17. We don’t know how to value Intel and Microsoft
我们不知道如何评估英特尔和微软
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 11, please.
沃伦·巴菲特: 请第十一区提问。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, I would like to thank you again for issuing the Class B shares.
观众: 是的,巴菲特先生,我再次感谢您发行了B类股票。
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Well, I’m glad we did, and I hope you own them.
沃伦·巴菲特: (笑)我很高兴我们这么做了,我希望您拥有这些股票。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a Class B shareholder.
观众: 我是一名B类股股东。
I need your comment on some analysis that we did. If someone uses your investment philosophy of building a highly concentrated portfolio of six to eight stocks, and adopts your buy-and-holding principle so that the max of compounding and no tax works for you, but however, with one major modification: invest in high-octane companies like Intel and Microsoft that are growing at 30 percent, instead of typical 15 percent growth company in your portfolio.
我们进行了一些分析。如果有人采用您的投资哲学,建立一个高度集中的投资组合,包含6到8只股票,并采用您的长期持有原则,这样可以最大化复利效应且免于缴税,但有一个主要修改:投资于像英特尔和微软这样的高增长公司,它们的增长率是30%,而不是您投资组合中典型的15%的增长公司。
My question is, will this investment philosophy translate into twice the shareholder return as you have historically provided to your shareholders?
我的问题是,这种投资哲学是否会转化为您历史上为股东提供回报的两倍?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, it will certainly work out to twice the return if Intel and Microsoft do twice as well as Coke and Gillette. I mean, it’s a question of being able to identify businesses that you understand and feel very certain about.
沃伦·巴菲特: 是的。如果英特尔和微软的表现是可口可乐和吉列的两倍,那么回报肯定也会是两倍。这主要取决于是否能够识别出您理解并非常确信的业务。
And if you understand those businesses, and many people do, but Charlie and I don’t, you have the opportunity to evaluate them. And if you decide they’re fairly priced and they have marvelous prospects, you’re going to do very well.
如果您理解这些业务,很多人确实理解,但查理和我不理解,那么您就有机会去评估它们。如果您认为它们的价格合理且前景光明,那么您会表现得非常出色。
But there’s a whole group of companies, a very large group of companies, that Charlie and I just don’t know how to value. And that doesn’t bother us. I mean, you know, we don’t know what — we don’t know how to figure out what cocoa beans are going to do, or the Russian ruble, or I mean, there’s all kinds of financial instruments that we just don’t feel we have the knowledge to evaluate.
但是,有一大类公司,确实是很大的一类公司,查理和我不知道该如何评估。而这并不会困扰我们。我的意思是,比如我们不知道可可豆的价格走势,也不知道俄罗斯卢布会如何表现,还有各种各样的金融工具,我们觉得自己没有足够的知识去评估它们。
And really, you know, it might be a little too much to expect that somebody would understand every business in the world.
确实,期望有人能够理解全世界的每一个行业可能有点过分。
And we find some that are much harder for us to understand. And when I say understand, my idea of understanding a business is that you’ve got a pretty good idea where it’s going to be in ten years. And I just can’t get that conviction with a lot of businesses, whereas I can get it with relatively few. But I only need a few. As you’ve pointed out, you only need a few, six or eight or something like that.
我们发现有些行业对我们来说非常难以理解。而我所说的“理解”是指你对一个企业十年后的状况有一个相当清晰的预判。而对于很多企业,我无法得到这种信心,而对于少数企业,我可以。但我只需要少数几个企业。正如你提到的,你只需要少数几个,比如六到八个这样的企业。
It would be better for you — it certainly would have been better for you — if we had the insights about what we regard as the somewhat more complicated businesses you describe, because there was and may still be a chance to make a whole lot more money if those growth rates that you describe are maintained.
如果我们对你所描述的那些稍微复杂一些的企业有更多的洞察力,这对你来说会更好——肯定会更好。因为如果这些增长率能够保持,那么确实有机会赚到更多的钱,现在可能仍然有这样的机会。
But I don’t think they’re — I don’t think you’ll find better managers than Andy Grove at Intel and Bill Gates at Microsoft. And they certainly seem to have fantastic positions in the businesses they’re in.
但我不认为——我不认为你能找到比英特尔的安迪·格罗夫(Andy Grove)和微软的比尔·盖茨(Bill Gates)更优秀的管理者。而且他们似乎确实在各自的领域中占据了极好的位置。
But I don’t know enough about those businesses to be as sure that those positions are fantastic as I am about being sure that Gillette and Coca-Cola’s businesses are fantastic.
但对于这些企业,我并没有足够的了解,无法像确信吉列和可口可乐的业务一样,确信它们的地位是如此的出色。
You may understand those businesses better than you understand Coke and Gillette because of your background or just the way your mind is wired. But I don’t, and therefore I have to stick with what I really think I can understand. And if there’s more money to be made elsewhere, I think the people that make it are entitled to it.
由于你的背景或思维方式,你可能比了解可口可乐和吉列更了解那些企业。但我不是,因此我必须坚持投资我真正认为可以理解的业务。如果其他地方可以赚更多的钱,我认为那些赚到钱的人是应得的。
Charlie?
查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if you take a business like Intel, there are limitations under the laws of physics which eventually stop your putting more transistors on a single chip. And the 30 percent per annum, or something like that, you — I don’t think — those limitations are still a good distance away, but they’re not any infinite distance away.
查理·芒格: 以英特尔这样的公司为例,物理定律设定了一些限制,这些限制最终会阻止你在单个芯片上放置更多的晶体管。至于30%的年增长率之类的情况,我认为——这些限制还比较遥远,但并不是无限遥远的。
That means that Intel has to leverage its current leadership into new activities, just as IBM leveraged the Hollerith machine into the computer. Predicting whether somebody’s going to be able to do that in advance is just — it’s too tough for us.
这意味着英特尔必须将其当前的领先地位扩展到新的活动中,就像IBM将霍勒瑞斯打孔机(Hollerith machine)扩展到计算机领域一样。提前预测某人是否能够做到这一点——对我们来说,这太难了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce —
沃伦·巴菲特: 鲍勃·诺伊斯——
CHARLIE MUNGER: We could (inaudible) to you.
查理·芒格: 我们可以(听不清)。
WARREN BUFFETT: Bob Noyce, one of the two founders of — two primary founders — of Intel, grew up in Grinnell, Iowa. I think he’s the son of a minister in Grinnell, and went through Grinnell College and was chairman of the board of trustees of Grinnell when I went on the board of Grinnell back in the late ’60s.
沃伦·巴菲特: 鲍勃·诺伊斯是英特尔的两位主要创始人之一,他在艾奥瓦州的格林内尔长大。我记得他是格林内尔一位牧师的儿子,就读于格林内尔学院,并在我于60年代末加入格林内尔董事会时,担任学院董事会主席。
And when he left Fairchild to form Intel with Gordon Moore, Grinnell bought 10 percent of the private placement that funded — was the initial funding for Intel.
当他离开仙童公司(Fairchild)与戈登·摩尔(Gordon Moore)共同创立英特尔时,格林内尔购买了英特尔初始私募资金的10%。
And Bob was a terrific guy. He was very easy to talk to, just as Bill Gates is. I mean, these fellows explained the businesses to me, and they’re great teachers but I’m a lousy student. And they — I mean, they really do. They’re very good at explaining their businesses.
鲍勃是一个了不起的人。他非常平易近人,就像比尔·盖茨一样。我是说,这些人向我解释他们的业务,他们是很棒的老师,但我是个糟糕的学生。他们确实是非常擅长解释他们的业务。
Bob was a very down to earth Iowa boy who could tell you the risks and tell you the upside, and enormously likeable, a hundred percent honest, every way.
鲍勃是一个非常脚踏实地的艾奥瓦州男孩,他会告诉你风险和潜力。他非常讨人喜欢,完全诚实,方方面面都是如此。
So we did buy 10 percent of the original issue. The genius that ran the investment committee and managed to sell those a few years later, I won’t give you his name. (Laughter)
因此,我们确实购买了最初发行的10%。至于那个领导投资委员会并在几年后卖掉这些股份的天才,我就不说他的名字了。(笑声)
And there’s no prize for anybody that calculates the value of those shares now.
顺便说一下,现在谁要是计算这些股份的价值,是没有奖品的。
Incidentally, one of the things Bob was very keen on originally, in fact he was probably the keenest on it, was he had some watch that Intel was making. And it was a fabulous watch, according to Bob.
顺便说一下,鲍勃最初非常热衷的一件事,实际上他可能最为热衷的,是英特尔当时制作的一款手表。据鲍勃说,这是一款了不起的手表。
It just had one problem. We sent a guy out from Grinnell who was going out to the West Coast to where Intel was. And Bob gave him one of these watches. And when he got back to Grinnell he wrote up a report about this little investment we had, and he said, “These watches are marvelous.” He said, “Without touching anything, they managed to adapt to the time zones as they change as we went along.” In other words, they were running very fast, as it turned out. (Laughter)
不过它有一个问题。我们从格林内尔派了一个人到西海岸英特尔的所在地。鲍勃给了他一块这样的手表。当他回到格林内尔时,他写了一份关于我们这笔小投资的报告。他说:“这些手表太棒了。”他说:“不用动任何东西,它们就能自动适应我们经过的时区变化。”换句话说,事实证明,它们走得非常快。(笑声)
And they worked with that watch for about five or six years, and they fell on their face.
他们花了五到六年时间研究那款手表,结果以失败告终。
And as you know, you know, they had a total transformation in the mid-’80s when the product on which they relied also ran out of gas. So, it’s not —
大家知道,在80年代中期,他们依赖的产品也失去了动力,于是他们进行了彻底的转型。所以,这并不是——
And Andy Grove has written a terrific book, incidentally, Only the Paranoid Survive, which describes strategic inflection points. I recommend that every one of you read that book, because it is a terrific book.
顺便说一下,安迪·格罗夫写了一本非常棒的书——《只有偏执狂才能生存》,书中描述了战略拐点。我建议你们每个人都去读这本书,因为它确实很好。
But they had an Andy Grove there who made that transformation, along with some other people. But that doesn’t happen every time. Companies get left behind.
但他们有安迪·格罗夫和其他一些人一起完成了转型。不过,这种事情并不是每次都会发生。公司会被落下。
恰恰说明这是一项非常艰难的生意,微软有同样的经历。
We don’t want to be in businesses where companies — where we feel companies can be left behind. And that means that, you know — and Intel could have, and almost did, go off the tracks. IBM owned a big piece of Intel, as you know, and they sold it in the mid-’80s.
我们不希望进入那些我们认为可能会被落后的行业。这意味着,英特尔曾经——几乎确实——脱轨了。你们知道,IBM曾经拥有英特尔的大量股份,但他们在80年代中期卖掉了。
So, you know, here are a bunch of people that should know a lot about that business but they couldn’t see the future either.
所以,你看,这些人应该对那个行业非常了解,但他们也看不到未来。
I think it’s very tough to make money that way, but I think some people can make a lot of money understanding those kinds of businesses. I mean, there are people with the insights.
我认为靠那种方式赚钱非常困难,但我也认为有些人可以通过理解那类业务赚很多钱。我的意思是,有些人确实有这种洞察力。
Walter Scott, one of our directors, has done terrifically with a business that started, you know, just a gleam in the eye maybe ten or 12 years ago here in Omaha, and it turned into a huge business.
我们的董事之一沃尔特·斯科特,在一家业务上取得了巨大的成功。这家业务大约在十到十二年前从奥马哈萌芽,后来发展成了一个巨大的企业。
And you know, Walter explained that to me on the way down to football games, but bad student again, so — (Laughs)
沃尔特曾在我们去看橄榄球比赛的路上向我解释过这个业务,但我还是一个差学生,所以——(笑声)
Walter — if Walter could have connected, and you know, I’d cheer from the stands. But that doesn’t bother me at all. I mean, what would bother me is if I think I understand a business and I don’t. That would bother me.
如果沃尔特能理解,我会在看台上为他欢呼。但这对我来说根本没有困扰。真正会困扰我的是,如果我认为我理解一个业务,但实际上并没有,那才会困扰我。
Charlie?
查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, having flunked when we were young and strong at understanding some complex businesses, we’re not looking to master what we earlier failed at — (laughs) — in our latter years. (Laughter)
查理·芒格: 我们年轻力壮的时候,就已经在理解一些复杂业务上失败了,现在年纪大了,我们可不打算重新掌握那些我们之前没搞懂的东西。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 12? This may turn out like a revival meeting where we all confess our sins and come forward (inaudible). (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特: 第十二区?这可能会像一个忏悔大会,大家都来承认自己的过错并站出来(听不清)。(笑声)
2013年,一家德国建筑公司的工人注意到他们的施乐复印机有些不对劲:当他们复制一个房屋的平面图时,复印件与原件存在微妙但重要的差异。在原始平面图中,每个房间都伴随着指定其面积的矩形:三个房间的面积分别为14.13、21.11和17.42平方米。然而,在照片复制品中,所有三个房间都被标记为大小为14.13平方米。该公司联系了计算机科学家David Kriesel调查这个看起来难以置信的结果。他们需要一位计算机科学家,因为现代施乐复印机不使用在1960年代流行的物理静电复印过程。相反,它数字扫描文档,然后打印生成的图像文件。再加上几乎每个数字图像文件都被压缩以节省空间,这个谜团的解决方案就开始浮现。
压缩文件需要两个步骤:首先是编码,其中文件被转换为更紧凑的格式,然后是解码,即将过程反转。如果恢复的文件与原文件相同,则压缩过程被描述为无损:没有丢失任何信息。相比之下,如果恢复的文件只是原始文件的近似值,则压缩被描述为有损:一些信息已经丢失,现在无法恢复。无损压缩通常用于文本文件和计算机程序,因为这些领域中,即使一个字符不正确都可能具有灾难性。有损压缩通常用于照片、音频和视频,在这些情况下,绝对准确性并不是必要的。大多数情况下,即使图像、歌曲或电影不是完美重现,我们也不会注意到。只有在文件被压缩得非常紧凑时,我们才会注意到所谓的压缩伪像:最小jpeg和mpeg图像的模糊程度,或低比特率MP3的尖锐声音。
施乐复印机使用一种名为jbig2的有损压缩格式,专为黑白图像设计。为了节省空间,复印机识别图像中外观相似的区域,并为所有区域存储一个副本;当文件被解压缩时,它重复使用该副本来重构图像。结果发现,复印机认为标记房间面积的标签足够相似,只需要存储一个标签“14.13”,并在打印平面图时将其重复使用于三个房间。
施乐复印机使用有损压缩格式而不是无损压缩格式本身并不是问题。问题在于复印机以微妙的方式降低了图像质量,压缩伪像并不是立即可识别的。如果复印机只是产生模糊的打印输出,每个人都会知道它们不是原件的准确复制品。导致问题的是,复印机产生的数字是可读但不正确的;复制品似乎是准确的,但实际上并不是。(2014年,施乐发布了一个修补程序来解决这个问题。)
我认为这个关于施乐复印机的事件值得我们今天牢记,因为我们考虑OpenAI的ChatGPT和其他类似的程序,这些程序被人工智能研究人员称为大型语言模型。复印机和大型语言模型之间的相似之处可能并不立即显现,但请考虑以下情况。想象一下,您即将永久失去对互联网的访问权限。为此,您计划创建整个网络上所有文本的压缩副本,以便将其存储在私有服务器上。不幸的是,您的私有服务器只有所需空间的百分之一;如果想让所有内容都适合,您就不能使用无损压缩算法。相反,您编写了一种有损算法,该算法识别文本中的统计规律并将它们存储在一种专门的文件格式中。由于您可以投入几乎无限的计算能力来完成此任务,因此您的算法可以识别非常微妙的统计规律,从而实现所需的100:1压缩比率。
现在,失去互联网访问权限并不太可怕;您在服务器上存储了网络上的所有信息。唯一的问题是,由于文本已经被高度压缩,您无法通过搜索确切的引用来查找信息;您永远不会得到完全匹配,因为存储的不是单词。为了解决这个问题,您创建了一个接口,以问题的形式接受查询,并用传达您服务器上内容要旨的答案进行响应。
我描述的情况听起来很像ChatGPT,或者说是大多数其他大型语言模型。将ChatGPT视为网络上所有文本的模糊JPEG。它保留了网络上的大部分信息,就像jpeg保留了更高分辨率图像的大部分信息一样,但是,如果您正在寻找确切的比特序列,您将找不到它;您将得到的一直是近似值。但是,由于近似值以语法文本的形式呈现,而ChatGPT擅长创建这种文本,因此通常是可以接受的。您仍然在查看模糊的jpeg,但是模糊之处以一种不会使整个图像显得不太清晰的方式发生。
这种与有损压缩的类比不仅是了解ChatGPT在使用不同的单词重新包装网络上的信息方面的能力的一种方式。它也是理解大型语言模型(如ChatGPT)容易出现“幻觉”或对事实问题的无意义回答的一种方式。这些幻觉是压缩伪像,但是——就像施乐复印机生成的不正确标签一样——它们是足够合理的,以至于需要将它们与原始数据进行比较,这在这种情况下意味着网络或我们自己对世界的了解。当我们以这种方式考虑它们时,这些幻觉并不令人惊讶;如果压缩算法旨在在丢弃99%的原始数据后重构文本,我们应该预计它生成的重要部分将是完全捏造的。