Our gain in net worth during 1984 was $152.6 million, or $133 per share. This sounds pretty good but actually it's mediocre. Economic gains must be evaluated by comparison with the capital that produces them. Our twenty-year compounded annual gain in book value has been 22.1% (from $19.46 in 1964 to $1108.77 in 1984), but our gain in 1984 was only 13.6%.

我们1984年的净资产增加了1.526亿美元，折合每股133美元。听起来不错，但实际上只是平庸之作。经济收益必须与产生它的资本相比较才有意义。过去二十年，我们账面价值的年复合增长率为22.1%（从1964年的19.46美元增长至1984年的1108.77美元），但1984年的增长率仅为13.6%。

As we discussed last year, the gain in per-share intrinsic business value is the economic measurement that really counts. But calculations of intrinsic business value are subjective. In our case, book value serves as a useful, although somewhat understated, proxy. In my judgment, intrinsic business value and book value increased during 1984 at about the same rate.

正如我们去年所说，每股内在商业价值的增长才是真正重要的经济衡量指标。但内在商业价值的计算本质上是主观的。就我们而言，账面价值是一个有用的替代指标，尽管它有所低估。在我看来，1984年内在商业价值与账面价值的增长速度大体相当。

Using my academic voice, I have told you in the past of the drag that a mushrooming capital base exerts upon rates of return. Unfortunately, my academic voice is now giving way to a reportorial voice. Our historical 22% rate is just that—history. To earn even 15% annually over the next decade (assuming we continue to follow our present dividend policy, about which more will be said later in this letter) we would need profits aggregating about $3.9 billion. Accomplishing this will require a few big ideas—small ones just won't do. Charlie Munger, my partner in general management, and I do not have any such ideas at present, but our experience has been that they pop up occasionally. (How's that for a strategic plan?)

我过去用学术腔告诉过你们，资本规模的急速膨胀会拖累回报率。遗憾的是，我的学术腔现在不得不让位于实报实录的语气了。我们历史上22%的增长率，终究只是历史。若要在未来十年维持哪怕15%的年回报（假设我们继续沿用现行的股息政策，关于这一点本信后文还会详述），我们需要累计利润约达39亿美元。要做到这一点，需要几个大主意——小打小闹是没用的。我的全面管理搭档Charlie Munger和我目前都没有这样的大主意，不过经验告诉我们，它们偶尔会自己冒出来。（这算不算一份战略规划？）

报告收益的来源

The table on the following page shows the sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. Berkshire's net ownership interest in many of the constituent businesses changed at midyear 1983 when the Blue Chip merger took place. Because of these changes, the first two columns of the table provide the best measure of underlying business performance.

下页的表格列示了Berkshire报告收益的来源。1983年中期Blue Chip合并完成后，Berkshire在旗下许多业务中的净所有权比例发生了变化。由于这些变化，表格的前两列最能反映各业务的基本经营状况。

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings. (We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very important.)

各业务实体因非常规资产出售而产生的所有重大损益，均与证券交易合并，列示于表格底部附近的单独一行，不计入经营收益。（我们认为任何单一年度的已实现资本损益数字毫无意义，但我们认为多年累计的已实现与未实现资本收益总额非常重要。）

Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is set forth as a separate item.

此外，商誉摊销不计入各具体业务，而是作为单独项目列示——原因已在1983年年报致股东信的附录中详细说明。

Sharp-eyed shareholders will notice that the amount of the special GEICO distribution and its location in the table have been changed from the presentation of last year. Though they reclassify and reduce "accounting" earnings, the changes are entirely of form, not of substance. The story behind the changes, however, is interesting.

眼尖的股东会注意到，GEICO特别分配款的金额及其在表格中的位置，与去年的列报方式有所不同。尽管这些变化重新分类并减少了"会计"收益，但完全只是形式上的调整，实质不变。不过，这些变化背后的故事倒是颇为有趣。

As reported last year: (1) in mid-1983 GEICO made a tender offer to buy its own shares; (2) at the same time, we agreed by written contract to sell GEICO an amount of its shares that would be proportionately related to the aggregate number of shares GEICO repurchased via the tender from all other shareholders; (3) at completion of the tender, we delivered 350,000 shares to GEICO, received $21 million cash, and were left owning exactly the same percentage of GEICO that we owned before the tender; (4) GEICO's transaction with us amounted to a proportionate redemption, an opinion rendered us, without qualification, by a leading law firm; (5) the Tax Code logically regards such proportionate redemptions as substantially equivalent to dividends and, therefore, the $21 million we received was taxed at only the 6.9% inter-corporate dividend rate; (6) importantly, that $21 million was far less than the previously-undistributed earnings that had inured to our ownership in GEICO and, thus, from the standpoint of economic substance, was in our view equivalent to a dividend.

正如去年所报告的：（1）1983年中期，GEICO发出要约回购本公司股份；（2）与此同时，我们与GEICO签订书面合同，约定按比例向其出售股份——出售数量与GEICO通过要约从其他所有股东处回购的股份总量保持同比例关系；（3）要约完成时，我们向GEICO交付了35万股，收到2100万美元现金，要约前后我们持有GEICO的股权比例分毫未变；（4）GEICO与我们之间的交易构成按比例赎回，一家知名律师事务所就此向我们出具了无保留意见；（5）税法合乎逻辑地将此类按比例赎回视为在实质上等同于股息，因此我们收到的2100万美元仅按6.9%的企业间股息税率纳税；（6）重要的是，这2100万美元远低于GEICO此前归属于我们持股部分的未分配留存收益，因此从经济实质的角度来看，我们认为这等同于一笔股息。

Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable quarterly report and in this section of the annual report. Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection, concurred with our dividend presentation.

由于这笔交易金额重大且性质特殊，我们去年在相关季报和年报的这一部分都向你们重点说明了GEICO的这笔分配款。此外，我们也专门向我们的审计师Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.强调了这笔交易。Peat Marwick的奥马哈办公室和负责复核的芝加哥合伙人均无异议，认同我们将其作为股息列报的处理方式。

In 1984, we had a virtually identical transaction with General Foods. The only difference was that General Foods repurchased its stock over a period of time in the open market, whereas GEICO had made a "one-shot" tender offer. In the General Foods case we sold to the company, on each day that it repurchased shares, a quantity of shares that left our ownership percentage precisely unchanged. Again our transaction was pursuant to a written contract executed before repurchases began. And again the money we received was far less than the retained earnings that had inured to our ownership interest since our purchase. Overall we received $21,843,601 in cash from General Foods, and our ownership remained at exactly 8.75%.

1984年，我们与General Foods进行了一笔几乎完全相同的交易。唯一的区别在于，General Foods是在一段时间内通过公开市场回购股票，而GEICO当时是一次性的要约回购。在General Foods这个案例中，我们在其每次回购股票的当天，同步向其出售相应数量的股份，使我们的持股比例始终精确不变。同样，这笔交易也是依据回购开始前签订的书面合同执行的。同样，我们收到的款项也远低于自我们买入以来归属于我们持股权益的留存收益。我们共从General Foods收到21,843,601美元现金，持股比例维持在恰好8.75%不变。

At this point the New York office of Peat Marwick came into the picture. Late in 1984 it indicated that it disagreed with the conclusions of the firm's Omaha office and Chicago reviewing partner. The New York view was that the GEICO and General Foods transactions should be treated as sales of stock by Berkshire rather than as the receipt of dividends. Under this accounting approach, a portion of the cost of our investment in the stock of each company would be charged against the redemption payment and any gain would be shown as a capital gain, not as dividend income. This is an accounting approach only, having no bearing on taxes: Peat Marwick agrees that the transactions were dividends for IRS purposes.

此时，Peat Marwick的纽约办公室介入了。1984年底，纽约办公室表示，它不同意该所奥马哈办公室和芝加哥复核合伙人的结论。纽约方面的意见是，GEICO和General Foods这两笔交易应被视为Berkshire出售股票，而非收取股息。按照这种会计处理方式，我们在各公司股票上的投资成本将有一部分被冲抵赎回款项，任何收益均应列报为资本利得，而非股息收入。这纯粹是一个会计处理问题，与税务无关：Peat Marwick认同，就美国国税局（IRS）而言，这两笔交易均构成股息。

We disagree with the New York position from both the viewpoint of economic substance and proper accounting. But, to avoid a qualified auditor's opinion, we have adopted herein Peat Marwick's 1984 view and restated 1983 accordingly. None of this, however, has any effect on intrinsic business value: our ownership interests in GEICO and General Foods, our cash, our taxes, and the market value and tax basis of our holdings all remain the same.

无论从经济实质还是从正确的会计处理角度，我们都不认同纽约办公室的立场。但为了避免审计师出具保留意见，我们在本报告中采用了Peat Marwick的1984年意见，并相应地对1983年的数据进行了重述。然而，这一切对内在商业价值毫无影响：我们在GEICO和General Foods的所有权权益、我们的现金、我们的税负，以及我们持仓的市场价值和计税基础，全部原封不动。

This year we have again entered into a contract with General Foods whereby we will sell them shares concurrently with open market purchases that they make. The arrangement provides that our ownership interest will remain unchanged at all times. By keeping it so, we will insure ourselves dividend treatment for tax purposes. In our view also, the economic substance of this transaction again is the creation of dividend income. However, we will account for the redemptions as sales of stock rather than dividend income unless accounting rules are adopted that speak directly to this point. We will continue to prominently identify any such special transactions in our reports to you.

今年我们再次与General Foods签订合同，约定在其进行公开市场回购的同时，同步向其出售股份，始终保持我们的持股比例不变。这样做可以确保我们在税务上获得股息待遇。在我们看来，这笔交易的经济实质同样是产生股息收入。不过，除非会计准则就此作出直接规定，否则我们将把这些赎回交易作为股票出售而非股息收入来列账。我们将继续在报告中显著标注任何此类特殊交易。

While we enjoy a low tax charge on these proportionate redemptions, and have participated in several of them, we view such repurchases as at least equally favorable for shareholders who do not sell. When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases.

尽管我们在这些按比例赎回中享有较低的税负，且已参与了数笔此类交易，但我们认为，回购对于那些不卖出股份的股东而言至少同样有利。当拥有卓越业务、财务状况宽裕的公司发现其股价在市场上远低于内在价值时，没有任何其他行动能像回购这样，如此确定地惠及股东。

(Our endorsement of repurchases is limited to those dictated by price/value relationships and does not extend to the "greenmail" repurchase—a practice we find odious and repugnant. In these transactions, two parties achieve their personal ends by exploitation of an innocent and unconsulted third party. The players are: (1) the "shareholder" extortionist who, even before the ink on his stock certificate dries, delivers his "your-money-or-your-life" message to managers; (2) the corporate insiders who quickly seek peace at any price—as long as the price is paid by someone else; and (3) the shareholders whose money is used by (2) to make (1) go away. As the dust settles, the mugging, transient shareholder gives his speech on "free enterprise", the muggee management gives its speech on "the best interests of the company", and the innocent shareholder standing by mutely funds the payoff.)

（我们对回购的认可，仅限于由价格与价值关系所驱动的那种，并不延伸至"绿票讹诈"式回购——这种做法我们认为令人厌恶、不齿为伍。在这类交易中，两方当事人以牺牲一个无辜且未被知会的第三方为代价，各自达成私人目的。登场角色如下：（1）"股东"勒索者——股票墨迹未干，便向管理层发出"要钱还是要命"的讯号；（2）公司内部人士——急于以任何代价换取平静，只要这个代价由别人来付；（3）普通股东——其钱财被（2）用来打发走（1）。尘埃落定之后，那位行凶的过客股东高谈"自由企业"精神，被打劫的管理层大讲"公司最佳利益"，而那位默默旁观的无辜股东，则悄悄为这整场买路钱埋了单。）

The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurchases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons—one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.

我们持仓最重的那些公司，都曾在价格与价值存在巨大背离之际，进行过大规模股票回购。作为股东，我们对此深感鼓舞，并从中受益，原因有两点——一点显而易见，另一点则微妙，并非总被人理解。显而易见的那点涉及基本算术：在每股内在商业价值大幅折价时进行大规模回购，会立竿见影地、极为显著地提升该价值。公司回购自家股票时，往往能轻松地用1美元买到2美元的现值。而企业并购计划几乎从来做不到这一点——在令人沮丧的大多数案例中，每花出去1美元，连接近1美元的价值都拿不回来。

The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company's market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management's domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?)

回购的另一项好处不那么容易精确衡量，但长远来看可能同样重要。当公司市场价值远低于其内在价值时仍坚持回购，管理层清楚地表明了自己的行事取向——致力于增加股东财富，而非热衷于扩张管理版图却对股东毫无裨益（甚至有所损害）。看到这一点，现有股东和潜在股东会上调对公司未来回报的预期。这种上调反过来又推动市场价格更趋近于内在商业价值。如此形成的价格完全合乎理性。对于由一位有据可查的亲股东型管理者掌舵的企业，投资者理应付出比由一位自我利益优先、另走一套的管理者掌舵的企业更高的价格。（说个极端的例子：如果一家公司由Robert Wesco控制，你愿意出多少钱去做它的少数股东？）

The key word is "demonstrated". A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as "maximizing shareholder wealth" (this season's favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth—and, after a while, neither will the market.

关键词是"有据可查"。一位管理者，若在回购明显符合股东利益时却屡屡背而不顾，他所暴露的动机，比他自己意识到的要多得多。无论他多么频繁、多么动听地挂在嘴边那些公关套话，比如"最大化股东财富"（本季最流行的说法），市场都会正确地对其名下资产打折。他的心并没有在听他的嘴——过不了多久，市场也不会再听了。

We have prospered in a very major way—as have other shareholders—by the large share repurchases of GEICO, Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings. (Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we have only recently established our position.) In each of these companies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain prices. We feel very comfortable owning interests in businesses such as these that offer excellent economics combined with shareholder-conscious managements.

我们从持仓最重的三家公司——GEICO、Washington Post和General Foods——的大规模股票回购中获益匪浅，其他股东亦然。（我们的第四大持仓Exxon同样明智而积极地回购了股票，但我们在这家公司的仓位建立不久。）在上述每一家公司，股东们对这些卓越业务的权益，都因低价回购而得到了实质性的增厚。能够持有这类兼具优秀经济特质与股东意识强烈的管理层的企业，我们感到十分踏实。

The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart.

下表列示了我们1984年末在上市股票中的净持仓。所有数字均不含归属于Wesco和Nebraska Furniture Mart少数股东的权益部分。

It's been over ten years since it has been as difficult as now to find equity investments that meet both our qualitative standards and our quantitative standards of value versus price. We try to avoid compromise of these standards, although we find doing nothing the most difficult task of all. (One English statesman attributed his country's greatness in the nineteenth century to a policy of "masterly inactivity". This is a strategy that is far easier for historians to commend than for participants to follow.)

距今已超过十年，从未像现在这样难以找到同时符合我们定性标准和定量标准（价值与价格之比）的股票投资机会。我们尽力避免在这些标准上妥协，尽管我们发现"什么都不做"才是最难完成的任务。（一位英国政治家将他的国家在十九世纪的伟大归功于一种"高明的无为"政策。这是一种让历史学家称赞起来远比让当局者践行起来容易得多的策略。）

In addition to the figures supplied at the beginning of this section, information regarding the businesses we own appears in Management's Discussion on pages 42-47. An amplified discussion of Wesco's businesses appears in Charlie Munger's report on pages 50-59. You will find particularly interesting his comments about conditions in the thrift industry. Our other major controlled businesses are Nebraska Furniture Mart, See's, Buffalo Evening News, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special attention here.

除本节开头提供的数字外，我们所拥有的业务的相关信息载于第42-47页的管理层讨论部分。Charlie Munger在第50-59页的报告中对Wesco旗下业务有更详尽的阐述，其中关于储蓄行业现状的评论尤为值得一读。我们其他主要的控股业务包括Nebraska Furniture Mart、See's、Buffalo Evening News和保险集团，以下将对这些业务予以专项介绍。

Last year I introduced you to Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her family. I told you they were terrific, and I understated the case. After another year of observing their remarkable talents and character, I can honestly say that I never have seen a managerial group that either functions or behaves better than the Blumkin family.

去年我向大家介绍了Mrs. B（Rose Blumkin）和她的家人。我说他们了不起，但那其实是低估了。又观察了一年他们非凡的才干与品格之后，我可以诚实地说，我从未见过任何一个管理团队，在能力表现和行事风范上能超越Blumkin家族。

Mrs. B, Chairman of the Board, is now 91, and recently was quoted in the local newspaper as saying, "I come home to eat and sleep, and that's about it. I can't wait until it gets daylight so I can get back to the business". Mrs. B is at the store seven days a week, from opening to close, and probably makes more decisions in a day than most CEOs do in a year (better ones, too).

身为董事长的Mrs. B今年91岁，最近在当地报纸上被引述道："我回家就是吃饭睡觉，就这些。我迫不及待地等天亮，好再回到店里去。"Mrs. B每周七天都守在店里，从开门到关门，她一天里做出的决策，恐怕比大多数CEO一年做的还多——而且做得更好。

In May Mrs. B was granted an Honorary Doctorate in Commercial Science by New York University. (She's a "fast track" student: not one day in her life was spent in a school room prior to her receipt of the doctorate.) Previous recipients of honorary degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary, then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and, most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)

5月，Mrs. B获纽约大学授予商业科学荣誉博士学位。（她是个"快车道"学生：在获得这个博士学位之前，她这辈子一天学校都没进过。）此前获得NYU商业荣誉学位的人包括：Exxon Corp.首席执行官Clifton Garvin, Jr.、时任Citicorp首席执行官Walter Wriston、时任IBM首席执行官Frank Cary、时任General Motors首席执行官Tom Murphy，以及最近的Paul Volcker。（她与这些人同列，并不逊色。）

The Blumkin blood did not run thin. Louie, Mrs. B's son, and his three boys, Ron, Irv, and Steve, all contribute in full measure to NFM's amazing success. The younger generation has attended the best business school of them all—that conducted by Mrs. B and Louie—and their training is evident in their performance.

Blumkin家族的血脉并未稀释。Mrs. B的儿子Louie，以及他的三个儿子Ron、Irv和Steve，都为NFM的惊人成功做出了十足的贡献。年轻一代就读于有史以来最好的商学院——由Mrs. B和Louie亲自主持的那所——他们所受的训练，在他们的表现中一览无遗。

Last year NFM's net sales increased by $14.3 million, bringing the total to $115 million, all from the one store in Omaha. That is by far the largest volume produced by a single home furnishings store in the United States. In fact, the gain in sales last year was itself greater than the annual volume of many good-sized successful stores. The business achieves this success because it deserves this success. A few figures will tell you why.

去年NFM净销售额增加了1,430万美元，总额达到1.15亿美元，全部来自奥马哈这一家门店。这是迄今为止美国单一家居用品门店所创造的最大销售额。事实上，去年的销售额增量本身，就已超过许多颇具规模的成功门店的全年营业额。这家企业取得这样的成就，是因为它配得上这样的成就。几组数字可以说明原因。

In its fiscal 1984 10-K, the largest independent specialty retailer of home furnishings in the country, Levitz Furniture, described its prices as "generally lower than the prices charged by conventional furniture stores in its trading area". Levitz, in that year, operated at a gross margin of 44.4% (that is, on average, customers paid it $100 for merchandise that had cost it $55.60 to buy). The gross margin at NFM is not much more than half of that. NFM's low mark-ups are possible because of its exceptional efficiency: operating expenses (payroll, occupancy, advertising, etc.) are about 16.5% of sales versus 35.6% at Levitz.

全美最大的独立家居专业零售商Levitz Furniture在其1984财年的10-K报告中，将自己的价格描述为"普遍低于其贸易区内传统家具店的收费"。Levitz当年的毛利率为44.4%（即平均而言，顾客付给它100美元的商品，其进价为55.60美元）。NFM的毛利率还不到Levitz的一半多一点。NFM之所以能保持如此低的加价，得益于其卓越的运营效率：运营费用（薪资、房租、广告等）约占销售额的16.5%，而Levitz这一比例为35.6%。

None of this is in criticism of Levitz, which has a well-managed operation. But the NFM operation is simply extraordinary (and, remember, it all comes from a $500 investment by Mrs. B in 1937). By unparalleled efficiency and astute volume purchasing, NFM is able to earn excellent returns on capital while saving its customers at least $3,000 million annually from what, on average, it would cost them to buy the same merchandise at stores maintaining typical mark-ups. Such savings enable NFM to constantly widen its geographical reach and thus to enjoy growth well beyond the natural growth of the Omaha market.

这些绝非对Levitz的批评——它的运营管理得相当不错。但NFM的运营简直是非凡的（别忘了，这一切都源于Mrs. B在1937年500美元的起步投入）。凭借无与伦比的效率和精明的批量采购，NFM既能为资本赚取丰厚回报，同时每年还能为顾客节省至少3000万美元——这是与维持典型加价率的门店相比顾客平均要多付的金额。这样的价格优势使NFM能够持续扩大其地理覆盖范围，从而实现远超奥马哈市场自然增长速度的扩张。

I have been asked by a number of people just what secrets the Blumkins bring to their business. These are not very esoteric. All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism their area of special competence and act decisively on all matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4) unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal with. (Mrs. B boils it down to "sell cheap and tell the truth".)

很多人问过我，Blumkin家族究竟有什么经商秘诀。其实并没有什么深奥的东西。家族所有成员：（1）以一种能让Ben Franklin和Horatio Alger都自叹不如的热情与干劲投入工作；（2）以非凡的现实感界定自己的专业能力范围，并在该范围内的一切事务上果断行动；（3）对超出该专业能力范围的提议，无论多么诱人，一概置之不理；（4）与所有打交道的人，始终保持高尚的行事风范。（Mrs. B将其浓缩为一句话："卖得便宜、说实话。"）

Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was demonstrated when we purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never had an audit and we did not request one; we did not take an inventory nor verify the receivables; we did not check property titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gave us her word. That made for an even exchange.

我们对Mrs. B和她家人诚信品格的判断，在我们收购其90%股权时得到了印证：NFM从未经过审计，我们也没有要求审计；我们没有盘点库存，也没有核实应收账款；我们没有核查产权文件。我们给了Mrs. B一张5,500万美元的支票，她给了我们她的承诺。这是一桩公平的交换。

You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the Blumkin family.

你我都有幸能与Blumkin家族成为合伙人。

This performance has not been produced by a generally rising tide. To the contrary, many well-known participants in the boxed-chocolate industry either have lost money in this same period or have been marginally profitable. To our knowledge, only one good-sized competitor has achieved high profitability. The success of See's reflects the combination of an exceptional product and an exceptional manager, Chuck Huggins.

这样的业绩并非乘着行业整体上升的东风取得的。恰恰相反，盒装巧克力行业中许多知名参与者在同一时期要么亏损，要么仅勉强维持微薄盈利。据我们所知，只有一家规模较大的竞争对手实现了高盈利。See's的成功，是卓越产品与卓越管理者Chuck Huggins相互成就的结果。

During 1984 we increased prices considerably less than has been our practice in recent years: per-pound realization was $5.49, up only 1.4% from 1983. Fortunately, we made good progress on cost control, an area that has caused us problems in recent years. Per-pound costs—other than those for raw materials, a segment of expense largely outside of our control—increased by only 2.2% last year.

1984年，我们的提价幅度远低于近年来的惯常水平：每磅实现收入为5.49美元，较1983年仅增长1.4%。所幸的是，我们在成本控制方面取得了良好进展——这是近年来一直困扰我们的领域。每磅成本（原材料成本除外，这部分费用在很大程度上不受我们控制）去年仅上升了2.2%。

Our cost-control problem has been exacerbated by the problem of modestly declining volume (measured by pounds, not dollars) on a same-store basis. Total pounds sold through shops in recent years has been maintained at a roughly constant level only by the net addition of a few shops annually. This more-shops-to-get-the-same-volume situation naturally puts heavy pressure on per-pound selling costs.

In 1984, same-store volume declined 1.1%. Total shop volume, however, grew 0.6% because of an increase in stores. (Both percentages are adjusted to compensate for a 53-week fiscal year in 1983.)

1984年，同店销量下降了1.1%。然而，由于门店数量增加，门店总销量增长了0.6%。（上述两个百分比均已作调整，以消除1983财年为53周所带来的影响。）

See's business tends to get a bit more seasonal each year. In the four weeks prior to Christmas, we do 40% of the year's volume and earn about 75% of the year's profits. We also earn significant sums in the Easter and Valentine's Day periods, but pretty much tread water the rest of the year. In recent years, shop volume at Christmas has grown in relative importance, and so have quantity orders and mail orders. The increased concentration of business in the Christmas period produces a multitude of managerial problems, all of which have been handled by Chuck and his associates with exceptional skill and grace.

See's的业务每年都会变得更加季节性。在圣诞节前四周，我们完成全年40%的销量，并赚取约75%的全年利润。复活节和情人节期间也能带来可观收入，但其余时间基本上是不赚不亏。近年来，圣诞期间的门店销量在相对重要性上持续上升，批量订单和邮购订单亦然。业务日益向圣诞节集中，由此产生了大量管理难题，但Chuck和他的团队都以非凡的技巧和从容应对了这一切。

Their solutions have in no way involved compromises in either quality of service or quality of product. Most of our larger competitors could not say the same. Though faced with somewhat less extreme peaks and valleys in demand than we, they add preservatives or freeze the finished product in order to smooth the production cycle and thereby lower unit costs. We reject such techniques, opting, in effect, for production headaches rather than product modification.

他们的解决方案丝毫未在服务质量或产品质量上有所妥协。我们大多数规模较大的竞争对手却未必能这么说。尽管他们面临的需求峰谷波动不及我们极端，他们仍通过添加防腐剂或将成品冷冻来平滑生产周期、降低单位成本。我们拒绝采用这类做法，实际上是选择了生产上的麻烦，而不是对产品本身做出改变。

Our mall stores face a host of new food and snack vendors that provide particularly strong competition at non-holiday periods. We need new products to fight back and during 1984 we introduced six candy bars that, overall, met with a good reception. Further product introductions are planned.

我们的商场门店正面临大批新兴食品和零食供应商的竞争，这些竞争在非节假日期间尤为激烈。我们需要新产品来加以应对——1984年我们推出了六款糖果棒，总体而言反响良好。进一步的新品推出已在计划之中。

In 1985 we will intensify our efforts to keep per-pound cost increases below the rate of inflation. Continued success in these efforts, however, will require gains in same-store poundage. Prices in 1985 should average 6%—7% above those of 1984. Assuming no change in same-store volume, profits should show a moderate gain.

1985年，我们将加大力度，力求将每磅成本涨幅控制在通胀率以下。然而，要持续取得这方面的成效，有赖于同店销售磅数的增长。1985年的价格预计将平均比1984年高出6%至7%。假设同店销量不变，利润应能实现温和增长。

Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than we expected. As at See's, excellent progress was made in controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the industry.

1984年，News的利润远超我们的预期。与See's一样，成本控制方面取得了出色进展。不计编辑室工时，总工时减少了约2.8%。得益于这一生产率提升，总体成本仅上涨了4.9%。Stan Lipsey和他的管理团队的这一表现，堪称行业内最优秀之列。

However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984 we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for a large "catch-up" wage increase. This catch-up is entirely appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the unprofitable 1977-1982 period was an important factor in our success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express. Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might well have been different.

然而，我们现在面临成本加速上升的压力。1984年中期，我们签订了新的多年期工会合同，合同规定了大幅的"补偿性"工资增长。这种补偿完全合情合理：在1977年至1982年亏损期间，工会展现出的合作精神，是我们得以在与The Courier-Express的竞争中保持成本竞争力的重要因素。若非当时将成本压住，那场竞争的结局未必会是今天这个样子。

Because our new union contracts took effect at varying dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984 costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985 and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors, we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.

由于新工会合同的生效日期参差不齐，补偿性增长对1984年成本的影响甚微。但这一增长将在1985年几乎全面生效，因此今年我们的单位劳动力成本上升幅度将远高于行业水平。我们期望通过持续小幅提升生产率来部分抵消这一增长，但今年大幅上升的人工成本在所难免。新闻纸的价格走势也比1984年时更为不利。主要由于这两个因素，我们预计News的利润率今年至少会有小幅收窄。

Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major economic importance:

对我们有利的，是News具备两项具有重大经济价值的优势：

(1)Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers. "Regional" newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on the other hand, have a significant portion of their circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are offering to sell via a classified ad—nor for the grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area. "Wasted" circulation—as the advertisers call it—hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are determined largely by gross circulation while advertising revenues (usually 70%—80% of total revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation;

我们的发行量在对广告商最具价值的地区高度集中，这一程度实属罕见。相比之下，发行范围广泛的"区域性"报纸，有相当一部分发行量覆盖在对大多数广告商几乎没有价值的地区。一个远在几百英里之外的订户，对于你通过分类广告出售的小狗来说算不上什么潜在买家——对于只在都市圈内开店的杂货商来说也是如此。广告商所说的"无效发行量"会损害盈利能力：报纸的成本主要由总发行量决定，而广告收入（通常占总收入的70%至80%）却只对有效发行量有所响应。

(2)Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their potential customers using only the News.

我们对Buffalo零售市场的渗透率出类拔萃；广告商只需借助News，便几乎可以触达其所有潜在客户。

Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance: among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)

去年我向大家介绍过这种非同寻常的读者认可度：在全美百大报纸中，我们当时日报渗透率排名第一，周日版排名第三。最新数据显示，我们工作日渗透率仍居第一，周日版跃升至第二。（即便如此，由于Buffalo的家庭户数有所减少，我们目前的工作日发行量略有下滑；周日版则保持不变。）

I told you also that one of the major reasons for this unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in our size range. In 1984 our "news hole" ratio was 50.9%, (versus 50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35%-40%. We will continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again, will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.

我还告诉过你们，读者对我们给予这种非同寻常认可的一个主要原因，是我们向他们传递的新闻量之大实属罕见：我们报纸中用于新闻内容的比例，高于同规模范围内任何一家主导性报纸。1984年，我们的"新闻版面"比率为50.9%（1983年为50.4%），远高于典型的35%-40%。我们将继续将这一比率维持在50%左右。此外，尽管去年我们减少了其他部门的总工时，但编辑室的用工水平保持不变，今后也将继续如此。1984年编辑室成本上升了9.1%，涨幅远超我们4.9%的总体成本增幅。

Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference between "high" and "low" news costs at papers of comparable size runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins are often ten times that amount.

我们的新闻版面政策使我们在新闻纸上额外付出了相当可观的成本。因此，我们的新闻成本（新闻版面所用新闻纸，加上编辑室薪资及费用）占收入的比例，高于大多数同规模主导性报纸。然而，我们的报纸或任何其他主导性报纸，都有足够的空间来承担这些成本：同等规模报纸中，新闻成本"高"与"低"之间的差距或许只有三个百分点，而税前利润率往往是这一差距的十倍。

The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better—as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.

一份主导性报纸的经济特质极为优秀，堪称商界翘楚之列。业主自然愿意相信，他们那令人称羡的盈利能力，全然源于他们始终如一地出品卓越产品。然而，这个令人舒适的理论，在一个令人不舒适的事实面前不攻自破。一流报纸固然利润丰厚，但三流报纸的利润同样不相上下，甚至有过之而无不及——只要这两类报纸中的任何一种在其所在社区占据主导地位。当然，产品质量或许对一份报纸取得主导地位至关重要。我们相信News正是如此，在很大程度上要归功于在我们之前像Alfred Kirchhofer这样的人。

Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its "bulletin board" value. Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command the attention of advertisers.

一旦取得主导地位，决定这份报纸好坏的，便是报纸自身，而非市场。无论好坏，它都将继续繁荣。这一点在大多数行业并不成立：质量低劣通常产生低劣的经济效益。但即便是一份糟糕的报纸，对大多数市民而言也物有所值，原因仅仅在于它的"公告栏"价值。在其他条件相同的情况下，劣质产品固然无法达到一流产品所能获得的读者规模，然而劣质产品对大多数市民来说仍不可或缺，而能够吸引读者注意力的东西，同样能够吸引广告商的注意力。

Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace, management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above-average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.

既然市场不会强制要求高标准，管理层就必须自我施加。我们承诺在新闻上投入高于平均水平的支出，这代表着一项重要的量化标准。我们相信Stan Lipsey和Murray Light将继续贯彻那些远比量化标准更为重要的定性标准。Charlie和我都相信，报纸在社会中是极为特殊的机构。我们为News感到自豪，并打算在未来的岁月里让这份自豪更加名副其实。

Best's data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

Best's的数据反映了几乎整个行业的经营状况，涵盖股份制公司、互助公司和相互保险公司。综合比率代表保险总成本（已发生赔款加费用）与保费收入之比；低于100表示承保盈利，高于100则表示承保亏损。

For a number of years, we have told you that an annual increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance policy.

多年来，我们一直告诉你们，行业承保保费每年约需增长10%，综合比率才能大体保持不变。我们在作出这一判断时假设：费用占保费的比例保持相对稳定，而赔款则因承保量增加、通货膨胀以及扩大保险责任范围的司法裁决三重因素叠加影响，每年增长约10%。

Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in 1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year percentage change in industry premium volume.

我们的判断正在被证明是令人沮丧地准确：若自1979年起保费每年增长10%，至1984年累计增幅将达61%，届时综合比率将与1979年的100.6几乎相同。然而现实是，行业保费仅增长了30%，1984年综合比率高达117.7。时至今日，我们仍然认为，承保盈利趋势的关键指标，是行业保费规模的年度变动百分比。

It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a "normal" level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually), five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly-competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios in the 108-113 range.

目前看来，1985年的保费规模将增长远超10%。因此，假设巨灾损失处于"正常"水平，我们预计综合比率将在年底前开始逐步下行。然而，在我们对全行业赔款的假设下（即每年增长10%），需要连续五年保费增长15%才能将综合比率拉回100。这意味着到1989年行业规模须翻倍，这在我们看来极不可能实现。我们预计，行业将经历数年略高于10%的保费增长，随后进入激烈竞争定价阶段，综合比率大体将维持在108至113的区间。

Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much additional detail, including the effect of discontinued operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average results during the past several years, and that circumstance has begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some. With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of 1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines with little loss of business.

我们1984年自身的综合比率高达令人汗颜的134。（在本报告中，与全文保持一致，我们在报告这一比率时剔除了结构性赔付和承担损失准备金的影响。更多细节，包括停止经营业务对该比率的影响，见第42-43页。）这是我们承保业绩连续第三年远逊于行业水平。我们预计1985年综合比率将有所改善，且改善幅度也将显著超过行业整体水平。Mike Goldberg纠正了我在他接手保险业务之前所犯的诸多错误。此外，我们的业务集中于过去数年表现差于平均水平的险种，这一状况已开始令许多竞争对手陷入困境，甚至令部分竞争者退出市场。随着竞争格局松动，我们在1984年下半年得以在若干重要险种上大幅提价，而业务量几乎未有流失。

For some years I have told you that there could be a day coming when our premier financial strength would make a real difference in the competitive position of our insurance operation. That day may have arrived. We are almost without question the strongest property/casualty insurance operation in the country, with a capital position far superior to that of well-known companies of much greater size.

多年来，我一直告诉你们，总有一天我们卓越的财务实力将真正改变我们保险业务的竞争地位。那一天或许已经到来。我们几乎毫无疑问是全美最强大的财产/意外险保险机构，资本状况远优于规模大得多的知名同行。

Equally important, our corporate policy is to retain that superiority. The buyer of insurance receives only a promise in exchange for his cash. The value of that promise should be appraised against the possibility of adversity, not prosperity. At a minimum, the promise should appear able to withstand a prolonged combination of depressed financial markets and exceptionally unfavorable underwriting results. Our insurance subsidiaries are both willing and able to keep their promises in any such environment—and not too many other companies clearly are.

同样重要的是，我们的公司政策是维持这种优势。保险购买者用现金换取的不过是一纸承诺。这份承诺的价值，应当以应对逆境的能力来衡量，而非以顺境时的表现来评判。这份承诺至少应能经受住金融市场长期低迷与承保结果极度不利相叠加的考验。我们的保险子公司在任何此类环境下都有意愿、有能力履行其承诺——而能够清楚地做到这一点的公司并不多见。

Our financial strength is a particular asset in the business of structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions that we reported on last year. The claimant in a structured settlement and the insurance company that has reinsured loss reserves need to be completely confident that payments will be forthcoming for decades to come. Very few companies in the property/casualty field can meet this test of unquestioned long-term strength. (In fact, only a handful of companies exists with which we will reinsure our own liabilities.)

我们的财务实力在结构性赔付和承担损失准备金业务中尤为关键，我们去年已就这两项业务作过介绍。结构性赔付中的索赔人，以及已将损失准备金再保险出去的保险公司，都需要对未来数十年的赔付有完全的信心。在财产/意外险领域，能够经受这种毋庸置疑的长期实力考验的公司寥寥无几。（事实上，我们自己愿意将负债再保险出去的公司也屈指可数。）

We have grown in these new lines of business: funds that we hold to offset assumed liabilities grew from $16.2 million to $30.6 million during the year. We expect growth to continue and perhaps to greatly accelerate. To support this projected growth we have added substantially to the capital of Columbia Insurance Company, our reinsurance unit specializing in structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions. While these businesses are very competitive, returns should be satisfactory.

我们在这些新业务线上已实现增长：我们持有的用于抵消承担负债的资金，在年内从1,620万美元增至3,060万美元。我们预计增长将持续，或许还将大幅提速。为支持这一预期增长，我们已大幅增加Columbia Insurance Company的资本金——这是我们专门从事结构性赔付和损失准备金承担业务的再保险子公司。尽管这些业务竞争激烈，回报应当令人满意。

At GEICO the news, as usual, is mostly good. That company achieved excellent unit growth in its primary insurance business during 1984, and the performance of its investment portfolio continued to be extraordinary. Though underwriting results deteriorated late in the year, they still remain far better than those of the industry. Our ownership in GEICO at yearend amounted to 36% and thus our interest in their direct property/casualty volume of $885 million amounted to $320 million, or well over double our own premium volume.

GEICO的消息一如既往地以好消息居多。该公司1984年在其主要保险业务上实现了出色的承保量增长，投资组合的表现也继续令人瞩目。尽管年末承保结果有所恶化，但仍远优于行业整体水平。我们年末持有GEICO的36%股权，因此我们在其8.85亿美元直接财产/意外险保费中权益对应的份额为3.2亿美元，是我们自身保费规模的两倍有余。

I have reported to you in the past few years that the performance of GEICO's stock has considerably exceeded that company's business performance, brilliant as the latter has been. In those years, the carrying value of our GEICO investment on our balance sheet grew at a rate greater than the growth in GEICO's intrinsic business value. I warned you that over performance by the stock relative to the performance of the business obviously could not occur every year, and that in some years the stock must under perform the business. In 1984 that occurred and the carrying value of our interest in GEICO changed hardly at all, while the intrinsic business value of that interest increased substantially.

过去几年，我曾向你们报告，GEICO股票的表现已大幅超越其自身业务表现——尽管后者本身已相当出色。在那些年里，我们GEICO投资在资产负债表上的账面价值增速，超过了GEICO内在商业价值的增速。我曾提醒你们，股票表现持续超越业务表现显然不可能年年发生，在某些年份股票必然会落后于业务表现。1984年正是如此——我们在GEICO权益的账面价值几乎没有变化，而该权益的内在商业价值却实质性地增长了。

Since 27% of Berkshire's net worth at the beginning of 1984 was represented by GEICO, its static market value had a significant impact upon our rate of gain for the year. We are not at all unhappy with such a result: we would far rather have the business value of GEICO increase by X during the year, while market value decreases, than have the intrinsic value increase by only 1/2 X with market value soaring. In GEICO's case, as in all of our investments, we look to business performance, not market performance. If we are correct in expectations regarding the business, the market eventually will follow along.

由于GEICO在1984年初占Berkshire净资产的27%，其市场价值停滞不前对我们当年的收益率产生了显著影响。我们对这样的结果毫不介意：我们宁愿GEICO的业务价值在年内增长X而市场价值下跌，也不愿内在价值仅增长1/2 X而市场价值扶摇直上。对于GEICO，乃至我们所有的投资，我们关注的是业务表现，而非市场表现。如果我们对业务的预判正确，市场终将跟上。

You, as shareholders of Berkshire, have benefited in enormous measure from the talents of GEICO's Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder, and Lou Simpson. In its core business—low-cost auto and homeowners insurance—GEICO has a major, sustainable competitive advantage. That is a rare asset in business generally, and it's almost non-existent in the field of financial services. (GEICO, itself, illustrates this point: despite the company's excellent management, superior profitability has eluded GEICO in all endeavors other than its core business.) In a large industry, a competitive advantage such as GEICO's provides the potential for unusual economic rewards, and Jack and Bill continue to exhibit great skill in realizing that potential.

作为Berkshire的股东，你们从GEICO的Jack Byrne、Bill Snyder和Lou Simpson的才华中获益良多。在其核心业务——低成本汽车及房主保险——领域，GEICO拥有重大且可持续的竞争优势。这在商界是稀缺资产，在金融服务领域更是几近绝迹。（GEICO自身便是这一点的佐证：尽管公司管理卓越，但在核心业务之外的所有尝试中，GEICO均未能实现卓越盈利。）在一个规模庞大的行业中，GEICO这样的竞争优势蕴含着获取非凡经济回报的潜力，而Jack和Bill在实现这一潜力方面持续展现出高超的技巧。

Most of the funds generated by GEICO's core insurance operation are made available to Lou for investment. Lou has the rare combination of temperamental and intellectual characteristics that produce outstanding long-term investment performance. Operating with below-average risk, he has generated returns that have been by far the best in the insurance industry. I applaud and appreciate the efforts and talents of these three outstanding managers.

GEICO核心保险业务产生的大部分资金交由Lou负责投资。Lou兼具产生卓越长期投资业绩所需的罕见气质与智识特质。他在承担低于平均水平风险的情况下，创造了迄今保险业内遥遥领先的投资回报。我对这三位杰出管理者的付出与才能深表钦佩与感谢。

损失准备金计提的误差

Any shareholder in a company with important interests in the property/casualty insurance business should have some understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the reporting of current earnings in that industry. Phil Graham, when publisher of the Washington Post, described the daily newspaper as "a first rough draft of history". Unfortunately, the financial statements of a property/casualty insurer provide, at best, only a first rough draft of earnings and financial condition.

任何在财产/意外险业务中持有重要权益的公司的股东，都应当对该行业当期盈利报告中固有的缺陷有所了解。Washington Post的出版人Phil Graham曾将日报描述为"历史的第一份草稿"。遗憾的是，一家财产/意外险保险公司的财务报表，充其量也只是其盈利状况和财务状况的第一份草稿。

The determination of costs is the main problem. Most of an insurer's costs result from losses on claims, and many of the losses that should be charged against the current year's revenue are exceptionally difficult to estimate. Sometimes the extent of these losses, or even their existence, is not known for decades.

成本的确定是核心难题。保险公司的大部分成本源于理赔损失，而其中许多应计入当年收入的损失极难估算，有时这些损失的规模甚至其是否存在，数十年后才能知晓。

The loss expense charged in a property/casualty company's current income statement represents: (1) losses that occurred and were paid during the year; (2) estimates for losses that occurred and were reported to the insurer during the year, but which have yet to be settled; (3) estimates of ultimate dollar costs for losses that occurred during the year but of which the insurer is unaware (termed "IBNR": incurred but not reported); and (4) the net effect of revisions this year of similar estimates for (2) and (3) made in past years.

财产/意外险公司当期损益表中列示的损失费用，包含以下几个部分：（1）当年发生并已赔付的损失；（2）当年发生并已向保险公司报案、但尚未结案的损失估算；（3）当年已发生但保险公司尚不知晓的损失最终金额估算（即"IBNR"：已发生未报告）；（4）本年度对以往年度就（2）和（3）所作类似估算进行修正的净影响。

Such revisions may be long delayed, but eventually any estimate of losses that causes the income for year X to be misstated must be corrected, whether it is in year X + 1, or X + 10. This, perforce, means that earnings in the year of correction also are misstated. For example, assume a claimant was injured by one of our insureds in 1979 and we thought a settlement was likely to be made for $10,000. That year we would have charged $10,000 to our earnings statement for the estimated cost of the loss and, correspondingly, set up a liability reserve on the balance sheet for that amount. If we settled the claim in 1984 for $100,000, we would charge earnings with a loss cost of $90,000 in 1984, although that cost was truly an expense of 1979. And if that piece of business was our only activity in 1979, we would have badly misled ourselves as to costs, and you as to earnings.

此类修正或许会延迟很久，但最终，任何导致X年收益被误报的损失估算都必须加以纠正，无论是在X+1年还是X+10年。这必然意味着，修正当年的收益同样被误报。举例而言，假设某索赔人于1979年被我们的一名被保险人所伤，我们当时估计赔付金额约为1万美元。那一年，我们会在损益表中列支1万美元作为损失的估算成本，并在资产负债表上相应设立等额负债准备金。如果我们在1984年以10万美元结案，我们就需要在1984年的损益中列支9万美元的损失成本，尽管这笔成本实质上是1979年的费用。倘若那笔业务是我们1979年的唯一业务，我们对成本的判断和你们对收益的认知，都将严重失实。

The necessarily-extensive use of estimates in assembling the figures that appear in such deceptively precise form in the income statement of property/casualty companies means that some error must seep in, no matter how proper the intentions of management. In an attempt to minimize error, most insurers use various statistical techniques to adjust the thousands of individual loss evaluations (called case reserves) that comprise the raw data for estimation of aggregate liabilities. The extra reserves created by these adjustments are variously labeled "bulk", "development", or "supplemental" reserves. The goal of the adjustments should be a loss-reserve total that has a 50-50 chance of being proved either slightly too high or slightly too low when all losses that occurred prior to the date of the financial statement are ultimately paid.

在财产/意外险公司损益表中，那些以看似精确的形式呈现的数字，在汇总过程中必然大量依赖估算，这意味着无论管理层的初衷多么端正，误差都必然会渗入其中。为尽量减少误差，大多数保险公司采用各种统计技术，对构成总体负债估算原始数据的数千项个别损失评估（称为"案件准备金"）进行调整。这些调整所产生的额外准备金，被冠以"批量"、"发展"或"补充"准备金等不同名称。调整的目标，应当是使损失准备金总额在财务报表日期之前发生的所有损失最终赔付完毕时，有50%的概率被证明略微偏高，也有50%的概率被证明略微偏低。

At Berkshire, we have added what we thought were appropriate supplemental reserves but in recent years they have not been adequate. It is important that you understand the magnitude of the errors that have been involved in our reserving. You can thus see for yourselves just how imprecise the process is, and also judge whether we may have some systemic bias that should make you wary of our current and future figures.

在Berkshire，我们虽然计提了我们认为适当的补充准备金，但近年来这些准备金并不充足。让你们了解我们在准备金计提中所涉及的误差幅度，是至关重要的。如此你们便可以亲眼见证这一过程究竟有多不精确，并判断我们是否存在某种系统性偏差，从而对我们当前和未来的数据保持应有的警惕。

The following table shows the results from insurance underwriting as we have reported them to you in recent years, and also gives you calculations a year later on an "if-we-knew-then-what-we think-we-know-now" basis. I say "what we think we know now" because the adjusted figures still include a great many estimates for losses that occurred in the earlier years. However, many claims from the earlier years have been settled so that our one-year-later estimate contains less guess work than our earlier estimate:

下表列示了近年来我们向你们报告的保险承保结果，并同时提供了一年后在"若当时知道我们现在自以为知道的事情"基础上的测算数据。我之所以说"自以为知道"，是因为调整后的数字仍然包含大量对早年发生损失的估算。然而，由于早年的许多索赔已经结案，我们一年后的估算所含的猜测成分，已少于此前的估算：

To help you understand this table, here is an explanation of the most recent figures: 1984's reported pre-tax underwriting loss of $45.4 million consists of $27.6 million we estimate that we lost on 1984's business, plus the increased loss of $17.8 million reflected in the corrected figure for 1983.

为帮助你们理解这张表格，以下是对最新数据的说明：1984年报告的税前承保亏损4,540万美元，由两部分构成：我们估计在1984年业务上亏损的2,760万美元，加上1983年修正数据所反映的新增亏损1,780万美元。

As you can see from reviewing the table, my errors in reporting to you have been substantial and recently have always presented a better underwriting picture than was truly the case. This is a source of particular chagrin to me because: (1) I like for you to be able to count on what I say; (2) our insurance managers and I undoubtedly acted with less urgency than we would have had we understood the full extent of our losses; and (3) we paid income taxes calculated on overstated earnings and thereby gave the government money that we didn't need to. (These overpayments eventually correct themselves, but the delay is long and we don't receive interest on the amounts we overpaid.)

从这张表格可以看出，我向你们报告时所犯的误差相当巨大，而且近年来始终呈现出比实际情况更为乐观的承保状况。这令我深感痛惜，原因有三：（1）我希望你们能够信赖我所说的话；（2）我们的保险管理层和我本人，因未能充分认识到损失的全貌，行动的紧迫感无疑不如应有的程度；（3）我们按高估的收益缴纳了所得税，将本不必要缴纳的钱白白交给了政府。（这些超额缴纳最终会自行纠正，但延迟时间漫长，且我们对超额缴纳的金额收不到任何利息。）

Because our business is weighted toward casualty and reinsurance lines, we have more problems in estimating loss costs than companies that specialize in property insurance. (When a building that you have insured burns down, you get a much faster fix on your costs than you do when an employer you have insured finds out that one of his retirees has contracted a disease attributable to work he did decades earlier.) But I still find our errors embarrassing. In our direct business, we have far underestimated the mushrooming tendency of juries and courts to make the "deep pocket" pay, regardless of the factual situation and the past precedents for establishment of liability. We also have underestimated the contagious effect that publicity regarding giant awards has on juries. In the reinsurance area, where we have had our worst experience in under reserving, our customer insurance companies have made the same mistakes. Since we set reserves based on information they supply us, their mistakes have become our mistakes.

由于我们的业务偏重于意外险和再保险险种，在估算损失成本方面，我们比专注于财产险的公司面临更多困难。（当你承保的一栋建筑付之一炬，你能很快确定损失成本；但当你承保的一位雇主发现其某位退休员工罹患了数十年前工作导致的疾病，情况便大相径庭。）但我仍然为我们的误差感到难堪。在直接业务方面，我们严重低估了陪审团和法院强迫"深口袋"付款的愈演愈烈的倾向——无论事实情况如何，也无论过去确立责任的判例是什么。我们也低估了巨额判决的媒体报道对陪审团的传染效应。在准备金计提不足问题最为严重的再保险领域，我们的客户保险公司犯了同样的错误，而由于我们是依据他们提供的信息来设定准备金的，他们的错误也就变成了我们的错误。

I heard a story recently that is applicable to our insurance accounting problems: a man was traveling abroad when he received a call from his sister informing him that their father had died unexpectedly. It was physically impossible for the brother to get back home for the funeral, but he told his sister to take care of the funeral arrangements and to send the bill to him. After returning home he received a bill for several thousand dollars, which he promptly paid. The following month another bill came along for $15, and he paid that too. Another month followed, with a similar bill. When, in the next month, a third bill for $15 was presented, he called his sister to ask what was going on. "Oh", she said. "I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit."

我最近听到一个故事，与我们的保险会计问题颇为贴切：一个男人在海外旅行时接到姐姐的电话，得知父亲突然离世。他无法赶回家参加葬礼，便告诉姐姐一切葬礼事宜由她安排，账单寄给他。回家后，他收到了一张数千美元的账单，随即付清。下个月又来了一张15美元的账单，他也付了。再下个月，同样的账单又来了。当第三张15美元的账单出现时，他打电话问姐姐怎么回事。"哦，"她说，"我忘了告诉你。我们给爸爸穿的是租来的西装。"

If you've been in the insurance business in recent years—particularly the reinsurance business—this story hurts. We have tried to include all of our "rented suit" liabilities in our current financial statement, but our record of past error should make us humble, and you suspicious. I will continue to report to you the errors, plus or minus, that surface each year.

如果你近年来身处保险业——尤其是再保险业——这个故事会刺痛你。我们已尽力将所有"租来的西装"式负债纳入当前财务报表，但我们过去的误差记录理应让我们保持谦逊，也理应让你们保持警惕。我将继续向你们报告每年浮现的误差，无论正负。

Not all reserving errors in the industry have been of the innocent-but-dumb variety. With underwriting results as bad as they have been in recent years—and with managements having as much discretion as they do in the presentation of financial statements—some unattractive aspects of human nature have manifested themselves. Companies that would be out of business if they realistically appraised their loss costs have, in some cases, simply preferred to take an extraordinarily optimistic view about these yet-to-be-paid sums. Others have engaged in various transactions to hide true current loss costs.

行业中并非所有准备金误差都属于"无辜但愚蠢"的那一类。近年来承保结果如此糟糕，加之管理层在财务报表的列报上又拥有如此大的自由裁量空间，人性中一些不那么光彩的一面便由此显现。某些公司若如实评估损失成本便会面临倒闭，在这种情况下，它们干脆选择对这些尚未赔付的金额持极度乐观的态度。还有一些公司则通过各种交易手段来掩盖真实的当期损失成本。

Both of these approaches can "work" for a considerable time: external auditors cannot effectively police the financial statements of property/casualty insurers. If liabilities of an insurer, correctly stated, would exceed assets, it falls to the insurer to volunteer this morbid information. In other words, the corpse is supposed to file the death certificate. Under this "honor system" of mortality, the corpse sometimes gives itself the benefit of the doubt.

这两种做法都能"奏效"相当长的时间：外部审计师无法有效监督财产/意外险公司的财务报表。如果一家保险公司如实列报的负债超过资产，那么披露这一不祥信息的责任便落在保险公司自己身上。换句话说，尸体应当自己去填写死亡证明。在这种"荣誉制度"下，尸体有时会给自己一个"从宽认定"的余地。

In most businesses, of course, insolvent companies run out of cash. Insurance is different: you can be broke but flush. Since cash comes in at the inception of an insurance policy and losses are paid much later, insolvent insurers don't run out of cash until long after they have run out of net worth. In fact, these "walking dead" often redouble their efforts to write business, accepting almost any price or risk, simply to keep the cash flowing in. With an attitude like that of an embezzler who has gambled away his purloined funds, these companies hope that somehow they can get lucky on the next batch of business and thereby cover up earlier shortfalls. Even if they don't get lucky, the penalty to managers is usually no greater for a $100 million shortfall than one of $10 million; in the meantime, while the losses mount, the managers keep their jobs and perquisites.

当然，在大多数行业，资不抵债的公司终将耗尽现金。保险业则不同：你可以已经破产，账上却依然充裕。由于保费在保单生效时即行收入，而损失赔付则发生在很久之后，资不抵债的保险公司在净资产耗尽后很久才会出现现金短缺。事实上，这些"行尸走肉"往往变本加厉地承揽业务，几乎接受任何价格和风险，只为维持现金的持续流入。它们的心态如同一个将盗用款项挥霍于赌桌的挪用公款者，寄望于下一批业务能够交上好运，从而掩盖早前的亏空。即便运气不来，管理层为1亿美元亏空所受的惩罚，通常也不会比1,000万美元的亏空更重；与此同时，在损失不断累积的过程中，管理层依然保住了自己的职位和特权。

The loss-reserving errors of other property/casualty companies are of more than academic interest to Berkshire. Not only does Berkshire suffer from sell-at-any-price competition by the "walking dead", but we also suffer when their insolvency is finally acknowledged. Through various state guarantee funds that levy assessments, Berkshire ends up paying a portion of the insolvent insurers' asset deficiencies, swollen as they usually are by the delayed detection that results from wrong reporting. There is even some potential for cascading trouble. The insolvency of a few large insurers and the assessments by state guarantee funds that would follow could imperil weak-but-previously-solvent insurers. Such dangers can be mitigated if state regulators become better at prompt identification and termination of insolvent insurers, but progress on that front has been slow.

其他财产/意外险公司的损失准备金误差，对Berkshire而言绝非仅具学术意义。Berkshire不仅深受这些"行尸走肉"不计代价的竞争之苦，还在它们的资不抵债最终被承认时再度受累。通过各州征收摊派款的担保基金，Berkshire最终要为这些资不抵债保险公司承担一部分资产缺口——而这些缺口通常因错误报告导致延迟发现而被进一步放大。甚至还存在引发连锁危机的潜在风险：几家大型保险公司的破产及随之而来的州担保基金摊派，可能会将原本虽弱但尚有偿付能力的保险公司拖入困境。如果州监管机构能够更及时地识别和处置资不抵债的保险公司，此类风险或可得到缓解，但在这方面的进展一直迟缓。

华盛顿公共电力供应系统

From October, 1983 through June, 1984 Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries continuously purchased large quantities of bonds of Projects 1, 2, and 3 of Washington Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS"). This is the same entity that, on July 1, 1983, defaulted on $2.2 billion of bonds issued to finance partial construction of the now-abandoned Projects 4 and 5. While there are material differences in the obligors, promises, and properties underlying the two categories of bonds, the problems of Projects 4 and 5 have cast a major cloud over Projects 1, 2, and 3, and might possibly cause serious problems for the latter issues. In addition, there have been a multitude of problems related directly to Projects 1, 2, and 3 that could weaken or destroy an otherwise strong credit position arising from guarantees by Bonneville Power Administration.

从1983年10月至1984年6月，Berkshire的保险子公司持续大量买入华盛顿公共电力供应系统（"WPPSS"）1号、2号和3号项目的债券。这家机构正是于1983年7月1日对22亿美元债券发生违约的同一主体——那批债券是为现已放弃的4号和5号项目的部分建设提供融资的。尽管这两类债券在债务人、承诺及担保资产方面存在实质性差异，4号和5号项目的问题已在1号、2号和3号项目上空笼罩了一片巨大的阴云，并有可能给后者带来严重麻烦。此外，直接与1号、2号和3号项目相关的问题也层出不穷，这些问题可能削弱乃至摧毁本来由Bonneville Power Administration担保所形成的强劲信用地位。

Despite these important negatives, Charlie and I judged the risks at the time we purchased the bonds and at the prices Berkshire paid (much lower than present prices) to be considerably more than compensated for by prospects of profit.

尽管存在上述重大不利因素，Charlie和我在我们买入债券时，以Berkshire所支付的价格（远低于当前价格）判断，盈利前景对风险的补偿已相当充分。

As you know, we buy marketable stocks for our insurance companies based upon the criteria we would apply in the purchase of an entire business. This business-valuation approach is not widespread among professional money managers and is scorned by many academics. Nevertheless, it has served its followers well (to which the academics seem to say, "Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory.") Simply put, we feel that if we can buy small pieces of businesses with satisfactory underlying economics at a fraction of the per-share value of the entire business, something good is likely to happen to us—particularly if we own a group of such securities.

如你们所知，我们为保险公司购买上市股票时，所依据的标准与收购一整家企业时相同。这种业务估值方法在职业基金经理中并不普及，也遭到许多学者的嗤之以鼻。尽管如此，它对其追随者而言一直成效卓著（对此学者们似乎会说："嗯，在实践中或许行得通，但在理论上永远行不通。"）简而言之，我们认为，如果我们能以整体企业每股价值的一小部分，买入具有令人满意的内在经济特质的企业的小份额权益，好事就很可能降临——尤其是当我们持有一组这样的证券时。

We extend this business-valuation approach even to bond purchases such as WPPSS. We compare the $139 million cost of our yearend investment in WPPSS to a similar $139 million investment in an operating business. In the case of WPPSS, the "business" contractually earns $22.7 million after tax (via the interest paid on the bonds), and those earnings are available to us currently in cash. We are unable to buy operating businesses with economics close to these. Only a relatively few businesses earn the 16.3% after tax on unleveraged capital that our WPPSS investment does and those businesses, when available for purchase, sell at large premiums to that capital. In the average negotiated business transaction, unleveraged corporate earnings of $22.7 million after-tax (equivalent to about $45 million pre-tax) might command a price of $250—$300 million (or sometimes far more). For a business we understand well and strongly like, we will gladly pay that much. But it is double the price we paid to realize the same earnings from WPPSS bonds.

我们将这种业务估值方法延伸至WPPSS这样的债券购买。我们将年末1.39亿美元的WPPSS投资成本，与同等规模的1.39亿美元经营性企业投资相比较。就WPPSS而言，这项"业务"在合同上每年税后赚取2,270万美元（通过债券利息支付实现），且这些收益目前即可以现金形式兑现。我们无法以接近这一水平的经济条件买到经营性企业。只有极少数企业能够在无杠杆资本上实现我们WPPSS投资所达到的16.3%的税后回报率，而这些企业一旦可供收购，往往以远高于该资本的大幅溢价出售。在一般的协议收购交易中，税后无杠杆企业盈利2,270万美元（相当于税前约4,500万美元），通常需要2.5亿至3亿美元的收购价格（有时远不止于此）。对于我们深刻了解且由衷喜爱的企业，我们乐于支付这样的价格。但那是我们通过WPPSS债券实现同等收益所付代价的两倍。

However, in the case of WPPSS, there is what we view to be a very slight risk that the "business" could be worth nothing within a year or two. There also is the risk that interest payments might be interrupted for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the most that the "business" could be worth is about the $205 million face value of the bonds that we own, an amount only 48% higher than the price we paid.

然而，就WPPSS而言，我们认为存在极小的风险——这项"业务"可能在一两年内变得一文不值，也存在利息支付可能被中断相当长一段时间的风险。此外，这项"业务"的价值上限约为我们持有债券2.05亿美元的面值，仅比我们支付的价格高出48%。

This ceiling on upside potential is an important minus. It should be realized, however, that the great majority of operating businesses have a limited upside potential also unless more capital is continuously invested in them. That is so because most businesses are unable to significantly improve their average returns on equity—even under inflationary conditions, though these were once thought to automatically raise returns.

上行空间的天花板是一个重要的减分项。然而应当认识到，绝大多数经营性企业的上行潜力同样有限——除非持续不断地向其注入更多资本。原因在于，大多数企业无法显著提升其平均股权回报率，即便在通胀环境下也是如此——尽管通胀曾一度被认为会自动提升回报率。

(Let's push our bond-as-a-business example one notch further: if you elect to "retain" the annual earnings of a 12% bond by using the proceeds from coupons to buy more bonds, earnings of that bond "business" will grow at a rate comparable to that of most operating businesses that similarly reinvest all earnings. In the first instance, a 30-year, zero-coupon, 12% bond purchased today for $10 million will be worth $300 million in 2015. In the second, a $10 million business that regularly earns 12% on equity and retains all earnings to grow, will also end up with $300 million of capital in 2015. Both the business and the bond will earn over $32 million in the final year.)

（让我们将"债券即企业"的类比再推进一步：如果你选择将12%债券的年度收益"留存"下来，用票息所得购买更多债券，那么这项债券"业务"的收益增长速度，将与大多数同样将全部收益再投资的经营性企业相当。具体而言：一张今天以1,000万美元买入的30年期零息12%债券，到2015年将价值3亿美元；而一家初始规模1,000万美元、持续实现12%股权回报率且将全部收益再投入增长的企业，到2015年同样将积累3亿美元的资本。无论是这家企业还是这张债券，在最后一年的收益都将超过3,200万美元。）

Our approach to bond investment—treating it as an unusual sort of "business" with special advantages and disadvantages—may strike you as a bit quirky. However, we believe that many staggering errors by investors could have been avoided if they had viewed bond investment with a businessman's perspective. For example, in 1946, 20-year AAA tax-exempt bonds traded at slightly below a 1% yield. In effect, the buyer of those bonds at that time bought a "business" that earned about 1% on "book value" (and that, moreover, could never earn a dime more than 1% on book), and paid 100 cents on the dollar for that abominable business.

我们对债券投资的方式——将其视为一种具有特殊优劣势的非寻常"业务"——或许在你们看来有些怪癖。然而，我们相信，如果投资者能以商人的视角审视债券投资，许多触目惊心的错误本可避免。举例而言，1946年，20年期AAA级免税债券的交易收益率略低于1%。实际上，那时买入这些债券的人，购买了一项在"账面价值"上赚取约1%收益的"业务"（而且永远不可能在账面上多赚一分钱），并为这项糟糕透顶的业务付出了百分之百的对价。

If an investor had been business-minded enough to think in those terms—and that was the precise reality of the bargain struck—he would have laughed at the proposition and walked away. For, at the same time, businesses with excellent future prospects could have been bought at, or close to, book value while earning 10%, 12%, or 15% after tax on book. Probably no business in America changed hands in 1946 at book value that the buyer believed lacked the ability to earn more than 1% on book. But investors with bond-buying habits eagerly made economic commitments throughout the year on just that basis. Similar, although less extreme, conditions prevailed for the next two decades as bond investors happily signed up for twenty or thirty years on terms outrageously inadequate by business standards. (In what I think is by far the best book on investing ever written—"The Intelligent Investor", by Ben Graham—the last section of the last chapter begins with, "Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike." This section is called "A Final Word", and it is appropriately titled.)

如果一位投资者有足够的商业头脑，能以这样的方式思考问题——而这正是所达成交易的确切实质——他必定会对这个提议嗤之以鼻，转身离去。因为在同一时期，前景优异的企业本可以账面价值或接近账面价值的价格买到，且其税后账面回报率高达10%、12%乃至15%。1946年在美国，大概没有任何一家企业以账面价值易手，而买家还相信它赚取的账面回报不会超过1%。然而，习惯于购买债券的投资者却在全年热情洋溢地在这样的基础上做出经济承诺。此后二十年，类似但程度较轻的状况持续存在，债券投资者心甘情愿地以商业标准来看极度不合理的条款，签下二三十年的协议。（在我认为迄今为止所写就的最佳投资著作——Ben Graham的《聪明的投资者》——最后一章的最后一节以这样一句话开篇："投资在最具商业头脑时，是最为明智的。"这一节题为"最后的忠告"，这个标题恰如其分。）

We will emphasize again that there is unquestionably some risk in the WPPSS commitment. It is also the sort of risk that is difficult to evaluate. Were Charlie and I to deal with 50 similar evaluations over a lifetime, we would expect our judgment to prove reasonably satisfactory. But we do not get the chance to make 50 or even 5 such decisions in a single year. Even though our long-term results may turn out fine, in any given year we run a risk that we will look extraordinarily foolish. (That's why all of these sentences say "Charlie and I", or "we".)

我们要再次强调，WPPSS这笔投资无疑存在一定风险，而且是那种难以评估的风险。如果Charlie和我一生中能够处理50个类似的评估案例，我们预期自己的判断力会被证明是相当令人满意的。但我们没有机会在单独一年内做出50个、甚至5个这样的决策。即便我们的长期结果最终证明不错，在任何特定的年份，我们都面临着看起来极度愚蠢的风险。（这就是为什么所有这些句子都说"Charlie和我"，或者"我们"。）

Most managers have very little incentive to make the intelligent-but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot decision. Their personal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if an unconventional decision works out well, they get a pat on the back and, if it works out poorly, they get a pink slip. (Failing conventionally is the route to go; as a group, lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad press.)

大多数管理者几乎没有动力去做出那种"明智但有可能显得像个蠢货"的决策。他们个人的得失比显而易见：非常规决策若成功，不过是得到一句褒奖；若失败，则会收到一张解雇通知。（循规蹈矩地失败才是正道；作为一个群体，旅鼠的形象或许很糟糕，但从来没有哪只单独的旅鼠因此受到负面报道。）

Our equation is different. With 47% of Berkshire's stock, Charlie and I don't worry about being fired, and we receive our rewards as owners, not managers. Thus we behave with Berkshire's money as we would with our own. That frequently leads us to unconventional behavior both in investments and general business management.

我们的处境不同。持有Berkshire 47%的股份，Charlie和我不必担心被解雇，而且我们的回报来自作为所有者，而非管理者。因此，我们对待Berkshire的钱，一如对待自己的钱。这使我们在投资和日常经营管理上都频繁表现出非常规的行为。

We remain unconventional in the degree to which we concentrate the investments of our insurance companies, including those in WPPSS bonds. This concentration makes sense only because our insurance business is conducted from a position of exceptional financial strength. For almost all other insurers, a comparable degree of concentration (or anything close to it) would be totally inappropriate. Their capital positions are not strong enough to withstand a big error, no matter how attractive an investment opportunity might appear when analyzed on the basis of probabilities.

我们在保险公司投资集中度上依然保持非常规风格，包括在WPPSS债券上的持仓。这种集中之所以合理，仅仅是因为我们的保险业务建立在异常雄厚的财务实力基础之上。对几乎所有其他保险公司而言，类似程度的集中（或任何接近这一程度的做法）都是完全不适当的。它们的资本状况不够强大，无法承受一个重大失误的冲击，无论某个投资机会在概率分析的基础上看起来多么诱人。

With our financial strength we can own large blocks of a few securities that we have thought hard about and bought at attractive prices. (Billy Rose described the problem of over-diversification: "If you have a harem of forty women, you never get to know any of them very well.") Over time our policy of concentration should produce superior results, though these will be tempered by our large size. When this policy produces a really bad year, as it must, at least you will know that our money was committed on the same basis as yours.

凭借我们的财务实力，我们可以重仓持有少数几只我们深思熟虑、以有吸引力的价格买入的证券。（Billy Rose描述了过度分散的问题："如果你有四十个妻妾，你永远无法深入了解其中任何一个。"）从长远来看，我们的集中持仓策略应能产生卓越的结果，尽管这会因我们的规模庞大而有所减损。当这一策略终将带来真正糟糕的一年时，你们至少会知道，我们的钱与你们的钱是押在同一个基础上的。

We made the major part of our WPPSS investment at different prices and under somewhat different factual circumstances than exist at present. If we decide to change our position, we will not inform shareholders until long after the change has been completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and even a modest amount of added competition on either side can cost us a great deal of money. Our WPPSS purchases illustrate this principle. From October, 1983 through June, 1984, we attempted to buy almost all the bonds that we could of Projects 1, 2, and 3. Yet we purchased less than 3% of the bonds outstanding. Had we faced even a few additional well-heeled investors, stimulated to buy because they knew we were, we could have ended up with a materially smaller amount of bonds, purchased at a materially higher price. (A couple of coat-tail riders easily could have cost us $5 million.) For this reason, we will not comment about our activities in securities—neither to the press, nor shareholders, nor to anyone else—unless legally required to do so.

我们在WPPSS的主要投资，是在与当前有所不同的价格和事实情况下分批建立的。如果我们决定改变持仓，不会在变动完成后很久才通知股东。（你们读到这封信时，我们可能正在买入或卖出。）证券的买卖是一项竞争性业务，即便是略微增加一点买方或卖方的竞争，都可能让我们损失大量金钱。我们买入WPPSS就是这一原则的体现。从1983年10月至1984年6月，我们试图尽可能多地买入1号、2号和3号项目的债券，然而我们买入的量不到流通债券总量的3%。如果当时多了哪怕几个财力雄厚、因知道我们在买而受到刺激跟进的投资者，我们最终买到的债券数量就会大幅减少，而买入价格则会大幅提高。（几个跟风者就可能轻易让我们多花500万美元。）正因如此，除非法律要求，我们不会就证券买卖活动发表任何评论——无论是对媒体、股东还是任何其他人。

One final observation regarding our WPPSS purchases: we dislike the purchase of most long-term bonds under most circumstances and have bought very few in recent years. That's because bonds are as sound as a dollar—and we view the long-term outlook for dollars as dismal. We believe substantial inflation lies ahead, although we have no idea what the average rate will turn out to be. Furthermore, we think there is a small, but not insignificant, chance of runaway inflation.

关于我们购买WPPSS债券，还有最后一点说明：在大多数情况下，我们不喜欢购买大多数长期债券，近年来购买的也极少。这是因为债券与美元同样可靠——而我们对美元的长期前景看法悲观。我们相信前方存在相当程度的通货膨胀，尽管我们对平均通胀率最终会是多少毫无把握。此外，我们认为恶性通胀的概率虽小，但绝非可以忽视。

Such a possibility may seem absurd, considering the rate to which inflation has dropped. But we believe that present fiscal policy—featuring a huge deficit—is both extremely dangerous and difficult to reverse. (So far, most politicians in both parties have followed Charlie Brown's advice: "No problem is so big that it can't be run away from.") Without a reversal, high rates of inflation may be delayed (perhaps for a long time), but will not be avoided. If high rates materialize, they bring with them the potential for a runaway upward spiral.

考虑到通胀已经下降到目前的水平，这种可能性或许显得荒诞。但我们认为，当前以巨额赤字为特征的财政政策，既极度危险，又难以逆转。（迄今为止，两党的大多数政客都遵循了Charlie Brown的忠告："没有任何问题大到无法逃避。"）若不加以逆转，高通胀可能会被推迟（或许是很长一段时间），但终究无法避免。一旦高通胀成真，随之而来的便是失控螺旋式上升的潜在风险。

While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks (as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range, runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a small but unacceptable "wipe out" risk, and we require any purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely to be few and far between.

当年通胀率处于5%至10%的区间时，债券与股票（作为一个资产类别）之间并无太多优劣之分，但恶性通胀则是另一回事。在那种情况下，一个分散化的股票投资组合几乎肯定会遭受实际价值的巨大损失。但存量债券所受的打击将远为惨烈。因此，我们认为纯债券投资组合承载着一种虽小但不可接受的"全军覆没"风险，并要求任何长期债券的购买都必须跨越一道特别的门槛。只有当购买债券看起来明显优于其他商业机会时，我们才会涉足。这样的时机很可能少之又少，相隔遥远。

股息政策

Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A company will say something like, "Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI". And that's it—no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is, we believe managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.

股息政策常常被向股东报告，却鲜少得到解释。公司往往只是说一句"我们的目标是派发40%至50%的收益，并以不低于CPI涨幅的速度增加股息"——仅此而已，却不提供任何分析来说明为何这一特定政策对企业的所有者而言是最优的。然而，资本配置对于企业经营和投资管理至关重要。正因如此，我们认为管理者和所有者都应当认真思考：在什么情况下应当留存收益，在什么情况下又应当予以分配。

The first point to understand is that all earnings are not created equal. In many businesses particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios—inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion—let's call these earnings "restricted"—cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.

首先需要理解的是，并非所有收益都生而平等。在许多企业中——尤其是那些资产/利润比率较高的企业——通货膨胀会导致部分乃至全部报告收益变成虚假的替代品。这部分虚假收益——姑且称之为"受限收益"——若企业要维持其经济地位，便不能作为股息分配出去。一旦这部分收益被派发，企业就会在以下一个或多个方面失去立足之地：维持单位销售量的能力、长期竞争地位、财务实力。无论派息比率多么保守，一家持续分配受限收益的公司，除非另行注入股权资本，否则注定走向消亡。

Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company's stock to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value. But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners. Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, "Dig We Must".)

受限收益对所有者而言很少是毫无价值的，但往往必须被大幅折价。实际上，无论企业的经济潜力多么贫乏，这部分收益都被企业强制征用了。（这种"无论回报多么糟糕都必须留存"的处境，在十年前被Consolidated Edison以一种妙不可言的讽刺方式无意中道出。彼时，严苛的监管政策是导致该公司股价低至账面价值四分之一的主要因素——也就是说，每留存一美元收益再投入业务，那一美元便只转化为25美分的市场价值。然而，尽管经历着这种点金成铅的过程，大部分收益仍被再投入业务，而非支付给所有者。与此同时，纽约各地的建设和维修工地上，标牌骄傲地宣示着公司的口号："挖掘，我们义不容辞。"）

Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this dividend discussion. Let's turn to the much-more-valued unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion, management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.

在这次关于股息的讨论中，受限收益无需我们进一步操心。让我们转向价值远为宝贵的非受限收益。这部分收益无论留存还是分配，在可行性上并无差异。在我们看来，管理层应当选择对企业所有者而言更有意义的那条路。

This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders—to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect—backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future—that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of market value will be created for owners. This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.

这一原则并未得到普遍认同。出于种种原因，管理者倾向于将非受限的、随时可分配的收益扣押不发——为了扩张他们所统治的企业帝国，为了在异常充裕的财务舒适区中运营，等等。但我们认为，留存收益只有一个正当理由：只有当有合理前景——最好有历史证据支撑，或在适当时候辅以对未来的深思熟虑的分析——表明企业每留存一美元，至少能为所有者创造一美元市场价值时，非受限收益才应当被留存。这只有在留存资本所产生的增量收益等于或高于投资者普遍可获得的回报率时，才会实现。

To illustrate, let's assume that an investor owns a risk-free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms; i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or-reinvest option. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest rate on long-term, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100 cents on the dollar. Under these circumstances, the investor wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that, he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest rates, not even those bondholders needing cash for living purposes.

为了说明这一点，让我们假设一位投资者持有一张无风险的10%永续债券，这张债券有一个非常罕见的特征：每年，投资者可以选择以现金形式收取10%的票息，或者将票息再投资于具有相同条款的更多10%债券——即永续存续，且票息同样提供现金或再投资的选项。如果在某一特定年份，长期无风险债券的市场利率为5%，那么投资者选择以现金形式收取票息便是愚蠢的，因为他本可以选择的那些10%债券，价值将远超面值的100美分。在这种情况下，想要套取现金的投资者应当选择以额外债券形式收取票息，然后立即在市场上出售。这样一来，他所获得的现金将多于直接以现金形式收取票息的金额。假设所有债券均由理性投资者持有，那么在利率为5%的时代，没有人会选择现金——即便是那些因生活所需而急需现金的债券持有者也不例外。

If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course—reinvestment of the coupon—would give an investor additional bonds with market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a large discount.

然而，如果利率为15%，没有任何理性投资者会愿意让自己的钱以10%的回报率被代为投资。在这种情况下，投资者会选择以现金形式收取票息，即便他个人对现金毫无需求。相反的做法——将票息再投资——只会给投资者带来市场价值远低于他本可选择的现金金额的额外债券。如果他确实想持有10%的债券，他完全可以用收到的现金直接在市场上购买——届时那些债券将以大幅折价的方式供应。

An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a company's unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out. Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are the likely outcome of reinvestment.

与这位假想债券持有者所做的类似分析，同样适用于所有者思考一家公司的非受限收益是否应当留存或分配的问题。当然，这一分析要困难得多，也更容易出错，因为再投资收益的回报率并非像债券案例中那样是一个合同约定的数字，而是一个波动的数字。所有者必须对中期未来的平均回报率作出判断。然而，一旦作出有据可依的判断，其余的分析便简单明了：如果再投资预期能够获得高回报，你应当希望收益被留存；如果再投资很可能只带来低回报，你应当希望收益被支付给你。

Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to their parent company. At that level, the managers have no trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions at the parent company level often are a different story. Here managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes of their shareholder-owners.

许多公司管理者在决定子公司是否应当向母公司分配收益时，确实会沿着这样的思路进行推理。在这个层面上，管理者毫不费力地就能像一个明智的所有者那样思考。但在母公司层面的派息决策上，情况往往大相径庭。在这里，管理者常常难以设身处地地站在股东所有者的立场上思考问题。

With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all available earnings in order that they may be invested in Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected to be 15%. The CEO's business school oath will allow no lesser behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental capital is 5%—and market rates are 10%—he is likely to impose a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern. Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be retained in their operations rather than distributed to the parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.

带着这种精神分裂式的思维方式，一家多部门公司的CEO会指示增量资本收益率平均预期只有5%的子公司A，将所有可分配收益上缴，以便将其投入到增量资本收益率预期为15%的子公司B。CEO的商学院誓言不允许他有任何低于这一标准的行为。然而，如果他本人在增量资本上的长期记录是5%——而市场利率是10%——他却很可能向母公司的股东强加一套只是沿袭某种历史惯例或行业普遍模式的股息政策。更有甚者，他会要求子公司管理层对"为何将收益留存在本业务而非上缴母公司所有者"作出完整的解释。但他自己却鲜少向其所有者提供针对整个公司的类似分析。

In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return (as was discussed in last year's section on Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company's overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incrementally invested in the core business. The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team's best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.

在判断管理层是否应当留存收益时，股东不应简单地将近年来的总增量收益与总增量资本相比较，因为这一关系可能被核心业务的状况所扭曲。在通胀时期，拥有具有非凡经济特质的核心业务的公司，能够以极高的回报率在该业务中使用少量增量资本（正如去年商誉部分所讨论的）。但是，除非它们正在经历强劲的单位销量增长，否则卓越的业务按其定义就会产生大量超额现金。如果一家公司将这些钱中的大部分投入其他回报率低下的业务，那么公司留存资本的整体回报率看起来依然出色，这是因为增量投入核心业务的那部分收益正在创造非凡回报。这种情况类似于业余职业高尔夫混合赛：即便所有业余球手都是无可救药的臭手，球队的最佳球成绩也会相当体面——因为那位职业球手的主导性技艺在撑场面。

Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisitions of businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The managers at fault periodically report on the lessons they have learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.)

许多公司在股权回报率和总体增量资本回报率上持续表现良好，但实际上，它们已将大部分留存收益用于经济上毫无吸引力、甚至灾难性的方向。然而，它们那些年复一年持续增长的卓越核心业务，掩盖了在其他领域资本配置上的屡次失败（通常涉及以高价收购那些内在经济特质平庸的企业）。犯错的管理者会定期汇报他们从最新的挫折中汲取的教训，然后通常又去寻找下一次教训。（失败似乎令他们飘飘然。）

In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business, with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock (an action that increases the owners' interest in the exceptional business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses). Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with low returns should be held to account for those allocation decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise is.

在这种情况下，如果收益仅被留存用于扩展高回报业务，其余部分则以股息形式支付或用于回购股票（这一举措在增加所有者在卓越业务中权益的同时，使他们免于参与低于平均水平的业务），股东的处境将会好得多。对于那些持续将高回报业务所产生的大量现金投入其他低回报事业的管理者，无论整体企业的盈利能力如何，都应当就这些资本配置决策被追究责任。

Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate outlook changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been unwisely retained.

本文的任何内容都无意主张股息应随收益或投资机会的每一次波动而逐季颠簸跌宕。上市公司的股东自然希望股息保持稳定且可预期。因此，派息应当反映对收益和增量资本回报率的长期预期。由于企业的长期前景变化频率本就不高，股息模式的变化也不应更为频繁。但随着时间推移，被管理者扣留的可分配收益必须证明自身的留存价值。如果收益被不明智地留存，那么管理者本人很可能也是被不明智地留任的。

Let's now turn to Berkshire Hathaway and examine how these dividend principles apply to it. Historically, Berkshire has earned well over market rates on retained earnings, thereby creating over one dollar of market value for every dollar retained. Under such circumstances, any distribution would have been contrary to the financial interest of shareholders, large or small.

现在让我们转向Berkshire Hathaway，看看这些股息原则如何适用于它。从历史上看，Berkshire在留存收益上的回报率远超市场水平，从而每留存一美元便创造了超过一美元的市场价值。在这种情况下，任何分配都将有悖于股东——无论大小——的财务利益。

In fact, significant distributions in the early years might have been disastrous, as a review of our starting position will show you. Charlie and I then controlled and managed three companies, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., and Blue Chip Stamps (all now merged into our present operation). Blue Chip paid only a small dividend, Berkshire and DRC paid nothing. If, instead, the companies had paid out their entire earnings, we almost certainly would have no earnings at all now—and perhaps no capital as well.

事实上，早年大规模分配或许会酿成灾难，回顾我们的起点便可见一斑。Charlie和我当时控制并管理着三家公司：Berkshire Hathaway Inc.、Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.和Blue Chip Stamps（这些公司现已全部并入我们目前的运营体系）。Blue Chip只派发少量股息，Berkshire和DRC则分文未派。如果当时这些公司将全部收益悉数分配，我们现在几乎肯定将毫无收益可言——或许连资本也所剩无几。

The three companies each originally made their money from a single business: (1) textiles at Berkshire; (2) department stores at Diversified; and (3) trading stamps at Blue Chip. These cornerstone businesses (carefully chosen, it should be noted, by your Chairman and Vice Chairman) have, respectively, (1) survived but earned almost nothing, (2) shriveled in size while incurring large losses, and (3) shrunk in sales volume to about 5% its size at the time of our entry. (Who says "you can't lose 'em all"?) Only by committing available funds to much better businesses were we able to overcome these origins. (It's been like overcoming a misspent youth.) Clearly, diversification has served us well.

这三家公司最初各自只靠一项业务赚钱：（1）Berkshire的纺织业；（2）Diversified的百货业；（3）Blue Chip的印花票业务。这些基石业务（值得一提的是，均由你们的董事长和副董事长精心挑选）的结局分别是：（1）勉强存活但几乎分文未赚；（2）规模萎缩并招致巨额亏损；（3）销售额缩水至我们入主时的约5%。（谁说"不可能全部押注落空"？）只有将可用资金投入到更好得多的业务，我们才得以摆脱这一起点的拖累。（这就像是在弥补一段虚度的青春。）显而易见，多元化对我们大有裨益。

We expect to continue to diversify while also supporting the growth of current operations though, as we've pointed out, our returns from these efforts will surely be below our historical returns. But as long as prospective returns are above the rate required to produce a dollar of market value per dollar retained, we will continue to retain all earnings. Should our estimate of future returns fall below that point, we will distribute all unrestricted earnings that we believe can not be effectively used. In making that judgment, we will look at both our historical record and our prospects. Because our year-to-year results are inherently volatile, we believe a five-year rolling average to be appropriate for judging the historical record.

我们预计将继续推进多元化，同时支持现有业务的增长——尽管如我们已指出的，这些努力所带来的回报必然低于我们的历史水平。但只要预期回报高于每留存一美元创造一美元市场价值所要求的门槛，我们就将继续留存全部收益。一旦我们对未来回报的估计跌破这一门槛，我们就将分配所有我们认为无法得到有效运用的非受限收益。在作出这一判断时，我们将同时参考历史记录和未来前景。由于我们的逐年业绩本质上波动较大，我们认为以五年滚动平均值来评判历史记录是适当的。

Our present plan is to use our retained earnings to further build the capital of our insurance companies. Most of our competitors are in weakened financial condition and reluctant to expand substantially. Yet large premium-volume gains for the industry are imminent, amounting probably to well over $15 billion in 1985 versus less than $5 billion in 1983. These circumstances could produce major amounts of profitable business for us. Of course, this result is no sure thing, but prospects for it are far better than they have been for many years.

我们目前的计划是将留存收益用于进一步充实我们保险公司的资本。我们大多数竞争对手的财务状况已经大为削弱，并不愿意大幅扩张。然而，行业大规模保费增长已是近在眼前——1985年的保费可能将远超150亿美元，而1983年还不到50亿美元。这些情况可能为我们带来大量盈利业务。当然，这一结果并无定数，但其前景之好，已是多年未见。

其他事项

This is the spot where each year I run my small "business wanted" ad. In 1984 John Loomis, one of our particularly knowledgeable and alert shareholders, came up with a company that met all of our tests. We immediately pursued this idea, and only a chance complication prevented a deal. Since our ad is pulling, we will repeat it in precisely last year's form:

这是我每年刊登小型"寻找收购标的"广告的地方。1984年，我们特别博学且敏锐的股东之一John Loomis找到了一家符合我们所有标准的公司。我们立即跟进了这个想法，只是因为一个偶然的复杂情况才未能促成交易。既然我们的广告有效果，我们将按照去年的原文重新刊登：

We prefer:

我们倾向于：

(1)large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax earnings),

大型收购（至少500万美元的税后收益），

(2)demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turn-around" situations),

经过验证的持续盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对"扭亏为盈"的情况亦然），

(3)businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

股权回报率良好、几乎不使用或完全不使用债务的企业，

(4)management in place (we can't supply it),

现有管理层到位（我们无法提供管理层），

(5)simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),

简单的业务（如果涉及大量技术，我们就会看不懂），

(6)an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

明确的要价（在价格未知的情况下，即便是初步商谈，我们也不愿浪费自己或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business—and the right people—we can provide a good home.

我们不会进行敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并能极为迅速地给出答复——通常在五分钟内——告知我们是否有兴趣。我们倾向于以现金收购，但如果我们所获得的内在商业价值与所付出的相当，也会考虑发行股票。我们欢迎潜在卖方通过联系我们过往的合作伙伴来对我们进行考察。对于合适的业务——以及合适的人——我们可以提供一个好的归宿。

A record 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1984 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through this program were $3,179,000, and 1,519 charities were recipients. Our proxy material for the annual meeting will allow you to cast an advisory vote expressing your views about this program—whether you think we should continue it and, if so, at what per-share level. (You may be interested to learn that we were unable to find a precedent for an advisory vote in which management seeks the opinions of shareholders about owner-related corporate policies. Managers who put their trust in capitalism seem in no hurry to put their trust in capitalists.)

创纪录的97.2%的合资格股份参与了Berkshire 1984年的股东指定捐款计划。通过该计划的捐款总额为3,179,000美元，共有1,519家慈善机构受益。我们的年会委托投票材料将允许你就该计划投下咨询性意见票——表达你对是否应当继续这一计划的看法，以及如果继续，应以每股多少金额执行。（你或许有兴趣知道，我们找不到任何先例，是管理层就与所有者相关的公司政策向股东征询意见的咨询性投票。那些将信任寄托于资本主义的管理者，似乎并不急于将信任寄托于资本家。）

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 60 and 61. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1985 will be ineligible for the 1985 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第60和61页关于我们股东指定捐款计划的说明。如果你希望参与未来的计划，我们强烈建议你立即确认你的股份已以实际所有者的名义登记，而非以"街名"或代理名义登记。未在1985年9月30日前完成如此登记的股份，将无资格参与1985年的计划。

Our annual meeting will be on May 21, 1985 in Omaha, and I hope that you attend. Many annual meetings are a waste of time, both for shareholders and for management. Sometimes that is true because management is reluctant to open up on matters of business substance. More often a nonproductive session is the fault of shareholder participants who are more concerned about their own moment on stage than they are about the affairs of the corporation. What should be a forum for business discussion becomes a forum for theatrics, spleen-venting and advocacy of issues. (The deal is irresistible: for the price of one share you get to tell a captive audience your ideas as to how the world should be run.) Under such circumstances, the quality of the meeting often deteriorates from year to year as the antics of those interested in themselves discourage attendance by those interested in the business.

我们的年会将于1985年5月21日在奥马哈举行，希望你能出席。许多年会对股东和管理层而言都是浪费时间。有时原因在于管理层不愿就实质性业务问题畅所欲言；但更多时候，无谓的会议是股东参与者的过失——他们更在意自己在台上的那一刻，而非公司的事务。本应是商业讨论论坛的场合，变成了表演作秀、发泄怨气和鼓吹议题的舞台。（这笔交易实在难以抗拒：只需一股的价格，你就能向一个别无选择的听众讲述你对世界应当如何运转的想法。）在这种情况下，年会的质量往往每况愈下，因为那些只关心自己的人的把戏，令真正关心公司业务的人望而却步。

Berkshire's meetings are a different story. The number of shareholders attending grows a bit each year and we have yet to experience a silly question or an ego-inspired commentary. Instead, we get a wide variety of thoughtful questions about the business. Because the annual meeting is the time and place for these, Charlie and I are happy to answer them all, no matter how long it takes. (We cannot, however, respond to written or phoned questions at other times of the year; one-person-at-a time reporting is a poor use of management time in a company with 3000 shareholders.) The only business matters that are off limits at the annual meeting are those about which candor might cost our company real money. Our activities in securities would be the main example.

Berkshire的年会则是另一番景象。每年出席的股东人数都略有增长，我们从未遭遇过愚蠢的问题或出于自我表现的评论。相反，我们收到的是各种各样关于业务的深思熟虑的问题。正因为年会是提出这些问题的最佳时机与场合，Charlie和我很乐意逐一作答，无论需要多长时间。（然而，我们无法在一年中的其他时间回应书面或电话提问；对于一家拥有3,000名股东的公司而言，逐一应答是对管理层时间的低效利用。）年会上唯一不在讨论之列的业务事项，是那些坦诚表态可能给公司造成实际损失的话题，我们的证券买卖活动是最主要的例子。

We always have bragged a bit on these pages about the quality of our shareholder-partners. Come to the annual meeting and you will see why. Out-of-towners should schedule a stop at Nebraska Furniture Mart. If you make some purchases, you'll save far more than enough to pay for your trip, and you'll enjoy the experience.

我们一直在这些页面上对我们股东合伙人的素质略加自夸。来参加年会，你就会明白为什么。外地来的股东应当安排一站Nebraska Furniture Mart。如果你在那里购物，所节省的金额将远远超过此行的旅费，而且你一定会享受这段体验。

Subsequent Event: On March 18, a week after copy for this report went to the typographer but shortly before production, we agreed to purchase three million shares of Capital Cities Communications, Inc. at $172.50 per share. Our purchase is contingent upon the acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. by Capital Cities, and will close when that transaction closes. At the earliest, that will be very late in 1985. Our admiration for the management of Capital Cities, led by Tom Murphy and Dan Burke, has been expressed several times in previous annual reports. Quite simply, they are tops in both ability and integrity. We will have more to say about this investment in next year's report.

后续事件：3月18日，即本报告文稿送交排印后一周、正式付印前不久，我们签订协议，以每股172.50美元的价格购买Capital Cities Communications, Inc.的300万股股份。我们的购买以Capital Cities收购American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.为前提条件，并将于该交易完成时同步交割。最早也要到1985年底方能完成。我们对以Tom Murphy和Dan Burke为首的Capital Cities管理层的钦佩，已在过去几份年报中多次表达。简而言之，他们在能力与诚信两方面均属顶尖。关于这笔投资，我们将在明年的报告中作进一步介绍。