The Best's data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total operating and loss costs as compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
Best's数据反映了几乎整个行业的经营情况，涵盖股份制、互助制和互惠制保险公司。综合比率代表总运营成本与赔付成本之和与保费收入之比；低于100表示承保盈利，高于100则表示亏损。
For reasons outlined in last year's report, as long as the annual gain in industry premiums written falls well below 10%, you can expect the underwriting picture in the next year to deteriorate. This will be true even at today's lower general rate of inflation. With the number of policies increasing annually, medical inflation far exceeding general inflation, and concepts of insured liability broadening, it is highly unlikely that yearly increases in insured losses will fall much below 10%.
基于去年报告中阐述的原因，只要行业保费收入的年增幅远低于10%，就可以预期次年的承保状况将会恶化。即便在当前较低的整体通胀环境下，这一判断依然成立。随着保单数量逐年增加、医疗通胀大幅超越整体通胀，以及保险责任概念的持续扩展，保险赔付损失的年增幅不太可能大幅低于10%。
You should be further aware that the 1982 combined ratio of 109.5 represents a "best case" estimate. In a given year, it is possible for an insurer to show almost any profit number it wishes, particularly if it (1) writes "long-tail" business (coverage where current costs can be only estimated, because claim payments are long delayed), (2) has been adequately reserved in the past, or (3) is growing very rapidly. There are indications that several large insurers opted in 1982 for obscure accounting and reserving maneuvers that masked significant deterioration in their underlying businesses. In insurance, as elsewhere, the reaction of weak managements to weak operations is often weak accounting. ("It's difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.")
你们还应当了解，1982年109.5的综合比率不过是一个"最乐观"的估计。在某一特定年度，一家保险公司几乎可以呈现任何它希望展示的利润数字，尤其是当它（1）承保"长尾"业务（即当前成本只能估算、因为赔付迟迟延后才发生的险种），（2）过去积累了充足的准备金，或（3）正处于高速扩张阶段。有迹象表明，若干大型保险公司在1982年采用了晦涩的会计手法和准备金操作，掩盖了其基础业务的重大恶化。俗话说空麻袋很难立起来，保险业像其它行业一样，糟糕的管理面对糟糕的经营结果的本能反应往往是糟糕的会计掩饰。
The great majority of managements, however, try to play it straight. But even managements of integrity may subconsciously be less willing in poor profit years to fully recognize adverse loss trends. Industry statistics indicate some deterioration in loss reserving practices during 1982 and the true combined ratio is likely to be modestly worse than indicated by our table.
然而，绝大多数管理层仍力求如实反映。但即便是诚信的管理层，在盈利不佳的年份，也可能在潜意识中不愿充分确认不利的赔付趋势。行业统计数据显示，1982年赔付准备金计提实践有所恶化，真实的综合比率很可能比我们表格所呈现的略差。
The conventional wisdom is that 1983 or 1984 will see the worst of underwriting experience and then, as in the past, the "cycle" will move, significantly and steadily, toward better results. We disagree because of a pronounced change in the competitive environment, hard to see for many years but now quite visible.
传统观点认为，1983年或1984年将是承保业绩最差的时期，此后如历史规律一样，"周期"将显著而稳定地朝着好转的方向演进。我们对此持异议——原因在于竞争环境出现了一个显著变化，多年来难以察觉，但如今已相当清晰。
To understand the change, we need to look at some major factors that affect levels of corporate profitability generally. Businesses in industries with both substantial over-capacity and a "commodity" product (undifferentiated in any customer-important way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support, etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles. These may be escaped, true, if prices or costs are administered in some manner and thereby insulated at least partially from normal market forces. This administration can be carried out (a) legally through government intervention (until recently, this category included pricing for truckers and deposit costs for financial institutions), (b) illegally through collusion, or (c) "extra-legally" through OPEC-style foreign cartelization (with tag-along benefits for domestic non-cartel operators).
要理解这一变化，我们需要审视若干普遍影响企业盈利水平的主要因素。在产能严重过剩且产品高度同质化（在客户关心的任何维度上——如性能、外观、服务支持等——均无差异）的行业中，企业最容易陷入盈利困境。当然，若价格或成本能够以某种方式得到管控，从而至少部分隔离于正常市场力量之外，这种困境或可避免。这种管控可以通过以下方式实现：（a）政府干预下的合法管控（直至近期，这一类别还包括对卡车运输商的定价管制以及对金融机构的存款成本管制）；（b）通过合谋进行的非法管控；或（c）通过OPEC式的境外卡特尔化实施的"法外"管控（国内非卡特尔运营商可顺势搭车获益）。
If, however, costs and prices are determined by full-bore competition, there is more than ample capacity, and the buyer cares little about whose product or distribution services he uses, industry economics are almost certain to be unexciting. They may well be disastrous.
然而，如果成本与价格完全由充分竞争决定，产能远超需求，而买家对选用谁的产品或分销服务又漠然置之，那么该行业的经济前景几乎注定令人提不起兴趣。甚至可能是灾难性的。
Hence the constant struggle of every vendor to establish and emphasize special qualities of product or service. This works with candy bars (customers buy by brand name, not by asking for a "two-ounce candy bar") but doesn't work with sugar (how often do you hear, "I'll have a cup of coffee with cream and C & H sugar, please").
因此，每一个供应商都在不断努力，试图建立并强调其产品或服务的独特品质。这对棒棒糖有效（顾客按品牌购买，而不是开口要"两盎司棒棒糖"），但对白糖却行不通（你多久才会听到有人说："请给我一杯咖啡，加奶油，用C&H的糖"）。
In many industries, differentiation simply can't be made meaningful. A few producers in such industries may consistently do well if they have a cost advantage that is both wide and sustainable. By definition such exceptions are few, and, in many industries, are non-existent. For the great majority of companies selling "commodity" products, a depressing equation of business economics prevails: persistent over-capacity without administered prices (or costs) equals poor profitability.
在许多行业，差异化根本无从实现。在这类行业中，少数生产商若拥有既宽广又可持续的成本优势，或许能持续表现出色。但按定义，此类例外寥寥无几，在许多行业中甚至根本不存在。对于绝大多数销售同质化产品的公司而言，一个令人沮丧的商业经济等式始终成立：持续的产能过剩加上缺乏价格（或成本）管控，等于低劣的盈利能力。
Of course, over-capacity may eventually self-correct, either as capacity shrinks or demand expands. Unfortunately for the participants, such corrections often are long delayed. When they finally occur, the rebound to prosperity frequently produces a pervasive enthusiasm for expansion that, within a few years, again creates over-capacity and a new profitless environment. In other words, nothing fails like success.
当然，产能过剩最终可能通过产能收缩或需求扩张实现自我修正。然而不幸的是，对于身处其中的参与者而言，这种修正往往迟迟不来。而当它终于到来时，复苏带来的普遍扩张热情，往往在数年之内再度制造出新一轮产能过剩和无利可图的环境。换言之，没有什么比成功更容易导致失败。
What finally determines levels of long-term profitability in such industries is the ratio of supply-tight to supply-ample years. Frequently that ratio is dismal. (It seems as if the most recent supply-tight period in our textile business—it occurred some years back—lasted the better part of a morning.)
在这类行业中，最终决定长期盈利水平的，是供给紧张年份与供给充裕年份的比例。这一比例通常令人沮丧。（我们纺织业务最近一次供给紧张的时期——发生在若干年前——似乎撑不过一个上午的大半。）
In some industries, however, capacity-tight conditions can last a long time. Sometimes actual growth in demand will outrun forecasted growth for an extended period. In other cases, adding capacity requires very long lead times because complicated manufacturing facilities must be planned and built.
然而在某些行业，产能紧张的状态可以持续相当长的时间。有时实际需求增长会在较长时期内超出预测增长。另一些情况下，扩充产能需要极长的准备周期，因为复杂的生产设施必须经过规划和建设。
But in the insurance business, to return to that subject, capacity can be instantly created by capital plus an underwriter's willingness to sign his name. (Even capital is less important in a world in which state-sponsored guaranty funds protect many policyholders against insurer insolvency.) Under almost all conditions except that of fear for survival—produced, perhaps, by a stock market debacle or a truly major natural disaster—the insurance industry operates under the competitive sword of substantial overcapacity. Generally, also, despite heroic attempts to do otherwise, the industry sells a relatively undifferentiated commodity-type product. (Many insureds, including the managers of large businesses, do not even know the names of their insurers.) Insurance, therefore, would seem to be a textbook case of an industry usually faced with the deadly combination of excess capacity and a "commodity" product.
但回到保险业这一话题——在这个行业，产能可以由资本加上承保人愿意签字的意愿即时创造出来。（在各州政府担保基金保护众多投保人免受保险公司破产之虞的世界里，资本的重要性甚至有所降低。）除了因股市崩溃或真正重大自然灾害所引发的生存危机之外，在几乎所有情形下，保险业都在严重产能过剩的竞争利剑之下运营。此外，尽管业界作出种种努力，保险业销售的通常仍是相对同质化的大宗商品类产品。（许多投保人，包括大企业的管理层，甚至不知道自己保险公司的名字。）因此，保险业堪称教科书式的案例——一个长期面临产能过剩与同质化产品这一致命组合的行业。
Why, then, was underwriting, despite the existence of cycles, generally profitable over many decades? (From 1950 through 1970, the industry combined ratio averaged 99.0. allowing all investment income plus 1% of premiums to flow through to profits.) The answer lies primarily in the historic methods of regulation and distribution. For much of this century, a large portion of the industry worked, in effect, within a legal quasi-administered pricing system fostered by insurance regulators. While price competition existed, it was not pervasive among the larger companies. The main competition was for agents, who were courted via various non-price-related strategies.
那么，为何承保业务尽管存在周期波动，在过去数十年间总体上仍能保持盈利？（从1950年到1970年，行业综合比率平均为99.0，使得全部投资收益加上1%的保费得以转化为利润。）答案主要在于历史上的监管与分销方式。在本世纪的大部分时间里，很大一部分保险业实际上是在保险监管机构所扶持的一套合法的准管制定价体系内运作的。价格竞争虽然存在，但在大型公司之间并不普遍。主要的竞争集中在对代理人的争夺上，各方通过各种与价格无关的策略来赢得代理人的青睐。
For the giants of the industry, most rates were set through negotiations between industry "bureaus" (or through companies acting in accord with their recommendations) and state regulators. Dignified haggling occurred, but it was between company and regulator rather than between company and customer. When the dust settled, Giant A charged the same price as Giant B—and both companies and agents were prohibited by law from cutting such filed rates.
对于行业巨头而言，大多数费率通过行业"协会"（或按照其建议行事的公司）与州监管机构之间的谈判来确定。虽有一番体面的讨价还价，但那是在公司与监管机构之间进行的，而非公司与客户之间。尘埃落定之后，巨头A与巨头B收取相同的价格——而法律明令禁止公司和代理人擅自降低已备案的费率。
The company-state negotiated prices included specific profit allowances and, when loss data indicated that current prices were unprofitable, both company managements and state regulators expected that they would act together to correct the situation. Thus, most of the pricing actions of the giants of the industry were "gentlemanly", predictable, and profit-producing. Of prime importance—and in contrast to the way most of the business world operated—insurance companies could legally price their way to profitability even in the face of substantial over-capacity.
公司与州政府协商确定的费率包含了具体的利润容差，当赔付数据显示当前费率已无利可图时，公司管理层与州监管机构都预期双方会携手纠正这一局面。因此，行业巨头的大多数定价行为是"君子式的"、可预期的，且能产生利润的。至关重要的一点——与商业世界大多数行业的运作方式截然不同——保险公司即便面对严重的产能过剩，也能合法地通过定价手段维持盈利。
That day is gone. Although parts of the old structure remain, far more than enough new capacity exists outside of that structure to force all parties, old and new, to respond. The new capacity uses various methods of distribution and is not reluctant to use price as a prime competitive weapon. Indeed, it relishes that use. In the process, customers have learned that insurance is no longer a one-price business. They won't forget.
那个时代已经过去。尽管旧体制的部分残余尚存，但游离于该体制之外的新产能已远远过剩，足以迫使新旧各方不得不作出回应。新产能采用多样化的分销方式，毫不忌惮地将价格作为主要竞争武器，甚至乐此不疲。在这一过程中，客户已经意识到保险不再是统一定价的生意。这一认知不会消失。
Future profitability of the industry will be determined by current competitive characteristics, not past ones. Many managers have been slow to recognize this. It's not only generals that prefer to fight the last war. Most business and investment analysis also comes from the rear-view mirror. It seems clear to us, however, that only one condition will allow the insurance industry to achieve significantly improved underwriting results. That is the same condition that will allow better results for the aluminum, copper, or corn producer—a major narrowing of the gap between demand and supply.
行业未来的盈利能力将由当前的竞争特征决定，而非过去的。许多管理层对此认识迟缓。偏爱打上一场战争的不只是将军。大多数商业与投资分析同样来自后视镜。然而在我们看来，有且只有一种条件，能让保险行业的承保业绩实现显著改善——那与让铝、铜或玉米生产商获得更好业绩的条件相同：供需缺口的大幅收窄。
Unfortunately, there can be no surge in demand for insurance policies comparable to one that might produce a market tightness in copper or aluminum. Rather, the supply of available insurance coverage must be curtailed. "Supply", in this context, is mental rather than physical: plants or companies need not be shut; only the willingness of underwriters to sign their names need be curtailed.
不幸的是，保险需求不可能出现类似铜或铝市场那样能够造成供给紧张的需求激增。真正需要收缩的，是可供保险承保的供给。这里所说的"供给"，是心理层面的而非物质层面的：无需关闭工厂或公司，只需收敛承保人签字画押的意愿即可。
This contraction will not happen because of generally poor profit levels. Bad profits produce much hand-wringing and finger-pointing. But they do not lead major sources of insurance capacity to turn their backs on very large chunks of business, thereby sacrificing market share and industry significance.
这种收缩不会仅仅因为普遍低迷的利润水平而发生。糟糕的利润只会引发大量的哀叹与相互指责，却不会促使主要保险产能来源放弃大量业务，从而牺牲市场份额与行业地位。
Instead, major capacity withdrawals require a shock factor such as a natural or financial "megadisaster". One might occur tomorrow—or many years from now. The insurance business—even taking investment income into account—will not be particularly profitable in the meantime.
相反，主要产能的退出需要一个冲击性因素，例如自然界或金融领域的"巨灾"。这种事件也许明天就会发生，也许要等到许多年之后。在此之前，保险业——即便将投资收益纳入考量——将不会有特别可观的盈利。
When supply ultimately contracts, large amounts of business will be available for the few with large capital capacity, a willingness to commit it, and an in-place distribution system. We would expect great opportunities for our insurance subsidiaries at such a time.
当供给最终收缩时，大量业务将向少数几家手握雄厚资本、愿意投入资本且拥有现成分销体系的公司敞开。届时，我们预期我们的保险子公司将迎来绝佳的机遇。
During 1982, our insurance underwriting deteriorated far more than did the industry's. From a profit position well above average, we slipped to a performance modestly below average. The biggest swing was in National Indemnity's traditional coverages. Lines that have been highly profitable for us in the past are now priced at levels that guarantee underwriting losses. In 1983 we expect our insurance group to record an average performance in an industry in which average is very poor.
1982年，我们的保险承保业绩恶化程度远超行业平均水平。我们从远高于平均水平的盈利位置，滑落至略低于平均水平的表现。最大的落差出现在National Indemnity的传统险种上。过去为我们带来丰厚盈利的险种，如今的定价水平已注定会产生承保亏损。1983年，我们预计我们的保险集团将在一个"平均即糟糕"的行业中录得平均水平的业绩。
Two of our stars, Milt Thornton at Cypress and Floyd Taylor at Kansas Fire and Casualty, continued their outstanding records of producing an underwriting profit every year since joining us. Both Milt and Floyd simply are incapable of being average. They maintain a passionately proprietary attitude toward their operations and have developed a business culture centered upon unusual cost-consciousness and customer service. It shows on their scorecards.
我们旗下的两位明星——Cypress的Milt Thornton和Kansas Fire and Casualty的Floyd Taylor——自加入我们以来，每年均实现承保盈利的卓越记录得以延续。Milt和Floyd这两个人，根本不具备平庸的能力。他们对各自的业务怀有一种近乎主人翁式的热忱，并建立了一种以非凡的成本意识和客户服务为核心的企业文化。他们的成绩单说明了一切。
During 1982, parent company responsibility for most of our insurance operations was given to Mike Goldberg. Planning, recruitment, and monitoring all have shown significant improvement since Mike replaced me in this role.
1982年，母公司对大部分保险业务的管理责任移交给了Mike Goldberg。自Mike接替我承担这一职责以来，规划、招募与监督各方面均有显著改善。
GEICO continues to be managed with a zeal for efficiency and value to the customer that virtually guarantees unusual success. Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder are achieving the most elusive of human goals—keeping things simple and remembering what you set out to do. In Lou Simpson, additionally, GEICO has the best investment manager in the property-casualty business. We are happy with every aspect of this operation. GEICO is a magnificent illustration of the high-profit exception we described earlier in discussing commodity industries with over-capacity—a company with a wide and sustainable cost advantage. Our 35% interest in GEICO represents about $250 million of premium volume, an amount considerably greater than all of the direct volume we produce.
GEICO始终以对效率和客户价值的高度热忱来经营管理，这几乎注定了其非凡的成功。Jack Byrne和Bill Snyder正在实现人类最难以企及的目标——保持简单，并始终记得自己出发时的初心。此外，GEICO还拥有Lou Simpson——财产意外险行业中最出色的投资经理。我们对这家公司的每一个方面都感到满意。GEICO是我们此前在讨论产能过剩的同质化行业时所描述的那种高盈利例外的绝佳范本——一家拥有宽广且可持续成本优势的公司。我们持有GEICO 35%的权益，对应约2.5亿美元的保费规模，远超我们直接承保业务的全部保费量。