10. “Time is the enemy of the poor business”
“时间是平庸企业的敌人”
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s try zone 3.
沃伦·巴菲特:让我们试试第三区域。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Warren Hayes (PH). I’m from Chicago, Illinois.
听众:我叫沃伦·海斯(音译),来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥。
I understand from various publications, like Outstanding Investor Digest, that many of the best value investors are buying high-quality, multi-national Japanese companies that are trading below net-net working capital value.
据我从《杰出投资者文摘》等刊物了解到,许多最优秀的价值投资者正在购买一些优质的、日本的跨国公司,这些公司以低于净营运资本的价格交易。
Do you agree that these values exist in Japan? And would you consider a purchase of some of them?
您是否认为日本存在这样的价值?您会考虑购买其中一些公司吗?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Henry Emerson, who publishes the Outstanding Investor’s Digest is here, so I will give a tout on it.
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,出版《杰出投资者文摘》的亨利·埃默森今天也在这里,所以我先夸奖一下这本刊物。
I read the Outstanding Investor’s Digest, OID, and it’s a very good publication. And I have read some of the commentary about Japanese securities.
我读过《杰出投资者文摘》(OID),这是一份非常好的刊物。我也看过一些关于日本证券的评论。
We’ve looked at securities in all major markets, and we certainly looked at them in Japan, particularly in recent years when the Nikkei has so underperformed the S&P here.
我们研究过所有主要市场的证券,当然也看过日本的,尤其是最近几年,日经指数表现远逊于美国的标普指数。
We’re quite a bit less enthused about those stocks as being any kind of obvious bargains than the people that you read about in OID.
对于那些股票,我们的兴趣没有《杰出投资者文摘》里的那些人描述的那么高,因为我们并不觉得它们显然是便宜货。
The returns on equity in most areas of Japanese business, returns on equity are very low. And it’s extremely difficult to get rich by owning — by being the owner of a business that earns a low return on equity.
日本大多数行业的股本回报率都很低。而通过持有一个股本回报率低的公司变富是非常困难的。
You know, we always look at what a business does in terms of what it earns on capital.
你知道,我们总是以企业的资本回报来衡量它的表现。
We want to be in good businesses. Where you really want to be is in businesses that are going to be good businesses and better businesses ten years from now. And we want to buy them at a reasonable price.
我们希望投资于优秀的企业。我们真正想要的是那些在未来十年仍然是优秀企业,并且会变得更好的企业。我们希望以合理的价格买入它们。
But many years ago we gave up what I’ve labeled the “cigar butt” approach to investing, which is where you try and find a really kind of pathetic company, but it sells so cheap that you think there’s one good free puff left in it.
但是多年前,我们放弃了我所说的“烟蒂式”投资法。这种方法是寻找一个看起来很差劲的公司,但由于它的价格极低,你觉得还可以从中获得一口“免费烟”。
And — (laughter) — we used to pick up a lot of soggy cigar butts, you know. I mean, I had a portfolio full of them.
我们过去确实捡了很多湿漉漉的烟蒂。我的投资组合里曾经全是这样的公司。(笑声)
And there were free puffs in them. I mean, I made money out of that. But A, it doesn’t work with big money anyway, and B, we don’t find many cigar butts around that we would be attracted to.
这些烟蒂确实还能抽一口,我的确从中赚过钱。但首先,这种方法不适合大资金运作;其次,我们现在几乎找不到让我们感兴趣的“烟蒂”。
But those are the companies that had low returns on equity. And if you have a business that’s earning 5 or 6 percent on equity and you hold it for a long time, you are not going to do well in investing. Even if you buy it cheap to start with.
那些公司都是股本回报率很低的。如果一个企业的股本回报率只有5%或6%,并且你长期持有它,在投资上你不会有好结果。即使你一开始以便宜的价格买入。
Time is the enemy of the poor business, and it’s the friend of the great business. I mean if you have a business that’s earning 20 or 25 percent on equity, and it does that for a long time, time is your friend.
时间是平庸企业的敌人,却是优秀企业的朋友。换句话说,如果你有一家企业的股本回报率是20%或25%,并且长期保持这个水平,时间就是你的朋友。
But time is your enemy if you have your money in a low-return business. And you may be lucky enough to pick the exact moment when it gets taken over by someone else.
但如果你的资金投在一个低回报的企业上,时间就是你的敌人。你或许足够幸运,能在它被其他人收购的那一刻抓住机会。
But we like to think when we buy a stock we’re going to own it for a very long time, and therefore we have to stay away from businesses that have low returns on equity.
但我们喜欢这样想:当我们买入一只股票时,我们会长期持有。因此,我们必须远离那些股本回报率低的企业。
Charlie?
查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it’s not that much fun to buy a business where you really hope this sucker liquidates before it goes broke. (Laughter)
查理·芒格:是啊,买一个企业,只是希望它在破产前清算掉,这并不是很有趣的事情。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: We’ve been in a few of those, too.
沃伦·巴菲特:我们也经历过这样的企业。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right. (Laughter)
查理·芒格:没错。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie and I, we — or at least I have, I’ve owned stock in an anthracite company. There are probably people in this room that don’t know what anthracite is. Three railway companies. Windmill manufacturers. What other gems have we had, Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,查理和我——至少我是这样——我曾经持有一家无烟煤公司的股票。这房间里可能有人都不知道什么是无烟煤。还有三家铁路公司,风车制造商。我们还有过哪些“宝藏”企业,查理?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Textiles. (Laughter)
查理·芒格:纺织业。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, textiles. Don’t even think. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特:是的,纺织业。别提了。(笑声)
Yeah, Berkshire was a mistake, believe it or not. I mean we went into Berkshire because it was cheap statistically just as a general investment back in the early ’60s, and it was a company that in the previous ten years had earned less than nothing. I mean it had a significant net loss over the previous ten years.
是的,伯克希尔是个错误,相信与否。我们进入伯克希尔是因为在统计上它很便宜,就像早期60年代的一个普通投资。而在之前十年,它实际上是亏损的,也就是说,十年来净亏损相当严重。
It was selling well below working capital, so it was a cigar butt. And it was — I mean we could have done the things we’ve done subsequently from a neutral base rather than a negative base, and actually it would have worked out better, but it’s been a lot of fun.
它的交易价格远低于营运资本,所以它是一个“烟蒂”。我想,我们本可以从一个中立的基础而不是负面的基础开始做我们后来做的事情,这样实际上会更好,但这一路确实很有趣。