1982-02-26 Warren Buffett.General Acquisition Behavior
General Acquisition Behavior
一般收购行为
As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments—"If something's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well".) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.
我们的历史表明，无论是完全拥有一家企业，还是持有代表企业小额权益的有价证券，我们都同样自在。我们持续寻求在这两个领域大规模运用资金的方式。（但我们力求避免小额投入——"如果一件事根本不值得做，那它也不值得做好。"）事实上，我们保险业务和交易印花业务的流动性要求，本身就决定了必须在有价证券上进行大规模投资。
Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)
我们的收购决策，目标在于实现真实经济利益的最大化，而非扩张管理版图，也非追求账面数字的好看。（从长远来看，那些以会计外观凌驾于经济实质之上的管理层，最终两者往往都所获无几。）
Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.
不论对当期可报告收益有何影响，我们宁愿以每股X的价格买入优秀企业T 10%的股份，也不愿以每股2X的价格收购T的100%。大多数公司管理层恰恰偏好相反的做法，且从不缺乏为此振振有词的理由。
扩张版图的心理动机可以掩盖很多的事实。
However, we suspect three motivations—usually unspoken—to be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most high-premium takeovers:
然而，我们怀疑以下三种动机——通常不会被明说——单独或合并起来，才是大多数高溢价收购背后真正重要的驱动力：
1. Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.
无论是商界还是其他领域的领导者，动物精神从不匮乏，往往乐于迎接更多行动与挑战。在Berkshire，没有什么时候比一桩收购呼之欲出时，公司的脉搏跳得更快。
2. Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)
无论是商业机构还是其他组织，衡量自身、被他人衡量、以及对管理层的薪酬激励，所用的尺度远比其他任何标准都更偏重规模。（问一位Fortune 500的经理人，他的公司在那份榜单上排第几——得到的答案，几乎无一例外来自按销售额排名的榜单；至于Fortune同样一丝不苟地编制的、按盈利能力对同样500家公司排名的那份榜单，他很可能根本不知道自己的公司排在哪里。）
3. Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).
许多管理层显然在童年的懵懂岁月里，将那个美丽公主一吻解救了困于蟾蜍之身的英俊王子的故事读得太熟了。于是他们深信不疑，自己管理层的那一吻，必将对目标公司T的盈利能力创造奇迹。
“animal spirits”的说法来自凯恩斯，后面的"institutional imperative"是更深入、更细化的分析，都指向脱离事实的心理现象。
Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?
这种乐观主义不可或缺。若无这番玫瑰色的想象，收购方A的股东们，又有什么理由要以2X的收购成本持有T的权益，而不是自己直接在市场上以X的价格买入？
In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We've observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses—even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.
换言之，投资者随时可以按蟾蜍的市价买入蟾蜍。若投资者转而为那些愿意付双倍价格换取亲吻蟾蜍权利的公主们掏腰包，那这一吻最好真能炸出点什么。我们见过许多吻，却极少见到奇迹。尽管如此，许多管理层公主们依然神态自若地对自己未来那一吻的威力充满信心——即便她们公司的后院，早已蟾蜍成堆、毫无反应。
In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.
公平而言，我们应当承认，某些收购记录确实令人眼前一亮。其中有两大类尤为突出。
The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.
第一类是那些无论出于主动设计还是歪打正着，收购目标始终局限于特别适应通胀环境的企业。此类受青睐的企业须具备两个特质：（1）能够相当轻松地提价——即便产品需求平淡、产能未被充分利用——且无需担心市场份额或销售量的明显流失；（2）能够以极少的追加资本投入，承接业务金额的大幅增长（这种增长往往更多来自通胀而非真实扩张）。近几十年来，能力平平的管理者，只要专注于符合上述条件的收购机会，便已取得了出色的成果。然而，同时具备这两种特质的企业少之又少，争购此类企业的竞争如今已激烈到自我消耗的程度。
The second category involves the managerial superstars—men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial "twofer", whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives' achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)
第二类涉及管理界的超级明星——他们能识别出那个乔装成蟾蜍的稀有王子，并具备将伪装剥除的管理能力。我们向这样的管理者致敬：Northwest Industries的Ben Heineman、Teledyne的Henry Singleton、National Service Industries的Erwin Zaban，尤其是Capital Cities Communications的Tom Murphy（一位真正的管理"双料冠军"——他的收购努力恰当地聚焦于第一类，而他的经营才能也使他跻身第二类的领军人物）。从直接和间接的经验来看，我们深知这些管理者成就的难度与罕见程度。（他们自己也清楚；这些冠军近年来鲜有出手，往往发现回购本公司股份才是运用企业资本最明智的方式。）
Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn't count, building arks does.)
遗憾的是，你们的董事长并不具备第二类的资格。而且，尽管对驱使人专注于第一类的经济因素有着相当深入的理解，我们在该类别的实际收购行动却零星而不足。我们的说教强于我们的表现。（我们忽视了诺亚原则：预测下雨不算数，造出方舟才是真。）
在一个充满噪音、充满“animal spirits”的商业环境中，关键的“商业模式”不好，所引发的不确定是需要特别引起关注的。
We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes—but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.
我们偶尔尝试过以低廉的价格买入蟾蜍，结果已在历年报告中有所记载。显然，我们的吻毫无效果。我们也确实在几位王子身上做得不错——但他们被收购时本就是王子。至少我们的吻没有把他们变成蟾蜍。最后，我们偶尔在以蟾蜍般的价格买入易于辨识的王子的零星权益方面，取得了相当不错的成绩。
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