1982-02-26 Warren Buffett.Equity Value-Added
Equity Value-Added
股权投资的附加价值
An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns—interest on fixed-income securities—will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is "entitled" to higher returns. A "value-added" bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.
还有一个因素，应当能进一步压制你们对我们长期回报率残存的任何热情。为股权投资提供经济依据的论点是：通过将管理与企业家才能与股权资本结合运用，总体而言将获得超越被动投资回报——固定收益证券利息——的额外收益。此外，该论点还认为，由于股权资本头寸承担着比被动投资形式更大的风险，它"理应"获得更高的回报。股权资本带来"增值"红利，似乎既自然又确定。
But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10% enabled a corporation to be classified as a "good" business—i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands of the individual investor.
但真的如此吗？几十年前，仅仅10%的净资产收益率就足以使一家公司被归类为"好"企业——即在该企业中，每再投入一美元，理所当然地可以预期市场对其估值超过一百美分。因为，当长期应税债券收益率为5%、长期免税债券为3%时，一家能以10%回报运用股权资本的企业，在投资者眼中显然值得相对于所用股权资本支付一定溢价。即便股息税与资本利得税合并计算，会将企业赚取的10%压缩到个人投资者手中的6%至8%，上述判断依然成立。
Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were "good" businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.
投资市场认可了这一事实。在那个早先的时期，美国企业运用股权资本平均获得约11%的回报，股票总体上以远高于该股权资本（账面价值）的估值出售，平均超过每美元150美分。大多数企业都是"好"企业，因为它们的盈利远超维持自身运转的成本（长期被动资金的回报）。股权投资所产生的增值，总体而言相当可观。
That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence are difficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday's assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.
那个时代已经过去。但在那个时代习得的教训，却难以割舍。投资者和管理者虽然必须将双脚踏入未来，他们的记忆与神经系统却往往仍插在过去。投资者沿用历史市盈率、管理者沿用历史商业估值标准，都远比每天重新审视自己的前提假设来得容易。当变化缓慢时，不断重新思考实际上并不可取——收效甚微，还会拖慢反应速度。但当变化剧烈时，坚守昨日的假设只会付出沉重代价。而经济变化的速度，已经令人窒息。
During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16% and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.
过去一年，长期应税债券收益率超过16%，长期免税债券达14%。此类免税债券所取得的总回报，当然直接落入个人所有者的口袋。与此同时，美国企业的股权回报率仅约14%。而这14%在个人所有者将其存入账户之前，还将被税收大幅侵蚀。侵蚀的程度，取决于企业的股息政策以及适用于投资者的税率。
Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax-exempt bond. And, if conditions persist—if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14%—the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.
因此，以1981年末的被动投资利率水平，一家典型的美国企业对个人股东而言，已不再值每美元一百美分。（若该企业由养老基金或其他免税投资者持有，算术虽仍不诱人，但会大幅改善。）假设一位处于50%税率档的投资者；若我们这家典型公司将全部收益分配出去，投资者的收益回报将相当于一只7%免税债券的回报。而且，若这种状况持续下去——全部收益悉数分配、净资产收益率维持在14%——对高税率档的个人投资者而言，这个7%的免税等价回报，就像免税债券的票息一样被冻住了。这样一只永续7%免税债券，在撰写本文时，市值可能仅值五十美分。
If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.
另一方面，若我们这家典型美国企业将全部收益留存，且净资产收益率同样保持不变，则收益将以每年14%的速度增长。若市盈率保持不变，这只典型股票的价格也将以每年14%的速度增长。但这14%尚未落入股东口袋。要将其落袋，需要缴纳资本利得税，目前最高税率为20%。这一净回报，当然低于目前可获得的被动投资税后回报率。
Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains in earnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.
除非被动投资利率下降，否则那些每股收益年增14%却不派发现金股息的企业，对其个人股东而言是经济上的失败。被动资本的回报超越了主动资本的回报。这对投资者和企业管理者而言都是一个令人不快的事实，因此他们或许希望对此视而不见。但事实不会因为令人不快而消失，也不会因为被忽视而消失。
Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of their earnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently "bad" businesses economically—producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.
大多数美国企业会将相当一部分收益分配出去，因而介于上述两个极端之间。而从经济角度而言，大多数美国企业目前都是"差"企业——为其个人投资者税后创造的回报，低于资金的免税被动回报率。当然，即便在目前条件下，某些高回报企业仍具吸引力。但美国股权资本总体而言，对个人投资者并不产生增值。
It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occur because corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.
必须强调的是，这种令人沮丧的局面，并非因为企业在经济上跳得比以前低。事实上，它们跳得还略高了一些：净资产收益率在过去十年间提升了几个百分点。但被动回报的横杆抬升得快得多。令人遗憾的是，大多数企业除了寄望于横杆大幅下降之外，几乎无能为力；净资产收益率能大幅提升的行业，已属凤毛麟角。
Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not the only) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically "bad" would be restored to the "good" category under such circumstances.
通胀的经历与预期，将是影响未来几年横杆高度的主要因素——但非唯一因素。若长期通胀的成因能够得到遏制，被动投资回报很可能随之下降，美国股权资本的内在地位也将显著改善。许多目前不得不被归类为经济上"差"的企业，在这种情况下将重新回到"好"的行列。
A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the "bad" business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings—no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.
通胀环境还对"差"企业的所有者施加了另一重、尤为讽刺的惩罚。为了维持目前的经营模式，此类低回报企业通常必须留存大部分收益——无论这一政策对股东造成怎样的代价。
Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. An individual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and—if inclined to reinvest—looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.
理性当然会给出截然相反的处方。一个持有5%债券、距到期日尚有多年的人，不会在同类债券以四十美分可购的情况下，用债券票息以一百美分的价格继续买入更多5%债券。他会拿着这只低回报债券的票息——若有意再投资——去寻找当前可得的最高安全回报。好钱不该追着坏钱扔。
What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for the shareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective high returns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised—"wicked and slothful"—but also is required to redirect all of his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)
对债券持有人合理的，对股东同样合理。从逻辑上讲，一家历史上和可预见未来净资产收益率都高的企业，应当留存大部分乃至全部收益，使股东能在增厚的资本上获得超额回报。反之，低回报的企业股权则意味着应采取极高的股息分配政策，以便所有者能将资本导向更具吸引力的领域。（《圣经》在此表示赞同。在按才受职的比喻中，两位高收益的仆人获得了100%的收益留存作为奖励，并被鼓励扩大经营。然而，那位没有收益的第三个仆人不仅遭到斥责——"又恶又懒"——还被要求将他全部的资本转交给表现最优者。马太福音25：14-30）
But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the "bad" business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past—and most entities, including businesses, do—it simply has no choice.
但通货膨胀将我们带过了镜子，进入了《爱丽丝梦游仙境》那个颠倒的世界。当物价持续上涨，"差"企业必须留存它能留存的每一分钱。不是因为它作为股权资本的容身之所有何吸引力，恰恰是因为它如此缺乏吸引力，低回报企业才不得不奉行高留存政策。若它希望未来像过去一样继续经营下去——大多数实体，包括企业，都有这种意愿——它根本别无选择。
For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollars regardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level of reported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.
通货膨胀的作用，犹如一条巨大的企业绦虫。这条绦虫不管宿主机体的健康状况如何，都会先发制人地消耗其每日所需的投资养分。无论报告利润水平如何（哪怕为零），企业都持续需要更多的资金用于应收账款、存货和固定资产，仅仅是为了维持与上一年相同的实物销量。企业越不景气，绦虫所占据的可用养分比例就越大。
几十年后，绦虫的比喻被用在另一个地方：美国的医药行业。
Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or "real" dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company's inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of "dividends" that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)
在目前条件下，一家净资产收益率为8%或10%的企业，往往在扩张、偿债或派发"真实"股息方面已无剩余。通胀这条绦虫将盘子舔得干干净净。（低回报企业无力派息的窘境，可以理解地往往被掩饰起来。美国企业界越来越多地转向股息再投资计划，有时甚至设置折扣安排，几乎是强迫股东将股息再投入。另一些公司则向张三发行新股，以便向李四支付股息。当心那些只有在有人承诺补充所分配资本的前提下才能派发的"股息"。）
Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after-tax passive return—but barely. Our historic 21% return—not at all assured for the future—still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative. But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone's control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.
Berkshire继续留存收益，出于进攻性而非防御性或被迫的理由。但我们绝非对不断攀升的被动投资回报对股权资本所施加的压力免疫。我们继续越过税后被动回报的横杆——但仅此而已，勉强而过。我们历史上21%的回报率——对未来绝无保证——在扣除当前资本利得税率（我们预期未来几年将大幅上升）之后，仍较目前被动资金的税后利率保有一点微薄的余量。若我们的公司增值变为负数，未免有些丢人。但这在我们身上也可能发生，正如它在其他地方已经发生过的那样——无论是源于任何人都无法掌控的外部事件，还是源于我们自身相对适应不良。
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