2010-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 2009 was $21.8 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 19.8%. Over the last 45 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*
我们在 2009 年的净资产增长为 218 亿美元，使我们的 A 类股与 B 类股的每股账面价值均增长了 19.8%。过去 45 年（即现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 84,487 美元，复合年增长率为 20.3%。*
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
本报告中所有“每股”数据均以 Berkshire 的 A 类股为准。B 类股的数据为 A 类股所示数据的 1/1500。
Berkshire’s recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It’s important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire’s operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you — but particularly our new shareholders — to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I’m gone.
Berkshire 近期收购 Burlington Northern Santa Fe（BNSF），使我们的股东人数在原有约 50 万人的基础上，至少新增了 65,000 名股东。对我、我的长期搭档 Charlie Munger 来说，重要的是让每一位股东都理解 Berkshire 的运营、目标、局限与文化。因此，我们会在每年年报中重申指导我们的经济原则。今年这些原则列在第 89–94 页，我建议各位——尤其是新加入的股东——务必阅读。Berkshire 数十年来一直遵循这些原则，并将在我离开后很久依然如此。
In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.
在这封信中，我们也会回顾一些我们业务的基础内容：既希望为 BNSF 的新股东提供一堂“新生入门课”，也希望为 Berkshire 的老股东做一次“复习课”。
How We Measure Ourselves
我们如何衡量自己
Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have — or have not — accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.
我们用于评估管理层绩效的指标列在对页。自一开始，Charlie 和我就相信：衡量我们做到了什么、没做到什么，必须有一套理性且不动摇的标准。这样才能避免一种诱惑：先看业绩之箭落在何处，再把靶心涂在箭落点周围。
Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?
选择 S&P 500 作为我们的“对标基准”很容易，因为我们的股东几乎无需成本就能通过持有指数基金获得与其相当的回报。既然如此，股东为什么要付费给我们，只为了复制同样的结果？
A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.
对我们来说，更难的决定在于：该如何衡量 Berkshire 相对 S&P 的进步。用股价变动来衡量有充分理由；从很长时间跨度看，这确实是最好的检验。但年度之间的市场价格可能极端反复无常。即便评估期长达十年，如果区间起点或终点的价格愚蠢地过高或过低，也会让结论严重失真。Microsoft 的 Steve Ballmer 和 GE 的 Jeff Immelt 对这个问题会深有体会——他们接过管理权时，公司股票正处在“让人流鼻血”的高价位。
The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value — understated though it is — supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.
衡量我们每年进步的理想标准，应当是 Berkshire 每股内在价值的变化。可惜内在价值无法被接近精确地计算，因此我们改用一个粗糙的替代指标：每股账面价值。使用这个尺子有其缺陷，我们在第 92、93 页讨论过。此外，大多数公司的账面价值都会低估内在价值，Berkshire 当然也不例外。总体而言，我们旗下业务的实际价值远高于账面入账价值。尤其在至关重要的保险业务上，这个差异更是巨大。即便如此，Charlie 和我仍认为：虽然账面价值偏低，但它仍是追踪内在价值变化最有用的工具。按这一衡量方式——正如本信开头段落所说——自 1965 财年起，我们的账面价值以 20.3% 的复合年增长率增长。
We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.
需要指出的是：如果我们改用市价作为衡量标尺，Berkshire 的结果会更好——自 1965 财年起的复合年增长率将是 22%。令人惊讶的是，这个看似不大的年复合差异，却在整整 45 年里造成了巨大分化：市值累计增长 801,516%，而账面价值累计增长 434,057%（见第 2 页）。我们的市值增幅更好，是因为 1965 年 Berkshire 的股价相对于其盈利不足的纺织资产账面价值，处于合理的折价；而如今 Berkshire 的股价则经常以高于其一流业务会计入账价值的溢价交易。
Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 — and there have been 41 of these — during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.
概括而言，第 2 页表格传达了三条信息：两条是正面的，一条是极其负面的。第一，自 1965–69 开始、以 2005–09 结束，我们从未出现过任何一个五年期（这样的五年期一共有 41 个）在其中账面价值增幅不超过 S&P 的增幅。第二，尽管在某些市场上涨的年份我们落后于 S&P，但在 S&P 出现负收益的 11 年里，我们却一贯跑赢。换句话说，我们的防守比进攻更强，而且这很可能会持续。
The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.
最大的负面在于：随着规模扩大，我们相对于市场的优势已大幅收缩——这是一个令人不快、且必然还会延续的趋势。诚然，Berkshire 拥有许多卓越的企业与一群真正伟大的管理者，他们在一种不同寻常的企业文化中运作，使其才能得以充分发挥。Charlie 和我相信，这些因素仍会在长期带来高于平均水平的结果。但巨额资金自带“锚”，未来即便仍有优势，也只会是历史优势的一小部分。
What We Don’t Do
我们不做什么
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)
很久以前，Charlie 说过他最强烈的愿望：“我只想知道我会死在什么地方，这样我就永远不去那里。”这句智慧之言受到了普鲁士伟大数学家 Jacobi 的启发——他建议用“反过来想，永远反过来想（Invert, always invert）”来帮助解决难题。（我也可以补充一句：这种“反向思维”在不那么高深的层面同样有效：把一首乡村歌倒着唱，你很快就能找回你的车、房子和妻子。）
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
下面是几个我们在 Berkshire 如何运用 Charlie 思路的例子：
Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
Charlie 和我会避开那些我们无法评估其未来的行业，不管它们的产品看上去多么令人兴奋。过去，人们无需多聪明就能预见某些行业将迎来惊人增长，比如汽车（1910 年）、飞机（1930 年）和电视机（1950 年）。但与此同时，未来还包含了激烈的竞争格局，足以把几乎所有涌入这些行业的公司“打残”。即便是幸存者，通常也会伤痕累累、流血退出。
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
仅仅因为 Charlie 和我能清楚看到某个行业即将出现的高速增长，并不意味着我们就能判断：当一大群竞争者为争夺霸主地位而厮杀时，这个行业最终的利润率与资本回报会是什么样子。在 Berkshire，我们会坚持只做那种“未来几十年利润图景看起来仍相对可预测”的业务。即便如此，我们仍会犯下不少错误。
We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
我们绝不会依赖“陌生人的善意”而生存。“大而不倒（too-big-to-fail）”在 Berkshire 从不是退路。相反，我们会始终把自己的安排做成这样：任何我们在可想象范围内可能需要的现金，都将远远小于我们自身的流动性规模。而且，这份流动性还会被我们众多且多元化业务持续喷涌的盈利不断“补给、刷新”。
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed — without delay — our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
当金融体系在 2008 年 9 月陷入“心脏骤停”时，Berkshire 是体系的流动性与资本供应者，而不是乞求者。在危机最顶峰时，我们向商业世界投入了 155 亿美元——若非如此，很多机构只能转而寻求联邦政府的援助。其中，90 亿美元用于为三家声誉卓著、此前被视为安全的美国企业补充资本——它们需要我们立刻给出一张“看得见摸得着的信任票”。其余 65 亿美元则履行了我们为收购 Wrigley 提供资金支持的承诺；在别处恐慌横行之际，这笔交易仍然不打停、不按暂停键地完成了。
We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.
为了维持我们首屈一指的财务实力，我们付出了不小代价。我们惯常持有的 200 亿美元以上现金等价资产，在当前只能赚到微不足道的收益。但我们睡得很踏实。
We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly — or not at all — because of a stifling bureaucracy.
我们往往让众多子公司自行运作，几乎不进行任何程度的监督与监控。这意味着我们有时较晚才发现管理层问题；也意味着在经营与资本决策上，偶尔会出现一些“如果当时征求了我们意见，Charlie 和我会不同意”的决定。不过，我们的大多数经理人都把这种独立性发挥得极好：他们以一种以股东为导向的心态来回报我们的信任——这种心态极其宝贵，却在庞大组织中极其罕见。我们宁愿承受少数错误决策带来的“看得见的成本”，也不愿承担因官僚体系扼杀活力而导致的无数“看不见的成本”——决策变慢，甚至干脆不决策。
With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.
随着我们收购 BNSF，我们现在大约有 257,000 名员工，业务单元多到数以百计——而且我们希望两者都能更多。但我们绝不会让 Berkshire 变成一个被委员会、预算汇报和层层管理所淹没的巨型“单块怪物”。相反，我们计划像“由一组分别管理的中大型企业组成的集合体”那样运作：大多数决策都发生在各业务的运营层面。Charlie 和我会把自己限制在四件事上：资本配置、企业风险控制、挑选经理人，以及设定他们的薪酬。
We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.
我们不会刻意去讨好华尔街。那些根据媒体或分析师评论来买进卖出的人，不适合做我们的股东。我们想要的是这样的合伙人：之所以加入 Berkshire，是因为他们希望对一门自己理解的生意做长期投资，并且这门生意奉行的政策与他们的理念一致。假如 Charlie 和我与少数合伙人一起做一个小项目，我们也会寻找与我们同频的人——因为共同目标与共同命运，会让所有者与管理者之间形成一种幸福的商业“婚姻”。规模扩大到巨无霸，并不会改变这一真理。
To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can’t be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.
为了建立一群“与我们兼容”的股东，我们努力以直接、信息充分的方式与股东沟通。我们的目标是：如果角色对调，我们希望知道什么，我们就告诉你什么。此外，我们尽量在周末尽早把季度与年度财务信息发布到互联网上，让你和其他投资者在非交易时段有充足时间消化这家多元化企业到底发生了什么。（偶尔，SEC 的截止日期会迫使我们在非周五披露。）这些事情不可能用几段话讲清，也不适合被压缩成记者有时寻求的那种“抓眼球标题”。
Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: “We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 — and probably well beyond — but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall.” Many news organizations reported — indeed, blared — the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren’t predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.
去年我们就看到一个案例：依靠“金句/短声道（sound-bite）”的报道会如何出错。在那封年报信 12,830 个词当中，有一句话是：“例如，我们确信经济在 2009 年将陷入一片狼藉——并且很可能会持续更久——但这个结论并不能告诉我们股市会涨还是会跌。”许多新闻机构报道——甚至用醒目的方式“放大播报”——这句话的前半截，却完全不提后半截。我认为这是糟糕的新闻：被误导的读者或观众很可能以为 Charlie 和我在预测股市会很糟糕，但我们不仅在那句话里没有这么说，在信中其他地方也明确表示：我们根本不预测市场。任何被这些耸动者误导的投资者都付出了沉重代价：年报信发布当日，道指收于 7,063 点，而当年年末收于 10,428 点。
Given a few experiences we’ve had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.
经历了类似的几件事后，你就能理解为什么我更希望我们与各位的沟通，尽可能保持直接、完整、不被删节。
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Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
让我们进入 Berkshire 运营层面的具体内容。我们有四个主要运营板块，每个板块在资产负债表与损益表的特征上都与其他板块不同。因此，把它们像财务报表的常规做法那样“混在一起”会妨碍分析。所以我们会把它们当作四家独立的企业来呈现——这也是 Charlie 和我看待它们的方式。
Insurance
保险
Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value — and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.
我们的财产意外险（property-casualty，P/C）业务一直是 Berkshire 增长背后的发动机，并将继续如此。它为我们创造了奇迹。我们在账面上对 P/C 公司计入的价值，比它们的净有形资产高出 155 亿美元，这一差额记录在“Goodwill（商誉）”科目里。然而，这些公司的价值远高于其账面入账价值——下面对 P/C 行业经济模型的介绍，会告诉你为什么。
Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.
保险公司先收保费、后付赔款。在极端情况下，比如某些工伤赔付事故，赔款可能会持续几十年。这种“先收钱、后付款”的模型让我们长期持有一大笔资金——我们称之为“float（浮存金）”——这笔钱最终要付给别人。但在此期间，我们可以把这笔浮存金用于 Berkshire 的投资收益。尽管单个保单与理赔不断更替，我们持有的浮存金规模相对于保费规模却保持着惊人的稳定。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也会增长。
If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.
如果保费收入超过费用与最终赔付损失的总和，我们就会获得承保利润（underwriting profit），它会叠加在由浮存金投资所产生的投资收益之上。这个组合让我们能享受“免费资金”的使用权——更妙的是，我们还会因为持有这笔钱而“被付费”。可惜，对这种美好结果的期待会吸引激烈竞争；在多数年份，竞争之激烈甚至会让整个 P/C 行业出现显著的承保亏损。换句话说，这个亏损就是行业为了持有浮存金所付出的“成本”。通常这项成本不高，但在某些灾害频发的年份，承保亏损的成本会不仅吞掉、甚至超过浮存金带来的投资收益。
In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most — though certainly not all — future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.
在我或许带有偏见的观点里，Berkshire 拥有全球最好的大型保险运营体系。我也会毫不含糊地说：我们拥有最好的管理者。我们的浮存金从 1967 年进入该业务时的 1,600 万美元，增长到 2009 年末的 620 亿美元。而且，我们已经连续七年实现承保盈利。我认为，在未来的大多数年份——当然不是每一年——我们仍有望继续保持承保盈利。若能如此，我们的浮存金就将是“零成本”的，几乎就像有人在我们这里存入 620 亿美元，我们可以为自身利益去投资，却无需支付利息。
Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.
我再强调一次：零成本浮存金并不是整个 P/C 行业可以普遍期待的结果。多数年份里，保费都不足以覆盖理赔与费用的总和。因此，多年以来，该行业整体的有形股本回报率远远低于 S&P 500 的回报。Berkshire 的卓越经济性之所以存在，只因为我们有卓越的管理者在经营一些不寻常的业务。我们的保险 CEO 值得你们感谢——他们为 Berkshire 增加了数十亿美元的价值。我很高兴能向你们介绍这些“全明星”。
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Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.
让我们从 GEICO 说起。你们都认识 GEICO，因为它每年有 8 亿美元的广告预算（几乎是汽车保险行业第二大广告主的两倍）。GEICO 由 Tony Nicely 管理，他在 18 岁时加入公司。如今 66 岁的 Tony 仍每天“踢踏舞般”地去办公室——就像 79 岁的我一样。我们都觉得自己很幸运：能在一门自己热爱的生意里工作。
GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.
GEICO 的客户对公司也怀有温暖的感情。证据如下：自 Berkshire 在 1996 年取得 GEICO 控制权以来，GEICO 的市场份额从 2.5% 提升到 8.1%，对应净新增 700 万名保单持有人。也许他们联系我们是因为觉得我们的壁虎很可爱，但他们向我们购买，是为了省下真正要紧的钱。（也许你也可以；打 1-800-847-7536 或去 www.GEICO.com。）他们之所以留下来，是因为既喜欢我们的服务，也喜欢我们的价格。
Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.
Berkshire 分两阶段收购 GEICO。1976-80 年，我们用 4,700 万美元买下了公司大约三分之一的股票。后来多年里，公司大量回购自家股票，使我们的持股比例在我们未再额外买入任何股份的情况下，增长到大约 50%。接着在 1996 年 1 月 2 日，我们用 23 亿美元现金买下了 GEICO 剩余的 50% 股权——这笔成本约为我们最初投入的 50 倍。
An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
华尔街有个老笑话，很贴近我们的经历：
Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.
客户：谢谢你让我在 5 美元时买入 XYZ 股票。我听说它涨到 18 美元了。
Broker: Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
经纪人：对，而且这只是开始。事实上，公司现在经营得这么好，18 美元反而比你当初买入时更值得买。
Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.
客户：该死，我就知道我应该等等再买。
GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.
GEICO 在 2010 年的增长可能会放缓。由于汽车销量下滑，美国车辆登记数量其实在下降。此外，高失业率正导致越来越多司机选择不买保险。（这在几乎所有地方都违法，但如果你丢了工作又仍想开车……）不过，我们作为“低成本生产者（low-cost producer）”的地位，必然会让我们在未来获得显著增长。1995 年，GEICO 是美国第六大车险公司；现在我们是第三。公司的浮存金从 27 亿美元增长到 96 亿美元。同样重要的是：在 Berkshire 拥有 GEICO 的 14 年中，GEICO 有 13 年实现了承保盈利。
I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.
我在 1951 年 1 月第一次拜访 GEICO 时，还是 20 岁学生，那次就让我对 GEICO 兴奋不已。多亏了 Tony，我今天比当年更兴奋。
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A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha — and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)
Berkshire 历史上发生过一件极其重要的事：那是在 1985 年的一个周六。Ajit Jain 走进了我们在 Omaha 的办公室——我立刻就知道，我们找到了一位超级明星。（是 Mike Goldberg 发现了他——Mike 如今已晋升为“圣迈克（St. Mike）”。）
We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.
我们立刻让 Ajit 负责 National Indemnity 规模很小、而且举步维艰的再保险业务。多年下来，他把这门生意打造为保险世界里独一无二的巨无霸。
Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits — and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.
如今 Ajit 的团队只有 30 个人，却在多个保险领域创下了交易规模记录。Ajit 能承保十亿美元级别的保额上限——而且把全部风险都自己留下来，不再分给其他保险公司。三年前，他从 Lloyds 手里接下了巨额负债，让 Lloyds 得以理顺它与 27,972 名参与者（“names”）之间的关系——这些人曾承保过问题重重的保单，一度威胁到这家 322 年老牌机构的生存。那一份单独合同的保费就达 71 亿美元。2009 年，他又谈成了一份寿险再保险合同，未来大约 50 年可能为我们带来累计 500 亿美元的保费。
Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.
Ajit 的业务与 GEICO 恰好相反。在 GEICO，我们有数以百万计的小保单，而且大多会年复一年续保。Ajit 承保的保单相对很少，并且每年的组合会发生显著变化。在全球范围内，只要有某件既非常巨大、又非常特殊的风险需要投保，Ajit 就是人们会打电话求助的那个人。
If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat — and you can only save one of us — swim to Ajit.
如果有一天 Charlie、我和 Ajit 同时在一艘正在下沉的船上——而你只能救其中一个——那就游向 Ajit。
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Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.
我们的第三个保险“重炮”是 General Re。若干年前，这项业务曾经麻烦缠身；如今它已成为我们保险王冠上一颗闪闪发亮的宝石。
Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.
在 Tad Montross 的领导下，General Re 在 2009 年实现了出色的承保年度；同时，它还为我们带来了“每一美元保费对应的浮存金”异常丰厚的表现。除了 General Re 的财产意外险（P/C）业务之外，Tad 和他的同事们还打造了一项重要的寿险再保险业务，而且其价值正变得越来越高。
Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key — though only partially-owned — part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.
去年，General Re 终于实现了对 Cologne Re 的 100% 持股。自 1995 年以来，Cologne Re 一直是我们全球布局中的关键组成部分——尽管此前我们只部分持有。Tad 和我将在 9 月前往 Cologne，向其管理团队致谢，感谢他们对 Berkshire 作出的重要贡献。
Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
最后，我们还拥有一组规模更小的公司，其中多数专注于保险世界里一些“冷门又奇特的角落”。总体而言，它们的业绩一直保持盈利；并且如下表所示，它们为我们提供的浮存金规模也相当可观。Charlie 和我非常珍视这些公司及其管理者。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
以下是我们四个财产意外险与寿险业务板块的整体记录：
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And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.
现在来一段痛苦的坦白：去年，你们的董事长亲手为一场代价极其高昂的商业惨败画上了句号——而这场惨败完全是我自己一手造成的。
For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right — but of the wrong type.
多年以来，我一直绞尽脑汁，想给我们数以百万计、忠诚的 GEICO 客户提供一些“附加产品”。不幸的是，我最终还真想出来了——我灵光一现，认为我们应该营销一张属于我们自己的信用卡。我当时推理：GEICO 的保单持有人大概率是优质的信用风险（也就是违约概率更低），只要我们提供一张有吸引力的卡，他们很可能把业务带给我们。我们确实拿到了业务——但拿到的是“错误类型”的业务。
Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.
在我终于醒悟之前，我们的信用卡业务税前亏损大约达到了 630 万美元。随后，我们把那笔 9,800 万美元的“问题应收款”资产组合以面值 55 美分的价格出售，又额外亏损了 4,400 万美元。
GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the – – – – – well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.
需要强调的是，GEICO 的管理层从来就不喜欢我的这个主意。他们警告我：我们拿不到 GEICO 客户里的“奶油层”，我们会拿到——嗯——我们就把它叫作“非奶油层”吧。我则含蓄地暗示：我更年长，也更聪明。
I was just older.
事实证明：我只是更年长而已。
Regulated Utility Business
受监管的公用事业业务
Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
Berkshire 持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 89.5% 的权益，而后者拥有种类广泛的公用事业资产。其中最大的包括：(1) Yorkshire Electricity 和 Northern Electric，它们拥有 380 万终端用户，是英国第三大电力分销商；(2) MidAmerican Energy，主要在 Iowa 为 725,000 名电力客户提供服务；(3) Pacific Power 和 Rocky Mountain Power，在美国西部六个州为约 170 万名电力客户提供服务；(4) Kern River 与 Northern Natural 两条管道，输送的天然气约占美国消费量的 8%。
MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners. They are truly a dream team.
MidAmerican 有两位一流的经理人：Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel。此外，我的多年好友 Walter Scott 及其家族在公司也持有重要股权。Walter 无论参与哪项业务，都能带来非同寻常的商业洞察。与 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 共事的十年，反复印证了我最初的判断：Berkshire 不可能找到更好的合作伙伴。他们真的是一支梦之队。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.
有点“不太搭调”的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过 21 家本地品牌公司运营，旗下有 16,000 名经纪人。尽管去年房屋销售依然糟糕，HomeServices 仍赚到了一点小钱。它还收购了 Chicago 的一家经纪公司，并将在优质标的以合理价格出现时继续收购。十年之后，HomeServices 很可能会大得多。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
以下是 MidAmerican 运营的一些关键数据：
Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities’ regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.
我们的受监管电力公用事业公司，在大多数情况下提供的是垄断性服务，它们与服务区域内的客户以一种共生方式运行：用户依赖我们提供一流的服务，并为他们未来的需求提前投资。发电设施与大型输电设施的审批与建设周期往往被拉得很长，因此我们必须具备远见。反过来，我们也指望公用事业监管机构（代表客户行事）允许我们在为满足未来需求而必须投入的巨额资本上获得适当回报。如果我们自己不履行承诺，就不该指望监管方履行他们那一端的承诺。
Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.
Dave 和 Greg 确保我们做到这一点。全国性的研究机构持续把我们在 Iowa 与美国西部的公用事业公司评为行业内的顶尖或接近顶尖。同样地，在一家名为 Mastio 的机构对美国 43 条管道的排名中，我们的 Kern River 与 Northern Natural 两项资产并列第二。
Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned $2.5 billion, while in this same period spending $3 billion on wind generation facilities.
此外，我们继续向运营中投入巨额资金，不仅为未来做准备，也让这些业务更环保。自我们十年前买下 MidAmerican 以来，它从未派发过股息。我们转而把盈利用于改善与扩张我们在各服务区域的资产。举一个戏剧性的例子：在过去三年里，我们的 Iowa 与西部公用事业公司赚了 25 亿美元；而在同一时期，它们在风力发电设施上的投入却达到了 30 亿美元。
MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society’s credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the ever-increasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.
MidAmerican 一贯兑现了它对社会的承诺；而社会也值得称道地给予了回报：除少数例外，我们的监管机构都迅速允许我们在持续增加的资本投入上获得公平回报。展望未来，为了以各区域所期望的方式提供服务，我们会不惜一切代价去做到。我们也相信，作为回报，我们将被允许在投入资金上获得我们应得的回报。
In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met — and we believe that they will be — Berkshire’s ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.
在早些年，Charlie 和我会刻意回避公用事业这类资本密集型行业。事实上，从所有者角度看，最好的生意依然是那种资本回报率高、且为了增长不需要大量追加投资的企业。我们很幸运已经拥有不少这样的公司，也很想再买更多。但考虑到 Berkshire 未来将产生越来越多的现金，我们今天也很愿意进入那些经常需要大额资本开支的行业。我们只要求：这些企业对其新增投入资金能获得体面的回报，具备合理预期。如果我们的预期得到满足——我们相信会如此——那么在未来几十年里，Berkshire 不断扩大的“好到伟大”的企业集合体，应当能带来高于平均水平、但当然谈不上惊人的回报。
BRK的关键优势是不需要支付股息，这类公司不管是发行股票、债券都需要将每年留存的部分收益支付出去，BRK不需要。
Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.
需要指出的是，我们的 BNSF 业务在一些重要的经济特征上，与电力公用事业非常相似。在这两类业务中，我们都提供基础性服务——这些服务对客户、我们所服务的社区，乃至整个国家的经济福祉都至关重要，而且未来也将持续如此。未来几十年，两者都需要重资产投入，其规模将大幅超过折旧允许的额度。两者也都必须做很长远的规划，以满足预计将超过历史水平的需求。最后，两者都需要明智的监管者：监管者必须就“允许的回报”提供确定性，只有这样，我们才能有把握去做维持、替换与扩张资产所需的巨额投资。
We see a “social compact” existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should — and we believe will — understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.
我们认为，在公众与我们的铁路业务之间存在一种“社会契约（social compact）”，就像公用事业一样。如果任何一方逃避其义务，双方都不可避免地受损。因此，契约双方都应当——而且我们相信也会——理解：以一种能促使对方也表现良好之方式行事，是符合双方利益的。可以肯定地说：如果没有一流的电力系统与铁路系统，我们国家不可能实现接近其全部的经济潜力。我们会尽自己的一份力量，确保它们存在并持续高质量运作。
In the future, BNSF results will be included in this “regulated utility” section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens — yes, tens — of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.
未来，BNSF 的业绩将被纳入本“受监管公用事业”板块。除了两项业务在底层经济特征上相似之外，它们还有两点“结构性相似”：两者都适合使用大量、且不由 Berkshire 担保的债务；两者都将保留大部分利润不分红；两者无论景气还是不景气，都能赚到并投入巨额资金——尽管铁路的周期性会更强。总体而言，我们预计这一受监管板块的盈利将随时间显著增长，但代价是：我们必须投入数以百亿计——是的，几十个“十亿”——的新增股权资本。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire 在这一部分的业务几乎无所不包。不过，让我们先看一下整个业务组的汇总资产负债表与利润表摘要。
Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009’s severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.
本板块中几乎所有数量众多、且高度多元化的业务，在 2009 年严重衰退中都不同程度地受到了冲击。最主要的例外是 McLane——我们向成千上万家零售网点分销杂货、糖果与非食品商品的公司，而其中规模最大、遥遥领先的客户是 Wal-Mart。
Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of $344 million, which even so amounted to only slightly more than one cent per dollar on its huge sales of $31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets — practically all of which it owns — including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane’s prime asset, however, is Grady.
Grady Rosier 带领 McLane 创下了 3.44 亿美元的税前利润纪录；即便如此，相对于其高达 312 亿美元的巨额销售额，这也只相当于“每 1 美元销售额略多于 1 美分”的利润。McLane 拥有大量实体资产——几乎全部为自有资产——包括 3,242 辆挂车、2,309 辆牵引车，以及 55 个配送中心，总面积达 1,520 万平方英尺。不过，McLane 最重要的资产是 Grady 本人。
We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:
我们旗下有不少公司出现了这样一种情况：销售额下滑，但利润却改善了——这始终是一项极其出色的管理成就。以下是促成这一点的 CEO 名单：
Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak’s Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.
在我们所拥有、且对低迷工业板块有重大敞口的企业中，Marmon 和 Iscar 的表现都相对强劲。Frank Ptak 领导下的 Marmon 实现了 13.5% 的税前利润率，创历史新高。尽管公司销售额下降了 27%，Frank 以成本为先的管理方式缓解了利润下滑。
Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar — not wars, recessions or competitors. The world’s two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar’s results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.
以色列的 Iscar 几乎“无所畏惧”——战争、衰退、竞争对手都挡不住它。全球另外两家领先的小型切削刀具供应商在去年都过得很艰难，全年大部分时间都处于亏损运营状态。虽然 Iscar 的业绩较 2008 年显著下降，但公司仍持续报告盈利——即便它当时正在整合并梳理 Tungaloy（我们去年提到过的那笔大型日本收购）。等制造业复苏时，Iscar 会再创新纪录。Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman 这支不可思议的管理团队会确保这一点。
Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.
我们旗下所有与住宅和商业建筑相关的业务在 2009 年都遭受重创。Shaw、Johns Manville、Acme Brick 和 MiTek 的合计税前利润为 2.27 亿美元，相比 2006 年建筑繁荣时期的 12.95 亿美元下降了 82.5%。这些业务仍在谷底徘徊，不过它们的竞争地位依然毫发无损。
周期性行业的特点，某种程度上也是BRK喜欢他们的点。
The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.
去年 Berkshire 的最大问题是 NetJets——一家提供喷气机分时所有权（fractional ownership）的航空业务。多年来，NetJets 在建立自身为行业龙头方面极其成功：其机队价值超过了三大主要竞争对手的总和。总体而言，我们在这一领域的统治地位仍无人能挑战。
NetJets’ business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million. Moreover, the company’s debt has soared from $102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire’s guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It’s clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.
然而，NetJets 的经营业绩却是另一回事。在我们持有该公司 11 年里，它累计录得 1.57 亿美元的税前亏损。此外，公司的债务从收购时的 1.02 亿美元飙升到去年 4 月的 19 亿美元。若没有 Berkshire 对该债务提供担保，NetJets 早已倒闭。很明显，我让 NetJets 恶化到这种地步，是对你们的失职。但幸运的是，我被“救援”了。
Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to $1.4 billion, and, after suffering a staggering loss of $711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable.
MidAmerican Energy 那位极具才华的建设者与运营者 Dave Sokol，于 8 月出任 NetJets 的 CEO。他的领导带来了脱胎换骨的变化：债务已降至 14 亿美元；公司在 2009 年遭遇惊人的 7.11 亿美元亏损之后，如今已经稳稳实现盈利。
Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more.
更重要的是，Dave 推动的所有改变，没有任何一项削弱 Rich Santulli（NetJets 前 CEO、也是分时所有权行业之父）所坚持的顶级安全与服务标准。Dave 和我在个人层面拥有最强烈的利益动机去维持这些标准，因为我和我们的家人几乎所有飞行都使用 NetJets，我们的许多董事与经理也是如此。我们没有任何“专属飞机”或“专属机组”。我们得到的待遇与任何其他所有者完全相同——也就是说，当我们用自己的合同时，支付的价格和大家一模一样。简而言之，我们自己也吃自己做的饭。在航空业，没有任何背书比这更有分量。
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.
我们在这一板块中最大的业务是 Clayton Homes，它是美国领先的模块化住宅与工厂预制房（modular and manufactured homes）生产商。Clayton 并非一直是第一：十年前，行业三大制造商是 Fleetwood、Champion 和 Oakwood，三者合计占行业产量的 44%。此后它们都已破产。与此同时，行业总产量从 1999 年的 382,000 套下降到 2009 年的 60,000 套。
The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.
该行业之所以一片狼藉，有两个原因。第一个原因，如果美国经济想要复苏，就必须接受它（也就是说，它是“必须发生/必须忍受”的调整）。这与美国的新屋开工量（包括公寓单元）有关。2009 年，新屋开工只有 554,000 套——这是我们掌握数据的 50 年里最低的数字，远远低于其他年份。看似矛盾的是：这其实是好消息。
People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts — the supply side of the picture — were running about two million annually. But household formations — the demand side — only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.
几年前，当新屋开工（供给端）每年大约 200 万套时，人们还以为那是好消息。但家庭形成数量（需求端）只有大约 120 万户。这样供需失衡持续几年后，美国自然就出现了严重的房屋过剩。
There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.
要消化这份“过剩”，有三种办法：(1) 炸掉一大批房子，类似“以旧换新（cash-for-clunkers）”项目里报废汽车的做法；(2) 加快家庭形成速度，比如鼓励青少年同居——这种项目大概不会缺志愿者；(3) 把新屋开工压到显著低于家庭形成的水平。
Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.
我们国家明智地选择了第三种方案。这意味着，再过一年左右，住宅房地产的问题大体上就会成为过去；例外主要是高价住宅，以及某些过度建设特别严重的地区。当然，房价会长期低于“泡沫”水平；但每一个因此受伤的卖方（或放贷方），对应都会有一个受益的买方。事实上，许多家庭在几年前还买不起合适的房子，如今却发现完全负担得起——因为泡沫破裂了。
The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.
制造房（预制房）行业受困的第二个原因，则是行业特有的：工厂预制房与现场建造房（site-built homes）之间存在惩罚性的按揭利率差异。在你继续往下读之前，我先强调一个显而易见的事实：Berkshire 在这场争论里是“有利益相关”的，因此你应当格外谨慎地评估我接下来要说的观点。做完这个提醒之后，我再解释：为什么这种利率差异既伤害大量低收入美国人，也伤害 Clayton。
The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 5¼%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.
住宅按揭市场由政府规则所塑造，这些规则体现在 FHA、Freddie Mac 和 Fannie Mae 的体系之中。它们的放贷标准具有“决定性力量”，因为由它们担保的按揭贷款通常可以被证券化，并在实质上变成美国政府的义务。目前，购买传统的现场建造房（site-built homes）的买家，只要符合这些担保条件，就能拿到大约 5¼% 的 30 年期贷款。此外，联邦储备在近期还大量买入这类按揭（证券），这也帮助把利率维持在“地板价”般的水平。
In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however — and, of course, most buyers do — the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.
相对而言，能符合机构保险按揭条件的工厂预制房（factory-built homes）非常少。因此，一个资质良好、想买预制房的买家，贷款利率往往需要支付大约 9%。如果买家全款买房，Clayton 的房子性价比极高；但如果买家需要按揭融资——而绝大多数买家确实需要——融资成本的差异就常常会抵消预制房本身的价格优势。
Last year I told you why our buyers — generally people with low incomes — performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.
去年我告诉过你们：我们的买家（通常是低收入人群）为什么作为信用风险反而表现很好。关键在于他们的心态：他们买房是为了住进去，而不是为了倒卖或再融资。因此，我们的买家通常会把贷款月供安排在与其可核实收入相匹配的水平（我们并没有发放“撒谎贷款（liar’s loans）”），并期待有朝一日能把按揭烧掉（彻底还清）。如果他们失业、健康出问题或离婚，我们当然会预期出现违约。但他们很少仅仅因为房价下跌就选择“弃房走人”。即便在今天，尽管失业带来的麻烦加重了，Clayton 的逾期与违约仍处于合理范围，不会给我们造成重大问题。
We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.
我们一直努力让更多客户的贷款能够获得类似于现场建造房那样的融资待遇。但到目前为止，我们只取得了象征性的成功。因此，许多收入不高但习惯负责的家庭，只因为预制房融资利率差异导致月供过高，就不得不放弃拥有住房。如果不扩大资格范围，让所有符合首付与收入标准的人都能获得低成本融资，那么预制房行业似乎注定会艰难挣扎并逐步萎缩。
Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn’t have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire’s interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire’s credit to support Clayton’s mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can’t borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.
即便在这些条件之下，我仍相信 Clayton 在未来几年会保持盈利——但会远低于其潜力。我们不可能有比 CEO Kevin Clayton 更好的管理者了；他对待 Berkshire 的利益，就像对待自己的利益一样。我们的产品一流、价格低廉，而且持续改进。与此同时，我们会继续使用 Berkshire 的信用来支持 Clayton 的按揭项目，因为我们确信其稳健性。即便如此，Berkshire 的借款利率也不可能接近政府机构所享有的融资利率。这一劣势将限制销量，既伤害 Clayton，也伤害大量渴望低成本住房的优秀家庭。
In the following table, Clayton’s earnings are net of the company’s payment to Berkshire for the use of its credit. Offsetting this cost to Clayton is an identical amount of income credited to Berkshire’s finance operation and included in “Other Income.” The cost and income amount was $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008.
下表中，Clayton 的收益已扣除了公司为使用 Berkshire 信用而向 Berkshire 支付的费用。与 Clayton 这项成本相对应的，是一笔等额收入计入 Berkshire 的金融业务，并包含在“Other Income（其他收入）”中。这项成本与收入在 2009 年为 1.16 亿美元，2008 年为 9,200 万美元。
The table also illustrates how severely our furniture (CORT) and trailer (XTRA) leasing operations have been hit by the recession. Though their competitive positions remain as strong as ever, we have yet to see any bounce in these businesses.
该表也展示了：我们的家具（CORT）与拖车（XTRA）租赁业务在衰退中遭受了多么严重的打击。尽管它们的竞争地位依然一如既往地强，我们至今仍未看到这些业务出现任何反弹。
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At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country’s third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.
在 2009 年年末，我们成为 Berkadia Commercial Mortgage（前身为 Capmark）的 50% 股东。该公司是美国第三大商业按揭贷款服务机构。除了为规模达 2,350 亿美元的资产组合提供贷款服务外，公司也是重要的按揭贷款发起人，在全美设有 25 个办公室。尽管未来几年商业地产将面临重大问题，但从长期看，Berkadia 的机会相当可观。
Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.
我们在这项业务中的合伙人是 Leucadia，由 Joe Steinberg 和 Ian Cumming 领导。几年前 Berkshire 曾与他们合作收购 Finova——一家陷入困境的金融业务——那次合作经历非常愉快。在解决那次局面时，Joe 和 Ian 做的工作远远超过他们应尽的份额——而这种安排，我一向鼓励。自然地，当他们再次打电话邀请我一起参与收购 Capmark 时，我非常高兴。
Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let’s call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I’ll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia.
我们第一次的合作项目也叫 Berkadia。那么这一次就叫它 “Son of Berkadia（Berkadia 之子）”吧。也许有一天，我还会写信跟你们谈 “Grandson of Berkadia（Berkadia 之孙）”。
Investments
投资
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面我们列出截至年末市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资：
In addition, we own positions in non-traded securities of Dow Chemical, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re and Wrigley with an aggregate cost of $21.1 billion and a carrying value of $26.0 billion. We purchased these five positions in the last 18 months. Setting aside the significant equity potential they provide us, these holdings deliver us an aggregate of $2.1 billion annually in dividends and interest. Finally, we owned 76,777,029 shares (22.5%) of BNSF at yearend, which we then carried at $85.78 per share, but which have subsequently been melded into our purchase of the entire company.
此外，我们还持有 Dow Chemical、General Electric、Goldman Sachs、Swiss Re 和 Wrigley 的非交易证券头寸，合计成本为 211 亿美元，账面价值为 260 亿美元。我们在过去 18 个月里买入了这五项投资。先不谈这些头寸为我们带来的可观股权上行潜力，它们每年合计还能为我们贡献 21 亿美元的股息与利息收入。最后，截至年末我们持有 76,777,029 股 BNSF（占 22.5%），当时我们按每股 85.78 美元入账；但这部分股份随后已并入我们对整家公司收购之中。
In 2009, our largest sales were in ConocoPhillips, Moody’s, Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson (sales of the latter occurring after we had built our position earlier in the year). Charlie and I believe that all of these stocks will likely trade higher in the future. We made some sales early in 2009 to raise cash for our Dow and Swiss Re purchases and late in the year made other sales in anticipation of our BNSF purchase.
2009 年，我们卖出最多的股票包括 ConocoPhillips、Moody’s、Procter & Gamble 以及 Johnson & Johnson（对后者的卖出发生在我们当年早些时候建立持仓之后）。Charlie 和我认为，这些股票未来很可能会交易在更高的价格。我们在 2009 年初进行了一些卖出，以筹集现金用于购买 Dow 和 Swiss Re；而在年末又进行了一些其他卖出，以为收购 BNSF 做准备。
We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
我们在去年告诉过你们：当时公司债与市政债市场存在非常不寻常的状况，这些债券相对于美国国债而言“便宜得荒谬”。我们用一些买入行动来支持这一判断，但我本该做得更多。重大机会并不常见。当天上在下金子时，要拿桶去接，而不是拿顶针。
We entered 2008 with $44.3 billion of cash-equivalents, and we have since retained operating earnings of $17 billion. Nevertheless, at yearend 2009, our cash was down to $30.6 billion (with $8 billion earmarked for the BNSF acquisition). We’ve put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It’s been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business — through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market — and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two.
2008 年初，我们有 443 亿美元的现金等价物；此后我们保留了 170 亿美元的经营收益。尽管如此，到 2009 年年末，我们的现金却降至 306 亿美元（其中 80 亿美元已预留给 BNSF 收购）。在过去两年的混乱中，我们投入了大量资金。对投资者而言，那是一个理想时期：恐惧的氛围是他们最好的朋友。那些只在评论员情绪高涨时才投资的人，最终会为毫无意义的“安慰”付出沉重代价。归根结底，投资中真正重要的是：你为一家企业付了什么价格——无论是通过在股市购买它的一小部分——以及这家企业在随后的十年或二十年里能赚到多少钱。
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Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts, which were then the subject of both controversy and misunderstanding. For that discussion, please go to www.berkshirehathaway.com.
去年我曾详细谈到我们的衍生品合约；当时它们既引发争议，也被广泛误解。关于那部分讨论，请到 www.berkshirehathaway.com查阅。
We have since changed only a few of our positions. Some credit contracts have run off. The terms of about 10% of our equity put contracts have also changed: Maturities have been shortened and strike prices materially reduced. In these modifications, no money changed hands.
此后，我们只对少数头寸做了调整。一些信用合约已经到期自然结束。我们大约 10% 的股票指数看跌期权（equity put）合约条款也发生了变化：到期日被缩短，行权价被显著下调。在这些修改中，并没有任何现金交换。
A few points from last year’s discussion are worth repeating:
去年讨论中的几个要点值得再重复一遍：
Though it’s no sure thing, I expect our contracts in aggregate to deliver us a profit over their lifetime, even when investment income on the huge amount of float they provide us is excluded in the calculation. Our derivatives float — which is not included in the $62 billion of insurance float I described earlier — was about $6.3 billion at yearend.
虽然并非十拿九稳，但我预计我们这些合约整体在其生命周期内会为我们带来利润——即便在计算时不把它们提供的巨额“浮存金”所产生的投资收益算进去。我们的衍生品浮存金——不包含在我前面提到的 620 亿美元保险浮存金里——在年末大约为 63 亿美元。
Only a handful of our contracts require us to post collateral under any circumstances. At last year’s low point in the stock and credit markets, our posting requirement was $1.7 billion, a small fraction of the derivatives-related float we held. When we do post collateral, let me add, the securities we put up continue to earn money for our account.
我们只有极少数合约在任何情况下会要求我们缴纳抵押品（collateral）。在去年股市与信用市场的最低点，我们需要缴纳的抵押品是 17 亿美元，只占我们持有的与衍生品相关浮存金的一小部分。并且，当我们确实需要缴纳抵押品时，我还要补充一点：我们拿去抵押的证券仍然继续为我们账户赚钱。
Finally, you should expect large swings in the carrying value of these contracts, items that can affect our reported quarterly earnings in a huge way but that do not affect our cash or investment holdings. That thought certainly fit 2009’s circumstances. Here are the pre-tax quarterly gains and losses from derivatives valuations that were part of our reported earnings last year:
最后，你们应当预期这些合约的账面价值会出现大幅波动——这些项目可能会以极大的幅度影响我们披露的季度利润，但并不会影响我们的现金或投资持仓。这一点在 2009 年尤其贴切。以下是我们去年计入报告利润的、来自衍生品估值的季度税前盈亏：
Quarter $ Gain (Loss) in Billions
1 (1.517)
2 2.357
3 1.732
4 1.052
As we’ve explained, these wild swings neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. When we report to you, we will continue to separate out these figures (as we do realized investment gains and losses) so that you can more clearly view the earnings of our operating businesses. We are delighted that we hold the derivatives contracts that we do. To date we have significantly profited from the float they provide. We expect also to earn further investment income over the life of our contracts.
正如我们解释过的，这些剧烈波动既不会让 Charlie 和我欢呼，也不会让我们烦恼。我们向你们报告时，会继续把这些数字单独拆出来（就像我们对已实现的投资收益与损失所做的那样），从而让你们更清晰地看到我们运营业务的盈利情况。我们很高兴自己持有目前这些衍生品合约。迄今为止，我们已经从它们提供的浮存金中获益颇丰。我们也预计在合约存续期内，还会进一步赚取投资收益。
We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced, just as we try to invest in mispriced stocks and bonds. Indeed, we first reported to you that we held such contracts in early 1998. The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society — dangers of which we’ve long warned, and that can be dynamite — arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred — nor will it.
多年来，我们一直投资于 Charlie 和我认为被错误定价的衍生品合约，就像我们试图投资被错误定价的股票与债券一样。事实上，我们早在 1998 年初就首次向你们报告我们持有这类合约。衍生品对参与者与社会所构成的危险——我们长期以来一直警告这种危险，它可能像炸药一样——出现在这些合约导致极端的杠杆和/或极端的交易对手风险时。在 Berkshire，从未发生过类似情况——未来也不会发生。
It’s my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.
让 Berkshire 远离这类问题，是我的职责。Charlie 和我相信：CEO 绝不能把风险控制外包或下放，这件事太重要了。在 Berkshire，除了少数子公司与运营相关的合约（例如 MidAmerican）以及 General Re 的少量逐步到期合约外，我既发起也监督我们账上每一份衍生品合约。如果 Berkshire 将来陷入麻烦，那会是我的责任。不会是因为“风险委员会”或“首席风险官”判断失误造成的。
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In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it — with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees — the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.
在我看来，如果一家大型金融机构的董事会不坚持让 CEO 对风险控制承担全部责任，那就是失职。如果 CEO 没能力胜任这项工作，他就该另谋高就。如果他在这件事上失败了——结果政府不得不出手，用资金或担保来兜底——那么他本人以及他的董事会，都应该为此付出沉重的财务代价。
对风险不敏感=对能力边界不敏感。
It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.
并不是股东把我们国家一些最大金融机构的经营搞砸了。然而，在多数失败案例里，承担后果的却是股东：他们持有的价值往往被抹去了 90% 甚至更多。在过去两年里，仅最大的四起金融惨案中，股东合计损失就超过 5,000 亿美元。说这些所有者被“救助（bailed-out）”了，简直是在嘲弄这个词。
The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price — one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.
但失败公司的 CEO 与董事们，大多却安然无恙。他们的财富也许因所监管的灾难而缩水，但仍然过着奢华的生活。需要改变的是这些 CEO 与董事的行为：如果他们的鲁莽伤害了机构与国家，他们就该付出沉重代价——而且这代价不能由被他们伤害的公司补偿，也不能由保险来报销。长期以来，CEO 以及在很多情况下的董事，一直享受着过于丰厚的“胡萝卜”；如今，他们的雇佣条款里也应该有一些真正有意义的“大棒”。
An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)
一个不太方便的真相（董事会过热）
Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.
去年，我们的子公司用现金做了几笔小型“加挂式（bolt-on）”收购，但我们与 BNSF 的那笔重磅交易则要求我们发行大约 95,000 股 Berkshire 股票，相当于此前流通股的 6.1%。Charlie 和我喜欢发行 Berkshire 股票的程度，大概和我们喜欢为结肠镜检查做准备差不多。
The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?
我们厌恶的原因很简单：如果我们连做梦都不会在当前市价把整个 Berkshire 卖掉，那我们为什么要在并购中用发行股票的方式，在同样不够充分的价格上“卖掉”公司中相当重要的一部分？
In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares — the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.
在评估“以股换股”的报价时，被收购方的股东出于理性，当然会关注收购方将要交付给他们的股票的市场价格。但他们也期待：交易能让他们拿到自己原本持股的内在价值——也就是他们要交出去的那部分价值。如果潜在收购方的股票价格低于其内在价值，那么在全股票交易中，这个买方就不可能做出一笔“合理的交易”。你不可能用一只被低估的股票去交换一只被充分定价的股票，而不伤害自己的股东。
Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 1¼ shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.
请你想象一下：A 公司与 B 公司规模相当，且两家企业的生意内在价值都为每股 100 美元。然而，它们的股票都以每股 80 美元交易。A 的 CEO 自信爆棚但不够聪明，他提出用 A 的 1¼ 股去换 B 的 1 股，并且对董事会“正确地”说：B 每股值 100 美元。但他会刻意不提的是：他拿出去的这份对价，会让 A 的股东付出每股 125 美元的内在价值成本。如果董事们在数学上也同样不灵光，于是交易完成，那么 B 的股东最终将拥有 A 与 B 合并后资产的 55.6%，而 A 的股东只拥有 44.4%。需要指出的是，在这笔荒唐交易里，并不是 A 的所有人都是输家：CEO 现在管理着一家规模变成原来两倍的公司——而在这个世界里，规模往往与声望和薪酬正相关。
If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)
如果收购方的股票被高估，故事就不一样了：用它当“货币”对收购方反而有利。这就是为什么股市某些领域一出现泡沫，就总会引发狡猾的推销者连番发行股票。按其股票的市值来看，他们有能力高价收购，因为他们实际上是在用“伪钞”付款。历史上周期性地发生过许多“空气换资产（air-for-assets）”式的收购；而 20 世纪 60 年代末则是这种欺诈行为特别令人作呕的时期。的确，一些大型公司就是靠这种方式堆出来的。（当然，参与者无人会公开承认正在发生什么，但私下里偷笑的并不少。）
In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.
在我们收购 BNSF 的交易中，出售方股东以每股 100 美元对我们的报价进行评估，这是完全合理的。但对我们而言，成本要更高一些，因为这 100 美元里有 40% 是用我们的股票支付的，而 Charlie 和我认为我们的股票内在价值高于其市价。幸运的是，我们早就用现金在市场上买入了相当数量的 BNSF 股票。因此合计下来，我们总体成本中只有大约 30% 是用 Berkshire 股票支付的。
In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.
最终，Charlie 和我认为：用股票支付 30% 价格所带来的不利因素，可以被这笔收购带来的机会所抵消——它让我们得以把 220 亿美元现金投入到一门我们理解且长期喜欢的生意中。这门生意还有一个额外优点：由 Matt Rose 领导——我们信任并敬重他。我们也看好未来多年继续追加投资数十亿美元、并获得合理回报的前景。但最后的决定非常接近。如果我们不得不为了完成收购而使用更多股票，那这笔交易事实上就毫无意义了——因为那样我们放弃的会多于得到的。
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I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully inadequate — absolutely no indicator of its real value — had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.
我参加过几十次董事会会议，会上讨论过并购事项；而董事们往往会被高价投行家“教育”（投行还有不高价的吗？）。几乎无一例外，投行会给董事会一份关于“被收购公司价值”的详尽评估，并着重解释：为什么它的价值远远高于其市价。但在我超过五十年的董事任职经历里，我从未听到投行家（或管理层！）讨论“我们付出去的东西”究竟真实值多少钱。只要交易涉及发行收购方股票，他们就简单地用市价来衡量成本。他们这么做，哪怕他们在另外一种情景下——如果讨论的是别人来收购“收购方”——就会辩称：收购方的股价低得离谱，完全不能代表其真实价值。
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
当并购打算以股票作为“货币”，而董事们又在听取顾问意见时，在我看来，想要一场理性且平衡的讨论，只有一种办法：董事们应该再雇一个第二顾问，让他专门站在“反对交易”的立场上陈述理由，并且其报酬要以交易最终未能通过为条件（也就是“交易没做成才拿钱”）。如果没有这种激烈的补救措施，我们对使用顾问的建议仍然是那句老话：“别去问理发师你需不需要理发。”
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I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers — fine people and able bankers — not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
我忍不住再给你们讲一个很久以前的真实故事。我们曾持有一家大型、经营良好的银行的股票；这家银行在几十年里因法律限制而无法并购。后来法律终于改了，我们的银行立刻开始寻找潜在收购标的。它的管理层——都是好人，也都是有能力的银行家——不出所料，很快表现得像一群刚发现女孩存在的青春期男孩。
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
他们很快盯上了一家规模小得多的银行，同样经营得很好，并且在诸如股本回报率、净息差、贷款质量等方面的财务特征也相似。我们的银行股票估值很温和（这也是我们当初买它的原因）：股价徘徊在账面价值附近，市盈率也很低。与此同时，那家小银行的老板正被州内其他大银行追求，他坚持要一个接近账面价值三倍的价格。而且，他要的是股票，不要现金。
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
结果，我们那帮同伴很自然就“跪了”，同意了这笔毁灭价值的交易。他们说：“我们得让人看到我们在积极出击。再说，这只是个小交易。”仿佛“只有对股东造成重大伤害”，才算得上是阻止交易的正当理由。Charlie 当时的反应是：“难道我们还要鼓掌庆祝，只因为在我们草坪上拉屎的狗是一只吉娃娃而不是一只圣伯纳？”
The seller of the smaller bank — no fool — then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. “After the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, “I’m going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”
那位小银行卖家——不是傻子——在谈判最后又提出了一个要求。“合并之后，”他大意是说（可能用词比我这里更委婉一些），“我会成为你们银行的大股东，而这项持股将占我净资产的很大一部分。因此，你们必须向我保证：以后再也不许做这么蠢的交易。”
Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank — newly bigger — lived happily ever after.
是的，并购还是完成了。小银行老板变得更富，我们变得更穷，而大银行的管理层——规模变得更大——从此幸福快乐地生活下去。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year (up from 12 — no zeros omitted — in 1981). With our shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year. Therefore, we will have to make a few changes in the usual routine. There will be no change, however, in our enthusiasm for having you attend. Charlie and I like to meet you, answer your questions and — best of all — have you buy lots of goods from our businesses.
我们估计去年有 35,000 人参加了年会（相比之下，1981 年只有 12 人——没漏写零）。随着股东群体大幅扩大，我们预计今年还会更多。因此，我们不得不对以往惯例做一些调整。不过，我们欢迎你们到场的热情不会有任何变化。Charlie 和我喜欢见到你们、回答你们的问题——而最棒的是——希望你们从我们的企业里多买点东西。
The meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 1st. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)
今年的会议将在 5 月 1 日（周六）举行。一如既往，Qwest Center 会在早上 7 点开门，8:30 播放一部新的 Berkshire 电影。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节；期间会在 Qwest 的摊位处休息吃午饭；问答将持续到 3:30。短暂休会后，Charlie 和我会在 3:45 正式召开年度股东大会。如果你决定在当天问答期间离场，请尽量在 Charlie 发言时离开。（要快点；他讲话可能很简练。）
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I get testy and lock the exits.)
当然，离场最好的理由是去购物。我们会帮你做到这一点：我们会把紧邻会场的 194,300 平方英尺大厅塞满来自数十家 Berkshire 子公司的商品。去年你们已经尽了力，大多数摊位都创下销售纪录。但你们还能做得更好。（友情提示：如果我发现销售疲软，我会变得暴躁，并把出口锁起来。）
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 会设一个展台，由来自全国各地的一批顶级顾问坐镇，随时为你们提供车险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能给股东提供折扣（通常为 8%）。在我们经营的 51 个司法辖区中，有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。（补充一点：如果你还符合其他折扣，例如某些群体折扣，那么该股东折扣不会叠加。）带上你现有保险的细节来对比一下，看看我们是否能帮你省钱。至少对 50% 的你们，我相信我们能做到。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. Among the more than 30 books and DVDs it will offer are two new books by my sons: Howard’s Fragile, a volume filled with photos and commentary about lives of struggle around the globe and Peter’s Life Is What You Make It. Completing the family trilogy will be the debut of my sister Doris’s biography, a story focusing on her remarkable philanthropic activities. Also available will be Poor *Charlie’*s Almanack, the story of my partner. This book is something of a publishing miracle — never advertised, yet year after year selling many thousands of copies from its Internet site. (Should you need to ship your book purchases, a nearby shipping service will be available.)
一定要去逛 Bookworm。它将提供 30 多本书和 DVD，其中包括我两个儿子的两本新书：Howard 的 Fragile（一本充满全球艰难生活照片与评论的作品）以及 Peter 的 Life Is What You Make It。家庭“三部曲”的最后一部，是我妹妹 Doris 的传记首发，讲述她非凡的慈善活动。现场也会有 Poor *Charlie’*s Almanack——我那位合伙人的故事。这本书堪称出版奇迹：从未做过广告，却年复一年在其网站上卖出数以千计的册数。（如果你需要把书籍邮寄回去，附近会有一项邮寄服务可用。）
If you are a big spender — or, for that matter, merely a gawker — visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing.
如果你是个大手笔——或者哪怕只是来“围观”的——那就请在周六中午到下午 5:00 之间，去 Omaha 机场东侧的 Elliott Aviation 看看。我们会在那里摆出一队 NetJets 飞机，保证让你心跳加速。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
随本报告一并附上的委托书材料附件，说明了你如何获取进入会场及其他活动所需的入场凭证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次请 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。每年负责这些事项的 Carol Pedersen 都做得非常出色，我在此向她致谢。酒店房间可能很难找，但只要和 Carol 配合，你就能订到。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday, May 3rd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Berkyville BBQ to which you are all invited.
在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（位于 72nd Street、Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 77 英亩），我们将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”折扣价。要享受 Berkshire 股东折扣，你必须在 4 月 29 日（周四）到 5 月 3 日（周一）期间（含首尾两天）完成购买，并出示你的会议入场凭证。本次期间特价甚至适用于若干知名厂商的产品——这些厂商通常对打折有铁一般的规定，但出于股东周末的精神，特地为你破例。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 周一到周六营业时间为上午 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日为上午 10 点到下午 6 点。今年周六晚上 5:30 到 8:00，NFM 将举办 Berkyville BBQ，诚邀各位参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 2nd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在 Borsheims，我们也将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是 4 月 30 日（周五）晚上 6 点到 10 点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场也是主场盛会，将在 5 月 2 日（周日）上午 9 点到下午 4 点举行。周六当天，我们营业到下午 6 点。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 26th through Saturday, May 8th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder. Enter with rhinestones; leave with diamonds. My daughter tells me that the more you buy, the more you save (kids say the darnedest things).
整个周末 Borsheims 都会人潮汹涌。为方便你们，股东价格将从 4 月 26 日（周一）持续到 5 月 8 日（周六）。在此期间，请通过出示会议入场凭证，或能证明你持有 Berkshire 的券商对账单来表明你的股东身份。带着水钻进门；带着钻石出门。我的女儿说：你买得越多，省得越多（孩子们总能说出些惊人的话）。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.
周日，在 Borsheims 外的商场区域，蒙着眼睛的 Patrick Wolff（两届美国国际象棋冠军）将以每组六人的方式接受所有挑战者——挑战者们当然是睁大眼睛的。附近还会有来自 Dallas 的传奇魔术师 Norman Beck，让围观者看得目瞪口呆。
Our special treat for shareholders this year will be the return of my friend, Ariel Hsing, the country’s top-ranked junior table tennis player (and a good bet to win at the Olympics some day). Now 14, Ariel came to the annual meeting four years ago and demolished all comers, including me. (You can witness my humiliating defeat on YouTube; just type in Ariel Hsing Berkshire.)
今年我们给股东的特别节目，是我的朋友 Ariel Hsing 回归——她是全美排名第一的青少年乒乓球选手（而且很可能将来在 Olympics 夺冠）。如今 14 岁的 Ariel，四年前来参加年会时把所有挑战者都“横扫”了，包括我。（你可以在 YouTube 亲眼见证我那场丢人的惨败；只要搜索 Ariel Hsing Berkshire。）
Naturally, I’ve been plotting a comeback and will take her on outside of Borsheims at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. It will be a three-point match, and after I soften her up, all shareholders are invited to try their luck at similar three-point contests. Winners will be given a box of See’s candy. We will have equipment available, but bring your own paddle if you think it will help. (It won’t.)
当然，我一直在谋划“复仇”，并会在周日下午 1:00 在 Borsheims 店外与她再战一场。这将是一场“三分制”比赛；等我先把她“打热身”之后，欢迎所有股东也来参加同样的三分制挑战。获胜者将得到一盒 See’s candy。我们会提供器材，但如果你觉得自带球拍能更有帮助，也尽管带来。（没用。）
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year, though, it was overwhelmed by demand. With many more diners expected this year, I’ve asked my friend, Donna Sheehan, at Piccolo’s — another favorite restaurant of mine — to serve shareholders on Sunday as well. (Piccolo’s giant root beer float is mandatory for any fan of fine dining.) I plan to eat at both restaurants: All of the weekend action makes me really hungry, and I have favorite dishes at each spot. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.
Gorat’s 将在 5 月 2 日（周日）再次只对 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间为下午 1 点到晚上 10 点。不过去年它被需求“挤爆”了。预计今年用餐人数还会更多，所以我已请我在 Piccolo’s 的朋友 Donna Sheehan——这也是我另一家最喜欢的餐厅——同样在周日为股东提供服务。（Piccolo’s 那个巨大的 root beer float，对任何“精致餐饮”爱好者来说都是必点项目。）我打算两家都吃：周末活动太多让我特别饿，而且两家餐厅我都有最爱的菜。记住：要在 Gorat’s 订位，请在 4 月 1 日致电 402-551-3733（但不要提前）；Piccolo’s 订位请拨 402-342-9038。
Regrettably, we will not be able to have a reception for international visitors this year. Our count grew to about 800 last year, and my simply signing one item per person took about 2½ hours. Since we expect even more international visitors this year, Charlie and I decided we must drop this function. But be assured, we welcome every international visitor who comes.
遗憾的是，今年我们将无法为国际访客举办招待会。去年国际访客人数增长到大约 800 人，而我只给每个人签一件物品就花了约 2.5 小时。鉴于我们预计今年国际访客还会更多，Charlie 和我决定必须取消这个环节。但请相信，凡是远道而来的国际访客，我们都非常欢迎。
Last year we changed our method of determining what questions would be asked at the meeting and received many dozens of letters applauding the new arrangement. We will therefore again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.
去年我们改变了“年会提问”的选取方式，收到了数十封来信称赞新安排。因此，今年我们将继续采用同样的方式：仍由三位财经记者主持问答环节，他们会把股东通过电子邮件提交的问题整理后向 Charlie 和我提问。
The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
三位记者及其邮箱地址如下：Fortune 的 Carol Loomis，可发邮件至 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，邮箱为 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱为 arsorkin@nytimes.com。每位记者会从来信问题中挑选大约一打（十来个）他们认为最有趣、最重要的问题。他们告诉我：如果你把问题写得简洁，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题，你的问题被选中的概率最高。（在邮件里，如果你希望问题被选中时提及你的姓名，请告诉记者。）
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
无论 Charlie 还是我，都不会提前得到任何“提示”，甚至连一点点风声都不会有。我们知道记者会挑一些尖锐的问题——我们就喜欢这样。
We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We’ve added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group.
周六 8:15，我们还会在 13 个麦克风处分别抽签，让希望自己提问的股东获得机会。会议当天，我会把记者提问与抽中的股东提问交替进行。我们把问答时间增加了 30 分钟，预计两组各能问大约 30 个问题。
***********
At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).
在 86 岁与 79 岁的年纪，Charlie 和我仍然幸运得超乎梦想。我们生在美国；父母非常出色，确保我们接受了良好教育；我们拥有美满的家庭与健康的身体；并且天生带着一种“business”基因，使我们得以以一种极不成比例的方式获得成功——而社会上有许多人对整体福祉的贡献不比我们少、甚至更多，却并未得到同等回报。此外，我们长期从事着自己热爱的工作，并在无数方面得到才华横溢且乐观开朗的同事们帮助。事实上，这些年来，我们的工作变得越来越迷人；难怪我们会踢踏舞般地去上班。若真要较真，我们甚至愿意倒贴一大笔钱来保住这份工作（但别告诉 Comp Committee）。
Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
不过，对我们而言，没有什么比在 Berkshire 的年度股东大会上与各位股东合伙人相聚更有趣了。所以，5 月 1 日请到 Qwest 来参加我们这场“资本家的 Woodstock”。到时见。
February 26, 2010
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
P.S. Come by rail.
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