or something of the sort — not exactly the same — but that brand is huge, and we have to come through on the promise we give, which is to save people significant money on insurance — a great many people. That brand is huge, and we’re dealing directly with the consumer.

我们的品牌巨大，今年我们将在广告上花费超过15亿美元。我们自1936年以来就一直在说同样的事情，比如“15分钟省15%”，虽然不完全一样，但这个品牌非常重要。我们必须兑现我们的承诺，即为许多人提供显著的保险费节省。这是一个巨大的品牌，我们直接面向消费者。

And when you’re selling Kool-Aid or ketchup or, you know, Heinz 57 sauce or something, you are going through a channel, and they would — the phrase was used earlier today. You know, our gross margin is their opportunity, and we think that the ultimate consumer is going to force them to have our product, and that we will get the gross margin.

当你在销售果汁饮料、番茄酱或亨氏 57 种调味酱之类的产品时，你是在通过一个渠道进行销售，今天早些时候提到过这个说法。我们的毛利率就是他们的机会，我们认为最终消费者会迫使他们销售我们的产品，而我们将获得毛利。

And that fight, that tension, has increased in the last five years and I think is likely to increase the next five or ten years. And Charlie is a director of a company that has caused me to think a lot about that subject. Charlie?

而那场斗争，那种紧张感，在过去五年中加剧了，我认为在接下来的五年或十年中可能会继续加剧。查理是一个公司的董事，这让我对这个话题进行了很多思考。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well. What I think is interesting about the 3G situation, it was a long series of transactions that worked very well, and finally there was one transaction at the end that didn’t work so well.

查理·芒格：嗯。我认为 3G 的情况有趣的是，这是一系列非常成功的交易，最后有一笔交易没有那么成功。

That is a very normal outcome of success in a big place with a lot of young men who want to get rich quick. And it just happens again and again. And you do want to be careful.

在一个大公司中，有很多年轻人想快速致富，这种结果非常正常。这种情况一次次发生。你确实需要小心。

It’s so much easier to take the good ideas and push them to wretched excess.

把好的想法推向极端要容易得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that is — no idea is good at any price, and the price settlement is probably something that we worry more about generally than our partners, but we are their partners in Kraft Heinz. And it’s not at all inconceivable that we could be partners in some other transaction in the future.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，没有任何想法在任何价格下都是好的，价格是我们比合作伙伴更关注的问题之一。但我们确实是卡夫亨氏的合作伙伴，未来再次合作进行其他交易也不是不可能的。

32. Buffett’s not worried about strength of Kraft Heinz’s brands

巴菲特并不担心卡夫亨氏品牌的实力

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello Warren and Charlie. Consumer tastes are changing. I think if we asked how many people here in the arena have eaten Velveeta cheese in the last year or so, there’d be only a small handful, maybe more for Jell-O.

观众成员：你好，沃伦和查理。消费者的口味正在改变。如果我们问在场的观众，过去一年里有多少人吃过Velveeta奶酪，可能只有少数人，也许吃过Jell-O的会多一些。

3G’s playbook of cutting R&D looks to have stifled new product development amidst changing preferences.

3G的策略削减了研发支出，似乎在消费者偏好变化的情况下，抑制了新产品的开发。

So, here’s my question. Why continue to hold when the moat appears to be dry? Or do you think it is filling back up?

所以，我的问题是。为什么在护城河似乎干涸时还要继续持有？还是你认为它正在重新注满？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t think the problem was that they cut research or something. I think the problem was, they paid a little too much for the last acquisition.

查理·芒格：我认为问题不在于他们削减了研究或其他什么。我认为问题在于，他们为最后一次收购支付的价格有点太高了。

WARREN BUFFETT: That Jell-O — I can’t give you the exact figures. There are certain brands that may be declining 2 percent a year or 3 percent a year in unit sales, and there’s others that are growing 1 or 2 percent. There’s not dramatic changes taking place at all. I mean, Kraft Heinz is earning more money than Kraft and Heinz were earning six or seven years ago.

沃伦·巴菲特：那种果冻——我不能给你确切的数字。有些品牌的单位销售可能每年下降 2%或 3%，而其他品牌则增长 1%或 2%。实际上并没有发生剧烈的变化。我的意思是，卡夫亨氏现在赚的钱比六七年前的卡夫和亨氏赚得更多。

I mean, and the products are being used in a huge way. Now it’s true that certain — that there are always trends going to some degree, but they have not fallen apart, remotely. And they have widened the margin somewhat.

我的意思是，这些产品正在被广泛使用。现在确实有一些趋势在某种程度上存在，但它们并没有完全崩溃，远非如此。而且它们的利润空间在某种程度上有所扩大。

But it is tougher, in terms of the margin and the price negotiations, probably to go through to the actual consumer. It’s become a somewhat tougher passageway for all food companies, than it was ten years ago. It’s still a terrific business.

不过，与过去相比，现在的利润率和价格谈判更加艰难，食品公司进入消费者市场的渠道变得更具挑战性。但它仍然是一个非常好的业务。

I mean, you know, you mentioned Jell-O or Velveeta. Charlie worked at my grandfather’s grocery store in 1940, I worked there in ’41. And they were buying those products then, and they buy the products now. The margins are still very good. They earn terrific returns on invested capital. But we paid too much in the case of Kraft.

我的意思是，你知道，你提到了果冻或 Velveeta。查理在 1940 年时在我祖父的杂货店工作，我在 41 年时也在那里工作。他们当时就购买这些产品，现在也在购买。这些产品的利润率仍然很好。他们在投资资本上获得了可观的回报。但在卡夫的案例中，我们支付的价格太高了。

You can pay too much for a growing brand. I mean, you can pay way too much for a growing brand, probably be easier to be sucked into that. So, I basically don’t worry about the brands.

你可以为一个增长中的品牌支付过高的价格。实际上，可能更容易在这种情况下被吸引支付过高的价格。所以，基本上我并不担心这些品牌。

A certain number are very strong, and a certain number are declining a bit. But that was the case 10 years ago. It’ll be the case 10 years from now. There’s nothing dramatic happening in that.

有一些非常强大，有一些稍微在下降。但十年前就是这样的情况。十年后也会是这样的情况。没有什么戏剧性的变化发生。

33. Buffett’s biggest problem with Apple is the stock keeps going up

巴菲特对苹果最大的担忧是股票不断上涨。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we’ll take one more, and then we’ll break for lunch. Andrew.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，我们再来一个，然后我们就休息吃午饭。安德鲁。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. Question on technology and the company’s biggest holding now.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。关于技术和公司目前最大的持股的问题。

“Given that Apple is now our largest holding, tell us more about your thinking. What do you think about the regulatory challenges the company faces, for example? Spotify has filed a complaint against Apple in Europe on antitrust grounds. Elizabeth Warren has proposed ending Apple’s control over the App Store, which would impact the company’s strategy to increase its services businesses. Are these criticisms fair?”

“鉴于苹果现在是我们最大的持股，请告诉我们更多你的想法。你对公司面临的监管挑战有什么看法，例如？Spotify 在欧洲以反垄断为理由对苹果提出了投诉。伊丽莎白·沃伦提议结束苹果对 App Store 的控制，这将影响公司增加其服务业务的战略。这些批评公平吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, again, I will tell you that all of the points you’ve made I’m aware of, and I like our Apple holdings very much. I mean, it is our largest holdings.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我再告诉你，你提到的所有观点我都知道，我非常喜欢我们的苹果股份。我的意思是，它是我们最大的持股。

And actually, what hurts, in the case of Apple, is that the stock has gone up. You know, we’d much rather have the stock — and I’m not proposing anything be done about it — but we’d much rather have the stock at a lower price so we could buy more stock.

实际上，苹果公司面临的问题在于股票价格上涨。你知道，我们更希望股票价格较低——我并不是提议采取任何措施——但我们更希望股票价格低一些，这样我们就可以购买更多的股票。

And importantly, if Apple — I mean, they authorized another 75 billion the other day — but let’s say they’re going to spend a hundred billion dollars in buying in their stock in the next three years. You know, it’s very simple. If they buy it at 200, they’re going to get 500 million shares. They’ve got 4 billion, 600 million out now. And so they’ll end up with 4.1 billion under that circumstance.

重要的是，如果苹果——我的意思是，他们前几天授权了另外 750 亿美元——但假设他们在接下来的三年里将花费一千亿美元回购股票。你知道，这很简单。如果他们以 200 美元的价格购买，他们将获得 5 亿股。他们现在有 46 亿股。因此，在这种情况下，他们最终将拥有 41 亿股。

If they’re buying at 150, they buy in 667 million shares. And instead of owning what we would own in the first case, we’d now — the divisor would be less than 4 billion, and we’d own a greater percentage of it.

如果他们以 150 的价格购买，他们将购买 6.67 亿股。与我们在第一种情况下拥有的不同，我们现在的分母将少于 40 亿，我们将拥有更大比例的股份。

So, in effect, a major portion of earnings — at least possibly, it’s at least been authorized — will be spent in terms of increasing our ownership without us paying out a dime, which I love for a wonderful business.

因此，实际上，收益的主要部分——至少可能是，至少已经获得授权——将用于增加我们的所有权，而我们不需要支付一分钱，这让我对这家优秀的企业感到非常满意。

And the recent development, when the stock has moved up substantially, actually hurts Berkshire over time. We’ll still do — In my opinion, we’ll do fine, but we’re not going to dissect our expectations about Apple, you know, for people who may be buying it against us tomorrow or something of the sort. We don’t give away investment advice on that for nothing.

最近的发展，当股票大幅上涨时，实际上会对伯克希尔造成长期伤害。我们仍然会——在我看来，我们会做得很好，但我们不会拆解我们对苹果的预期，你知道的，针对那些可能明天与我们对着干的人。我们不会无缘无故地提供投资建议。

But we have — all the things you’ve mentioned, obviously we know about, and we’ve got a whole bunch of other variables that we crank into it. And we like the fact that it’s our largest holding. Charlie?

但我们有——你提到的所有事情，显然我们都知道，还有很多其他变量我们也考虑在内。我们喜欢它是我们最大的持股。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, in my family, the people who have Apple phones, it’s the last thing they’ll give up. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：在我的家庭里，使用苹果手机的人，那是他们最后才会放弃的东西。（笑声）

34. Union Pacific has higher profit margins than BNSF

联合太平洋的利润率高于 BNSF。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. If you’ll take your seats, we’ll proceed in a minute.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。如果大家就坐，我们马上开始。

And it looks like we’re ready for Gregg.

看起来我们已经准备好迎接格雷格了。

GREGG WARREN: Good morning, Charlie. I have a follow up on the railroad business.

格雷格·沃伦：早上好，查理。我想跟进一下铁路业务。

By nearly all measures, BNSF had a solid year in 2018, full-year revenue growth of 11 1/2 percent was better than the 7 1/2 percent topline growth at Union Pacific — which is BNSF’s largest direct competitor — came up with, with Burlington Northern seeing both larger increases in average revenue per car unit and total volumes than its closest peer.

按几乎所有指标来看，BNSF在2018年表现出色，全年的收入增长11.5%，优于其最大直接竞争对手联合太平洋（Union Pacific）7.5%的增长。BNSF的每辆车单位平均收入和总运量增幅都超过了其最接近的同行。

Even so, Burlington Northern once again fell short of Union Pacific when it came to profitability, with its operating ratio declining 130 basis points to 66.9 percent, while Union Pacific’s ratio fell only 120 basis points to 62.7, further cementing the spread that exists between the two companies’ margins, at more than 400 basis points.

尽管如此，在盈利能力方面，BNSF再次落后于联合太平洋，BNSF的运营比率下降了130个基点至66.9%，而联合太平洋的比率仅下降了120个基点至62.7%，进一步巩固了两家公司之间超过400个基点的利润率差距。

Can you explain what is driving the difference in profitability between Burlington Northern and Union Pacific, as theoretically we should not see that wide of a spread between two similar-sized companies that are basically competing for the same business, with the same customers in the western half of the United States?

你能解释一下是什么导致了BNSF和联合太平洋之间盈利差距的原因吗？理论上，这两家规模相似的公司不应该在同一个市场、同样的客户中竞争时有如此大的差距，它们都在美国西部运营。

And while you noted that Burlington Northern is in a wait and see mode with regards to precision-schedule railroading, we’ve kind of heard the same line historically with regards to GEICO’s approach to telematics.

虽然你提到BNSF在精确计划铁路运输方面采取观望态度，但历史上我们也曾听到类似的说法，比如GEICO对远程信息处理的态度。

And what worries me here is that the potential now exists for a much wider gap to emerge between profitability levels at Burlington Northern and Union Pacific, which has recently adopted a version of PSR some of which Union Pacific could eventually use to get more price competitive.

我担心的是，现在有可能会出现BNSF和联合太平洋之间更大的盈利差距，联合太平洋最近采用了一种精确计划铁路运输（PSR）的版本，这可能最终让联合太平洋在价格竞争方面更具优势。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren knows the answer to that a lot better than I do. My guess is that they work a little harder than we do at billing the rates. But Warren, you answer that one.

查理·芒格：嗯，沃伦对这个问题的答案比我清楚得多。我的猜测是，他们在收费方面比我们努力一些。但沃伦，你来回答这个问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it’s true that we receive the lowest ton mile revenue of any of the six big railroads in North America, and there’s some explanation for that — obviously, a significant explanation — in the particular types of hauls we have and that sort of thing. We have longer hauls, generally.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。确实，我们在北美六大铁路公司中每吨每英里收入最低，这有一些解释——显然，有一个重要的解释——在于我们所运输的货物类型等方面。一般来说，我们的运输距离更长。

But the answer — Union Pacific’s profit margin, they talk about operating ratios, but that goes back to the Interstate Commerce Commission. It’s really profit margin, pre-tax, pre-interest profit margin. And Union Pacific, at one time, probably 15 or maybe a little more years ago, they really went off the tracks, so to speak. But they’ve done a very good job of getting — well, they got a lot of underpriced coal contracts that worked out, as did we.

但答案是——联合太平洋的利润率，他们谈论的是运营比率，但这可以追溯到州际商业委员会。实际上是税前、利息前的利润率。联合太平洋在大约 15 年前，或者稍微多一点的时候，确实偏离了轨道，可以这么说。但他们在恢复方面做得非常好——好吧，他们获得了很多低价的煤炭合同，这也对我们有利。

But they’ve also — they’ve done a very good job on expenses. And there’s no fundamental reason why the BNSF franchise — I always like the western railroads better than the eastern — not by a dramatic margin — but I think the west will do better in terms of ton miles over time than the eastern roads.

此外，他们在控制成本方面做得非常好。BNSF的基本条件并没有理由比联合太平洋差。我一直更喜欢西部的铁路公司，不是因为有巨大的差异，但我认为随着时间推移，西部铁路在吨英里方面会表现得比东部铁路更好。

And we’ve got some great routes, some of which were underwater in March for a while. (Laughs)

我们有一些很棒的线路，其中一些在三月份还一度被淹没了。（笑）

We pay a lot of attention to what’s going on at the Union Pacific, as we should.

我们非常关注联合太平洋发生的事情，这是我们应该做的。

And the future, it’s not like we’re losing business to anybody. But they have been operating more efficiently, in effect, than we have during the last few years. And like I said, we take notice of it.

未来并不是说我们在失去生意给任何人。但他们在过去几年中实际上比我们运作得更有效率。正如我所说，我们对此是有所注意的。

They’ve cut a lot of people, right here in Omaha. And we’ll see what that does in terms of passengers — or in terms of shipper satisfaction.

他们在奥马哈这里裁掉了很多员工。我们会看看这对乘客——或者说货主满意度有何影响。

But we are measuring ourselves very carefully against what they do. And if changes are needed, we’ll do that.

但我们正在非常仔细地衡量自己与他们的做法。如果需要改变，我们会这样做。

We’ve got a wonderful asset in that business. And when I bought it, I said it’s for a hundred years. It’s for a lot more than a hundred years. It is a very, very fundamental business. And we’ve got a wonderful franchise, and we should have margins comparable to other railroads. Charlie?

我们在那项业务中拥有一个很棒的资产。当我购买它时，我说这是为了百年。实际上，它的价值远超过百年。这是一项非常非常基础的业务。我们拥有一个很棒的特许经营，我们的利润率应该与其他铁路公司相当。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t know much about it.

查理·芒格：我对此了解不多。

WARREN BUFFETT: You don’t? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你不这样认为？（笑声）

35. Buffett: I’m lucky that I can “control my own time”

巴菲特：我很幸运可以“掌控自己的时间”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren and Charlie. My name is Rob Lee (PH) from Vancouver, Canada. Could you please share with us what you value the most in life now? Thank you.

观众成员：嗨，沃伦和查理。我叫罗布·李（音），来自加拿大温哥华。请问你们现在最看重的是什么？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well — 沃伦·巴菲特：好吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’d like to have a little more of it. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：我想要多一点。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s the two things you can’t buy, time and love. And that, I value those for a long time. And I’ve been very, very, very lucky in life, in being able to control my own time to an extreme degree. Charlie’s always valued that, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：有两样东西是买不到的，时间和爱。我一直很重视这两样东西。我在生活中非常非常非常幸运，能够在极大程度上掌控自己的时间。查理也一直很重视这一点。

That’s why we really wanted to have money, was so we could do what we damn pleased, basically — (laughs) — in our life. It wasn’t six houses or boats or anything. Well, Charlie’s got a boat. But it doesn’t do us that much good.

这就是为什么我们真的想要钱，基本上是为了能够随心所欲地生活——（笑）——并不是为了六栋房子或船之类的。好吧，查理有一艘船。但对我们来说并没有太大用处。

But time is valuable. And we are very, very lucky to be in jobs where physical ability doesn’t make any difference.

但时间是宝贵的。我们非常非常幸运，能够从事那些身体能力没有任何影响的工作。

And, you know, we’ve got the perfect job for a couple of guys with aging bodies. And we get to do what we love to do every day.

而且，你知道，我们为几个身体逐渐衰老的家伙准备了完美的工作。我们每天都能做我们热爱的事情。

I mean, I literally could do anything that money could buy, pretty much. And I’m having more fun doing what I do than doing anything else, and Charlie is designing dormitories. And I mean, he’s got an interesting life, and he brings a lot to it.

我的意思是，我几乎可以做任何用钱能买到的事情。但我做现在的事情比做其他任何事都更有趣，而查理则在设计宿舍。他的生活很有意思，而且他为生活带来了很多乐趣。

He still reads, you know, more books in a week than I get done in a month, and he remembers what he reads. So, we’ve got it very good, but we don’t have unlimited time. And whatever we do to free up the time to do what we like to do — and we both maximize that in our lives — we do.

他仍然在阅读，你知道，他一周读的书比我一个月读的还多，而且他记得他读的内容。所以，我们的生活非常好，但我们没有无限的时间。无论我们做什么来腾出时间去做我们喜欢的事情——我们都在生活中最大化这一点——我们都会去做。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Anybody’s lucky if he so that what he spends his time at, he really likes doing. That’s a blessing.

查理·芒格：如果一个人能花时间做自己真正喜欢的事情，那他就是幸运的。这是一种祝福。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve had so much good luck in life. It sort of blows your mind. Starting with being born in the United States. And Canada would be fine too, incidentally. I don’t want to offend anybody. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们在生活中有过很多好运。这真让人难以置信。首先是出生在美国。顺便说一下，加拿大也很好。我不想冒犯任何人。（笑声）

36. “We’re not in the business of explaining why we own a stock”

“我们不在解释为什么持有某只股票的业务中。”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Carol?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question is from Brian Neal (PH), who writes from the Mayo Clinic Education Site.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自布赖恩·尼尔（PH），他来自梅奥诊所教育网站。

“Berkshire owns approximately 200 billion in publicly traded stocks. I appreciate the disclosure of Berkshire’s holdings, but I am disappointed by the lack of specific performance information.

“伯克希尔拥有大约 2000 亿美元的上市股票。我欣赏伯克希尔持股的披露，但对缺乏具体的业绩信息感到失望。”

“Since investing in publicly owned stocks is so much a part of Berkshire’s business, why do you not tell us every year how our portfolio performed?”

“由于投资于上市股票是伯克希尔业务的重要组成部分，为什么你们不每年告诉我们我们的投资组合表现如何？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, obviously it could be calculated fairly easily, and it’s about 40 percent of Berkshire’s value. But 60 percent is the businesses. And if you look at the top ten stocks I would guess, you know, you’re down to where beyond those ten stocks you’re talking about less than — probably less than 10 percent of Berkshire’s value.

沃伦·巴菲特：很显然，这个计算很容易做到，而这大约占伯克希尔价值的40%。但60%是我们的业务。如果你看前十大股票，我猜你会发现，除了这十大股票之外，剩下的股票可能不到伯克希尔价值的10%。

So, I — again — we’re not in the business of explaining why we own a stock. We’re not looking for people to compete to buy it. We have a portfolio of companies where I would say that, of that 200 billion or so, at least 150 billion of them are buying in their stock and increasing our interest every year.

所以，我——再说一遍——我们并不是在解释为什么我们拥有某只股票。我们并不希望人们竞争去购买它。我们有一个公司组合，我可以说，在那大约 2000 亿中，至少有 1500 亿的公司在回购自己的股票，并且每年都在增加我们的持股比例。

And why in the world should we want to tell a whole bunch of people to go out and buy those stocks so that we end up paying — or the company on our behalf — ends up paying more money for them?

那么我们为什么要告诉一大堆人去买那些股票，以至于我们最终要支付——或者代表我们公司的——更多的钱呢？

I mean, people get very happy when their stocks go up. But if we’re going to own whatever, whether it’s Bank of America, whether it’s Apple, whether it’s any of the big holdings, we will do considerably better in the next ten years if their stocks do terribly during certain periods and that they buy lots of stock in.

我的意思是，当人们的股票上涨时，他们会非常高兴。但是如果我们要持有无论是什么，无论是美国银行、苹果，还是任何大型持股，如果在某些时期他们的股票表现糟糕，而他们大量买入股票，那么在接下来的十年里，我们的表现会好得多。

It’s just exactly like buying it ourselves, except we’re using their — they’re using our money. But it’s so elementary.

这就像我们自己买的一样，只不过我们在用他们的——他们在用我们的钱。但这太简单了。

And why in the world would we want to go out and tell the world that these stocks should go up so that maybe they can sell or something when it costs us money? And we’re not going to be able to move in and out of the stocks to our advantage.

我们为什么要出去告诉世界这些股票应该上涨，以便他们可能会出售或其他什么，而这会让我们花钱？而且我们无法进出这些股票以获得我们的利益。

So, our holdings are filed quarterly — our domestic holdings, as it was pointed out earlier — filed quarterly.

所以，我们的持股是按季度提交的——我们的国内持股，正如之前提到的——按季度提交。

But we would rather not tell the world what we own, any more than we’d like to tell them what our strategy is at NetJets or what we’re going to do with Lubrizol and what we’re working on in the way of better advances in additives or whatever it may be, or where we plan to build a new store for the Furniture Mart or something.

但我们宁愿不告诉世界我们拥有什么，就像我们不想告诉他们我们在 NetJets 的战略，或者我们打算如何处理 Lubrizol，以及我们在改进添加剂方面的工作，或者我们计划在哪里为家具市场建立新店之类的事情。

That’s proprietary information. And we have to disclose a certain amount, but we’re certainly not going to be touting the stocks to other people.

那是专有信息。我们必须披露一定量的信息，但我们肯定不会向其他人宣传这些股票。

In terms of calculating our performance, you can take the top ten or 12 stocks, and anybody could make the calculation. I mean, at the end of the year the Wall Street Journal runs — all the papers run something — where it says a year-to-date performance or something of the sort. So that’s a simple calculation. Charlie?

在计算我们的业绩时，你可以选择前十或十二只股票，任何人都可以进行计算。我的意思是，在年底，《华尔街日报》会发布——所有报纸都会发布一些——上面会写着年初至今的业绩或类似的内容。所以这是一项简单的计算。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add to that.

查理·芒格：我对此没有什么要补充的。

37. FlightSafety probably won’t get more demand for its simulators after Boeing MAX 737 crashes

飞行安全可能不会因为波音 MAX 737 坠毁而获得更多对其模拟器的需求。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Jonathan.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，乔纳森。

JONATHAN BRANDT: No one’s ever asked a question about FlightSafety, but perhaps this year it’s somewhat topical given the 737 MAX controversy. The New York Times spoke to engineers who said that Boeing explicitly designed the MAX in a manner that allowed airline customers to avoid paying for simulators to train their pilots.

乔纳森·布兰特：从来没有人问过关于FlightSafety的问题，但今年可能与737 MAX争议相关。《纽约时报》采访了一些工程师，他们表示波音公司明确设计了MAX，以使航空公司客户避免为模拟器支付费用来训练飞行员。

Do you expect the worldwide regulatory and commercial response to the MAX’s problems to result in increased demand for FlightSafety simulators? And could you please more generally discuss FlightSafety’s competitive position and growth prospects?

您是否预计全球对 MAX 问题的监管和商业反应会导致对 FlightSafety 模拟器的需求增加？您能否更一般地讨论一下 FlightSafety 的竞争地位和增长前景？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, FlightSafety is — their specialty would be with corporate pilots. They train our NetJets pilots, for example. They have a major facility with simulators for that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，FlightSafety 的专长是企业飞行员。他们为我们的 NetJets 飞行员提供培训，例如。他们有一个主要的设施，配备了模拟器。

I don’t think what’s happened with the 737 MAX will have any particular effect. I mean, we have — I don’t know how many of the Fortune 100 companies that we do business with, but it’s a very significant percentage.

我认为 737 MAX 发生的事情不会有任何特别的影响。我的意思是，我们与多少家财富 100 强公司有业务往来我不太清楚，但这是一个非常显著的比例。

And they train their pilots with FlightSafety because we’ve got the talent and the simulators like nobody else has for that business. And Charlie, didn’t you have that friend of yours that was trying to get Al Ueltschi to pass him when he shouldn’t?

这些公司之所以选择FlightSafety培训他们的飞行员，是因为我们有无人能及的人才和模拟器。查理，你那个朋友不是曾经试图让Al Ueltschi通过他考试吗？其实他不应该通过。

CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: You remember that story of your friend that wanted to have FlightSafety —

沃伦·巴菲特：你还记得你那个朋友想通过FlightSafety考试的故事吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh yes. 查理·芒格：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, why don’t you tell them? I mean, Al Ueltschi, who started FlightSafety with a few thousand dollars and a little visual simulator, or whatever it may have been at, LaGuardia, I mean, he really cared about saving lives. And he made a lot of money in the process, but he was dedicated throughout his lifetime to truly train better pilots and reduce the chance of accidents dramatically.

沃伦·巴菲特：为什么不告诉他们呢？Al Ueltschi创办了FlightSafety，只用了几千美元和一个简单的视觉模拟器，或许是当时在拉瓜迪亚机场。他真的关心拯救生命。他在过程中赚了很多钱，但他一生都致力于真正培训更好的飞行员，大幅减少事故的可能性。

It was a mission with him. And that spirit still continues.

这对他来说是一项使命。那种精神依然延续。

And as I say we’ve got a — I can’t tell you the percentages, I don’t know, but I know it’s very high — of certainly the corporate business. We have government business, we have some airline businesses and all of that.

我不能告诉你具体的百分比，我不知道，但我知道这个比例非常高——当然是企业业务。我们有政府业务，还有一些航空公司业务等等。

But I don’t expect any great change in the flight training business. But tell them about your friend, Charlie.

但我不期待飞行培训业务会有任何重大变化。但告诉他们关于你的朋友查理的事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, of course, people pass those tests with flying colors, and then some of them just barely pass. And one of my friends just barely passed and they called me and told me. It’s (inaudible) of the business.

查理·芒格：当然，人们在这些测试中表现得非常出色，而有些人则勉强通过。我的一个朋友勉强通过了，他们打电话告诉我。这是（听不清）业务的一部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: FlightSafety would not —

沃伦·巴菲特：FlightSafety 不会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They care about everything.

查理·芒格：他们关心一切。

WARREN BUFFETT: They care.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们在乎。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They watch the details.

查理·芒格：他们关注细节。

WARREN BUFFETT: They care. And those simulators can cost over $10 million, I mean, just — and they’re dedicated, obviously, to a given model of plane.

沃伦·巴菲特：他们在乎。而这些模拟器的成本可以超过 1000 万美元，我的意思是——而且它们显然是专门为某一型号的飞机而设计的。

You might find it interesting, at NetJets our pilots only fly one model. I mean — most charters and all those, I’m sure they — and incidentally, I think they could fly other models and all that, but we just want them to be flying one model. And we give them the maximum amount of training annually.

你可能觉得有趣的是，在NetJets，我们的飞行员只驾驶一种型号的飞机。我相信大多数包机飞行员可能会驾驶多种型号，但我们只要求他们驾驶一种型号的飞机，并且每年给予他们最多的培训。

And it’s — when I bought the company for Berkshire in, I think it was 1998 or thereabouts, you know, the thought obviously bothered me that I would have a significant percentage of people who would be friends of mine that were using it, and you know, you’d hate to have anything happen.

当我在 1998 年左右为伯克希尔收购这家公司时，我显然担心会有相当一部分使用它的人是我的朋友，而你知道，任何事情发生我都会感到不安。

I use it, my family uses it, our managers use it. And there’s nobody that cares more about safety. But I don’t see — other than at NetJets — it’s a first-class operation.

我使用它，我的家人使用它，我们的经理使用它。而且没有人比我们更关心安全。但我没有看到——除了在 NetJets——这是一个一流的操作。

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’ve never killed a passenger. They had one pilot who hit a glider at 16,000 feet, and it was kind of a difficult landing.

查理·芒格：他们从来没有导致乘客死亡。他们有一次，一个飞行员在16000英尺的高度撞上了一架滑翔机，导致了非常困难的着陆。

WARREN BUFFETT: It was more than difficult landing —

沃伦·巴菲特：这不仅仅是困难着陆——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They’ve never killed a — it was a woman pilot, yeah.

查理·芒格：他们从来没有杀过一个——是位女飞行员，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And she was flying the next day. The copilot was kind of taken out of operation for a while. But this woman ended up almost with the control panel in her lap because this guy turned off his battery and hit one of our Hawkers. And she had one shot at the runway and she brought it in.

沃伦·巴菲特：她第二天就又飞了。而副驾驶则暂时停飞了。那名女飞行员几乎把控制面板压在膝盖上，因为那家伙关闭了电池，撞上了我们的一架霍克飞机。她只有一次降落的机会，但她成功了。

And we’ve had some remarkable training and pilots there. You should ask for her if you’re flying on NetJets. (Laugher)

我们在培训和飞行员方面有一些非常了不起的成就。如果你乘坐NetJets，应该要求她来当你的飞行员。（笑声）

38. Buffett on tech investing: “We won’t go into something because somebody else tells us it’s a good thing to do”

巴菲特谈科技投资：“我们不会因为别人告诉我们这是个好主意就去做某事”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 10 站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, hi. My name is Daphne. I’m from New York and I’m nine years old. And I’m excited to be at the Berkshire meeting, and this is my third year.

观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，您好。我叫达芙妮，来自纽约，今年九岁。我很高兴能参加伯克希尔的会议，这是我第三年参加。

WARREN BUFFETT: Wow. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：哇。（掌声）

You should be rich by now. (Laughter)

你现在应该很富有了。（笑声）

AUIENCE MEMBER: You have often said that investors are well-served by identifying businesses with a wide moat, where the castle behind the moat is run by a king or queen who can be trusted to make good decisions.

观众成员：你经常说，投资者应该识别那些拥有广阔护城河的企业，而护城河背后的“城堡”由能够信任的国王或王后经营，确保做出明智的决策。

In the past, you have applied this advice by investing in businesses with world class strong brands, such as Coke, American Express, and See’s, as well as media companies that has helped these brands protect and widen their moats, such as Cap Cities, ABC, and the Washington Post.

过去，你们将这一建议应用于投资世界级强品牌的企业，比如可口可乐、美国运通和See’s糖果公司，以及帮助这些品牌保护和拓宽护城河的媒体公司，比如Capital Cities、ABC和《华盛顿邮报》。

In the past, you have also generally avoided investing in technology companies, pointing out how quickly technology changes and how hard it is to build a circle of competence in it.

过去，你通常也避免投资科技公司，指出科技变化的速度有多快，以及在这个领域建立竞争优势有多困难。

Today, we seem to be in a world where some of the most dominant companies in the world are technology companies. And we have built powerful platforms, such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Microsoft in America, and Alibaba and Tencent in China.

今天，我们似乎处于一个世界，在这个世界中，一些最具主导地位的公司是科技公司。我们在美国建立了强大的平台，如亚马逊、谷歌、Facebook 和微软，以及在中国的阿里巴巴和腾讯。

These companies all have wide moats, strong brands, and are led by brilliant — entrepreneurs.

这些公司都有广泛的护城河、强大的品牌，并由杰出的企业家领导。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s good. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：很好。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question to you is this: if Berkshire is to honor its tradition of investing in wide moats and strong brands, and especially in companies that are also capital efficient, do you think that Berkshire needs to expand its investing lens to include more of these leading technology platforms?

观众成员：我想问你的是：如果伯克希尔要遵循其投资于宽护城河和强品牌的传统，特别是投资于那些资本效率高的公司，你认为伯克希尔是否需要扩大其投资视野，以包括更多这些领先的科技平台？

In other words, do you believe that you need to adapt your model of wide moats and strong brands to embrace, not avoid, technology? (Applause)

换句话说，您是否相信需要调整您对宽护城河和强品牌的模型，以拥抱而不是回避技术？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the answer is maybe. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为答案可能是。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer is to put her on the board and it’ll bring down the average age enormously. We won’t get criticized as much.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为答案是让她进入董事会，这将大大降低平均年龄。我们不会受到那么多批评。

You’re exactly right, in that we do like moats, and we used to be able to identify them in a newspaper that was the only newspaper in town, or in TV stations where we felt the dominant position, we felt the product was underpriced in terms of advertising. We saw it in brands, sometimes.

你说得非常正确，我们确实喜欢护城河。我们过去能够识别护城河，像是只有一份报纸的城镇，或者那些我们觉得有主导地位的电视台，我们认为它们的广告价格被低估了。我们有时在品牌中也看到了护城河。

And it is true that in the tech world, if you can build a moat, it can be incredibly valuable. I’ve not felt the confidence that I was the best one to judge that in many cases.

在科技界，确实如此，如果你能建立一个护城河，它可能会非常有价值。在许多情况下，我并没有感到自己是最适合判断这一点的人。

It wasn’t hard to figure out who was winning at any given time or what their business was about, but there were a huge number of people that knew more about the game than I did. And we don’t want to try and win at a game we don’t understand. We may hire people, such as Ted (Weschler) and Todd (Combs), that are better at understanding certain areas of investing than I am, or maybe even Charlie is.

在任何时候，弄清楚谁在获胜或他们的业务是什么并不难，但有很多人对这个游戏的了解超过我。我们不想尝试在一个我们不理解的游戏中获胜。我们可能会雇佣一些人，比如泰德（韦施勒）和托德（科姆斯），他们在某些投资领域的理解能力比我更强，甚至可能比查理还要强。

But the principles haven’t changed. You’re right that some of the old ones have lost their moat and you’re right that there are going to be companies in the future that have them that will be enormously valuable.

但原则没有改变。你说得对，一些旧的原则已经失去了护城河，你也说得对，未来会有一些拥有护城河的公司，它们将会非常有价值。

And we hope we can identify one every now and then. But we won’t — we’ll still stay within where we think we know what we’re doing. And obviously, we’ll make mistakes even within that area.

我们希望能时不时识别出一个，但我们还是会坚持在我们觉得自己知道自己在做什么的领域内行动。当然，即使在这个领域内我们也会犯错。

But we won’t go into something because somebody else tells us it’s a good thing to do. I mean, we are not going to subcontract your money to somebody else’s judgment. You can take your money and follow somebody else’s judgment, but we’re not in the business of thinking that if we hire ten people with specialties in this area or that, that it will lead to superior investment results. And we do worry that we could blow a lot of money that way.

但我们不会因为别人告诉我们某件事是好事就去做。我们不会将你的钱交给别人的判断。如果你想用自己的钱去跟随别人的判断，那是你的选择，但我们不会通过雇佣一些专门研究某些领域的人来获得更好的投资结果。我们担心这样会浪费很多钱。

So, we’ll do our best to enlarge the circle of competence of the people at Berkshire so that we don’t miss so many. But we’ll miss a lot in the future. We missed a lot in the past.

所以，我们会尽力扩大伯克希尔员工的能力圈，以便不再错过这么多机会。但未来我们仍会错过很多。过去我们也错过了很多。

The main thing to do is to find things where our batting average is going to be high. And if we miss the biggest ones, that really doesn’t bother us, as long as the things we do with money work out OK. Charlie?

主要的事情是找到我们击球率高的地方。如果我们错过了最大的机会，那其实并不打紧，只要我们用钱做的事情能够顺利进行就可以了。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think we’ve still got an awful lot of companies with big moats, and a lot of them are very — and some are industrial brands that are just incredibly strong in the niches we’re in.

查理·芒格：我认为我们仍然有很多拥有巨大护城河的公司，其中许多公司非常强大，还有一些是我们所处细分市场中极其强大的工业品牌。

So, Berkshire shareholders don’t need to worry about we’re just one big morass of unprofitability or anything like that. But we have not covered ourselves with glory in the new fields.

所以，伯克希尔的股东不必担心我们会陷入无利可图的困境。但在新领域，我们确实没有获得太多辉煌的成绩。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We won’t end up all in buggy whips, though, or anything. But it’s a very good question, and it’s what we focus on all the time. And I hope —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们不会最终全都投资于“马车鞭”这样的落后产业。你的问题很好，这也是我们一直关注的重点。我希望——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We’re trying to improve.

查理·芒格：我们正在努力改进。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we hope we see you back here for your fourth next year.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们希望明年还能看到你来参加第四次会议。

39. “In the end, Berkshire should prove itself over time”

“最终，伯克希尔应该随着时间的推移证明自己”

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？（掌声）

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Stuart Boyd (PH), who’s a chemical engineer from Australia.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自斯图尔特·博伊德（PH），他是一位来自澳大利亚的化学工程师。

He says, “Currently Berkshire would be incredibly difficult for an activist investor to target, because number one, Warren, your ownership stake is large. Number two, shareholders appreciate the business is more valuable operating under the Berkshire umbrella rather than being sold off in pieces.

他说：“目前，伯克希尔对激进投资者来说将非常难以成为目标，因为第一，沃伦，你的持股比例很大。第二，股东们认识到，在伯克希尔的庇护下，企业的价值更高，而不是被拆分出售。”

“And number three, the sheer size or market capitalization of Berkshire is an entry barrier for most activist investors.

“第三，伯克希尔的庞大规模或市值对大多数激进投资者来说是一个进入障碍。”

“Warren and Charlie, after your ownership has been completely distributed, will Berkshire be more vulnerable to activist investors? I’m guessing this isn’t something that keeps you up at night, but thought it was worth asking.”

“沃伦和查理，在你们的所有权完全分配后，伯克希尔会更容易受到激进投资者的攻击吗？我猜这不是让你们夜不能寐的事情，但我觉得问问还是值得的。”

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it’s going to happen quite a few decades after my death.

查理·芒格：不，这将在我去世几十年后发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。它——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think I’ll be bothered much by it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我觉得这不会让我太困扰。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: No, anything could happen. It’s a low probability. It can’t happen for a lot of years, in terms of the way my stock gets distributed and in terms of the way other stock is held.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，任何事情都有可能发生。不过这种情况的可能性很低。在我的股票分配方式和其他股票的持有方式上，未来很多年里这种情况都不会发生。

But in the end, Berkshire should prove itself over time. I mean, there are no perpetuities. And it deserves to be continued in its present form. It has a lot of attributes that are maximized by being in one entity, which people don’t fully understand.

但最终，伯克希尔应该会随着时间的推移证明自己。我的意思是，没有永恒的事物。它值得以目前的形式继续存在。它有许多属性，通过作为一个实体来最大化，而人们并没有完全理解这一点。

I think if you spin off something that would command a high PE that therefore value has been unlocked, which is totally nonsense. I mean, it’s already built in.

我认为如果你剥离出一些能够获得高市盈率的东西，那么价值就被释放了，这完全是胡说。我是说，这已经内置在里面了。

One day out, you know, you might have an extra 3 percent or 5 percent in price, but over the years, we want to keep the wonderful businesses.

短期内，你可能会在股价上看到3%或5%的增长，但从长期来看，我们希望保持这些优秀的业务。

But eventually I think the culture will remain one of a kind. I think that we will be able to do things other people can’t do.

但最终我认为这种文化将保持独一无二。我认为我们将能够做其他人做不到的事情。

I think that the advantages of having them in one spot will likely be significant over time. And if that happens, then no activist is going to take it over.

我相信这些业务集中的优势在未来会非常显著。如果这种情况继续发生，激进投资者就不会对伯克希尔产生威胁。

And if the model doesn’t work for some reason over a long period of time, then something else should happen. Charlie?

但如果某些原因导致这种模式长期不再奏效，那么应该采取其他措施。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing more.

查理·芒格：没有更多。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. 沃伦·巴菲特：好的。

40. GEICO trying to improve its loss ratio as it competes with Progressive

GEICO 试图改善其损失比率，以便与 Progressive 竞争

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay. 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊。

JAY GELB: This question is on GEICO. Progressive is gaining the most market share among the major auto insurers, based on its presence in the direct and independent agency channels, as well as now bundling its auto and homeowners insurance coverage.

杰伊·盖尔布：这个问题是关于GEICO的。Progressive公司目前在主要汽车保险公司中占据了最多的市场份额，主要是因为它在直销和独立代理渠道中的强势地位，以及将汽车保险与房主保险打包销售。

How does GEICO plan on responding to competitive threats so that it can retain its place as the second-largest auto insurer? I was hoping we could also hear on this topic from Ajit (Jain) or GEICO’s management. Thank you.

GEICO计划如何应对这些竞争威胁，以保住其作为第二大汽车保险公司的地位？我也希望能听到Ajit Jain或GEICO管理层对此的看法。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Progressive is a very well-run business. GEICO is a very well-run business. And I think they will, for a long time, be the two companies that the rest of the auto insurance industry has trouble not losing share to. But there’s, you know, I think — I’ve always thought for a long, long time, Progressive has been very well run.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。Progressive 是一家管理非常出色的公司。GEICO 也是一家管理非常出色的公司。我认为，在很长一段时间内，它们将是汽车保险行业中其他公司难以不失去市场份额的两家公司。但我认为——我一直认为，Progressive 管理得非常好。

They have an appetite for growth. Sometimes they copy us a little, sometimes we copy them a little. And I think that’ll be true five years from now and 10 years from now.

他们有很强的增长欲望。有时他们会模仿我们，有时我们会模仿他们。我认为在未来的五年或十年内，这种情况还会继续。

And we sell substantial amounts of homeowners insurance. We have an agency arrangement with that. We were in the business of writing it ourselves, until Hurricane Andrew, when a decision was made — we didn’t control it then — but the decision was made that the homeowners, essentially, you could lose as much in one year as you made in the previous 25 years. And the float isn’t as large.

我们销售大量的房主保险。我们与此有代理安排。我们曾经自己承保，直到安德鲁飓风，那时做出了一个决定——我们当时并没有控制权——但决定是，房主保险基本上，你在一年内可能会损失的金额与过去 25 年所赚的金额一样多。而且浮存金也没有那么大。

So, we became a company that placed our customers’ desire for homeowners with several other large and solid organizations.

因此，我们成为了一家为客户提供与其他几家大型且稳健组织的房主保险安排的公司。

The big thing is auto insurance. And we grew in the first quarter about 340,000 policies, net, which will look quite good compared to anybody but Progressive.

最大的事情是汽车保险。在第一季度，我们净增长了大约 340,000 份保单，与其他公司相比，这看起来相当不错，除了 Progressive。

And that was quite a bit more than last year, but not as good as two years ago. And the profit margin was in the nine-point area. So, I feel extremely good about GEICO, I mean, what has been built there by Tony (Nicely) and his people is perfect, but I would feel fine —

而这比去年多了很多，但不如两年前好。利润率在九个百分点左右。所以，我对 GEICO 感到非常满意，我的意思是，托尼（尼克利）和他的团队所建立的东西是完美的，但我会觉得很好——

We don’t own any Progressive, but I think that Progressive is an excellent company, and we will watch what they do, and they will watch what we do. And we will see, five years from now or 10 years from now, which one of us passes State Farm first. Charlie? Oh, and Ajit, would you like?

我们不拥有任何 Progressive 的股份，但我认为 Progressive 是一家优秀的公司，我们会关注他们的动态，他们也会关注我们的动态。我们将看看，五年后或十年后，谁会先超过 State Farm。查理？哦，阿吉特，你想要吗？

AJIT JAIN: Well, the underwriting profit is really a function of two major variables. One is the expense ratio and the other is the loss ratio, without getting too technical.

AJIT JAIN：嗯，承保利润实际上是两个主要变量的函数。一个是费用比率，另一个是损失比率，不用太过技术性。

GEICO has a significant advantage over Progressive when it comes to the expense ratio, to the extent of about seven points or so.

GEICO 在费用比率方面相较于 Progressive 具有显著优势，差距约为七个百分点左右。

On the loss ratio side, Progressive does a much better job than GEICO does. They have, I think, about a 12-point advantage over GEICO. So, net-net, Progressive is ahead by about five points.

在损失比率方面，Progressive 的表现远胜于 GEICO。我认为他们比 GEICO 有大约 12 个百分点的优势。因此，综合来看，Progressive 领先大约五个百分点。

GEICO is very aware of this disadvantage on the loss ratio that they are suffering, and they’re very focused on trying to bridge that gap as quickly as they can. They have a few projects in place, and, you know, sometimes GEICO is ahead of Progressive. Right now, Progressive is ahead of GEICO. But I’m hopeful they’ll catch up on the loss ratio side and maintain the expense ratio advantage as well. Thank you.

GEICO 非常清楚他们在损失比率上所面临的劣势，并且他们非常专注于尽快弥补这一差距。他们有一些项目在进行中，有时 GEICO 会领先于 Progressive。现在，Progressive 领先于 GEICO。但我希望他们能在损失比率方面赶上，并保持费用比率的优势。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: GEICO has gained market share, essentially — I’d have to look at the figures for sure — but virtually every year since Tony took over. And I would bet significant money that GEICO increases its market share in the next five years. And I think it will, for sure, this year.

沃伦·巴菲特：自从托尼接管以来，GEICO 几乎每年都在增加市场份额——我得查看具体数据——但我敢打赌，GEICO 在未来五年内会增加市场份额。我认为今年肯定会如此。

So, it is a terrific business. And — but Progressive is a terrific business. And we’ll — as Ajit says, we’ve got the advantage in expenses, and we will have an advantage in expenses. And then the question is, are we —

所以，这是一个很棒的业务。而且——但 Progressive 也是一个很棒的业务。正如 Ajit 所说，我们在费用上有优势，并且我们将继续在费用上保持优势。然后问题是，我们是否——

They have a very sophisticated way of pricing business. And the question is whether we give some of that five points back — or six points back — in terms of loss ratio. We are working very hard at that, but I’m sure they’re working very hard too to improve their system.

他们有一种非常复杂的定价方式。问题是我们是否在损失比率方面优化其中的五个点——或者六个点。我们正在为此努力，但我相信他们也在努力改善他们的系统。

So, it’s a — to some extent it’s a two-horse race, and we’ve got a very good horse.

某种程度上，这是一场两匹马的竞赛，而我们拥有一匹非常好的马。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But Warren, in the nature of things, every once in a while, somebody’s a little better at something than we are.

查理·芒格：但是沃伦，事物的本质是，偶尔会有人在某些方面比我们更出色。

WARREN BUFFETT: Ha. You’ve noticed. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：哈。你注意到了。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I noticed.

查理·芒格：是的。我注意到了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I’d settle for second place in a lot of the businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在很多行业中，我愿意接受第二名。

41. Try to have a big circle of competence but be realistic about its perimeter

尽量拥有一个广泛的能力圈，但要对其边界保持现实。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 11.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，11 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for taking my question. My name is Feroz Qayyum and I’m from Mississauga in Canada, and now live in New York.

观众成员：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，谢谢你们回答我的问题。我叫费罗兹·凯尤姆，来自加拿大的密西沙加，现在住在纽约。

My question is how to best emulate your success in building your circle of competence. Given the environment today in investing is a lot more competitive than when you started out, what would you do differently, if anything at all, when building your circle?

我的问题是如何最好地模仿您在建立能力圈方面的成功。考虑到今天的投资环境比您刚开始时竞争要激烈得多，您在建立能力圈时会有什么不同的做法吗？

Would you still build a very broad, generalist framework? Or would you build a much deeper but narrower focus, say on industries, markets, or even a country? And if so, which ones would interest you? Thank you.

你还会建立一个非常广泛的通用框架吗？还是会建立一个更深入但更狭窄的焦点，比如说在行业、市场或甚至一个国家上？如果是的话，哪些会引起你的兴趣？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, you’re right. It’s much more competitive now than when I started. And you would — when I started, I literally could take the Moody’s industrial manual and the Moody’s banks and financial manual and I could go through page by page, at least run my eyes over every company and think about which ones I might think more about.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你说得对。现在的竞争比我刚开始时要激烈得多。当我刚开始时，我可以逐页翻阅穆迪的工业手册和穆迪的银行与金融手册，至少可以浏览每家公司，考虑哪些公司我可能会更深入思考。

It’s — it’s important — I would just do a whole lot of reading. I’d try and learn as much as I could about as many businesses, and I would try to figure out which ones I really had some important knowledge and understanding that was probably different than, overwhelmingly, most of my competitors.

这很重要——我会大量阅读。我会尽量了解尽可能多的企业，并试图找出我真正拥有的一些重要知识和理解，这些知识和理解可能与大多数竞争对手截然不同。

And I would also try and figure out which ones I didn’t understand, and I would focus on having as big a circle as I could have, and also focus on being as realistic as I could about where the perimeters of my circle of competence were.

我还会试着弄清楚哪些我不理解的内容，并专注于尽可能扩大我的能力圈，同时也尽量现实地认识到我的能力范围的边界在哪里。

I knew when I met (GEICO executive) Lorimer Davidson in January of 1951, I could get insurance. I mean, what he said made so much sense to me in the three or four hours I spent with him on that Saturday.

我记得1951年1月我遇到（GEICO高管）洛里默·戴维森时，我很快就明白了保险行业的逻辑。他说的话在那几个小时里对我非常有意义，所以我深入研究，发现我的思维在这个领域工作得很好。

So, I dug into it and I could understand it. My mind worked well in that respect.

所以，我深入研究了这个，我能够理解它。在这方面，我的思维运作得很好。

I didn’t think I could understand retailing. All I’d done is work for the same grocery store that Charlie had, and neither one of us learned that much about retailing, except it was harder work than we liked.

我没想到我能理解零售业。我所做的只是和查理在同一家杂货店工作，我们都没有学到太多关于零售业的知识，只知道这比我们喜欢的工作要辛苦得多。

And you’ve got to do the same thing, and you’ve got way more competition now. But if you get to know even about a relatively small area more than the other people do, and you don’t feel the compulsion to act too often, you just wait till the odds are strongly in your favor. It’s still a very interesting game. It’s harder than it used to be. Charlie?

现在竞争更加激烈，但即使你只在一个相对较小的领域比其他人了解得更多，并且不感到必须频繁行动，等待时机成熟时再出手，仍然是一场非常有趣的游戏。只是现在比以前更难了。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the great strategy, for the great mass of humanity, is to specialize. Nobody wants to go to a doctor that half-proctologist and half-dentist, you know? (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我认为，对于大多数人来说，最好的策略是专注化。没人愿意去看一个既是肛肠科医生又是牙医的人。（笑声）

And so, the ordinary way to succeed is to narrowly specialize. Warren and I really didn’t do that. And that — and we didn’t because we prefer the other type of activity. But I don’t think we could recommend it to other people.

所以，普通人成功的方式是专注于某个狭窄的领域。沃伦和我并没有这样做——我们没有这样做是因为我们更喜欢其他类型的活动。但我不认为我们可以向其他人推荐这种方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, a little more treasure hunting in our day, and it was easy to spot the treasures —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们那时候有更多的寻宝活动，很容易就能发现宝藏——

CHARLIE MUNGER: We made it work, but it was kind of a lucky thing.

查理·芒格：我们让它成功了，但这有点运气成分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s not the standard way to go.

查理·芒格：这不是标准的做法。

WARREN BUFFETT: The business, at least I best understood, actually was insurance. I mean — and I had very little competition. You know, I went to the insurance department in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. I remember one time I drove there just to check on some Pennsylvania company. And this is when you couldn’t get all this information on the internet.

沃伦·巴菲特：我最了解的业务实际上是保险。我的竞争非常少。你知道，我去过宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡的保险部门。我记得有一次我开车去那里只是为了查看一家宾夕法尼亚公司。当时你无法在互联网上获取所有这些信息。

And I went in and I asked about some company, and the guy said, “You’re the first one that’s ever asked about that company.” And there wasn’t a lot.

我进去问了一些关于某公司的事，那个人说：“你是第一个问这个公司的。”而且没有很多信息。

I went over to the Standard and Poor’s library on Houston — Houston — Street, I guess they call it. And I would go up there and ask for all this obscure information. And there wasn’t anybody sitting around there. They had a whole bunch of tables that you could set and examine things through. So, there was less competition.

我去了位于休斯顿街的标准普尔图书馆。我会去那里询问所有这些晦涩的信息。那里没有人坐着。他们有一大堆桌子，你可以坐下来研究东西。因此，竞争较少。

But if you know even one thing very well, it’ll give you an edge at some point. You know, it’s what Tom Watson Sr. said at IBM, you know. “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.” And that’s basically what Charlie and I try and do. And I think that’s probably what you can do. But you’ll find those spots in —

但如果你对某一件事非常了解，这将在某个时刻给你带来优势。你知道，汤姆·沃森（Tom Watson Sr.）在 IBM 时说过：“我不是天才，但我在某些方面聪明，我会待在那些地方。”这基本上就是查理和我所尝试做的。我认为这也是你可以做到的。但你会在——找到那些地方。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we did it in several fields. That’s hard.

查理·芒格：是的，我们在几个领域做到了。这很难。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we got our head handed to us a few times, too.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们也吃了几次亏。

42. Berkshire is strong on the environment but won’t do expensive reports to prove it

伯克希尔在环境方面表现强劲，但不会花费高昂的费用来证明这一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thanks, Warren. Governance question from a shareholder.

安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：谢谢，沃伦。来自股东的治理问题。

Larry Fink of BlackRock has predicted that in the near future, all investors will be using ESG —environmental, social, governance — metrics to help determine the value of a company. I’m worried we don’t score well on everything from climate to diversity to inclusion. How well do you think Berkshire measures up on those metrics, and are they valuable metrics?

贝莱德的拉里·芬克预测，在不久的将来，所有投资者都将使用 ESG（环境、社会、治理）指标来帮助确定公司的价值。我担心我们在气候、多样性和包容性等方面的评分不高。你认为伯克希尔在这些指标上的表现如何，这些指标有价值吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think in reality we measure up well, but we don’t participate in preparing reports for anybody that asks about it.

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为实际上我们做得很好，但我们不参与为任何提出问题的人准备报告。

And we have this idea that even though all shareholders are equal, we sort of — we prefer individual shareholders. We actually prefer people we know as co-owners.

我们有一个想法，即使所有股东都是平等的，我们更倾向于个体股东。实际上，我们更喜欢我们认识的股东作为共同所有者。

And we don’t want to be preparing a lot of reports and asking 60 subsidiaries each to do something, where they’ll set up a team, and they’ll mail things to headquarters, and then we’ll supply them to somebody who, if our stock goes up some, is probably going to sell it anyway.

我们不想准备大量报告并要求 60 个子公司各自做一些事情，他们会组建一个团队，然后将材料邮寄到总部，最后我们再把这些材料提供给某个如果我们的股票上涨，可能会卖掉的人。

We want our managers to do the right things. We give them enormous latitude to do that. And I think that our batting average really is quite good.

我们希望我们的经理做正确的事情。我们给予他们巨大的自由度去做到这一点。我认为我们的成功率确实相当不错。

You saw that in the movie, we talked about having a hundred percent of the electricity we sell in Iowa come from, essentially, wind generation. Now that doesn’t mean that we get to do it 24 hours a day. We sell some and we buy it. But essentially, we will be creating as much wind energy as all of our customers use in electricity.

您在电影中看到了，我们谈到了在爱荷华州出售的电力中，有100%来自风能发电。当然，这不意味着我们24小时都能这么做。我们卖一部分，买一部分。但基本上，我们会创造的风能与所有客户使用的电力一样多。。

There’s one competitive — there’s one other utility — electric utility — that’s about our size — roughly our size — in Iowa, and they have practically no wind resources. And the wind blows where they exist, too. But we have — we will have that hundred percent — and as a matter of fact, it’s a moving target, because we do so well — partly — we do so well on wind generation that a number of the high-tech companies want to locate in Iowa and get clean energy from us at very low prices. And therefore, the moving target becomes our growth in customers in that area.

在爱荷华州，有一家与我们规模相当的电力公司，但他们几乎没有风能资源。而且风能的存在也与他们的地理位置有关。但我们将实现百分之百的风能发电——实际上，这个目标是动态变化的，因为我们在风能发电方面表现得非常出色——部分原因是，许多高科技公司希望在爱荷华州落户，并以非常低的价格从我们这里获取清洁能源。因此，这个动态目标变成了我们在该地区客户增长的目标。

But we are not going to put out a — we’re not going to spend the time of the people at Berkshire Hathaway Energy responding to questionnaires or trying to score better with somebody that is working on that.

但我们不会发布——我们不会花时间让伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的员工回答问卷或试图在某些正在处理此事的人面前得分更高。

It’s just, we trust our managers and I think the performance is at least decent. And we keep expenses and needless reporting down to a minimum at Berkshire.

事实是，我们信任我们的管理人员，我认为他们的表现至少是不错的。我们在伯克希尔将不必要的报告和开支降到最低。

We do not get — and I mentioned this in the annual report — I can’t imagine another company like it — but here we are, with 500 billion of market capitalization — we do not have a consolidated P&L monthly. We don’t need it.

我们没有——我在年度报告中提到过——我无法想象还有其他公司像这样——但我们现在市值达到 5000 亿美元——我们没有每月的合并损益表。我们不需要它。

Now I can’t imagine any other organization doing that, but we don’t need it. And we’re not going to tie up resources — people resources — doing things we don’t need to do just because it’s the sort of standard procedure in corporate America.

现在我无法想象其他任何组织会这样做，但我们不需要这样。我们也不会把人力资源浪费在不必要的事情上，仅仅因为这在美国企业中是标准程序。

And corporate America is very worried about, in general, they’re very worried about whether somebody’s going to upset their apple cart, you know, with activists and everything.

一般来说，企业美国非常担心他们的局面会被打破，特别是有激进投资者的存在。

So, they want to be very sure that every shareholder is happy on issues like that. And in the end, fortunately, we don’t have to worry about that. So, we don’t have to run up a lot of expenses doing things that don’t actually let us run the business better. Charlie?

所以，他们非常确保每位股东在这些问题上都感到满意。但幸运的是，我们不必担心这些问题。所以我们不需要通过做那些并不能让我们更好地经营业务的事情来增加开支。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think at Berkshire the environmental stuff is done one level down from us. And I think Greg Abel is just terrific at it. And so, I think we score very well.

查理·芒格：我认为在伯克希尔，环境事务是在我们下面的一级处理的。我认为格雷格·阿贝尔在这方面做得非常出色。所以，我认为我们在这些方面的评分非常高。

When it gets to so-called best corporate practices, I think the people that talk about them don’t really know what the best practices are. They just know what they think are the best practices. And they determine that based on what will sell, not what will work.

当谈到所谓的最佳企业实践时，我认为谈论这些的人并不真正知道最佳实践是什么。他们只知道他们认为的最佳实践。他们的判断是基于什么能卖，而不是基于什么有效。

And so, I like our way of doing things better than theirs, and I hope to God we never follow their best practices. (Applause)

因此，我更喜欢我们的方法，而不是他们的，我希望上帝保佑我们永远不要遵循他们的最佳实践。（掌声）

43. “Independent” board members aren’t really independent

“独立”董事并不真正独立

WARREN BUFFETT: I’d like to point out one thing on independent directors. I mean, I have been on 20 public company corporate boards, not counting any Berkshire subsidiaries. So, I’ve seen a lot of corporate boards operate. And the independent directors, in many cases, are the least independent.

沃伦·巴菲特：我想指出独立董事的一个问题。我的意思是，我曾在 20 个上市公司的董事会任职，不包括任何伯克希尔的子公司。因此，我见过很多公司董事会的运作。在许多情况下，独立董事是最不独立的。

I mean, if the income you receive as a corporate director — which typically may be around $250,000 a year — now, if that’s an important part of your income, and you hope that some other corporation calls the CEO and says, “How’s so-and-so as a director?” and the current CEO — your CEO — says, “Oh, he’s fine and never raises any problems,” and then you get on another board at 250,000 and that’s an important part, how in the world is that independent? I mean, I really, just an observation. (Applause)

我的意思是，如果你作为公司董事所获得的收入——通常大约是每年 25 万美元——现在，如果这对你的收入来说是一个重要部分，而你希望其他公司打电话给首席执行官，问“某某作为董事怎么样？”而现任首席执行官——你的首席执行官——说：“哦，他很好，从来没有提出任何问题，”然后你又在另一个董事会获得 25 万美元的收入，而这又是一个重要部分，这样怎么可能是独立的呢？我的意思是，这只是一个观察。（掌声）

I can’t recall, particularly, any independent director — where their income from the board was important to them — I can’t recall them ever doing anything in board meetings or committee meetings that actually was counter to the interest — you know, they put them on the comp committee.

我特别回忆不起来有哪位董事会成员，他们从董事会获得的收入对他们来说很重要，但他们在董事会会议或委员会会议上做过任何实际上违背公司利益的事情。通常他们被安排到薪酬委员会上，他们是不会破坏现状的。

They’re just not going to upset the apple cart, because what they’re — and I’d probably behave the same way in the same position. I mean, if $250,000 a year is important to you, why in the hell would you behave in a way that’s going to cause your CEO to say to the next CEO, “This guy acts up a little bit too much. You really better get somebody else.” It’s the way it works. But they’ve —

他们只是不想打乱局面，因为他们——我在同样的情况下可能也会这样做。我的意思是，如果每年 25 万美元对你很重要，为什么你会以一种会让你的首席执行官对下任首席执行官说“这个家伙有点太过分了。你最好找其他人”的方式行事呢？这就是事情的运作方式。但他们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it works a little worse than Warren’s telling you. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：我觉得实际情况比沃伦描述的还要糟糕。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理和我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s really awful.

查理·芒格：这真是太糟糕了。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s awful. I mean, we —

沃伦·巴菲特：这太糟糕了。我的意思是，我们——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And not only that, Warren and I are — we occupy the niche for pomposity very well ourselves. We don’t need any more of it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：不仅如此，沃伦和我已经很好地占据了自大这方面的利基市场，我们不需要更多的人来填补这个位置了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I were on one board. Well, I was on one board, actually, a long time ago where we owned a very significant percentage of the company. And the rest of the board was almost exclusively customers of the company. But not owners. They had absolutely token holdings. And at one point we were looking at something where a tax decision was being made in terms of the distribution of some securities.

沃伦·巴菲特：查理和我曾在一个董事会。我实际上很久以前在一个董事会，我们拥有公司非常重要的股份。董事会的其他成员几乎都是公司的客户，但不是股东。他们的持股几乎是象征性的。在某个时刻，我们在考虑一个问题，涉及到一些证券分配的税务决策。

And it was a lot of money that was involved. And one of the other directors said, “Well, let’s just swallow the tax.” Well, his swallowing amounted to about $15 or something — (Laughs)

涉及的金额非常庞大。另一位董事说：“那我们就吞下这笔税吧。”他的吞下大约只值 15 美元左右——（笑）

I said, “Let’s parse this sentence out. Let’s swallow the tax. That’s let us swallow the tax. So, who wants to swallow an equal amount, you know, to me?”

我说：“我们来分析这个句子。让我们承担税收。也就是说，让我们承担税收。那么，谁想要承担与我相等的金额呢？”

It’s — you know, it’s — you don’t get invited to be on boards if you belch too often at the dinner table —

你知道的，如果你在餐桌上太频繁地打嗝，就不会被邀请加入董事会

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at Blue Chip Stamps we had a director who said, “I don’t see why you guys get to be so important just because you own all the shares.”

查理·芒格：在蓝筹印花公司，我们有一位董事说：“我不明白你们为什么仅仅因为拥有所有股份就变得如此重要。”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

Charlie and I used to have to cool off after the Blue Chip Stamps meetings, because we and Rick Garrett owned what percent, probably?

查理和我以前在蓝筹印花会议后需要冷静一下，因为我们和里克·加雷特拥有多少百分比，可能？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, 50 percent.

查理·芒格：哦，50%。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, 50 percent, and they’d appointed all these —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，50%，他们任命了所有这些——

CHARLIE MUNGER: They were all members of the Rotary Club.

查理·芒格：他们都是扶轮社的成员。

WARREN BUFFETT: It came out of a government settlement or something. And it was not an ideal form of decision making. And they just had a different calculus in their mind than we did. And I can understand it, but I’m not going to replicate it. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是来自某个政府和解的结果。这并不是一种理想的决策方式。他们心中的计算方式与我们不同。我能理解，但我不会去复制它。（笑）

44. “We will put a lot of money into energy” with capital spending at utilities

“我们将投入大量资金用于能源”，公用事业的资本支出。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。

GREGG WARREN: Warren and Charlie, U.S. electricity demand has flatlined during the past decade, but could potentially pick up over the next decade with three emerging sources of demand — electric vehicle charging, datacenters, and cannabis cultivation — expected to account for more than 5 percent of total U.S. electricity demand.

格雷格·沃伦：沃伦和查理，过去十年，美国的电力需求基本保持平稳，但未来十年，电动汽车充电、数据中心和大麻种植这三大新兴需求源，预计将占到美国总电力需求的5%以上。

Utilities will have to work hard to benefit from this new demand, though, much of which is likely to accrue to states in the South Atlantic, Central, West, and Mountain regions, with the greatest benefit going to firms that invest in grid expansion, smart networks, reliability, and renewable energy.

不过，公用事业公司需要付出努力才能从这种新增需求中受益，其中大部分需求可能会集中在南大西洋、中部、西部和山区地区，而那些投资于电网扩展、智能网络、可靠性和可再生能源的公司将获得最大的利益。

While Berkshire Energy has been aggressive with its capital investments, and already has some of the lowest electricity rates in the areas where it competes, it seems like the firm is winding down its annual spending at a time when more might actually be required.

尽管伯克希尔能源在资本投资方面非常积极，并且在其竞争的地区已经拥有一些最低的电价，但似乎该公司正在减少年度支出，而此时实际上可能需要更多的投资。

With annual spending expected to fall from around 6 billion, on average, annually to around 4 billion in 2021, with two-thirds of that spending being more maintenance driven than growth.

预计年度支出将从每年约 60 亿下降到 2021 年的约 40 亿，其中三分之二的支出更多是以维护为主，而非增长。

Is there any one area where you feel Berkshire Energy might need to commit more capital over the next decade to ensure that it captures this future expected demand growth, much as it already has with wind power in western Iowa, which is now populated with a lot of data centers, and for territories where demand growth is expected to be the strongest but where Berkshire does not have a presence, are there any avenues aside from acquisitions for the company to put capital to work?

在未来十年中，您认为伯克希尔能源是否有某个领域需要投入更多资本，以确保能够捕捉到未来预期的需求增长，就像它在西爱荷华州的风能项目一样，该地区现在有很多数据中心。对于需求增长预计最强的地区，但伯克希尔尚未进入，除了收购之外，公司还有哪些途径可以投入资本？

WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to throw that over to Ajit in just a second. But I will tell you that we have three owners of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. We are the 91 percent owner. And there are no three owners that are more interested in pouring money into sensible deals within the utility industry or are better situated in terms of the people we have to maximize any opportunities. We have never had a penny of dividends in — whatever it is — close to 20 years of owning MidAmerican Energy.

沃伦·巴菲特：我将把这个问题交给阿吉特。但我可以告诉你，我们拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦能源的三位股东。我们持有91%的股份。没有比我们更愿意在公用事业行业中进行明智投资的股东，也没有比我们更具备最大化机会的能力的团队。我们拥有中美能源快20年了，从未分配过一分钱的股息。

And other utility companies pay high dividends. They really — they just don’t have the capital appetite, essentially, that we do. So, it’s just a question of finding sensible projects.

其他公用事业公司支付高额股息。他们实际上——他们根本没有我们所需的资本需求。因此，这只是寻找合理项目的问题。

And I would say that there’s no group that is as smart about it, as motivated about it as our group. And with that I’ll turn it over to Greg.

我想说，没有哪个团队像我们团队一样对这件事如此聪明和有动力。接下来我把时间交给格雷格。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In short, we’re about as good as you can get, and you should worry about something else.

查理·芒格：简而言之，我们已经尽可能优秀了，你应该担心其他事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

But Greg, could you stand up and talk about —? We really hope to spend a lot of money in energy.

但是格雷格，你能站起来谈谈——吗？我们真的希望在能源方面花很多钱。

GREG ABEL: Yeah, yeah. Afternoon. Yeah, Gregg, you touched on it. A couple critical areas we go forward is to look realistically in the ’21, 2022 timeframe. Because as you touched on, we’ve got a great portfolio as we finish out 2019, 2020. And it’s really been focused on building new renewable energy projects in Iowa, expanding the grid.

格雷格·阿贝尔：是的，是的。下午好。是的，格雷格，你提到了这一点。我们前进的几个关键领域是要在 2021 年和 2022 年时间框架内进行现实的审视。正如你提到的，我们在 2019 年和 2020 年结束时拥有一个很好的投资组合。我们的重点实际上是建设新的可再生能源项目，扩展电网。

But equally, we do have those opportunities in our other utilities. The footprint in Iowa, realistically, is getting pretty full. As we hit a hundred percent renewables — Warren touched on it — every time we get a new data center, that means we can build another 300 megawatts of renewables. We’ll continue to do that.

但同样，我们在其他公用事业中也有这些机会。爱荷华州的市场实际上已经相当饱和。当我们达到百分之百的可再生能源时——沃伦提到过——每当我们获得一个新的数据中心，就意味着我们可以再建设 300 兆瓦的可再生能源。我们将继续这样做。

But when you look at PacifiCorp, where we serve six states in the Northwest, we’ve really just embarked on an expansion program there.

但是当你看看 PacifiCorp，我们在西北地区服务六个州，我们实际上刚刚开始了一个扩展计划。

The first part was to build significant transmission, so expand the grid, and then start to build renewables. But just to give you some perspective of the regulation that exists in place, we started that project in 2008. And we’re realistically building the first third of it. But we do have the planning in place for the second phase and the third phase, and that’s what you’ll see coming into place in 2021 and in ’23.

第一部分是建立重要的传输，因此扩展电网，然后开始建设可再生能源。但为了让你了解现有的监管情况，我们在 2008 年开始了这个项目。实际上，我们正在建设其中的三分之一。但我们已经为第二阶段和第三阶段做好了规划，这就是你将在 2021 年和 2023 年看到的。

And the reality is we’ll continue to do that at NV Energy, with really, again, the focus being on both grid expansion, so we can move the resources, and then supplementing it with renewables. So, it’s exactly what you’ve touched on.

在 NV Energy，我们将继续这样做，重点是电网扩展，以便我们能够调动资源，并通过可再生能源进行补充。这正是您提到的内容。

And we haven’t identified the specific projects yet, so we never put them in our capital forecast that we disclose to folks. But as they firm up and we know that they will go forward, clearly you’ll see some incremental capital. And that’s capital we clearly earn on behalf of the Berkshire shareholders as we deploy it. Thank you.

我们还没有确定具体的项目，因此我们从未将它们纳入我们向外界披露的资本预测中。但随着项目的确定并且我们知道它们将会推进，显然你会看到一些增量资本。这是我们在为伯克希尔股东部署资本时显然赚取的资本。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We will put a lot of money into energy. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我们会投入大量资金用于能源。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we’re really in marvelous shape in this department.

查理·芒格：是的，我们在这个部门的状况真是太好了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, you know, Walter Scott, I mean, he gets excited looking at all these projects, and goes out and visits them. He knows way more about the business — and he’s forgotten more about it than I’ll ever know.

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，你知道，沃尔特·斯科特，他看到这些项目时会感到兴奋，并且会去实地考察。他对这个行业了解得多得多——他忘记的东西比我永远都能知道的还要多。

But we’ve got a great partnership. We’ve got unlimited capital. We’ll continue to have it. And there’s needs for huge capital in the industry.

但我们有一个很好的合作关系。我们拥有无限的资本。我们将继续拥有它。这个行业对巨额资本有需求。

So, I think 10 years from now or 20 years from now, our record will be looked at and there’ll be nothing like it in the energy business.

所以，我认为 10 年后或 20 年后，我们的记录将会被审视，而在能源行业中将没有任何类似的记录。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Greg, is there anybody ahead of where we are in Iowa in terms of energy?

查理·芒格：好吧，格雷格，在爱荷华州，是否还有人比我们在能源方面更先进？

GREG ABEL: Charlie, there’s realistically no one ahead of us in the U.S., let alone in Iowa. When you look at the amount of energy we produce relative to what our customers consume, we really do lead the nation and Iowa.

格雷格·阿贝尔：查理，实际上在美国没有人能超过我们，更不用说在爱荷华州了。当你看看我们生产的能源与客户消费的能源相比时，我们确实在全国和爱荷华州处于领先地位。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And aren’t our rates about half that of our leading competitor in Iowa to boot?

查理·芒格：而且我们的费率大约是我们在爱荷华州的主要竞争对手的一半，难道不是吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: About half. Close.

沃伦·巴菲特：大约一半。接近。

GREG ABEL: Exactly. We’re right in that range.

格雷格·阿贝尔：没错。我们正好在那个范围内。

CHARLIE MUNGER: If this isn’t good enough for you, we can’t help you. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：如果这对你来说还不够好，我们就无能为力了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, I mean, we sell electricity five miles from here. Greg, is that correct?

沃伦·巴菲特：顺便说一下，我是说，我们在这里五英里外卖电。格雷格，是这样吗？

GREG ABEL: Right across the river.

格雷格·阿贝尔：就在河对面。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, right across the river. And, you know, the wind blows the same and all that sort of thing. And the public power district here, in Nebraska, going back to George Norris, has always been a public power state. There’s no — capitalism doesn’t exist in the electric utility field in Nebraska.

沃伦·巴菲特：对，就在河对岸。你知道，风在这里吹得一样，而这种情况一直存在。公共电力公司在内布拉斯加州，回到George Norris时代，一直是公共电力州。在电力公用事业领域没有资本主义存在。

So, they have had the advantage of selling tax-exempt bonds. We have to sell taxable bonds, which raises cost to some degree. They have a big surplus, which they don’t have to pay dividends on or anything else. And our rates are cheaper than theirs, you know, basically.

所以，他们有卖免税债券的优势。我们不得不卖应税债券，这在一定程度上提高了成本。他们有一个大盈余，不用支付股息或其他费用。而我们的电价基本上比他们便宜。

I mean, we’re very proud of our utility operation.

我们对我们的公用事业运营感到非常自豪。

45. Why Berkshire doesn’t put its unspent cash into a stock index fund

为什么伯克希尔不把未使用的现金投入股票指数基金

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: “Warren, you are a big advocate of index investing, and of not trying to time the market. But by your having Berkshire hold such a large amount of cash in T-bills, it seems to me you don’t practice what you preach.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：沃伦，你是指数投资的坚定支持者，并且不主张市场时机。然而，由于你让伯克希尔持有如此大量的现金在国库券中，这让我觉得你并没有践行你所倡导的理念。

“I’m thinking that a good alternative would be for you to invest most of Berkshire’s excess cash in a well-diversified index fund until you find an attractive acquisition or buy back stocks.

“我认为一个好的替代方案是让你将伯克希尔的大部分闲置现金投资于一个良好分散的指数基金，直到你找到一个有吸引力的收购机会或回购股票。”

“Had you done that over the past 15 years, all the time keeping the $20 billion cash cushion you want, I estimate that at the end of 2018, the company’s 112 billion balance in cash, cash equivalents, in short-term investments and T-bills, would’ve instead been worth about 155 billion.

“如果你在过去 15 年里这样做，同时保持你想要的 200 亿美元现金缓冲，我估计到 2018 年底，公司在现金、现金等价物、短期投资和国债中的 1120 亿美元余额，实际上会变成大约 1550 亿美元。”

The difference between the two figures is an opportunity cost equal to more than 12 percent of Berkshire’s current book value. What is your response to what I say?” And I forgot to say the question is from Mike Elzahr, who is with the Colony Group, located in Boca Raton, Florida.

这两个数字之间的差异是一个机会成本，相当于伯克希尔当前账面价值的12%以上。你对我所说的有什么回应？我忘了说这个问题是来自佛罗里达州博卡拉顿的Colony Group的Mike Elzahr。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s a perfectly decent question, and I wouldn’t quarrel with the numbers. And I would say that that is an alternative, for example, that my successor may wish to employ. Because, on balance, I would rather own an index fund than carry Treasury bills.

沃伦·巴菲特：这是一个非常合理的问题，我不会对这些数字提出异议。我想说，这是一种选择，例如，我的继任者可能希望采用这种方式。因为总体而言，我宁愿拥有一个指数基金，而不是持有国债。

I would say that if we’d instituted that policy in 2007 or ’08, we might have been in a different position in terms of our ability to move late in 2008 or 2009.

我想说，如果我们在 2007 年或 2008 年实施了那项政策，我们在 2008 年或 2009 年晚些时候的行动能力可能会处于不同的状态。

So, it has certain — it has certain execution problems with hundreds of billions of dollars than it does if you were having a similar policy with a billion or 2 billion or something of the sort.

所以，它在执行上存在某些问题，涉及数千亿美元，而如果你有类似的政策，涉及十亿、二十亿或类似的金额，则问题要小得多。

But it’s a perfectly rational observation. And certainly, looking back on ten years of a bull market, it really jumps out at you.

但这完全是一个理性的观察。回顾过去十年的牛市，这一点确实让人印象深刻。

But I would argue that if you were working with smaller numbers, it would make a lot of sense. And if you’re working with large numbers, it might well make sense in the future at Berkshire to operate that way.

但我认为，如果你处理的是较小的数字，这样做是非常有意义的。如果你处理的是大数字，那么未来在伯克希尔运作这种方式可能也很有意义。

You know, we committed 10 billion a week ago. And there are conditions under which— and they’re not remote, they’re not likely in any given week or month or year — but there are conditions under which we could spend a hundred billion dollars very, very quickly.

你知道，我们一周前承诺了100亿美元。在某些情况下——而这些情况并不遥远，也并不是在任何给定的周、月或年中很可能出现——我们可能会非常迅速地花掉1000亿美元。

And if we did — if those conditions existed — it would be capital very well deployed, and much better than in an index fund.

如果我们这样做——如果那些条件存在——那么这将是非常合理的资本配置，远比投资于指数基金要好。

So, we’ve been — we’re operating on the basis that we will get chances to deploy capital. They will come in clumps in all likelihood. And they will come when other people don’t want to allocate capital.

所以，我们的操作基础是我们将有机会进行资本部署。这些机会很可能成群出现。当其他人不愿意配置资本时，它们会出现。

Charlie, what do you think about it?

查理，你对此怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I plead guilty to being a little more conservative with the cash than other people. But I think that’s all right.

查理·芒格：好吧，我承认我在现金方面比其他人更保守。但我认为这没问题。

We could have put all the money into a lot of securities that would’ve done better than the S&P with 20/20 hindsight. Remember, we had all that extra cash all that period, if something had come along in the way of opportunities and so on.

我们本可以把所有的钱投入到许多证券中，这些证券在事后看来会比标准普尔表现得更好。记住，在那段时间我们有那么多的额外现金，如果有机会出现的话。

I don’t think it’s a sin to be a little strong on cash when you’re as a big a company as we are. We don’t have to —

我认为作为一家像我们这样的大公司，手头稍微有点现金并不是罪过。我们不必——

I watched Harvard use the last ounce of their cash, including all their prepaid tuition from the parents, and plunge it into the market at exactly the wrong moment and make a lot of forward commitments to private equity. And they suffered, like, two or three years of absolute agony. We don’t want to be like Harvard.

我看到哈佛用尽了他们所有的现金，包括所有家长预付款，然后在完全错误的时机把钱投入市场，还做了大量的私募股权承诺。他们遭受了两三年的绝对痛苦。我们不想像哈佛那样。

WARREN BUFFETT: Plus timber and a whole bunch of —

沃伦·巴菲特：还有林业和一大堆——

CHARLIE MUNGER: What? 查理·芒格：什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Plus timber. And I mean —

沃伦·巴菲特：还有木材。我是说——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah. We’re not going to change. (Laughter and applause)

查理·芒格：是的，是的。我们不会改变。（笑声和掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We do like having a lot of money to be able to operate very fast and very big. And we know — and maybe we won’t — we know we won’t get those opportunities frequently.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们确实喜欢拥有大量资金，以便能够快速而大规模地运作。我们知道——也许我们不会——我们知道我们不会经常获得这些机会。

I don’t think — certainly, you know, in the next 20 or 30 years there’ll be two or three times when it’ll be raining gold and all you have to do is go outside. But we don’t know when they will happen. And we have a lot of money to commit.

我认为——当然，你知道，在接下来的 20 或 30 年里，会有两三次“下金雨”的机会，你所要做的就是走出去。但我们不知道它们会在什么时候发生。而我们有很多钱需要投入。

And I would say that if you told me I had to either carry short-term Treasury bills or have index funds and just let that money be invested in America generally, I would take the index funds.

我会说，如果你告诉我，我必须在短期国库券和指数基金之间做选择，让那笔钱投资于美国整体，我会选择指数基金。

But we still have hopes. And the one thing you should very definitely understand about Berkshire is that we run the business in a way that we think is consistent with serving shareholders who have virtually all of their net worth in Berkshire. I happen to be in that position myself, but I would do it that way under any circumstances.

但我们仍然有希望。你必须非常明确地理解伯克希尔的运作方式，我们以一种我们认为与服务那些几乎所有净资产都在伯克希尔的股东一致的方式经营公司。我也处于这种位置，但无论在什么情况下，我都会这样做。

We have a lot of people who trust us, who really have disproportionate amounts of Berkshire compared to their net worth, if you were to follow standard investment procedures.

我们有很多信任我们的人，他们的伯克希尔股票与他们的净资产相比，实际上占比过高，如果按照标准投资程序来看的话。

And we want to make money for everybody, but we want to make very, very sure that we don’t lose permanently money for anybody that buys our stock somewhere around intrinsic business value to begin with.

我们希望为每个人赚钱，但我们非常非常确定，不会让任何在内在商业价值附近购买我们股票的人永久性地亏损。

We just have an aversion to having a million-plus shareholders, maybe as many as two million, and having a lot of them ever really lose money, if they’re willing to stay with us for a while.

我们对拥有一百万多名股东，甚至可能有两百万名股东，并且让很多人真正亏损是非常反感的，只要他们愿意与我们共度一段时间。

And we know how people behave when the world, generally, is upset. And they want to be with something — I think they want to be with something they feel is like the Rock of Gibraltar. And we have a real disposition toward that group.

我们知道人们在世界普遍不安的时候会如何行为。他们希望有一个像“直布罗陀岩石”一样的东西。我认为他们希望有这样的东西，我们确实对那个群体有真实的倾向。

46. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should do more loans for manufactured housing, even if it hurts Clayton’s profits

房利美和房地美应该为制造房屋提供更多贷款，即使这会损害克莱顿的利润。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have new financing programs for manufactured home loans that I’m guessing could finally put purchasers of those homes who need mortgages on a somewhat more level playing field with those buying site-built homes.

乔纳森·布兰特：房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）推出了新的制造房屋贷款融资计划，我猜测这些计划可能会让需要贷款的制造房屋购房者在某种程度上与购买建造房屋的购房者处于更公平的竞争环境。

How positive an effect do you expect these new programs to have on manufactured home demand? And how might the programs affect Clayton’s sizable profits from lending? Will Clayton sell more loans to Freddie and Fannie, and does that help profits even if spreads compress?

您预计这些新项目对制造房屋需求会产生多大的积极影响？这些项目可能会如何影响 Clayton 在贷款方面的可观利润？Clayton 会向 Freddie 和 Fannie 出售更多贷款吗？即使利差缩小，这是否有助于利润？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it may not help profits, but it would — it definitely is good if the Freddie and Fannie are authorized to do more lending against manufactured homes.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能不会有利于利润，但如果Freddie和Fannie被授权对制造房屋进行更多贷款，那绝对是好事。

Manufactured homes are a very reasonable for people to get decent housing and have a home. And they are hard to finance to some degree. The local banks frequently do it, but the big lenders haven’t wanted to do it. They are —

制造房屋是人们获得体面住房和拥有家的一个非常合理的选择。并且在某种程度上，它们的融资比较困难。当地银行经常会提供融资，但大型贷款机构并不愿意这样做。它们是——

There is the possibility, or the likelihood, that Freddie and Fannie are going to expand. We already sell — I don’t know whether it’s 10 million a month of loans or something like that — to Freddie and Fannie.

Freddie和Fannie可能会扩展这一领域。我们每个月已经向Freddie和Fannie出售——我不确定是不是1000万美元——的贷款。

But it would be very good for America, in my view, if Freddie and Fannie did more in that area. Obviously, we would sell some more homes, but we would lose financing, and we might come out behind, we might come out ahead. But I think it would a good thing to do. Charlie?

但在我看来，如果Freddie和Fannie在这个领域做得更多，对美国来说会是非常有利的。显然，我们会销售更多的房屋，但我们可能会失去一些融资，这可能会让我们处于不利地位，也可能会让我们获益。但我认为这样做是值得的。Charlie，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Freddie and Fannie will finance more and more homes, and I think they’ll do it more and more of it through Clayton. And they’ll do it because Clayton is very trustworthy, and will do a very good job at making good housing at cheap prices for people.

查理·芒格：我认为Freddie和Fannie将会为越来越多的房屋提供融资，而且他们会通过Clayton做得越来越多。他们这样做是因为Clayton非常值得信赖，并且能以低廉的价格提供优质住房。

And I think Clayton will get bigger and bigger and bigger as far ahead as you can see. And the guy’s young, he doesn’t look like Warren and me. Not at all.

我认为Clayton会变得越来越大，能走得远远的。那个年轻的家伙，看起来完全不像沃伦和我。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve got a perfect managerial group at Clayton, and we’re expanding our site-built homes. We just closed on a builder a couple — a few days ago. And we now have nine different — I believe — nine different site-built home operations, and we didn’t have any a few years ago.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们在Clayton拥有一个完美的管理团队，并且我们正在扩展我们建造的房屋。我们刚刚几天前完成了对一个建筑商的收购。现在我们有九个不同的建造房屋的业务，而几年前我们没有任何。

And we think extraordinarily well of Kevin Clayton and his group. Our directors met last year in Knoxville and viewed the Clayton operation for the second time. So, we like the idea of Clayton expanding, and we like the idea of more people having very affordable housing.

我们对Kevin Clayton和他的团队有非常高的评价。我们的董事去年在诺克斯维尔会议时第二次参观了Clayton的运营。所以，我们喜欢Clayton的扩展，也喜欢更多的人能拥有非常实惠的住房。

During the 2008 and ’09 recession, our borrowers — who had very low FICO scores on average, I mean compared to typical home buyers, and they — if they kept their jobs, they made the payments. I mean, they wanted that home, and the home was an enormously important item to them. And we had various programs that helped them as well.

在2008和2009年的经济衰退期间，我们的借款人——他们的FICO评分很低，与典型的购房者相比——只要他们保持工作，他们就会按时还款。房子对他们来说非常重要。他们也得到了各种帮助。

But our loan experience was far better than people anticipated under the stress that existed then. But it was because a home really means something to people. And absent losing jobs or sickness — and, like I say, we have some programs to help people — they make the payments, and they have very decent living.

但我们的贷款体验比人们在当时的压力下预期的要好得多。因为房子对人们来说真的很重要。只要没有失业或疾病——我们也有一些帮助计划——他们会按时还款，拥有非常体面的生活。

But they would get that even cheaper if Freddie and Fannie expanded their programs. And, like I say, I hope they do.

但如果Freddie和Fannie扩展他们的计划，他们可以以更便宜的价格获得这些住房。正如我说的，我希望他们这样做。

47. “Ingenious” capitalism will replace jobs lost to automation

“巧妙的”资本主义将取代因自动化而失去的工作。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 2.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，第二站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Hi Warren, hi Charlie. My name is Carrie and this is my daughter, Chloe. She’s 11 weeks. It’s her very first Berkshire meeting. (Laughter)

观众成员：嗨。嗨，沃伦，嗨，查理。我叫凯莉，这是我的女儿，克洛伊。她 11 周大。这是她第一次参加伯克希尔会议。（笑声）

We’re from San Francisco, and we have a question on employment for you. As both a major employer and a producer of consumer goods, what do you make of the uncertain outlook for good full-time jobs with the rise of automation and temporary employment?

我们来自旧金山，我有一个关于就业的问题。作为主要雇主和消费品生产商，你们如何看待由于自动化和临时就业的兴起而导致的全职工作前景的不确定性？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if we’d asked that question 200 years ago, and somebody said, “With the outlook for development of farm machinery and tractors and combines and so on —” meaning that 90 percent of the people on farms were going to be — lose their job — it would look terrible, wouldn’t it?

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，如果我们在 200 年前问这个问题，有人说：“考虑到农用机械、拖拉机和联合收割机等的发展前景——”这意味着 90%的农场工人将失业——那看起来会很糟糕，不是吗？

But our economy and our people, our system, has been remarkably ingenious in achieving whatever we have now — 160 million jobs — when throughout the period ever since 1776, we’ve been figuring out ways to get rid of jobs. That’s what capitalism does, and it produces more and more goods per person.

但是我们的经济和我们的人民，我们的系统，在实现我们现在所拥有的 160 million 个工作岗位方面表现出了非凡的聪明才智——自 1776 年以来，我们一直在寻找消除工作的方式。这就是资本主义的运作方式，它使每个人生产越来越多的商品。

And we never know exactly where they’re going to come from. I mean, it — I don’t know if you were whatever occupation — well, if you were in the passenger train business, I mean, you know, you were going to — that was going to change.

我们永远不知道他们会从哪里来。我的意思是，如果你从事某种职业——好吧，如果你在客运火车行业，我的意思是，你知道，这将会改变。

But we find ways, in this economy, to employ more and more people. And we’ve got now more people employed than ever in the history of the country, even though company after company in heavy industry and that sort of thing, has been trying to figure out, naturally, how to get more productive all the time, which means turning out the same number of goods with fewer people, or turning out more goods with the same number.

但我们在这个经济中找到方法，雇佣越来越多的人。现在，我们的就业人数比国家历史上任何时候都要多，尽管一家又一家重工业公司等一直在努力自然地寻找如何不断提高生产力的方法，这意味着用更少的人生产相同数量的商品，或者用相同数量的人生产更多的商品。

That is capitalism. I don’t think you need to worry about American ingenuity running out. I mean, if you look at people in all kind of businesses, and they like to make money, but they really like to be inventive, you know. They like to do things.

这就是资本主义。我认为你不需要担心美国的创造力会枯竭。我的意思是，如果你看看各行各业的人，他们喜欢赚钱，但他们更喜欢创新，你知道。他们喜欢做事情。

And this economy, it works. It will continue to work. And it will be very — it’s very tough in certain industries, and there will be dislocations. You know, we won’t be making as many horseshoes and that sort of thing when cars come along and all that.

这个经济体系是有效的。它将继续有效。在某些行业会非常艰难，并且会出现一些调整。你知道，当汽车出现时，我们不会再制造那么多马蹄铁之类的东西。

But we do find ways now to employ whatever we’re employing — 155, whatever it is — million people, and supporting a population of 330 million people when we started with 4 million people, with 80 percent of the labor being employed on farms.

但我们现在确实找到了方法来雇用我们所雇用的任何人——1.55 亿，无论是什么——支持 3.3 亿人口，而我们最初只有 400 万人，80%的劳动力在农场工作。

So, the system works and it will continue to work. And I don’t know what the next big thing will be. I do know there will be a next big thing. Charlie?

所以，系统运作良好，并将继续运作。我不知道下一个重大事件会是什么，但我知道一定会有下一个重大事件。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we want to shift the scut work to the robots to the extent we can. That’s what we were doing, as Warren said, for 200 years.

查理·芒格：好吧，我们希望尽可能将繁重的工作转移给机器人。正如沃伦所说，这就是我们 200 年来所做的。

Nobody wants to go back to being a blacksmith, or scooping along the street, picking up the horse manure, or whatever the hell people used to do. We’re glad to have that work eliminated.

没有人想回去当铁匠，或者在街上捡马粪，或者人们以前做的任何事情。我们很高兴这些工作被取消了。

And a lot of this worry about the future comes from leftists who worry terribly that the people at the bottom of the economic pyramid have had a little stretch when the people at the top got ahead faster.

很多对未来的担忧来自左翼人士，他们非常担心经济金字塔底层的人在顶层的人迅速取得进展时，底层的人却经历了一段艰难的时期。

That happened by accident because we were in so much trouble that we had to flood the world with money and drive interest rates down to zero. And, of course, that drove asset prices up and helped the rich.

那是偶然发生的，因为我们遇到了如此大的麻烦，以至于不得不向世界注入大量资金并将利率压低到零。当然，这推动了资产价格上涨，并帮助了富人。

Nobody did that because they suddenly loved the rich, it was just an accident, and it will soon pass.

没有人这样做是因为他们突然爱上了富人，这只是一个意外，很快就会过去。

We want to have all this productivity improvement, and we shouldn’t worry a little about the fact that one class or another is a little ahead at one stretch.

我们想要所有这些生产力的提升，不应该担心某一阶层在某个阶段超前了一点。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I — (applause) — we worked in a grocery store. And when people ordered a can of peas, we had ladders that we climbed up to reach the can of peas, and then we placed it in a folding box, and then we put it on a truck. And if you looked at the amount of food actually transferred between the producer and the person who consumed it, and the number of people involved in the transaction, you know, it was — I don’t know whether it was one-third or one-quarter or one-fifth as efficient as the best way now to get food delivered to you. And —

沃伦·巴菲特：Charlie和我——（掌声）——我们曾在一家杂货店工作。当人们订购一罐豌豆时，我们得爬梯子去拿那罐豌豆，然后把它放在一个折叠盒里，再把它放上卡车。如果你看一下实际上从生产者到消费者之间转移的食品量，以及参与这一交易的人数，那效率可能是现在最好的食品配送方式的三分之一、四分之一或五分之一。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And the food was worse.

查理·芒格：食物更糟。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) And my grandfather, you know, was distressed about the fact that this particular credit and delivery kind of store would be eliminated. And it was eliminated, but society —

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）我祖父曾为这个特定的信用和配送商店会被淘汰而感到困扰。它确实被淘汰了，但社会——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s coming back.

查理·芒格：它正在回归。

WARREN BUFFETT: —addressed the — pardon?

沃伦·巴菲特：——请问您说什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s coming back.

查理·芒格：它正在回归。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s coming back, but more efficiently. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：它正在回归，但更有效率。（笑声）

Anyway, we’ve seen a little creative destruction. And frankly, we’re glad that it freed us up to go into the investment business. Worked out better for us.

总之，我们经历了一些创造性的破坏。坦白说，我们很高兴这些让我们有更多的时间进入投资领域，对我们来说效果更好。

48. Regulations can be “irritating,” but they’re needed for banks and insurance

规章制度可能会“令人烦恼”，但它们对银行和保险是必要的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Becky? 沃伦·巴菲特：贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Brian Gust of Grafton, Wisconsin. He’s talking about regulators and politicians. It says, “The Berkshire Hathaway investment portfolio holds several large financial institutions that are heavily regulated and are politically charged.

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自威斯康星州格拉夫顿的布莱恩·古斯特。他谈到了监管机构和政治家。问题是：“伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资组合持有几家受到严格监管并且政治色彩浓厚的大型金融机构。”

“Do you feel that, in some cases, the regulators and/or politicians are running the big banks instead of the CEO and the board of directors?”

你是否觉得在某些情况下，监管机构和/或政治家实际上在操控大型银行，而不是由首席执行官和董事会来操控？”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. (Laughter) But not too much.

查理·芒格：当然。（笑）但不要太多。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, insurance has been regulated — it happens to be regulated primarily on a state basis — but insurance has been regulated ever since we went into it, and it hasn’t — you know, when I looked at GEICO, it was doing 7 million of business. And, you know, it will do 30-odd billion of — billion — of business now. And it’s been regulated the whole time.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，保险是受到监管的——它主要是在州级进行监管——但自从我们进入这个行业以来，保险一直受到监管。而且，你知道，当我查看 GEICO 时，它的业务量是 700 万。而且，现在它的业务量将达到 300 多亿。它一直在整个过程中受到监管。

And regulation can be a pain in the neck, generally, but on the other hand, we don’t want a bunch of charlatans operating in the insurance business. And insurance actually lends itself to charlatans because you get handed money and you give the other guy a promise.

规章制度通常可能让人感到头疼，但另一方面，我们不希望一群骗子在保险行业中活动。保险实际上容易吸引骗子，因为你收到了钱，而你给了对方一个承诺。

And I like the fact that there is regulation in the insurance business, or the banking business. It doesn’t mean it can’t drive you crazy sometimes or anything of the sort, but those businesses should be regulated. It — they’re too important.

我喜欢保险行业或银行业有监管这一点。这并不意味着它有时不会让你感到疯狂或其他类似的事情，但这些行业应该受到监管。它们太重要了。

And anytime you can take other people’s money, and they go home with a promise and you go home with the money, I don’t mind a certain amount of regulation in those businesses. Charlie?

任何时候你可以拿到别人的钱，对方回家时带着一个承诺，而你带着钱回家，我不介意这些行业有一定的监管。Charlie？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. You’re using the government’s credit because you have deposit insurance, there’s an implicit bargain. You can’t be too crazy with what you do with the money. That’s a perfectly reasonable —

查理·芒格：是的。你在使用政府的信用，因为你有存款保险，这是一种隐含的交易。你不能对你用这笔钱做的事情太疯狂。这是完全合理的——

And I absolutely believe that we should have a regulation system that involves supervision of risk-taking by banks.

我绝对相信我们应该有一个监管系统来监督银行的风险承担。

It got particularly bad in the investment banks at the peak of the real estate crisis, and the behavior was — there’s only word for the behavior — it was disgusting. And it was pretty much everybody.

在房地产危机的高峰期，投资银行的行为特别糟糕，那种行为——只有一个词可以形容——那就是恶心。而且几乎是所有人都如此。

Warren, you — it’s hard to think of anybody who stayed sane in that boom. They felt the other guy’s doing dumb things, I’ve got to do it, too, or I’ll be left out. What a crazy way to behave.

沃伦，你——很难想象在那场繁荣中有谁保持理智。他们觉得别人做傻事，我也得这样做，否则我就会被抛在后面。这真是疯狂的行为。

And so, sure, there’s some intervention, but there probably has to be.

所以，当然，有一些干预，但可能是必须的。

WARREN BUFFETT: You want a Food and Drug Administration. Yeah. You’ll be unhappy with how they do it, if you’re in the business and all that, but — and, you know, I find any kind of regulation irritating. But nevertheless, it’s good for the system.

沃伦·巴菲特：你需要一个食品药品监督管理局。是的。如果你在这个行业，你会对他们的做法感到不满，但——你知道，我发现任何形式的监管都令人恼火。不过，尽管如此，这对系统是有好处的。

And actually, a number of regulators, you know, I would say that they’ve really been quite sensible about regulation. But you don’t feel that way when you’re being told how to run your business.

实际上，许多监管机构，我想说他们在监管方面确实相当理智。但当你被告知如何经营你的业务时，你并不会有这样的感觉。

But as Charlie says, you wouldn’t want to be a bank that ran in an unregulated system where anybody could come in and do all kinds of things that would actually have consequences that drew you into the problems that they created themselves.

但正如查理所说，你不想成为一个在不受监管的系统中运营的银行，在这个系统中，任何人都可以进来做各种事情，这些事情实际上会导致后果，使你卷入他们自己造成的问题。

We had the Wild West in banking long ago, and it produced a lot of problems in the 19th century.

我们早期的银行业就是一片狂野，这在19世纪产生了很多问题。

49. Shareholders don’t want or need very detailed information on the subsidiaries

股东不想要或不需要关于子公司的非常详细的信息。

WARREN BUFFETT: Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：杰伊？

JAY GELB: For the past several years, in Berkshire’s annual shareholder letter, there’s been increasingly less detail provided on its operating businesses and financial performance.

杰伊·盖尔布：在过去的几年里，伯克希尔的年度股东信中，关于其运营业务和财务表现提供的细节越来越少。

For example, the company is no longer providing details on the finance and financial product segment, or a balance sheet for the manufacturing, service, and retail segment, or a breakdown of float by unit in the insurance business.

例如，公司不再提供金融产品部门的详细数据，或者制造、服务和零售部门的资产负债表，或者保险业务中浮存金的单位分解。

For a company as large and diversified as Berkshire, why are investors being provided less information than previously?

对于像伯克希尔这样规模庞大且多元化的公司，为什么投资者获得的信息比以前少了？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think we actually provide less information. We may present it in a somewhat different form from year to year, just — and then this year, for example, you know, I started my letter, as usual, in my mind as saying, “Dear Doris and Birdie,” my sisters, to tell them what I would tell anybody that had a very significant proportion of their net worth in Berkshire, who is intelligent, did not know all the lingo of our various businesses, that would read a lot of words, because they did have a large investment. So, if I explained anything, and did a decent job, that they would understand what I was talking about.

沃伦·巴菲特：我不认为我们实际上提供的信息更少了。我们可能以不同的形式呈现这些信息。例如，今年，我开始写我的信时，就像平常一样，我在心里想：“亲爱的Doris和Birdie，”我的姐妹们，告诉她们我会告诉任何一个在伯克希尔有很大投资的人，如果他们聪明，不知道我们各种业务的行话，他们会读很多字，因为他们确实有很大的投资。如果我解释了任何事情，并且做得不错，他们会明白我在说什么。

And I tell them that in the language that I think will be understandable to a significant percentage of a million-plus people who have all kinds of different understanding of accounting and all that sort of thing. I tell them the information I would want to hear on the other side.

我告诉他们，用我认为大部分拥有各种不同会计知识的人能够理解的语言。我会告诉他们我在另一边希望听到的信息。

Now, if I was a competitor, and I wanted to know what one of our furniture stores was earning or something of the sort, you know, I might love it, but it doesn’t really make any difference.

现在，如果我是一位竞争对手，想知道我们某家家具店的收入情况或类似的事情，我可能会很感兴趣，但这实际上没有什么意义。

If you’re talking about a $500 billion organization, if you understand our insurance business, in terms of giving you the picture, I think, in three or four or five pages — you know, actually we’ve got a whole bunch of stuff required by the SEC about loss reserve development.

如果你在谈论一个 5000 亿美元的组织，如果你了解我们的保险业务，从给你一个整体的视角来看，我认为在三、四或五页内——你知道，实际上我们有一大堆美国证券交易委员会要求的关于损失准备金发展的资料。

I think you can write a 300-page report that gives a whole lot less information than a 50-page report. And you lose people.

我认为你可以写一份 300 页的报告，提供的信息远远少于一份 50 页的报告。而且你会失去读者。

So, I try to tell them — like I say, in my mind, it’s my sisters — I try to tell them what I would tell them if we had a private business and they owned a third of it each, and I owned a third, and once a year, they like to get filled in. And they don’t know what a combined ratio means because it’s a dumb term that everybody uses. And the important thing is to call it a profit margin.

所以，我试着告诉他们——就像我说的，在我心里，她们是我的姐妹——我试着告诉她们，如果我们有一个私人企业，而她们各自拥有三分之一的股份，我也拥有三分之一，每年一次，她们想要了解情况。我告诉她们，综合比率是什么意思，因为这是一个大家都在用的愚蠢术语，我们会称其为“利润率”。

They don’t know what the operating ratio is in the railroad business, and it’s an obsolete term. It’d be better to call that a profit margin. But the lingo — we’re not writing it for analysts. We’re writing it for shareholders, and we’re trying to tell them something so they can make a — they can not only get the picture as to what we own now, but how we think about the operation, what we’re trying to do over time. And we try to do the best job we can every year.

他们不知道铁路业务中的运营比率是什么，这个术语已经过时。称其为利润率会更好。但术语——我们不是为分析师写的。我们是为股东写的，我们试图告诉他们一些信息，以便他们能够了解——他们不仅能了解我们现在拥有的资产，还能了解我们对运营的看法，以及我们希望随着时间的推移所做的事情。我们每年都尽力做到最好。

And I don’t think it — I think if somebody is terribly interested in the details, they really are missing the whole picture. Because you could have known every detail of our textile business in 1965, and we could give you the information as to how much we made from linings and how much we made from handkerchiefs, and you’d be in a different world. I mean, the important thing was how we looked at running money and what we would do about things over time.

我认为如果有人对细节过于关注，他们真的会错过整体情况。因为你可能知道我们 1965 年纺织业务的每一个细节，我们可以告诉你我们从衬里赚了多少钱，从手帕赚了多少钱，但那样你就会处于一个不同的世界。我的意思是，重要的是我们如何看待资金运作，以及我们会如何随着时间的推移处理这些事情。

And it just — you could have gotten very misled — if you’d read it in 1980 or ’85 and you looked for great detail on how See’s candy was doing because they moved eastward, you know, we’ll tell you that overall that failed, in terms of moving out the territory.

而且如果你在 1980 年或 1985 年阅读它，并且寻找关于 See’s 糖果如何发展的详细信息，因为他们向东扩展，你知道，我们会告诉你，总体来说，这在扩展领土方面是失败的。

But going into a whole lot of detail that might be very interesting to an analyst, but really for the shareholder, they’ve got to make a decision as to who’s running their money, and how they’re running it, and what they’ve done over time, and what they hope to do in the future, and how to measure that. And again, we’re writing it for the individual. Charlie?

但进入大量细节可能对分析师非常有趣，但对于股东来说，他们必须决定谁在管理他们的钱，如何管理，以及他们在过去做了什么，未来希望做什么，以及如何衡量这些。再说一次，我们是为个人写的。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I suppose I should be watching every tiny little business down to the last nickel, but I don’t. And I don’t want that much detail. And I think our competitors would like it, and it wouldn’t do our shareholders any good. So, we’ll probably just keep reporting the way we do.

查理·芒格：我想我应该关注每一个小业务，直到最后一分钱，但我并没有这样做。我也不想要那么多细节。我认为我们的竞争对手会喜欢这样，但这对我们的股东没有任何好处。所以，我们可能会继续以现在的方式报告。

WARREN BUFFETT: You can see how flexible we are here. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以看到我们在这里是多么灵活。（笑声）

50. Munger: “Climate getting better” for U.S. investments in China

芒格：对美国投资者来说，“中国的投资环境正在改善”

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 3.

沃伦·巴菲特：站点 3。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. I’m Sasha Xixi (PH) from China International Capital Corporation Limited.

观众成员：您好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我是来自中国国际金融股份有限公司的萨莎·西西。

Last week, China announced 12 new measures further opening up the financial industry. All these measures will allow more invested institutions to enter into Chinese financial market, and to insure the policies of foreign investment to be consistent with those of domestic investment.

上周，中国宣布了12项进一步开放金融行业的新措施。所有这些措施将允许更多投资机构进入中国金融市场，并确保外资政策与内资政策保持一致。

What do you think about these new measures? Do you believe the foreign financial institutions will have more pricing power over the Chinese stock markets in the future? Do you have any plans to set up a company in China? If so, what time? Thank you.

你对这些新措施有什么看法？你认为外国金融机构在未来会对中国股市拥有更多的定价权吗？你有计划在中国设立公司吗？如果有，是什么时候？谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we’ve got one now. Dairy Queen is all over China. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：好吧，我们现在有一个。冰雪皇后遍布中国。（笑声）

And it’s working fine. And we didn’t wait for new laws. We did it under the old laws. But we’re not that big, net, in China, right, Warren?

而且运作得很好。我们没有等待新法律。我们是在旧法律下进行的。但我们在中国并不算大，对吧，沃伦？

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re not that big what?

沃伦·巴菲特：我们并没有那么大，什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: In China.

查理·芒格：在中国。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, but we had something, you know, that could have happened that would have been quite sizable.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，但我们有一些事情，你知道，可能会发生，那将是相当可观的。

But China, it’s a big market, and we like big markets. I mean, we really can only deploy capital in a major way maybe in 15 or so countries just because of the size.

但是中国是一个大市场，我们喜欢大市场。我的意思是，由于规模的原因，我们实际上只能在大约 15 个国家以重大方式投入资本。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But generally, I think the climate is getting better. It really makes sense for the two countries to get along. Think of how stupid it would be if China and the United States didn’t get along. Stupid on both sides, I might add.

查理·芒格：但总体来说，我认为气候在改善。两国和睦相处是非常有意义的。想想如果中国和美国不和，那会多么愚蠢。我还想补充一点，这对双方来说都是愚蠢的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We’ve done well in China. We haven’t done enough, but — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。我们在中国做得很好。我们还没有做得足够，但——（掌声）

51. Buffett has “feeling” Brexit vote was a mistake, but he’s still anxious for a U.K. deal

巴菲特认为脱欧投票是个错误，但他仍然渴望与英国达成协议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Warren, this is a question from a member of the House of Lords in Westminster, who happens to be here today, who also is a shareholder of the company.

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：沃伦，这是来自威斯敏斯特的一位上议院成员的问题，他今天恰好在这里，同时也是公司的股东。

This is Lord (Jitesh) Gadhia who says, “You’ve written, ‘We hope to invest significant sums across borders. So, what’s your appetite to invest in the U.K. and Europe, and how will Brexit impact that? And while we’re at it, what’s your advice for solving U.K.’s Brexit dilemma?” (Laughter)

这是贾德希亚勋爵（Jitesh Gadhia），他说：“你写过，‘我们希望在跨境投资大量资金。那么，你对在英国和欧洲投资的兴趣有多大，英国脱欧会如何影响这一点？同时，你对解决英国脱欧困境有什么建议？”（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s yours, Warren. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：那是你的，沃伦。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can — I will tell you this. I mean, I gave an interview to The Financial Times, and I don’t do that very often.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，我可以——我会告诉你这一点。我是说，我接受了《金融时报》的采访，而我并不经常这样做。

But one of the considerations I have is that I would like to see Berkshire Hathaway better known in both the U.K. and Europe. And the FT audience was an audience that I hoped would think of Berkshire more often in terms of when businesses are for sale.

但我考虑的一点是，我希望看到伯克希尔·哈撒韦在英国和欧洲更加知名。而《金融时报》的受众是我希望能更多地想到伯克希尔的受众，当企业待售时。

Our name is familiar, I think, pretty much around the world in, at least, financial circles. But there is no question if anybody’s going to sell a large business in the United States, they’re going to think of Berkshire. They may decide, for other reasons, they’d rather do it differently. But they will think of Berkshire.

我们的名字在全球，至少在金融圈中，应该是相当熟悉的。但毫无疑问，如果有人要在美国出售一家大型企业，他们会想到伯克希尔。他们可能出于其他原因决定以不同的方式进行。但他们一定会想到伯克希尔。

And I don’t think — I mean, obviously that is not as true around the world. We’ve had some very good luck with a few people that have thought of Berkshire, I mean, such as at ISCAR. And actually, Berkshire Hathaway Energy had one of its base holdings from way back was in the U.K.

我认为——我的意思是，显然这在世界各地并不完全成立。我们在一些考虑过伯克希尔的人身上运气很好，比如在 ISCAR。而实际上，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源早期的一个基础投资是在英国。

But I was looking, in doing that interview, I was willing to spend three hours with the FT reporters in the hope that when they write about — when they write the story — that somebody, someplace thinks of Berkshire that wouldn’t otherwise think of it.

但我在进行那次采访时，愿意花三个小时与《金融时报》的记者交流，希望他们在写故事时，有人会想到伯克希尔，而不是其他人。

And we’d love to put more money into the U.K. I mean, if I get a call tomorrow and somebody says, you know, “I’ve got an X-billion-dollar — pound — company that I think might make sense for you to own,” and that I would like to actually have as part of Berkshire, you know, I’ll get on the plane and be over there.

我们非常希望在英国投入更多资金。我的意思是，如果我明天接到一个电话，有人说：“我有一家价值数十亿英镑的公司，我认为你拥有它是有意义的，”而我实际上希望将其作为伯克希尔的一部分，你知道，我会马上坐飞机过去。

But they’ll have to name — they’ll have to tell me what their price ideas are, and what its earnings — I’m not interested in going over and talking about it and pricing it for them and not making a deal. We like to make deals when we actually get into action. And we’re hoping for it.

但他们必须告诉我他们的价格想法和收益情况——我不愿意过去与他们讨论价格而不达成交易。我们喜欢在实际行动中达成交易。我们希望能达成交易。

And we’re hoping for a deal in the U.K., and/or in Europe, no matter how Brexit comes out.

我们希望在英国和/或欧洲达成协议，无论脱欧结果如何。

I think it — I don’t — I’m not an Englishman, but I have the feeling it was a mistake to vote to leave. But I don’t think it’s — I don’t think it — it doesn’t destroy my appetite in the least for making a very large acquisition in the U.K. Charlie?

我认为——我不是——我不是英国人，但我感觉投票离开是个错误。但我不认为——我不认为——这丝毫不影响我在英国进行大规模收购的兴趣。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, all my ancestors came from northern Europe so I’m very partial to the place. On the other hand, if you asked me how I would vote on Brexit if I lived in Britain, I don’t even know. It just strikes me as a horrible problem. And I’m glad it’s theirs, not mine. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我所有的祖先都来自北欧，所以我对那个地方非常偏爱。另一方面，如果你问我如果我住在英国会如何投票支持脱欧，我甚至不知道。这对我来说似乎是个可怕的问题。我很高兴这是他们的问题，而不是我的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But if I called you tomorrow and said we had a deal in U.K., you’d tell me —

沃伦·巴菲特：但是如果我明天打电话给你，说我们在英国达成了交易，你会告诉我——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I would go in, in a minute.

查理·芒格：哦，我立刻就会去。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Those are my kind of people. I understand them.

查理·芒格：那是我喜欢的人。我理解他们。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（笑声）

52. We don’t need “boots on the ground” to find foreign acquisitions, we need lower prices

我们不需要“地面部队”来寻找外国收购，我们需要更低的价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Gregg. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，格雷格。（笑声）

GREGG WARREN: Yeah, Warren, just wanted to kind of maybe follow up on those past two questions, because there is sort of a theme there.

格雷格·沃伦：是的，沃伦，我只是想跟进一下前两个问题，因为它们之间似乎有一些共通的主题。

It seems to me that there’s definitely more of a home country bias when we look at the acquisitions and investments that Berkshire’s done historically.

在我看来，伯克希尔历史上的收购和投资确实有更强的本土偏向。

And while there’s definitely value in sticking with what you know and feel the most comfortable with, it seems like you’ve gone from a model that was originally focused on putting boots on the ground to find investment and acquisition opportunities to one where you’re seemingly more content to have sellers or their representatives call you or drop by the office, basically more of a pull model than a push model.

虽然坚持自己熟悉的领域并感到最舒适确实有其价值，但看起来你们已经从最初的‘派遣实地人员’来寻找投资和收购机会的模式，转变为更倾向于让卖方或其代表主动联系你们或到办公室拜访的‘拉动模式’。

There’s nothing wrong with this, but I just wonder, if the opportunity cost that comes with this type of model is that Berkshire misses out on a lot of overseas business where owners are unaware of your willingness to step up and buy them outright and allow them to run their companies under the Berkshire umbrella, and missing stock investment opportunities because Berkshire if not necessarily familiar enough with the local market.

这没有什么错，但我只是想知道，这种模式带来的机会成本是否意味着伯克希尔错过了很多海外业务，因为那些业主并不知道你愿意直接收购他们，并允许他们在伯克希尔的保护下运营他们的公司，同时也错过了股票投资机会，因为伯克希尔可能对当地市场不够熟悉。

At this point, do you think Berkshire would benefit from putting more boots on the ground in these overseas markets?

现在，你认为伯克希尔是否会从在这些海外市场增加更多‘实地人员’中获益？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — actually, it must have been after we bought ISCAR, Eitan Wertheimer convinced me that we should get more exposure in Europe. And he helped out in doing that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，实际上，在我们收购ISCAR之后，艾坦·维尔特海默（Eitan Wertheimer）说服我，我们应该在欧洲获得更多的曝光。他在这方面提供了帮助。

I went over, he arranged various meetings. We’ve had a lot of contact. It isn’t that they’re not aware, and we do hear about some.

我去了一趟，他安排了各种会议。我们有很多接触。问题不是他们不了解我们，我们确实会听到一些机会。

But we do have the problem they’ve got to be sizable. I mean, if we do a billion-dollar acquisition, and it makes $100 million, or thereabouts, pretax, $80 million after tax, you know, it’s — if we really know the business and we’re sure we’re not going to have a problem with the people running it being motivated in the future, and doing a similar job as to when they had their money in and everything, it’s nice to add 80 million to 25 billion.

但我们确实面临一个问题，那就是它们必须是相当可观的。我是说，如果我们进行一项价值十亿美元的收购，而它的税前利润是大约一亿，税后是八千万，你知道，如果我们真的了解这个业务，并且确信未来负责运营的人不会有问题，能够像他们投资时那样做好工作，那么将八千万加到二百五十亿上是很不错的。

But you can’t afford to spend lots of time doing that. And we gain something by having Todd (Combs) and Ted (Weschler) do some looking at things, screening them and that sort of thing.

但你不能花太多时间去做这些。我们通过托德（Combs）和泰德（Weschler）来筛选一些机会，也能获得一些好处。

But in the end, you want somebody that — you want some family that’s held their business in Europe or in the U.K. for 50 or 100 years that can make a deal, and that wants to do it with Berkshire.

但最终，你需要的是一个在欧洲或英国经营了50年或100年的家族，他们能做出交易，并希望与伯克希尔合作。

I mean, if they’re looking to get the most money, if they want to have an auction, we’re not going to win and we’re not going to participate because we’re not going to waste our time on it.

我的意思是，如果他们想要获得最多的钱，如果他们想要进行拍卖，我们不会赢，也不会参与，因为我们不想在这上面浪费时间。

If we form an acquisition crew, they’ll acquire something. I mean, I’ve watched so many institutions in operation that, you know, if your job every day is to go to work and screen a bunch of things with the idea that you’re the strategic department or acquisition department, you’re going to want to do something. I want to do something, but I don’t want to do something unless — (laughs) — Berkshire benefits by it — truly benefits by it — and generally it’s of a size.

如果我们组成一个收购团队，他们会收购一些东西。我看过许多机构运作，如果你每天的工作就是筛选一些机会，想要做出战略性或收购性的决定，你肯定会想要做点什么。我也想做点什么，但我不想做除非——（笑声）——伯克希尔真正从中受益——而且通常是以一定的规模。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, our problem is not a lack of boots on the ground, our problem is the people on the ground are paying prices that we don’t want to pay.

查理·芒格：沃伦，我们的问题不是缺乏地面部队，而是地面上的人们正在支付我们不想支付的价格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s our problem. And that problem is not going to be cured by boots.

查理·芒格：这才是我们的问题，这个问题不会通过增加实地人员得到解决。

WARREN BUFFETT: We can spend $100 billion in the next year. That is not a problem.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以在明年花费 1000 亿美元。这不是问题。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: Spending it intelligently is a huge problem. And the —

沃伦·巴菲特：明智地花钱是一个巨大的问题。还有——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Our competitors are buying with somebody else’s money, and they get part of the upside and take none of the downside.

查理·芒格：我们的竞争对手正在用别人的钱进行购买，他们获得部分收益，却不承担任何风险。

WARREN BUFFETT: And a lot of them —

沃伦·巴菲特：而且很多人——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It is hard to compete with people like that.

查理·芒格：与这样的人竞争是很困难的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They’ll leverage it up, they’ll make a lot of money if it fails, and they’ll make even more money if it succeeds. And that’s not our equation.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。他们会加杠杆，如果失败了，他们会赚很多钱，如果成功了，他们会赚更多的钱。这不是我们的方程式。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

WARREN BUFFETT: And that isn’t always that way, but it’s certainly that way now. It’s probably —

沃伦·巴菲特：情况并不总是如此，但现在确实如此。这可能是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And it’s not in the shareholders’ interest that we get to be like everybody else.

查理·芒格：我们变得和其他人一样并不符合股东的利益。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。（掌声）

53. We feel good about Berkshire as a long-term “compounding machine”

我们对伯克希尔作为一个长期的“复利机器”感到满意。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，4 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you so much for the wisdom you’ve shared with us over the years. This is Steven Wood from New York. And, Mr. Buffett, thank you very much for your feedback, your very generous feedback, last August on the book that I’m writing.

观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，非常感谢您们多年来与我们分享的智慧。我是来自纽约的史蒂文·伍德。巴菲特先生，非常感谢您去年八月对我正在写的书给予的反馈，您非常慷慨的反馈。

I just had one follow-up, if I may. In studying the most significant value creators of all time, it is very evident that the major compounding effect happened later — at the later stages of the careers. Or, in (Cornelius) Vanderbilt’s case, even beyond his own career.

我只是想跟进一下，如果可以的话。在研究有史以来最重要的价值创造者时，很明显，主要的复合效应发生在职业生涯的后期。或者，在（科尼利厄斯）范德比尔特的案例中，甚至超出了他自己的职业生涯。

So, your recent investments have suggested to me that you are designing Berkshire to being a steady compounding machine that should continue to create value for a very long time.

所以，你最近的投资让我觉得你正在将伯克希尔设计成一个稳定的复利机器，应该会在很长一段时间内继续创造价值。

Would you both please elaborate on this compounding machine? And the machine’s ability to continue to adapt to keep this value creation durable. And then is this legacy one of your sort of primary motivations when you wake up every day?

请你们详细说明一下这个复合机器吗？以及这台机器持续适应以保持价值创造的能力。然后，这种遗产是否是你们每天醒来时的主要动力之一？

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say it is the primary motivation, but it’s been that for a very, very, very long time.

沃伦·巴菲特：我会说这是主要动机，但这已经持续了非常非常长的时间。

No matter what was going right in my life, if things were going badly at Berkshire, I would not feel good, you know. I don’t need to be spending my time working on something — (laughs) — that makes me feel bad about the results when we get through.

无论我生活中有什么顺利的事情，如果在伯克希尔的情况不好，我就不会感到好，你知道的。我不需要花时间去做一些——（笑）——让我对结果感到不好的事情。

And it’s something that’s doable. I mean, the culture is stronger now than it was 10 years ago, and it was stronger then than 10 years previously. It moves slowly, but it goes in the right direction.

这是一件可行的事情。我的意思是，现在的文化比十年前更强大，而十年前又比十年前更强大。它发展缓慢，但朝着正确的方向前进。

And when we get chances to deploy the capital, we’ve always tried to make any entity, whether it was the partnership originally, or Berkshire now, or Blue Chip Stamps when we owned it, or even Diversified (inaudible), we wanted them all to be compounding, in effect, be compounding machines.

当我们有机会投入资本时，我们总是试图让任何实体，无论是最初的合伙企业，还是现在的伯克希尔，或者我们拥有时的蓝筹印花，甚至是多元零售（听不清），我们希望它们都能有效地进行复利，实际上成为复利机器。

That’s why people gave us capital. That’s why we put our own capital in. And if we failed at it, we really felt like we’d failed. It didn’t make any difference how much money we made from fees or anything like that, we knew what our yardstick was.

这就是为什么人们愿意把资本交给我们，这也是我们投入自己资本的原因。如果我们在这方面失败了，我们真的会感到失败。无论我们从费用中赚了多少钱，这些都无关紧要，我们知道我们的标准是什么。

And so that will continue. I think Berkshire is better situated than it’s ever been, except for the fact that size is a drag on performance, and I probably wrote that 40 years — well, I wrote it, actually, when I closed the partnership to new money when we had like $40 million in it.

因此，这种情况将继续下去。我认为伯克希尔的状况比以往任何时候都要好，除了规模对业绩的拖累这一点，我可能在 40 年前就写过——实际上，我是在我们有大约 4000 万美元时关闭合伙企业以接受新资金时写的。

I just said, really, that new — that additional capital would drag down returns from a $40 million base. So, you can imagine how I feel with a $368 billion — (laughs) — base of capital in Berkshire now.

我刚才说过，真的，那笔新的——额外的资本会拉低 4000 万美元基础上的回报。所以，你可以想象我现在在伯克希尔拥有 3680 亿美元的资本基础时的感受。

But this culture is special. It can work. It won’t be the highest compounder, by a long shot, against many other businesses. I think it will be one of the safest ways to make decent money over time. But that will depend on the people that follow us. Charlie?

但这种文化是特别的。它可以运作。虽然它不会是最高效的复利者，远远不及许多其他企业，但我认为它将是长期获得合理收益的最安全方式之一。但这将取决于继任者。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we came a long way from very small beginnings. And the fact that it slows down a little when it becomes monstrous is not my idea of a huge tragedy. And I think we will continue to do very well in the future.

查理·芒格：嗯，我们从非常小的起点走了很长一段路。它在变得庞大时稍微放慢一点，这并不是我认为的巨大悲剧。我认为我们在未来会继续做得很好。

We had nothing like the energy operation, you know, 20 years ago, and it’s a powerhouse. We had nothing like Kevin’s (Clayton) operation in home building 30 years ago, and it will soon be the biggest — well, even now, it’s bigger than anybody else in the country, you know, both of types of housing. Isn’t it — houses? I think so.

20年前我们没有像能源业务这样的东西，现在它是一个强大的力量。30年前我们没有像凯文（克莱顿）的房屋建筑业务那样的东西，现在它将很快成为最大的——好吧，即使现在，它在全国范围内也比其他任何公司都要大，无论是住房类型。是不是——房子？我认为是的。

And we have a lot going for us, and I’m satisfied. I think it’s going to continue reasonably.

我们有很多优势，我很满意。我认为这将会继续保持合理。

WARREN BUFFETT: And it would ruin our life if we did terribly. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果我们做得很糟糕，那将毁了我们的生活。（笑）

So, that’s what we wake up thinking about in the morning. But I wouldn’t want to be in a business where I was going to let down other people, and I think it would be crazy to do something like that, even if you weren’t rich and 88. (Laughs)

所以，这就是我们早上醒来时思考的事情。但我不想从事一个会让其他人失望的生意，我认为这样做是疯狂的，即使你不富有，已经 88 岁了。（笑）

But we are motivated to have something that is regarded as something different than others, and we’re actually — in a world where so much money is institutionalized, you know, I like the idea of having something that’s actually owned by individuals in very significant part, who basically trust us and, you know, don’t worry about what the next quarter’s earnings are going to be. I think it’s different than much of capitalism, and I think it’s something that Charlie and I feel good about. Isn’t it, Charlie?

但我们希望拥有一种被认为与其他公司不同的东西，而且我们实际上——在一个如此多的钱被机构化的世界里，我喜欢有一些由个人拥有的重要部分，基本上信任我们的人，且不担心下一季度的收益会怎样。我认为这与资本主义的许多方面不同，我认为这是查理和我都感到满意的事情。对吧，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, absolutely. (Applause)

查理·芒格：是的，绝对如此。（掌声）

54. Berkshire vs the S&P, with taxes thrown in

伯克希尔与标准普尔，考虑税收因素

WARREN BUFFETT: Carol? 沃伦·巴菲特：卡罗尔？

CAROL LOOMIS: This question comes from Stephen De Bode of Danville, California, and it raises a question I’ve certainly never heard before.

卡罗尔·卢米斯：这个问题来自加利福尼亚州丹维尔的斯蒂芬·德·博德，这提出了一个我从未听过的问题。

“Mr. Buffett, in the past, you have recommended low-cost S&P — and again today — the S&P 500 Index funds as reliable, long-term investment vehicles. These funds have certain inherent structural advantages such as low costs, and automatic reshuffling of their holding.

“巴菲特先生，过去您曾推荐低成本的标准普尔 500 指数基金，今天也再次提到这些基金作为可靠的长期投资工具。这些基金具有某些固有的结构优势，例如低成本和自动调整持仓。”

“But Berkshire also has certain structural advantages, such as financial leverage from the float, and diverse capital allocation opportunities. I think of Berkshire as being ahead in this game.

但伯克希尔也有一些结构性优势，比如来自浮存金的财务杠杆和多样化的资本配置机会。我认为伯克希尔在这场游戏中处于领先地位。

“For example, it seems to me that if Berkshire’s overall operating business and investment performance were to exactly match the total return of the S&P Index over a 10-year period, Berkshire’s growth in intrinsic value would outperform the S&P 500.

例如，在我看来，如果伯克希尔的整体运营业务和投资表现在 10 年期间完全匹配标准普尔指数的总回报，伯克希尔的内在价值增长将超过标准普尔 500 指数。

“If you agree, could you estimate by how many percentage points?”

“如果您同意，您能估计一下有多少个百分点吗？”

WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, the answer is, I won’t estimate anything. But the — if we just owned stocks, and we owned the S&P, our performance would be significantly worse than the S&P because we would be incurring a corporate tax, which would now be 21 percent on capital gains, plus possibly some state income taxes. And effectively, our tax rate on dividends is — depends where they’re held — but somewhere between 10 1/2 or 11 and 13 percent.

沃伦·巴菲特：（笑）好吧，答案是，我不会估计任何事情。但是——如果我们只拥有股票，并且我们拥有标准普尔指数，我们的表现将显著低于标准普尔，因为我们将承担企业税，这将是 21%的资本利得税，加上可能的一些州所得税。实际上，我们对股息的税率——取决于它们的持有地点——大约在 10.5%到 13%之间。

So, Berkshire is a mistake — or it’s at a corporate disadvantage simply by the way the tax law runs, compared to owning an index fund, which has no tax at the corporate level, but just passes through to shareholders.

所以，伯克希尔是一个错误——或者说它在公司层面上处于不利地位，仅仅是因为税法的运作方式，相比之下，拥有一个指数基金在公司层面上没有税收，只是将收益传递给股东。

So, I wouldn’t — I don’t know whether we’ll outperform the S&P 500 or not. I know that we’ll behave with our shareholders’ money exactly as we would behave with our own money.

所以，我不知道我们是否会超越标准普尔 500 指数。我知道我们会用股东的钱和用我们自己的钱一样来对待。

And we will have — we’ll basically tie our fortunes in life to this business, and we will be very cognizant of doing anything that can destroy value in any significant way. But we will probably —

我们将把我们的命运与这项业务紧密相连，并且我们会非常注意避免做任何可能以显著方式破坏价值的事情。但我们可能会——

If there were to be a very strong bull market from this point forward, we would probably underperform during that period. If the market five years from now or 10 years from now is at this level or below, we will probably overperform.

如果从现在开始出现一个非常强劲的牛市，我们在那段时间可能会表现不佳。如果五年后或十年后的市场处于这个水平或以下，我们可能会表现优异。

But I don’t think that I want to — I don’t quite understand the question in terms of when it said the total return of the S&P over a 10-year period and Berkshire’s growth in intrinsic value would outperform. I don’t know whether that will happen or not. Charlie?

但我不认为我想这样做——我不太理解这个问题，关于标准普尔在 10 年期间的总回报和伯克希尔内在价值的增长是否会超越。我不知道这是否会发生。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there would be one big advantage for the shareholders that pay taxes, and that is that the Berkshire shareholders, even if we just matched the S&P, we’d be way ahead after taxes. We all have a pretty decent role in life and a pretty good position. We shouldn’t be too disappointed.

查理·芒格：好吧，对于那些支付税款的股东来说，有一个很大的优势，那就是，即使我们只是匹配标准普尔，伯克希尔的股东在税后也会大大领先。我们在生活中都扮演了相当不错的角色，处于很好的位置，我们不应该太失望。

WARREN BUFFETT: No. If we — we could have structured — going back to partnership days — we could have structured things so that actually, over a period of time, doing the same things we did, would have actually come out somewhat more favorably for shareholders if we had kept it to the original partnership group.

沃伦·巴菲特：不。如果我们——我们可以从合伙企业时代开始设计一些结构，其实，如果我们一直保持原来的合伙企业，做相同的事情，实际上对股东会更有利。

But the present form hasn’t worked badly, although we have had periods when our corporate capital gains tax, as opposed to the individual, I think it got up to 39 percent a couple of years or one year, and certainly was 35 percent for a long time. And then, on top of that, we had the state income taxes in some cases.

但现在的形式也没怎么差，尽管我们曾有一段时间，公司资本利得税相较于个人税，曾经达到39%，或者说过一段时间是35%。此外，我们还在某些情况下面临州所得税。

And they exceeded — well, I mean, if you owned a pass-through fund, you did not have that level of possible double taxation. Now, if you hold your stock forever, you don’t pay it. But if you actually sell your stock, you’ve had a double tax effect.

这些税收超过了——好吧，我是说，如果你拥有一个通道基金，你不会有这种可能的双重税收效果。现在，如果你永远持有股票，你不会支付这部分税。但如果你实际出售股票，就会面临双重税收的效果。

We’re not complaining in any way, shape, or form. This country has treated us incredibly well, and we’ve added this huge tailwind, which I wrote about in the annual report. And it wouldn’t have happened in any other country.

我们并没有以任何方式抱怨。这个国家对我们非常好，我们增加了这个巨大的顺风，这在年度报告中我也提到过。而在其他国家是不会发生这样的事情的。

So, we’ve been very lucky that we’ve been operating in this country at this time. Charlie, anything?

所以，我们非常幸运在这个时候在这个国家运营。查理，有什么想说的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

55. How NV Energy is working to recover from casino defections

NV Energy 如何应对赌场客户的流失进行恢复

WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?

沃伦·巴菲特：乔纳森？

JONATHAN BRANDT: In Nevada, several casinos have cut the cord with our NV Energy subsidiary and are seeking their electricity needs elsewhere, even though they had to pay huge exit fees. I have three questions about this phenomenon.

乔纳森·布兰特：在内华达州，几家赌场已经与我们的 NV 能源子公司断绝了关系，并在其他地方寻求电力需求，尽管他们不得不支付巨额的退出费用。我对这一现象有三个问题。

One: do you believe that these are rational choices, or were they made for non-economic reasons?

一：您认为这些决定是理性的，还是出于非经济原因？

Two: what can NVD do, if anything, to stem the tide of defections?

二：NV能源可以做些什么来遏制这种客户流失的潮流？

And, three: is this something that could happen in other states where you operate regulated utilities? Or is the situation in Nevada somehow unique because of super-sized customers that have more leverage in the power market than smaller industrial customers in other states?

三：这种情况会发生在您运营的其他受监管的公用事业州吗？还是说内华达州的情况因为有超大型客户在电力市场上拥有更大的杠杆，而与其他州的较小工业客户不同？

And I don’t know whether that’s a question for you or Greg, but I’d be happy to hear from either of you.

我不知道这是你还是格雷格的问题，但我很乐意听听你们中的任何一个的意见。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a question for Greg. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：这是个问格雷格的问题。（笑声）

GREG ABEL: Thanks, Jonathan. So just for everybody, I think they heard the question from Jonathan, but we’ve owned the utility there for approximately five years.

格雷格·阿贝尔：谢谢你，乔纳森。首先，大家可能听到乔纳森的问题，我们拥有那个公用事业已经大约五年了。

When we inherited the utility, we knew it had some fundamental issues around its customers. The relationships were really strained from day one because they’d had a history of continuing to increase rates, and they really weren’t delivering renewable energy or meeting the customers’ needs or expectations. So, we knew we had some challenges there.

当我们接管这家公用事业公司时，我们知道它在客户方面存在一些根本性的问题。从第一天起，关系就非常紧张，因为他们有不断提高费率的历史，并且实际上并没有提供可再生能源或满足客户的需求和期望。因此，我们知道在这方面我们面临一些挑战。

As we sit here today, we’ve had five customers leave our system. Those customers still use our distribution services. So, the only thing we do not provide them is the power. So, we have lost an opportunity to sell them power, and we’ve lost the associated margin on that. And we are disappointed with that. We do recover, you know, substantial fees, as you noted.

到今天为止，我们有五个客户离开了我们的系统。这些客户仍然使用我们的配电服务。所以，唯一我们不提供的是电力。因此，我们失去了销售电力的机会，也失去了相关的利润。对此我们感到失望。正如你所提到的，我们确实收回了大量的费用。

How the commission looked at it was, “Well, you lose this customer; we’ll give you effectively six years of profit on that. And by then, you should have grown back into your normal load.” And actually, it’s a fair outcome. Our load is higher than it was relative to when those customers have left. So, we’ve grown through that, and it’s consistent with their belief.

委员会的看法是，‘你失去这个客户，我们实际上会给你六年的利润。到那时，你应该已经恢复到正常负荷。’实际上，这是一个公平的结果。我们的负荷比客户离开时要高。所以，我们已经通过这种方式增长了，这符合他们的信念。

The fundamental issue, and you’ve touched on it, why are they leaving? There are economic reasons for them leaving. And the fundamental reason is, in year seven, they no longer bear sort of the societal costs that are being imposed by the state. They don’t have to bear the costs of renewable energy. They don’t bear the costs of energy efficiency. And they viewed it as sort of the time to exit out of that model.

根本性的问题，你提到过，为什么他们要离开？他们离开的原因是经济性的。根本原因是在第七年，他们不再承担由国家强加的社会成本。他们不需要承担可再生能源的成本，也不需要承担能源效率的成本。他们认为这是退出这一模式的时机。

We do have a variety of legislation that’s going to levelize the playing field. We’ve had a number of customers that announced they were leaving now who’ve entered into long-term agreements with NV Energy. And I really do believe our team has the right model, which is we’re much more focused on delivering a great value proposition to our customers. So, it has to include price.

我们确实有多项立法将使竞争环境更加公平。我们有一些客户宣布他们将离开，但他们已经与 NV Energy 签订了长期协议。我真的相信我们的团队有正确的模式，我们更加专注于为客户提供良好的价值主张。因此，这必须包括价格。

But equally, we’re building substantial renewable energy there now. And long term, our team will deliver a great proposition to them, and I think NV Energy will prosper in the long term. We’re going to be happy with it as a long-term investment. Thank you.

但同样，我们现在正在那里建设大量可再生能源。从长远来看，我们的团队将为他们提供一个很好的提议，我认为 NV Energy 将在长期内繁荣发展。我们会对这项长期投资感到满意。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Greg, could you give them, give the audience a rough approximation of what, say, in the 10 years or whatever it may be before we bought Nevada Power, what had happened with rates; what had happened with rates under us; and what has happened with coal generation under us?

沃伦·巴菲特：Greg，你能给大家一个粗略的估计吗，比如在我们购买内华达电力之前的10年间，价格发生了什么变化；在我们接手后价格发生了什么变化；以及在我们接手后煤炭发电的情况？

GREG: Right. Yeah. Yeah, that’s great. So, you know, Warren’s really expanding on what are — the focus we’ve brought to delivering something to the customer.

格雷格：好的，是的，非常好。所以，你知道，Warren其实是在扩展我们给客户提供的关注点。

So, if you’d looked at the prior ten years, they pretty much had a rate strategy that, every second year, their rates would go up sort of by the cost of inflation. And that pretty much materialized year after year.

如果你看过去的十年，他们的价格策略基本上是每隔两年，他们的价格就会涨一次，涨幅大约是通胀的成本。这几乎每年都发生。

We came in immediately, just like we’ve done in Iowa — so we’ve built all that renewable in Iowa, and we’ve never increased rates since the date we acquired it, 1999. So, rates have been stable, and we don’t ever see raising rates in Iowa till probably 2030 or 2031.

我们立即进入，就像我们在爱荷华州所做的那样——我们在爱荷华州建设了所有这些可再生能源，自从我们收购它以来（1999 年），我们从未提高过费率。因此，费率一直保持稳定，我们预计在 2030 年或 2031 年之前不会在爱荷华州提高费率。

Our team took a very similar approach in Nevada, which was to, you know, stabilize it. So, rates are down probably 5-7 percent since we’ve owned them. So, we haven’t had rate increases.

我们的团队在内华达州采取了类似的方法，就是稳定价格。所以，自我们拥有他们以来，价格大约下降了5-7%。所以，我们没有提高价格。

We’ve announced substantial rate increases (decreases) again that will take effect every two years. So just like we used to be able to have rate increases, we have a few of when we’ll decrease their rates. Their rates will go down again in 2002. We’ve — pardon me, in two years.

我们再次宣布了大幅降价的计划，这将每两年生效一次。所以，就像我们以前能够提高价格一样，我们有几个降价的时间点。他们的价格将在两年后再次下降。

And then on top of that, there’s been an approach to eliminate coal, as Warren touched on. So fundamentally, when we acquired it, all their coal fleet was operating. We’ve retired a substantial portion of the coal fleet already. And by, I believe it’s within a year of this, 2023, we’ll have eliminated 100 percent of their use of coal in that state. And it was a substantial portion of their portfolio in the past. So — (applause) — team’s done a great job. Thank you.

此外，正如Warren提到的，我们采取了消除煤炭的措施。基本上，当我们收购时，他们的所有煤炭发电设施都在运营。我们已经退役了相当大一部分煤炭发电设施。到2023年，我相信，我们将在该州完全消除煤炭的使用。这曾经是他们投资组合中的一个重要部分。所以——（掌声）——团队做得很棒。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, have anything?

沃伦·巴菲特：查理，有什么想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

56. Portfolio managers Weschler and Combs roughly matching the S&P but making other contributions

投资组合经理韦施勒和科姆斯大致与标准普尔指数相匹配，但做出了其他贡献。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 5.

沃伦·巴菲特：第五站。

AUIDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, hi. My name is Aaron Lanni. I’m a portfolio manager at a company called Medici out of Montreal, Quebec.

观众成员：你好，我叫亚伦·兰尼。我是来自魁北克蒙特利尔的一家公司 Medici 的投资组合经理。

My question is actually for Todd (Combs) and Ted (Weschler), if possible.

我的问题实际上是问 Todd（Combs）和 Ted（Weschler），如果可能的话。

So according to Warren, you lagged slightly behind the S&P 500 since joining Berkshire. So what recent changes, if any, have you implemented to increase your odds of beating the S&P in your respective stock portfolios over the next 10 years?

根据沃伦的说法，自从加入伯克希尔以来，你的表现略微落后于标准普尔 500 指数。那么，最近你实施了哪些变化（如果有的话），以提高在未来 10 年内在各自的股票投资组合中超越标准普尔 500 指数的机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’m not sure whether Todd or Ted are here, but they — I will tell you, but then — I’ll make this the final report on it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我不确定托德或泰德是否在这里，但我会告诉你，然后——我会把这作为最终报告。

But on March 31st, actually, one is modest ahead, one is modestly behind. But they are extraordinary managers. It has not been — it was a tough — it’s been a tough period to beat the S&P and, like I say, one of them is now ahead of the S&P over that period, one’s modestly behind.

不过到3月31日，一个是稍微领先，一个是稍微落后。但他们都是杰出的经理。击败标准普尔500指数是一个艰难的时期，就像我说的，一个在这段时间内领先于标准普尔500，一个稍微落后于标准普尔500。

They’ve also helped us in just all kinds of ways. What Todd has done in connection with the medical initiative, we have — with J.P. Morgan, Amazon, I mean, I don’t know how many hours a week he’s worked totally on that. The things they’ve brought to me, what Ted did in terms of the Home Capital Group where we have essentially, in a major way — well, we stabilized a financial institution that was under attack and experiencing runs in Canada. And he did the whole thing.

他们还在各种方面帮助了我们。Todd在医疗计划方面做的事情，我们和J.P.摩根、亚马逊合作，我不知道他每周在这方面工作了多少小时。他们带给我的东西，以及Ted在Home Capital Group方面做的工作，我们在加拿大主要稳定了一个正在遭受攻击并经历挤兑的金融机构。他做了整个过程。

I heard about that on a Monday, and on Wednesday, we put an offer before the company. And previously to that, they probably had dozens and dozens of people combing over them and, meanwhile, they were struggling. And, you know, it was remarkable what he did and I think it’s appreciated in the Toronto area.

我周一听说这个情况，周三我们就向公司提出了一个报价。在此之前，他们可能有几十个人在审查，而与此同时，他们在挣扎。你知道，他做的事情非常了不起，我认为在多伦多地区也得到了赞赏。

So, we are enormously better off because the two are with us. And while we have that measurement, like I say, I’ll just put it this way, they’re doing better than I am anyway. So, if you ask me to report on them all the time, I’ll have to report and myself all the time, and I’m not — (laughs) — that would be embarrassing compared to how they do. They do better.

所以，我们因为他们俩的加入而变得非常好。虽然我们有这样的测量，但我会这样说，他们无论如何都做得比我好。所以，如果你们要求我经常报告他们的情况，我将不得不报告我自己，而我——（笑声）——这将相对于他们的表现感到尴尬。他们做得更好。

They’re very, very smart. They’ve been smart with their own money over the years. They’ve been smart in running other people’s money over the years. And they’ve made us a lot of money, but they made it during a market where you’d have made a lot of money in S&P as well. Charlie?

他们非常聪明。他们这些年来在自己的钱上表现得很聪明，也在管理其他人的钱方面表现得很聪明。他们给我们赚了很多钱，但在一个你同样也会在标准普尔500中赚很多钱的市场环境中赚了钱。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’m fine.

查理·芒格：不，我很好。

57. Power of American Express’s brand will help fend off heavy credit card competition

美国运通品牌的力量将有助于抵御激烈的信用卡竞争。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。贝基？

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Leiders Luff (PH), Yosis Luff (PH), and Dan Gorfung (PH) of Israel. And they write to both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, “Do you think that AmEx’s share of mind is enough to win the credit cards race? How do you see AmEx’s competitive position now compared to the past? And who is the most threatening competitor now, compared to the past?

贝基·奎克：这个问题来自以色列的莱德斯·卢夫（PH）、约西斯·卢夫（PH）和丹·戈尔丰（PH）。他们写信给巴菲特先生和芒格先生：“您认为美国运通的市场份额足以赢得信用卡竞争吗？您如何看待美国运通目前的竞争地位与过去相比？现在与过去相比，谁是最具威胁的竞争对手？”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, everybody’s a competitor, including now Apple. It has just instituted a card, I guess, in conjunction with Goldman Sachs.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，每个人都是竞争者，包括现在的苹果。它刚刚与高盛合作推出了一张卡。

Everybody — there will always be, in my view, many, many competitors in the business. Banks can’t afford to leave the field. It’s a growing field. They build up receivables on it.

在我看来，大家在这个行业中总会有很多竞争者。银行不能放弃这个领域。这是一个不断增长的领域。他们在这个领域积累应收账款。

But I wouldn’t think of the credit card business as a one-model business any more than I would think of the car business as essentially being one model. I mean, Ferrari is going to make a lot of money, but they’re going to have just a portion of the market.

但我不会把信用卡业务视为单一模型的业务，就像我不会认为汽车业务本质上是一个模型一样。我的意思是，法拉利会赚很多钱，但他们只会占据市场的一部分。

Well, AmEx is growing around the world with individuals, it’s growing around the world with small businesses. You just saw the contract they made with Delta — which is probably the ideal partner— that runs, what, for eight or nine, whatever it may be, nine or 10 years, actually.

好吧，美国运通在全球范围内与个人和小型企业一起增长。你刚刚看到他们与达美航空签订的合同——这可能是理想的合作伙伴——合同期限大约是八年或九年，实际上是九年或十年。

You know, the billings go up per capita, they go up — the coverage spreads. And they’re going to have loads of competition, and they always will. But they had — you know, that’s something — J.P. Morgan, you know, took on the Platinum Card. It was a competitor, and the Platinum Card had the highest renewal rates that they’ve had. And they increased the price I think from 450 to $550 during a competitive battle, and retention improved, and new business improved, and 68 percent or so of the new business was millennials.

你知道，账单人均上升，覆盖面扩大。他们将面临大量竞争，并且永远会有竞争。但他们曾经——你知道，摩根大通推出了白金卡。这是一个竞争对手，而白金卡的续费率是他们最高的。我认为在竞争中，他们将价格从 450 美元提高到 550 美元，客户留存率和新业务都得到了改善，约 68%的新业务是千禧一代。

I mean, it is a — it is not an identical product with anything else. And as a premium card, it has a clientele which is large. It may only be — it may be X percent of the market, it may be three-quarters of X percent, or whatever it may be. It isn’t for the person that likes to have five cards and look every day at which one provides the most rewards that day or in what gas stations or something of the sort.

我的意思是，这是一款——它与其他任何产品都不相同。作为一张高端卡，它的客户群体很大。它可能只占市场的 X 百分比，可能是 X 百分之三分之四，或者其他什么。它并不适合那些喜欢拥有五张卡片，并每天查看哪一张在那天提供最多奖励的人，或者在什么加油站之类的。

But it’s got a very large constituency that has a renewal rate, a usage rate, that’s the envy of everybody else in the industry. So, I like our American Express position very well. Charlie?

但它拥有一个非常庞大的客户群，具有令人羡慕的续订率和使用率。因此，我非常喜欢我们美国运通的地位。查理？

Charlie, anything on American Express?

查理，有关于美国运通的消息吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter) No, I think we own the world as long as the technology stays the same.

查理·芒格：不。（笑）不，我认为只要技术保持不变，我们就拥有这个世界。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — it’s an interesting thing.

沃伦·巴菲特：不，我们——这是一件有趣的事情。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I have no opinion about technology.

查理·芒格：我对技术没有意见。

WARREN BUFFETT: This year — (laughter) — the technology is not the whole thing. I mean, you know, fortunately. I mean, it —

沃伦·巴菲特：今年——（笑）——科技并不是全部。我是说，你知道，幸运的是。我是说，它——

If you look at credit card usage, there are a lot of different things motivating different people to use different various types of payment systems. And there’s a lot of them that are growing. There are some of them that are marginal. And American Express is an extraordinary operation.

如果你看看信用卡的使用情况，会发现有很多不同的因素促使不同的人使用各种不同类型的支付系统。其中有很多正在增长，有一些则处于边缘状态。而美国运通是一家非凡的公司。

And I think this year, our share of the earnings — well, by next year, our share of the earnings of American Express will be equal to the cost of our position. We’ll be earning a hundred percent on what that position cost us, and I think it will grow.

我认为今年我们的收益份额——到明年，我们在美国运通的收益份额将等于我们持仓的成本。我们将获得相当于我们持仓成本的百分之百的收益，我认为这将会增长。

And I think the number of shares will go down and our interest will go up without us laying out a dime. So, it’s —

我认为股票数量会减少，而我们的利益会增加，而我们不需要花一分钱。所以，这就是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: As you say, we own the world if it doesn’t change.

查理·芒格：正如你所说，如果世界不改变，我们就拥有这个世界。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, even if it changes some. The world has changed a lot. American Express was formed in 1850.

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，即使它有所变化。世界已经发生了很大变化。美国运通成立于 1850 年。

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’m talking about WeChat.

查理·芒格：不，我说的是微信。

WARREN BUFFETT: You can talk about all kinds of competitors, but —

沃伦·巴菲特：你可以谈论各种竞争对手，但——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: But the — American Express actually was an express company, formed in 1850, like I say, by Wells and Fargo, of all people. And, you know, for a while they carried these big trunks around of valuables. And then the railroads came along and that wasn’t going to work very well anymore, so they went into traveler’s checks.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是，美国运通实际上是一家快递公司，成立于 1850 年，正如我所说，由韦尔斯和法戈创办。你知道，曾经他们运送这些装满贵重物品的大箱子。然后铁路出现了，这种方式就不再有效了，所以他们转向了旅行支票。

And it’s a very interesting thing. In 1950, when I was living at 116th and Broadway, they were down at 65 Broadway, and they were the most important name in travel. They were synonymous with the integrity of their traveler’s checks. And the whole company, in a record year for travel, earned $3 million. $3 million. What a bond trader earns now in my lifetime, that’s what they’ve done with — and their hand going in was the traveler’s check, which has more or less disappeared.

这是一件非常有趣的事情。在 1950 年，当我住在 116 街和百老汇时，他们在 65 百老汇，他们是旅行界最重要的名字。他们的旅行支票与诚信同义。在一个旅行的创纪录年份里，整个公司赚了 300 万美元。300 万美元。在我这一生中，债券交易员现在赚的就是他们当时的收入——而他们的入场工具是旅行支票，这种支票或多或少已经消失了。

But American Express, the power of that brand, intelligently used, going into the credit card business, where they entered much later than the Diners Club, later than Carte Blanche, but they came to dominate the luxury end of the credit card business.

但美国运通凭借其品牌的力量，明智地进入了信用卡业务，尽管他们进入这一领域的时间比 Diners Club 晚，比 Carte Blanche 晚，但他们最终在高端信用卡市场中占据了主导地位。

It’s a fantastic story, and I’m glad we own 18 percent of it.

这是一个精彩的故事，我很高兴我们拥有其中的 18%。

58. Occidental came to us for a $10B loan because we could do it quickly

西方石油找我们借 100 亿美元，因为我们可以快速完成。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Jay? 沃伦·巴菲特：好的，杰伊？

JAY GELB: Actually, I’m going to ask something about Occidental Petroleum. I’m surprised it hasn’t been asked yet.

杰伊·盖尔布：实际上，我想问一下关于西方石油的事情。我很惊讶到现在还没有人问过。

So, Berkshire has committed to providing $10 billion in financing in the form of an 8 percent preferred share and attached warrants for Occidental’s proposed acquisition of Anadarko.

因此，伯克希尔已承诺以 8%的优先股和附带认股权证的形式提供 100 亿美元的融资，以支持西方石油公司对安纳达科的拟议收购。

This is the first time Berkshire has committed to such a large preferred share investment since the acquisition of Heinz in 2013.

这是自 2013 年收购亨氏以来，伯克希尔首次承诺进行如此大规模的优先股投资。

What did you find attractive about the Occidental deal, in terms of its business? And should we expect other large financing transactions in the future, as a way for Berkshire to deploy a portion of its excess cash?

你觉得西方石油在商业方面吸引人的地方是什么？我们是否应该期待未来还有其他大型融资交易，以便伯克希尔部署其部分多余现金？

WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t think the Occidental transaction will be the last one we do. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：我认为西方石油的交易不会是我们最后一笔交易。（笑）

There may be one, you know, in a month. They may be one three or four years from now. It won’t be identical. I hope it’s larger.

可能会有一个，你知道，在一个月内。它们可能在三四年后出现。它不会是完全相同的。我希望它更大。

But the point is, we’re very likely to get the call because we can do something that really I don’t think — no institution can do it. I mean, they’ve got committees that have to pass on it, and they want to have so-called MAC clauses, Material Adverse Changes. They want to do this and that.

但关键是，我们很可能会接到这个电话，因为我们能做一些我认为没有任何机构能做到的事情。我的意思是，他们有委员会需要对此进行审查，他们想要所谓的 MAC 条款，即重大不利变化。他们想要这样那样。

And if somebody wants a lot of certain money for a deal, you know, they’ve seen that I can get a call on Friday afternoon, and they can make a date with me on Saturday, and on Sunday, it’s done. And they absolutely know that they have $10 billion and we’re not going to tell them how to structure their transaction or do anything else. They’ve got it.

如果有人想要很多特定的钱来达成交易，你知道，他们看到我可以在周五下午接到电话，他们可以和我约好在周六见面，周日就完成了。他们绝对知道他们有 100 亿美元，我们不会告诉他们如何构建他们的交易或做其他任何事情。他们已经搞定了。

And there will be times in the future when something, not identical, but similar, comes along, and we’re the one to call. And I hope its larger than 10 billion. But —

未来会有一些事情出现，虽然不完全相同，但相似，我们会是那个可以拨打电话的人。我希望它的规模超过 100 亿。但——

It could be — it could be we’ll do — you know, in the next five years. It could be we’ll do a lot of money, additional money in things similar to this, not identical. And it could be that nothing will happen.

这可能是——在接下来的五年里我们会做的事情。我们可能会在类似的事情上赚很多额外的钱，但并不完全相同。也可能什么都不会发生。

But if there are any $10 billion, or $20 billion, or maybe even $50 billion two-day transactions, if there are any in the world, believe me, they’ll think of Berkshire Hathaway for sure in terms of what number to call. Charlie?

但如果世界上有任何价值 100 亿美元、200 亿美元，甚至可能是 500 亿美元的两天交易，相信我，他们一定会想到伯克希尔哈撒韦，考虑拨打哪个号码。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I like it. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：嗯，我喜欢这个。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I called Charlie as soon as we made the — I called Ron Olson first because I was worried that he might have a conflict. And in about ten minutes, he had — I told him we — it had to be done by Monday night. And Cravath was being told the same thing by Occidental.

沃伦·巴菲特：我在做出决定后马上给查理打了电话。我首先打给了Ron Olson，因为我担心他可能有冲突。在大约十分钟内，他就同意了。我告诉他，我们必须在周一晚上完成。Cravath也收到了Occidental相同的通知。

And it was very late on Monday light, but all the papers were put in order. And Munger, Tolles was in Los Angeles, and Cravath was in New York, and I was in Omaha. And I didn’t do that much; Mark Hamburg did a lot of the work. He was at work on Sunday on other things when I went down (laughs) to meet with the Occidental people.

虽然周一晚上很晚，但所有文件都已经整理好。Munger, Tolles在洛杉矶，Cravath在纽约，而我在奥马哈。我没有做太多的工作；Mark Hamburg做了很多工作。他在周日还在处理其他事务时，我下楼（大笑）去见Occidental的人。

And it was the product of people who understood us, understood how we operate, and both with an incentive to put all the manpower necessary on the job.

这得益于那些理解我们、理解我们运作方式的人，他们都很有动力投入到这项工作中。

And like I say, I think their board of directors met at 10 o’clock on Monday night to approve it. But they could announce it Tuesday morning, and that’s what they wanted to do. And with Berkshire, they could do it.

我认为他们的董事会在周一晚上 10 点开会批准了这个决定。但他们可能会在周二早上宣布，这正是他们想要做的。与伯克希尔合作，他们可以做到这一点。

59. We have no formula for assessing risk

我们没有评估风险的公式

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 6.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，6 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, my name’s Tony McCall and I’m from Montgomery, Alabama. And my question is about your disciplined risk evaluation approach and how you balance that with the fact that perseverance and determination and grit are often necessary for success.

观众成员：下午好，我叫托尼·麦考尔，来自阿拉巴马州的蒙哥马利。我的问题是关于你们的严谨风险评估方法，以及你们如何平衡这一点与毅力、决心和勇气在成功中常常是必要的事实。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not — I certainly like determination and grit in the — with the people we work for.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，我并不是——我当然喜欢我们为之工作的人的决心和毅力。

But we don’t have any formula that evaluates risk, but we certainly make our own calculation of risk versus reward in every transaction we do.

但我们没有任何评估风险的公式，但我们在每一笔交易中肯定会自行计算风险与回报。

And that’s true whether it’s marketable securities, that’s true whether it’s private investments, that’s true whether it’s making an investment in a business.

无论是市场证券、私人投资还是对企业的投资，这都是如此。

And sometimes we’re wrong, and we’re going to be wrong sometimes in the future. You can’t make a lot of decisions in this business without being wrong. But we don’t think the procedure — or the results — would be changed favorably by having lots of committees and lots of spreadsheets and that sort of thing. It just — you know —

有时候我们是错的，将来我们也会犯错。在这个行业中，你无法做出很多决策而不犯错。但我们认为，程序或结果不会因为有很多委员会和大量电子表格之类的东西而得到改善。这就是——你知道的——

If I had a group under me, they would try and figure out what I wanted the answer to be, and they would tell me what I wanted to hear.

如果我有一个团队在我身边，他们会试图弄清楚我想要的答案是什么，然后告诉我我想听的话。

And I’ve watched that approach at 20 public companies. And what the CEO wants to do, they may spend a lot of time getting there, but the investment banker gets there, and the internal committees get there, — or the internal operations — get there.

我在20家上市公司中观察到过这种方法。首席执行官想做的事情，他们可能会花很多时间去实现，但投资银行家、内部委员会，或者内部操作都会达到那个结果。

The calculations are — it’s the same as the insurance business with Ajit (Jain). Ajit gets calls on insurance deals, and you have to think through that deal.

计算是——这与 Ajit（Jain）的保险业务是一样的。Ajit 会接到保险交易的电话，你必须仔细考虑这个交易。

The main thing is you have — are you reasonably sure that you know what you’re doing? And if it gets past that hurdle, then we go on to figure out the math of gain versus loss and how much loss we can afford to take in anything. And we’re willing to take what sounds like large losses if we think that the rewards are more likely and proportional. Charlie?

主要的问题是你是否合理地确定你知道自己在做什么？如果能跨过这个障碍，我们就会继续计算收益与损失的数学，以及我们在任何事情上能承受多少损失。如果我们认为回报更有可能且成比例，我们愿意承受看似巨大的损失。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing.

查理·芒格：我没有什么要补充的。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s very disappointing — we have no formulas around Berkshire. We don’t sit down and write a bunch, you know — have people work till midnight calculating things and putting spreadsheets together.

沃伦·巴菲特：这非常令人失望——我们没有关于伯克希尔的公式。我们不会坐下来写一堆公式，让人们工作到午夜计算东西和整理电子表格。

And if the hurdle rate is 15 percent or something, having them all come out at 15.1 or 15.2, because that’s what’s going to happen. I mean, you’re going to get the numbers you want to hear and to an extreme degree.

即使障碍率是15%，他们也会让结果都是15.1或15.2，因为那就是会发生的情况。你会得到你想听到的数字，并且是极端程度的。

60. Buffett describes some of the dishonest business propositions it gets

巴菲特描述了一些他所遇到的不诚实商业提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: The proposals we see from the investment world — I’ve got to tell you about one because it illustrates what goes on.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们从投资界看到的提案——我得跟你们讲一个，因为它能说明发生了什么事情。

We received a proposition the other day — and I’ll disguise the numbers a little bit so somebody can pick it out — but it was a private company, and we’ll say it was earning a hundred million dollars a year. But the seller of the business and the investment banker suggested that we should look at the earnings as being 110 million dollars a year, because as a private company they had to pay their top people in cash, which was expensed.

我们前几天收到一个提议——我会稍微掩饰一下数字，以便有人能识别出来——但这是一家私人公司，我们可以说它每年的收入是一亿美元。但是，业务的卖方和投资银行家建议我们应该将收益视为每年一亿一千万美元，因为作为一家私人公司，他们必须以现金支付高管的薪酬，这部分费用是可以抵扣的。

But we could pay them in stock options and things like that, which weren’t expensed, or were explained as not really counting and therefore we could report 110 million dollars if we gave away something we didn’t want to give away.

但是，我们可以用股票期权等方式支付他们，这些并不被计入支出，或者被解释为不算数，因此如果我们把一些我们不想给出的东西给他们，我们可以报告一亿一千万美元。

But by essentially — by sort of lying about our accounting, we could add 10 million dollars in earnings, and they wanted us to pay them because they couldn’t do it and we could do it. And therefore — at this point, they’re losing me of course, totally.

但通过在会计上说谎，我们可以增加一千万美元的收益，他们想让我们付钱，因为他们做不到，而我们可以做到。因此——此时，他们完全让我失去了兴趣。

But it — it’s just astounding the accounting games that are played. All the adjustments are why the place should really be — will be — earning more than before. It’s a business.

但——真的是令人震惊的会计游戏。所有的调整都是为了说明这个地方实际上会赚得更多。这是一个商业行为。

We also had one that came in from a private equity firm and by a mistake we got the email that was sent to the manager from the email from the private equity firm that owned it, to the manager, in terms of making projections for it.

我们还收到过一个来自私募股权公司的提案，我们错误地收到了从私募股权公司发给经理的电子邮件，内容涉及对其进行预测。

And they told them to add 15 percent because they said Buffett will discount it by 15 percent or 20 percent anyway. (Laughs)

他们告诉经理要增加15%，因为他们说巴菲特无论如何都会以15%或20%的折扣来处理。（笑）

So just add 15 percent to offset his conservatism. You know, it’s not an elegant business, as Charlie will tell you. (Laughter)

所以只需增加15%以抵消他的保守态度。你知道，这个行业并不优雅，正如查理所说的。（笑）

You have any better stories, Charlie? (Laughter)

你有什么更好的故事，查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s bad enough.

查理·芒格：这已经够糟糕了。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew —

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，安德鲁——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s really very bad enough.

查理·芒格：这真的非常糟糕。

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Thank you, Warren. I think it’s —

安德鲁·罗斯·索金：谢谢你，沃伦。我认为这是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Why do we want our leading citizens lying and cheating?

查理·芒格：我们为什么要让我们的优秀公民撒谎和作弊？

61. Buffett would bet against a car company like Tesla being able to compete on auto insurance

巴菲特会对像特斯拉这样的汽车公司在汽车保险方面的竞争能力进行押注。

WARREN BUFFETT: Andrew? 沃伦·巴菲特：安德鲁？

ANDREW: I believe it’s my final question and admittedly it’s a two-parter, but it’s the same topic.

安德鲁：我相信这是我最后一个问题，虽然这实际上是一个两部分的问题，但它是同一个主题。

Elon Musk says that Tesla will start to offer insurance for its cars and can price it better than a typical insurance company because of the data it collects from all of the vehicles on the road.

埃隆·马斯克说特斯拉将开始提供汽车保险，并且可以比典型的保险公司更好地定价，因为他们从所有的车辆上收集了数据。

You’ve talked about the threat of autonomous vehicles on the insurance business. But what about to GEICO of automobile themselves getting into the insurance business?

你谈到了自动驾驶汽车对保险业务的威胁。但是，如果GEICO（伯克希尔旗下的保险公司）自己进入保险业务呢？

And on a very similar topic, Tesla recently announced that they are shifting to an online-only sales model. And several traditional auto dealerships are also reducing their property holdings as car buyers increasingly use smart phones and the internet to shop for cars. What does this portend for Berkshire Hathaway Automotive?

类似的话题，特斯拉最近宣布他们将转向仅在线销售模式。随着消费者越来越多地使用智能手机和互联网来购车，许多传统汽车经销商也在减少他们的物业持有。这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦汽车业务意味着什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Actually, General Motors had a company for a long time called Motors Insurance Company and various companies have tried it.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。实际上，通用汽车曾经有一家名为汽车保险公司的公司，许多公司尝试过这个。

I would say that the success of the auto companies getting insurance business are probably about as likely as the success of the insurance companies getting into the auto business. (Laughter)

我会说，汽车公司成功进入保险业务的可能性大约和保险公司成功进入汽车业务的可能性一样。（笑声）

I worry much more about Progressive than all of the auto company possibilities that I can see, in terms of getting insurance business. It’s not an easy business at all.

我对 Progressive 的担忧远超过我能看到的所有汽车公司在获取保险业务方面的可能性。这根本不是一项容易的业务。

And I would bet against any company in the auto business being any kind of an unusual success.

我敢打赌，任何汽车行业的公司都不会有任何异常的成功。

The idea of using telematics, in terms of studying people’s drivers habits, that’s spreading quite widely. And it is important to have data on how people drive, how hard they break, how much they swerve, all kinds of things.

使用远程信息处理技术来研究人们的驾驶习惯的想法正在广泛传播。了解人们的驾驶方式、刹车力度、转向幅度等各种数据是非常重要的。

So, I don’t doubt the value of the data but I don’t think that the — the auto companies will have any advantage to that. I don’t think they’ll make money in the insurance business.

所以，我不怀疑数据的价值，但我认为汽车公司不会从中获得任何优势。我认为他们在保险业务中不会赚钱。

Using the internet to shop for cars is like, you know, using the internet for shopping for everything. It’s another competitor. And there’s no question that people will look for better ways.

在网上购物买车就像你知道的，使用互联网购物的一切。这是另一个竞争者。毫无疑问，人们会寻找更好的方式。

The gross margin on new cars is about 6 percent or thereabouts. So, there’s not lots of room in the game. But that will be a method and that will sell some cars.

新车的毛利率大约在 6%左右。因此，市场空间并不大。但这将是一种方法，并且会卖出一些车。

And if there are, you know — it’s another competitor. But I don’t think it destroys the auto dealer who takes good care of the customers and is there to service the customers.

如果有的话，你知道——这又是一个竞争对手。但我认为这并不会摧毁那些善待客户并为客户提供服务的汽车经销商。

It’s not an overwhelming threat, but it’s obviously something that’s going to be around and will sell some cars. Charlie?

这不是一个压倒性的威胁，但显然这将是一个存在的事物，并且会卖出一些汽车。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Again, nothing. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：再一次，没什么特别的意见。（笑声）

62. Buffett: I’m betting all my wealth on the survival of Berkshire’s culture

巴菲特：我将我所有的财富押在伯克希尔文化的生存上

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Gregg?

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。格雷格？

GREGG WARREN: Warren, a lot of Berkshire’s success over the years has come from the fact that you and Charlie have had the luxury of being patient, waiting for the right opportunities to come along to put excess capital to work, even if it has led to a buildup of large amounts of cash on the balance sheet.

格雷格·沃伦：许多伯克希尔的成功来自于你和查理有耐心等待合适的机会来利用多余的资本，即使这导致了资产负债表上大量现金的积累。

This has historically worked out well for shareholders, as you and Charlie have been able to take full advantage of the disruptions in equity and credit markets or special situations like we saw with the Oxy deal, to negotiate deals on terms that ultimately benefit Berkshire shareholders.

这种方法历史上对股东有利，因为你和查理能够充分利用股市和信贷市场的干扰或像Oxy交易这样的特殊情况，来谈判有利于伯克希尔股东的交易。

That said, there is an opportunity cost attached to your decision to hold onto so much cash, one that investors have been willing to bear, primarily by forgoing a return of excess capital, dividends, and share repurchases, as well as seeing lower returns on cash holdings.

这就是说，您决定持有如此多现金是有机会成本的，投资者愿意承担这一成本，主要是通过放弃多余资本的回报、股息和股票回购，以及看到现金持有的回报降低。

As we look forward, how certain can we be that this will still be the case once you’re no longer running the show, especially if Berkshire’s returns are expected to be lower over time. And is it not more likely that the next managers at Berkshire will have to manage the eventual migration of Berkshire from an acquisition and investment platform to a returning capital to shareholders vehicle?

展望未来，我们能有多大把握在你不再掌舵时，这种情况仍然会如此？特别是如果伯克希尔的回报预期会随着时间的推移而降低。是否更有可能的是，伯克希尔的下一任管理者将不得不管理伯克希尔从一个收购和投资平台到一个向股东回报资本的转变？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s certainly a possibility. I mean, that’s a possibility under me. It’s a possibility under the successor. I mean, it’s a question of can you invest truly large sums reasonably well. You can’t do it as well as you can do small sums. There’s no question about that.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。这当然是一个可能性。这在我在职期间是一个可能性，在继任者在职期间也是一个可能性。问题是你是否能合理地投资非常大的金额。显然，你不能像投资小额资金那样做得那么好，这是没有疑问的。

But we will have to see how that works out over many years because certain years lots of opportunities, huge opportunities, present themselves and other years there are totally dry holes.

但我们需要看看这在许多年后会如何发展，因为某些年份会出现很多机会，巨大的机会，而其他年份则完全没有机会。

So that’s not a judgment you can make in a one-year period or a three-year period. It’s certainly a judgment you can make over time though.

所以这不是你可以在一年或三年内做出的判断。然而，随着时间的推移，这确实是一个可以做出的判断。

And I personally — my estate will have basically nothing but Berkshire in it for some time as it gets disbursed to philanthropies. And I have a section in there which says to the trustees, in effect, to manage it — I have a section in there that says — ignore the — your exempt, from my standpoint, from the law that trustees normally should diversify and do all that sort of thing.

而且我个人——我的遗产在一段时间内基本上只会包含伯克希尔，因为它将分发给慈善机构。我在其中有一部分写道，实际上是对受托人说，管理它——我有一部分写道——你可以忽略你通常应该多样化和做所有这类事情的法律要求。

And I want the entire amount that they have to be kept in Berkshire as they distribute it over time to the philanthropies. And I don’t worry at all about the fact — I would like to have a very large sum go to the philanthropies, and I don’t worry at about the fact that it essentially will all be in Berkshire. And I’m willing to make that decision while I’m alive, which will continue for some years after I die.

我希望他们拥有的全部金额都保留在伯克希尔，因为他们会随着时间的推移将其分配给慈善事业。我一点也不担心这一点——我希望有一大笔钱用于慈善事业，我也不担心这笔钱基本上都会在伯克希尔。我愿意在我活着的时候做出这个决定，这个决定在我去世后还会持续几年。

So, I have a lot of confidence in the ability of the Berkshire culture to endure and that we have the right people to make sure that that happens. I’m betting my entire net worth on that. And that doesn’t give me pause at all.

所以，我对伯克希尔文化的持续能力充满信心，并且我们有合适的人来确保这一点。我将我的全部净资产押在这一点上。这一点让我毫不犹豫。

I rewrite my will every few years, and write it the same way in respect to the Berkshire holdings. Charlie?

我每隔几年就重写一次遗嘱，并在伯克希尔的持股方面以相同的方式写。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t own any indexes. And I have always been willing to own just two or three stocks. And I have not minded that everybody who teaches finance in law school and business school teaches that what I’m doing is wrong. It isn’t wrong. It’s worked beautifully.

查理·芒格：我不拥有任何指数。我一直愿意只拥有两三只股票。我并不介意每个在法学院和商学院教授金融的人都教我所做的事情是错误的。其实并没有错。这种方法运作得非常好。

I don’t think you need a portfolio of 50 stocks if you know what you’re doing. And I hope my heirs will just sit.

我认为如果你知道自己在做什么，就不需要持有 50 只股票的投资组合。我希望我的继承人只是静静地坐着。

WARREN BUFFETT: My heirs hope that I’ll change my will. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：我的继承人希望我能改变我的遗嘱。（笑声）

63. “Having the right partners in life is enormously important”

“在生活中拥有合适的伴侣是非常重要的”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station 7.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的，7 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Bill He (PH), and I’m from Vancouver, Canada. You two make up an iconic duo. And growing up, I found your investment strategies very admirable. And so, my question is, how do you deal with conflicts when they arise between the two of you?

观众成员：你好。下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫比尔·赫（音），来自加拿大温哥华。你们两位是一个标志性的组合。在我成长的过程中，我发现你们的投资策略非常令人钦佩。因此，我的问题是，当你们之间出现冲突时，你们是如何处理的？

WARREN BUFFETT: Are you applying personal conflicts in terms of doing something ourselves versus having Berkshire, do it? Or — oh, between the two of you. I’m just in —

沃伦·巴菲特：你是在指个人冲突，是指我们自己做某事还是让伯克希尔来做？还是——哦，你们俩之间的。我只是在——

Charlie and I literally, and people find this hard to believe, but in 60 years we’ve never had an argument. We have disagreed about things and we’ll probably keep occasionally disagreeing about this or that.

查理和我真的，虽然人们很难相信，但在过去的 60 年里我们从未争吵过。我们在某些事情上有过分歧，可能今后也会偶尔在这或那方面有不同意见。

But if you define an argument as something where emotion starts entering into it, or anger or anything of the sort, it just doesn’t happen.

但如果你把争论定义为情感开始介入的事情，或者愤怒或类似的东西，那就根本不会发生。

I think that Charlie is smarter than I am, but I also think that there are certain things where I’ve spent more on them than he has. And sometimes we both think we’re right. And generally, I get my way because Charlie is willing to do it that way and he’s never second-guessed me when things have been wrong. And I wouldn’t dream of second-guessing him if he were doing something that was wrong — that turned out to be wrong. We will never have a conflict, basically. Charlie?

我认为查理比我聪明，但我也认为有些事情我比他花的时间更多。有时我们都认为自己是对的。通常，我会按照我的方式行事，因为查理愿意这样做，当事情出错时他从未怀疑过我。如果他做了一些最终证明是错误的事情，我也不会怀疑他。我们基本上不会有冲突。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the issue isn’t how long — how we get along, the issue is how is the company going to work when we’re gone? And the answer is fine. It’s going to work fine.

查理·芒格：问题不在于我们相处多久，问题在于当我们不在时公司将如何运作？答案是很好。它会运作得很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re lucky that, you know, I ran into him when I was, what, 28 years old. And — we both worked in the same grocery store and he grew up less than a block away from where I now live and everything. But I did not know who Charlie Munger was — (laughs) — until I was 28.

沃伦·巴菲特：我们很幸运，我在 28 岁时遇到了他。我们俩都在同一家杂货店工作，他的家离我现在住的地方不到一个街区。但我在 28 岁之前并不知道查理·芒格是谁——（笑）——直到我 28 岁。

But clearly, we’re in sync in how we see the world. And we’re in sync on business decisions, basically.

但显然，我们在看待世界的方式上是同步的。而在商业决策上，我们基本上也是同步的。

Charlie would do fewer things than I would, but that’s because I’m spending my time on this while he’s designing dormitories or something. (Laughter)

查理会做的事情比我少，但那是因为我在花时间做这个，而他在设计宿舍或其他什么。（笑声）

And we both keep busy in our own ways. And we have a lot of fun dividing the labor like we do.

我们各自忙着自己的事情，分工合作的方式让我们感到很有趣。

But you really want to work — I mean, having the right partners in life, particularly the right spouse, but having the right partners in life is enormously important. I mean, it’s more fun with a partner, both in personal life and in business life. And you probably get more accomplished, too.

但你真的想工作——我的意思是，生活中有合适的伴侣，特别是合适的配偶，生活中有合适的伴侣是非常重要的。我的意思是，有伴侣会更有趣，无论是在个人生活还是商业生活中。而且你可能也能取得更多成就。

But you just have a better time. It would not be any fun to do work in a little room and make a ton of money trading around securities but never working with another human being.

但你会过得更愉快。在一个小房间里做工作，靠交易证券赚很多钱，但从不与其他人合作，这样的生活一点乐趣都没有。

So, I recommend finding — well, Charlie gave some advice in the movie, finding the best person that will have you or something like that. (Laughs) Sort of a limited objective.

所以，我建议寻找——好吧，查理在电影中给出了一些建议，找到最适合你的人，或者类似的东西。（笑）这算是一种有限的目标。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But it’s not hard to be happy if you’re a collector and don’t run out of money.

查理·芒格：但是如果你是一个收藏家，并且不缺钱，快乐并不难。

Collecting is intrinsically fun. Just think who — how many people who you’ve known your whole life who were collectors who didn’t run out of money, who weren’t happy collecting? That’s why we’ve been collecting all our lives.

收集本身就是一种乐趣。想想看——你一生中认识的有多少收藏家，他们没有用完钱，也没有因为收藏而感到快乐？这就是为什么我们一生都在收藏的原因。

You know, it’s a very interesting thing. There’s always a new rock to be turned over. And it’s interesting.

你知道，这是一件非常有趣的事情。总有一块新石头可以翻过来。这很有趣。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And in a certain way we’ve collected friends that make our lives better and that we have a good time with. And it’s very important, you know, who you select as your heroes or friends. And I’ve been lucky in this. I mean, it was only because of the doctor named Eddie Davis and his wife that Charlie and I even met.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。在某种程度上，我们结交了让我们的生活更美好、让我们愉快的朋友。选择你的英雄或朋友是非常重要的。我在这方面很幸运。我的意思是，正是因为一位名叫埃迪·戴维斯的医生和他的妻子，查理和我才得以相遇。

But if you keep doing enough things, some will work out very lucky. And the best ones are ones that involve lifelong involvement with other people.

但如果你不断尝试足够多的事情，有些会非常幸运地成功。而最好的事情是那些与他人终身参与的事情。

We’ve got some in our directors, a number of our directors, that have had similar impacts on me.

我们的一些董事，对我产生了类似的影响。

So, I recommend that you look for somebody better than you are and then try to be like they are.

所以，我建议你寻找一个比你更优秀的人，然后努力去像他们一样。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s funny, you know, we’ve lost people along the way. And when I lost Warren’s secretary I thought, “Oh, my God. She was so wonderful. Gladys (Kaiser). We’ll never get another one.” Becki (Amick) is better. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：有趣的是，我们在这个过程中失去了很多人。当我失去沃伦的秘书时，我想，“哦，我的天。她太棒了。格拉迪斯（凯泽）。我们再也找不到一个了。”贝基（阿米克）更好。（笑声）

And then we had Verne McKenzie, who was a wonderful chief financial officer. He’s gone and the current incumbent (Marc Hamburg) is better. We’ve been very lucky. And maybe the shareholders will be lucky a few more times. (Laughter)

然后我们有了维尔恩·麦肯齐，他是一位出色的首席财务官。他已经离开，而现任的（马克·汉堡）更优秀。我们非常幸运。也许股东们还会再幸运几次。（笑声）

64. Expand you circle of competence if you can, but don’t force it

如果可以的话，扩大你的能力圈，但不要强迫自己。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 8. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。第 8 站。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name is Jacob (PH). I’m a shareholder from China and also a proud graduate of Columbia Business School. Thanks for having us here. (Cheers)

观众成员：嗨，沃伦。嗨，查理。我叫雅各布（音）。我是来自中国的股东，也是哥伦比亚商学院的自豪毕业生。感谢你们邀请我们来这里。（欢呼）

My question is, our world is changing at a faster pace today versus 40 years ago and even more so going forward. And in this context, for each of us individually, should we expand our circle of competence continuously over time? Or should we stick with the existing circle but risk having a shrinking investment universe? Thank you.

我的问题是，今天我们的世界变化的速度比 40 年前快得多，未来的变化甚至更大。在这种情况下，对于我们每个人来说，是否应该随着时间的推移不断扩大我们的能力圈？还是应该坚持现有的能力圈，但冒着投资范围缩小的风险？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, obviously you should, under any conditions, you should expand your circle of competence —

沃伦·巴菲特：显然，在任何情况下，你都应该扩大你的能力范围——

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you can.

查理·芒格：如果你能的话。

WARREN BUFFETT: If you can. Yeah. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：如果可以的话。是的。（笑声）

And I’ve expanded mine a little bit over time. But —

我随着时间的推移稍微扩展了一下我的。可是——

CHARLIE MUNGER: If you can’t — I’d be pretty cautious.

查理·芒格：如果你不能——我会非常谨慎。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can’t force it. You know. If you told me that I had to, you know, become an expert on physics or, you know —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。你不能强迫它。你知道。如果你告诉我我必须，嗯，成为物理学的专家，或者，嗯——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Dance maybe the lead in a ballet, Warren. That would be a sight. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：沃伦，也许跳个芭蕾舞的主角，那会是个景象。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. That’s one I hadn’t really —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，嗯。这是我还没有真正——

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible) now.

查理·芒格：（听不清）现在。

WARREN BUFFETT: That’s one you may be thinking about, but I— (laughter) — it hadn’t even occurred to me. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特：你可能在考虑这个，但我——（笑）——我甚至没有想到过。（笑）

But, you know, it’s ridiculous. That doesn’t mean you can’t expand it at all. I mean, I did learn about some things as I’ve gone along in a few businesses.

但是，你知道，这太荒谬了。这并不意味着你完全不能扩展它。我的意思是，在我参与的一些业务中，我确实学到了一些东西。

In some cases, I’ve learned that I’m incompetent, which is actually a plus, then you’ve discarded that one.

在某些情况下，我意识到自己无能，这实际上是一个优点，那么你就抛弃了那个。

But it doesn’t really — the world is going to change. And it’s going to keep changing. It’s changing every day. And that makes it interesting. You know.

但实际上并不是这样——世界将会改变。而且它会不断变化。它每天都在变化。这使得它变得有趣。你知道的。

And as it changes, certainly within what you think is your present existing circle, you have to — you should be the master of figuring that one out or it really isn’t your circle of competence.

随着变化，当然在你认为的现有圈子内，你必须——你应该成为弄清楚这一点的高手，否则这真的就不是你的能力范围。

And if you get a chance to expand it somewhat as you go along —

如果你有机会在进行过程中稍微扩展一下——

I’ve learned some about the energy business from Walter (Scott) and Greg (Abel) as we’ve worked together, but I’m not close to their level of competence on it. But I do know more than I used to know. And so, you get a chance to expand it a bit.

我从沃尔特（斯科特）和格雷格（阿贝尔）那里学到了一些关于能源业务的知识，尽管我与他们的能力水平相差甚远。但我确实比以前知道得更多。因此，你有机会稍微扩展一下。

Usually, I would think normally your core competence is probably something that sort of fits the way the mind has worked.

通常，我认为你的核心竞争力可能是某种适合思维运作方式的东西。

Some people have what I call a “money mind.” And they will work well in certain types of money situations.

有些人拥有我所称之为“金钱思维”。他们在某些类型的金钱情况下表现良好。

It isn’t so much a question of IQ. The mind is a very strange thing. And people have specialties, whether in chess or bridge. I see it in different people that can do impossible — what seem to me — impossible things. And they’re really kind of, as Charlie would say, stupid in other areas — (laughs) — you know.

这并不是智商的问题。思维是一件非常奇怪的事情。人们都有自己的专长，无论是在国际象棋还是桥牌上。我看到不同的人能够做一些看似不可能的事情。而他们在其他领域真的有点，正如查理所说，愚蠢——（笑）——你知道的。

So just keep working on it. But don’t think you have to increase it and therefore start bending the rules. Anything further, Charlie?

所以继续努力。但不要认为你必须增加它，因此开始违反规则。还有其他问题吗，查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 查理·芒格：不。

65. It’s easy to make 50% on a million, but much more difficult on larger amounts

在一百万上赚取 50%很容易，但在更大金额上就困难得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Station 9. We’re just about — yeah, we got time for a couple more.

沃伦·巴菲特：第 9 站。我们差不多——是的，我们还有时间再来几个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is John Dorso (PH), and I’m from New York.

观众成员：我叫约翰·多索（PH），我来自纽约。

Mr. Buffett, you’ve said that you could return 50 percent per annum, if you were managing a one-million-dollar portfolio. What type of strategy would you use? Would you invest in cigar butts, i.e., average businesses at very cheap prices? Or would it be some type of arbitrage strategy? Thank you.

巴菲特先生，您曾说过如果您管理一个一百万美元的投资组合，您每年可以获得 50%的回报。您会使用什么样的策略？您会投资于“雪茄屁股”，即以非常便宜的价格购买普通企业吗？还是会采用某种套利策略？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: It might well be the arbitrage strategy, but in a very different, perhaps, way than customary arbitrages, a lot of it.

沃伦·巴菲特：这可能确实是套利策略，但可能与传统套利方式非常不同，很多时候都是如此。

One way or another, I can assure you, if Charlie was working with a million, or I was working with a million, we would find a way to make that with essentially no risk, not using a lot of leverage or anything of the sort.

无论如何，我可以向你保证，如果查理在处理一百万，或者我在处理一百万，我们都会找到一种几乎没有风险的方法，不使用大量杠杆或类似的东西。

But you change the one million to a hundred million and that 50 goes down like a rock.

但是你把一百万改成一亿，那 50 就像石头一样下跌。

There are little fringe inefficiencies that people don’t spot. And you do get opportunities occasionally to do. But they don’t really have any applicability to Berkshire. Charlie?

有一些小的边际低效，人们没有发现。你确实会偶尔有机会去做这些事。但它们对伯克希尔并没有实际意义。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree totally. It’s just you used to say that large amounts of money, they develop their own anchors. You’re just — it gets harder and harder.

查理·芒格：我完全同意。你曾经说过，大量资金会形成自己的锚点。你只是——这变得越来越困难。

I’ve just seen genius after genius with a great record and pretty soon they got 30 billion and two floors of young men and away goes the good record. That’s just the way it works.

我见过一个个天才，他们有很好的记录，但很快他们有了300亿美元和两层楼的年轻人，好记录就没了。这就是运作的方式。

WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie —

沃伦·巴菲特：当查理——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s hard as the money goes up.

查理·芒格：随着钱的增加，这很难。

WARREN BUFFETT: When Charlie was a lawyer, initially, I mean, you were developing a couple of real estate projects. I mean, if you really want to make a million dollars — or 50 percent on a million — and you’re willing to work at it — that’s doable. But it just has no applicability to managing huge sums. Wish it did, but it doesn’t.

沃伦·巴菲特：当查理还是律师的时候，最初，我是说，你们正在开发几个房地产项目。我是说，如果你真的想赚一百万美元——或者在一百万上赚 50%——而且你愿意为此努力——这是可以做到的。但这对管理巨额资金没有任何适用性。希望它有，但实际上没有。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Lee Louley (PH), using nothing but the float on his student loads, had a million dollars, practically, shortly after he graduated as a total scholarship student. He found just a few things to do. And did them.

查理·芒格：是的。李·卢利（音），仅用他学生贷款的浮存金，几乎在毕业后不久就拥有了一百万美元。他找到了一些事情去做，并成功了。

66. We’ve tried, but See’s Candies gets no traction outside California

我们已经尝试过，但 See’s Candies 在加利福尼亚州以外没有获得关注。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10.

沃伦·巴菲特：好的。10 号站。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren and Charlie. I’m Luis Cobo (PH) from Panama. I’m a proud Berkshire Hathaway shareholder since 10 years ago.

观众成员：你好，沃伦和查理。我是来自巴拿马的路易斯·科博（PH）。我自十年前以来一直是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的骄傲股东。

I’ve been looking at See’s Candies, and I’m a pretty good fan of them. And I see Charlie is as well throughout our meeting.

我一直在关注 See’s Candies，我是它们的忠实粉丝。而且我在我们的会议中看到查理也是如此。

And even with all our consumption — and you know, the company has given us generous profits over the past decades.

即使在我们所有的消费中——你知道，这家公司在过去几十年里给了我们丰厚的利润。

Why do you think the company has not grown to the scale of Mars or Hershey’s, and what do you think we could do to make this company grow and become a bigger part of our company, being such an amazing product?

你认为公司为什么没有发展到像玛氏或好时那样的规模？你认为我们可以做些什么来使这家公司成长，并成为我们公司更大的一部分，毕竟这是一个如此出色的产品？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve probably had a dozen or so ideas over the years. And we used to really focus on it because it was a much more sizable part of our business. In fact, it was practically our only business aside from insurance.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，多年来我们大概有十几个想法。我们曾经非常专注于此，因为它是我们业务中一个更大规模的部分。事实上，除了保险，它几乎是我们唯一的业务。

And like I say, we’ve had 10 or 12 ideas. Some of them we tried more than once. And as we got a new manager they’ve tried them. And the truth is none of them really work.

就像我说的，我们有 10 到 12 个想法。有些我们尝试过不止一次。随着新经理的加入，他们也尝试了这些想法。事实是，没有一个真正有效。

And the business is extraordinarily good in a very small niche. Boxed chocolates are something that everybody likes to receive, or maybe give it as a gift, both sides of it.

这个生意在一个非常小的细分市场中异常好。盒装巧克力是每个人都喜欢收到的东西，或者也许作为礼物送出，双方都是如此。

And relatively few of the people go out and buy to consume themselves. If I leave a box of chocolates open at the office — we’ve only got 25 people — but it’s gone, you know, almost immediately.

相对较少的人会出去自己消费。如果我在办公室里放一盒巧克力——我们只有 25 个人——但它几乎立刻就被吃光了。

If I take it as a gift to somebody, they’re happy to get it. And if you leave the box open at a dinner party again, they’re all gone. But those same people that so readily grab it when it’s right there in front of them, do not walk out to a candy store very often and buy it just to eat themselves. They’re not going to buy. It’s very much a gift product.

如果我把它当作礼物送给某人，他们会很高兴。而如果你在晚宴上再次把盒子打开，他们就全没了。但是那些在它摆在面前时如此乐意抓取的人，并不常常走进糖果店，买来自己吃。他们不会去买。这很大程度上是一种礼品产品。

It does not grow worldwide. Very interesting thing. People in these — last time I checked, people in the west prefer milk chocolate, people in the east prefer dark chocolate. People in the west like big, chunky pieces. People in the east will take miniatures.

它并没有在全球范围内增长。非常有趣的事情。根据我上次检查的情况，西海岸更喜欢牛奶巧克力，东海岸更喜欢黑巧克力。西海岸喜欢大块的巧克力，东海岸则喜欢迷你巧克力。

We’ve tried to move it geographically many, many, many, many times. Because it would be so wonderful if it — when it works it works wonderfully. But it doesn’t travel that well.

我们尝试过很多很多次将其地理位置移动。因为如果它能正常工作，那将是非常美好的。但它的移动性并不好。

If we open a store in the east, we get enormous traffic for a while and everybody says, “We’ve been waiting for you to come.” And then it finally — we end up with a store that does X pounds per year when we need one and a half X in the same square footage to make terrific returns.

如果我们在东部开一家店，我们会在一段时间内获得巨大的客流，大家都会说：“我们一直在等你们来。” 然后最终——我们得到的店每年只做 X 英镑的生意，而我们需要在同样的面积上做到 1.5X 才能获得可观的回报。

And we’ve tried everything because the math is so good when it works. And overall, we have a business that doesn’t — chocolate consumption generally doesn’t grow that much. But yeah, go ahead Charlie —

我们已经尝试了所有方法，因为当它有效时，数学是如此出色。总体而言，我们的业务并没有——巧克力消费通常增长不大。但没关系，查理，继续吧——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, well, we failed in turning our little candy company into Mars or Hershey’s for the same reason that you fail to get the Nobel Prize in physics and achieve immortality. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，我们未能将我们的小糖果公司变成玛氏或好时，原因和你未能获得诺贝尔物理奖和实现永生是一样的。（笑声）

It’s too tough for us. (Laughter)

这对我们来说太难了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: But we put 25 million dollars into it. And it’s given us over two billion dollars of pre-tax income, well over two billion. And we’ve used it to buy other businesses. And if we were the typical company and had bought that business and tried desperately to use all the retained earnings within the candy business I think we’d have fallen on our face.

沃伦·巴菲特：但是我们投入了 2500 万美元。而它给我们带来了超过 20 亿美元的税前收入，远远超过 20 亿。我们用它来收购其他企业。如果我们是典型的公司，购买了那家企业并拼命尝试利用糖果业务中的所有留存收益，我认为我们会失败。

I think that it just illustrates that all these formulas, you know, you learn or that having a strategic plan to use all the capital or something — some businesses work in a fairly limited area. Others really play out over this —

我认为这只是说明了所有这些公式，你知道的，或者说有一个战略计划来利用所有的资本或其他东西——一些企业在相对有限的领域内运作。其他企业则在更广泛的范围内发挥作用——

Dr. Pepper, you know, has — I don’t know what the percentage is now, but it might be at 10 or 12 percent market share or something like that in Dallas or maybe it’s eight. And then you go to Detroit or Boston and it’s less than 1 percent. I’m not sure about the numbers currently.

德克萨斯州的 Dr. Pepper，你知道的，市场份额——我不知道现在的百分比是多少，但在达拉斯可能是 10%或 12%左右，或者可能是 8%。然后你去底特律或波士顿，市场份额不到 1%。我不确定目前的数字。

But you’d think in a mobile society, you know, with Dr. Pepper having been around since the time that Coke was founded in 1886 — it’s amazing how certain things travel, certain things don’t travel.

但你会认为，在一个流动的社会中，Dr. Pepper自1886年可口可乐成立以来就存在——这真是令人惊讶地某些东西能传播，某些东西却无法传播。

You know, candy bars — you mentioned Hershey. I mean, Cadbury doesn’t do that well here and Hershey doesn’t do that well in the U.K. And here we are, we all look alike. But somehow, we eat different candy bars. It’s very interesting to observe.

你知道，巧克力棒——你提到Hershey。我是说，Cadbury在这里做得不好，Hershey在英国做得不好。我们看起来都差不多，但我们却吃不同的巧克力棒。观察这点非常有趣。

And the idea that you have some formula for businesses that provide that each one should pursue the course they’re on because they made it in X, they should try to find other ways to make it in X. We’re quite willing to find it in A, B, C, D, E, or F — the money is fungible.

你拥有一个业务公式，每个业务都应该坚持自己的路线，因为它在X领域成功了，他们应该尝试找到其他方式在X领域成功。我们愿意在A、B、C、D或F中寻找，资金是可以流动的。

And I think, actually, it has worked very much to our advantage to have that philosophy. So, anything further, Charlie?

我认为，实际上，这种哲学对我们非常有利。那么，查理，还有其他问题吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I once told a very great man at dinner after he’d written a very great book, I said, “You know, you’re never going to write another great book like that.” And he was deeply offended. And I’ve read his four subsequent books and I’m totally right. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：“我曾经在晚餐时对一位非常伟大的作家说，在他写了一本非常伟大的书之后，我说，‘你知道，你永远不会再写出这样的一本伟大书了。’他深感冒犯。我读了他之后写的四本书，我完全是对的。 (笑声)

To write one great book is a lot to do in one lifetime. And people aren’t holding back on you when they don’t do more. It’s hard.

在一生中写出一本伟大的书已经很了不起了。人们不会因为他们做不到更多而对你有保留。很难。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. But you ought to make the most of the first one you got. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特：是的。但你应该充分利用你得到的第一个。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you’re lucky. You know.

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，你很幸运。你知道的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. 查理·芒格：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we were very fortunate. I would’ve blown the chance to buy See’s Candy, but Charlie said, “Don’t be so cheap,” basically. And we still got it at a pretty good price. And we learned a lot —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们非常幸运。我本来会错过购买 See’s Candy 的机会，但查理基本上说：“别这么小气。”而我们还是以相当不错的价格买到了它。我们学到了很多——

CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s amazing how much we’ve learned over the years.

查理·芒格：多年来我们学到了多少真是令人惊讶。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve learned —

沃伦·巴菲特：是的，我们已经学到了——

CHARLIE MUNGER: And if we hadn’t, the record would be so much worse.

查理·芒格：如果我们没有这样做，记录会糟糕得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. 沃伦·巴菲特：是的。

CHARLIE MUNGER: At any given time, what we already knew was not going to be enough to take us to the next step. That’s what makes it difficult. Think of all the people you know that have tried to take one extra step and have fallen off a cliff.

查理·芒格：在任何给定的时间，我们已经知道的知识都不够带我们迈出下一步。这就是困难所在。想想你认识的所有那些尝试迈出一步而掉下悬崖的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on that happy note — (laughter) — we will conclude the meeting. (Applause and cheering)

沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，在这个愉快的时刻——（笑声）——我们将结束会议。（掌声和欢呼）

Thank you. Thank you. 谢谢。谢谢。

Thank you. 谢谢。

Thank you, but save of it for next year. We may need it then.

谢谢，但把它留到明年吧。那时我们可能需要它。

Just give us a carry-forward on the rest of it, and thank you.

只需将其余部分结转给我们，谢谢。

We’ll come back at 3:45. We will conduct the business meeting, and it doesn’t — we have no — nothing on the proxy to vote on, but we will be back here in 15 minutes.

我们将在 3:45 回来。我们将进行商务会议，代理投票没有任何事项，但我们将在 15 分钟后回来。

And if you enjoy a process, you can stick around and watch us reelect our board.

如果你喜欢这个过程，可以留下来观看我们重新选举董事会。

Thank you. Thanks for coming.

谢谢。感谢您的到来。

67. Formal business meeting and election of board members

正式商务会议和董事会成员选举

WARREN BUFFETT: The meeting will now come to order.

沃伦·巴菲特：会议现在开始。

I’m Warren Buffett, chairman of the company and I welcome you to this 2019 — 2019 annual meeting of shareholders.

我是沃伦·巴菲特，公司董事长，欢迎您参加 2019 年股东年会。

This morning I introduced the Berkshire Hathaway directors who are present.

今天早上我介绍了在场的伯克希尔哈撒韦董事。

Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors.

今天与我们在一起的还有德勤会计师事务所的合伙人，他们是我们的审计师。

Jennifer Tselentis is the assistant secretary of Berkshire Hathaway and she will make a written record of the proceedings.

詹妮弗·特塞伦蒂斯是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的助理秘书，她将对会议进行书面记录。

Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting, and she will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors and the motions to be voted upon at this meeting.

贝基·阿米克已被任命为本次会议的选举监察员，她将对董事选举中投票的计数以及本次会议上将要投票的动议进行认证。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott and Marc Hamburg.

本次会议的指定代理持有人是沃尔特·斯科特和马克·汉堡。

Does the assistant secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?

助理秘书是否有关于在会议上有投票权并被代表的伯克希尔股份总数的报告？

Jennifer? 詹妮弗？

JENNIFER TSELENTIS: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent to all shareholders of record on March 6, 2019, the record date for this meeting, there were 724,765 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 1,371,697,551 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each vote entitled to 1/10,000th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting.

詹妮弗·特塞伦蒂斯：是的，我有。如 2019 年 3 月 6 日发送给所有记录在案的股东的会议通知所附的委托书中所示，本次会议的记录日期为 2019 年 3 月 6 日，伯克希尔哈撒韦 A 类普通股的流通股为 724,765 股，每股在会议上对提案投票时有一票的权利，而伯克希尔哈撒韦 B 类普通股的流通股为 1,371,697,551 股，每票在会议上对提案投票时有 1/10,000 的投票权。

Of that number 503,181 Class A shares and 839,707,642 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, May 2nd.

在这个数字中，503,181 股 A 类股份和 839,707,642 股 B 类股份通过截至 5 月 2 日星期四晚上的代理人出席了本次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢。这个数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接开始会议。

First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders, and I recognize Mr. Walter Scott, who will place a motion before the meeting.

会议的首要事项是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录，我请沃尔特·斯科特先生提出一项动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders be dispensed with and the minutes be approved.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议省略上次股东会议的会议记录阅读，并批准会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：我听到有人支持吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Motion has been moved and seconded. We will vote on the motion by voice vote. All those in favor say aye.

沃伦·巴菲特：动议已被提出并获得支持。我们将通过口头表决对动议进行投票。所有赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion’s carried.

沃伦·巴菲特：反对？提案通过。

Next item of business is to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who did not send in a proxy or wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in, you may vote in person for the election of directors and other matters to be considered in this meeting.

下一个议程是选举董事。如果有股东在场但未提交委托书或希望撤回之前提交的委托书，您可以亲自投票选举董事以及本次会议将要考虑的其他事项。

Please identify yourselves to one of the meeting officials in the aisles so that you can receive a ballot.

请向走道上的会议官员自我介绍，以便您可以领取选票。

I recognize Mr. Walter Scott to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.

我提议沃尔特·斯科特先生在会议上提出关于董事选举的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Stephen Burke, Susan Decker, William Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Thomas Murphy, Ronald Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、斯蒂芬·伯克、苏珊·德克、威廉·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、托马斯·墨菲、罗纳德·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer be elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：提议并第二次支持选举沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默为董事。

Are there any other nominations? Or any discussion? The nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person they should now mark the ballot on the election of directors and deliver that ballot to one of the meeting officials in the aisles.

还有其他提名吗？或者有什么讨论？提名已经准备好进行表决。如果有股东亲自投票，他们现在应该在董事选举的选票上做记号，并将选票交给走道上的会议官员之一。

Miss Amick, when you are ready you may give your report.

阿米克小姐，当您准备好时，可以提交您的报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 543,703 votes for each nominee. That number exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes of all Class A and Class B shares outstanding.

贝基·阿米克：我的报告已经准备好了。代理持有人的选票在上周四晚上收到的代理投票中，每位提名人获得的票数不少于 543,703 票。这个数字超过了所有流通的 A 类和 B 类股份总票数的多数。

The certification required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.

根据特拉华州法律要求的投票精确计数的认证将交给秘书，以便与本次会议的会议记录一起存档。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Miss Amick. Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, Greg Abel, Howard Buffett, Steve Burke, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Ajit Jain, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, Walter Scott, and Meryl Witmer have been elected as directors.

沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你，阿米克小姐。沃伦·巴菲特、查尔斯·芒格、格雷格·阿贝尔、霍华德·巴菲特、史蒂夫·伯克、苏珊·德克、比尔·盖茨、大卫·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·古伊曼、阿吉特·贾因、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森、沃尔特·斯科特和梅瑞尔·维特默已被选为董事。

We now — we now have a motion from Walter Scott.

我们现在——我们现在有来自沃尔特·斯科特的动议。

WALTER SCOTT: I move the meeting be adjourned.

沃尔特·斯科特：我提议会议休会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?

沃伦·巴菲特：还有第二个吗？

RON OLSON: I second the motion.

RON OLSON: 我支持这个提议。

WARREN BUFFETT: A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye.

沃伦·巴菲特：已经提出并得到支持的休会动议。我们将进行口头表决。有没有讨论？如果没有，赞成者请说“赞成”。

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

2019-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

2019-05-04 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1. Welcome and Munger’s insurgency campaign

2. Berkshire directors introduced

3. Berkshire’s Q1: Pay attention to operating earnings

4. Berkshire signs 20-year lease for its Omaha headquarters

5. Berkshire employees pitch in for annual meeting

6. Q&A Begins

7. Munger: “I predict we’ll get a little more liberal in repurchasing shares”

8. BNSF may adopt “precision-scheduled railroading”

9. BNSF trying to improve energy efficiency

10. Bank CEOS who make bad mistakes should lose all their net worth

11. “We will spend a lot of money” on buybacks if price is right

12. Buying one share in an oil-rich duck hunting club

13. Buffett speaks for himself on politics, not for Berkshire

14. Buffett: “I’m a card-carrying capitalist” but some regulations are needed

15. We don’t try to push Berkshire stock higher or lower

16. We welcome change, but we won’t always adapt to it

17. Kraft Heinz is a good business, but we paid too much

18. Internet competition for Berkshire’s furniture retailers

19. Pension funds should avoid “alternative” investments

20. Amazon buy doesn’t mean portfolio managers aren’t “value” investors

21. Buffett: Berkshire insurance businesses are worth more than you think

22. “Don’t go overboard on delayed gratification”

23. Munger on succession: “You’re just going to have to endure us”

24. Munger invited to happy hour by the bitcoin people

25. Berkshire will probably increase stakes above 10% if regulations are eased

26. Money managers need to set expectations for their investors

27. Berkshire doesn’t have to disclose most foreign stock holdings, so it doesn’t

28. Buffett expects Precision Castparts earnings will “improve fairly significantly”

29. The older you get, the better you understand human behavior

30. Ajit Jain on pricing unconventional insurance contracts

31. Despite Kraft Heinz problems, Berkshire could partner with 3G again

32. Buffett’s not worried about strength of Kraft Heinz’s brands

33. Buffett’s biggest problem with Apple is the stock keeps going up

34. Union Pacific has higher profit margins than BNSF

35. Buffett: I’m lucky that I can “control my own time”

36. “We’re not in the business of explaining why we own a stock”

37. FlightSafety probably won’t get more demand for its simulators after Boeing MAX 737 crashes

38. Buffett on tech investing: “We won’t go into something because somebody else tells us it’s a good thing to do”

39. “In the end, Berkshire should prove itself over time”

40. GEICO trying to improve its loss ratio as it competes with Progressive

41. Try to have a big circle of competence but be realistic about its perimeter

42. Berkshire is strong on the environment but won’t do expensive reports to prove it

43. “Independent” board members aren’t really independent

44. “We will put a lot of money into energy” with capital spending at utilities

45. Why Berkshire doesn’t put its unspent cash into a stock index fund

46. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should do more loans for manufactured housing, even if it hurts Clayton’s profits

47. “Ingenious” capitalism will replace jobs lost to automation

48. Regulations can be “irritating,” but they’re needed for banks and insurance

49. Shareholders don’t want or need very detailed information on the subsidiaries

50. Munger: “Climate getting better” for U.S. investments in China

51. Buffett has “feeling” Brexit vote was a mistake, but he’s still anxious for a U.K. deal

52. We don’t need “boots on the ground” to find foreign acquisitions, we need lower prices

53. We feel good about Berkshire as a long-term “compounding machine”

54. Berkshire vs the S&P, with taxes thrown in

55. How NV Energy is working to recover from casino defections

56. Portfolio managers Weschler and Combs roughly matching the S&P but making other contributions

57. Power of American Express’s brand will help fend off heavy credit card competition

58. Occidental came to us for a $10B loan because we could do it quickly

59. We have no formula for assessing risk

60. Buffett describes some of the dishonest business propositions it gets

61. Buffett would bet against a car company like Tesla being able to compete on auto insurance

62. Buffett: I’m betting all my wealth on the survival of Berkshire’s culture

63. “Having the right partners in life is enormously important”

64. Expand you circle of competence if you can, but don’t force it

65. It’s easy to make 50% on a million, but much more difficult on larger amounts

66. We’ve tried, but See’s Candies gets no traction outside California

67. Formal business meeting and election of board members

Article Comments Update

热门标签

Related Articles

1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2016-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

1990-03-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1994-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2018-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting