I.H.80.Steve Jobs.Management By Values
1、Steve Jobs
《2003-05-29 Steve Jobs.You never know what’s around the next corner.》
There’s a lot of management techniques. I’m sure you study a lot of management techniques. When I was younger, it was management by objective. It’s all a crock. They’re all after-the-fact management techniques: “You’ve failed, and I know that because we are going out of business tomorrow.” All after the fact. “You’ve ruined this department; all the good people have left. So now I’m firing you.” “You’ve accomplished none of your objectives.” It doesn’t work.
有很多管理技巧。我相信你研究了很多管理技巧。当我年轻的时候，目标管理是主流。这都是废话。它们都是事后管理技巧：“你失败了，我知道，因为我们明天就要倒闭。”全都是事后才说。“你毁了这个部门；所有优秀的人都离开了。所以现在我要解雇你。”“你没有完成任何目标。”这行不通。
And a really smart guy I met a long time ago who used to teach at Disney University—Walt Disney recruited him to run Disney University, actually—he told me about his point of view, which I’ve remembered to this day. He called it management by values. What that means is you find people that want the same things you want, and then just get the hell out of their way.
我很久以前遇到的一个非常聪明的人，他曾在迪士尼大学任教——实际上是沃尔特·迪士尼招募他来管理迪士尼大学——他告诉我他的观点，我至今仍记得。他称之为价值观管理。这意味着你找到那些想要和你一样东西的人，然后就让他们自由发挥。
The way I describe it is, let’s say we’re all going to take a trip together. The first thing is to figure out where we all want to go. The worst thing is if we all decide we want to go to different places. You can never manage it. [Pointing] You want to go to New Orleans. You want to go somewhere else. I want to go to San Francisco. You want to go to San Diego.
我描述的方式是，假设我们要一起去旅行。第一件事是弄清楚我们都想去哪里。最糟糕的是如果我们都决定想去不同的地方。你永远无法管理它。[指着] 你想去新奥尔良。你想去别的地方。我想去旧金山。你想去圣地亚哥。
It doesn’t work. Right? 它不管用。对吧？
But if we all want to go to San Diego, that’s the key. Then we can argue about how to get there. [Pointing] You think it’s better to walk. You think it’s better to take a plane. You think it’s better to take a train. We’ll figure that [part] out. Because if I say, “I want to take a train to San Diego,” and somebody goes, “That’s really stupid! It will take three days! We can fly and be there in an hour,” I’ll go, “Oh. OK.” Because, actually, I want to go to San Diego. So if I can get there in an hour [flying], I’ll ditch my idea about the train.
但如果我们都想去圣地亚哥，那就是关键。然后我们可以争论怎么去那里。[指着] 你认为走路更好。你认为坐飞机更好。你认为坐火车更好。我们会搞清楚这一部分。因为如果我说：“我想坐火车去圣地亚哥，”而有人说：“那真的很愚蠢！要花三天时间！我们可以飞一个小时就到，”我会说：“哦，好吧。”因为实际上，我想去圣地亚哥。所以如果我能一个小时内到达[飞行]，我就会放弃我关于火车的想法。
That’s what management by values is. It’s finding people with passion that want to go to San Diego—who want to go to the same place you want to go to! Right? That’s the key.
这就是价值观管理。就是要找到有激情、想去圣地亚哥的人--他们想去的地方和你想去的地方一样！对不对？这就是关键所在。
And so, what happened at Apple was that Apple’s goals used to be to make the best personal computers in the world. And then the second goal was to make a profit so we could keep on doing number one. Right?
所以，苹果发生的事情是，苹果的目标曾经是制造世界上最好的个人电脑。第二个目标是盈利，以便我们能够继续做第一件事。对吗？
What happened was that, for a time, those got reversed: “We want to make a bunch of money, and so, OK, to do that, we’re going to have to make some good personal computers.” But it didn’t work. It never works. And so things start to fall apart.
发生的事情是，曾经这些情况发生了逆转：“我们想赚很多钱，因此，好吧，为了做到这一点，我们必须制造一些好的个人电脑。”但这并没有成功。它从来没有成功过。因此事情开始崩溃。
Those subtle changes in values can mean everything. The higher up in the organization they are, the more pervasive influence they have. So if you want to preserve something, what you want to do is have a good enough place to go, that’s got a long enough focal length that it will survive over time, that everybody agrees on—and not codify how you’re going to get there. So that each generation can argue anew about the best way to get to San Diego, and they’re not just taking your footsteps on how you got there. You see what I’m saying? But all the people want to go to the same place.
那些微妙的价值变化可能意味着一切。它们在组织中的地位越高，影响力就越广泛。因此，如果你想保留某样东西，你需要有一个足够好的地方可以去，那个地方的焦距足够长，以便能够随着时间的推移而存活下来，大家都能达成共识——而不是规定你将如何到达那里。这样每一代人都可以重新争论到达圣地亚哥的最佳方式，而不仅仅是沿着你到达那里时的足迹。你明白我的意思吗？但所有人都想去同一个地方。
And that’s one of my mantras around Apple and Pixar: that recruiting is the most important thing that you do. Finding the right people—that’s half the battle.
这也是我在苹果和皮克斯工作时的口头禅之一：招聘是最重要的事情。找到合适的人，就等于成功了一半。
2、Warren Buffett
《1980-03-03 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》
In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.
在很大程度上，公司获得了他们所寻求和应得的股东群体。如果他们将思维和沟通集中在短期业绩或短期股市后果上，他们在很大程度上会吸引关注相同因素的股东，而若公司对其股东采取轻蔑的态度，最后投资大众亦会以相同的态度回报之。
Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele - patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc. - and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.
菲尔·费舍尔，一位受人尊敬的投资者和作家，曾将公司吸引股东的政策比作餐厅吸引潜在顾客的方式。餐厅可以寻求特定的顾客群体——快餐、优雅正餐、东方美食等的顾客——并最终获得一群合适的忠实顾客。如果工作做得很出色，这些顾客会因为提供的服务、菜单和价格水平而持续光顾。但餐厅不能不断改变其特色，否则就无法拥有快乐和稳定的顾客群。如果生意在法式料理和外卖炸鸡之间摇摆不定，结果将是顾客不断进出，感到困惑和不满。
So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.
同样的，公司和它们所寻求的股东群体也是如此。你不能同时迎合所有人的需求，寻求不同的所有者，他们的主要利益从短期收益到长期资本增长，再到股市的烟火表演等各不相同。
The reasoning of managements that seek large trading activity in their shares puzzles us. In effect, such managements are saying that they want a good many of the existing clientele continually to desert them in favor of new ones - because you can’t add lots of new owners (with new expectations) without losing lots of former owners.
管理层寻求其股票大量交易活动的理由让我们感到困惑。实际上，这些管理层是在说，他们希望现有的许多客户不断抛弃他们，转而选择新的客户——因为你无法在不失去许多原有股东的情况下增加大量新股东（带着新的期望）。
We much prefer owners who like our service and menu and who return year after year. It would be hard to find a better group to sit in the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder “seats” than those already occupying them. So we hope to continue to have a very low turnover among our owners, reflecting a constituency that understands our operation, approves of our policies, and shares our expectations. And we hope to deliver on those expectations.
我们更喜欢那些喜欢我们的服务和菜单，并且年复一年回来的股东。很难找到比现在已经占据伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东“席位”的人更好的群体。因此，我们希望在我们的股东中继续保持非常低的流动率，反映出一个理解我们运营、认可我们政策并分享我们期望的群体。我们希望能够兑现这些期望。
《2010-05-01 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
17. Creating a good corporate culture is easier than changing a bad one
创造良好的企业文化比改变不良的企业文化要容易。
WARREN BUFFETT: Area 6.
沃伦·巴菲特：第 6 区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, thanks for having us here.
观众成员：芒格先生和巴菲特先生，谢谢你们邀请我们来这里。
I recently joined a new organization and for me to succeed there, the culture of the organization needs to change.
我最近加入了一个新组织，而要在其中获得成功，组织的文化需要改变。
So I’m interested in hearing your thoughts about how do you change culture of an organization? And if you’re building a new organization, then how do you make sure you have a strong and unique culture?
我很想听听你对如何改变一个组织文化的看法。如果你正在建立一个新组织，那么你如何确保拥有强大而独特的文化？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s a lot easier to build a new organization around a culture than it is to change the culture of an existing organization. It is really tough. And I like that fact, in the sense of Berkshire.
沃伦·巴菲特：我认为围绕一种文化建立一个新组织要比改变现有组织的文化容易得多。这真的很困难。我喜欢这一点，从伯克希尔的角度来看。
I mean, it would be very tough to change the culture of Berkshire. It’s so ingrained in all our managers, our owners. Everything about the place is designed, in effect, to reinforce a culture.
我意思是，改变伯克希尔的文化将非常困难。这种文化在我们所有的管理者和所有者中根深蒂固。这个地方的一切实际上都是为了强化这种文化而设计的。
And for anybody to come in and try and change it very much, I think the culture would basically reject it.
如果有任何人试图对其进行重大改变，我认为文化基本上会抵制它。
And the problem you describe, if you want to walk into, you know, whatever kind of organization you want to name — I’ve got to be a little careful here — it is tough to change cultures.
你描述的问题，如果你想走进某个组织——我得小心措辞——改变文化是很困难的。
Charlie and I have bucked up against that a few times. And I would say if you have any choice in the matter, I would much rather start from scratch and build it around it.
查理和我在这方面也遇到过几次挑战。我会说，如果你在这方面有任何选择，我宁愿从头开始，围绕文化建立。
But that was the — I’ve had the luxury of time with Berkshire. I mean, it goes back to 1965, and there really wasn’t much of anything there, you know, except some textile miles, so I didn’t have to fight anything.
但那是——我有幸与伯克希尔共度时光。我的意思是，这可以追溯到 1965 年，当时那里几乎没有什么，除了几条纺织品生产线，所以我不需要与任何东西抗争。
And as we added companies, they became complementary and they bought into something that they felt good about, but it took decades.
随着我们增加公司，它们变得互补，并且它们认同了一些让他们感到良好的事情，但这花费了几十年。
And, you know, at Salomon, I attempted to change the culture, in terms of some respects, and I would not grade myself A+ in terms of the result.
在Salomon，我试图在某些方面改变文化，但我不会给自己的结果打 A+。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m quite flattered that a man would say that he’s in a new place where he can’t succeed unless he changes the culture and he wants us to tell him how to change the culture.
查理·芒格：嗯，我很受宠若惊，有人说他在一个新地方，除非改变文化，否则无法成功，而他想让我们告诉他如何改变文化。
In your position, my failure rate has been 100 percent. (Laughter) And —
在你的情况下，我的失败率是100%。（笑声）——
文化是自我选择，问出问题本身就说明有问题了，无可救药了。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, Charlie started a law firm. Go back to, what, 1962, Charlie, what was it?
沃伦·巴菲特：是的，查理开了一家律师事务所。回到 1962 年，查理，那是什么？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I can move out but I couldn’t change the culture. (Laughs)
查理·芒格：是的。我可以搬出去，但我无法改变文化。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: We can tell some interesting stories from the old law firm, but we’ll go on to Carol now.
沃伦·巴菲特：我们可以讲一些关于旧律师事务所的有趣故事，但我们现在继续请卡罗尔提问。
《2022-05-02 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》
32. How a “culture of lying” can develop at a company
公司如何形成“撒谎文化”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Station six. OK.
沃伦·巴菲特：是的。第六站。好的。
MARTIN WEGAND: My name is Martin Wegand. I live in Nashville, Tennessee. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for your lifetime of teachings and for hosting us back in Omaha this year. (Applause)
马丁·韦甘德：我的名字是马丁·韦甘德。我住在田纳西州的纳什维尔。巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您们一生的教导，以及今年在奥马哈接待我们。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特：谢谢你。
MARTIN WEGAND: You have mentioned that companies get the shareholders they deserve. And in this year’s letter, you mentioned a great satisfaction of yours is working for the individual long-term shareholders. With the growing influence of institutional index funds, how can management teams foster a shareholder culture like the one we have at Berkshire? Thank you.
马丁·韦甘德：您提到过公司得到的股东是他们应得的。在今年的信中，您提到您最大的满足之一是为个人长期股东工作。随着机构指数基金影响力的不断增强，管理团队如何培养像我们在伯克希尔那样的股东文化？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, fortunately we have it, and we know more about how to keep it than to institute one. And it’s very interesting. We have a 1,470,000 class A shares outstanding today. Fewer than we had a year ago. And those seats are filled. I mean you are the shareholders in place.
沃伦·巴菲特：好吧，幸运的是我们有它，我们知道如何保持它比建立一个更有经验。这非常有趣。我们今天有 1,470,000 股 A 类股票在外流通。比一年前少。那些席位已经满了。我的意思是你们是现有的股东。
We like the group we have. So why in the world, when we got a fixed number of seats, should we go out and recruit other people to replace you? You know? I mean the ideal shareholder group we can have is the group we have today. And, you know, if we had a church, we’d want the people to keep coming back week after week after week.
我们喜欢我们现在的团队。那么，为什么在我们有固定座位的情况下，还要出去招募其他人来替代你呢？你知道吗？我的意思是，我们理想的股东群体就是我们今天拥有的这个团队。而且，你知道，如果我们有一个教堂，我们希望人们一周又一周地回来。
If we had a limited number of seats, and we had some wonderful parishioners, we would not go out and recruit another 50 or 100 of them and have to throw out 50 or 100 of the ones we already had. We’ve got. And every company I know, virtually, you know, is wooing new people to come in.
如果我们座位有限，而我们有一些优秀的教区居民，我们不会去招募另外 50 或 100 个，然后不得不把我们已经拥有的 50 或 100 个赶出去。我们已经拥有的。几乎我知道的每家公司都在吸引新的人加入。
And whether they’re improving the group they get or not, I mean it strikes us as basically crazy. We don’t want anybody different (Laughter) than we have now. And, you know, we’re not going to get rid of the index fund, so we have to get rid of people like you, and we don’t want to get rid of people like you. (Laughs)
无论他们是否在改善他们得到的团队，我的意思是这基本上让我们觉得疯狂。我们不想要任何与我们现在不同的人（笑）。而且，你知道，我们不会放弃指数基金，所以我们必须摆脱像你这样的人，但我们不想摆脱像你这样的人。（笑）
And I just don’t understand why if you had a neighborhood, and the size of the terrain or whatever it was would be such that you could have ten neighbors, and they were all great neighbors, why in the world would you go out and say to a whole bunch of people going up and down the street, you know, “Why don’t you buy the house of the guy next to me?”
我就是不明白，如果你有一个社区，地形的大小或其他什么因素使得你可以有十个邻居，而且他们都是很好的邻居，为什么你会出去对一群在街上走来走去的人说：“你们为什么不买我旁边那个家伙的房子？”
You know, (Laughs) it is weird, but there’s an awful lot of people that make their living by doing that, and they never really question. I would sort of ask any company that’s making analyst presentations every month or something, “Which of the present ones are you trying to get rid of?”
（笑）这确实很奇怪，但有很多人靠这种方式谋生，他们从来没有真正质疑过。我会问那些每个月都做分析师展示的公司，“你们现在到底想摆脱哪一个股东？”
You know, basically, because I hope you’re not going to have more shares outstanding at the end of the year than you have now. And am I supposed to, you know, get out of the way so (Laughs) some other fund that is thinking about what your stock is going to do next week replaces me? It is a very, very, very weird situation.
基本上，我希望你们年底的流通股数量不会比现在更多。难道我应该让位，让那些只关心你们股票下周走势的基金取代我吗？（笑）这真是一个非常、非常、非常奇怪的局面。
And of course, the really crazy process that has developed is people talking to, we’ll say, analyst group, you know, sort of the high priests of finance, you know, some companies are doing it more than once a month. Well, just imagine if you work for that company, you go to work for that company, and every month people are repeating these things about their company that, “It’s important that we have more services per customer at 6.2 and we got to get to seven,” or something like that.
当然，发展出来的真正疯狂的过程就是公司与分析师群体——也就是金融界的“高僧”——对话。有些公司每个月进行不止一次这样的交流。试想一下，如果你在这家公司工作，每个月人们都在重复这些关于公司的事情，比如“我们每位客户的服务数量从6.2增加到7很重要”之类的目标。
And they’d say that month after month after month, so it becomes a catechism. And CEO says it or his or her representative says it, and how do you go on the next month and say, “By the way, we were really wrong, and this is what we should be working on.”
他们一个月又一个月地这样说，所以这变成了一种教义。首席执行官或他的代表这样说，那么下个月你怎么能说，“顺便说一下，我们真的错了，这才是我们应该努力的方向。”
You don’t say that. And it’s a terrible problem the new CEO has coming in after a previous CEO has said the important thing to do is to hit your earnings targets. Well, you know, he’s been meeting them, in all probability, by cheating from some time to time.
你不要这么说。这对新任 CEO 来说是个可怕的问题，因为前任 CEO 曾说过，重要的事情就是达到你的盈利目标。好吧，你知道，他很可能是通过不时作弊来达到这些目标的。
And this guy hands you the baton, and are you going to come out and say, “Well, we’ve really been cheating a little and it’s really counterproductive to the development of the, you know, companies, not to make earnings projections and just to give you the results as they come, rather than making up a few things.
这个家伙把接力棒递给你，你会出来说：“好吧，我们其实一直在作弊，这对公司的发展真的没有帮助，不做盈利预测，而只是把结果按时给你，而不是编造一些东西。”
And the accounting department, you know, they can’t do it. It’s not human nature, and besides, you wouldn’t get appointed the successor. But you just don’t go in and say, “We’ve been perpetuating these myths that we can always deliver 8% growth or we can do this or do that, or the most important thing is this.”
而会计部门，你知道，他们做不到。这不是人性，而且，你也不会被任命为继任者。但你不能就这样进去说：“我们一直在延续这些神话，认为我们总是能实现 8%的增长，或者我们能做到这个或那个，或者最重要的事情是这个。”
You can’t go in and change that if every month you’ve been preaching to people that this is what we stand for, and just ask another question and carry this message out to the masses, to the analysts and all that. And it’s a totally destructive policy.
如果你每个月都在向人们宣讲这是我们公司的立场，那么你就不能轻易改变这种做法。你只是不断重复同样的问题，并将这个信息传达给大众、分析师等人。这是一种完全具有破坏性的政策。
I mean, you know, I can, within gap accounting, I can play a lot of games with numbers. We’ve done a lot-ta dumb things at Berkshire. We have never told anybody that the number had to be this or that or to change anything. I mean once you start it, it’s all over.
我意思是，你知道，在公认会计原则下，我可以对数字做很多文章。我们在伯克希尔做过很多愚蠢的事情。我们从来没有告诉过任何人这个数字必须是这样或那样，或者要改变什么。我是说，一旦你开始了，这一切就结束了。
You can’t quit. It’s like taking $5 out of the cash register. You know, the first time you take the five bucks out, you’ll say, “Well, I’m going to put it back.” And then do it a few times, and you’ll never stop. In fact, do it once and you probably never stop.
你不能放弃。这就像从收银机里拿出 5 美元。你知道，第一次拿出这五块钱时，你会说：“好吧，我会把它放回去。”然后再做几次，你就再也停不下来了。事实上，做一次，你可能就永远停不下来了。
But if something is going to be destructive, the thing to do is not start it. And forecasting earnings, I can’t imagine anything more destructive. I’ve got 360,000 people out there, and they know whether I’m lying or not. Many of them.
但如果某件事情会造成破坏，最好的做法就是不要开始它。而预测收益，我无法想象还有什么比这更具破坏性。我有 36 万人在外面，他们知道我是否在说谎。很多人都知道。
And they know what they send in figures, and they get changed? You know, what message are you telling? We’ve got one dramatic illustration of that within Berkshire. And it’s just, you know, if you start lying you’ve got a big problem. It’s that simple.
他们知道他们发送的数字是什么，并且它们会被更改吗？你知道，你在传达什么信息？我们在伯克希尔有一个戏剧性的例子。就是，如果你开始说谎，你就有一个大问题。就是这么简单。
And if you start saying to your team that somehow you’ve got a job — you’ve got shareholder relations, your job is to go out and tell everybody that our stock is the best thing among thousands of choices to buy, every day. Well, that’s crazy.
如果你开始对你的团队说，你有一份工作——你负责股东关系，你的工作是每天出去告诉大家我们的股票是成千上万种选择中最好的，那真是疯狂。
So what do you tell them? Well, they try to, you know, see which way the wind is blowing and figure out what they have to tell people. And that they go out and tell them, and then if you’re human, and you’ve said, “We’re going to earn $3.59 a share,” you can get to $3.59. And get there quite a while.
那么你会告诉他们什么呢？他们试图看清风向，弄清楚需要告诉人们什么，然后出去告诉他们。如果你是人类，你已经说过“我们会每股赚3.59美元”，你就会努力达到3.59美元。而且还会持续一段时间。
And, you know, you can have all these processes, but if you have a culture of lying, the processes really don’t — they just disappear. And Charlie and I have seen it, well, probably every time we’ve gone on a board. Charlie, tell them about it? (Laughs)
而且，你知道，你可以有所有这些流程，但如果你有一个说谎的文化，这些流程实际上并没有——它们只是消失了。查理和我见过这种情况，嗯，可能是我们每次上董事会时都会遇到。查理，跟他们讲讲吧？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Berkshire’s culture’s going to last a long time after we’re gone. And I think it should, and I think it’ll prosper pretty well. The rest of corporate America is quite different, and it gets more different, I think, with each passing decade.
查理·芒格：我认为，伯克希尔的文化在我们离开后会持续很长时间。我认为它应该这样，并且我认为它会相当繁荣。美国其他企业则截然不同，我认为随着每个十年的过去，它们会变得更加不同。
And it’s getting very peculiar. Pretty soon they’re going to hold all the shareholders’ meetings online, and the shareholders won’t even come. And it’s just it’s getting very peculiar. And the index fund’s getting more and more important than the voting. And it’s like everything else in life. It changes, and not always in ways you like.
而且情况变得非常奇怪。很快他们就会在线召开所有股东会议，而股东们甚至不会来。就是这样，情况变得非常奇怪。指数基金变得越来越重要，超过了投票。就像生活中的其他一切一样。它在变化，而变化并不总是你喜欢的方式。
WARREN BUFFETT: And it ends up for selecting different CEOs and all kinds of things. I mean, you’re not going to appoint a successor CEO that’s going to come in and say everything that’s been done before, you know, has been kind of fraudulent. You know? I mean if we needed to book an extra sale after the end of the quarter, if we needed to adjust the reserves, once you start lying, it’s all over.
沃伦·巴菲特：这最终会导致选择不同的首席执行官和各种事情。我的意思是，你不会任命一个继任的首席执行官，他会进来后说之前所做的一切都是有点欺诈的。你知道吗？我的意思是，如果我们在季度结束后需要记录一笔额外的销售，如果我们需要调整储备，一旦你开始说谎，一切就结束了。
And I just don’t know any way around that, except to try every way you can to not — if you set the wrong example at the top, you’ve got a real problem. You know? And we’ve never told anybody to change a figure. And we never will. And if they had been changing figures, you know, we’d be in all kinds of trouble, because they know it and I’d know it and the next person would know it. And it just deteriorates.
我真的不知道有什么办法可以解决这个问题，除了尽可能地避免——如果你在高层树立了错误的榜样，那你就有了真正的问题。你知道吗？我们从来没有告诉过任何人要更改数据。我们也永远不会。如果他们真的在更改数据，你知道，我们会陷入各种麻烦，因为他们知道，我也知道，下一个人也会知道。这只会恶化。
And we’ve really seen it time after time. The way boards operate, you know, it has to be process-oriented. I mean I understand the problems that Delaware has in writing a statute that judges face when they look at things, but it’s just extraordinary what an emphasis on process can do to an organization, because they think they can do anything if it’s allowed.
我们真的一次又一次地看到了这一点。董事会的运作方式，你知道，它必须是以流程为导向的。我的意思是，我理解特拉华州在制定法令时法官面临的问题，但对流程的重视对一个组织的影响是非凡的，因为他们认为只要被允许，他们就可以做任何事情。
And, you know, eventually the foundation crumbles.
而且，你知道，最终基础会崩溃。
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