I.H.301.Right Price.Warren Buffett.Mr.Market
市场波动在数学上是幂律分布，很难预测，只能根据每个当下判断价格和价值的关系。
1、《1999-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
42. Japan’s economic slump doesn’t affect Berkshire
日本的经济低迷不会影响伯克希尔
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特： 第五区域。（笑声）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Bob Brewer (PH). And I’m from down the road in Lincoln, Nebraska.
观众： 早上好。我叫鲍勃·布鲁尔（音），来自内布拉斯加州林肯，就在附近。
I just wanted to ask you how you think the continuing economic turmoil in Japan is likely to affect the global economy and the U.S. stock market over the next five to 10 years?
我想请问您，您认为日本持续的经济动荡可能会如何影响未来五到十年的全球经济和美国股市？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I are no good on those macro questions.
沃伦·巴菲特： 嗯，查理和我不擅长回答这种宏观问题。
But I would say this: I mean, the Japan problem has been around, now — in financial markets and banking systems — has been around for some time now. So, I see no reason why it should have more impact on the rest of world now than it has had in the last few years. And I would say it’s had certainly very little effect on the U.S. in the last few years.
但我想说的是，日本的问题，无论是在金融市场还是银行系统，都已经存在了一段时间。所以，我看不出为什么它现在会比过去几年对世界其他地方有更大的影响。而且，我认为过去几年它对美国的影响非常小。
It’s not — it’s no factor in our thinking at all, in terms of what we would buy or sell tomorrow morning. I mean, if we got offered a good business tomorrow — unless it was directly involved and its primary business was in Japan — but if it was a business in this country, that’s not something that we would be thinking about. We would be thinking about the specifics of that business.
它完全不是我们考虑的因素，无论是明天早上要买还是要卖。我是说，如果明天我们遇到一个好的生意——除非它直接与日本相关且主要业务在日本——但如果它是美国的业务，我们不会考虑日本问题。我们会关注的是这个业务的具体情况。
We don’t really get too concerned about the things that come and go. I mean, in the end, if we’re right about a business over a 10 or 20-year period — take See’s Candy.
我们不会过于担心那些来来去去的事情。我的意思是，最终，如果我们对一个业务在10年或20年的时间里判断正确——比如说See’s糖果。
问题是很多人活在来来去去的事情中。
We bought it in 1972. Look what happened in 1973 and 4, you know, and all the oil shocks and what this country was going through and inflation, all that sort of thing.
我们在1972年买下了它。看看1973年和1974年发生了什么，比如石油危机，这个国家经历的各种问题，以及通货膨胀，等等。
For us to — and let’s say in 1972 somebody laid out a roadmap from 1972 to 1982, with the prime rate going to 21 1/2 percent, long-term rates going to 15 percent. And all of the things happening, the Dow going to 570 or what — or 560.
假设在1972年，有人列出一份从1972年到1982年的路线图，说明基准利率会升到21.5%，长期利率会升到15%，还有其他各种事情，道琼斯指数会降到570点或560点。
That wasn’t the important thing. The important thing was that this peanut brittle tastes like it does, which is terrific. (Laughter)
这些都不是重要的事情。重要的是，这款花生脆糖的味道依然如同它本来的样子——非常棒。（笑声）
And that over time, we could get a little more money for it. So, you know. See’s made $4 million, pretax, in 1972, when we bought it. It made 62 million last year.
而且随着时间的推移，我们可以从中赚到更多钱。你知道的，1972年我们买下See’s时，它的税前利润是400万美元。去年，它赚了6200万美元。
It doesn’t — we don’t want to be thinking about the wrong things when we’re buying businesses. And that applies to marketable securities, just as much as it does as when we’re buying 100 percent of the business.
当我们购买业务时，我们不想考虑错误的事情。这一点同样适用于可交易证券，就像适用于我们购买一家公司100%的股份时一样。
If we’re right about the business, the macro factors aren’t going to make any difference, you know. And if we’re wrong about the business, macro factors are not going to bail us out.
如果我们对业务的判断是正确的，宏观因素不会产生任何影响。如果我们对业务的判断是错误的，宏观因素也救不了我们。
Charlie?
查理？
2、《2020-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
17. Why buying a stock should be like buying a farm
为什么购买股票应该像购买农场一样
WARREN BUFFETT: But going back to stocks, people bring the attitude to them too often that because they are liquid and quoted minute-by-minute, that it’s important that you develop an opinion on them, minute-by-minute.
沃伦·巴菲特：但回到股票上，人们往往带着这样的态度，因为股票是流动的，并且每分钟都有报价，所以你必须每分钟对它们形成看法。
Now that’s really foolish when you think about it. And that’s something Benjamin Graham taught me in 1949. I mean, that single thought, that stocks were parts of businesses and not just little things that moved around on charts or — charts were very popular in those days — whatever it may be.
现在仔细想想，这真是愚蠢。而这是本杰明·格雷厄姆在 1949 年教我的。我是说，这个单一的想法，即股票是企业的一部分，而不仅仅是图表上移动的小东西——在那个时代，图表非常流行——无论它是什么。
Imagine for a moment that you decided to invest money now. And you bought a farm, and the farmland around here — let’s say you bought 160 acres and you bought it at x per share — or per acre. And the farmer next to you had 160 identical acres, same contour, same quality — soil quality. So, it was — it was identical.
想象一下，如果你决定现在投资一些钱。你买了一块农场，周围的农田——假设你买了 160 英亩，并且以每股或每英亩 x 的价格购买。而你旁边的农民也有 160 英亩相同的土地，地形相同，土壤质量相同。所以，它是——它是完全相同的。
And that farmer next door to you was a very peculiar character. Because every day that farmer with the identical farm said, “I’ll sell you my farm” — or “I’ll buy your farm” — at a certain price which he would name. Now, that’s a very obliging neighbor. I mean, that’s got to be a plus to have a fellow like that with the next farm.
而你隔壁的农民是个非常奇特的人。因为每天那个拥有相同农场的农民都会说：“我会以某个价格卖给你我的农场”——或者“我会以某个价格买你的农场”。现在，这真是个很乐于助人的邻居。我是说，拥有这样一个邻居肯定是个好处。
You don’t get that with farms. You get it with stocks. You want a hundred shares of General Motors. On Monday morning, somebody will buy your hundred shares or sell you another hundred shares at exactly the same price, and that goes on five days a week.
你在农场得不到这一点。你在股票中得到它。你想要一百股通用汽车。周一早上，有人会以完全相同的价格买下你的那一百股，或者再卖给你一百股，这样一周五天都在进行。
But just imagine if you had a farmer doing that. When you bought the farm, you looked to what the farm would produce. That was what went through your mind. You’re saying to yourself, I’m paying x dollars per acre, I think I’ll get so many bushels of corn or soybeans on average, some years good, some years bad, some years the price will be good, some years the price will be bad, etc.
但想象一下如果你有一个农民这样做。当你购买农场时，你考虑的是农场将会生产什么。这就是你脑海中想到的。你在心里说，我每英亩支付 x 美元，我认为我平均会得到这么多蒲式耳的玉米或大豆，有些年份好，有些年份差，有些年份价格好，有些年份价格差，等等。
But you think about the potential of the farm. And now you get this idiot that buys a farm next to you and — and on top of that he’s sort of a manic depressive and drinks, maybe smokes a little pot, so his numbers just go all over the place.
但是你考虑到农场的潜力。现在你遇到这个傻瓜，他在你旁边买了一个农场——而且他有点躁郁症，还喝酒，可能还抽一点大麻，所以他的数字完全不稳定。
Now, the only thing you have to do is to remember that this guy next door is there to serve you and not to instruct you. You bought the farm because you thought the farm was — had the potential. You don’t really need a quote on it.
现在，您唯一需要做的就是记住，隔壁的这个家伙是来为您服务的，而不是来指导您的。您购买这块农场是因为您认为这块农场有潜力。您实际上并不需要对此进行报价。
You know, if you bought in with John D. Rockefeller, or Andrew Carnegie, there were never any quotes — well, there were quotes later on, but — but basically, you bought into the business, and that’s what you’re doing when you buy stocks.
你知道，如果你和约翰·D·洛克菲勒或安德鲁·卡内基一起投资，根本没有任何报价——好吧，后来有了报价，但——基本上，你是投资于这个业务，而这就是你购买股票时所做的。
But you get this added advantage that you do have this neighbor, who you’re not obliged to listen to at all, who is going to give you a price every day. And he’s going to have his ups and downs. And maybe he’ll name a silly price that he’ll buy at, in which case you sell, if you want to. Or maybe he’ll name a very low price and you’ll buy his farm from him. But you don’t have to. And you don’t want to put yourself in a position where you have to sell.
但你会得到一个额外的好处，那就是你有这个邻居，你完全不必听他的，他每天都会给你一个价格。他会有起有落。也许他会报一个愚蠢的买入价格，这样的话，如果你愿意，你可以卖给他。或者也许他会报一个非常低的价格，你可以从他那里买下他的农场。但你并不一定要这样做。你也不想让自己处于必须出售的境地。
Stocks have this enormous inherent advantage of people yelling out prices all the time to you. And many people turn that into a disadvantage. And of course, many people can profit in one way or another from telling — telling you that they can tell you what this farmer is going to yell out tomorrow or next — your neighboring farmer — is going to yell out tomorrow or next week or next month. There’s huge money in it.
股票有一个巨大的内在优势，那就是人们不断向你喊出价格。然而，许多人把这个优势变成了劣势。当然，许多人通过告诉你，他们可以预测明天或下周甚至下个月你的邻居农民会喊出什么价格，从中获利。这其中有巨大的利润空间。
So, people tell you that it’s important and they know and that you should pay a lot of attention to their thoughts about what price changes should be, or you tell yourself that there should be this great difference.
于是，人们告诉你，这些价格变化很重要，他们知道这些，并且你应该非常关注他们对价格变化的看法，或者你自己认为这些价格变化应该有很大的差异。
But the truth is, if you owned the businesses you liked prior to the virus arriving — it changes prices and it changes — but nobody’s forcing you to sell. And if you really like the business, and you like the management you’re in with, and the business hasn’t fundamentally changed — and I’ll get to that a little when I report on Berkshire, which I will soon, I promise.
但事实是，如果你在病毒到来之前拥有你喜欢的企业——价格会变化，情况也会变化——但没有人强迫你出售。如果你真的喜欢这个企业，喜欢你所参与的管理，而且企业没有从根本上改变——我稍后会在报告伯克希尔时提到这一点，我会很快做到，我保证。
Stocks have an enormous advantage. And you still can bet on America. But you can’t bet unless you’re willing, and have an outlook, to independently decide that you want to own a cross section of America, because I don’t think most people are in a position to pick single stocks. A few may be, but — but on balance, I think people are much better off buying a cross section of America and just forgetting about it.
股票有巨大的优势，你仍然可以押注美国的未来。但除非你有意愿，并且有独立的视野去决定你想拥有美国的一个横截面，否则你无法进行这样的押注。因为我认为大多数人并不具备挑选单只股票的能力。少数人可能可以，但总体来看，我认为人们最好是购买一部分美国的整体股票，然后忘记它，不去过多关注。
If you’d done that — if I’d done that when I got out of college, it’s all I had to do to make 100-for-1 and collect dividends on top of it, which increased — would increase substantially over time.
如果你那样做了——如果我在大学毕业时就那样做，那是我唯一需要做的事情，就可以赚到100倍的回报，并且还能领取股息，而这些股息会随着时间大幅增加。
The American tailwind is marvelous. American business represents — and it’s going to have interruptions and you’re not going to foresee the interruptions, and you do not want to get yourself in a position where those interruptions can — can affect you, either because you’re leveraged or because you’re psychologically unable to handle looking at a bunch of numbers.
美国的顺风势头非常强劲。美国的商业代表了这一点——虽然会有中断，你无法预见这些中断，但你不希望让自己处于被这些中断影响的境地，可能是因为你用了杠杆，或者你在心理上无法应对看到一堆数字的压力。
If you really had a farm, and you had this neighbor and one day he offered you $2,000 an acre, and the next day he offers you $1200 an acre, and maybe the day after that he offers you $800 an acre, are you really going to feel that at $2,000 an acre, when you had evaluated what the farm would produce, are you going to let this guy drive you into thinking I better sell because this number keeps coming in lower all the time?
如果你真的有一个农场，而你有一个邻居，有一天他给你每英亩 2000 美元的报价，第二天他给你每英亩 1200 美元的报价，也许在那之后的某一天他给你每英亩 800 美元的报价，你真的会觉得在每英亩 2000 美元的情况下，当你评估过农场的产出时，你会让这个家伙让你觉得我最好卖掉，因为这个数字一直在下降吗？
It’s a very, very, very important matter to bring the right psychological approach to owning common stocks.
将正确的心理方法应用于拥有普通股是一个非常非常重要的事情。
But I will tell you if you bet on America and sustain that position for decades, you’re going to do better than — than — in my view — far better than owning Treasury securities. Or far better than following people who tell you what the farmer is going to yell out next.
但我会告诉你，如果你押注于美国并在几十年内坚持这个立场，你会比——在我看来——远远好于拥有国债。或者远远好于听那些告诉你农民接下来会喊什么的人。
There’s huge amounts of money that people pay for advice they really don’t need and for advice where the person giving it can be very well meaning and believe their own line. But the truth is that — that you can’t have — you can’t deliver superior results to everybody by just having them trade around a business.
人们为他们实际上并不需要的建议支付了巨额费用，而提供这些建议的人可能出于好意并相信自己的观点。但事实是，你无法通过让所有人频繁交易股票来为每个人提供优异的结果。
A business is going to deliver what the business produces. And the idea that you can outsmart the person next to you, or that the person advising you can outsmart the next — the person sitting next to you — is — well, it’s really the wrong approach.
一家公司将会交付它所能生产的成果。认为你可以比身边的人更聪明，或者你的顾问可以比坐在你旁边的人更聪明，这种想法——其实是错误的方法。
So, find businesses — get a cross section. In my view, for most people, the best thing to do is to own the S&P 500 index fund. People will try and sell you other things because there’s more money in it for them if they do. And I’m not saying that that’s a conscious act on their part. Most — most good salespeople believe their own baloney. I mean, that’s part of being a good salesperson. And I’m sure I’ve done plenty of that in my life, too. But it’s very human.
所以，寻找企业——获取一个横截面。在我看来，对于大多数人来说，拥有标准普尔 500 指数基金是最好的选择。人们会试图向你推销其他东西，因为这样对他们来说能赚更多的钱。我并不是说这是他们有意识的行为。大多数——大多数优秀的销售人员相信他们自己的胡说八道。我是说，这也是成为一名优秀销售人员的一部分。我相信我在生活中也做过很多这样的事情。但这非常人性化。
If you keep repeating something — often that’s why lawyers get — have the witnesses keep saying things over and over again that by the time they get on the witness stand, they’ll — they’ll believe it whether it was true in the first place or not. The—
如果你不断重复某件事——这通常就是律师让证人不断重复说同样的话的原因——以至于当他们上证人席时，他们会相信这是真的，无论最初是否真实。
Some good trades
一些不错的交易
A classic way to trade bonds is that you call up a broker-dealer (generally a trader at a big bank) and say “I want to buy Bond X and I’ll pay up to 90 cents on the dollar for it,” and then the dealer thinks about who else she knows who owns Bond X and might want to sell it, and she thinks “ah yes Customer Y was telling me the other day that she wants to get rid of Bond X,” so she calls Customer Y and says “hey do you want to sell Bond X,” and the Customer Y says “sure but I won’t sell for less than 91 cents on the dollar,” and then the dealer tries to negotiate you up and/or negotiate Customer Y down so that a trade can happen. If she gets you up to 90.5, and gets Customer Y down to 90.25, then a trade will happen: The dealer will buy from Customer Y at 90.25 and sell to you at 90.5, collecting 0.25 as payment for her work.
一种经典的债券交易方式是，你打电话给一家经纪自营商（通常是大银行的交易员），说“我想买入 X 债券，我愿意支付最高 90 美分兑 1 美元的价格。”然后，交易员会考虑她认识的其他持有 X 债券并可能想要出售的人，并想到“啊，对了，客户 Y 前几天告诉我她想卖掉 X 债券。”于是她打电话给客户 Y，说“嘿，你想卖 X 债券吗？”客户 Y 回答说“当然可以，但我不会低于 91 美分兑 1 美元出售。”然后，交易员会尝试让你提高报价，或者让客户 Y 降低报价，以促成交易。如果她让你提高到 90.5 美分，同时让客户 Y 降到 90.25 美分，那么交易就会达成：交易员会以 90.25 美分从客户 Y 手中买入，并以 90.5 美分卖给你，从中赚取 0.25 美分作为报酬。
This is not the only way for bond trades to happen — a lot of trading is electronic, and sometimes the dealer will own Bond X herself, and just sell to you out of inventory — but it is a common one. It is often called a “riskless principal” trade: The dealer buys from Customer Y for her own account, and then sells to you at a markup, but she does both trades at the same time without taking any market risk by holding the bonds.
这并不是债券交易发生的唯一方式——很多交易是电子化的，有时交易商自己持有债券 X，并直接从库存中卖给你——但这是一种常见的方式。这通常被称为“无风险自营”交易：交易商以自有账户从客户 Y 手中买入，然后加价卖给你，但她同时进行这两笔交易，而不会因持有债券而承担任何市场风险。
There is no magic to these numbers, 90 and 91 or whatever. It’s sort of natural for the best bid for a bond (the highest price you, or anyone, will pay for it) to be lower than the best offer for that bond (the lowest price Customer Y, or anyone, will accept to sell it), so it takes some effort or new information to make trades happen. Your model could be “there is a market price, say 90.5, and any trades that would have happened at the market price have already happened, so anybody currently holding the bond wants more than 90.5, and anyone looking for the bond wants to pay less than 90.5” (This is a roughly plausible model of the stock market, for instance.)
这些数字，90 和 91 或其他，并没有什么神奇之处。对于一只债券来说，最高买价（你或任何人愿意支付的最高价格）通常低于最低卖价（客户 Y 或任何人愿意接受的最低出售价格），这是自然的，因此需要一些努力或新的信息才能促成交易。你的模型可能是：“市场价格是 90.5，任何会在市场价格成交的交易已经发生了，所以当前持有债券的人希望价格高于 90.5，而想要购买债券的人希望支付低于 90.5 的价格。”（例如，这是一个大致合理的股票市场模型。）
It is not always true in bond markets, though, because some bonds don’t trade that often or have much in the way of a public “market price.” Many bonds — like stocks — trade electronically and frequently in markets whose prices are pretty widely visible to investors, so you (and Customer Y) might know exactly what the market prices are, but many don’t. Many trade infrequently and don’t have bid and offer prices displayed on any electronic platform. You might not know how much Bond X should cost, and Customer Y might not know how much he should ask for it. So you might call your dealer and say “I want to buy Bond X and I’ll pay up to … 95 cents?” And the dealer might call Customer Y, who might say “sure but I won’t sell for less than 88 cents.” And then there is definitely a trade!
不过，在债券市场中情况并非总是如此，因为有些债券交易并不频繁，或者没有明确的公开“市场价格”。许多债券——就像股票一样——在电子市场上频繁交易，其价格对投资者来说相对透明，因此你（以及客户 Y）可能确切知道市场价格是多少，但也有许多债券并非如此。许多债券交易不频繁，且在任何电子平台上都没有买入和卖出报价。你可能不知道债券 X 应该值多少钱，客户 Y 可能也不知道他应该要价多少。因此，你可能会打电话给你的交易商，说“我想买债券 X，我愿意支付……95 美分？”而交易商可能会打电话给客户 Y，客户 Y 可能会说“可以，但我不会低于 88 美分出售。”然后，交易就达成了！
What is the trade, though? If the dealer is acting as a fiduciary for you, she will buy the bond from Customer Y at 88 cents on the dollar and turn around and sell it to you at, say, 88.25, taking a markup of 0.25 for herself. “Good news,” she will tell you, “I got you a better price than you asked for.” On the other hand, if she is acting as a fiduciary for Customer Y, she will tell him “oh I can do better than 88, I’ll buy from you at 94.75,” and then sell to you at 95, taking 0.25 for herself. If she values you both equally, she’ll meet in the middle, buying from Customer Y at, say, 91.5 and selling to you at 91.75.
但交易是什么呢？如果经销商作为您的受托人行事，她会以每美元 88 美分的价格从客户 Y 那里购买债券，然后以 88.25 的价格卖给您，从中赚取 0.25 的加价。她会告诉您：“好消息，我给您拿到了比您要求更好的价格。” 另一方面，如果她作为客户 Y 的受托人行事，她会告诉他：“哦，我可以做得比 88 更好，我会以 94.75 的价格向您购买。” 然后再以 95 的价格卖给您，从中赚取 0.25。如果她对你们两者同等看待，她会在中间折中，比如以 91.5 的价格从客户 Y 购买，再以 91.75 的价格卖给您。
Or, you know. Or Customer Y will say “sure but I won’t sell for less than 88 cents,” and the dealer will say “man you are driving a hard bargain, my kids need to eat, but okay, fine, I think I can do 88,” and then she will call you and say “good news, it wasn’t easy, but with hard work and my excellent relationships I was able to get those bonds for you, here they are, 95 cents on the dollar just like you asked.” And she gets 7 points for herself and a round of applause from her trading desk.
或者，你知道。或者客户 Y 会说：“当然，但我不会以低于 88 美分的价格出售。” 经销商会说：“伙计，你真是个难缠的谈判者，我的孩子还要吃饭呢，不过好吧，好吧，我想我可以接受 88。” 然后她会打电话给你，说：“好消息，这并不容易，但通过努力工作和我出色的人脉关系，我为你拿到了这些债券，正如你要求的，每美元 95 美分。” 然后她为自己赚了 7 个点，并从她的交易台获得一阵掌声。
In general your bond dealer, in a riskless principal trade, isn’t a fiduciary for you, and is kind of in the business of making as much money as she can on her trades, so she might be inclined to take the 7 points. But there are important constraints. Here are three:
一般来说，在无风险本金交易中，你的债券交易商并不是你的受托人，而是尽可能从交易中赚取更多利润的生意人，因此她可能倾向于拿走那 7 个点。但也有重要的限制。以下是三个：
1.You are, in this hypothetical situation, probably a professional investor, an asset manager. (The retail market is works differently.) You know all this stuff. You can just ask! The dealer will call you and say “I found those bonds for you” and you can say “well how much are you paying for them” and she will probably tell you the truth. She will tell you the truth because she wants to do repeat business with you and cares about her reputation for honesty, because she expects you’ll find out if she’s lying, and because, if she lies to you, she will get in trouble and possibly go to prison. (Not legal advice, and we have talked about cases where courts have said actually it’s okay for her to lie to you.) If she tells you that she’s paying 88, you will demand to pay 88.25, not 95.
在这个假设的情况下，你可能是一名专业投资者，一名资产管理人。（零售市场的运作方式不同。）你了解所有这些事情。你可以直接问！交易商会打电话给你，说“我为你找到了那些债券”，然后你可以问“你为它们支付了多少”，她可能会告诉你实情。她会告诉你实情，因为她希望与你进行长期交易，并在意自己诚实的声誉，因为她认为如果她撒谎，你最终会发现，而且如果她对你撒谎，她可能会惹上麻烦，甚至可能入狱。（这不是法律建议，我们也讨论过法院认为她对你撒谎实际上是可以的案例。）如果她告诉你她支付了 88，你会要求支付 88.25，而不是 95。
2.There are rules — internal rules, ethical precepts, but mostly a rule of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Finra) — forbidding dealers from charging “excessive markups.” Exactly what that means is a little vague, and this is not legal advice, but (1) in many markets there is a fairly standard “market” rate of markups (for instance, the 0.25 points I have used in my hypothetical examples), (2) if you regularly charge a large multiple of the market rate for ordinary transactions, you might get nervous, and (3) markups above 5% are generally assumed to be excessive. (Though “the ‘5% Policy’ is a guide, not a rule,” and “a mark-up pattern of 5% or even less may be considered unfair or unreasonable under the ‘5% Policy.’”) So the 7 points in my example is probably too much.
有规则——内部规则、道德准则，但主要是金融业监管局（Finra）的规则——禁止交易商收取“过高的加价”。这到底意味着什么有点模糊，这不是法律建议，但（1）在许多市场上，加价通常有一个相对标准的“市场”水平（例如，我在假设示例中使用的 0.25 点）；（2）如果你在普通交易中经常收取市场水平的多倍加价，你可能会感到不安；（3）加价超过 5%通常被认为是过高的。（尽管“5%政策”是指导方针，而不是规则，并且“即使是 5%或更低的加价模式，在‘5%政策’下也可能被视为不公平或不合理。”）所以，我示例中的 7 点可能太高了。
3.Bond prices are public, after the trade. You might not know how much you should pay for Bond X when you call your dealer. But as soon as the trade happens, the dealer generally has to report it to Finra’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (Trace), which then generally publishes it. (Though the parties to the trade are anonymous.) For many types of bonds, this happens more or less immediately — within 15 minutes of the trade — so you can look, and bond investors definitely do look. The dealer will report both sides of the riskless principal trade, and if you see “Dealer buys 1,750 of Bond X at 88” followed immediately buy “Dealer sells 1,750 of Bond X at 95,” you know you got ripped off. And then you won’t trade with that dealer again. And she knows that, so she won’t rip you off.
债券价格在交易后是公开的。你在打电话给你的交易商时，可能不知道应该为 Bond X 支付多少。但一旦交易发生，交易商通常必须向 Finra 的交易报告与合规引擎（Trace）报告，随后该引擎通常会发布交易信息。（尽管交易双方是匿名的。）对于许多类型的债券，这一过程几乎是即时的——在交易后 15 分钟内——所以你可以查看，债券投资者确实会查看。交易商会报告无风险本金交易的双方信息，如果你看到“交易商以 88 买入 1,750 份 Bond X”，紧接着又看到“交易商以 95 卖出 1,750 份 Bond X”，你就知道自己被坑了。然后你就不会再和那个交易商交易。而她也知道这一点，所以她不会坑你。
That’s the general theory. There are exceptions. Some types of bonds don’t get reported or published immediately on Trace. For instance:
这是一种普遍理论。但也有例外。某些类型的债券不会立即在 Trace 上报告或公布。例如：
Consider, for example, Non-Agency CMO [collateralized mortgage obligations], the privately sponsored structured products based upon pools of residential mortgage collateral. The markets for such securities are illiquid and opaque. There are no price screens offering a real-time view into live quotes for the thousands of existing securities. Thus, buyers and sellers of such securities only learn the prices that bond dealers pay and receive through private disclosures from dealers. Moreover, in sharp contrast to its nearly immediate dissemination of prices from corporate bond transactions, FINRA waits more than 18 months after the trade date to release reports for CMO transactions with trade quantities greater than $1 million. After the 18-month period, the data becomes available for purchase from FINRA in quarterly releases. The absence of timely trade report dissemination in CMO means that customers have no practical way to audit dealer performance. Thus, dealers in CMO have much wider scope to profit from unfair handling of not-held customer orders than in otherwise similar Corporate bond, MBS, and ABS transactions.
例如，非机构抵押债务（Non-Agency CMO）是基于住宅抵押贷款池的私人发行结构化产品。这类证券的市场流动性差且不透明。没有价格屏幕可以实时显示成千上万种现有证券的实时报价。因此，这类证券的买卖双方只能通过交易商的私人披露来了解交易商支付和收到的价格。此外，与公司债券交易价格几乎即时发布形成鲜明对比的是，FINRA 在交易日期后超过 18 个月才会发布交易量超过 100 万美元的 CMO 交易报告。在 18 个月的时间过后，这些数据才会通过 FINRA 的季度发布供购买。CMO 交易报告发布的延迟意味着客户无法实际审核交易商的表现。因此，相较于类似的公司债券、MBS 和 ABS 交易，CMO 交易商在不受限客户订单的不公平处理上有更大的获利空间。
If you are an investment manager and you buy a corporate bond from a dealer, you will probably look on your Bloomberg Terminal a minute later to see the trade print, and if it prints at a huge markup you will call and complain. If you buy a non-agency CMO from a dealer, will you wait 18 months, buy the quarterly data release from Finra, and scroll through it to see if your trade printed at a huge markup? That would be very cool, but no, probably not.1 Probably you’ve forgotten the trade by then. So the dealer has more freedom to charge you whatever she wants.
如果你是一名投资经理，从交易商那里购买公司债券，一分钟后你可能会在彭博终端上查看交易记录，如果交易以高额加价成交，你会打电话投诉。如果你从交易商那里购买非机构抵押债券（CMO），你会等 18 个月，购买 Finra 的季度数据发布，然后翻阅数据看看你的交易是否以高额加价成交吗？那样做会很酷，但可能不会。你可能早已忘记了这笔交易。因此，交易商有更大的自由向你收取她想要的价格。
That quoted paragraph is from a paper titled “Drawing the Line between Bond Dealer and Bandit,” by Vladimir Atanasov, John Merrick and Philipp Schuster. Basically they downloaded the files and did the scrolling through them and found that, sure, dealers generally charge higher markups on CMO trades (long-delayed Trace) than on trades in corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities (near-instant Trace):
该引用的段落来自一篇题为《在债券交易商与强盗之间划清界限》的论文，作者是弗拉基米尔·阿塔纳索夫、约翰·梅里克和菲利普·舒斯特。他们基本上下载了文件并浏览了其中的内容，发现交易商在抵押债务债券（长期延迟的 Trace）交易中的加价通常高于公司债券、抵押支持证券和资产支持证券（几乎即时的 Trace）交易中的加价。
Median markups on such transactions with market values in the $5-$10 million range for MBS and ABS are just 0.03%, comparable to the 0.02% observed for Corporate bonds. Corresponding median markups are 0.10% for Agency CMO and 0.20% for Non-Agency CMO. … The top quartile of both Agency and Non-Agency CMO riskless principal trades cross at markups above 1.0%, more than quadruple their median values.
此类交易中，市场价值在 500 万至 1000 万美元范围内的 MBS 和 ABS 的中位加价仅为 0.03%，与公司债券观察到的 0.02%相当。相应的中位加价为机构 CMO 0.10%，非机构 CMO 0.20%。…… 机构和非机构 CMO 无风险本金交易的最高四分位数加价超过 1.0%，是其中位值的四倍以上。
But also they went and found a specific very cool trade:
但他们还找到了一笔特别酷的交易：
One particular cluster of riskless principal trades stands out among the high-markup transactions. On March 25, 2020, one dealer made $54.5 million in riskless profits by buying 238 Non-Agency CMO worth $1.732 billion from a single seller, while simultaneously splitting sales of these same positions among five counterparty accounts to generate proceeds of $1.787 billion. The value-weighted average markup on this portfolio crossing trade was 3.15% (about fifteen times the full-sample median level of 0.20% for average-sized Non-Agency CMO trades).
在高加价交易中，有一组无风险本金交易尤为突出。2020 年 3 月 25 日，一名交易商通过从单一卖方购买 238 笔非机构 CMO（总价值 17.32 亿美元），同时将这些头寸拆分出售给五个对手方账户，实现无风险利润 5450 万美元，最终获得 17.87 亿美元的收益。该投资组合交叉交易的加权平均加价率为 3.15%（约为平均规模非机构 CMO 交易全样本中位数 0.20%的十五倍）。
High-fives all around! March 2020 was intense, man! The whole reason to be a bond trader at a bank is that every once in a long while there is some global catastrophe that pushes customers to buy or sell huge portfolios of bonds in a hurry, and when that happens you can charge whatever you want. You buy low, from them, and sell high, to someone else, because you sit in the middle of all the trading and the trading is wild. Banks’ trading desks make money on volatility, and this is how: This trade, in the middle of a market meltdown, apparently took the bank 12 minutes and made $54.5 million.2
到处都是击掌庆祝！2020 年 3 月太疯狂了，伙计！在银行做债券交易员的整个理由就是，偶尔会发生某种全球性灾难，促使客户匆忙买卖庞大的债券组合，而当这种情况发生时，你可以随意定价。你低价从他们那里买入，高价卖给别人，因为你处于所有交易的中间，而交易非常疯狂。银行的交易部门靠波动性赚钱，而这就是方式：这笔交易发生在市场崩溃的过程中，显然银行用了 12 分钟就赚了 5450 万美元。
The buyers did even better:
买家做得更好：
We interpret these trades as a stark example of a dealer who conspired with a group of “vulture” buyers to profit from a vulnerable seller. We provide benchmarks that suggest this dealer also orchestrated a price suppression of at least 20% of the fair value of this trade, benefiting the buying group while disadvantaging the seller by more than $346 million. Summing together both the price suppression and the markup effects, at least $400 million of the seller’s interests vaporized in this dealer-facilitated transaction.
我们将这些交易解读为一个经销商与一群“秃鹫”买家合谋，从一个脆弱的卖家那里获利的典型案例。我们提供的基准表明，该经销商还策划了至少比该交易公允价值低 20%的价格压制，使买方群体受益，同时使卖方损失超过 3.46 亿美元。综合价格压制和加价效应，至少有 4 亿美元的卖方利益在这笔由经销商促成的交易中蒸发。
Thirty-five days later, on April 29, 2020, exactly one-fifth of this same set of 238 Non-Agency CMO was “unwound” with a dealer who crossed its buy trades with matched sales to a new customer. The vulture investor received $496.8 million from the dealer upon sale of its positions, generating $139.4 million in capital gains relative to its initial investment of $357.4 million (i.e., one-fifth of $1.787 billion). The $139.4 million capital gain corresponds to a 39.0% return on invested capital in 35 days for the unwinding vulture investor
三十五天后，即 2020 年 4 月 29 日，这同一组 238 只非机构 CMO 中的五分之一被“解除”，交易商将其买入交易与匹配的销售交易对接给一位新客户。秃鹫投资者在出售其持仓时从交易商处获得了 4.968 亿美元，相较于其最初的 3.574 亿美元投资（即 17.87 亿美元的五分之一），实现了 1.394 亿美元的资本收益。1.394 亿美元的资本收益相当于这位解除持仓的秃鹫投资者在 35 天内获得了 39.0%的投资资本回报率。
The authors think this is all bad — the buyers are “vultures” and the dealer is a “bandit” — but that’s how markets work! If you have to dump all of your bonds because the market is panicking and (1) you are also panicking and/or (2) the general panic causes you to lose your financing, someone else will probably buy those bonds from you, but they will buy them cheap. They’re buying into a panic; they want a discount. And then 35 days later when the panic is over they will make 39% on their money. Also the bank that puts the trade together will make a killing.
作者们认为这一切都很糟糕——买家是“秃鹫”，交易商是“强盗”——但市场就是这样运作的！如果你因为市场恐慌而不得不抛售所有债券，而（1）你自己也在恐慌，和/或（2）普遍的恐慌导致你失去融资，那么可能会有其他人从你那里买下这些债券，但他们会以低价购买。他们是在恐慌中买入，他们想要折扣。然后 35 天后，当恐慌结束时，他们将在这笔交易中赚取 39%。此外，促成交易的银行也会大赚一笔。
BlackRock DEI loans
贝莱德多元、公平与包容贷款
Seven hundred years ago, in 2021, BlackRock Inc. struck a deal to borrow some money from a group of banks led by Wells Fargo & Co.1 As part of the agreement, BlackRock and the banks agreed to three sets of “sustainability targets” for BlackRock’s business: It would aim to employ more Black and Hispanic employees, have more women in leadership roles, and manage more assets with sustainable-investing mandates.2 If it hit enough of these targets, its commitment fee for the credit facility — the amount it paid the banks every year even if it didn’t actually draw any money — would go down by 0.01% from the baseline agreed fee, and its interest rate — the amount it paid if it did actually take any money — would go down by 0.05%. If it missed enough of the targets badly enough, its commitment fee and rate would go up by 0.01% and 0.05%. So if BlackRock was very diverse, it would pay 0.02% less per year (in commitment fees) than if it was very not diverse. (As far as I can tell it has not drawn on the credit facility, so I focus on the commitment fee.)
七百年前，即 2021 年，贝莱德公司（BlackRock Inc.）与以富国银行（Wells Fargo & Co.）为首的一组银行达成了一项借款协议。作为协议的一部分，贝莱德与这些银行就贝莱德的业务达成了三组“可持续发展目标”：增加黑人和西班牙裔员工的雇佣比例，增加女性领导者人数，以及管理更多具有可持续投资使命的资产。如果贝莱德达到足够多的这些目标，其信贷额度的承诺费（即即使未实际提款，每年也需支付给银行的费用）将比协议基准费用降低 0.01%，而实际提款时的利率则降低 0.05%。如果未能充分达到这些目标，其承诺费和利率则分别上升 0.01%和 0.05%。因此，如果贝莱德的多元化程度很高，其每年支付的承诺费将比多元化程度很低时少 0.02%。（据我所知，贝莱德尚未动用该信贷额度，因此我关注的是承诺费。）
You could try to analyze this provision in a normal credit-y way. Many credit agreements contain some sort of rate adjustment for things that make the loan riskier or safer. You could have a credit agreement where the rate is linked to credit ratings or net income or leverage ratios: If the company’s credit gets riskier, it has to pay its banks more; if it gets safer, it can pay them less. You can tell a story like this here. “These sustainability targets do in fact improve the long-term sustainability of the firm — thus the name — so the more diverse BlackRock’s leadership is, the more stable it will be, and the safer its debt will be. Therefore the banks should be willing to accept 0.02% less interest in states of the world where BlackRock is more diverse than in states where it is less diverse, because the more-diverse states are better for the credit, and the banks want to incentivize BlackRock to make decisions that are good for the credit.”
你可以尝试以常规的信贷分析方式来解读这一条款。许多信贷协议都包含某种利率调整机制，以应对贷款风险的增加或降低。你可以设想一种信贷协议，其中利率与信用评级、净收入或杠杆比率挂钩：如果公司的信用风险增加，它就必须向银行支付更多利息；如果风险降低，它就可以支付更少利息。你可以在这里讲述这样一个故事：“这些可持续发展目标确实能提高公司的长期可持续性——因此才有了这个名称——因此贝莱德的领导层越多元化，公司就越稳定，其债务也就越安全。因此，在贝莱德领导层更多元化的情况下，银行应愿意接受比领导层较少元化时低 0.02%的利息，因为更多元化的状态对信贷更有利，而银行希望激励贝莱德做出有利于信贷的决策。”
I do not think this is the right analysis?3 Or rather, I do not think it is what the banks or BlackRock were thinking. I have various reasons for this belief, but a simple one is: 0.02% is not very much. A bank making decisions about credit risk is probably thinking things like “if this company’s income goes down a lot, its credit will be a lot riskier, and we should charge a lot more,” or at least a medium amount; credit decisions rarely come as fine-tuned as 0.02%. It’s possible that a more diverse BlackRock really would be 0.02% less risky than a less diverse one, and that fee difference is correct, but if that’s true it’s sort of a lucky accident.
我认为这种分析并不正确？或者说，我不认为这是银行或贝莱德的想法。我有各种理由支持这一观点，但一个简单的理由是：0.02%并不是很多。一家银行在做信用风险决策时，可能会考虑类似“如果这家公司的收入大幅下降，其信用风险将大大增加，我们应该收取更高的费用”，或者至少是适中的费用；信用决策很少会精细到 0.02%这种程度。也许一个更多元化的贝莱德确实比一个较少元化的贝莱德风险低 0.02%，而且这种费用差异是正确的，但如果真是这样，那也只是某种幸运的巧合。
A more realistic analysis might be:
一个更现实的分析可能是：
1.The banks, in 2021, liked being able to say that they were doing some large volume of loans that were sustainable, sustainability-linked, ESG (environmental, social and governance investing), etc. Adding a — small — diversity incentive transformed this loan into a “sustainability-linked” loan, and the banks could put in their reports that they were doing a lot of sustainable lending.
2021 年，各银行乐于宣称自己发放了大量可持续贷款、可持续关联贷款、ESG（环境、社会和治理投资）贷款等。加入一个（小的）多元化激励措施后，这笔贷款便转变为“可持续关联”贷款，银行便可在报告中宣称自己进行了大量可持续贷款业务。
2.BlackRock, in 2021, was also very into that sort of thing, and taking out the sustainability-linked loan was good press for it.
贝莱德在 2021 年也非常热衷于此类事务，获得与可持续发展挂钩的贷款对其而言是个好宣传。
Anyway, right, that was 700 years ago. Here’s the Wall Street Journal today:
不管怎样，那已经是 700 年前的事了。以下是今天《华尔街日报》的报道：
BlackRock cut references to its diversity, equity and inclusion strategy in its latest annual report, joining the list of Wall Street firms and corporate employers distancing themselves from DEI.
贝莱德在其最新的年度报告中删除了对多元化、公平和包容性战略的提及，加入了与 DEI 保持距离的华尔街公司和企业雇主的行列。
It is a particularly notable turnaround for BlackRock, where Chief Executive Larry Fink once embraced DEI and environmental, social and governance investing.
对于贝莱德来说，这是一次尤为显著的转变，其首席执行官拉里·芬克曾一度支持多元、公平和包容（DEI）以及环境、社会和治理（ESG）投资。
“Just as we ask of other companies, we have a long-term strategy aimed at improving diversity, equity and inclusion at BlackRock,” Fink wrote in a 2021 letter to shareholders. “To truly drive change, we must embed DEI into everything we do.”
“正如我们对其他公司的要求一样，我们在贝莱德制定了一项旨在改善多元化、公平和包容性的长期战略，”芬克在 2021 年致股东的信中写道。“要真正推动变革，我们必须将多元化、公平和包容性融入到我们所做的一切之中。”
In BlackRock’s annual report filed Tuesday, the world’s largest asset manager deleted statements it included in past reports about a diverse and inclusive workforce being “a commercial imperative and indispensable.”
在贝莱德周二提交的年度报告中，这家全球最大的资产管理公司删除了此前报告中关于多元化和包容性员工队伍是“一项商业必要条件且不可或缺”的表述。
BlackRock removed references to its “three pillar DEI strategy.” Gone also was a statement that “BlackRock views transparency and measurement as critical to its strategy,” and a breakdown of its U.S. employees by gender and self-disclosed ethnicity.
贝莱德删除了对其“三大支柱多元、公平与包容（DEI）战略”的提及。同时被删除的还有“贝莱德认为透明度和衡量标准对其战略至关重要”的声明，以及按性别和自我披露族裔划分的美国员工数据。
And — perhaps — more substantively:
而且——或许更重要的是：
A subtle footnote in the annual filing showed BlackRock backing away from DEI in another way. In 2021, the company struck a financing deal with a group of banks that linked the lending costs for a $4.4 billion credit facility to its ability to achieve certain goals, such as meeting targets for women in senior leadership and Black and Latino employees in its workforce.
年度申报文件中的一条不起眼的脚注显示，贝莱德在另一个方面也在逐步远离多元、公平与包容（DEI）。2021 年，该公司与一组银行达成了一项融资协议，将一笔 44 亿美元信贷额度的贷款成本与其实现特定目标的能力挂钩，例如达到高级领导层女性人数以及员工中黑人和拉丁裔人数的目标。
BlackRock said the ESG-linked credit facility, a novel arrangement at the time, would enhance its accountability.
贝莱德表示，当时这种与 ESG 挂钩的信贷安排是一种新颖的做法，将提高其问责性。
Those metrics will no longer be enforced. BlackRock disclosed Tuesday that it amended the credit facility to “update the sustainability-linked pricing mechanics to remove existing metrics.”
这些指标将不再被执行。贝莱德周二披露，其已修改信贷安排，“更新了与可持续性挂钩的定价机制，移除了现有指标”。
Here is the annual report; apparently the sustainability-linked metrics were removed in May 2024 and “new metrics, if any” might be set later.4 I would love to have been at those negotiations. Do you think they got heated?
这是年度报告；显然，与可持续性相关的指标已于 2024 年 5 月被移除，“如有新指标”可能稍后设定。⁴ 我真希望当时能在谈判现场。你觉得谈判会很激烈吗？
BlackRock: We will need to stop doing the thing where we pay you an extra 0.01% if we’re not diverse enough, and we pay you 0.01% less if we’re very diverse.
贝莱德：我们需要停止这种做法，即如果我们的多元化程度不够，就额外支付你们 0.01%，如果我们的多元化程度很高，就少支付你们 0.01%。
Banks: What? Those metrics were crucial to our credit analysis, and we are not comfortable just deleting them. You promised us that you would work to meet diversity targets, and if you can’t do that then we will have to reevaluate our entire lending relationship.
银行：什么？那些指标对我们的信贷分析至关重要，我们不愿意就这样删除它们。你们曾承诺会努力实现多元化目标，如果你们做不到，我们将不得不重新评估我们整个贷款关系。
BlackRock: ...
贝莱德：...
Banks: …
银行：…
BlackRock: Lol.
贝莱德：哈哈。
Banks: Ahahaha we had you going for a minute there. No it’s fine just delete it, who cares, we’re not reporting our diversity-linked lending anymore either.
银行：哈哈哈，我们刚才差点把你骗到了。没事，删了吧，谁在乎呢，反正我们也不再报告与多元化相关的贷款了。
There is something a little annoying about this. A loan agreement is mostly negotiated between lenders who want one thing and a borrower who wants another thing. Generally speaking, if the loan agreement says the borrower has to pay more in some circumstances, it’s because the lenders are worried about those circumstances and have insisted on some protections and incentives. If the borrower comes to the lenders and says “can we just forget about that,” the lenders will say things like “no” or “what” or “are you in trouble?”
这件事有点令人恼火。贷款协议通常是在想要某种东西的贷款方和想要另一种东西的借款方之间协商达成的。一般来说，如果贷款协议规定借款人在某些情况下必须支付更多费用，那是因为贷款方担心这些情况，并坚持要求一些保护措施和激励条款。如果借款人找到贷款方说：“我们能不能就当没这回事？”贷款方通常会回应：“不行”、“什么？”或者“你是不是遇到麻烦了？”
And so, in 2021, when BlackRock signed this agreement, it was meant to signal some sort of costly commitment: If we fail to hit our diversity targets, it will cost us, because there are economically motivated banks on the other side who will hold us to those targets. But there weren’t! It was all pretty much fake. There was no real commitment, and when it became inconvenient for BlackRock, it became similarly inconvenient for the banks, and they could just forget about it.
因此，在 2021 年，当贝莱德签署这项协议时，本意是表明某种代价高昂的承诺：如果我们未能达到多元化目标，就会付出代价，因为另一方是有经济动机的银行，会督促我们实现这些目标。但实际上并非如此！这一切基本上都是虚假的。并没有真正的承诺，当这对贝莱德变得不便时，对银行来说也同样变得不便，他们就可以直接将其抛诸脑后。
类似恒大在美元债中提供的担保，全年有效但12月31日无效，白痴通过激烈的取巧为现实提供了丰富性，如果是训练AI，这样的丰富性肯定可以提高AI的智能水平。
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