2024-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2024-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway

查理·芒格——伯克希尔·哈撒韦的建筑师

Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.
查理·芒格于11月28日逝世，距离他100岁生日仅33天。

Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959  when he was 35 that I first met him.  In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management.
尽管生于并成长于奥马哈，他却有80%的时间在外地定居。因此直到1959年、他35岁时我才第一次见到他。1962年，他决定涉足资产管理。

Three years later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.
三年后，他告诉我——准确无误！——我收购伯克希尔控股权的决定愚蠢至极。但他向我保证，既然我已经做出了这一举动，他会告诉我如何纠正错误。

In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.
以下所述须牢记一点：当时查理和他的家人并未在我所管理、并用其资金购买伯克希尔的那个小型投资合伙中投入哪怕一分钱。此外，我们俩都未曾预料到查理将来会持有伯克希尔的任何股份。

Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.
然而，1965年查理立即给我建议：“沃伦，别再买另一家像伯克希尔这样的公司。但既然你掌控了伯克希尔，就要以公道价格买入优质企业，放弃以极低价格购买一般企业。换句话说，抛开你从偶像本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切。那套方法确实有效，但仅适用于小规模操作。”虽然我多次倒退，但最终还是遵从了他的指示。

Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.
多年后，查理成为我共同经营伯克希尔的合伙人，每当我旧习复萌，他都屡次把我拉回理智。直至去世，他始终扮演这一角色，而我们与早期与我们共同投资的人所取得的成就也远超查理和我当初的梦想。

In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.
事实上，查理是今日伯克希尔的“建筑师”，而我则充当“总承包商”，日复一日地实现他的蓝图。

Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me  take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never – never –reminded me of my mistake.
查理从未想为自己作为创造者的角色邀功，而是让我站在台前接受掌声。从某种意义上说，他与我的关系既像兄长，又像慈父。即便知道自己是对的，他仍把缰绳交给我；当我犯错时，他从不——绝不——翻旧账。

In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.
在实体世界里，伟大建筑总与其建筑师紧密相连，而那些浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人却很快被人遗忘。伯克希尔已成长为一家伟大的公司。尽管长期以来我负责施工队，但查理应当永远被誉为这座大厦的建筑师。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
伯克希尔拥有超过三百万个股东账户。我每年都必须撰写一封信，旨在对这个多样且不断变化的股东群体有所帮助，其中许多人希望进一步了解自己的投资。

Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.
查理·芒格——数十年来与我共同管理伯克希尔的伙伴——对于这一责任与我看法一致，并且期望我今年仍以常规方式与诸位沟通。对于我们对伯克希尔股东的职责，他与我完全同心。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).
作者通常喜欢想象其所面向的读者，且往往希望吸引大众受众。在伯克希尔，我们的目标更为有限：那些把储蓄托付给伯克希尔、且并不打算转售的投资者（他们的心态更像是存钱去买农场或出租物业的人，而不是将闲钱投入彩票或“热门”股票的人）。
把钱种在地里，种下的每一块钱都能创造超过一块钱的价值。
Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年来，伯克希尔吸引了大量此类“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的存在，并相信他们有权每年直接从首席执行官而非永远灌输乐观与甜腻之辞的投资者关系官或公关顾问那里，听到公司好消息与坏消息。

In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.
在想象伯克希尔所寻求的股东形象时，我很幸运拥有一个完美的心理模型——我的妹妹伯蒂。让我来介绍她。

For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.
首先，伯蒂聪明、睿智，喜欢挑战我的思考。然而，我们从未发生过争吵或任何近乎关系破裂的事情，也绝不会有。

Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.
此外，伯蒂和她的三个女儿都将其大量储蓄投入伯克希尔股票。她们持股已跨越数十年，而伯蒂每年都会阅读我的来信。我的职责是预判她的疑问，并给出诚实的答案。

Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.
伯蒂和你们大多数人一样，懂得许多会计术语，但还不足以参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻——每天阅读四份报纸——却不认为自己是经济学专家。她理性——非常理性——本能地知道应当始终忽略所谓专家。毕竟，如果她真能可靠预测明日赢家，又怎么会毫无保留地分享宝贵见解、从而加剧竞争性买盘？那就像发现金矿后再把地图送给邻居一样。

Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
伯蒂明白激励的力量——无论好坏——也洞悉人性的弱点，以及观察人类行为时可识别的“暗示”。她知道谁在“推销”，谁值得信任。简而言之，她绝非傻瓜。

So, what would interest Bertie this year?
那么，今年什么会让伯蒂感兴趣呢？

Operating Results, Fact and Fiction

经营业绩：事实与虚构

Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.
先从数字说起。正式年报自 K-1 页起，长达 124 页，内容包罗万象——有些重要，有些琐碎。

Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.
在众多披露中，许多股东和财经记者都会盯住 K-72 页上的“底线”——“净利润（亏损）”。数据显示：2021 年为 900 亿美元，2022 年为（230 亿美元），2023 年为 960 亿美元。

What in the world is going on?
这到底是怎么回事？

You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 ”
你去寻求答案，得到的解释是：这些“收益”的计算程序由严谨且具权威的财务会计准则委员会（FASB）制定，由勤勉的证券交易委员会（SEC）强制执行，并由德勤（D&T）的世界级专业人士审计。在 K-67 页，德勤直言不讳：“在我们看来，这些财务报表在所有重大方面（斜体为我所加）公允地反映了公司……截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日止三年各年度的财务状况及经营成果……”

So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.
就这样，被“神圣化”的这组分毫无用的“净利润”数字通过互联网和媒体迅速传遍全球。所有相关方都认为自己已经尽责——从法律层面看，他们确实如此。

We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我们对此并不满意。在伯克希尔看来，“收益”应当是一个合乎理性的概念，让伯蒂觉得多少有用——但仅作为评估企业的起点。因此，伯克希尔亦向伯蒂和诸位披露我们称之为“经营利润”的指标。结果是：2021 年 276 亿美元；2022 年 309 亿美元；2023 年 374 亿美元。

The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
强制口径与伯克希尔偏好口径的主要差异在于，我们剔除了未实现资本盈亏——有时单日波动可超 50 亿美元。讽刺的是，这一做法在 2018 年前本是通行规则，直至“改进”被强制实施。几个世纪前伽利略的遭遇早已教会我们：别随意挑战“天条”。但在伯克希尔，我们可以固执一点。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
千万别低估资本利得的重要性：我预计，在未来几十年里，它们将是伯克希尔价值增长的关键组成部分。否则，我们又为何要像我终生用自有资金所做的那样，将你们（以及伯蒂）的巨额资金投入可交易股权？

I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
自 1942 年 3 月 11 日——我第一次买股票那天——起，我记不得有哪段时期我的净资产没有大部分配置在股票上，且均为美国股票。事实证明一切安好。那天，道琼斯工业平均指数曾跌破 100 点，我放学时账面已亏约 5 美元；很快形势逆转，如今指数徘徊在 38,000 点左右。美国始终是投资者的福地，他们要做的只是安静坐着，什么也别听。

It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”
然而，依据包含股市日复一日乃至年复一年反复无常波动的“收益”来判断伯克希尔的投资价值，绝非仅仅愚蠢而已。正如本·格雷厄姆教导我的那样：“短期而言，市场是投票机；长期来看，它是称重机。”

What We Do

我们的业务

Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring.
伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们希望完全或部分持有那些经济特性优良且根本而持久的企业。

Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
在资本主义体系中，某些企业可以长盛不衰，而另一些则终成陷阱。预测孰胜孰负比你想的更难；自称知道答案的人往往不是自我欺骗，就是在兜售蛇油。

At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.
在伯克希尔，我们尤其青睐那些未来能够以高回报持续投入新增资本的稀缺企业。只要拥有其中一家并耐心持有，便可能积累无法衡量的财富；即便继承人——呃！——有时也能因此安享一生。
保险。
We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.
我们也希望这类优质企业由能力出众且值得信赖的管理者掌舵，但这项判断更为艰难，伯克希尔在此方面也曾遭遇失望。

In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.
1863 年，美国首任货币监理署署长休·麦卡洛克向所有国民银行致函，其中警告道：“永远不要指望自己能防住恶棍的欺诈，还与其打交道。”无数自认为能“管得住”恶棍的银行家已领悟麦卡洛克的箴言——我亦然。看透人性并不容易，真诚与同理心极易伪装，如今与 1863 年别无二致。

This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.
收购企业时需要兼顾的这两项要素长期以来都是我们的目标，在相当长一段时间里，我们有充足的候选标的可供评估。我错过过不少标的，但总会有其他机会出现。

Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
那样的日子早已一去不复返；规模成了我们的掣肘，收购竞争加剧也是原因之一。

Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
伯克希尔如今拥有美国企业中迄今最高的 GAAP 账面净值。创纪录的经营利润与强劲的股市推动年末净值达到 5,610 亿美元。标普 500 其余 499 家公司的 GAAP 净值合计在 2022 年为 8.9 万亿美元（2023 年数据尚未统计，但不太可能超过 9.5 万亿美元）。

By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).
以此衡量，伯克希尔在其所处的整体领域中已占近 6%。在例如五年内将如此庞大的基数翻倍几乎不可能，尤其是我们极度排斥增发股份（那会立刻抬高净值）。

There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
美国境内仅剩寥寥数家公司能够真正撬动伯克希尔的体量，而它们已被我们和其他买家反复研究。有些我们能估值，有些不能；即便能估值，也必须价格诱人。美国以外基本不存在对伯克希尔具有重要资本配置意义的标的。总而言之，我们不可能再取得令人瞠目的业绩。

Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.
尽管如此，经营伯克希尔大多时候仍充满乐趣并且常有新意。积极的一面是，经过 59 年的积累，公司如今部分或全资拥有的多元业务在加权后整体前景略优于大多数大型美企。凭借运气与胆识，成百上千次决策中诞生了几个巨大的赢家。如今我们还拥有一小批资深经理人，他们从未萌生去意，也把 65 岁当作普通生日。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
伯克希尔受益于罕见的目标恒定与清晰。虽然我们强调善待员工、社区及供应商——谁又不想这样做呢？——但我们的忠诚永远献给国家和股东。我们始终记得：即便你的资金与我们的混合使用，它们依旧属于你。

With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.
基于这一重心，以及我们当前的业务组合，伯克希尔的表现应略优于美国企业平均水平，更重要的是，其永久性资本损失风险也应显著更低。至于超越“略优”则是奢望。当年伯蒂全情投入伯克希尔时并非如此——但如今确实如此。

Our Not-So-Secret Weapon

我们的并非秘密的武器

Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t happen often – but they will happen.
有时，市场和/或经济会导致一些基础优良的大型企业的股票和债券出现极度错误的价格。事实上，市场完全可能——也确实会——在毫无征兆时陷入停滞，甚至如 1914 年长达四个月、2001 年数日那样彻底消失。如果你认为当下的美国投资者比过去更稳定，请回想 2008 年 9 月。通信速度与技术奇迹令全球瞬间瘫痪，如今我们早已告别烽火传信的时代。这种瞬间恐慌不会经常发生——但必定会发生。

Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
伯克希尔能以巨额资金并确信执行力迅速应对市场停摆，这或许偶尔为我们带来大规模机遇。虽说如今股市规模远超我们创业初期，但当今活跃参与者的情绪稳定性或受教育程度并未比我上学时更高。不知出于何种原因，市场如今表现出更浓厚的赌场特征。赌场现已搬进许多家庭，每天诱惑其中的住户。

One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’ juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.
金融生活中有一条事实永远不应被遗忘。用比喻的说法，“华尔街”固然希望客户赚钱，但真正令其居民血脉偾张的是狂热的交易活动。在那样的时刻，凡是能推销的愚蠢东西都会被大肆推销——并非人人如此，却总有人如此。

Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.
有时，场面会变得丑陋。政客们随之震怒；最肆无忌惮的不端行为者富裕而全身而退；你的邻居朋友却困惑不解、更加贫穷，甚至心怀怨恨。他领悟到，金钱凌驾于道德之上。

One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.
伯克希尔的一条投资准则从未改变，也永不会变：绝不拿资本的永久性损失去冒险。得益于美国的顺风与复利的威力，只要在一生中做出几次正确决定并避免严重错误，我们所处的舞台过去是——未来也将是——回报丰厚的。

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I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.
我相信伯克希尔可应对超出既往任何规模的金融灾难，我们绝不会放弃这种能力。当经济动荡如约而至时，伯克希尔的目标是成为国家的资产——正如 2008-2009 年那样，在小范围内发挥过作用——帮助扑灭金融大火，而非成为无意或有意点燃大火的众多公司之一。

Our goal is realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA” is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.
我们的目标脚踏实地。伯克希尔的实力来源于其多元收益如尼亚加拉瀑布般在扣除利息、税费及大量折旧摊销后汇集（“EBITDA”在伯克希尔被禁用）。即便国家遭遇长期的全球经济疲软、恐慌或近乎停摆，我们仍能以极低的现金需求运转。

Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.
伯克希尔目前不支付股息，回购股票亦为 100% 自主决定；年度到期债务从来不具实质性规模。

Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.
公司还持有远超传统观点所需水平的现金与美国国库券。2008 年恐慌期间，伯克希尔依靠经营活动产生现金，并未在任何程度上依赖商业票据、银行授信或债务市场。我们从未预测经济停摆的时点，但始终为此做好准备。

Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
极端的财政保守是我们对伯克希尔股东作出的公司承诺。在大多数年份——甚至大多数十年——我们的谨慎可能被证明是不必要的，就像给自认为防火的堡垒买保险。但伯克希尔不愿对伯蒂或任何信任我们并投入储蓄的个人造成永久性财务伤害——长期行情缩水虽难避免。

Berkshire is built to last.
伯克希尔生而长存。

Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable

让我们感到安心的非控股业务

Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
去年，我提到了伯克希尔长期部分持股的两家公司——可口可乐和美国运通。这些投资不像我们的苹果持仓那样庞大，各自仅占伯克希尔 GAAP 净资产的 4-5%。但它们是有意义的资产，也体现了我们的思考方式。

American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.
美国运通始于 1850 年，可口可乐则于 1886 年在亚特兰大的药店问世。（伯克希尔并不热衷新生事物。）多年来，两家公司都曾尝试扩张到无关领域，但鲜有成功。过去——当然不是现在——它们甚至出现过管理不善。

But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
然而，两家公司在各自核心业务上都取得了巨大成功，并根据形势对业务进行适度调整。至关重要的是，它们的产品能够“走出去”。可口可乐和美国运通以及它们的核心产品都成为了全球知名品牌，而饮料消费和对无可置疑的金融信任的需求是世界永恒的基本要素。

During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.
在 2023 年，我们既未买入也未卖出美国运通或可口可乐的任何股份——延续了我们长达二十多年的“沉睡”策略。去年，两家公司再次以提升盈利和分红回报了我们的不作为。事实上，2023 年我们所分得的美国运通利润已远超我们当年 13 亿美元的购股成本。

Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
美国运通和可口可乐在 2024 年几乎肯定都会提高分红——美国运通大约提升 16%——而我们全年必定维持原有持股不动。难道我能打造出比这两家公司更好的全球性业务吗？正如伯蒂会告诉你的：“没门。”

Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.
虽然伯克希尔在 2023 年未增持这两家公司的股份，但由于我们进行了伯克希尔自身的股票回购，你对可口可乐和美国运通的间接持有量去年有所增加。这类回购能提升你对伯克希尔所持每项资产的参与度。对于这一显而易见却常被忽视的事实，我要再加一句老生常谈：所有股票回购都应以价格为依归。在低于内在价值时理智的行为，如若溢价进行便会变得愚蠢。

The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.
从可口可乐和美国运通得到的教训是什么？当你找到一家真正优秀的企业，就要坚持持有。耐心终有回报，一家卓越的企业足以抵消许多难免的平庸决策。

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This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.
今年，我想谈谈另外两项我们预计会长期持有的投资。与可口可乐和美国运通一样，这些投入相对于我们的资源并非庞大，但它们确实值得持有，我们也在 2023 年增持了这两家公司。

At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.
截至年末，伯克希尔持有西方石油 27.8% 的普通股，并持有一批可在五年多时间内以固定价格大幅增持的认购权证。尽管我们非常看重现有持股和这些期权，伯克希尔并无意收购或经营西方石油。我们尤其欣赏其在美国境内庞大的油气储量，以及在碳捕集领域的领先地位，虽然该技术的经济可行性尚待验证。这两项业务都符合美国的利益。

Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
不久之前，美国还严重依赖进口石油，碳捕集也几乎无人问津。事实上，1975 年美国日产油当量（“BOEPD”）仅为 800 万桶，远不能满足国内需求。美国从二战时期有利的能源地位退至对外部（可能不稳定）供应商高度依赖。那时普遍预测，国内产量将进一步下降，而未来需求将持续增加。
 
For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
长期以来，这种悲观似乎被验证为正确，到 2007 年产量已降至每日 500 万桶油当量（BOEPD）。与此同时，美国政府在 1975 年设立战略石油储备（SPR），以减轻——虽然远未能完全抵消——美国能源自给能力的侵蚀。

And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
然后——哈利路亚！——2011 年页岩油开发经济可行，我们的能源依赖宣告结束。如今，美国产量已超过每日 1,300 万桶油当量，欧佩克不再握有主动权。西方石油公司在美国的年产量每年几乎等同于 SPR 的全部库存。如果国内产量仍停留在每日 500 万桶油当量，并且极度依赖海外资源，美国今天将会非常非常紧张；一旦外部石油中断，SPR 可能在数月内耗尽。

Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在Vicki Hollub的领导下，西方石油正为国家和股东做正确的事情。没人能预测未来一月、一年或十年的油价走势，但Vicki懂得如何把石油从岩石里分离出来，这是一项罕见的才能，对股东和国家都极具价值。

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Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.
此外，伯克希尔继续被动长期持有五家大型日本公司的股份，这些公司多元化经营，与伯克希尔的经营模式颇为相似。去年，格雷格·阿贝尔与我赴东京与其管理层会谈后，增持了这五家公司的股份。

Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the year-end market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our year-end unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.
伯克希尔目前大约持有这五家公司各约 9% 的股份。（补充一点：日本公司计算在外流通股的方法与美国惯例不同。）伯克希尔已向各公司承诺不会将持股比例增至 9.9% 以上。我们对这五家公司的投资成本合计 1.6 万亿日元，年末市值 2.9 万亿日元。然而，近年来日元走弱，以美元计的期末未实现收益为 61%，约 80 亿美元。

Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a year-end gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.
格雷格和我都不认为自己能预测主要货币的市场价格，也不相信能雇到具备此能力的人。因此，伯克希尔以发行 1.3 万亿日元债券所得为日本投资提供了大部分融资。这些债券在日本市场颇受欢迎，我相信伯克希尔的未偿日元债务规模超过任何其他美国公司。日元走弱为伯克希尔带来了 19 亿美元的期末收益，按照 GAAP 规则，这部分收益在 2020-2023 年期间已分期计入利润。

In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.
在若干重要方面，伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友这五家公司采取的股东友好政策远优于美国企业的惯常做法。自我们开始买入日本股票以来，五家公司都以有吸引力的价格减少了流通股数量。

Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about one-third of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
与此同时，这五家公司的管理层在薪酬方面远不如美国同行那般激进。还需注意，五家公司仅将约三分之一的利润用于分红。它们保留的大量资金一方面用以扩展各自众多业务，另一方面也在一定程度上用于回购股份。与伯克希尔一样，这五家公司都不愿意发行新股。

An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
伯克希尔获得的另一项额外益处是，此次投资或许能让我们有机会与这五家规模庞大、管理良好且备受尊崇的公司在全球范围内合作。与我们相比，它们的业务领域要广阔得多。而对于日方而言，日本的首席执行官们也清楚，伯克希尔始终拥有庞大的流动资金，可随时为任何规模的合作提供支持。

Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我们对日本公司的建仓始于 2019 年 7 月 4 日。鉴于伯克希尔如今的体量，通过公开市场买入建立头寸需要极大的耐心和持续的“友好”价格。整个过程如同调转一艘战列舰，这是伯克希尔早期所未曾面对的重要劣势。

The Scorecard in 2023

2023年的成绩单

Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
我们每个季度都会发布新闻稿，以类似于下方所示的方式披露我们的简明经营收益（或亏损），以下为全年汇总：



At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
在 2023 年 5 月 6 日的伯克希尔年度大会上，我首先报告了当日清晨发布的第一季度业绩，并简要概述了全年展望：（1）大多数非保险业务在 2023 年的利润将下滑；（2）这一降幅将由两大非保险业务——BNSF 和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）——的稳健表现所抵消，这两家公司在 2022 年合计贡献逾 30% 的经营利润；（3）由于伯克希尔持有的大量美国国库券终于开始带来远高于往昔的收益，投资收入势必大幅增长；（4）保险业务预计表现良好，既因为其承保利润与宏观经济其他领域无明显相关性，更由于财产意外险价格上行。

Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
保险业务如预期般表现出色；然而，我对 BNSF 和 BHE 的预期均出现了偏差。下面我们逐一探讨。

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Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路对美国经济的未来至关重要。从成本、燃料消耗与碳强度衡量，它无疑是将重载货物运往远方的最高效方式。短途运输卡车更具优势，但美国人所需的诸多物资必须远距甚至跨洲运达。没有铁路，国家运转难以为继，而这一行业对资本的需求始终巨大。与大多数美国企业相比，铁路是个“吞金兽”。

BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
BNSF 是覆盖北美六大铁路系统中规模最大的运营商。其资产负债表上记录的固定资产包括 23,759 英里的主干线、99 座隧道、13,495 座桥梁、7,521 台机车及其他资产，总账面价值 700 亿美元。但我估计，要重建这些资产至少需 5,000 亿美元，并要耗费数十年。

BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.
BNSF 每年仅为维持现有业务水平，就必须投入超过折旧费用的资金。无论投资于何种行业，这对所有者都是不利的；而在资本密集型产业中尤其如此。

At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $1.5 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
自 14 年前收购以来，BNSF 每年超出 GAAP 折旧额的资本支出累计已达 220 亿美元，平均每年逾 15 亿美元。唉！这种差额意味着，除非经常性增加负债，否则 BNSF 向伯克希尔——其所有者——分配的股息将大幅低于其账面利润。而我们并不打算提高铁路的债务水平。

Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.
因此，伯克希尔在购入价格基础上获得了尚可的回报，但实际收益低于表面数据，更远低于资产重置价值的回报。对此，我及伯克希尔董事会并不意外，也正因如此我们才得以在 2010 年以远低于重置成本的价格收购 BNSF。

North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
北美铁路系统承担着煤炭、粮食、汽车及进出口货物等大量单程长距运输，这些行程常导致回程空载带来的收入难题。极端天气频繁限制甚至阻断轨道、桥梁与设备的运用，洪水更是一场噩梦。这一切都不足为奇。与我在舒适办公室里工作不同，铁路运输是一项露天作业，许多员工在艰苦乃至危险的条件下工作。

An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
一个渐显的问题是，越来越多的美国人不愿接受铁路工作中艰苦且常带孤独感的环境。火车司机必须面对这样一个现实：在 3.35 亿人口中，总有人选择卧轨自杀，而满载百节车厢的重型列车制动距离少说也要一英里以上。你愿意成为那位无能为力的司机吗？在北美，这样的悲剧几乎每日发生一次；在欧洲更为普遍，且将长期存在。

Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.
铁路行业的工资谈判最终可能交由总统和国会裁决。此外，美国铁路每天必须运输大量危险品，这是业内本想规避却不得不承担的职责。“公共承运人”四字，界定了铁路的义务。

Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
去年，随着收入下滑，BNSF 的盈利降幅超出我的预期。尽管燃料成本同步下降，但华盛顿颁布的加薪幅度远高于全美通胀目标。此类差距今后的劳资谈判中或将再次出现。

Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
虽然 BNSF 的货运量和资本支出均高于北美其他五大铁路，但自我们收购以来，其利润率相对这五家有所下滑。我认为公司庞大的服务范围首屈一指，因此利润率比较有望且应当得到改善。

I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.
我尤为自豪的是，BNSF 对国家的贡献，以及那些在北达科他和蒙大拿寒冬零下环境中工作、保障美国商业动脉畅通的员工。铁路正常运转时鲜有关注，可一旦停摆，全国都会立刻感受到缺口。

A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
一个世纪之后，BNSF 依旧会是美国和伯克希尔的重要资产。这一点毋庸置疑。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii).  In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
去年，我们遭遇的第二个、且更为严重的盈利失望发生在伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）。其大部分电力公用事业以及庞大的天然气管网的表现大体符合预期，但少数州的监管环境却带来了零盈利甚至破产的阴影（加州最大的公用事业公司已出现此状况，夏威夷目前亦面临该威胁）。在这些司法管辖区里，预测利润和资产价值都十分困难，而电力公用事业曾被视为全美最稳定的行业之一。

For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through  a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（有时因卓越表现可获小幅奖励）筹集巨额资金，以支撑其扩张。凭借这种模式，企业得以提前进行大规模投资，以满足数年后可能出现的需求。这种前瞻性监管体现了公用事业建设发电与输电资产通常需要多年才能完工的现实。BHE 在美国西部跨多州的输电巨型工程始于 2006 年，目前距完工尚需数年；最终，该线路将服务于占美国本土面积 30%、横跨 10 个州的广大地区。

With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory- return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
在私营和公营电力系统均采取这一模式的情况下，即便人口增长或工业需求超出预期，电网依旧稳定运行。这种“安全边际”方法在监管者、投资者和公众看来皆属理性。然而，如今少数州已打破这一“固定且合理回报”的契约，投资者担心此局面会蔓延。气候变化令忧虑加剧——地下输电或成必需，但在几十年前，谁愿意承担其惊人的建设成本？

At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已对已发生损失作出最佳估算。这些损失源于森林火灾；若对流风暴愈发频繁，其发生频率与强度均将继续上升。

It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
要想了解 BHE 因森林火灾造成的最终损失，并据此理性决定未来是否在西部易受灾州继续投资，还需要很多年时间。目前尚不清楚其他地区的监管环境是否会发生变化。

Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is   risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司或将遭遇与太平洋煤电公司及夏威夷电力公司类似的生存困境。如果现有问题以“没收式”结局收场，对 BHE 显然不利，但 BHE 与伯克希尔本身的架构都足以承受突发冲击。我们的保险业务经常面对此类意外——其核心产品本就是承担风险——其他领域亦难免发生。伯克希尔能承受财务冲击，却不会明知无望仍继续砸钱。

Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to  adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will  decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔如何，电力行业的最终局面或许令人担忧：部分公用事业公司可能再无法吸引美国民众的储蓄，被迫转向公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 20 世纪 30 年代便已作此选择，全国也有众多公共电力机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们偏好的模式。
在 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条时期，内布拉斯加州决定 全面放弃以股东盈利为目的的私营电力公司（private-power systems），转而由公共机构或非营利合作社来拥有和运营电力系统，即采纳 public-power model。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当尘埃落定时，美国对电力的需求及其引发的资本支出将达到惊人规模。我当初既未预见、更未考虑监管回报的不利变化，与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两位合作伙伴一样，这一忽视让我付出了昂贵的代价。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from \$17 million to \$83 billion – we have much room to grow.
说完问题，让我们谈点好消息：我们的保险业务去年表现十分出色，在保费收入、浮存金规模及承保利润方面均创下纪录。财产意外保险（“P/C”）构成伯克希尔兴旺成长的核心。我们从事该业务已达 57 年，业务规模虽已扩大近 5,000 倍——从 1,700 万美元增至 830 亿美元——但仍有广阔的成长空间。

Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
此外，我们也——常常是以痛苦的代价——充分认识到哪些险种和哪些人应当敬而远之。最重要的一课是：我们的核保员可以瘦也可以胖，男性女性、年长年轻、本土或外籍都无妨，但在办公桌前他们绝不能做乐观主义者，尽管乐观在生活中通常可取。

Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
P/C 业务中的意外——即便在六个月或一年期保单到期数十年后仍可能发生——几乎一律是坏消息。行业会计制度旨在体现这一现实，但估损误差可能极大。一旦掺杂骗子，揭露往往既缓慢又代价高昂。伯克希尔始终力求准确估计未来赔付，但货币通胀与“法律通胀”都是不可控的变数。

I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
关于我们的保险业务故事我已讲过无数次，新读者可直接翻到第 18 页。此处只想重申：若非阿吉特·贾恩于 1986 年加入伯克希尔，我们绝无今日成就。那幸运日到来之前——除了自 1951 年初与 GEICO 开启、并将永续的美妙合作——我在创建保险业务的过程中几乎一直如在荒野摸索。

Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.
阿吉特加盟后取得的成就，离不开我们各 P/C 业务中众多才华横溢的保险高管的支持。他们的姓名与面孔鲜为媒体和公众所识，但在 P/C 保险领域，伯克希尔这支管理队伍堪比棒球界库珀斯敦名人堂级别。

Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
伯蒂，你大可欣慰：你所持有的这一卓越 P/C 业务现已遍及全球，拥有无与伦比的财力、声誉与人才。2023 年，它功不可没。

What is it with Omaha?

奥马哈究竟有什么魔力？

Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.
欢迎参加2024年5月4日的伯克希尔年度大会。届时，舞台上将出现三位如今肩负掌舵公司重任的经理人。你或许会好奇：他们三人有什么共同之处？外表显然各不相同。让我们深入挖掘。

Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.
格雷格·阿贝尔负责伯克希尔所有非保险业务——无论怎样，他都已随时可以出任伯克希尔的首席执行官。格雷格出生并成长于加拿大（至今仍打冰球）。然而在1990年代，格雷格曾在奥马哈居住六年，距离我家仅数个街区。在那段时间里，我与他从未谋面。

A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
约在更早十几年之前，出生、成长并受教育于印度的阿吉特·贾恩和家人住在奥马哈，离我1958年以来的住所不到一英里。尽管阿吉特和妻子廷库已搬至纽约三十余年（因再保险业务多在纽约进行），他们仍在奥马哈拥有众多朋友。

Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
今年的舞台上将缺少查理的身影。他和我都出生在奥马哈，距离你们五月聚会所在的座位约两英里。查理的前十年在伯克希尔长期办公地点半英里之内度过。我和查理都在奥马哈的公立学校接受早期教育，我们的童年深深烙印着奥马哈。然而，我们相遇得很晚。（如果你感到惊讶，这里有个脚注：查理经历了美国45位总统中的15位。人们称拜登为第46任总统，但这一计数把两任非连任的格罗弗·克利夫兰算作第22任和第24任。美国仍是一个非常年轻的国家。）

Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.
从公司层面看，伯克希尔在新英格兰扎根81年后，于1970年迁至奥马哈，在新家抛却旧忧并蓬勃发展。

As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
“奥马哈效应”还有一个收尾：伯蒂——没错，就是那位伯蒂——在奥马哈的中产阶级社区度过了塑造人格的早年，几十年后成长为美国最出色的投资者之一。

You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你也许以为她把所有钱都投进伯克希尔并一动不动。但事实并非如此。1956年成家后，伯蒂在理财上活跃了20年：持有债券，将三分之一资金投入上市共同基金，并频繁交易股票。她的潜力当时无人发觉。

Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).
1980年，46岁的伯蒂在未受兄长任何建议的情况下决定行动。她只保留了共同基金和伯克希尔的持仓，之后43年再未进行任何交易。在这期间，她变得非常富有，即便捐出了巨额善款（九位数级别）。

Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
数以百万计的美国投资者本可遵循她的逻辑——这不过是她孩提时代在奥马哈某种方式吸收的常识。为稳妥起见，伯蒂每年五月都会重返奥马哈，为自己充电。

* * * * * * * * * * * *
So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?
那么，这一切是怎么回事？是奥马哈的水？奥马哈的空气？还是类似催生牙买加短跑选手、肯尼亚马拉松跑者或俄罗斯国际象棋高手的奇异行星现象？难道我们得等到未来的人工智能来破解这个谜题？

Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.
保持开放心态。五月来奥马哈，呼吸此地空气，饮一口此地之水，向伯蒂和她貌美的女儿们问好。谁知道会发生什么？绝无坏处，无论如何，你都会玩得尽兴，结识大量友善的人们。

To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack.
此外，《穷查理宝典》第四版亦将上市。

Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.
不妨买一本。查理的智慧正如改变我的人生一般，也将改变你的人生。


February 24, 2024 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

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