Perry told Hohn that he’d like to offer him a job but had no desk, the TCI founder recalls. Hohn replied that he could bring his own.
TCI创始人回忆说,佩里告诉霍恩他想给他一份工作,但没有多余的办公桌。霍恩回答说他可以自己带一张。
Hohn got the job and stayed with the firm for seven years. In 1998, he moved to London to open Perry’s U.K. office. He would launch Perry Capital European Fund in the spring of 2000. At the time, Hohn says, Europe was a hot market, with a lot of privatizations and restructurings — and a lot of cheap stocks. “It was ripe for special situations,” he explains. “It was like a candy store of fantastic opportunities.” These included an Italian toll road and French insurance privatizations.
霍恩得到了这份工作,并在公司待了七年。1998年,他搬到伦敦开设佩里的英国办事处。2000年春,他推出佩里资本欧洲基金。当时,霍恩表示,欧洲市场火热,私有化和重组项目众多,廉价股票林立。“这正是特殊情形投资的最佳时机,”他解释道,“就像糖果店里摆满了绝佳机会。”其中包括一条意大利收费公路和法国保险私有化项目。
The Perry Capital European Fund grew to more than \$1 billion in three years. During that period, Hohn generated a better than 20 percent annualized return.
佩里资本欧洲基金在三年内规模增长至超过10亿美元。在此期间,霍恩实现了超过20%的年化收益率。
In 2003, Hohn decided to leave to start TCI Fund Management. He had never fully adopted the event-driven, merger arbitrage style and was frustrated with Perry’s insistence on running portfolios with relatively low net market exposure. (Hohn preferred to run a more concentrated, mostly long portfolio.)
2003年,霍恩决定离职创立TCI基金管理公司。他从未完全接受事件驱动、并购套利的投资风格,对佩里坚持保持较低净市场敞口的投资组合感到沮丧。(霍恩更倾向于持有集中度更高、以做多为主的投资组合。)

段永平是2001年,相近的时间点。
When launching TCI, Hohn told prospective clients he would donate a third of the 1.5 percent management fee to CIFF.
在创办TCI时,霍恩告知潜在客户,他将把1.5%管理费中的三分之一捐赠给CIFF。
After its first month, January 2004, the fund was already managing about \$470 million.
成立后第一个月——2004年1月——基金的管理规模已达到约4.7亿美元。
“I thought he was a really talented investor,” Marshall recalls. “You could tell he did his own deep research and truly believed the story. He didn’t leave details to the team. I came from the money management side. I can tell who is BS’ing. He clearly knew his stuff and could understand the thesis.”
马歇尔回忆道:“我觉得他是位非常有才华的投资者。你能看出他做了深入研究,真正相信自己的投资逻辑。他不会把细节丢给团队。我来自资产管理行业,我能分辨谁在胡扯。他显然很懂行,也能理解投资论点。”
As for Hill, he remembers being impressed by Hohn’s business plan and historical track record. “In the hedge fund business they can have fancy bells and whistles, but ultimately you have to trust they do what they say they are going to do, that they have strong risk management protocols in place and are not going to take foolish bets, engage in style drift, or chase capital to grow AUM just to earn more management fees,” he says.
希尔则回忆说,霍恩的商业计划和历史业绩令他印象深刻。“在对冲基金行业可能会有各种花哨噱头,但归根结底,你必须相信他们言行一致,拥有强大的风险管理体系,不会做愚蠢的赌注、风格漂移,或仅为赚取更多管理费而盲目扩张资产规模。”
Hohn is in fact well known for carrying around what he calls a “quality list” of target companies, including each company’s enterprise value, leverage, and margins; what he would pay for it; and the potential IRR over three to five years, among other information. These days, the list is on a spreadsheet on Hohn’s computer.
事实上,霍恩因随身携带他所谓的“优质名单”而闻名,其中列有目标公司的企业价值、杠杆率、利润率,他愿意支付的价格,以及三到五年的潜在内部收益率等信息。如今,这份名单存放在他电脑上的电子表格里。
Hohn started off doing mostly special situations investments in Europe. On day one, he put 20 percent of his capital into two Korean companies — including consumer electronics maker LG Corp., whose stock went up five times.
霍恩最初主要在欧洲进行特殊情形投资。第一天,他就将20%的资本投入两家韩国公司——其中包括消费电子制造商LG集团,该股后来上涨了五倍。
“I always decided to be concentrated,” he says.
他说:“我始终决定保持投资集中度。”
One of his early themes was publicly traded stock exchanges. Hohn took large stakes in Deutsche Börse and Euronext. When the two exchanges tried to merge soon after, he stepped in and played a major role in preventing the deal from being completed — his first foray into activism.
他早期的主题之一是上市交易所。霍恩重仓持有德意志交易所和泛欧交易所。当两家交易所不久后尝试合并时,他介入其中并在阻止交易完成的过程中发挥了关键作用——这是他首次涉足激进投资。
Euronext wound up being acquired by the New York Stock Exchange the following year.
翌年,泛欧交易所最终被纽约证券交易所收购。
In 2007, Hohn bought 1 percent of the shares of Dutch banking giant ABN Amro, which represented 10 to 15 percent of his hedge fund’s capital. He filed a resolution at the company’s annual meeting urging it to put itself up for sale. Shareholders then forced the company to put itself up for auction. A consortium of three banks — Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Banco Santander — ended up paying roughly \$100 billion in all cash at the peak of the market.
2007年,霍恩买入荷兰银行业巨头ABN Amro 1%的股份,相当于其对冲基金资本的10%至15%。他在公司年会上提交决议,敦促其挂牌出售。随后股东迫使公司进行拍卖。由苏格兰皇家银行、富通和桑坦德银行组成的财团最终在市场高点以全现金约1000亿美元的价格完成收购。
By May 2008, Hohn had racked up annualized gains of roughly 40 percent in each of his first four years and built the firm to \$19 billion in assets, with a staff that included 12 analysts.
截至2008年5月,霍恩在前四年中取得约40%的年化回报,并将公司资产规模扩大至190亿美元,团队包括12名分析师。
Then came TCI’s first major test.
随后,TCI迎来了首次重大考验。
In 2008, as the financial crisis wreaked havoc on global markets, TCI lost 43 percent. Hohn blamed this steep decline on being long equities, which went down in line with the rest of the market.
2008年,金融危机席卷全球市场,TCI亏损43%。霍恩将这一下跌归咎于持有股票仓位,与大盘同步下跌。
But in 2009, as the market recovered and the S\&P 500 surged 26 percent, TCI was up only 10 percent. Hohn attributes the underperformance to the fund’s all but shutting down risk. He followed that disappointing year with gains of just 9 percent and 7 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
然而到2009年,随着市场复苏、标普500指数飙升26%,TCI仅上涨10%。霍恩将业绩落后归因于基金几乎完全关闭风险敞口。2010年和2011年,他分别仅获得9%和7%的收益。
Many of Hohn’s investors, unhappy with the fund’s mediocre results after the huge drawdown — not to mention its unusually severe three- and five-year lockups — began fleeing en masse as their terms expired.
许多投资者对基金在大幅回撤后的平庸表现感到不满——更不用说异常严格的三年和五年锁定期——随着期限到期,他们开始大批撤资。
By the end of 2012, assets had shrunk to \$4.9 billion in the main fund, even after it posted an impressive 29.5 percent gain that year — its best performance in five years.
到2012年底,尽管当年取得了29.5%的亮眼收益(为五年来最佳表现),主基金资产仍缩水至49亿美元。
Investors weren’t the only ones eager to escape the firm: From 2009 to 2011, several analysts and the head of investor relations also left.
急于离开的不仅是投资者:2009年至2011年期间,数名分析师和投资者关系负责人也先后离职。

同时间的BRK,2008年下跌32%,2009年上涨2.17%,2010年上涨21.89%,2011年下跌4.76%,2012年上涨17.56%,大家都差不多,问题是基金的大部分是别人的钱。
This period was a big wakeup call for Hohn.
这段时期对霍恩来说是一次重要的警醒。
In a 2015 interview with Institutional Investor, Hohn looked back at the 2008 debacle and the ensuing mediocre years and conceded, “We had strayed from being heavily invested in stocks, with a high barrier to entry and a bulletproof franchise to weaker industries. Then we weren’t fully invested in 2009. The team and the fund got too large.”
在2015年接受《机构投资者》采访时,霍恩回顾2008年的惨败及其后的平庸岁月,并坦言:“我们从重仓投资于高护城河、稳固特许经营权的股票转向了较弱的行业。随后在2009年我们没有充分投资。团队和基金规模都过大了。”
To get back on track, Hohn moved away from special situations, jettisoning stocks in industries like banks and commodity companies and pivoting away from what he deemed to be weak businesses, such as manufacturers.
为了重回正轨,霍恩远离特殊情形投资,抛售银行和大宗商品等行业股票,并退出他认为较弱的业务,如制造业公司。
Instead he focused his very concentrated portfolio on monopoly companies with large moats or high barriers to entry and very strong pricing power, he says in the recent interview.
相反,他将高度集中的投资组合聚焦于拥有深厚护城河或高进入壁垒并具备强大定价权的垄断型企业,他在最近的采访中说道。

一开始从表格入手就有这个问题,投资对象的经济韧性不够,表格不善于反映经济韧性。
“We found it in many different places,” Hohn notes.
霍恩指出:“我们在许多不同的地方都找到了这样的公司。”
These targets have included media content companies like Newscorp, which TCI has invested in twice over the past decade.
这些投资对象包括媒体内容公司,例如 News Corp(新闻集团),在过去十年里 TCI 曾两度投资该公司。
The first time was during Newscorp’s hacking scandal in 2011. The second was four years ago, when TCI took an outsized stake in 21st Century Fox — Newscorp’s new name — when the media giant put itself up for sale. It wound up selling many of its assets to Walt Disney, which was vying with Comcast at the time.
第一次是在 2011 年 Newscorp 卷入电话窃听丑闻期间。第二次是四年前,当媒体巨头挂牌出售时,TCI 大举买入其更名为 21st Century Fox 的股份。最终,该公司将多项资产出售给当时正与康卡斯特竞购的华特迪士尼公司。
“I visited \[chairman] Rupert \[Murdoch] during the Disney-Comcast fight, and I demanded the company sell to the highest bidder,” Hohn recalls. “He said, ‘I would like the same thing, but I can’t say it. I’m under contract.’”
霍恩回忆道:“在迪士尼与康卡斯特竞价期间,我拜访了(董事长)鲁珀特·默多克,并要求公司卖给出价最高者。”“他说,‘我也想这么做,但我不能说。我受合同约束。’”
At the end of 2021, TCI held just 13 different stocks in its \$44.4 billion U.S.-listed stock portfolio; its five largest holdings accounted for two-thirds of the assets. And all of them are the kind of dominant companies that Hohn prefers.
截至 2021 年底,TCI 在其价值 444 亿美元的美股投资组合中仅持有 13 只股票;前五大重仓占资产的三分之二,且全都是霍恩偏好的行业主导型公司。
They included Google parent Alphabet; broadband giant Charter Communications, which TCI has held since 2016; cloud computing giant Microsoft, which it initiated in 2017; credit card payments giant Visa; and Canadian National Railway.
这些持仓包括谷歌母公司 Alphabet;自 2016 年起持有的宽带巨头 Charter Communications;2017 年建仓的云计算巨头微软;信用卡支付巨头 Visa;以及加拿大国家铁路公司。
The tighter focus has clearly paid off. Over the past ten years, TCI has generated a better than 19 percent annualized return, posting double-digit returns in eight of those years. It has never lost money since the huge 2008 drawdown.
更加聚焦的策略显然收效显著。过去十年,TCI 实现了逾 19% 的年化回报,其中八年收益为两位数,自 2008 年大幅回撤以来再未出现亏损。
In early 2019, TCI made the unusual offer to return some capital “to provide investors additional flexibility to manage the size of their \[investment] in TCI through a modest rebalancing opportunity,” according to a client letter at the time.
2019 年初,TCI 在致客户的信中提出罕见的回资要约,称此举“为投资者提供通过适度再平衡机会来管理其在 TCI 投资规模的额外灵活性”。
Unsurprisingly, few investors took advantage.
不出所料,几乎没有投资者利用这一机会。
Although TCI is still perceived by many Wall Streeters as an activist firm, Hohn plays down this part of the firm’s strategy. “Activism is now more opportunistic rather than fundamental for us,” he says.
尽管华尔街许多人仍将 TCI 视为激进投资机构,但霍恩淡化了这一策略在公司中的重要性。“激进投资如今对我们来说更多是机会主义,而非核心策略,”他说。
This said, Hohn was recently locked in a battle with Canadian National Railway. In May 2021, TCI doubled its stake, to 8 percent, when the railroad giant announced a bidding war for Kansas City Southern. (TCI also has a big stake in Canadian Pacific Railway.)
尽管如此,霍恩最近仍与加拿大国家铁路公司展开了较量。2021 年 5 月,当该铁路巨头宣布与 Kansas City Southern 展开竞购战时,TCI 将其持股翻番至 8%。(TCI 同时持有加拿大太平洋铁路的大额股份。)
TCI fired off a letter to CN chairman Robert Pace opposing the merger, asserting, in part, that the company was taking a big risk by committing roughly \$2 billion related to potential breakup fees as it awaited regulatory approval.
TCI 致函加拿大国家铁路董事长罗伯特·佩斯,反对该并购案,部分理由是公司在等待监管批准期间承诺约 20 亿美元潜在解约金,承担了巨大风险。
The firm also complained about “weak leadership” that “resulted in deteriorating financial and operating performance,” calling for CN to replace chief executive officer Jean-Jacques Ruest with Jim Vena — who had served as chief operating officer from February 2013 to July 2016.
该基金还批评公司“领导力薄弱”,导致“财务和运营表现恶化”,并呼吁加拿大国家铁路用吉姆·维纳取代首席执行官让-雅克·鲁埃斯特——维纳曾于 2013 年 2 月至 2016 年 7 月担任首席运营官。
And TCI nominated four directors to the board.
此外,TCI 提名四名董事进入董事会。
In September, Kansas City Southern terminated the merger agreement with CN and agreed to merge with Canadian Pacific. The same month, Canadian National announced a plan to cut spending and improve profitability and pledged to repurchase \$4 billion in stock.
同年 9 月,Kansas City Southern 终止与加拿大国家铁路的合并协议,转而同意与加拿大太平洋铁路合并。同月,加拿大国家铁路宣布削减支出、提升盈利能力,并承诺回购 40 亿美元股票。
In October, CN agreed with TCI to hold a special shareholder meeting on March 22, 2022. Two weeks later, CN announced the retirement of its president and chief executive officer, effective January 2022.
10 月,加拿大国家铁路与 TCI 同意于 2022 年 3 月 22 日召开特别股东大会。两周后,公司宣布其总裁兼首席执行官将于 2022 年 1 月退休。
Then in January, CN and TCI reached an agreement whereby the railroad would make several changes to its board, including committing to appointing two new independent directors.
随后在 1 月,加拿大国家铁路与 TCI 达成协议,公司将对董事会进行多项调整,包括承诺任命两名新的独立董事。
Hohn stresses that in general TCI does not plan to be so aggressive as an activist. But one area where it is becoming much more active is in its campaign to address climate change.
霍恩强调,整体而言,TCI 并不打算采取过于激进的策略。不过,公司在应对气候变化的行动上正变得更加积极。
The firm’s Say on Climate initiative has been voluntarily adopted by nearly two dozen companies, including Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, and Moody’s, as well as 19 asset managers, including Soros Fund Management and Caxton Associates.
TCI 发起的“Say on Climate”倡议已被近二十家公司自愿采纳,其中包括荷兰皇家壳牌、联合利华和穆迪,以及索罗斯基金管理公司、卡克斯顿联合公司等 19 家资产管理机构。
Altogether, more than 100 investors support Say on Climate if you count the 54 investor members of the Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change and the major French investors via Forum pour l’Investissement, which have issued public statements of support.
如果将气候变化投资者组织 IIGCC 的 54 家成员以及通过法国投资论坛发表公开支持声明的法国主要投资者计算在内,支持“Say on Climate”的投资者总数已超过 100 家。
TCI requires all of the companies in its portfolio to have a climate plan and put it up to shareholders.
TCI 要求其投资组合中的所有公司制定气候计划并提交股东审议。
According to TCI, key principles of a credible climate action plan include a pledge to reduce emissions by 50 percent by 2030 and the belief that a long-term target (beyond ten years) without a short-term plan (five years) is inadequate.
TCI 指出,一份可信的气候行动计划的关键原则包括承诺在 2030 年前将排放量减少 50%,并认为若没有五年期的短期计划,仅提出十年以上的长期目标是不充分的。
Climate change has been an important issue for Hohn for many years. His foundation, CIFF, has been active in environmental causes for more than 15 years, with an arm dedicated to climate change.
多年来,气候变化一直是霍恩关注的重要议题。他的基金会 CIFF 在环保领域已活跃超过 15 年,并设有专门的气候变化部门。
Hohn points out that addressing climate change is related to the foundation’s initial focus on children in poverty, especially in Africa and India. As soil dries out because of drought, it is harder to grow food, which will increasingly cause malnutrition, he explains.
霍恩指出,应对气候变化与基金会最初关注的贫困儿童问题相关,尤其是在非洲和印度。随着干旱导致土壤干涸,粮食生产愈发困难,营养不良问题将日益严峻,他解释道。
Of the \$500 million CIFF plans to give out this year, \$200 million is aimed at climate change, Hohn says.
霍恩表示,CIFF 今年计划捐赠的 5 亿美元中,有 2 亿美元用于气候变化项目。
Hohn also co-founded the European Climate Foundation, which he says today spends \$100 million a year on advocacy and technical assistance to support Europe’s pledge to cut emissions by 2030.
霍恩还共同创立了欧洲气候基金会,他称该组织目前每年在倡议和技术援助方面支出 1 亿美元,以支持欧洲到 2030 年减排的承诺。
One goal is to end what he calls “dirty finance,” which means financing fossil fuels and high emissions. Hohn says 35 percent of emissions are created in the corporate sector. “Instead of cutting emissions in half, corporate emissions are rising,” he notes.
其目标之一是终结他所称的“肮脏融资”,即为化石燃料和高排放活动提供融资。霍恩指出,企业部门产生了 35% 的排放量。“企业排放不仅未减半,反而在上升,”他补充道。
Hohn’s climate change efforts got a big boost in late March from U.S. regulators when the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rule changes that would require companies to include certain climate-related disclosures in their registration statements and quarterly and annual reports. These would include information about climate-related risks that are “reasonably likely to have a material impact” on their business, results of operations, or financial condition, and certain climate-related financial statement metrics in a note to their audited financial statements. The required climate-related risk assessments would include disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions, “which have become a commonly used metric to assess a registrant’s exposure to such risks,” according to the announcement.
美国证券交易委员会在 3 月底提出的规则变更为霍恩的气候行动提供了重大助力。新规要求公司在注册文件以及季报和年报中披露特定的气候相关信息,其中包括“很可能对业务、经营结果或财务状况产生重大影响”的气候相关风险,以及在经审计财报附注中披露相关气候财务指标。公告称,所需的气候风险评估包括温室气体排放披露,“这已成为衡量公司相关风险敞口的常用指标”。
“That was an important moment,” Hohn says.
“那是一个重要时刻,”霍恩表示。
For Hohn, the climate change and other philanthropic efforts are what differentiate TCI. “We set out from day one to create philanthropic funds,” he says.
对霍恩而言,气候变化和其他慈善工作正是 TCI 的差异化所在。“我们从第一天起就计划打造慈善基金,”他说。

人生的激励函数有点问题,参考巴菲特、乔布斯的激励函数。
The sentiment is lauded by Joe Dowling, the global head of BAAM, who has known Hohn since they met at Harvard Business School in 1991.
这一理念得到 BAAM 全球负责人乔·道林的称赞,他与霍恩自 1991 年在哈佛商学院相识至今。
“It goes back to his core DNA to impact the world,” Dowling says. “He wants it to be a better place.”
道林说:“这源自他影响世界的核心 DNA。他希望让世界变得更美好。”
In fact, the first time Hohn received a significant bonus at Perry Capital, he gave it to charity.
事实上,霍恩在 Perry Capital 获得第一笔可观奖金时,就将其全部捐给了慈善事业。
As for the \$2 billion that he has gifted to his foundation over the years, it has doubled several times over, creating \$7 billion in capital gains.
至于他多年来向基金会捐赠的 20 亿美元,通过投资增值已多次翻倍,创造了 70 亿美元的资本收益。
“I always felt I was a custodian; the money is never really mine,” says Hohn, who nonetheless made more than \$2 billion last year, thanks in large part to his compounding wealth in his fund. “What’s the point of making lots of money if not having the joy of giving of service, meaning, and purpose? I still stick to the original goal: Do well for investors and encourage philanthropy through example.”
霍恩说:“我一直觉得自己只是托管人,这些钱从来不真正属于我。”然而,由于基金中的财富复利增长,他去年仍赚取了超过 20 亿美元。“要是不能享受服务他人、赋予人生意义与目标的喜悦,那么赚再多钱又有什么意义?我仍坚守最初的目标:为投资者创造收益,并以身作则推动慈善。”