I.H.19.Warren Buffett.Financial companies

1、《2001-04-28 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

46. Why Berkshire sold its Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae stakes

为什么伯克希尔出售了房地美和房利美的股份

WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3, please.

沃伦·巴菲特：请三号提问区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Steve Sondheimer. I live in Chicago and I’m 14 years old. I’m a third generation shareholder and my question is, I noticed that you sold our position in Freddie Mac. What risks do you see in that industry?

观众：我叫史蒂夫·桑德海默，来自芝加哥，今年14岁。我是第三代股东，我的问题是，我注意到您卖掉了我们在房利美（Freddie Mac）的持股。您认为这个行业有什么风险？

WARREN BUFFETT: Are you Joe’s granddaughter?

沃伦·巴菲特：你是乔的孙女吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah.

观众：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, good. We have an amazing number of second and third and even fourth generation shareholders, which I’m delighted with. I mean, I don’t think lots of companies — big companies on the stock exchange — are in that position.

沃伦·巴菲特：哦，太好了。我们有很多第二代、第三代甚至第四代的股东，这让我非常高兴。我想，很多上市大公司都不太会出现这样的情况。

It is true, we sold the Freddie Mac stock last year. And there were certain aspects of the business that we felt less comfortable with as they unfolded — and Fannie Mae, too.

的确，我们去年卖掉了房利美的股票。随着一些业务发展，我们对它的某些方面感到不太放心——房地美（Fannie Mae）也是如此。

And the consequences of what we saw may not hurt the companies, I mean, at all. But they made us less comfortable than we were earlier, when, actually, those practices or activities didn’t exist.

我们观察到的情况可能并不会对这些公司造成损害，但它们让我们感到不如之前那样安心，尤其是当时这些做法或活动尚不存在时。

We did not — I would stress — we did not sell because we were worried about more government regulation of Freddie and Fannie. If anything, just the opposite, so —

我必须强调，我们并不是因为担心房利美和房地美面临更多政府监管而卖掉它们的股票。恰恰相反——

It was not — it was not — Wall Street occasionally will react negatively to the prospect of more government regulation and the stocks will react sometimes short-term for that reason. But that was not our reason. We were — we felt the risk profile had changed somewhat.

并不是这样——华尔街有时会对政府监管预期做出负面反应，导致股票短期波动。但这并不是我们的理由。我们是因为感觉风险状况发生了一些变化。

Charlie?

查理，你怎么看？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, but that may be a peculiarity of ours. We are especially prone to get uncomfortable around financial institutions.

查理·芒格：是的，但这可能是我们的一个特点。我们对金融机构特别容易感到不安。

WARREN BUFFETT: We’re quite sensitive to —

沃伦·巴菲特：我们对风险非常敏感——

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.

查理·芒格：没错。

WARREN BUFFETT: — risk in — whether it’s in banks, insurance companies or in what they call GSEs here, in the case of Freddie and Fannie.

沃伦·巴菲特：无论是银行、保险公司，还是像房利美和房地美这样的政府支持企业（GSEs），我们都对风险十分敏感。

We feel there’s so much about a financial institution that you don’t know by looking at just figures, that if anything bothers us a little bit, we’re never sure whether it’s an iceberg situation or not.

我们认为，金融机构有很多东西是无法仅从财务数据中了解的。如果有什么让我们稍微感到不安，我们就无法确定这是否会是“冰山”现象。

And that doesn’t mean it is an iceberg situation, in the least, at banks or insurance companies that we pass.

但这并不意味着我们放弃的银行或保险公司就一定存在问题。

But we have seen enough of what happens with financial institutions that push one way or another, that if we get some feeling that that’s going on, we just figure we’ll never see it until it’s too late anyway.

不过，我们见过太多金融机构因某种推动而出问题的情况。如果我们有这种感觉，我们就会认为，等我们真正看到问题时已经太晚了。

So we bid adieu without — and wish them the best — without any implication that they’re doing anything wrong. It’s just that we can’t be 100 percent sure of the fact they’re doing things that we like.

所以我们选择道别，并祝他们一切顺利——这并不意味着他们做错了什么。只是我们无法百分之百确定他们在做我们喜欢的事情。

And when we get to that situation, it’s different than buying into a company with a product or something, or a retail operation. You could spot troubles usually fairly early in those businesses. You spot troubles in financial institutions late. It’s just the nature of the beast.

在这种情况下，这与购买产品公司或零售业务的股票有所不同。在那些行业里，你通常可以很早发现问题。而在金融机构里，你往往发现得太迟。这就是其固有的特点。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Financial institutions tend to make us nervous when they’re trying to do well. (Laughter)

查理·芒格：是的，当金融机构试图表现出色时，它们反而会让我们感到紧张。（笑声）

That sounds paradoxical, but that’s the way it is.

这听起来有些矛盾，但事实就是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: Financial institutions don’t get in trouble by running out of cash in most cases. Other businesses, you can spot that way.

沃伦·巴菲特：在大多数情况下，金融机构不会因为现金短缺而出问题。其他行业则可以通过这种方式早早发现麻烦。

But a financial institution can go beyond the point — and we had banks 10 years ago that did that, en masse — but they can go beyond the point of solvency even while they still have plenty of money around.

但金融机构可以在看似资金充裕时，早已超过了偿债能力的极限。10年前，我们见过银行集体陷入这种情况。

2、《2005-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

41. Don’t blame the ratings agencies

不要责怪评级机构

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4.

沃伦·巴菲特：第四位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Bill Ackman from New York, New York.

观众成员：谢谢。比尔·阿克曼，来自纽约，纽约。

Four of the handful of triple-A rated companies — AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and MBIA — are under formal investigation for accounting shenanigans and are in the process of restating their financials.

四家获得三A 评级的公司——AIG、房利美、房地美和 MBIA——正因会计违规行为接受正式调查，并正在重新编制其财务报表。

Like Charlie said before, I think of a triple-A rated company as an exemplar, a company that should behave with the highest accounting and ethical standards.

正如查理之前所说，我认为一家三 A 级公司是一个典范，一家公司应该以最高的会计和道德标准行事。

My questions this leads me to are, how can investors comfortably invest in any financial service company when even — when a decent percentage of the triple-A rated companies have false and misleading financials?

我的问题是，投资者如何能放心地投资于任何金融服务公司，即使是那些获得三 A 级评级的公司中也有相当一部分存在虚假和误导性的财务信息？

And I guess the follow-up question is, why don’t the rating agencies do some independent due diligence from an accounting standpoint so that they can help serve as a watch on this issue?

我想接下来的问题是，为什么评级机构不从会计角度进行一些独立的尽职调查，以便帮助监督这个问题呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, financial companies are more difficult to analyze than many companies.

沃伦·巴菲特：嗯，金融公司比许多公司更难分析。

I mean, the — it is more — if you take the insurance business, you know, the biggest single element that is very difficult to evaluate, even if you own the company, is the loss and loss adjustment expense reserve.

我的意思是，——更——如果你看保险业务，你知道，即使你拥有公司，最难评估的最大单一因素是损失和损失调整费用准备金。

And that has a huge impact on reported earnings of any given period. And the shorter the period, the more the impact can be from just small changes in assumptions.

这对任何特定时期的报告收益都有巨大影响。而且，时间越短，来自假设的小变化对报告利润的影响可能越大。

You know, we carry, we’ll say 45 billion of loss reserves. But, you know, if I had to bet my life on whether 45 billion turned out to be a little over or a little under, I mean, it’d be a — I’d think a long time.

你知道，我们持有，我们会说 450 亿的损失准备金。但是，你知道，如果我必须赌上我的生命来判断 450 亿是多了一点还是少了一点，我的意思是，我会考虑很长时间。

And you could just as easily have a figure of 45 1/2 billion or 44 1/2 billion. And if you were concerned about reporting given earnings in a given period, that would be an easy game to play.

你同样可以得到 455 亿或 445 亿的数字。如果你关心在特定时期报告特定收益，那将是一个容易玩的游戏。

In a bank, you know, it basically is whether the loans are any good. And I’ve been on the boards of banks. And that’s — you know, I’ve gotten surprises. It’s tough to tell.

在银行，你知道，基本上就是贷款是否良好。我曾在银行的董事会任职。我也遇到过一些意外。这很难判断。

It’s — financial companies — if you’re analyzing something like WD-40, you know, or See’s Candy, or our brick business, or whatever, you know, they may have good or bad prospects but you’re not likely to be fooling yourself much about what’s going on currently. But with financial institutions, it’s much tougher.

这是——金融公司——如果你在分析像 WD-40、See's Candy 或我们的砖块业务之类的东西，你知道，它们可能有好的或坏的前景，但你不太可能在当前的情况上自欺欺人。但是对于金融机构来说，这要困难得多。

Then you add — throw in derivatives on top of it, and, you know, it’s — no one probably knows, you know, perfectly, what some of the — or even within a reasonable range — the exact condition of some of the biggest, you know, banks in the world.

然后你再加上——在此基础上加入衍生品，而且，你知道，可能没有人确切知道，一些——甚至在合理范围内——世界上一些最大银行的确切状况。

And — but that brings you back to the due diligence question of the agencies. You had very high-grade, very smart — financially smart — people on the boards of both Freddie and Fannie. And yet, you know, one was five billion and one was apparently nine billion.

这就回到了对机构尽职调查的问题。你在房利美和房地美的董事会中都有非常高素质、非常聪明——在财务上非常聪明——的人。然而，你知道，一个是五十亿，另一个显然是九十亿。

Those are big numbers. And I don’t think those people were negligent. And it’s just, it’s very, very tough to know precisely what’s going on in a financial institution.

那些数字很大。我不认为那些人是疏忽的。要准确了解金融机构中发生的事情是非常非常困难的。

Charlie and I were directors of Salomon [Brothers]. And Charlie was on the audit committee. And I forget the size of a few of those things that you found. But, you know, what wasn’t found — and that doesn’t mean that people below are crooks or anything like that.

查理和我是所罗门兄弟公司的董事。查理是审计委员会的成员。我忘记了你发现的那些事情的具体规模。但是，你知道，未被发现的事情——这并不意味着下面的人是骗子或类似的东西。

It just means that it’s very tough with thousands and thousands and thousands of complicated transactions, sometimes involving — the computations involving — multiple variables, it can be very hard to figure out where things stand at any given moment.

这只是意味着在成千上万的复杂交易中，有时涉及多个变量的计算，可能很难在任何给定时刻弄清楚事情的状况。

And, of course, when the numbers get huge on both sides, and you get small changes in these huge numbers, they have this incredible effect on quarterly or yearly figures because it all comes lumped in — those adjustments — come lumped in a short period of time.

当然，当双方的数字都变得巨大时，即使这些巨大数字有微小的变化，也会对季度或年度数据产生巨大影响，因为所有这些调整都会集中在短时间内。

So I just think you have to accept the fact that insurance, banking, finance companies — we’ve seen all kinds of finance company — both frauds and just big mistakes over time — of just one after another over the years.

所以我认为你必须接受这样一个事实，即保险、银行、金融公司——我们见过各种各样的金融公司——多年来接连不断地出现欺诈和重大错误。

And the — it’s just a more dangerous field to analyze. It doesn’t mean you can’t make money in it. We’ve made a lot of money on it. But it’s difficult.

而且——这只是一个更危险的领域来分析。这并不意味着你不能在其中赚钱。我们在这上面赚了很多钱。但这很困难。

Now, obviously a GEICO, where you’re insuring pretty much the same thing — auto drivers — and you get — your statistics are much more valid in something like that than they will be if you’re taking something that — like asbestos liability — you’re subject to far greater errors in estimation.

现在，很明显在像 GEICO 这样的公司中，你基本上为相同的东西——汽车驾驶员——投保，你得到的统计数据在这种情况下要比在处理像石棉责任这样的事情时更为有效，因为后者在估算中容易出现更大的误差。

Doesn’t mean that people aren’t operating in good faith. But, you know, I would take — just take the asbestos estimates of the 20 largest insurance companies. I will bet you they’re way off, but I don’t know in which direction. And that’s sort of the nature of financial companies.

这并不意味着人们不是在善意行事。但是，你知道，我会拿——就拿 20 家最大保险公司的石棉估算来说。我敢打赌他们的估算大错特错，但我不知道是哪个方向。这就是金融公司的本质。

I wouldn’t fault the rating agencies in terms of not being able to dig into the financials and find things that —

我不会责怪评级机构无法深入财务状况并发现问题——

You know, all of the companies that you’ve talked about have had big name auditors. And our auditors at Berkshire, how many hours did they spend last year?

你知道，你提到的所有公司都有知名的审计师。而我们在伯克希尔的审计师，去年花了多少小时？

You know, I don’t know whether — what it would be, probably 60, 70,000 hours. And I’m sure at other — you know, if you take major banks, they’re spending more than that. But, you know, can they be certain of the numbers? I doubt it.

你知道，我不知道会是多少，可能是六万到七万小时。我确信其他——你知道，如果你看主要银行，他们花费的时间比这还多。但是，你知道，他们能确定这些数字吗？我对此表示怀疑。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Warren is obviously correct that where you’ve got complexity, which by its very nature provides better opportunities to be mistaken and not have it come to notice, or to be fraudulent and have it not be found out, you’re going to get more fraud and mistakes than you are if you’re selling a business where you shovel sand out of the river and sell it by the truckload.

查理·芒格：是的。沃伦显然是正确的，当你有复杂性时，这种复杂性本质上提供了更多的机会让错误不被注意到，或者进行欺诈而不被发现，你会比在经营一个从河里铲沙然后按卡车出售的生意中遇到更多的欺诈和错误。

And just as a business that sells natural gas is going to have more explosions than a business that sells sand, a business like these major financial institutions, by its nature, is going to have way more problems.

就像销售天然气的企业比销售沙子的企业更容易发生爆炸一样，这些大型金融机构这样的企业，因其性质，必然会有更多的问题。

And that will always be true. And it’s true when the financial institutions are owned by governments.

这将永远是真实的。当金融机构由政府拥有时，这也是事实。

In fact, some of the worst financial reporting in the world is done by governments and governments — institutions like government banks in China, et cetera.

事实上，世界上一些最糟糕的财务报告是由政府和政府机构完成的，比如中国的国有银行等。

So, if you don’t like the lack of perfect accounting in financial institutions, you’re in the wrong world.

所以，如果你不喜欢金融机构中不完美的会计，那么你就处在错误的世界里。

I.H.19.Warren Buffett.Financial companies

I.H.19.Warren Buffett.Financial companies

1、《2001-04-28 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

2、《2005-04-30 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

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