2022-10-28 Todd Combs.32nd Annual Graham & Dodd Breakfast
Summary:
总结：
The event’s guest speaker was Todd Combs and was moderated by Michael Mauboussin. Combs provided his insight on defining a “good business,” the longevity of these businesses, the accuracy of financial statements, and a unit cost centered valuation approach.
本次活动的嘉宾演讲者是Todd Combs，由Michael Mauboussin主持。Combs分享了他对“好企业”的定义、这些企业的持久性、财务报表的准确性，以及以单位成本为核心的估值方法的见解。
Combs opened his discussion on investing by equating it to Einstein’s theory of intelligence, which he said ranges from smart, intelligent, brilliant, genius to simple. Combs states that while investing is simple, it is not easy.
Combs在开启关于投资的讨论时，将其比作Einstein的智力层次理论，他说这一理论从smart、intelligent、brilliant、genius到simple。Combs表示，投资虽然简单，但并不容易。
最高一级是simple，我们搞了两个标签“Smart Idea”、“Simple Idea”，跟BRK团队的想法一模一样，并且比Todd Combs的说法更好，更简洁。
During one of Todd Combs and Warren Buffett’s famed Saturday afternoon living room chats, the two posed the following question as a means of valuation: if you take a business, what is your level of confidence in predicting what it looks like in five years?
在Todd Combs和Warren Buffett著名的周六下午客厅谈话中，他们提出了这样一个用于估值的问题：如果你选择一家企业，你对预测其五年后的样子有多大信心？
Buying a whole business requires varied degrees of scrutiny into factors which cannot be evaluated using financial modeling formulas, such as: level of capital required, management style and efficacy.
收购一家完整的企业需要对一些无法通过财务建模公式评估的因素进行不同程度的审视，例如：所需资本水平、管理风格及其有效性。
Combs recalled the first question Charlie Munger ever asked him was what percentage of S\&P 500 businesses would be a “better business” in five years. Combs believed that it was less than 5% of S\&P businesses, whereas Munger stated that it was less than 2%. You can have a great business, but it doesn’t mean it will be better in five years. The rate of change in the world is significant, which makes this exercise difficult, but this is something that Charlie, Warren and Todd think about. When Combs started at Berkshire, they had a 7/10 confidence on the businesses outlook for the next five years. The nature of the world is that things are constantly changing, and Todd says they are right on maybe 1/10 predictions.
Combs回忆道，Charlie Munger问他的第一个问题是：在五年内，S&P 500中有多少比例的企业会成为“更好的企业”。Combs认为少于5%，而Munger则表示少于2%。你可以拥有一家很好的企业，但这并不意味着它在五年后会变得更好。世界变化的速度非常快，使得这一判断非常困难，但这是Charlie、Warren和Todd一直在思考的问题。当Combs刚加入Berkshire时，他们对未来五年企业前景的信心大约是7/10。但世界的本质在于不断变化，Todd表示他们可能只有1/10的预测是正确的。
Michael asked if there are traditional measures that Combs/Berkshire look at to indicate good business performance? And how does Combs/Berkshire assess that quantitatively? Combs explained how one question is constantly asked, usually daily, and that is if the moat is wider or narrower on any of their businesses.
Michael问Combs/Berkshire是否有一些传统指标用来衡量企业的良好表现？他们又是如何在量化上进行评估的？Combs解释说，他们每天都会不断问的一个问题是：他们的任何一家企业的护城河是在变宽还是变窄。
98% of what Buffett and Combs discuss is qualitative. If something is 30x earnings you can calculate what it will have to do to get to run rate earnings. The worst business grows and needs infinite capital with declining returns. The best business grows exponentially with no capital.
Buffett和Combs的讨论有98%是定性的。如果一家公司市盈率是30倍，你可以计算它需要做到什么水平才能达到稳定的盈利。最差的企业增长时需要无限资本且回报不断下降；最好的企业则几乎不需要资本却能实现指数级增长。
At Berkshire there’s a focus on owner’s earnings. It’s a good sign when the owner’s earnings are close to the reported earnings. Owner’s earnings can be calculated in the following way: (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization and certain other noncash charges less (c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc., that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the incremental spending should also be included in section (c). However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change. LIFO would give the appearance of an additional need for working capital because inventory is held at a cost less than average, and, or FIFO. Buffet is saying not to confuse that with a working capital need.)
在Berkshire，非常注重所有者盈余。当所有者盈余接近报告盈余时，这是一个好迹象。所有者盈余的计算方式如下：(a) 报告盈余，加上 (b) 折旧、耗竭、摊销和某些其他非现金费用，减去 (c) 企业为全面维持其长期竞争地位和业务量所需的资本化支出的年均金额（如厂房和设备等）。(如果企业需要额外的营运资本来维持其竞争地位和业务量，那么这部分增量支出也应计入(c)项。然而，采用LIFO存货方法的企业，如果业务量不变，通常不需要额外的营运资本。LIFO会看似产生额外营运资本需求，因为库存的计价低于平均成本，而FIFO也可能有类似情况。Buffett强调不要把这种会计假象误认为是真实的营运资本需求。)
Combs goes to Buffett’s house on many Saturdays to talk, and here’s a litmus test they frequently use. Warren asks “How many names in the S\&P are going to be 15x earnings in the next 12 months? How many are going to earn more in five years (using a 90% confidence interval), and how many will compound at 7% (using a 50% confidence interval)?” In this exercise, you are solving for cyclicality, compounding, and initial price. Combs said that this rubric was used to find Apple, since at the time the same 3-5 names kept coming up.
Combs经常在周六去Buffett家里交流，他们常用一个“试金石”。Warren会问：“在未来12个月里，S&P中有多少家公司会是15倍市盈率？有多少家公司在五年后能赚得更多（以90%的置信区间衡量）？有多少家公司会以7%的复合增长率增长（以50%的置信区间衡量）？” 在这个练习中，你要解答的是周期性、复利和初始价格问题。Combs说，他们正是用这个标准找到了Apple，因为当时反复出现的就是那三到五个名字。
可以作为合理的推理的一部分。
Businesses are run by people, and Buffett says he likes taking the cash flow and removing it from managers and investing it himself. There’s a known adage, when looking to buy a business: look to buy a business a dummy can run, because eventually a dummy will run it.
企业由人来经营，Buffett表示，他喜欢把现金流从管理层手中拿走，由自己来进行投资。有句广为人知的箴言：在收购企业时，要选择一个即便傻瓜也能经营的企业，因为最终总会有傻瓜来经营它。
The discussion then shifted to how Combs thinks about understanding if a company is more focused on internal growth vs external growth. Combs mentioned that business destruction has accelerated and that every business has become a data and technology company and to stay aware of what parts of the business are dying.
讨论随后转向Combs如何判断一家公司更关注内部增长还是外部增长。Combs提到，企业毁灭的速度正在加快，每个企业都已经变成了数据和科技公司，因此必须时刻警惕企业中哪些部分正在衰亡。
Charlie famously says you get what you incentivize. If a management is incentivized to appeal to Wall Street, it might behave in a value destructive way. Combs said that it’s a red flag if a company is too focused on external relations. Combs mentioned how his responsibilities are great, and his time is scarce, but if he was 150% dedicated to analyzing companies, he’d focus on delta reports, and see what management is changing from year to year. In 2005, Bear Stearns changed something very essential in their reports while saying something different to the street.
Charlie有一句名言：激励什么，就会得到什么。如果管理层的激励是为了取悦华尔街，他们可能会做出破坏价值的行为。Combs表示，如果一家公司过于关注对外关系，这是一个危险信号。Combs提到，他肩负着重大的责任，时间非常有限，但如果他能150%地投入到公司分析中，他会专注于delta报告，观察管理层每年在改变什么。在2005年，Bear Stearns就在报告中修改了一些非常关键的内容，却在面对华尔街时说着完全不同的话。
大量总想着吸引别人眼球的网红，头条、抖音上属于这一类接近于100%。
A big signaling effect for Combs is when management changes the key performance indicators for which it will get compensated by, presumably because management won’t get compensated if the KPIs are left as is.
对Combs来说，一个强烈的信号就是当管理层改变其薪酬挂钩的关键绩效指标时，因为可以推测，如果KPI维持不变，管理层就无法获得报酬。
Combs estimates that in the fortune 500, approximately 20% of companies are changing the incentive metrics for management. That’s not an accident.
Combs估计，在财富500强企业中，大约20%的公司正在改变管理层的激励指标。这绝不是偶然。
Every time Combs meets with a company, there are two questions he always asks management: (1) How long do you spend talking to investors, and (2) what would you be doing if you were not publicly traded? The median response is 25% of the time is spent talking to investors. In response to the second question management usually lists a number of things that make a lot of sense, and Combs then proceeds to ask why they don't do that, and they say because they feel handcuffed. When management is focused on the quarterly performance, and they don’t have the proper time horizon, they are not empowered to do the right thing. As a fiduciary you are setting yourself up for failure if you don’t have the right time horizon.
Combs每次与公司会面时，总会问管理层两个问题：(1) 你们花多少时间与投资者交流？(2) 如果你们不是上市公司，你们会做什么？中位数回答是大约25%的时间用来与投资者交流。对于第二个问题，管理层通常会列出一些非常合理的事情，Combs接着会问他们为何不去做，他们的回答是因为感觉被束缚住了。当管理层过于关注季度业绩而缺乏合适的时间视角时，他们就无法被赋权去做正确的事情。作为受托人，如果你没有正确的时间跨度，你就是在为失败埋下伏笔。
一切向内收敛的力量，够不够收敛？
Categorically, founder led businesses outperform because the founders are the fiduciary, and they have a longer time horizon.
总体而言，由创始人领导的企业表现更佳，因为创始人本身就是受托人，他们拥有更长远的时间视角。
Valuation:
估值：
How does Combs look at valuations? What significance does valuation have in his investments, and how does it help him screen for companies?
Combs如何看待估值？估值在他的投资中有什么意义？它又是如何帮助他筛选公司的？
Combs began by describing a three-legged stool and explaining how you can't ignore any one leg (in this case valuation). You have to pay attention to valuation. You have to have a framework where you are getting a financial return. Sometimes earnings are misleading. David Einhorn once wrote about this, that there's an arbitrage in situations when most people are focused solely on financial metrics, you need to adjust for accounting which can be extremely misleading. For example, at Berkshire things are marked to market but not considering real earnings. You can have SAAS businesses incurring 100 cents on the dollar in expenses on day one and going forward earn whatever the LTV of the customer is. You have to have a view where you can understand what the financial image looks like. For example, “in the early days of Walmart and Amazon, I wouldn’t focus on the fact that the reserves seemed wrong and quite large. Look at where it took them. I build out unit economics (in the case of Walmart look at the individual store), and that is your north star. You backtrack, and you get to CAC, LTV, and so on.”
Combs首先把估值比作一张三条腿的凳子，解释说不能忽略任何一条腿（这里指估值）。你必须关注估值，并且要有一个能获得财务回报的框架。有时候利润数据会产生误导。David Einhorn曾写过相关内容，他指出在大多数人只关注财务指标时，存在套利机会，因为会计处理可能极具误导性。例如，在Berkshire，资产是按市值计价的，但这并未考虑真实盈利。你可能会看到SaaS公司在第一天就花掉每一美元的成本，而未来只能赚取客户的LTV。你必须形成一个能够理解财务全貌的视角。例如，“在Walmart和Amazon的早期，我不会太关注准备金看起来不正确且规模很大这一点，而是要看最终它们的发展方向。我会建立单位经济模型（以Walmart为例，就看单个门店的表现），这才是你的北极星。然后倒推回去，得到CAC、LTV等等。”
Amazon的问题是需要时刻保持聪明，但确实很聪明。
What is so bad about EBITDA? Combs remarks, “You mean BS earnings?”
EBITDA到底有什么不好？Combs调侃道：“你是说胡扯的盈利（BS earnings）吗？”
Combs then goes on to explain the flaws embedded within EBITDA. Something frequently not understood, not discussed, and consequently not evaluated is maintenance capex. Feynman had this saying “it’s so easy to fool yourself and you’re the easiest person to fool.” CEO’s have a very low grasp of their maintenance capex. Combs further says how most management teams aren't even able to have that discussion because of their confidence in investing for growth. In reality management often is mistaking growth for something that is really maintenance capex. “It might be growth spending, but you’re not growing!”.
接着，Combs解释了EBITDA中隐藏的缺陷。一个经常被忽视、没有讨论、因此也未被评估的问题就是维护性资本支出。Feynman曾说过：“自欺是最容易的，而你最容易欺骗的人就是自己。” CEO们对自己企业的维护性资本支出理解极其有限。Combs进一步指出，大多数管理团队甚至无法就此展开讨论，因为他们太自信于投资增长。但实际上，管理层常常把本质上是维护性的资本支出误认为是增长投资。“这可能看起来是增长支出，但你其实并没有在增长！”
更简单的思路是不需要资本，但凡重资产投入的都有问题，投资增长的说法都是自我实现的幻觉。
A recent Ph.D at Columbia wrote a paper on maintenance capex. The paper found that depreciation understates maintenance capex, he explains it industry by industry. Very few companies talk about maintenance capex. You can have a SAAS company where the maintenance capex is your people and your salesforce, so you can’t ignore it just because you’re not capitalizing those expenses.
最近，Columbia有一位博士写了一篇关于维护性资本支出的论文。论文发现，折旧低估了维护性资本支出，并逐个行业加以解释。很少有公司会谈论维护性资本支出。在一家SaaS公司，维护性资本支出可能就是员工和销售团队，所以你不能因为没有将这些费用资本化，就忽视它们。
When looking at a company Combs begins inside out versus outside in.
在分析公司时，Combs是从内向外出发，而不是从外向内。
Combs explains there’s a lot of outside in. You hear a narrative, you meet with management, and it’s extremely intellectually dishonest. The goal of investing is to have intellectual purity. There’s facts and numbers, and then there is a narrative. Combs tries to wall himself off from the narrative until he has a view. As mentioned before, Combs would start with delta reports. Put together your view without looking at the market cap. Limit the pollution. Then think about the future of the company and pressure test your assumptions.
Combs解释说，很多分析是从外到内的：你听到故事，见了管理层，但这在智识上是不诚实的。投资的目标是保持智识的纯净。世界上有事实和数据，也有叙事。Combs会尽量在自己形成观点之前屏蔽叙事。如前所述，他会从delta报告开始。先在不看市值的情况下形成观点，减少外界干扰。然后再思考公司的未来，对自己的假设进行压力测试。
真正有平常心的不需要屏蔽，缺少的很难屏蔽。
With regard to quantitative research, Combs doesn’t understand that world as well, if he did Berkshire returns would reflect Renaissance’s returns. Charlie and Todd talk about this a lot. Combs thinks some funds have quant groups, but he’s not so sure about implementing it at Berkshire. He admitted it was somewhat of a cop out answer, but he honestly just doesn't know.
至于量化研究，Combs承认自己对这个领域理解不深。如果他真正理解，Berkshire的回报就会像Renaissance那样。Charlie和Todd经常讨论这个问题。Combs认为一些基金确实有量化团队，但他不确定这种方式是否适合在Berkshire实施。他坦言这有点像是逃避的答案，但他确实不知道。
A notable change recently has been a change from tangible to intangible investments at Berkshire. Next, they discuss sticky customers and how that affects valuation.
最近一个显著的变化是，Berkshire的投资从有形资产转向了无形资产。接下来，他们讨论了“粘性客户”以及这如何影响估值。
Combs focuses on fundamental unit economics. “First figure out CAC and LTV for GEICO. You know the data of where they live, the kind of car, and then there is the LTV of the customer. Combs thinks where people go wrong is where they think they know their CAC and LTV but it’s from too high a level. When you slice the data, there are really big pockets where the LTV is negative, and that is where the potential is to improve margins.”
Combs关注根本性的单位经济学。他说：“首先要弄清楚GEICO的CAC和LTV。你掌握了客户的居住地、驾驶的车型等数据，然后可以得到客户的LTV。Combs认为，人们常犯的错误是以为自己了解CAC和LTV，但其实是站在过高的层面上看问题。一旦把数据切分下来，就会发现一些LTV为负值的客户群体，而这正是改善利润率的潜力所在。”
Another example “to shed light on this can be in a large bank, where the overall ROA can be great, but within that you can have pockets of high and low ROAs. So, it’s important to break down and segregate to see actual unit economics.”
另一个例子是“大型银行的情况，总体ROA可能很高，但其中可能存在ROA高和低的分区。因此，将其拆解和分隔开来看实际的单位经济学非常重要。”
With Google, for example, Berkshire missed it despite the auto insurance being the number one and number two groups for paid search. Warren was in a position where he had the right information and the unit economics and yet he still didn’t act on that right information. That’s why he regards it as such a meaningful mistake of inaction.
以Google为例，Berkshire错过了它，尽管汽车保险在付费搜索中是排名第一和第二的群体。Warren当时拥有正确的信息和单位经济学数据，但他却没有基于这些正确信息采取行动。这就是他为何认为这是一个非常重要的“不作为的错误”。
可能的顾虑是Google的垄断地位，没想到Google能通过搜索引擎聚敛大部分的注意力。
To some degree, when valuing a business, you disregard the financial statements and accounting, and you focus your attention on the unit economics. Combs even said, “throw the accounting out”! After figuring out unit economics, the first thing Combs does is evaluate P/E, and then understand the owner's earnings. “Look at where you’re at in the lifecycle of the company, and where it is. Then let’s look at where it is going and apply some confidence intervals.”
在某种程度上，评估一家企业时，你要忽略财务报表和会计数据，把注意力集中在单位经济学上。Combs甚至说过，“把会计数据扔掉”！在弄清楚单位经济学之后，Combs做的第一件事就是评估市盈率，然后再去理解所有者盈余。“看看这家公司在生命周期的哪个阶段、现在处于什么位置。然后再看看它要往哪里去，并应用一些置信区间。”
A traditional value strategy hasn’t done well in the last decade. Why and will it reverse?
传统的价值投资策略在过去十年表现不佳。为什么？它会逆转吗？
Combs likes to think on reflexivity, where there is a feedback loop with low interest rates, great returns from growth. It’s easy to say no to value.
Combs倾向于从“反身性”角度思考：在低利率环境下，增长股的回报形成了反馈循环。在这种情况下，很容易拒绝价值投资。
With regard to the few things within the Berkshire portfolio that are growthier, Combs says focus on the unit economics.
至于Berkshire投资组合中那些更偏向成长的公司，Combs表示关键仍然是关注单位经济学。
Mergers and Acquisitions:
并购：
Most companies struggle to make valuable deals. How do you do a deal that is both strategic and good value?
大多数公司在达成有价值的交易上都很困难。如何才能做到既具战略意义，又有良好价值的交易呢？
Charlie once asked Todd about derivatives and Todd said that he really doesn't know much about them. So, Charlie then said, “but if I gave you 1,000, you could probably pick out the best 3.” One does not need to be an expert to see when the scale is large, and it is sometimes better not be an expert to spot a macro trend. “Remove the fish from the fishbowl. If you are only seeing three deals out of ten competitive companies, you’ll probably not allocate capital well. In fact, it might be really bad. 80% of M\&A is value destructive. Usually, the price paid is the issue. Strategically, they make sense, but that doesn’t excuse any price. Sometimes 1+1 = 3, the problem is they are paying 5!”
Charlie曾问Todd关于衍生品的看法，Todd回答说自己其实并不了解。于是Charlie说：“但如果我给你1000个，你可能还是能挑出最好的3个。” 这说明当规模足够大时，你不需要是专家也能看出什么，甚至有时候不是专家反而更容易发现宏观趋势。“要把鱼从鱼缸里拿出来。如果你只是在十个竞争公司中的三个交易里挑选，你可能根本无法做好资本配置。事实上，这可能会非常糟糕。80%的并购是破坏价值的。通常问题出在支付的价格上。从战略角度来看，它们有道理，但这并不能为任何价格辩护。有时候1+1=3，但问题是他们却付出了5！”
冲着协同效应，这种心理很容易导致高估。
Sometimes companies do deals because other companies do deals. As Charlie says, the best quality is to remain rational.
有时候公司做并购，仅仅是因为其他公司在做。正如Charlie所说，最重要的品质就是保持理性。
Combs’ Day-to-Day at Geico and his Managerial Side:
Combs在GEICO的日常及其管理角色：
Combs has been CEO of GEICO for almost three years. How does he decompartmentalize the investor and management roles?
Combs已经担任GEICO的CEO将近三年。他是如何区分投资者和管理者的角色的？
Combs explains that when it comes to investing, “you don’t need charisma or social skills. You need to have a decent conversation with management. On the other hand, when you are in management, you have to convince people in the company when it comes to initiating change and you have to be good at explaining why change is necessary. As a manager if you are good at communicating you can mobilize people to change the operations, whereas as an investor, you see businesses fail left and right, you have the experience, so theoretically, you should be able to come in and tell people to change. But it doesn’t work like that, and management usually is too charismatic to listen.”
Combs解释说，在投资方面，“你不需要魅力或社交技巧。你只需要能够和管理层进行一次像样的对话。另一方面，当你处在管理岗位时，你必须说服公司里的员工去接受变革，并且你必须善于解释为什么需要变革。作为一个管理者，如果你善于沟通，就能够动员人们去改变运营方式；而作为一个投资者，你见过很多企业失败，有相关的经验，所以理论上你应该能够直接告诉人们该改变什么。但事情并不是这样运作的，管理层通常过于有魅力，以至于不会听从。”
Here are some places where managing and investing overlap:
以下是管理和投资的重叠之处：
1.Process vs outcome is similar. Carry around a list of things to get done.
过程与结果的关系类似。随身带着一份待办清单。
2.Intellectual honesty
智识上的诚实
3.Facts and numbers vs narratives
事实与数据 vs 叙事
叙事很容易脱离假设、事实和合理的推理，讲话对于大脑是个低能耗的活动，所有关联的逻辑都会采用最节省能量的方式。
4.Everything is a meritocracy as an investor. You need to reinforce that as a CEO.
作为投资者，一切是精英治国；作为CEO，你需要强化这一点。
5.Due diligence, Combs loves “skip level meetings”. That’s where all the information is, speak to the people 3-7 levels down!
尽职调查，Combs非常喜欢“越级会议”。所有信息都在那里，要和低3到7级的员工交谈！
6.Get the big stuff right
把大事做好
7.Finding owners who are fiduciaries, (Charlie asked Combs what percent of management are fiduciaries)
寻找作为受托人的所有者（Charlie曾问Combs，有多少比例的管理层是真正的受托人）
8.Transparency and accountability, the people in power are held accountable and are aware of the implications their actions have
透明度与问责制，掌权者必须对其行为的影响负责，并且要有认知
9.Avoiding past dependencies, tendency to fall prey to trusting past research and former experience
避免对过去的依赖，避免陷入信任过往研究和经验的陷阱
10.Find areas where you can push a little and change a lot. You want nuclear fusion. Put in 100 units and get out 1,000 or a 1,000,000
找到那些可以小推力带来大改变的领域。你希望的是核聚变——投入100个单位，却能产出1,000甚至1,000,000。
这样的清单更接近芒格的性格，过于复杂、不够收敛，本质是抓住重要并且可计量的因素。
How has Combs dealt with incentives at GEICO, has he made changes where he was surprised by the outcomes?
Combs在GEICO是如何处理激励机制的？他是否做出过一些改变，而结果令他感到意外？
Combs explained how there’s no perfect way to structure incentives. On the one hand, everyone on the team gets a super bowl ring, but you also want to make sure people are compensated by the things they can impact and not the things out of their control. Being private definitely helps. Combs changed the compensation when he arrived. “Compensation can also lead to behavior that is not good, e.g., at Wells Fargo. Anything that is good can be taken too far. GEICO used to have a regional structure, but that was changed. You want a meritocracy that is bespoke and tailored to the individuals, you want to compensate people for alpha, not beta.“
Combs解释说，激励机制没有完美的设计方式。一方面，团队中的每个人都能拿到“超级碗戒指”；另一方面，你也要确保员工的报酬与他们能够影响的事情挂钩，而不是那些超出他们控制范围的事情。作为一家私营公司确实有帮助。Combs在上任后就调整了薪酬结构。“激励机制也可能引发不良行为，例如Wells Fargo的案例。任何好的东西，过度了都会变坏。GEICO过去是区域性结构，但后来被改变了。你希望的是一种量身定制的精英制度，你要奖励员工创造的alpha，而不是市场带来的beta。”
Public vs Private:
上市公司 vs 私营公司：
What does it take to be public and do the right thing?
要成为一家上市公司并且仍然做正确的事情，需要什么条件？
Combs says that you need to have the north star. Again, as was said earlier, founders usually have this concept best. Lay out the principles. Look at how you do things and why. Are you focused on style, or are you focused on substance? If you are outward focused, you’ll probably focus more on style.
Combs表示，你需要有一颗“北极星”。正如之前所说，创始人通常最理解这一点。要制定清晰的原则，审视你做事的方式以及原因。你是注重形式，还是注重实质？如果你的关注点更多是对外的，那你很可能会更注重形式。
够不够本分。
Haven: The Healthcare Joint Venture
Haven：医疗保健合资企业
Combs was involved in the joint venture with Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and JP Morgan’s Jamie Dimon to fix the healthcare system in the US. What was the mission, why was it dissolved, and what did Combs learn?
Combs参与了与Amazon的Jeff Bezos和JP Morgan的Jamie Dimon合作的合资企业，试图改善美国的医疗保健体系。其使命是什么？为什么会解散？Combs从中学到了什么？
Combs remarks that it was a lofty goal. The three partners decided they weren't making the progress they needed to keep it going. They each have a number of programs running internally that are like petri dishes, but the medical system in the US is a very entrenched system. COVID helped the digital disruption, which shows the environment can move much faster than you can control.
Combs表示，这是一个雄心勃勃的目标。三方合作伙伴决定没有取得足够的进展来维持该项目。他们各自内部都有一些类似“培养皿”的项目在进行，但美国的医疗体系根深蒂固。新冠疫情推动了数字化颠覆，这说明外部环境的变化速度远远超过你能掌控的范围。
Questions and Answers from the Audience - Highlights:
观众问答环节 —— 精选内容：
A question was asked how Combs thinks about selling a stock that may be fully valued vs its tax implications, and, on a different note, how he balances his time with being the CEO of GEICO and managing the portfolio?
有人问Combs如何看待出售可能已完全定价的股票与其税务影响，以及另一个问题：他如何平衡担任GEICO CEO和管理投资组合的时间？
Combs answered when Warren bought Burlington, he said he should have bought it long before he actually did. His great attribute is knowing when and how to adapt. Like the Keynes quote “the facts have changed, what did you do?” Most of us get more set in our ways. It’s part of being a learning machine to avoid that.
Combs回答说，当Warren买入Burlington时，他说自己早就应该买了。他的一个重要特质是知道何时以及如何调整。正如Keynes的名言：“事实已经改变了，你做了什么？” 我们大多数人会越来越固执于原有方式，而避免这种情况正是成为“学习机器”的一部分。
“Generally speaking, we (Berkshire) don’t pay a lot of attention to taxes. Some of it is bespoke. Some are compounders, vs return to par, which is cigar butts which we don’t usually do. Coke is more in the compounder category.“
“总体而言，我们（Berkshire）不会过于关注税收问题。有些投资是定制化的。有些是复利增长型的；另一些则是回到面值的‘烟蒂股’，而这是我们通常不做的。可口可乐更属于复利增长的类别。”
With respect to his time management, Combs said that he has a couple of jobs. From an allocation perspective, 100-110% at GEICO, 16-hour days there, and he does his investing at nights and weekends, which makes up approximately 25%, and finally bank board meetings and other is 25% (Combs sits on JP Morgan’s board which unlike a traditional company has 8 board meetings a year as opposed to 4).
关于时间管理，Combs表示自己身兼数职。从分配角度看，他在GEICO投入了100-110%的精力，每天工作16小时；投资工作安排在晚上和周末，占大约25%；最后还有银行董事会会议等事务，占25%（Combs在JP Morgan董事会任职，该董事会每年开8次会，不同于一般公司一年开4次）。
Bill Ackman asked if Combs could talk about Berkshire’s investment in Nubank. How did the idea come to Berkshire, how was it found, what was the nature of the due diligence, and how do you (Combs) think about its value?
Bill Ackman问Combs能否谈谈Berkshire在Nubank的投资。这一想法是如何传到Berkshire的？是怎么被发现的？尽职调查的性质如何？Combs又是如何看待它的价值的？
Combs didn’t really want to discuss any names in particular. So he asked Bill if there was something else he would like to ask. To which Bill responded by questioning the moral grounds of investing in a company that makes sugary beverages (Coca Cola or Pepsi) and does a great job showing skinny people playing volleyball on the beach while consuming their product. Then you look at Mexico City, cities around the world, and the penetration of soft drinks, and you get diabetes, obesity, fatty liver disease, etc. This company is effectively the Phillip Morris of this generation. These companies are causing a lot of harm and they are doing a really good job marketing it, you have to believe that at HQ they know what is going on.
Combs并不太愿意讨论任何具体公司的名字，所以他反问Bill是否还有其他问题。对此Bill追问投资一家生产含糖饮料的公司（如Coca Cola或Pepsi）的道德基础。这些公司在广告中极力展示身材苗条的人在沙滩上打排球并饮用其产品，但当你看看墨西哥城以及全球各大城市，软饮料的普及带来了糖尿病、肥胖、脂肪肝等问题。这样的公司实际上就是这一代的Phillip Morris。这些公司造成了很大的危害，但他们的营销做得极其出色，你不得不相信总部一定清楚这一切。
Combs wittingly began by saying that the first question looked more appealing now knowing hearing the second one. He also reminded everyone that Coca Cola is obviously not his name. However, Charlie got this question on Wells, and Charlie said something like “we have to invest in the world we live in, and not the world we want.,” “It’s a tough question. We used to have these questions on payday lending. But if you completely cut these things off, then people don’t have access to markets at all.” Combs acknowledged that he didn’t have an answer, and asked if Ackman asked Warren or Charlie?
Combs机智地说，现在听到第二个问题，才觉得第一个问题看起来更有吸引力。他还提醒大家，Coca Cola显然不是他挑选的投资对象。不过，Charlie当年被问到关于Wells的问题时曾说过类似的话：“我们必须投资于我们所处的世界，而不是我们想要的世界。” 这是一个艰难的问题。我们过去也被问过关于发薪日贷款的问题。但如果你完全切断这些东西，人们就完全无法进入市场。” Combs承认自己没有答案，并反问Ackman是否问过Warren或Charlie。
巴菲特解释过很多遍，糖给人带来的是快乐、正面的体验，正面是主因，而人性中的负面是不能根治的。
During times like this, a question about inflation was unavoidable. Someone asked what Comb’s thoughts were on the macro-outlook.
在这样的讨论中，通胀问题不可避免。有人问Combs对宏观前景的看法。
He reiterated that they don’t do macro, and they don’t predict the future at all. What they do instead is take the world they’ve been given in the present, without having to understand the future. They ask if inflation is secular or cyclical. (Warren and Todd were talking for hours this past Saturday and they didn’t talk about inflation for more than 30 seconds.) In a deflationary environment they would ask how this business would perform in 10% inflation. Never just extrapolate the current environment state. Cyclicals always look expensive at the bottom and cheap at the top. Always invert. Combs thinks about it like “a hot water faucet. Sometimes it takes some time to warm up and when you feel it you might gently scald your hand, the more inflation goes the more the Fed is going to be after it, and it can lead to recession. It works like a pendulum.”
他重申，他们不做宏观判断，也完全不预测未来。他们所做的，是接受当下的世界，而不是去理解未来。他们会问，通胀是长期性的还是周期性的。（上周六Warren和Todd聊了好几个小时，但关于通胀的话题不超过30秒。）在通缩环境中，他们会问：如果出现10%的通胀，这家企业会怎样表现？绝不要只是外推当前环境状态。周期性行业总是在底部看起来昂贵，而在顶部看起来便宜。一定要反向思考。Combs把通胀比作“热水龙头”。有时它需要一些时间才会变热，当你感觉到时可能会轻轻烫到手。通胀越高，美联储就会越紧追，最终可能导致衰退。它像钟摆一样运作。
Someone asked how Combs/Berkshire views overseas investments? And if the strength of the US Dollar changes things? Additionally, many businesses had to close down due to the Russian invasion. How do they think about geopolitical risks, internally to Berkshire and as an opportunity to buy foreign businesses?
有人问Combs/Berkshire如何看待海外投资？美元的强势是否会带来影响？此外，许多企业因俄罗斯入侵而被迫关闭。他们如何看待地缘政治风险——无论是Berkshire内部管理层面的，还是作为收购海外企业的机会？
Combs said the biggest issue is size. Many markets have few opportunities, Berkshire will look at them and they’ll have to assess those vs the opportunities it has here. There’s also a currency component when investing in other countries. Combs remarked how Berkshire may have missed some opportunities. With regard to Russia, the biggest overseas operation is Iscar, and in Russia its presence was relatively de-minimis. There might be changes in leadership and things can change, but it's definitely possible to have a large top ten stake in a large overseas company.
Combs表示，最大的问题是规模。很多市场机会有限，Berkshire会去看，但必须将其与美国国内的机会进行比较。同时，投资海外公司还涉及汇率因素。Combs提到Berkshire可能错过了一些机会。至于俄罗斯，Berkshire最大的海外业务是Iscar，而其在俄罗斯的存在相对微不足道。未来可能会出现领导层变动，事情可能会发生变化，但完全有可能在一家大型海外公司中持有前十大股东的股份。
Someone asked when Combs joined Berkshire, what were some of the things he looked to accomplish, how that’s going, professionally and personally.
有人问Combs刚加入Berkshire时，希望实现哪些目标？在职业和个人层面进展如何？
He responded that when he came to Berkshire, he took over Lou Simpson’s portfolio. Over time, after positive performance, he got a couple more billion. In the summer of 2011, the European market imploded. People were worried about Europe disbanding. He was strictly focused on the portfolio. He got a look at every deal that Warren did. In the 200 plus deals that came through to Berkshire every year.
他回答说，当他刚到Berkshire时，接管了Lou Simpson的投资组合。随着时间的推移，在取得正面业绩后，他又获得了几十亿美元的管理资金。2011年夏季，欧洲市场崩盘，人们担心欧洲解体。他当时全力专注于投资组合，也能看到Warren做的所有交易。每年有超过200个交易流入Berkshire。
With regard to what Combs wanted to accomplish, Combs said that he was wondering how to add value. He was hired to pick stocks, but Buffett was already pretty good at that. Buffett and Combs had many conversations about the paint industry that led into some things with operating companies. “I was not outcome oriented; I was just process oriented and trying to add value. With GEICO we want to be the #1 insurer, it’s compounded at 15% since Buffett bought it, I want to take it up a level.”
关于自己想实现的目标，Combs说，他当时在思考如何为Berkshire创造价值。他受聘的任务是选股，但Buffett本身已经非常擅长这一点。Buffett和Combs曾多次讨论涂料行业，这也引导到了一些与运营公司的相关事务。“我并不以结果为导向，而是以过程为导向，努力去增加价值。在GEICO，我们的目标是成为第一大保险公司。自从Buffett收购以来，它已经以15%的复合增长率发展，我希望把它提升到更高的水平。”
Someone said being in a room of a lot of people who started their careers at Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan what are some of the key takeaways Combs got from the state of Florida securities regulation division.
有人提到，现场很多人职业生涯是从Goldman、Morgan Stanley和JP Morgan起步的，而Combs是从佛罗里达州证券监管部门开始的。他从那里获得了哪些重要经验？
Combs graduated undergrad from Florida State. He said he didn’t have that option for investment banking, and further said the experience that he got was very robust and probably better than his friends at Arthur Anderson. Combs always wanted to be an investor but started his career working for the Florida State securities regulator. When he worked for the regulator, he worked on a case of insurance fraud. That introduced him to the parallels between insurance and investing. Additionally, at the time his friend was working for Progressive, and he loved it. Combs decided to try working directly in insurance and landed a job at Progressive. Later, Combs interned at a fund when he was at Columbia Business School, and he “was fortunate not to destroy value for people.” After graduating with an MBA, he got a job at a hedge fund and went on to start his own before coming to Berkshire.
Combs本科毕业于Florida State。他说自己没有机会进入投行，但在那里获得的经验非常扎实，可能比他在Arthur Anderson工作的朋友还要好。Combs一直想做投资人，但职业生涯最初是在佛罗里达州证券监管机构工作。在那里，他处理过一起保险欺诈案件，从而发现保险和投资之间的相似之处。此外，当时他的朋友在Progressive工作，他非常喜欢那份工作，于是Combs决定直接尝试进入保险行业，并最终加入Progressive。之后，Combs在Columbia Business School攻读MBA时曾在一家基金实习，并笑称自己“很幸运没有为别人毁掉价值”。毕业后，他进入一家对冲基金工作，后来创立了自己的基金，最终加入了Berkshire。
The final question asked was about their publicly listed competitor, Progressive, and how Combs/Berkshire competes?
最后一个问题是关于他们的上市竞争对手Progressive，以及Combs/Berkshire如何与之竞争？
Combs began by saying that he was really into data, and when he was at Progressive, they were doing things that have now become very popular. GEICO has also been very successful in the direct-to-consumer channel. GEICO used to be direct, like consumer banking, Progressive honed their chops in a sector that is more analogous to the commercial banking channel. All top ten insurers were formed prior to WWII. A lot of things have become much more challenging. Combs concluded that “We are investing in data and technology. We have lots of initiatives going on and they take time. We have a good infrastructure and a foundation of great people.”
Combs首先表示，他非常重视数据。当他在Progressive工作时，他们做的一些事情如今已变得十分流行。GEICO在直销渠道也非常成功。GEICO的模式类似于消费者银行的直销，而Progressive则在类似于商业银行渠道的领域磨炼出了优势。排名前十的保险公司全部成立于二战之前。如今，很多事情变得更加复杂和充满挑战。Combs最后总结道：“我们正在投资于数据和技术。我们有许多正在推进的项目，它们需要时间。我们拥有良好的基础设施和一支杰出的人才队伍。”
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