51. “It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts”
“重要的不是市场份额,而是心智份额”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1 again.
沃伦·巴菲特: 再次到第一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Assail (PH) from New York City.
听众: 我是来自纽约市的迈克·阿塞尔(音)。
Could you explain a little more about what you call the “mind of the consumer” and the “nature of the product” and explain how you actually apply these concepts to find the companies with the growing demand and the best investment potential? And thank you for being two of the greatest professors I’ve ever had.
您能否详细解释一下您所说的“消费者心智”和“产品的本质”,以及您如何实际应用这些概念来寻找具有增长需求和最佳投资潜力的公司?感谢你们二位成为我遇到过的最伟大的老师。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks. (Applause)
沃伦·巴菲特: 谢谢。(掌声)
You know, what you really — when you get into consumer products, you’re really interested in finding out — or thinking about — what is in the mind of how many people throughout the world about a product now, and what is likely to be in their mind five or ten or 20 years from now?
你知道,当你研究消费品时,你真正感兴趣的是了解——或思考——世界上有多少人现在对某种产品的看法是什么,以及五年、十年或二十年后,他们对该产品的看法可能会是什么。
Now, virtually every person on the globe — maybe, well, let’s get it down to 75 percent of the people on the globe — have some notion in their mind about Coca-Cola. They have — the word “Coca-Cola” means something to them. You know, RC Cola doesn’t mean anything to virtually anyone in the world, you know, it does to the guy who owns RC, you know, and the bottler.
目前,几乎全球的每个人——或者说,让我们将范围缩小到全球75%的人——对可口可乐都有某种看法。对他们来说,“可口可乐”这个词有着某种意义。而RC可乐几乎对世界上的任何人都没有意义,除了拥有RC可乐的人和装瓶商。
But everybody has something in their mind about Coca-Cola. And overwhelmingly, it’s favorable. It’s associated with pleasant experiences.
但是每个人对可口可乐都有某种看法。而且绝大多数情况下,这种看法是积极的。它与愉快的体验联系在一起。
Now, part of that is by design. I mean, it is where you are happy. It is at Disneyland, at Disney World. And it’s at ballparks. And it’s every place that you’re likely to have a smile on your face, including the Berkshire Hathaway meeting I might add. (Laughter)
这其中有一部分是精心设计的。它存在于让你感到快乐的地方,比如迪士尼乐园、迪士尼世界。它也出现在球场上,以及其他任何可能让你面带微笑的地方,包括我可以补充的伯克希尔哈撒韦股东大会。(笑声)
And that position in the mind is pretty firmly established. And it’s established in close to 200 countries around the world with people.
这种心智中的定位已经非常牢固地建立起来了。而且这种定位在全球近200个国家的人们心中都已形成。
A year from now, it will be established in more minds. And it will have a slightly, slightly, slightly different overall position. In ten years from now, the position can move just a little bit more.
一年之后,它将在更多人的心中扎根。整体定位会有轻微的、非常轻微的变化。十年后,这种定位可能会再稍微发生一点变化。
It’s share of mind. It’s not share of market. It’s share of mind that counts.
关键在于心智份额,而不是市场份额。重要的是心智份额。
Disney, same way. Disney means something to billions of people. And if you’re a parent of a couple young children and you got 50 videos in front of you that you can buy, you’re not going to sit down and preview an hour and a half of each video before deciding what one to stick in front of your kids. You know, you have got something in your mind about Disney. And you don’t have it about the ABC Video Company. Or you don’t even have it about other — you don’t have it about 20th Century. You know, you don’t have it about Paramount.
迪士尼也是一样。迪士尼对数十亿人来说有着特别的意义。如果你是有两个小孩的家长,面前有50部可以购买的视频,你不会花时间去预览每一部视频的90分钟内容来决定给孩子看哪部。你对迪士尼有印象,但对ABC视频公司却没有印象。甚至对其他公司,比如二十世纪影业或者派拉蒙,也没有相同的印象。
So that name, to billions of people, including lots of people outside this country, it has a meaning. And that meaning overwhelmingly is favorable. It’s reinforced by the other activities of the company.
所以这个名字,对包括很多外国人在内的数十亿人来说,有其特定的意义。这种意义是积极的,并且通过公司其他活动得到了强化。
And just think of what somebody would pay if they could actually buy that share of mind, you know, of billions of people around the world. You can’t do it. You can’t do it by a billion-dollar advertising budget or a $3 billion advertising budget or hiring 20,000 super salesmen.
想想看,如果有人真的可以购买这种“心智份额”,即获得全球数十亿人的认知,他们会付出什么代价?这是买不到的。你用十亿美元、甚至三十亿美元的广告预算,或者雇用两万名超级销售员,也做不到。
So you’ve got that. Now, the question is what does that stand for five or ten or 20 years from now? You know they’ll be more people. You know they’ll be more people that have heard of Disney. And you know that there will always be parents that are interested in having something for their kids to do. And you know that kids will love the same sort of things.
所以你已经拥有了这一点。现在的问题是,这种意义在五年、十年或二十年后将代表什么?你知道会有更多人。你知道会有更多人听说迪士尼。而且你知道父母总是希望为孩子寻找一些事情做。你也知道孩子们会喜欢同样的东西。
And, you know, that — (Munger accidentally knocks over his microphone) — what’s? (Laughter)
然后,你知道,这——(芒格不小心碰倒了他的麦克风)——怎么了?(笑声)
He emphasizes the key points when we get to those. (Laughter)
他总是在关键点上加以强调。(笑声)
But that is what you’re trying to think about with a consumption product. That’s what Charlie and I were thinking about when we bought See’s Candy. I mean, here we were. It’s 1972. You know, we know a fair amount about candy. I know more than when I sat down this morning. (Laughs)
但这就是你在考虑消费品时需要思考的问题。这也是查理和我在1972年购买See’s糖果时所考虑的。我是说,当时我们知道不少关于糖果的事情。我现在可能比今天早上坐下时知道得更多了。(笑声)
I mean, I had about 20 pieces already. (Laughter)
我已经吃了大约20块了。(笑声)
But, you know, what — whose, you know — does their face light up on Valentine’s Day, you know, when you hand them a box of candy and say, you know, it’s some nondescript thing and say, “Here, honey, I took the low bid,” you know, or something of the sort, and — (Laughter)
但是,你知道,当你在情人节递给他们一盒糖果时,他们的脸上会绽放笑容吗?而且你还说,“亲爱的,这是一种毫不起眼的糖果,我挑了最便宜的。”(笑声)
No. I mean, you want something — you know, you’ve got tens of millions of people — or at least many millions of people — that remember that the first time they handed that box of candy, it wasn’t that much thereafter that they got kids for the first time or something.
当然不是。我是说,你想要的是某种东西——比如,你有成千上万,甚至至少数百万的人记得,他们第一次递给对方那盒糖果后没多久,就有了第一个孩子之类的事情。
So it’s — the memories are good. The association’s good.
所以这是——美好的记忆和联想。
Total process. It isn’t just the candy. It’s the person who takes care of you at Christmastime when they’ve been on their feet for eight hours, and people have been yelling at them because they’ve been in line with 50 people in line, and that person still smiles at them.
整个过程。它不仅仅是糖果。还有那个圣诞节时照顾你的员工,他们已经站了八个小时,还有排着50人长队向他们大喊的顾客,但他们仍然对你微笑。
The delivery process. It’s the shop in which they get all kinds of things, the treat we give them. It’s all part of the marketing personality.
交付过程也是一部分。从他们进入商店、获取各种物品,到我们为他们提供的款待,这一切都是营销个性的一部分。
But that position in the mind is what counts with a consumer product. And that means you have a good product — a very good product — it means you may need tons of infrastructure, because you’ve got to have that — I had a case of Cherry Coke awaiting me at the top of the Great Wall when I got there in China. Now that — you’ve got to have something there so that the product is there when people want it.
但对于消费品来说,关键是心智中的定位。这意味着你需要一个好的产品——非常好的产品——同时,你可能需要大量的基础设施支持。比如,当我到达中国长城顶端时,有一箱樱桃可乐在那里等着我。你需要确保产品在消费者需要时能够随时到达。
And that happened — in World War II, General Eisenhower, you know, said to Mr. Woodruff that he wanted a Coca-Cola within arm’s length of every American serviceman in the world. And they built a lot of bottling plants to take care of that.
二战期间,艾森豪威尔将军告诉伍德拉夫先生,他希望全世界每个美国士兵都能随手喝到可口可乐。于是,他们建立了许多装瓶厂来满足这一需求。
That sort of positioning can be incredible. It seems to work especially well for American products. I mean, people want certain types of American products worldwide, you know, our music, our movies, our soft drinks, our fast food.
这种定位是非常强大的。尤其对美国产品特别有效。全球范围内,人们对某些类型的美国产品有极大的需求,比如我们的音乐、电影、软饮料和快餐。
You can’t imagine, at least I can’t, a French firm or a German firm or a Japanese firm having that — selling 47 or 48 percent of the world’s soft drinks. I mean, it just doesn’t happen that way. It’s part of something you could broadly call an American culture. And the world hungers for it.
你无法想象,至少我无法想象,一个法国公司、德国公司或日本公司能够做到这一点——占据全球47%或48%的软饮料市场。这种情况不会发生。这是你可以广义上称之为“美国文化”的一部分,而全世界都渴望它。
And Kodak, for example, probably does not have quite the same — and George Fisher’s doing a great job with the company. This goes back before that.
比如说,柯达可能不再拥有同样的地位——尽管乔治·费舍尔在领导公司时做得很棒。这种变化早在那之前就开始了。
But Kodak probably does not have the same place in people’s mind worldwide quite as it had 20 years ago. I mean, people didn’t think of Fuji in those days, we’ll say, as being in quite the same place.
但柯达在全球人们心中的地位可能不如20年前那么牢固。比如说,那时人们并不认为富士在市场上的地位与柯达相当。
And, then, Fuji took the Olympics, as I remember, in Los Angeles. And they just — they put them — they pushed their way to more of a parity with a Kodak. And you don’t want to ever let them do that.
后来,我记得富士赞助了洛杉矶奥运会。通过这种方式,他们逐渐提升自己的地位,接近了柯达的水平。而你绝不能让竞争对手做到这一点。
And that’s why you can see a Coca-Cola or a Disney and companies like that doing things that you think, well, this doesn’t make a hell of a lot of sense. You know, if they didn’t spend this $10 million, wouldn’t they still sell as much Coca-Cola?
这就是为什么你会看到像可口可乐或迪士尼这样的公司做一些看起来没什么意义的事情。比如,如果他们不花这1000万美元,难道他们就不会卖出同样多的可口可乐吗?
But, you know, that — I quoted from that 1896 report of Coca-Cola and the promotion they were doing back then to spread the word. You never know which dollar’s doing it. But you do know that everybody in the world, virtually, has heard of your product. Overwhelmingly, they’ve got a favorable impression on them and the next generation’s going to get it.
但你知道,我曾引用过1896年可口可乐的一份报告,描述了当时他们为了推广品牌所做的宣传活动。你永远不知道哪一美元的投入起到了作用。但你知道,几乎全世界的人都听说过你的产品。他们大多数对你的品牌有正面的印象,而下一代人也会延续这种印象。
So that’s what you’re doing with consumer products.
这就是你在消费品领域需要做的事情。
With See’s Candy, you know, we are no better — we want — no better than the last person who’s been served their candy or the last product they’ve been served.
对于See’s糖果来说,我们的声誉仅仅取决于最后一个购买糖果的顾客,或是最后一次提供的产品质量。
But as long as we do the job on that, people can’t catch us. You know, we can charge a little more for it because people are not interested in taking the low bid. And they’re not interested in saving a penny a bottle on colas. Remember we’ve talked about in these meetings, private labels, in the past.
只要我们把工作做到位,别人就无法赶上我们。你知道,我们可以多收一点钱,因为人们对选择最低价格并不感兴趣。他们也不愿意为了每瓶可乐省一分钱而选择替代品。记得我们在这些会议上谈过私人品牌的问题。
And private label has stalled out in the soft drink business. They want the real thing. And 900 and some odd million eight-ounce servings will be served today of Coca-Cola product around the world. Nine-hundred million, you know. And it’ll go up next year, the year after. And I don’t know how you displace companies like that.
私人品牌在软饮料行业已经停滞不前。消费者想要的是正品。今天,可口可乐的产品在全球范围内将提供超过9亿份8盎司的饮料。9亿份!明年还会更多,后年也会更多。我不知道你如何取代这样的公司。
茅台镇的各种假茅台。
I mean, if you gave me a hundred billion dollars — and I encourage if any of you are thinking about that to step forward — (laughter) — if you gave — and you told me to displace the Coca-Cola Company as the leader in the world in soft drinks, you know, I wouldn’t have the faintest idea of how to do it. And those are the kind of businesses we like.
我的意思是,如果你给我1000亿美元——如果有人真考虑这样做,我欢迎你站出来——(笑声)——你让我用这笔钱取代可口可乐成为全球软饮料的领导者,我根本不知道该怎么做。而这种企业正是我们喜欢的类型。
Charlie?
查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the See’s Candy example has an interesting teaching lesson for all of us.
查理·芒格: 是的,我认为See’s糖果的例子对我们所有人来说有一个有趣的启示。
Warren said we were — it’s the first time we really stepped up for brand quality. And it was a very hard jump for us. We’d been used to buying dollar bills for fifty cents.
沃伦说,这是我们第一次真正重视品牌质量。这对我们来说是一个非常大的飞跃。在此之前,我们习惯以五十美分的价格购买价值一美元的资产。
And the interesting thing was that if they had demanded an extra $100,000 for the See’s Candy company, we wouldn’t have bought it. And that was after Warren had been trained under the greatest professor of his era, and had worked 90 hours a week.
有趣的是,如果他们对See’s糖果的报价再多10万美元,我们就不会买下它。这是在沃伦接受了他那个时代最伟大的教授的训练,并且每周工作90小时之后发生的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT: And eaten a lot of chocolates, too. (Laughs)
沃伦·巴菲特: 还吃了很多巧克力。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Absorbing everything in the world. I mean, we just didn’t have minds well enough trained to make an easy decision right. And by accident, they didn’t ask the extra $100,000 for it. And we did buy it. And as it succeeded, we kept learning.
查理·芒格: 是的,吸收了世界上的一切知识。但我想说,我们的思维训练得还不够好,无法轻松做出正确的决定。碰巧的是,他们没有多要那10万美元,于是我们买下了它。随着它的成功,我们不断学习。
I think that shows that the name of the game is continuing to learn. And even if you’re very well-trained and have some natural aptitude, you still need to keep learning.
我认为,这表明关键在于持续学习。即使你受过良好训练,并且有一些天赋,你仍然需要不断学习。
And that brings along the delicate problem people sometimes talk about: two aging executives. (Laughter)
这也带来了人们有时会提到的一个微妙问题:两个年事已高的高管。(笑声)
I don’t know what the hell that means as an adjective because I don’t know anybody that is going in the other direction. (Laughter and applause)
我不知道“年事已高”这个形容词究竟是什么意思,因为我从没见过有人在朝相反的方向前进。(笑声和掌声)
But you people who hold shares are betting, for a while at least, until younger successors come along, you’re betting to some extent on what we’ll now tactfully continue to call “aging executives” continuing to learn.
但是你们这些持有股票的人,至少在一段时间内,直到年轻的继任者出现为止,你们某种程度上是在押注我们这些“年事已高的高管”能够继续学习。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, if we hadn’t have bought See’s, with some subsequent developments after that because that made us aware of other things, we wouldn’t have bought Coca-Cola in 1988. I mean, you can give See’s a significant part of the credit for the, I guess, $11 billion-plus profit we’ve got in Coca-Cola at the present time.
沃伦·巴菲特: 是的,如果我们没有买下See’s糖果,而在此之后的某些发展使我们意识到了其他事情,我们在1988年就不会买下可口可乐。我想说,可口可乐目前超过110亿美元的利润,有很大一部分功劳可以归于See’s糖果。
And you say, “Well, how could you be so dumb as not to be able to recognize a Coca-Cola?” Well, I don’t know, but —
你可能会问,“你怎么会这么愚蠢,以至于看不出可口可乐的价值?”嗯,我也不知道,但——
CHARLIE MUNGER: You were only drinking about 20 cans a day.
查理·芒格: 毕竟你每天只喝了大约20罐而已。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Right. It wasn’t that I hadn’t been exposed to it, or — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特: 是的,没错。这不是因为我没有接触过它,或者——(笑声)
It’s amazing. But it just made us start thinking more. I mean, we saw how decisions we made in relation to See’s played out in a marketplace and that sort of thing.
这很令人惊讶。但这确实让我们开始更多地思考。我的意思是,我们看到我们与See’s相关的决策在市场上是如何发挥作用的,以及类似的事情。
And we saw what worked and didn’t work. And it made us appreciate a lot what did work and shy away from things that didn’t work. But it led — it definitely led to a Coca-Cola. And we’ve had the good luck to buy some businesses themselves in their entirety that taught us a lot.
我们看到什么有效,什么无效。这让我们非常感激那些有效的事情,同时避免无效的事情。但这确实引导我们走向了可口可乐。而且我们很幸运,能够完全买下某些业务,而这些业务教会了我们很多东西。
You know, we bought — and it’s worked in the other direction. I mean, we were in the windmill business, one time. I was. Charlie stayed out of the windmill business. But I was in the windmill business and pumps and — third-level department — or second-level — department stores.
你知道,我们也曾向相反的方向尝试过。比如,有一次我们进入了风车业务。我参与了,查理则避开了风车业务。我还进入了泵业,以及三线或二线百货商店的业务。
And I just found out how tough it was and how it didn’t — you could apply all kinds of energy to them. And it didn’t do any good. It made a great deal of sense to figure out what pond to jump in. And what pond you jumped in was probably more important than how well you could swim.
我发现这些业务有多难,无论你投入多少精力都没有效果。选择跳进哪片池塘是非常重要的,甚至比你游泳技巧有多高超更为重要。
Charlie?
查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t think it’s necessary that people be as ignorant as we were, as long as we were. (Laughter)
查理·芒格: 我认为人们不必像我们一样在那么长时间里表现得那么无知。(笑声)
I think American education could be better, but not in the hands of any of the people who are now teaching. (Laughter)
我认为美国的教育可以更好,但不是在现在这些教书人的手中。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there any group we’ve forgotten to offend? I mean — (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特: 我们是不是漏掉了某个还没得罪的群体?我的意思是——(笑声)
27. Trying, and failing, to expand See’s Candies’ geographic market
尝试并未成功地扩展 See's Candies 的地理市场
WARREN BUFFETT: Jonathan?
沃伦·巴菲特:乔纳森?
JONATHAN BRANDT: See’s Candy is obviously small in the context of Berkshire’s currently expansive operations, but has long been one of your favorite businesses.
乔纳森·布兰特:在伯克希尔目前庞大的运营背景下,See's Candy 显然规模较小,但它一直是你最喜欢的业务之一。
And no wonder, given that its pre-tax profits grew consistently from less than $5 million in 1972 when Berkshire acquired it, to $74 million in 1999.
难怪,考虑到其税前利润从 1972 年伯克希尔收购时的不到 500 万美元,持续增长到 1999 年的 7400 万美元。
However, since 1999, profit growth appears to have stalled.
然而,自 1999 年以来,利润增长似乎已经停滞。
Can you explain why See’s was able to grow its profits through the ’70s, ‘80s and ’90s, but not, so far, in this millennium?
你能解释一下为什么 See's 在 70 年代、80 年代和 90 年代能够增长利润,但到目前为止在这个千年却没有吗?
Did something change about the business, for instance, the growth and demand for boxed chocolates or its market position?
关于业务是否发生了变化,例如,盒装巧克力的增长和需求或其市场地位?
Could you or Brad Kinstler discuss whether the relatively recent geographic expansion could help reignite See’s growth? Thank you.
您或布拉德·金斯特勒能否讨论一下最近的地理扩张是否有助于重新点燃 See 的增长?谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the boxed chocolate business is, basically, not growing.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,盒装巧克力业务基本上没有增长。
I mean, if you go back 100 years, the — each city of any size was characterized by lots of candy shops. Chicago was a big leader. New York was a big leader.
我的意思是,如果你回到 100 年前,每个有一定规模的城市都有很多糖果店。芝加哥是一个重要的领导者。纽约也是一个重要的领导者。
Believe it or not, the predecessor company to Pepsi Cola was the — a company with the most — it was a company called Loft’s — that had the most candy shops in New York City.
信不信由你,百事可乐的前身公司是——一家拥有最多——它是一家名为洛夫特的公司——在纽约市拥有最多糖果店。
It was a candy shop company, originally, that a fellow that — what was his name?
这是一家糖果店公司,最初,一个叫——他叫什么名字的家伙?
CHARLIE MUNGER: [Charles] Guth.
查理·芒格:[查尔斯] 古斯。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. What was it?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。那是什么?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Guth. 查理·芒格:古斯。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. He acquired Pepsi for a few thousand bucks, stuck it in Loft’s.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。他花了几千美元收购了百事可乐,把它放在洛夫特的。
And the corporate — the corporate name, if you go all the way back on Pepsi, is Loft’s.
而公司的——公司的名称,如果追溯到百事可乐,便是洛夫特的。
So there were loads of candy shops around everyplace. And including in Omaha.
所以到处都有很多糖果店,包括在奥马哈。
Boxed chocolates have lost position dramatically. Primarily, I would guess, to salted snacks of one sort or another. Various things.
盒装巧克力的市场地位急剧下降。主要原因,我猜,是因为某种咸味零食的竞争。各种各样的东西。
See’s has done remarkably well, far better than any chocolate company in the country.
See's 表现得非常出色,远远超过了国内任何一家巧克力公司。
Russell Stover did very well for a while. Very well, with a different business model. But, you know, they ran into their problems as well.
拉塞尔·斯托弗一度表现得非常好。非常好,采用了不同的商业模式。但是,你知道,他们也遇到了问题。
So, we can’t do much about increasing the size of the market. And we’ve tried a lot of ways. And we’ve tried moving out of our strong geography, multiple times.
所以,我们对扩大市场规模无能为力。我们尝试了很多方法,也多次尝试走出我们的强势地区。
I mean, Charlie and I looked at what we were earning in California in the ’70s and said to ourselves, “If we could do this in 50 states instead of one, you know, we’ll get very rich.”
我意思是,查理和我看着我们在 70 年代加利福尼亚的收入,心里想着:“如果我们能在 50 个州而不是一个州做到这一点,你知道的,我们会变得非常富有。”
So we tried it and we didn’t get very rich. It doesn’t travel that well.
所以我们尝试了,但并没有变得很富有。它的流通性不太好。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. And you figure out whether it’s going to work by trying it.
查理·芒格:有时候有效,有时候无效。你可以通过尝试来判断它是否会奏效。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we’ve tried it many times.
沃伦·巴菲特:是的。我们已经尝试过很多次。
But so far — it’s interesting. Two-thirds — people in the East prefer dark chocolate, two-thirds to one-third. In the West, they prefer milk chocolate, two-thirds to one-third.
但到目前为止——这很有趣。东部地区的人们更喜欢黑巧克力,比例为三分之二对三分之一。在西部,他们更喜欢牛奶巧克力,比例也是三分之二对三分之一。
They like miniatures in the East. They won’t eat miniatures in the West. There’s a lot of different things.
他们在东部喜欢小巧克力,在西部则不吃小巧克力。有很多不同的因素。
But in the end, there isn’t a lot of boxed chocolates volume.
但最终,盒装巧克力的市场份额并不大。
And we’ve done very, very, very well in See’s. And it not only has provided us with earnings that we’ve used to buy other businesses, so we’ve added lots of earnings power through See’s, beyond the earning power we’ve added at See’s.
我们在 See’s 方面做得非常好。它不仅为我们提供了收益,我们用这些收益购买了其他业务,从而增加了很多盈利能力。
But it opened my eyes to the power of brands and probably you could say that we made a lot of money in Coca-Cola partly because we bought See’s, or at least in my case, bought See’s, because I’d understood brands to some degree, but there’s nothing like owning one, and sort of seeing the possibilities with it as well as the limitations, to educate yourself about things you might do in the future.
但这让我意识到了品牌的力量,或许可以说,我们在可口可乐上赚了很多钱,部分原因是我们收购了 See's,或者至少在我看来,收购了 See's,因为我在某种程度上理解了品牌,但没有什么比拥有一个品牌更能让人看到它的可能性和局限性,这能让你对未来可能做的事情有更深的了解。
品牌是一种纵向的能力。
And in 1972, we bought See’s. And in 1988 we bought Coca-Cola.
1972 年,我们收购了 See's。1988 年,我们收购了可口可乐。
And I wouldn’t be at all surprised, if we had not owned See’s, whether we would’ve owned Coca-Cola later on.
我一点也不惊讶,如果我们没有拥有 See's,后来是否会拥有可口可乐。
Charlie? 查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. There’s no question about the fact that its main contribution to Berkshire was ignorance removal. And it’s not the only big contributor to ignorance removal.
查理·芒格:是的。毫无疑问,它对伯克希尔的主要贡献是消除无知。而且这并不是唯一一个对消除无知有重大贡献的因素。
If it weren’t for the fact we were so good at removing our ignorance, step by step, Berkshire would be practically nothing today.
如果不是因为我们在逐步消除无知方面做得如此出色,伯克希尔今天几乎一无所有。
What we knew originally wasn’t enough. We were pretty damn stupid when we bought See’s. We were just barely smart enough to buy it.
我们最初知道的还不够。当我们购买 See's 时,我们真是太愚蠢了。我们只是勉强聪明到足以买下它。
And if there’s any secret to Berkshire, it’s the fact that we’re pretty good at ignorance removal. And the nice thing about that is we have a lot of ignorance left to remove. (Laughter)
如果说伯克希尔有什么秘密,那就是我们在消除无知方面相当出色。而这件事的好处在于,我们还有很多无知需要去消除。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that’s what happens when I call on him. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特:好吧,这就是我叫他时发生的事情。(笑声)