1981-02-27 Warren Buffett.Insurance Industry Conditions
Insurance Industry Conditions
保险产业现况
The insurance industry’s underwriting picture continues to unfold about as we anticipated, with the combined ratio (see definition on page 37) rising from 100.6 in 1979 to an estimated 103.5 in 1980. It is virtually certain that this trend will continue and that industry underwriting losses will mount, significantly and progressively, in 1981 and 1982. To understand why, we recommend that you read the excellent analysis of property-casualty competitive dynamics done by Barbara Stewart of Chubb Corp. in an October 1980 paper. (Chubb’s annual report consistently presents the most insightful, candid and well-written discussion of industry conditions; you should get on the company’s mailing list.) Mrs. Stewart’s analysis may not be cheerful, but we think it is very likely to be accurate.
保险行业承保状况的发展，持续大致符合我们的预期：综合赔付率（定义见第 37 页）已从 1979 年的 100.6 上升到 1980 年估计的 103.5。几乎可以肯定，这一趋势还会继续，行业承保亏损将在 1981 年和 1982 年显著且逐步扩大。若要理解其中原因，我们建议你读一读 Barbara Stewart（Chubb Corp.）在 1980 年 10 月一篇论文中，对财产险和责任险行业竞争动态所做的出色分析。（Chubb 的年报一贯对行业状况作出最有洞见、最坦率、也最出色的书面讨论；你应该把自己加入这家公司的邮寄名单。）Stewart 女士的分析也许不令人愉快，但我们认为它极可能是准确的。
And, unfortunately, a largely unreported but particularly pernicious problem may well prolong and intensify the coming industry agony. It is not only likely to keep many insurers scrambling for business when underwriting losses hit record levels - it is likely to cause them at such a time to redouble their efforts.
而且，不幸的是，还有一个几乎未被充分报道、却尤其恶性的难题，很可能会延长并加剧即将到来的行业痛苦。它不仅很可能使许多保险公司在承保亏损创下纪录时仍疯狂争抢业务——而且还很可能使它们在那种时候加倍努力去抢。
This problem arises from the decline in bond prices and the insurance accounting convention that allows companies to carry bonds at amortized cost, regardless of market value. Many insurers own long-term bonds that, at amortized cost, amount to two to three times net worth. If the level is three times, of course, a one-third shrink from cost in bond prices - if it were to be recognized on the books - would wipe out net worth. And shrink they have. Some of the largest and best known property-casualty companies currently find themselves with nominal, or even negative, net worth when bond holdings are valued at market. Of course their bonds could rise in price, thereby partially, or conceivably even fully, restoring the integrity of stated net worth. Or they could fall further. (We believe that short-term forecasts of stock or bond prices are useless. The forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.)
这个问题源于债券价格的下跌，以及保险行业的一项会计惯例：无论市场价值如何，公司都可以按摊余成本来计量债券。许多保险公司持有的长期债券，按摊余成本计，规模相当于其净资产的两到三倍。若是三倍，那么债券价格相对成本只要缩水三分之一——如果这种缩水必须在账上确认——就足以把净资产全部抹掉。而现实中，债券价格确实已经下跌了。现在，一些规模最大、知名度最高的财产险和责任险公司，如果把债券按市价计量，实际上会发现自己只剩名义上的净资产，甚至是负净资产。当然，债券价格也可能上涨，从而部分地，甚至在理论上完全地，恢复账面净资产的完整性；但它们也可能进一步下跌。（我们认为，对股票或债券价格的短期预测毫无用处。这类预测也许能告诉你许多关于预测者本人的事情，却什么也告诉不了你关于未来。）
It might strike some as strange that an insurance company’s survival is threatened when its stock portfolio falls sufficiently in price to reduce net worth significantly, but that an even greater decline in bond prices produces no reaction at all. The industry would respond by pointing out that, no matter what the current price, the bonds will be paid in full at maturity, thereby eventually eliminating any interim price decline. It may take twenty, thirty, or even forty years, this argument says, but, as long as the bonds don’t have to be sold, in the end they’ll all be worth face value. Of course, if they are sold even if they are replaced with similar bonds offering better relative value - the loss must be booked immediately. And, just as promptly, published net worth must be adjusted downward by the amount of the loss.
有些人也许会觉得奇怪：一家保险公司如果股票投资组合价格下跌到足以显著削弱净资产，其生存就会受到威胁；但如果债券价格下跌得更厉害，却似乎完全不会引发任何反应。对此，行业的解释会是：不管当前市价如何，这些债券到期时都会按面值足额偿付，因此任何中间过程中的价格下跌，终归都会被消除。这个论点会说，也许需要二十年、三十年，甚至四十年，但只要这些债券不必卖出，最终它们都会值回面值。当然，如果这些债券被卖出——即便卖出后换成了相似、但相对价值更高的债券——那笔损失就必须立刻入账。而且，已公布的净资产也必须同样迅速地按照这笔损失向下调整。
Under such circumstances, a great many investment options disappear, perhaps for decades. For example, when large underwriting losses are in prospect, it may make excellent business logic for some insurers to shift from tax-exempt bonds into taxable bonds. Unwillingness to recognize major bond losses may be the sole factor that prevents such a sensible move.
在这种情况下，许多投资选择会消失，甚至可能一消失就是几十年。比如说，当巨额承保亏损已在眼前时，对某些保险公司而言，从免税债券转向应税债券，可能在商业逻辑上是极其合理的选择。而不愿确认重大的债券亏损，可能就是阻止这种理性举措发生的唯一因素。
But the full implications flowing from massive unrealized bond losses are far more serious than just the immobilization of investment intellect. For the source of funds to purchase and hold those bonds is a pool of money derived from policyholders and claimants (with changing faces) - money which, in effect, is temporarily on deposit with the insurer. As long as this pool retains its size, no bonds must be sold. If the pool of funds shrinks - which it will if the volume of business declines significantly - assets must be sold to pay off the liabilities. And if those assets consist of bonds with big unrealized losses, such losses will rapidly become realized, decimating net worth in the process.
但由大规模未实现债券亏损所引出的全部后果，要比单单使投资决策僵化严重得多。因为，用来购买并持有这些债券的资金来源，是一池来自保单持有人和索赔人（尽管面孔不断变化）的资金——这些钱，实质上是暂时存放在保险公司那里的。只要这池资金的规模不缩小，就无需卖出债券。可如果这池资金收缩——而一旦业务量明显下降，它就一定会收缩——公司就必须出售资产来偿付这些负债。而如果这些资产正是那些存在巨额未实现亏损的债券，那么这些亏损就会迅速变成已实现亏损，并在这一过程中重创净资产。
银行、信托、P2P都有相似的问题，亏的越多，经营上越激进。2023年的Silicon Valley Bank（SVB）、Charles Schwab是眼面前的例子。
1、Silicon Valley Bank受到冲击的速度很快，问题很快暴露，很快就倒闭了；
2、Charles Schwab有可能更麻烦，有可能通过旗下的券商业务掩盖问题，比如，零佣金、亏损的方式吸收业务。
商业的本质是提供有价值的产品和服务，不赚钱、低利润的业务是需要重点关注的警示信号，比如：
（1）亚马逊低空飞行的模式就值得怀疑，如果剔除AWS，亚马逊的价值需要打很大的折扣；
（2）对于亚马逊来说，AWS不是必然的结果，即使抓住了先机也很难说能赢到最后，正面临激烈的竞争；
（3）AWS是电商业务的衍生品，自己用、别人也能用，这个属性决定了很难差异化，结果也是个同质化竞争的业务。
Thus, an insurance company with a bond market value shrinkage approaching stated net worth (of which there are now many) and also faced with inadequate rate levels that are sure to deteriorate further has two options. One option for management is to tell the underwriters to keep pricing according to the exposure involved - “be sure to get a dollar of premium for every dollar of expense cost plus expectable loss cost”.
因此，一家保险公司如果其债券市值缩水已接近其账面净资产（现在这种公司已有很多），同时又面临明显不足、而且注定还会进一步恶化的费率水平，那么它其实只有两个选择。管理层的一个选择，是告诉承保人员继续按照风险暴露来定价——“务必要为每 1 美元的费用成本加上预期赔付成本，收取至少 1 美元的保费”。
The consequences of this directive are predictable: (a) with most business both price sensitive and renewable annually, many policies presently on the books will be lost to competitors in rather short order; (b) as premium volume shrinks significantly, there will be a lagged but corresponding decrease in liabilities (unearned premiums and claims payable); (c) assets (bonds) must be sold to match the decrease in liabilities; and (d) the formerly unrecognized disappearance of net worth will become partially recognized (depending upon the extent of such sales) in the insurer’s published financial statements.
这一指令的后果是可以预见的：(a) 由于大多数业务既对价格敏感，又是按年度续保的，账上现有的大量保单很快就会流失给竞争对手；(b) 随着保费规模显著收缩，负债（未赚保费和应付赔款）也会滞后但相应地减少；(c) 为了与负债减少相匹配，资产（债券）就必须被出售；以及 (d) 过去尚未被确认的净资产消失，将会在保险公司公开财务报表中被部分确认出来（具体程度取决于出售规模）。
Variations of this depressing sequence involve a smaller penalty to stated net worth. The reaction of some companies at (c) would be to sell either stocks that are already carried at market values or recently purchased bonds involving less severe losses. This ostrich-like behavior - selling the better assets and keeping the biggest losers - while less painful in the short term, is unlikely to be a winner in the long term.
这一令人沮丧的过程也会有一些变体，其对账面净资产的惩罚会稍轻一些。有些公司在走到步骤 (c) 时，可能会选择卖出那些已经按市价计量的股票，或者卖出近期购入、亏损较轻的债券。这种鸵鸟式做法——卖掉较好的资产，却把亏损最严重的资产留在手里——虽然短期内没那么痛苦，但从长期看，多半不会有好结果。
The second option is much simpler: just keep writing business regardless of rate levels and whopping prospective underwriting losses, thereby maintaining the present levels of premiums, assets and liabilities - and then pray for a better day, either for underwriting or for bond prices. There is much criticism in the trade press of “cash flow” underwriting; i.e., writing business regardless of prospective underwriting losses in order to obtain funds to invest at current high interest rates. This second option might properly be termed “asset maintenance” underwriting - the acceptance of terrible business just to keep the assets you now have.
第二种选择就简单得多：不管费率水平如何，也不管未来承保亏损会有多么惊人，照样继续承保业务，以此维持当前的保费规模、资产规模和负债规模——然后祈祷会有更好的日子到来，无论是承保环境改善，还是债券价格回升。行业媒体对“cash flow” 式承保有很多批评；也就是为了获取可投资于当前高利率环境中的资金，而不顾预期承保亏损照样承保业务。这第二种选择，更恰当的称呼也许应该是“资产维持型”承保——接受糟糕透顶的业务，只为了保住你现在手上的资产。
Of course you know which option will be selected. And it also is clear that as long as many large insurers feel compelled to choose that second option, there will be no better day for underwriting. For if much of the industry feels it must maintain premium volume levels regardless of price adequacy, all insurers will have to come close to meeting those prices. Right behind having financial problems yourself, the next worst plight is to have a large group of competitors with financial problems that they can defer by a “sell-at-any-price” policy.
当然，你知道大家会选哪一种方案。而且也很清楚：只要许多大型保险公司觉得自己被迫只能选第二种方案，承保环境就不会迎来什么更好的日子。因为如果行业中相当一部分公司觉得自己必须不顾价格是否合理、无论如何都维持保费规模，那么所有保险公司都不得不去接近这些价格。仅次于你自己陷入财务困境的第二糟糕处境，就是你有一大群竞争对手也陷入财务困境，而它们还能通过“赔本也要卖”的政策把问题往后拖。
防御式的反应都没有好的结果，无论是竞争的结果，还是心理上的防御，很多人因为生存的需求，仅有的一点钱只能存在银行拿一点微不足道的利息，陷进去以后安全边际越来越窄、越陷越深，很难出来。
We mentioned earlier that companies that were unwilling - for any of a number of reasons, including public reaction, institutional pride, or protection of stated net worth - to sell bonds at price levels forcing recognition of major losses might find themselves frozen in investment posture for a decade or longer. But, as noted, that’s only half of the problem. Companies that have made extensive commitments to long-term bonds may have lost, for a considerable period of time, not only many of their investment options, but many of their underwriting options as well.
我们前面提到过，那些由于各种原因——包括公众反应、机构自尊，或者保护账面净资产——而不愿在会迫使其确认重大亏损的价格水平上卖出债券的公司，可能会发现自己在投资姿态上被冻结十年甚至更久。但正如前面所说，这还只是问题的一半。那些在长期债券上作了大规模配置的公司，在相当长的一段时间里，失去的恐怕不仅是许多投资选择，也包括许多承保选择。
Our own position in this respect is satisfactory. We believe our net worth, valuing bonds of all insurers at amortized cost, is the strongest relative to premium volume among all large property-casualty stockholder-owned groups. When bonds are valued at market, our relative strength becomes far more dramatic. (But lest we get too puffed up, we remind ourselves that our asset and liability maturities still are far more mismatched than we would wish and that we, too, lost important sums in bonds because your Chairman was talking when he should have been acting.)[1]
就这一点而言，我们自己的处境是令人满意的。我们相信，在把所有保险公司的债券都按摊余成本计量的前提下，我们相对于保费规模的净资产实力，在所有大型、股东所有的财产险与责任险集团中是最强的。当债券按市价计量时，我们的相对实力就更加显著了。（不过，为了防止自己太过自满，我们也提醒自己：我们的资产与负债期限结构依旧比我们希望的要错配得多；而且我们自己在债券上也亏掉了相当重要的一笔钱，因为你们的董事长该行动的时候，却在讲话。）
Our abundant capital and investment flexibility will enable us to do whatever we think makes the most sense during the prospective extended period of inadequate pricing. But troubles for the industry mean troubles for us. Our financial strength doesn’t remove us from the hostile pricing environment now enveloping the entire property-casualty insurance industry. It just gives us more staying power and more options.
我们充足的资本和投资灵活性，将使我们在未来这段预计会持续较长时间的费率不足时期里，能够去做任何我们认为最有道理的事情。但是，行业的麻烦也就是我们的麻烦。我们的财务实力，并不能把我们从如今笼罩整个财产险与责任险行业的敌意定价环境中隔离出去。它只是让我们拥有更强的持久力和更多的选择。
浮存金和高流动性的资产、以及所有者权益之间应该有一个大致的比例。
1、浮存金大于所有者权益
浮存金投向风险较低的债券类资产，所有者权益投向股票，BRK的早期就是这么安排的。
2、浮存金大致等于所有者权益
存在比较大的安全边际，假设100亿美元的浮存金，对应100亿美元的所有者权益，可以将浮存金的大部分和所有者权益的全部拿去做股票投资，在相对极端的情况下，比如，下跌不超过50%，还能够保证保险的兑付。
3、浮存金小于所有者权益
BRK，2025年的数据，浮存金1760亿美元，类现金资产3690亿美元，股票2941亿美元，所有者权益7174亿美元，如果把类现金资产全部配成股票，整体下跌50%，还剩下3315.50亿美元，足以兑付保险，并且缩水后的所有者权益还有3858.50亿美元。
BRK，2025年的数据，浮存金1760亿美元，类现金资产3690亿美元，股票2941亿美元，所有者权益7174亿美元，如果把类现金资产全部配成股票，整体下跌50%，还剩下3315.50亿美元，足以兑付保险，并且缩水后的所有者权益还有3858.50亿美元。
安全边际有了，缺点是浮存金对于整体的贡献也下降了，但仍然有价值，相当于7174亿美元的净资产+1760亿美元低成本的负债，19.70%的负债率。
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