I.H.82.Warren Buffett.Quality Decision

I.H.82.Warren Buffett.Quality Decision

1、《1962-01-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Limited Partners》

The Question of Conservatism 关于保守

The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
从上述三类投资中,你可以对我们投资组合的保守程度有个大概了解。很多年以前,许多人买了中期或长期市政债券或国债,以为自己很保守。这些债券的市值多次大跌,这些人很多肯定也没做到资产保值或提升实际购买力。

Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
现在,很多人意识到通货膨胀的问题了,但可能又担心过头了,他们几乎不看市盈率或股息率就买入蓝筹股,以为自己很保守。那些以为买债券就是保守的人,我们看到他们后来的结果了,现在以为买蓝筹股就是保守的人,结果如何还不得而知,但我认为这么投资风险很大。猜测贪婪善变的大众会给出多高的市盈率,毫无保守可言。

You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
不是因为很多人暂时和你意见一致,你就是对的。不是因为重要人物和你意见一致,你就是对的。当所有人都意见一致时,正是考验你的行为是否保守的时候。

You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在很多笔投资的过程中,只要你的假设正确、事实正确、推理正确,你最后就是对的。只有凭借知识和理智,才能实现真正的保守。

I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
我们的投资组合和一般人的不一样,完全不能证明我们是否比一般人更保守。是否保守,必须看投资方法如何,投资业绩如何。

I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 1/2 of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为,要客观评判我们投资的保守程度,就应该看我们在市场下跌时业绩如何,最好是看我们在市场大跌时的表现。1957 年和 1960 年,市场温和下跌,从我们的业绩可以看出来,我说的没错,我们的投资方法确实极为保守。我欢迎任何合伙人提出客观评判保守程度的方法,看一下我们做的如何。我们实现的亏损从来没超过净资产总额的 0.5%,我们实现的收益总额与亏损总额之比约为 100 :1。这表明我们一直处在上行的市场中,但是,在这样的市场里,一样可能出现很多亏钱的交易(你自己就能找到一些例子),所以我觉得这个比例还是能说明一些问题的。

2、《2011-03-23 Ajit Jain.Interview with NDTV》

AM: But does it also act as a constant pressure to outperform because that’s the parameter he’s setting?
AM:但这是否也会成为一种持续的压力,促使超越,因为这是他设定的参数?

AJ: It does and it doesn’t. It does in as much as you always want to live up to the expectations people have for you. It doesn’t because, unlike a lot of executives, he’s very rational about expectations. And, more than rational, I think he’s one of the few executives and bosses that I can think of who does a very good job in terms of distinguishing between outcome and decision-making before the event happened.
AJ:有时候是,有时候不是。是因为你总是想要达到人们对你的期望。不是因为,与许多高管不同,他对期望非常理性。而且,我认为他不仅理性,他是我能想到的少数几位在事件发生之前能够很好地区分结果和决策的高管和老板之一。

The world, the way it works, they look at outcome and you may have made a good decision which ends up in a bad outcome — and everyone comes down on [you] like a ton of bricks. By the same token, on the flip side, you might make a bad decision and end up with a good outcome and you get all of the glory under the sun. Warren does an incredible job in terms of decoupling the two — and measuring and evaluating people and the people who work for him in terms of the quality of the decision that was made before you know the outcome.
世界的运作方式是,他们关注结果,而你可能做出了一个好的决定,但最终却导致了不好的结果——然后每个人都会像一吨砖头一样压在你身上。反之,你可能做出了一个坏决定,却得到了一个好的结果,这时你就会获得所有的荣耀。沃伦在这方面做得非常出色,他将这两者分开——在你知道结果之前,衡量和评估人以及为他工作的人,关注的是所做决定的质量。
Idea
巴菲特的精髓,I.C.S。
In a sense, that makes it very easy to work for a human being who’s rational, who you’re very clear about what is it that’s important, and he sets very clear guidelines in terms of expectations [and] in terms of the ethics and how business should be conducted. And, pretty much, within those very broad boundaries he leaves you to manage the business as you think best.
从某种意义上说,这使得与一个理性的人合作变得非常简单,因为你非常清楚什么是重要的,他在期望、伦理和商业运作方面设定了非常明确的指导方针。在这些非常宽泛的界限内,他基本上让你按照自己的想法来管理业务。

3、《2012-05-05 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Andrew?
沃伦·巴菲特:好的。安德鲁?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: OK, here’s the question:
安德鲁·罗斯·索金:好的,问题是:

“Please tell us more about your experience this past year with Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. What did they do well, and did they make any mistakes? And please discuss how you compensate them a bit more.
请告诉我们您过去一年与托德·科姆斯和泰德·韦施勒的经历。 他们做得很好,是否犯过错误? 请多谈谈您是如何补偿他们的。

In an interview, you said that Todd Combs was well compensated for the performance of his stock picks last year.
在一次采访中,你说托德·科姆斯因去年股票选择的表现得到了很好的报酬。

Should we be worried about a short-term horizon for compensation? How do you ensure that Todd and Ted don’t chase high-flying stocks for the sake of compensation?
我们是否应该担心短期的薪酬前景?你如何确保托德和泰德不会为了薪酬而追逐高飞的股票?

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we’ve always been more concerned about how our record is achieved than the precise record itself. And with both Todd and Ted, Charlie and I were struck by, not only a good record, but intellectual integrity and qualities of character, a real commitment to Berkshire, a lifelong-type commitment.
沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我们一直更关心的是我们的业绩是如何取得的,而不是具体的业绩本身。对于托德和泰德,查理和我不仅被良好的业绩所打动,更被他们的知识诚信和品格品质所吸引,对伯克希尔的真正承诺,这是一种终身的承诺。

And we’ve seen hundreds and hundreds of good records in our lifetimes; we haven’t seen very many people we want to have join Berkshire.
我们在一生中见过成百上千的好记录;但我们没有见过很多我们想要让他们加入伯克希尔的人。

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