2022-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2022-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.

查理·芒格，我长期的合伙人，和我负责管理您部分的储蓄。您对我们的信任令我们深感荣幸。

Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.

我们的职责要求我们向您汇报那些如果我们是缺席的所有者而您是经理时我们希望得知的信息。我们乐于通过这封年度信和年度股东大会直接与您沟通。

Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.

我们的政策是一视同仁地对待所有股东。因此，我们不会与分析师或大型机构单独交流。此外，只要有可能，我们会在周六上午发布重要信息，以便股东和媒体在周一开市前有充足时间消化新闻。

A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.

伯克希尔的众多事实和数据都载于公司定期向美国证监会提交的年度10-K报告中，我们在K-1至K-119页予以转载。有些股东会觉得这些细节引人入胜；另一些股东则更愿意了解我和查理认为伯克希尔当下的新进展或有趣事项。

Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.

遗憾的是，2021年这类行动不多。不过，我们在提升您所持股份内在价值方面仍取得了合理的进展。57年来，这一直是我的主要职责，而且今后仍将如此。

What You Own

您所拥有的资产

Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.

伯克希尔拥有多元化的业务组合，有些是百分之百持股，有些只持部分股份。后者主要是美国大型公司的可交易普通股。此外，我们还持有少量非美国股票，并参与若干合资或其他合作项目。

Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

不管我们采取何种持股形式，我们的目标都是对既具备持久经济优势又拥有一流首席执行官的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有股票是基于对其长期经营表现的预期，而不是把它们当作短线市场操作的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我并非挑选股票，而是挑选企业。

I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.

我会犯许多错误。因此，我们庞大的业务组合中既有拥有卓越经济特性的企业，也有表现良好的企业，当然也有少数边缘化的企业。普通股投资的一个优势是，有时候我们可以以极佳的价格买到卓越企业的股份。这种“瓮中捉鳖”的体验在谈判收购中极为罕见，更不会大规模出现。当错误发生在可交易的股票领域时，纠正起来也容易得多。

Surprise, Surprise

惊喜，惊喜

Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:

以下几件关于贵公司的事项常常令久经沙场的投资者都感到惊讶：

• Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.

• 许多人认为伯克希尔是一家庞大且略显奇特的金融资产集合体。事实上，伯克希尔拥有并运营的美国本土“基础设施”资产——在我们的资产负债表中列为物业、厂房及设备——比任何其他美国公司都要多。成为第一从来不是我们的目标，但这一地位却已成为客观事实。

At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire’s balance sheet at \$158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.

截至年末，这些国内基础设施资产在伯克希尔资产负债表上的账面价值为1,580亿美元。过去一年这一数字有所增加，未来也将继续增长。伯克希尔将始终在建设中前行。

• Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid \$3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of \$402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.

• 公司每年都向联邦政府缴纳大量所得税。以2021年为例，我们缴纳了33亿美元，而美国财政部报告的公司所得税总收入为4,020亿美元。此外，伯克希尔还缴纳可观的州税和海外税。对于伯克希尔股东来说，“我已经在办公室缴过了”这句话毋庸置疑。

Berkshire’s history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.

伯克希尔的历史生动地说明了政府与美国企业之间那种隐形且常被忽视的财务合作关系。我们的故事始于1955年初，当时伯克希尔细纱公司与哈撒韦制造公司同意合并业务。在寻求股东批准的过程中，这两家历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司对这桩结合寄予厚望。

The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).

例如，哈撒韦在致股东函中保证：“资源与管理层的整合将造就纺织业中最强大、最高效的组织之一。”这一乐观观点得到了公司顾问雷曼兄弟（没错，就是那家雷曼兄弟）的支持。

I’m sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.

我确信合并达成之日，位于福尔里弗（伯克希尔所在地）和新贝德福德（哈撒韦所在地）的人们都欢欣鼓舞。然而，当乐队散去、银行家回家后，股东们却收获了一场灾难。

In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire’s owners watched the company’s net worth crater from \$51.4 million to \$22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire’s struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.

在合并后的九年里，伯克希尔的所有者眼睁睁看着公司净值从5,140万美元跌至2,210万美元。部分原因在于股票回购、不明智的分红和工厂关闭。然而，数千名员工九年的努力仍以经营亏损告终。伯克希尔的挣扎并非个例：新英格兰纺织业已悄然进入漫长且不可逆转的衰亡征程。

During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire’s troubles. All told, the company paid the government only \$337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic \$100 per day.

在这九年里，美国财政部同样受伯克希尔困境所累。期间公司一共只向政府缴纳了337,359美元所得税——可怜的每天100美元。

Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.

1965年初，情况发生了变化。伯克希尔引入了新的管理层，重新部署可用现金，并将几乎所有收益投入到多元化的优质业务中，其中大多数经年依旧表现优良。收益再投资与复利的魔力结合，令股东们受益匪浅。

Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the \$100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly \$9 million daily to the Treasury.

值得注意的是，从这一转变中受益的并非只有伯克希尔的所有者。他们的“无声合伙人”——美国财政部——随后从公司收到了数百亿美元的所得税。还记得那每天100美元吗？如今，伯克希尔每天向财政部缴纳的金额约为900万美元。

In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge – indeed trumpet – the fact that Berkshire’s prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.

为了公平对待我们的政府伙伴，我们的股东应当承认——甚至应当高声宣扬——伯克希尔之所以繁荣昌盛，很大程度上是因为公司扎根于美国。即便没有伯克希尔，我们的国家自1965年以来依旧会发展得很出色。但如果没有这片美利坚土地，伯克希尔绝不可能成长为今日的模样。看到国旗时，请心怀感激。

• From an $8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from \$19 million when we entered the insurance business to \$147 billion.

• 通过1967年斥资860万美元收购 National Indemnity 作为起点，伯克希尔已成长为全球保险“浮存金”的领导者——这是一笔我们掌握并可投资却并不属于我们的资金。包括来自寿险业务的相对小额资金在内，伯克希尔的浮存金总额已从我们进入保险业时的1,900万美元增长至1,470亿美元。

So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float. Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.

迄今为止，这笔浮存金的成本不仅为零，甚至小于零。尽管我们经历过若干年保险亏损与运营费用之和高于保费收入，但总体来看，我们在创造该浮存金的承保活动中已持续55年获得小幅盈利。同样重要的是，浮存金具有极强的黏性。与我们保险业务相关的资金每天进出，但其总体规模不会骤减。因此，在投资浮存金时，我们能够着眼长远。

If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased \$9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP (“generally-accepted accounting principles”) presentation of earnings and net worth.

如果您尚未熟悉“浮存金”这一概念，请参阅 A-5 页的详细说明。令我惊讶的是，我们的浮存金去年增加了90亿美元，这为伯克希尔股东创造了重要价值，却未在符合 GAAP（“公认会计准则”）的收益和净值披露中得到体现。

Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire’s good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, “None.”

我们在保险领域创造的大量价值，很大程度上得益于伯克希尔在1986年幸运地聘用了 Ajit Jain。我们第一次见面是在一个周六早晨，我立即问 Ajit 有何保险经验。他回答：“没有。”

I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later.

我说：“没有人是完美的。”然后就雇用了他。那是我的幸运日：事实证明 Ajit 是最佳人选。更妙的是，35 年后的今天，他依然如此。

One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.

关于保险还有最后一点：我认为伯克希尔的浮存金很可能——但绝非确定——能够在不产生长期承保亏损的情况下维持。不过我也确信，我们有些年份会经历此类亏损，金额或许十分庞大。

Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.

伯克希尔的架构能够以其他任何保险公司难以匹敌的方式应对灾难性事件——这一优先事项将在查理和我离世之后仍然长存。

Our Four Giants

我们的四大巨头

Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices.

通过伯克希尔，我们的股东拥有数十家企业的所有权。其中一些企业本身又拥有多家子公司。例如，Marmon 拥有 100 多项独立业务，涵盖从铁路车厢租赁到医疗器械制造等领域。

• Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.

• 尽管如此，我们的“四巨头”公司运营贡献了伯克希尔价值的极大份额。居首位的是我们的保险集团。伯克希尔实际拥有该集团 100% 的股权，其庞大的浮存金价值已在前文阐述。此外，为兑现其承诺，我们投入的大量资本进一步扩大了这些保险公司的投资资产规模。

The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.

保险业务可谓为伯克希尔量身打造。该产品永不过时，销售量通常会随着经济增长和通胀而增加。同时，诚信与资本永远至关重要。我们的公司能够且必将表现良好。

There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire’s operation, however, would be almost impossible.

当然，也有其他保险公司拥有出色的商业模式和前景。然而，要复制伯克希尔的运营几乎是不可能的。

• Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to \$100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job.

• 苹果——按年末市值衡量位居第二的巨头——是一种截然不同的持股。在此，我们的持股比例仅为5.55%，高于一年前的5.39%。这一增幅听起来微不足道。但请想想，苹果2021年每增加0.1%的收益就相当于1亿美元。为了这部分增益，伯克希尔并未投入任何资金。苹果的股份回购完成了这项工作。

It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us \$785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering \$5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.

必须了解的是，伯克希尔在 GAAP 收益中只计入来自苹果的股息——去年，苹果向我们支付了7.85亿美元。然而，我们对苹果收益的“份额”高达56亿美元。公司保留的大部分利润被用于回购苹果股票，这一点我们拍手称赞。苹果杰出的首席执行官蒂姆·库克理所当然地把苹果产品的用户视为他的首要挚爱，但所有其他利益相关者同样受益于蒂姆的管理才干。

• BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America’s carbon emissions would soar.

• BNSF，我们的第三大巨头，仍是美国商业的首要动脉，这使其成为美国乃至伯克希尔不可或缺的资产。如果BNSF承运的大量关键产品改由卡车运输，美国的碳排放将急剧上升。

Your railroad had record earnings of \$6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull . . ..)

2021年，您的铁路创下60亿美元的纪录利润。需要说明的是，我们谈论的是我们偏爱的老派利润：在利息、税项、折旧、摊销以及各类薪酬后计算的数字。（按我们的定义，有必要提醒一句：随着股价上涨，对盈利进行“体面”但欺骗性的“调整”越来越多，也越来越离奇。若说得直白点，牛市往往催生夸夸其谈的“牛话”……）

BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.

去年，BNSF列车行驶了1.43亿英里，运送货物5.35亿吨。这两项成就均大幅领先于美国任何其他运输企业。您尽可以为这条铁路感到自豪。

• BHE, our final Giant, earned a record \$4 billion in 2021. That’s up more than 30-fold from the \$122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.

• BHE，我们的最后一位巨头，2021年实现了40亿美元的历史新高利润，相比伯克希尔2000年首次购入BHE股份时的1.22亿美元增长逾30倍。目前，伯克希尔持有该公司91.1%的股权。

BHE’s record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol’s and Greg Abel’s leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.

BHE在社会成就方面的记录与其财务表现同样卓越。2000年，公司尚无风能或太阳能发电业务，当时只是庞大电力行业中一家较新且规模较小的参与者。随后，在David Sokol和Greg Abel的领导下，BHE成长为公用事业巨擘（请别抱怨这个双关），并在美国大部分地区成为风能、太阳能和输电领域的领军力量。

Greg’s report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.

Greg在A-3和A-4页对这些成就进行了报告。您将在那里看到的绝不是当前流行的“漂绿”故事。自2007年以来，BHE每年都忠实披露其在可再生能源和输电方面的计划与业绩。

To further review this information, visit BHE’s website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.

如欲进一步了解相关信息，请访问BHE网站 brkenergy.com。在那里，您会看到公司长期以来一直在进行关注气候的投资，且将全部收益投入其中。未来机遇仍然广阔。BHE拥有我国所需大型电力项目所必备的管理能力、经验、资本与雄心。

Investments

投资

Now let’s talk about companies we don’t control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire’s two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to \$34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.

现在让我们谈谈我们不控制的公司，其中再次提到苹果。下表列出了我们持有的十五大股票，其中有几项是伯克希尔的两位长期投资经理托德·孔布斯和特德·韦施勒的选择。截至年末，这对杰出的搭档拥有管理价值340亿美元投资的全部权限，其中许多并未达到我们在表格中使用的门槛。此外，托德和特德管理的相当一部分资金投放在伯克希尔旗下企业的各类养老金计划中，而这些计划的资产未计入此表。

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的税务成本基础。

**Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.

该持仓由 BHE 持有；因此，伯克希尔股东仅拥有 91.1% 的权益。

*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.

包括对西方石油公司 100 亿美元的投资，由优先股和购买普通股的认股权证组成，目前这组合的估值为 107 亿美元。

In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the “equity” method, not market value, and carried at $13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of $45 billion.

除了附注中的西方石油持仓和我们持有的各类普通股外，伯克希尔还拥有卡夫亨氏 26.6% 的权益（按“权益法”核算，而非市值，账面价值为 131 亿美元），以及旅行中心龙头企业 Pilot Corp. 38.6% 的股份，该公司去年收入达到 450 亿美元。

Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted “equity” accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot’s earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.

自 2017 年购入 Pilot 股权以来，该持仓一直采用“权益法”核算。2023 年初，伯克希尔将再次增持 Pilot 股权，使我们的持股比例升至 80%，并在财务报表中全面并表 Pilot 的收益、资产和负债。

U.S. Treasury Bills

美国国库券

Berkshire’s balance sheet includes $144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, $120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about 1⁄2 of 1% of the publicly-held national debt.

伯克希尔的资产负债表中包括 1,440 亿美元的现金及现金等价物（不含 BNSF 和 BHE 的持有量）。其中 1,200 亿美元投资于美国国库券，全部在一年内到期。这意味着伯克希尔为大约 0.5% 的公开持有国债提供了资金。

Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than $30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.

查理和我已承诺，伯克希尔（以及除 BNSF 和 BHE 之外的子公司）将始终持有超过 300 亿美元的现金及等价物。我们希望公司在财务上坚不可摧，永远不依赖陌生人（甚至朋友）的善意。我们两人都喜欢安稳入睡，也希望我们的债权人、保险索赔方以及你们都能如此。

But $144 billion?

但是 1,440 亿美元？

That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was $114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)

我向你保证，如此庞大的数额并不是某种疯狂的爱国主义表现。查理和我对拥有企业的强烈偏好也从未改变。事实上，早在 80 年前的 1942 年 3 月 11 日，我就用全部积蓄 114.75 美元购买了城市服务公司三股优先股，首次表达了这种热情。（那天道琼斯工业平均指数收于 99 点，这一事实应当提醒你：永远不要押注美国会失败。）

After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My favored status throughout that period was 100% – and still is. Berkshire’s current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for long-term holding.

自那次初投以来，我始终将至少 80% 的净资产配置于股票。在整个时期内，我最偏好的状态是 100%——现在仍是如此。伯克希尔目前约 80% 的企业持股比重，是因为我未能找到符合我们长期持有标准的完整公司或其小部分（即可流通股票）。

Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.

过去，查理和我也曾不时承受类似的高现金占比局面。这些时期从不令人愉快，但也从不会永久持续。幸运的是，在 2020 和 2021 年，我们找到了一个略具吸引力的资本运用替代方案。请继续阅读。

Share Repurchases

股份回购

There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire’s controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire’s resources.

提升您投资价值有三种途径。第一种始终是我们的核心：通过内部增长或收购，提高伯克希尔所控制企业的长期盈利能力。当前，内部机会带来的回报远好于收购。然而，与伯克希尔的资源相比，这些机会的规模仍然很小。

Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.

我们的第二个选择是购买多家优秀上市公司中的非控股部分股权。某些时期，这类机会既多又极具吸引力。但如今，我们几乎找不到令人兴奋的标的。

That’s largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.

这主要源于一条不证自明的事实：低长期利率会推高所有生产性资产的价格，无论是股票、公寓、农场还是油井。估值还有其他影响因素，但利率始终举足轻重。

Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)

我们的最后一条增值路径是回购伯克希尔的股票。通过这一简单行动，您的持股在伯克希尔所有控股与非控股业务中的占比随之上升。当价格与价值关系合适时，这条路径既最简便，也最确定地提升您的财富。（除了持续股东的价值增加外，还有另外两方也受益：卖出被回购股份的股东获得一定好处，社会整体亦略有裨益。）

Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire’s owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of \$51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody’s).

当其他路径吸引力不足时，回购对伯克希尔股东而言就顺理成章。过去两年，我们以 517 亿美元的总成本，回购了 2019 年年末已发行股份的 9%。这笔支出使现有股东在伯克希尔所有业务中的持股比例增加约 10%，无论是全资（如 BNSF 和 GEICO）还是部分持股（如可口可乐和穆迪）。

非常成功的操作，成本估计在250左右，5年翻1倍，操作的金额也够大。

I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don’t want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of \$1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.

我想强调，要使伯克希尔的回购合理，我们的股票必须具备合适的价值。我们不愿为他人公司的股票付过高价格，同样也绝不会在回购伯克希尔时付出过高代价，否则将毁损价值。截至 2022 年 2 月 23 日，自年初以来我们又斥资 12 亿美元回购股票。我们的胃口依然很大，但始终取决于价格。

It should be noted that Berkshire’s buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.

需要指出的是，伯克希尔的高质量投资者群体限制了我们的回购机会。如果我们的股票被短期投机者大量持有，股价波动和交易量都会显著增加，那样的局面会让我们通过回购创造价值的机会大为提升。尽管如此，查理和我仍非常喜欢现有股东，他们值得称赞的长期持有态度虽然限制了长期股东从机会性回购中获益的程度。

Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from \$79,387 per “A” share to \$99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.

最后，再提一项容易被忽视、却对伯克希尔独具意义的价值计算：如我们所述，合适类型的保险“浮存金”对我们意义重大。而回购会自动提高每股对应的“浮存金”金额。过去两年，这一数字已增长 25%，从每股 A 股 79,387 美元升至 99,497 美元，这一具有实际意义的提升部分得益于回购。

A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business

一个了不起的人和一家了不起的企业

Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life – in both his business and his personal pursuits – Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told.

去年，保罗·安德鲁斯去世了。保罗是位于沃斯堡的伯克希尔子公司 TTI 的创始人兼首席执行官。在他的一生中——无论在事业还是个人追求上——保罗都默默展现出查理和我所敬仰的所有品质。他的故事值得被讲述。

In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul.

1971 年，保罗在通用动力公司担任采购代理时，噩运降临。公司失去了一份巨额国防合同后，裁掉了数千名员工，其中就包括保罗。

With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using \$500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled \$112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of \$7.7 billion.

眼看第一个孩子即将出生，保罗决定押注自己，用 500 美元积蓄创办了 Tex-Tronics（后来更名为 TTI）。公司以分销小型电子元件起家，首年销售额达到 11.2 万美元。如今，TTI 销售的不同产品已超过 100 万种，年业务量达 77 亿美元。

But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend’s early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man’s family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?

回到 2006 年：时年 63 岁的保罗，对家庭、工作和伙伴都很满意。但他心中有一个挥之不去的担忧，更因不久前亲眼目睹一位朋友早逝以及那位朋友的家庭和企业因此陷入的灾难而加剧。2006 年，保罗问自己：如果我突然去世，那些依赖我的人会怎样？

For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative “synergies” – savings that would be achieved as the acquiror slashed duplicated functions at TTI.

一年间，保罗一直在权衡各种选择。卖给竞争对手？从纯经济角度看，这是最合乎逻辑的做法。毕竟，竞争者能设想出丰厚的“协同效应”——即收购方通过削减 TTI 的重复职能所能节省的开支。

But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer’s home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.

但是……这样的买家无疑也会保留自己的首席财务官、法律顾问和人力资源部门。TTI 相应岗位的员工就会被扫地出门。更糟糕的是！若需要新建配送中心，收购方所在城市肯定会比沃斯堡更受青睐。

Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled – aptly so – a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.

无论经济利益如何可观，保罗很快得出结论：把公司卖给竞争对手并不适合他。接着他考虑寻找财务买家，也就是曾被恰如其分地称为“杠杆收购公司”的群体。然而保罗知道，这类买家关注的是“退出策略”。谁又能预知那将是什么？经过深思熟虑，保罗发现自己无意把苦心经营 35 年的事业交给倒手转卖的人。

When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying – in far more tactful phrasing than this – “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.

当保罗见到我时，他解释了为何排除这两类买家。随后他用比这更委婉的措辞概括了自己的困境：“经过一年的反复思考，我想把公司卖给伯克希尔，因为你是唯一剩下的合适人选。”于是，我提出了报价，保罗说“好”。一次会面，一顿午餐，一桩交易。

To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.

说我们此后一直过得幸福美满，都算轻描淡写。当伯克希尔收购 TTI 时，公司员工为 2,387 人；现在这一数字是 8,043 人。其中很大一部分增长发生在沃斯堡及其周边地区。公司的盈利增长了 673%。

Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I’m too busy now.”

每年，我都会打电话给保罗，告诉他应该大幅提高薪水。每年，他都会回答我：“沃伦，这事明年再谈吧；我现在太忙了。”

When Greg Abel and I attended Paul’s memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI’s first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.

当格雷格·阿贝尔和我参加保罗的追思会时，我们见到了他的子女、孙辈、长期同事（包括 TTI 的第一名员工）以及约翰·罗奇——伯克希尔在 2000 年收购的一家沃斯堡公司的前首席执行官。约翰把他的朋友保罗引荐到奥马哈，本能地知道我们会一拍即合。

At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.

在追思会上，格雷格和我听到无数保罗默默支持过的人和机构的故事。他的慷慨无比广博——始终致力于改善他人生活，尤其是沃斯堡人的生活。

In all ways, Paul was a class act.

在各方面，保罗都是一流典范。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Good luck – occasionally extraordinary luck – has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend – John Roach – TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.

好运——有时是非同寻常的好运——在伯克希尔的发展中起了作用。如果保罗和我没有共同的朋友约翰·罗奇，TTI 就不会归属我们。但这份丰厚的好运只是开始。很快，TTI 就引领伯克希尔完成了其最重要的一笔收购。

Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary’s CEO and learn more about the acquiree’s activities.

每年秋天，伯克希尔的董事们都会聚在一起，听取几位高管的汇报。有时我们会根据最近收购标的所在地点来选定会议地点，以便董事们能够见到新子公司的首席执行官，并更深入了解该被收购公司的业务。

In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad’s headquarters.

因此，在 2009 年秋天，我们选择了沃斯堡，得以访问 TTI。当时，同样以沃斯堡为总部的 BNSF 是我们可流通股票投资中的第三大持仓。尽管持股比例很大，我却从未造访过这家铁路公司的总部。

Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board’s opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF’s third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.

我的助理黛布·博萨内克将董事会的欢迎晚宴安排在 10 月 22 日举行。与此同时，我安排自己当天提前抵达，与我长久以来敬佩其成就的 BNSF 首席执行官马特·罗斯见面。当我敲定会面日期时，我并不知道我们的聚会恰逢 BNSF 当晚发布第三季度财报。

The market reacted badly to the railroad’s results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF’s earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn’t feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.

市场对这家铁路公司的业绩反应不佳。第三季度正值大衰退最严重的时期，BNSF 的盈利反映了这种低迷。经济前景也黯淡无光，华尔街对铁路股——其实对大多数股票——都不友好。

On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.

第二天，我再次与马特会面，提议伯克希尔将为这家铁路公司提供比其作为上市公司更好的长期归宿。我还告诉他伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。

Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I’ll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.

马特将这一报价转达给他的董事和顾问。忙碌的 11 天后，伯克希尔与 BNSF 公布了正式的收购协议。在此，我要大胆作出一个罕见的预测：一个世纪后，BNSF 仍将是伯克希尔及我国的重要资产。

The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn’t sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.

如果保罗·安德鲁斯当初没有认定伯克希尔是 TTI 的最佳归宿，BNSF 的收购案本就不会发生。

Thanks

谢谢

I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018.

70 年前，我开设了第一门投资课程。从那以后，我几乎每年都与各个年龄段的学生合作，并最终在 2018 年“退休”。

Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson’s fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.

在这期间，最难对付的听众是我孙子五年级的班级。这些 11 岁的孩子在座位上扭来扭去，对我投以茫然的目光，直到我提到可口可乐及其著名的秘密配方。顷刻间，所有小手齐刷刷举起，我这才明白“秘密”对孩子们有着致命吸引力。

Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.

教学和写作一样，帮助我发展并澄清自己的思想。查理称这种现象为“猩猩效应”：如果你坐下来，对一只猩猩认真讲解你珍视的想法，离开时也许只留下了一只困惑的灵长类动物，但你自己会思路更加清晰。

Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”

与大学生交流则要好得多。我一直鼓励他们在（1）自己喜爱的领域以及（2）愿意共事的同类人中寻找工作，如果他们不需要为钱发愁的话。我承认经济现实可能妨碍这种追求。即便如此，我仍敦促学生们永不放弃，因为当他们找到那样的工作时，就不再是“工作”了。

Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as parttimers at my grandfather’s grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.

查理和我在经历几次初期跌跌撞撞后，也走上了这种解放性的道路。我们都在我祖父的杂货店做过兼职：查理在 1940 年，我在 1942 年。我们被分配到枯燥的工作，工资低廉，绝不是我们所期待的。后来查理从事法律工作，我尝试卖证券，工作满足感依旧与我们无缘。

Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It’s a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.

最终，在伯克希尔我们找到了热爱的事业。除极少例外，我们已与自己喜欢并信任的人携手“工作”了数十年。与保罗·安德鲁斯这样的管理者，或是我去年提到的伯克希尔家庭合作，是人生乐事。在总部，我们雇用正派且才华横溢的人——没有混蛋。员工流动平均每年也许只有一人。

I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction - - - - working for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.

然而，我想强调还有一件让我们的工作充满乐趣和满足的事情——那就是为你们而工作。对查理和我而言，没有比赢得长期个人股东的信任更有成就感的了。几十年来，他们与我们并肩同行，期待我们成为其资金的可靠托管人。

Obviously, we can’t select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.

显然，我们无法像合伙制那样挑选股东。任何人今天都可以买入伯克希尔的股票并打算不久后卖出。当然，我们确实会有此类股东，同样也会有因被动配置而持有大量伯克希尔股票的指数基金。

To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large – some might say excessive – portion of their savings.

然而，伯克希尔拥有数量庞大的个人和家庭股东，这种比例在公司中实属罕见，他们加入我们时的意图接近于“至死不渝”。他们常常把相当大——有人甚至会说过大——的储蓄托付给我们。

Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.

这些股东有时会承认，伯克希尔可能并非他们能做出的最佳选择。但他们会补充说，伯克希尔在让人安心的投资中名列前茅。而对于投资感到安心的人，平均而言其结果往往比那些被不断变化的头条、噪音和承诺所驱动的人更好。

Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”

长期的个人股东既是查理和我一直寻求的“伙伴”，也是我们在伯克希尔作决策时时刻惦记的人。我们要对他们说：“为你们而‘工作’令人愉快，感谢你们的信任。”

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29th through Sunday, May 1st. The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.

清空你的日程！伯克希尔将于 4 月 29 日（星期五）至 5 月 1 日（星期日）在奥马哈举行一年一度的“资本家盛会”。有关这一周末的安排详见 A-1 和 A-2 页。奥马哈热切期待你的到来，我也是。

I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy’s masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family’s use. Join me.

我将以一段推销结束这封信。“表弟”吉米·巴菲特设计了一款浮筒“派对船”，现由伯克希尔旗下子公司 Forest River 负责生产。该船将于 4 月 29 日在我们的“伯克希尔折扣盛会”亮相。仅限两天，股东可享受九折优惠购买吉米的这件杰作。爱捡便宜的董事长我将为家人买上一艘。欢迎你一起加入。

February 26, 2022

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2022-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2022-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

What You Own

Surprise, Surprise

Our Four Giants

Investments

U.S. Treasury Bills

Share Repurchases

A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business

Thanks

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