1987-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1987-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or 26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually. Both the numerator and denominator are important in the per-share book value calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased less than 1%.

1986年，我们的净资产增加了4.925亿美元，即26.1%。在过去的22年（也就是现管理层接管以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到2,073.06美元，年复合增长率为23.3%。在每股账面价值的计算中，分子和分母都很重要：在这22年期间，我们公司的净资产增长了10,600%，而流通在外的股份只增加了不到1%。

In past reports I have noted that book value at most companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however, book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.

在以往的报告中，我指出，大多数公司的账面价值与企业的内在价值——对股东真正重要的那个数字——往往相差甚远。然而，就我们自身而言，十多年来，账面价值一直可以作为企业内在价值的一个合理（虽略保守）的代理。也就是说，我们的内在价值适度高于账面价值，二者之间的比率保持相当稳定。

The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say "probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments more than 10% apart.

好消息是，1986年我们内在价值的百分比增幅大概超过了账面价值的增幅。我说“⼤概”，是因为内在价值是一个较为主观、弹性的数值：就我们自身而言，两位同样知情的观察者所作判断可能相差超过10%。

一贯的严谨。

A large measure of our improvement in business value relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers - the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was substantial.

相较于账面价值，我们内在价值的大幅提升，很大程度上反映了我们主要运营业务中关键管理者的卓越表现。这些管理者——the Blumkins、Mike Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 和 Ralph Schey——这些年来在几乎不追加资本（保险业务除外）的情况下，显著提升了各自业务的盈利能力。这种成就创造了经济价值，即“商誉”，它既不会出现在资产负债表的净资产科目里，也不会体现在我们的每股账面价值中。1986年，这部分未入账的增值相当可观。

对“商誉”的实质进行了解释。

So much for the good news. The bad news is that my performance did not match that of our managers. While they were doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated.

好消息就说到这里。坏消息是，我的表现未能与我们的管理者相匹配。当他们在经营我们的业务上做得极其出色时，我却没能把他们创造的相当一部分资本进行更为高明的配置。

Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult. Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of directives from me about how to swing.

Charlie Munger（我们的副董事长）和我，其实只有两项工作。其一是吸引并留住出色的管理者来经营我们各项业务。这并不太难。通常，这些管理者随我们收购的公司一同而来，他们在跨越各种商业环境的职业生涯中早已证明了自己的才能。在认识我们之前，他们就是管理明星，而我们主要的贡献就是不去妨碍他们。这个做法看起来很朴素：如果我的工作是带一支高尔夫球队——而且如果 Jack Nicklaus 或 Arnold Palmer 愿意为我出场——我不会对他们如何挥杆发出什么指示。

Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all aspects of their business absorbing.

我们的部分核心管理者已经实现了财务独立（我们希望他们都如此），但这丝毫不影响他们持续的投入：他们工作是因为热爱所做之事，并沉醉于卓越表现带来的激动。他们始终以所有者的心态思考（这是我们能给予管理者的最高褒奖），并对业务的方方面面都全情投入。

(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?" Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")

（我们对职业热情的原型是一位 Catholic 裁缝，他把多年攒下的一点积蓄用于资助一次去 Vatican 的朝圣。回到家后，他的教区召开了一个特别聚会，想听他关于 Pope 的第一手见闻。“告诉我们，”热切的教友说，“他是个怎样的人？”我们的主角惜字如金：“他是 44 号，中号。”）

Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."

Charlie 和我知道，合适的选手几乎能让任何球队教练看起来很出色。我们认同 Ogilvy & Mather 的缔造天才 David Ogilvy 的理念：“如果我们每个人都雇用不如自己的人，我们就会变成一家公司里全是侏儒；但如果我们每个人都雇用比自己更强的人，我们就会成为一家巨人的公司。”

A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read management treatises that specify exactly how many people should report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us. When you have able managers of high character running businesses about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap. Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare qualities of the present ones.

我们的管理风格带来的一个副产品，是它赋予我们轻松扩大 Berkshire 业务版图的能力。我们读过一些管理学著作，对任何一位高管应当有多少人直线汇报有明确规定，但这些在我们看来并无多大意义。当你拥有德才兼备、对业务充满热情的能干经理人时，即便有一打乃至更多的人向你汇报，你仍然可以抽空午后小憩。相反，如果哪怕只有一位向你汇报的人不诚实、无能或缺乏兴趣，你就会发现自己力有未逮。只要他们具备现任团队所拥有的那些稀缺素质，Charlie 和我完全可以与现在两倍数量的经理人合作。

We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes our chances for good results, it also ensures us an extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich.

我们打算继续只与我们喜欢且敬佩的人合作。这项政策不仅最大化了取得好结果的机会，也保证了我们拥有格外愉快的时光。相反，与那些让你胃里翻腾的人一起工作，几乎就像为钱结婚——在任何情况下可能都是个坏主意；而如果你已经很富有，那简直是疯了。

The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow. Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-allocation decisions, though still important, will change the company’s economics far more slowly.

Charlie 和我必须处理的第二项工作是资本配置，而在 Berkshire，这项工作比大多数公司重要得多。造成这种情况有三个因素：我们赚得比平均水平多；我们把赚到的钱全部留存；而且幸运的是，我们的大多数业务在保持竞争力并实现增长时所需的增量资本很少。显然，一家年赚 23% 且全部留存的企业，其未来业绩受当下资本配置影响远大于一家年赚 10% 且把其中一半分配给股东的企业。如果我们的留存收益——以及我们主要被投企业 GEICO 和 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 的留存收益——被低效使用，Berkshire 的经济性会很快恶化。对于一家每年净资产仅增加（比如）5% 的公司而言，资本配置决策虽然仍然重要，但对公司经济性的影响将慢得多。

Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros. Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.

1986 年在 Berkshire 的资本配置工作很艰难。我们确实完成了一笔业务收购——The Fechheimer Bros. Company，关于它我们将在后文讨论。Fechheimer 拥有出色的经济性，由我们最乐于与之为伍的那类人经营。但它规模相对较小，仅动用了 Berkshire 约 2% 的净资产。

Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986 were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth would slow significantly.

与此同时，在可交易股票领域我们没有新的主意——就在几年前，我们还能以相当合理的价格，轻松把大笔资金投进杰出的企业。因此，1986 年我们资本配置的主要动作是偿还债务并储备现金。这两件事都不至于糟到不可忍受，但也不会让我们高兴得去做侧手翻。如果 Charlie 和我在资本配置上的努力连续几年都毫无斩获，Berkshire 的增长速度会显著放缓。

We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it is to help our performance materially. Under current stock market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly - you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might happen.

我们会继续寻找符合我们标准的经营性企业，运气好的话，每隔几年收购一家。但若要对我们的业绩产生实质帮助，收购必须足够大。在当前股市条件下，我们几乎无望为保险公司找到可买的股票。市场会发生显著变化——这是肯定的，总有一天又会轮到我们上场挥棒。只是，我们完全不知道那会在何时发生。

It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes described in a later section of this report. If we are to achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2 billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big (and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.

这一点再怎么强调也不为过（尽管你可能觉得我已经说过很多次）：即便在有利条件下，受规模扩大的影响，我们的回报肯定会大幅下降。我们曾告诉各位，我们希望实现平均 15% 的股本回报；尽管本报告后文会提到一些不利的税法变化，我们仍然保持这一期望。若要达到这一回报率，我们的净资产在未来十年必须增加 72 亿美元。只有在不久的将来提出几个非常大的（且优秀的）主意，这样的增幅才有可能实现。Charlie 和我不能保证结果，但我们可以保证会把精力始终聚焦在我们的目标上。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告利润来源

The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. This table differs in several ways from the one presented last year. We have added four new lines of business because of the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions. In the case of Scott Fetzer, the two major units acquired were World Book and Kirby, and each is presented separately. Fourteen other businesses of Scott Fetzer are aggregated in Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing. SF Financial Group, a credit company holding both World Book and Kirby receivables, is included in "Other." This year, because Berkshire is so much larger, we also have eliminated separate reporting for several of our smaller businesses.

下一页的表格展示了 Berkshire 报告利润的主要来源。这个表格与去年的版本在若干方面有所不同。由于收购了 Scott Fetzer 和 Fechheimer，我们新增了四条业务线。对于 Scott Fetzer，收购的两大业务单元是 World Book 和 Kirby，并分别单独列示。Scott Fetzer 的其他十四项业务合并计入 Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing。持有 World Book 和 Kirby 应收款的信贷公司 SF Financial Group 列入“Other”。今年，由于 Berkshire 规模大幅扩大，我们也取消了若干小型业务的单独披露。

In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 Annual Report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A Compendium of earlier letters, including the Goodwill discussion, is available upon request.) Both the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions created accounting Goodwill, which is why the amortization charge for Goodwill increased in 1986.

在该表格中，商誉的摊销不计入具体业务，而是基于我在 1983 年年度报告附录中阐述的理由，单独汇总列示。（凡索取者可获得早年致股东信合辑，包含关于商誉的讨论。）Scott Fetzer 与 Fechheimer 的收购均形成了会计上的商誉，这也是 1986 年商誉摊销费用上升的原因。

Additionally, the Scott Fetzer acquisition required other major purchase-price accounting adjustments, as prescribed by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP figures, of course, are the ones used in our consolidated financial statements. But, in our view, the GAAP figures are not necessarily the most useful ones for investors or managers. Therefore, the figures shown for specific operating units are earnings before purchase-price adjustments are taken into account. In effect, these are the earnings that would have been reported by the businesses if we had not purchased them.

此外，按照公认会计准则（GAAP）的规定，收购 Scott Fetzer 还需要进行其他重大购买价格会计调整。我们的合并财务报表当然采用 GAAP 口径的数据。但在我们看来，GAAP 数据未必是对投资者或管理者最有用的口径。因此，文中列示的各经营单位数据为未计入购买价格调整前的收益。实质上，这些数字相当于在我们未收购它们的情况下，这些业务原本会报告的收益。

A discussion of our reasons for preferring this form of presentation is in the Appendix to this letter. This Appendix will never substitute for a steamy novel and definitely is not required reading. However, I know that among our 6,000 shareholders there are those who are thrilled by my essays on accounting - and I hope that both of you enjoy the Appendix.

我们偏好这种呈现方式的理由，已在本信的附录中讨论。这个附录绝不可能替代一本情节火热的小说，也绝非必读材料。然而，我知道在我们 6,000 位股东中，确有一些人对我写的会计随笔感到兴奋——我希望你们两位都会喜欢这份附录。

In the Business Segment Data on pages 41-43 and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 45-49, you will find much additional information about our businesses. I urge you to read those sections, as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page 50.

在第 41–43 页的 Business Segment Data 以及第 45–49 页的 Management’s Discussion 部分，您会看到更多关于我们业务的补充信息。我也建议您阅读 Charlie Munger 写给 Wesco 股东的信，介绍该子公司各项业务的情况，起始于第 50 页。

As you can see, operating earnings substantially improved during 1986. Some of the improvement came from the insurance operation, whose results I will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer also will be discussed separately. Our other major businesses performed as follows:

正如你所见，1986 年经营利润有了大幅改善。其中一部分来自保险业务（其结果我将在后文讨论）。关于 Fechheimer 我们也将单独说明。我们的其他主要业务表现如下：

o Operating results at The Buffalo News continue to reflect a truly superb managerial job by Stan Lipsey. For the third year in a row, man-hours worked fell significantly and other costs were closely controlled. Consequently, our operating margins improved materially in 1986, even though our advertising rate increases were well below those of most major newspapers.

o The Buffalo News 的经营结果继续体现了 Stan Lipsey 出色的管理工作。连续第三年，劳动工时显著下降，其他成本得到严格控制。结果是，尽管我们的广告费率上调幅度远低于大多数主要报纸，1986 年经营利润率仍大幅改善。

Our cost-control efforts have in no way reduced our commitment to news. We continue to deliver a 50% "news hole" (the portion of the total space in the paper devoted to news), a higher percentage, we believe, than exists at any dominant newspaper in this country of our size or larger.

我们的成本控制努力丝毫没有削弱我们对新闻内容的投入承诺。我们持续提供 50% 的“news hole”（报纸总版面中用于新闻的比例）。我们相信，这一比例高于本国与我们同量级及更大规模的任何占主导地位的报纸。

The average news hole at papers comparable to the News is about 40%. The difference between 40% and 50% is more important than it might first seem: a paper with 30 pages of ads and a 40% news hole delivers 20 pages of news a day, whereas our paper matches 30 pages of ads with 30 pages of news. Therefore, given ad pages equal in number, we end up delivering our readers no less than 50% more news.

与 the News 可比的报纸，其平均 news hole 大约为 40%。40% 与 50% 的差别比乍看之下更重要：一份有 30 个广告版、news hole 为 40% 的报纸，每天提供 20 个新闻版；而我们的报纸用 30 个广告版匹配 30 个新闻版。因此，在广告版数相同的前提下，我们向读者提供的新闻至少多出 50%。

We believe this heavy commitment to news is one of the reasons The Buffalo News has the highest weekday penetration rate (the percentage of households in the paper’s primary marketing area purchasing it each day) among any of the top 50 papers in the country. Our Sunday penetration, where we are also number one, is even more impressive. Ten years ago, the only Sunday paper serving Buffalo (the Courier-Express) had circulation of 271,000 and a penetration ratio of about 63%. The Courier-Express had served the area for many decades and its penetration ratio - which was similar to those existing in many metropolitan markets - was thought to be a "natural" one, accurately reflecting the local citizenry’s appetite for a Sunday product.

我们相信，对新闻内容的重投入，是 The Buffalo News 在全国前 50 家报纸中工作日渗透率（在报纸主要营销区域内每天购买报纸的家庭占比）排名第一的原因之一。我们的周日渗透率同样位居第一，更为亮眼。十年前，服务于 Buffalo 的唯一周日报纸（the Courier-Express）发行量为 271,000 份，渗透率约为 63%。the Courier-Express 服务该地区数十年之久，其渗透率——与许多大都市市场的水平相近——被视为“自然”的，准确反映了当地居民对周日产品的需求。

Our Sunday paper was started in late 1977. It now has a penetration ratio of 83% and sells about 100,000 copies more each Sunday than did the Courier-Express ten years ago - even though population in our market area has declined during the decade. In recent history, no other city that has long had a local Sunday paper has experienced a penetration gain anywhere close to Buffalo’s.

我们的周日报纸创办于 1977 年末。如今其渗透率达到 83%，每个星期日的销量比十年前的 the Courier-Express 多约 100,000 份——即便在这十年间我们的市场区域人口有所下降。近代史上，其他长期拥有本地周日报纸的城市，没有哪一个的渗透率提升能接近 Buffalo 的水平。

Despite our exceptional market acceptance, our operating margins almost certainly have peaked. A major newsprint price increase took effect at the end of 1986, and our advertising rate increases in 1987 will again be moderate compared to those of the industry. However, even if margins should materially shrink, we would not reduce our news-hole ratio.

尽管市场接受度出众，我们的经营利润率几乎可以肯定已经见顶。一次主要的新闻纸涨价在 1986 年末生效，而我们 1987 年的广告费率涨幅相比行业仍将偏温和。然而，即使利润率显著收缩，我们也不会降低“news-hole”比率。

As I write this, it has been exactly ten years since we purchased The News. The financial rewards it has brought us have far exceeded our expectations and so, too, have the non-financial rewards. Our respect for the News - high when we bought it - has grown consistently ever since the purchase, as has our respect and admiration for Murray Light, the editor who turns out the product that receives such extraordinary community acceptance. The efforts of Murray and Stan, which were crucial to the News during its dark days of financial reversals and litigation, have not in the least been lessened by prosperity. Charlie and I are grateful to them.

当我写下这些时，距我们收购 The News 已整整十年。它带来的财务回报远超我们的预期，非财务回报亦然。我们对 the News 的敬意——在收购时就已很高——此后一直与日俱增；我们对编辑 Murray Light 的敬重与钦佩也同样提升，他打造出的产品获得了社区非同寻常的认可。在财务逆境与诉讼的黑暗时期，Murray 和 Stan 对 the News 的付出至关重要；繁荣并未让他们的努力有丝毫减弱。我与 Charlie 对他们深表感激。

报纸在报表上的排序仅次于保险，广告的商业模式至今都是非常好的。

o The amazing Blumkins continue to perform business miracles at Nebraska Furniture Mart. Competitors come and go (mostly go), but Mrs. B. and her progeny roll on. In 1986 net sales increased 10.2% to $132 million. Ten years ago sales were $44 million and, even then, NFM appeared to be doing just about all of the business available in the Greater Omaha Area. Given NFM’s remarkable dominance, Omaha’s slow growth in population and the modest inflation rates that have applied to the goods NFM sells, how can this operation continue to rack up such large sales gains? The only logical explanation is that the marketing territory of NFM’s one-and-only store continues to widen because of its ever-growing reputation for rock-bottom everyday prices and the broadest of selections. In preparation for further gains, NFM is expanding the capacity of its warehouse, located a few hundred yards from the store, by about one-third.

o 出色的 Blumkins 家族在 Nebraska Furniture Mart 继续创造商业奇迹。竞争者此起彼伏（大多是退出），但 Mrs. B. 及其子嗣一路高歌。1986 年净销售额增长 10.2%，至 1.32 亿美元。十年前的销售额为 4,400 万美元，而即便在当时，NFM 看起来已经拿下了 Greater Omaha Area 几乎所有可得的业务。考虑到 NFM 的非凡统治力、Omaha 人口增长缓慢以及适用于 NFM 商品的温和通胀率，这家企业如何还能持续取得如此大的销售增量？唯一合乎逻辑的解释是：凭借“一贯超低的日常价格”和“最广的商品选择”的口碑不断提升，NFM 这家“唯一门店”的市场辐射范围持续扩大。为进一步增长做准备，NFM 正把距门店几百码的仓库容量扩充约三分之一。

Mrs. B, Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, continues at age 93 to outsell and out-hustle any manager I’ve ever seen. She’s at the store seven days a week, from opening to close. Competing with her represents a triumph of courage over judgment.

Nebraska Furniture Mart 的董事会主席 Mrs. B. 现年 93 岁，依然在销售与勤奋度上胜过我所见过的任何经理。她每周七天都在店里，从开门到打烊。与她竞争，是用勇气战胜理性的行为。

It’s easy to overlook what I consider to be the critical lesson of the Mrs. B saga: at 93, Omaha based Board Chairmen have yet to reach their peak. Please file this fact away to consult before you mark your ballot at the 2024 annual meeting of Berkshire.

人们很容易忽略我认为是 Mrs. B. 传奇中至关重要的一课：在 93 岁时，Omaha 的董事会主席还未达到巅峰。请把这个事实存档，待你在 2024 年 Berkshire 年会上投票前查阅。

o At See’s, sales trends improved somewhat from those of recent years. Total pounds sold rose about 2%. (For you chocaholics who like to fantasize, one statistic: we sell over 12,000 tons annually.) Same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged. In the previous six years, same store poundage fell, and we gained or maintained poundage volume only by adding stores. But a particularly strong Christmas season in 1986 stemmed the decline. By stabilizing same-store volume and making a major effort to control costs, See’s was able to maintain its excellent profit margin in 1986 though it put through only minimal price increases. We have Chuck Huggins, our long-time manager at See’s, to thank for this significant achievement.

o 在 See’s，销售趋势较近年略有改善。按重量计的总销量上升约 2%。（给爱幻想的巧克力控一个数据：我们每年销售超过 12,000 吨。）同店销量（以磅计）几乎持平。在此前六年里，同店重量下滑，我们只能通过新增门店来获得或维持总体重量。但 1986 年异常强劲的圣诞季遏制了这一下降。通过稳定同店销量并大力控制成本，See’s 在仅进行极小幅提价的情况下，仍在 1986 年保持了优异的利润率。对此项显著成绩，我们要感谢 See’s 的长期管理者 Chuck Huggins。

See’s has a one-of-a-kind product "personality" produced by a combination of its candy’s delicious taste and moderate price, the company’s total control of the distribution process, and the exceptional service provided by store employees. Chuck rightfully measures his success by the satisfaction of our customers, and his attitude permeates the organization. Few major retailing companies have been able to sustain such a customer-oriented spirit, and we owe Chuck a great deal for keeping it alive and well at See’s.

See’s 拥有独一无二的产品“个性”，源于其糖果美味且定价适中、公司对分销流程的完全掌控，以及门店员工提供的卓越服务。Chuck 理所当然地以顾客满意度来衡量自己的成功，这种态度渗透到整个组织。能长期维持如此以客户为中心精神的大型零售公司并不多，而 See’s 能使这种精神蓬勃不衰，Chuck 功不可没。

See’s profits should stay at about their present level. We will continue to increase prices very modestly, merely matching prospective cost increases.

See’s 的利润应当大致维持在当前水平。我们将继续非常温和地上调价格，仅与预期的成本上升相匹配。

o World Book is the largest of 17 Scott Fetzer operations that joined Berkshire at the beginning of 1986. Last year I reported to you enthusiastically about the businesses of Scott Fetzer and about Ralph Schey, its manager. A year’s experience has added to my enthusiasm for both. Ralph is a superb businessman and a straight shooter. He also brings exceptional versatility and energy to his job: despite the wide array of businesses that he manages, he is on top of the operations, opportunities and problems of each. And, like our other managers, Ralph is a real pleasure to work with. Our good fortune continues.

o 在 1986 年初加入 Berkshire 的 17 个 Scott Fetzer 业务中，World Book 规模最大。去年我已兴奋地向你们介绍过 Scott Fetzer 的业务以及其管理者 Ralph Schey。经过一年的亲身体验，我对两者的热情更甚。Ralph 是一位出色的商人，也是一位直言不讳、坦率可靠的人。他还为工作带来非凡的多面手能力与充沛精力：尽管他管理的业务门类繁多，但对各项业务的运营、机会与问题都了然于胸。而且，与我们的其他经理人一样，与 Ralph 合作令人倍感愉快。我们的好运仍在延续。

World Book’s unit volume increased for the fourth consecutive year, with encyclopedia sales up 7% over 1985 and 45% over 1982. Childcraft’s unit sales also grew significantly.

World Book 的单位销量已连续第四年增长，其中百科全书销量较 1985 年增长 7%，较 1982 年增长 45%。Childcraft 的单位销量也显著提升。

World Book continues to dominate the U.S. direct-sales encyclopedia market - and for good reasons. Extraordinarily well-edited and priced at under 5 cents per page, these books are a bargain for youngster and adult alike. You may find one editing technique interesting: World Book ranks over 44,000 words by difficulty. Longer entries in the encyclopedia include only the most easily comprehended words in the opening sections, with the difficulty of the material gradually escalating as the exposition proceeds. As a result, youngsters can easily and profitably read to the point at which subject matter gets too difficult, instead of immediately having to deal with a discussion that mixes up words requiring college-level comprehension with others of fourth-grade level.

World Book 继续主导美国直销百科市场——且理由充分。其内容编辑极为出色、且每页定价不到 5 美分，这些书对青少年与成年人而言都物超所值。你或许会对一种编辑方法感兴趣：World Book 按难度对 44,000 多个词进行分级排序。百科中较长的条目在开头部分只使用最易理解的词汇，随后随着阐述推进逐步提高材料的难度。结果是，青少年可以轻松且有收获地阅读到难度开始超出自身水平为止，而不是一上来就面对把需大学水平理解的词与四年级水平的词混在一起的论述。

Selling World Book is a calling. Over one-half of our active salespeople are teachers or former teachers, and another 5% have had experience as librarians. They correctly think of themselves as educators, and they do a terrific job. If you don’t have a World Book set in your house, I recommend one.

销售 World Book 是一项带有使命感的事业。我们在岗销售人员中有一半以上是教师或前教师，另有 5% 有图书馆员经验。他们完全正确地把自己视为教育者，而且做得非常出色。如果你家里还没有一套 World Book，我建议备一套。

o Kirby likewise recorded its fourth straight year of unit volume gains. Worldwide, unit sales grew 4% from 1985 and 33% from 1982. While the Kirby product is more expensive than most cleaners, it performs in a manner that leaves cheaper units far behind (“in the dust,” so to speak). Many 30- and 40-year-old Kirby cleaners are still in active duty. If you want the best, you buy a Kirby.

o Kirby 同样实现了单位销量连续第四年增长。按全球口径，单位销量较 1985 年增长 4%，较 1982 年增长 33%。尽管 Kirby 产品比大多数吸尘器更昂贵，但其表现让价格更低的产品远远落后（可以说“吃灰”）。许多使用了 30 年或 40 年的 Kirby 吸尘器仍在服役。如果你要最好的，你就买 Kirby。

Some companies that historically have had great success in direct sales have stumbled in recent years. Certainly the era of the working woman has created new challenges for direct sales organizations. So far, the record shows that both Kirby and World Book have responded most successfully.

一些历史上在直销领域非常成功的公司，近年来已显露颠簸。职业女性时代无疑给直销组织带来了新的挑战。迄今为止，事实表明 Kirby 和 World Book 的应对最为成功。

The businesses described above, along with the insurance operation and Fechheimer, constitute our major business units. The brevity of our descriptions is in no way meant to diminish the importance of these businesses to us. All have been discussed in past annual reports and, because of the tendency of Berkshire owners to stay in the fold (about 98% of the stock at the end of each year is owned by people who were owners at the start of the year), we want to avoid undue repetition of basic facts. You can be sure that we will immediately report to you in detail if the underlying economics or competitive position of any of these businesses should materially change. In general, the businesses described in this section can be characterized as having very strong market positions, very high returns on capital employed, and the best of operating managements.

上述业务连同保险业务与 Fechheimer 构成了我们的主要业务单元。我们在此的简短描述绝不意味着这些业务对我们不重要。上述各项都已在以往年报中讨论过；而且由于 Berkshire 股东倾向于长期留在队伍中（每年年末约有 98% 的股票由年初已持股的股东持有），我们希望避免对基本事实的过度重复。可以肯定的是，一旦这些业务的基本经济性或竞争地位发生重大变化，我们会立即向你们详细报告。总体而言，本节所述业务的特征是：市场地位极强、投入资本回报率极高，以及一流的运营管理。

The Fechheimer Bros. Co.

Every year in Berkshire’s annual report I include a description of the kind of business that we would like to buy. This "ad" paid off in 1986.

每年我都会在 Berkshire 的年度报告中描述我们希望收购的业务类型。这则“广告”在 1986 年兑现了效果。

On January 15th of last year I received a letter from Bob Heldman of Cincinnati, a shareholder for many years and also Chairman of Fechheimer Bros. Until I read the letter, however, I did not know of either Bob or Fechheimer. Bob wrote that he ran a company that met our tests and suggested that we get together, which we did in Omaha after their results for 1985 were compiled.

去年 1 月 15 日，我收到来自 Cincinnati 的 Bob Heldman 的一封信，他多年是我们的股东，同时也是 Fechheimer Bros. 的董事长。然而在读到这封信之前，我并不认识 Bob，也不了解 Fechheimer。Bob 写道他经营着一家符合我们标准的公司，并建议我们见面。等他们把 1985 年的业绩整理完毕后，我们在 Omaha 会面了。

He filled me in on a little history: Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business, began operations in 1842. Warren Heldman, Bob’s father, became involved in the business in 1941 and his sons, Bob and George (now President), along with their sons, subsequently joined the company. Under the Heldmans’ management, the business was highly successful.

他给我简单介绍了历史：Fechheimer 是一家制服制造与分销企业，始于 1842 年。Bob 的父亲 Warren Heldman 于 1941 年加入该业务，随后他的两个儿子 Bob 和 George（现任总裁）以及他们的儿子也陆续加入公司。在 Heldman 家族的管理下，这项业务非常成功。

In 1981 Fechheimer was sold to a group of venture capitalists in a leveraged buy out (an LBO), with management retaining an equity interest. The new company, as is the case with all LBOS, started with an exceptionally high debt/equity ratio. After the buy out, however, operations continued to be very successful. So by the start of last year debt had been paid down substantially and the value of the equity had increased dramatically. For a variety of reasons, the venture capitalists wished to sell and Bob, having dutifully read Berkshire’s annual reports, thought of us.

1981 年，Fechheimer 通过一次杠杆收购（LBO）出售给一组风险投资人，管理层保留了部分股权。与所有 LBOS 一样，新公司一开始的负债/权益比率极高。然而在收购完成后，运营依然非常成功。因此，到去年年初，债务已大幅偿还，股权价值也显著上升。出于多种原因，这些风投方希望出售，而 Bob 一直认真阅读 Berkshire 的年度报告，于是想到了我们。

Fechheimer is exactly the sort of business we like to buy. Its economic record is superb; its managers are talented, high-grade, and love what they do; and the Heldman family wanted to continue its financial interest in partnership with us. Therefore, we quickly purchased about 84% of the stock for a price that was based upon a $55 million valuation for the entire business.

Fechheimer 正是我们喜欢收购的那类企业：其经营业绩一流；管理层才干出众、素质上乘且热爱所做之事；同时 Heldman 家族愿意与我们继续以合伙形式保持财务权益。因此，我们迅速以公司整体 5,500 万美元的估值为基础，收购了约 84% 的股权。

The circumstances of this acquisition were similar to those prevailing in our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart: most of the shares were held by people who wished to employ funds elsewhere; family members who enjoyed running their business wanted to continue both as owners and managers; several generations of the family were active in the business, providing management for as far as the eye can see; and the managing family wanted a purchaser who would not re-sell, regardless of price, and who would let the business be run in the future as it had been in the past. Both Fechheimer and NFM were right for us, and we were right for them.

这次收购的情形与我们收购 Nebraska Furniture Mart 时相似：多数股份由希望将资金用于他处的人持有；热爱经营的家族成员希望继续作为所有者与管理者；家族的几代人都在业务中活跃，为可预见的未来提供管理力量；管理家族希望买方无论价格如何都不会转手出售，并允许未来的经营方式延续过去的做法。Fechheimer 和 NFM 都适合我们，而我们也适合他们。

You may be amused to know that neither Charlie nor I have been to Cincinnati, headquarters for Fechheimer, to see their operation. (And, incidentally, it works both ways: Chuck Huggins, who has been running See’s for 15 years, has never been to Omaha.) If our success were to depend upon insights we developed through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble. Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the economic characteristics of the business - its competitive strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will be joining. Fechheimer was a standout in both respects. In addition to Bob and George Heldman, who are in their mid-60s - spring chickens by our standards - there are three members of the next generation, Gary, Roger and Fred, to insure continuity.

你也许会觉得有趣：Charlie 和我都未曾到过 Fechheimer 的总部 Cincinnati 去看他们的运营。（顺便说一句，这也是双向的：已管理 See’s 15 年的 Chuck Huggins 从未到过 Omaha。）如果我们的成功要依赖于通过工厂考察得出的见解，Berkshire 就麻烦了。实际上，在考虑一项收购时，我们试图评估的是业务的经济特征——其竞争优势与劣势——以及我们将要合作的人的素质。在这两方面，Fechheimer 都表现突出。除处于 60 多岁、按我们的标准还算“年轻人”的 Bob 和 George Heldman 外，还有下一代的三位成员 Gary、Roger 和 Fred，以确保业务延续。

As a prototype for acquisitions, Fechheimer has only one drawback: size. We hope our next acquisition is at least several times as large but a carbon copy in all other respects. Our threshold for minimum annual after-tax earnings of potential acquisitions has been moved up to $10 million from the $5 million level that prevailed when Bob wrote to me.

作为收购样板，Fechheimer 只有一个不足：规模。我们希望下一笔收购在规模上至少是它的数倍，而在其他方面完全照搬。对于潜在收购标的的年度税后最低利润门槛，我们已从 Bob 写信给我时的 500 万美元上调至 1,000 万美元。

Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a business that fits, call me or, preferably, write.

乘胜而上，我们再次刊登这则“广告”。如果你有合适的业务，请给我打电话，或者更好的是来信。

Here’s what we’re looking for:

我们的要求如下：

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

(1) 规模较大的标的（年度税后利润至少 1,000 万美元），

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),

(2) 已被证明的持续盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对“扭亏型”同样缺乏兴趣），

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt.

(3) 在很少或不使用负债的情况下实现良好股本回报的企业。

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

(4) 现成的管理层（我们无法提供），

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

(5) 业务简单（如果技术成分很多，我们就不懂），

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

(6) 明确的要价（在价格未知的情况下，我们不想就交易进行交流——哪怕只是初步接触——以免浪费双方时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business—and the right people—we can provide a good home.

我们不会从事恶意收购。关于我们是否感兴趣，我们承诺严格保密并给予非常迅速的回应——通常在五分钟内。我们偏好以现金收购，但当我们获得的内在商业价值与我们付出相当时，也会考虑以发行股票作为对价。事实上，鉴于 Berkshire 股票价格近期上涨，涉及发行股票的交易现在相当可行。我们欢迎潜在卖方联系曾与我们合作过的人士来了解我们。对于合适的业务——以及合适的人——我们可以提供一个理想的归宿。

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) “I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other.” None of these attracts us in the least.

另一方面，我们经常收到与我们标准相去甚远的并购提议：新创企业、扭亏型项目、近似竞拍式的出售，以及在经纪人中颇受欢迎的那种“我敢肯定只要你们彼此认识一下，事情总会成的”。这些对我们毫无吸引力。

* * *

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.

除上述对整体企业并购的兴趣之外，我们也对通过协商方式购买大宗但不具控制权的股份感兴趣，就像我们对 Cap Cities 的那笔交易。只有当我们对业务的经济性以及经营团队的能力与诚信都非常有把握时，这类交易才会吸引我们。我们偏好大额交易：在少见的情况下，我们可能会做小至 5,000 万美元（甚至更小）的项目，但我们更倾向于规模为其数倍的承诺。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

We present our usual table of industry figures, expanded this year to include data about incurred losses and the GNP inflation index. The contrast in 1986 between the growth in premiums and growth in incurred losses will show you why underwriting results for the year improved materially:

我们照例提供行业数据表，今年的版本扩展纳入了已发生损失与 GNP 通胀指数的数据。1986 年保费增长与已发生损失增长之间的对比，将向你说明当年承保业绩为何显著改善：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-112 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合成本率（赔付发生额加费用）与保费收入之比：低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 表示承保亏损。若将保险公司因持有保单持有人资金而获得的投资收益（“float（浮存金）”）计入，则综合成本率处于 107–112 区间时，通常可实现整体盈亏平衡（不包括股东投入资金所产生的收益）。

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to mount. This is not because auto accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned. Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues must grow at close to 10% annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be running only 2% - 4%.

概括在表格里的保险业“算术”并不复杂。行业年度保费收入仅以 4% 或 5% 的速度蹒跚前行时，承保亏损必然扩大。原因并非车祸、火灾、飓风等更频繁，也非近期一般物价通胀所致。如今，社会与司法层面的“通胀”才是主因：走进法庭的成本暴涨。一部分来自判赔金额的飙升，另一部分则来自法官与陪审团倾向于将保单保障范围扩展至保险公司在签单时并未预期的程度。鉴于两种趋势都未见缓解，我们仍认为：即便总体通胀仅为 2%–4%，行业保费收入也必须接近每年 10% 的增速，才能在盈利能力上“守住阵地”。

In 1986, as noted, the industry’s premium volume soared even faster than loss costs. Consequently, the underwriting loss of the industry fell dramatically. In last year’s report we predicted this sharp improvement but also predicted that prosperity would be fleeting. Alas, this second prediction is already proving accurate. The rate of gain in the industry’s premium volume has slowed significantly (from an estimated 27.1% in 1986’s first quarter, to 23.5% in the second, to 21.8% in the third, to 18.7% in the fourth), and we expect further slowing in 1987. Indeed, the rate of gain may well fall below my 10% "equilibrium" figure by the third quarter.

如前所述，1986 年行业保费规模增长快于损失成本增长，因而行业承保亏损大幅收窄。去年的报告中我们既预测了这种明显改善，也预测了繁荣转瞬即逝。遗憾的是，后一项预测已在应验。行业保费增速显著放缓（估计 1986 年一季度为 27.1%，二季度 23.5%，三季度 21.8%，四季度 18.7%），我们预计 1987 年还会进一步放慢。到三季度，增速很可能会跌破我所称的 10%“均衡”水平。

Nevertheless, underwriting results in 1987, assuming they are not dragged down by a major natural catastrophe, will again improve materially because price increases are recognized in revenues on a lagged basis. In effect, the good news in earnings follows the good news in prices by six to twelve months. But the improving trend in earnings will probably end by late 1988 or early 1989. Thereafter the industry is likely to head south in a hurry.

尽管如此，若不遭遇重大自然灾害拖累，1987 年的承保结果仍将明显改善，因为价格上调会滞后地体现在收入中。本质上，“盈利的好消息”会在“价格的好消息”之后 6–12 个月到来。但盈利改善的趋势大概率在 1988 年底或 1989 年初结束，随后行业很可能迅速转弱。

Pricing behavior in the insurance industry continues to be exactly what can be expected in a commodity-type business. Only under shortage conditions are high profits achieved, and such conditions don’t last long. When the profit sun begins to shine, long-established insurers shower investors with new shares in order to build capital. In addition, newly-formed insurers rush to sell shares at the advantageous prices available in the new-issue market (prices advantageous, that is, to the insiders promoting the company but rarely to the new shareholders). These moves guarantee future trouble: capacity soars, competitive juices flow, and prices fade.

保险业的定价行为，仍然与大宗商品型行业如出一辙：只有在“短缺”条件下才能获得高利润，而这种条件不会持久。一旦“利润的阳光”照到，老牌保险公司就会为补充资本而向投资者大量发行新股；同时，新成立的保险公司也会蜂拥至新股发行市场，在有利价位抛售股票（所谓“有利价位”，对推动上市的内部人有利，但很少对新股东有利）。这些举动几乎注定埋下后患：产能暴增，竞争冲动涌动，价格回落。

It’s interesting to observe insurance leaders beseech their colleagues to behave in a more "statesmanlike" manner when pricing policies. "Why," they ask, "can’t we learn from history, even out the peaks and valleys, and consistently price to make reasonable profits?" What they wish, of course, is pricing that resembles, say, that of The Wall Street journal, whose prices are ample to start with and rise consistently each year.

有趣的是，行业领袖常恳请同行在保单定价上更“有政治家风范”：“为何我们不能吸取历史教训，抹平高低起伏，并始终以能获得合理利润的方式定价？”他们想要的，当然是类似 The Wall Street journal 那样的定价：一开始就相当充裕，而且年年稳步上调。

Such calls for improved behavior have all of the efficacy of those made by a Nebraska corn grower asking his fellow growers, worldwide, to market their corn with more statesmanship. What’s needed is not more statesmen, but less corn. By raising large amounts of capital in the last two years, the insurance industry has, to continue our metaphor, vastly expanded its plantings of corn. The resulting increase in "crop" - i.e., the proliferation of insurance capacity - will have the same effect on prices and profits that surplus crops have had since time immemorial.

这类呼吁的成效，就像一位 Nebraska 的玉米种植户请求全球同行以更“有风度”的方式销售玉米一样。需要的不是更多“政治家”，而是更少的玉米。过去两年，通过大量融资，保险业——沿用我们的比喻——把“玉米播种面积”大幅扩张。由此增产的“作物”（即保险产能的扩张）对价格与利润的影响，和自古以来农作物过剩对价格与利润的影响并无二致。

Our own insurance operation did well in 1986 and is also likely to do well in 1987. We have benefited significantly from industry conditions. But much of our prosperity arises from the efforts and ability of Mike Goldberg, manager of all insurance operations.

我们自有的保险业务在 1986 年表现良好，1987 年也很可能如此。行业环境给了我们显著助益，但我们的繁荣很大程度上来自全面负责保险业务的 Mike Goldberg 的努力与能力。

Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) fell from 111 in 1985 to 103 in 1986. In addition, our premium growth has been exceptional: although final figures aren’t available, I believe that over the past two years we were the fastest growing company among the country’s top 100 insurers. Some of our growth, it is true, came from our large quota-share contract with Fireman’s Fund, described in last year’s report and updated in Charlie’s letter on page 54. But even if the premiums from that contract are excluded from the calculation, we probably still ranked first in growth.

我们的综合成本率（按法定口径，且不含结构化赔付与金融再保险）由 1985 年的 111 降至 1986 年的 103。另一个亮点是我们的保费增长异常强劲：尽管最终数据尚未公布，我相信过去两年我们在全美前 100 家保险公司中增速居首。诚然，我们部分增长来自与 Fireman’s Fund 的大额成数分保合同（见去年报告，并在第 54 页的 Charlie 来信中更新）；但即便将该合同所致保费从计算中剔除，我们很可能仍然排名第一。

Interestingly, we were the slowest-growing large insurer in the years immediately preceding 1985. In fact, we shrank - and we will do so again from time to time in the future. Our large swings in volume do not mean that we come and go from the insurance marketplace. Indeed, we are its most steadfast participant, always standing ready, at prices we believe adequate, to write a wide variety of high-limit coverages. The swings in our volume arise instead from the here-today, gone-tomorrow behavior of other insurers. When most insurers are "gone," because their capital is inadequate or they have been frightened by losses, insureds rush to us and find us ready to do business. But when hordes of insurers are "here," and are slashing prices far below expectable costs, many customers naturally leave us in order to take advantage of the bargains temporarily being offered by our competition.

有意思的是，在 1985 年之前的几年里，我们反而是大型保险公司中增速最慢的。事实上，我们还曾收缩过——未来也会不时如此。我们的业务量大起大落，并不意味着我们在保险市场“时来时去”。恰恰相反，我们是最为坚定的参与者：只要价格达标，我们始终准备好承保种类繁多、限额极高的业务。业务量的波动，更多源于其他保险公司的“来也匆匆、去也匆匆”。当大多数保险公司因资本不足或被亏损吓退而“离场”时，被保险人会蜂拥而至，我们随时待命；但当大批保险公司“在场”且以远低于可预期成本的价格疯狂砍价时，许多客户自然会转向对手那边捡一阵子便宜。

Our firmness on prices works no hardship on the consumer: he is being bombarded by attractively priced insurance offers at those times when we are doing little business. And it works no hardship on our employees: we don’t engage in layoffs when we experience a cyclical slowdown at one of our generally-profitable insurance operations. This no-layoff practice is in our self-interest. Employees who fear that large layoffs will accompany sizable reductions in premium volume will understandably produce scads of business through thick and thin (mostly thin).

我们在价格上的坚持不会让消费者受苦：在我们业务清淡的阶段，他们会被铺天盖地的“低价保险”所包围。同样，这也不会让员工受苦：当我们某块通常盈利的保险业务出现周期性放缓时，我们不会裁员。这项“不裁员”做法符合我们的自身利益。若员工担心保费规模一缩减就会引发大裁员，他们就会不分青红皂白拼命揽业务——无论顺境逆境（多半是逆境）。

The trends in National Indemnity’s traditional business - the writing of commercial auto and general liability policies through general agents - suggest how gun-shy other insurers became for a while and how brave they are now getting. In the last quarter of 1984, NICO’s monthly volume averaged $5 million, about what it had been running for several years. By the first quarter of 1986, monthly volume had climbed to about $35 million. In recent months, a sharp decline has set in. Monthly volume is currently about $20 million and will continue to fall as new competitors surface and prices are cut. Ironically, the managers of certain major new competitors are the very same managers that just a few years ago bankrupted insurers that were our old competitors. Through state-mandated guaranty funds, we must pay some of the losses these managers left unpaid, and now we find them writing the same sort of business under a new name. C’est la guerre.

从 National Indemnity 传统业务（通过总代理承保商用汽车与一般责任保单）的趋势，可以看出其他保险公司有段时间多么“心有余悸”，而如今又多么“胆气渐壮”。1984 年四季度，NICO 的月度业务量均值约 500 万美元，与此前几年大致相当；到 1986 年一季度，月度业务量攀升至约 3,500 万美元。近几个月则急转直下，目前约 2,000 万美元；随着新竞争者冒头、价格被下砍，仍将继续下滑。讽刺的是，某些重要新竞争者的管理层，正是几年前把我们老对手的保险公司做破产的那批人。通过州政府强制设立的担保基金，我们必须为他们未支付的一些损失埋单；而如今，他们换个名字，又在承保同样的业务。没辙，战争规则如此。

The business we call "large risks" expanded significantly during 1986, and will be important to us in the future. In this operation, we regularly write policies with annual premiums of $1 - $3 million, or even higher. This business will necessarily be highly volatile - both in volume and profitability - but our premier capital position and willingness to write large net lines make us a very strong force in the market when prices are right. On the other hand, our structured settlement business has become near-dormant because present prices make no sense to us.

我们称为“large risks”的业务在 1986 年显著扩张，未来也将对我们重要。在该业务中，我们常态性承保年保费 100–300 万美元、甚至更高的保单。该业务在规模与盈利上必然高度波动，但凭借一流的资本实力与承保大额自留额度的意愿，只要价格合理，我们在市场上就具备强大实力。另一方面，结构化赔付业务因当前价格缺乏意义而几近停滞。

The 1986 loss reserve development of our insurance group is chronicled on page 46. The figures show the amount of error in our yearend 1985 liabilities that a year of settlements and further evaluation has revealed. As you can see, what I told you last year about our loss liabilities was far from true - and that makes three years in a row of error. If the physiological rules that applied to Pinocchio were to apply to me, my nose would now draw crowds.

我们保险集团 1986 年的赔款准备金发展情况见第 46 页。这些数字显示：经过一年理赔结算与进一步评估，揭示出我们 1985 年年末负债的误差幅度。事实证明，我去年关于损失准备金的说法与真相相去甚远——这已是连续第三年出错。若把 Pinocchio 的“生理规律”套到我身上，我的鼻子如今恐怕会吸引围观。

When insurance executives belatedly establish proper reserves, they often speak of "reserve strengthening," a term that has a rather noble ring to it. They almost make it sound as if they are adding extra layers of strength to an already-solid balance sheet. That’s not the case: instead the term is a euphemism for what should more properly be called "correction of previous untruths" (albeit non-intentional ones).

当保险高管在事后才把准备金提足时，他们常称之为“reserve strengthening（加强准备金）”，这个说法听上去很高贵，仿佛是在原本稳固的资产负债表上又加了几层“加固”。事实并非如此：这其实是个委婉语，更贴切的叫法应是“对既往不实的纠正”（尽管并非主观造假）。

We made a special effort at the end of 1986 to reserve accurately. However, we tried just as hard at the end of 1985. Only time will tell whether we have finally succeeded in correctly estimating our insurance liabilities.

我们在 1986 年末为准确计提准备金做出了特别努力。不过，1985 年末我们同样尽了全力。我们是否终于正确估计了保险负债，唯有时间能给出答案。

Despite the difficulties we have had in reserving and the commodity economics of the industry, we expect our insurance business to both grow and make significant amounts of money - but progress will be distinctly irregular and there will be major unpleasant surprises from time to time. It’s a treacherous business and a wary attitude is essential. We must heed Woody Allen: "While the lamb may lie down with the lion, the lamb shouldn’t count on getting a whole lot of sleep."

尽管准备金计提存在难度，且行业具备大宗商品经济学的特征，我们仍预计保险业务将实现增长并赚到可观利润——只是进展将明显不均匀，且会不时出现不小的“意外”。这是个暗礁密布的行当，谨慎心态至关重要。我们必须记住 Woody Allen 的话：“羔羊也许能与狮子同卧，但别指望能睡个好觉。”

In our insurance operations we have an advantage in attitude, we have an advantage in capital, and we are developing an advantage in personnel. Additionally, I like to think we have some long-term edge in investing the float developed from policyholder funds. The nature of the business suggests that we will need all of these advantages in order to prosper.

在保险业务上，我们在态度上占优，在资本上占优，并且正在人才上建立优势。此外，我相信我们在运用保单资金形成的浮存金进行长期投资方面也具备一定优势。行业的本质决定了，若要兴盛，我们将需要用好以上所有优势。

* * *

GEICO Corporation, 41% owned by Berkshire, had an outstanding year in 1986. Industrywide, underwriting experience in personal lines did not improve nearly as much as it did in commercial lines. But GEICO, writing personal lines almost exclusively, improved its combined ratio to 96.9 and recorded a 16% gain in premium volume. GEICO also continued to repurchase its own shares and ended the year with 5.5% fewer shares outstanding than it had at the start of the year. Our share of GEICO’s premium volume is over $500 million, close to double that of only three years ago. GEICO’s book of business is one of the best in the world of insurance, far better indeed than Berkshire’s own book.

GEICO Corporation（Berkshire 持股 41%）在 1986 年表现出色。全行业范围内，个人险种的承保经验改善远不及商业险。但几乎专注于个人险的 GEICO 将综合成本率改善至 96.9，且保费规模增长 16%。GEICO 还持续回购自家股票，年末的流通股较年初减少 5.5%。我们按持股比例对应的 GEICO 保费规模已超过 5 亿美元，接近三年前的两倍。GEICO 的业务组合在保险业堪称一流，事实上远胜于 Berkshire 自身的组合。

The most important ingredient in GEICO’s success is rock-bottom operating costs, which set the company apart from literally hundreds of competitors that offer auto insurance. The total of GEICO’s underwriting expense and loss adjustment expense in 1986 was only 23.5% of premiums. Many major companies show percentages 15 points higher than that. Even such huge direct writers as Allstate and State Farm incur appreciably higher costs than does GEICO.

GEICO 成功最重要的因素是极低的运营成本，使其从提供汽车保险的数百家竞争对手中脱颖而出。1986 年，GEICO 的承保费用与理赔调整费用合计仅占保费的 23.5%。许多大型公司这一比例要高出 15 个百分点。即便是 Allstate 和 State Farm 这样的大型直销公司，其成本也明显高于 GEICO。

The difference between GEICO’s costs and those of its competitors is a kind of moat that protects a valuable and much-sought-after business castle. No one understands this moat-around-the-castle concept better than Bill Snyder, Chairman of GEICO. He continually widens the moat by driving down costs still more, thereby defending and strengthening the economic franchise. Between 1985 and 1986, GEICO’s total expense ratio dropped from 24.1% to the 23.5% mentioned earlier and, under Bill’s leadership, the ratio is almost certain to drop further. If it does - and if GEICO maintains its service and underwriting standards - the company’s future will be brilliant indeed.

GEICO 与竞争对手之间的成本差异，构成了一道保护这座宝贵且人人追逐的“商业城堡”的护城河（moat）。GEICO 董事长 Bill Snyder 对这条“护城河围城”理念的理解无人能及。他通过进一步压低成本，不断加宽护城河，从而捍卫并强化公司的经济特许地位。1985 年至 1986 年间，GEICO 的总费用率由 24.1% 降至前述的 23.5%；在 Bill 的领导下，该比例几乎可以肯定还会继续下降。若果真如此——且 GEICO 维持其服务与承保标准——公司的前景将无比光明。

The second stage of the GEICO rocket is fueled by Lou Simpson, Vice Chairman, who has run the company’s investments since late 1979. Indeed, it’s a little embarrassing for me, the fellow responsible for investments at Berkshire, to chronicle Lou’s performance at GEICO. Only my ownership of a controlling block of Berkshire stock makes me secure enough to give you the following figures, comparing the overall return of the equity portfolio at GEICO to that of the Standard & Poor’s 500:

GEICO 火箭的“第二级推进器”由副董事长 Lou Simpson 提供，他自 1979 年末起负责公司的投资。说实话，作为 Berkshire 投资负责人，在此记录 Lou 在 GEICO 的投资成绩，让我有点尴尬。若非我持有 Berkshire 的控股性股权，我大概没有足够的安全感向你们给出下列数字，用以将 GEICO 股票投资组合的总体回报与 Standard & Poor’s 500 进行对比：

     Year                   GEICO’s Equities      S&P 500
     ----                   ----------------      -------
     1980 ..................       23.7%           32.3%
     1981 ..................        5.4            (5.0)
     1982 ..................       45.8            21.4
     1983 ..................       36.0            22.4
     1984 ..................       21.8             6.2
     1985 ..................       45.8            31.6
     1986 ..................       38.7            18.6

These are not only terrific figures but, fully as important, they have been achieved in the right way. Lou has consistently invested in undervalued common stocks that, individually, were unlikely to present him with a permanent loss and that, collectively, were close to risk-free.

这些不仅是出色的数据，而且同样重要的是，它们是以正确的方式取得的。Lou 一直坚持投资被低估的普通股，这些股票单独来看几乎不可能带来永久性损失，而组合起来的风险也极低，几近无风险。

投资是可以通过学习获得的业务能力，只是极少数企业有这个打算。

In sum, GEICO is an exceptional business run by exceptional managers. We are fortunate to be associated with them.

总而言之，GEICO 是一家由卓越管理者经营的卓越企业。能与他们结为伙伴，我们非常幸运。

Marketable Securities

可流通证券

During 1986, our insurance companies purchased about $700 million of tax-exempt bonds, most having a maturity of 8 to 12 years. You might think that this commitment indicates a considerable enthusiasm for such bonds. Unfortunately, that’s not so: at best, the bonds are mediocre investments. They simply seemed the least objectionable alternative at the time we bought them, and still seem so. (Currently liking neither stocks nor bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she declared: “I like only two kinds of men - foreign and domestic.”)

在 1986 年期间，我们的保险公司购买了约 7 亿美元的免税债券，多数期限为 8 至 12 年。你也许会以为这表示我们对这类债券热情很高。不幸的是，并非如此：充其量，这些债券只是一般的投资。当时它们只是看起来最不令人反感的替代项，如今看仍是如此。（目前我既不喜欢股票也不喜欢债券，这让我与 Mae West 的宣言恰好相反——她说：“我只喜欢两种男人——外国的和本国的。”）

We must, of necessity, hold marketable securities in our insurance companies and, as money comes in, we have only five directions to go: (1) long-term common stock investments; (2) long-term fixed-income securities; (3) medium-term fixed-income securities; (4) short-term cash equivalents; and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在保险公司中我们必须持有可流通证券；当资金流入时，我们只有五个去向可选：（1）长期普通股投资；（2）长期固定收益证券；（3）中期固定收益证券；（4）短期现金等价物；（5）短期套利承诺。

Common stocks, of course, are the most fun. When conditions are right—that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value—stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea—and never have had—whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.

当然，股票是最“有趣”的。当条件具备——也就是具备良好经济特性与优秀管理的公司以远低于其内在价值的价格出售时——股票有时会带来“满贯本垒打”。但目前我们找不到接近满足我们标准的股票。此话绝不等同于对股市走势的预测：无论短期还是中期，市场会涨、会跌，还是横盘，我们从来都不知道。

What we do know, however, is that occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.

不过我们知道，投资圈中那两种“超级传染病”——恐惧与贪婪——会不时爆发且永远存在。它们出现的时间无法预测，由此引发的市场偏离在持续时间与幅度上也同样难以预测。因此，我们从不试图预判这两种情绪的来去。我们的目标更为朴素：在他人贪婪时尽量保持恐惧，只在他人恐惧时才适度贪婪。

As this is written, little fear is visible in Wall Street. Instead, euphoria prevails—and why not? What could be more exhilarating than to participate in a bull market in which the rewards to owners of businesses become gloriously uncoupled from the plodding performances of the businesses themselves. Unfortunately, however, stocks can’t outperform businesses indefinitely.

写下这些文字时，华尔街几乎看不到恐惧，取而代之的是普遍的亢奋——这也不难理解。还有什么比参与一轮牛市更令人兴奋的呢？在牛市里，企业所有者获得的回报与企业本身缓慢的业绩表现“精彩脱钩”。然而不幸的是，股票不可能无限期地跑赢其背后的企业。

Indeed, because of the heavy transaction and investment management costs they bear, stockholders as a whole and over the long term must inevitably underperform the companies they own. If American business, in aggregate, earns about 12% on equity annually, investors must end up earning significantly less. Bull markets can obscure mathematical laws, but they cannot repeal them.

事实上，由于承担了沉重的交易与投资管理成本，从长期看，股东整体的回报必然低于他们所持有的企业。如果美国企业整体年度股本回报约为 12%，那么投资者最终获得的回报必定显著低于这一水平。牛市可以遮蔽数学规律，但无法废除它们。

The second category of investments open to our insurance companies is long-term bonds. These are unlikely to be of interest to us except in very special situations, such as the Washington Public Power Supply System #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. (At yearend, we owned WPPSS issues having an amortized cost of $218 million and a market value of $310 million, paying us $31.7 million in annual tax-exempt income.) Our aversion to long-term bonds relates to our fear that we will see much higher rates of inflation within the next decade. Over time, the behavior of our currency will be determined by the behavior of our legislators. This relationship poses a continuing threat to currency stability—and a corresponding threat to the owners of long-term bonds.

我们的保险公司可选择的第二类投资是长期债券。除非在极为特殊的情形下（比如我们在 1984 年报告中讨论的 Washington Public Power Supply System #1、#2 与 #3 债券），否则我们很难对此感兴趣。（年末我们持有的 WPPSS 债券摊余成本为 2.18 亿美元、市场价值为 3.10 亿美元，每年向我们支付 3,170 万美元的免税收入。）我们厌恶长期债的原因在于担心未来十年通胀率会显著上升。从长远看，货币的“行为”取决于立法者的“行为”。这种关系持续威胁着货币稳定——也相应威胁着长期债券持有人。

We continue to periodically employ money in the arbitrage field. However, unlike most arbitrageurs, who purchase dozens of securities each year, we purchase only a few. We restrict ourselves to large deals that have been announced publicly and do not bet on the come. Therefore, our potential profits are apt to be small; but, with luck, our disappointments will also be few.

我们仍会阶段性地在套利领域运用资金。但与多数每年买入数十只证券的套利者不同，我们只买少数标的。我们只参与已公开宣布的大型交易，不押注“尚未落地”的传闻。因此，我们的潜在利润往往不大；不过，运气好的话，失望也会较少。

Our yearend portfolio shown below includes one arbitrage commitment, Lear-Siegler. Our balance sheet also includes a receivable for $145 million, representing the money owed us (and paid a few days later) by Unilever, then in the process of purchasing Chesebrough-Ponds, another of our arbitrage holdings. Arbitrage is an alternative to Treasury Bills as a short-term parking place for money—a choice that combines potentially higher returns with higher risks. To date, our returns from the funds committed to arbitrage have been many times higher than they would have been had we left those funds in Treasury Bills. Nonetheless, one bad experience could change the scorecard markedly.

我们下文所示的年末投资组合包含一笔套利头寸 Lear-Siegler。资产负债表中还有一笔 1.45 亿美元的应收款，代表 Unilever 欠付给我们的资金（几天后已支付），当时其正收购我们另一只套利持仓 Chesebrough-Ponds。套利可作为资金的短期“停泊地”，替代 Treasury Bills——这是一种潜在回报更高、风险也更高的选择。迄今为止，我们投入套利的资金回报远高于反复滚动配置于 Treasury Bills 本可获得的回报。不过，只要一次糟糕的经历，就可能明显改变这份成绩单。

We also, though it takes some straining, currently view medium-term tax-exempt bonds as an alternative to short-term Treasury holdings. Buying these bonds, we run a risk of significant loss if, as seems probable, we sell many of them well before maturity. However, we believe this risk is more than counter-balanced first, by the much higher after-tax returns currently realizable from these securities as compared to Treasury Bills and second, by the possibility that sales will produce an overall profit rather than a loss. Our expectation of a higher total return, after allowing for the possibility of loss and after taking into account all tax effects, is a relatively close call and could well be wrong. Even if we sell our bonds at a fairly large loss, however, we may end up reaping a higher after-tax return than we would have realized by repeatedly rolling over Treasury Bills.

此外，尽管这需要一点“勉强”，我们目前也把中期免税债券视为短期 Treasury 持有的替代项。买入这些债券后，如果（如同很可能发生的那样）我们在到期前很久就卖出许多，那么我们将面临显著亏损的风险。然而，我们认为这种风险被两点充分抵消：其一，与 Treasury Bills 相比，这些证券目前可实现的税后回报要高得多；其二，出售时出现总体盈利而非亏损也并非没有可能。考虑到可能的亏损并计入所有税务影响后，我们对更高总回报的预期其实是“险胜”且可能错误。即便我们最终以相当大的亏损卖出债券，所获得的税后回报也可能仍高于把资金反复滚动配置在 Treasury Bills 上的结果。

In any event, you should know that our expectations for both the stocks and bonds we now hold are exceptionally modest, given current market levels. Probably the best thing that could happen to us is a market in which we would choose to sell many of our bond holdings at a significant loss in order to re-allocate funds to the far-better equity values then very likely to exist. The bond losses I am talking about would occur if high interest rates came along; the same rates would probably depress common stocks considerably more than medium-term bonds.

无论如何，鉴于当前的市场水平，你应该知道我们对目前持有的股票与债券的回报预期都异常保守。对我们而言，最好的情形或许是这样的市场：我们会选择以显著亏损卖出大量债券持仓，把资金重新配置到届时很可能出现、价值远更具吸引力的股票上。我所说的债券亏损将发生在高利率到来之时；而相同的利率水平很可能对普通股造成的压力要大于对中期债券的压力。

We show below our 1986 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value of over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholdings of Wesco Financial Corp. and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.

下文列示我们在 1986 年年末持有的可流通股票净头寸。所有市值超过 2,500 万美元的持仓均予以列示；Wesco Financial Corp. 与 Nebraska Furniture Mart 的少数股权所对应的权益不在其中。

We should note that we expect to keep permanently our three primary holdings, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post. Even if these securities were to appear significantly overpriced, we would not anticipate selling them, just as we would not sell See’s or Buffalo Evening News if someone were to offer us a price far above what we believe those businesses are worth.

我们需要指出，我们预计将永久持有三项核心持仓：Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.、GEICO Corporation 和 The Washington Post。即便这些证券看起来显著高估，我们也不会考虑卖出；正如即使有人开出远高于我们认为这些业务价值的价格，我们也不会出售 See’s 或 Buffalo Evening News。

This attitude may seem old-fashioned in a corporate world in which activity has become the order of the day. The modern manager refers to his "portfolio" of businesses - meaning that all of them are candidates for "restructuring" whenever such a move is dictated by Wall Street preferences, operating conditions or a new corporate "concept." (Restructuring is defined narrowly, however: it extends only to dumping offending businesses, not to dumping the officers and directors who bought the businesses in the first place. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is a theology as popular with the Fortune 500 as it is with the Salvation Army.)

在当今把“折腾”当作日常的企业世界里，这种态度或许显得老派。现代管理者谈论他们的“业务组合”——意思是只要华尔街偏好、经营环境或新的公司“概念”需要，所有业务都可以成为“重组”的对象。（不过，“重组”的定义相当狭窄：它只延伸到丢弃“惹麻烦”的业务，而不是丢弃当初买下这些业务的高管和董事。“憎恶罪恶而爱罪人”的神学在 Fortune 500 中和在 Salvation Army 中一样受欢迎。）

Investment managers are even more hyperkinetic: their behavior during trading hours makes whirling dervishes appear sedated by comparison. Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mudwrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."

投资经理更是亢奋：他们在交易时段的表现，让“旋舞修士”相比之下都像被镇静了一样。事实上，“institutional investor（机构投资者）”这个词正越来越像一种自相矛盾的修辞（oxymoron），可与“jumbo shrimp（巨大的虾）”“lady mudwrestler（女性泥地摔跤手）”“inexpensive lawyer（便宜的律师）”同类。

Despite the enthusiasm for activity that has swept business and financial America, we will stick with our ‘til-death-do-us-part policy. It’s the only one with which Charlie and I are comfortable, it produces decent results, and it lets our managers and those of our investees run their businesses free of distractions.

尽管“好动热”席卷了美国商界与金融界，我们仍将坚持我们的“‘til-death-do-us-part（不离不弃）”政策。只有这种方式让 Charlie 和我感到踏实，它带来尚可的结果，也让我们的经理人及被投企业的经理人得以心无旁骛地经营业务。

NHP, Inc.

Last year we paid $23.7 million for about 50% of NHP, Inc., a developer, syndicator, owner and manager of multi-family rental housing. Should all executive stock options that have been authorized be granted and exercised, our equity interest will decline to slightly over 45%.

去年我们以 2,370 万美元收购了 NHP, Inc. 约 50% 的股权。该公司是多户型租赁住房的开发商、联合发起人、所有者与管理者。若已授权的高管期权全部获授并行权，我们的持股比例将降至略高于 45%。

NHP, Inc. has a most unusual genealogy. In 1967, President Johnson appointed a commission of business and civic leaders, led by Edgar Kaiser, to study ways to increase the supply of multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income tenants. Certain members of the commission subsequently formed and promoted two business entities to foster this goal. Both are now owned by NHP, Inc. and one operates under unusual ground rules: three of its directors must be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it is also required by law to submit an annual report to the President.

NHP, Inc. 的“家谱”颇不寻常。1967 年，President Johnson 任命由 Edgar Kaiser 领导的一个由商界与社会人士组成的委员会，研究如何增加面向中低收入租户的多户型住房供给。委员会的一些成员随后组建并推动了两个商业实体以促进这一目标。两者现均为 NHP, Inc. 所有，其中一家在非常规规则下运营：其三名董事必须由 President 提名并经 Senate 建议与同意，同时依法需向 President 提交年度报告。

Over 260 major corporations, motivated more by the idea of public service than profit, invested $42 million in the two original entities, which promptly began, through partnerships, to develop government-subsidized rental property. The typical partnership owned a single property and was largely financed by a non-recourse mortgage. Most of the equity money for each partnership was supplied by a group of limited partners who were primarily attracted by the large tax deductions that went with the investment. NHP acted as general partner and also purchased a small portion of each partnership’s equity.

当时有逾 260 家大型公司更多出于公共服务而非盈利动机，向这两个最初的实体投入了 4,200 万美元资金，它们随即通过合伙架构开发政府补贴的出租物业。典型的合伙项目只持有一处物业，大部分融资来源为无追索权抵押贷款。每个合伙项目的多数股本由一组有限合伙人提供，他们主要是被这类投资附带的大额税收抵扣所吸引。NHP 担任普通合伙人，并购入各合伙项目的一小部分股权。

The Government’s housing policy has, of course, shifted and NHP has necessarily broadened its activities to include non-subsidized apartments commanding market-rate rents. In addition, a subsidiary of NHP builds single-family homes in the Washington, D.C. area, realizing revenues of about $50 million annually.

随着 Government 的住房政策转向，NHP 必然拓展其业务，纳入不享受补贴、按市场租金计价的公寓。此外，NHP 的一家子公司在 Washington, D.C. 地区建设独栋住宅，年收入约 5,000 万美元。

NHP now oversees about 500 partnership properties that are located in 40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and that include about 80,000 housing units. The cost of these properties was more than $2.5 billion and they have been well maintained. NHP directly manages about 55,000 of the housing units and supervises the management of the rest. The company’s revenues from management are about $16 million annually, and growing.

目前 NHP 监管约 500 个合伙制物业，分布于 40 个州、District of Columbia 与 Puerto Rico，合计约 80,000 套住房。这些物业的成本超过 25 亿美元，且维护良好。NHP 直接管理其中约 55,000 套，并对其余部分实施管理监督。公司来自管理业务的年收入约 1,600 万美元，且在增长。

In addition to the equity interests it purchased upon the formation of each partnership, NHP owns varying residual interests that come into play when properties are disposed of and distributions are made to the limited partners. The residuals on many of NHP’s "deep subsidy" properties are unlikely to be of much value. But residuals on certain other properties could prove quite valuable, particularly if inflation should heat up.

除在各合伙设立时购入的股权外，NHP 还拥有若干不同条件的剩余权益，这些权益在物业处置并向有限合伙人分配时生效。NHP 许多“deep subsidy（深度补贴）”物业的剩余权益价值可能不高；但在某些其他物业上，这些剩余权益可能相当有价值，尤其在通胀升温时。

The tax-oriented syndication of properties to individuals has been halted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the main, NHP is currently trying to develop equity positions or significant residual interests in non-subsidized rental properties of quality and size (typically 200 to 500 units). In projects of this kind, NHP usually works with one or more large institutional investors or lenders. NHP will continue to seek ways to develop low- and moderate-income apartment housing, but will not likely meet success unless government policy changes.

面向个人、以税收为导向的物业联合发售已被 Tax Reform Act of 1986 叫停。总体上，NHP 目前正尝试在高品质、成规模（通常 200 至 500 套）的非补贴租赁物业中获取股权头寸或重要的剩余权益。在此类项目中，NHP 通常与一家或多家大型机构投资者或贷款人合作。NHP 将继续寻求开发中低收入公寓住房的路径，但除非政府政策发生改变，否则成功的可能性不大。

Besides ourselves, the large shareholders in NHP are Weyerhauser (whose interest is about 25%) and a management group led by Rod Heller, chief executive of NHP. About 60 major corporations also continue to hold small interests, none larger than 2%.

除我们之外，NHP 的大股东包括 Weyerhauser（持股约 25%）以及由 NHP 首席执行官 Rod Heller 领导的管理层团体。另有约 60 家大型公司继续持有小额股权，单家持股均不超过 2%。

参考：《2015-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.

这些构件建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一个世纪之后，BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy仍将在人类经济中发挥关键作用。住宅和汽车仍将是大多数家庭生活的核心。保险对企业和个人依然不可或缺。展望未来，Charlie和我看到一个为Berkshire量身定制的世界。我们很幸运被托付去管理它。

Taxation

税务

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.

1986 年税改法案对我们的各项业务产生了重要且不同的影响。尽管其中有不少可称道之处，但对 Berkshire 的净财务影响为负：与旧法相比，在新法下我们的业务价值增速很可能至少会有所放缓。对股东的净影响更为不利：每股业务价值每增加 1 美元（并假定 Berkshire 股票市值相应上涨 1 美元），股东获得的税后收益将为 72 美分，而不是旧法下的 80 美分。其原因当然在于个人资本利得税最高税率由 20% 上调至 28%。

Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:

以下是对 Berkshire 产生影响的主要税制变动：

o The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC and The Washington Post Company.

o 公司普通所得税税率计划自 1986 年的 46% 下调至 1988 年的 34%。这一变化显然对我们有利——对我们三大被投企业中的两家，Capital Cities/ABC 与 The Washington Post Company，也有显著的正面影响。

I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument, of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase. Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not help profits but will instead flow through, leading to correspondingly lower prices for consumers.

我之所以这样说，是清楚多年来关于“企业税究竟由谁承担——企业还是其客户”的讨论往往含糊其词且带有党派色彩。当然，争论通常围绕加税而非减税。反对上调企业税率的人常称，企业名义上被征税，实则分文不承担，而是充当一种经济“管道”，把全部税负转嫁给消费者。依此主张，任何企业税上调只会导致价格上涨，从而对企业本身抵消增税影响。既然持此立场，“管道理论”的拥护者也必须得出结论：企业减税不会提升利润，而是会“顺管道”传导为消费者价格的相应下降。

Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.

相反，另一些人认为企业不仅名义上缴纳其税负，而且事实上也自行消化，消费者不会受企业税率变动影响。

What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an important question for investors and managers, as well as for policymakers.

那么，现实中究竟发生什么？企业税率下调时，Berkshire、The Washington Post、Cap Cities 等公司是自己享受这部分好处，还是通过降低价格把好处转给客户？这对投资者、管理者以及政策制定者都是一个重要问题。

Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of that franchise is regulated.

我们的结论是：在某些情况下，企业减税的好处完全或几乎完全归属于公司及其股东；而在另一些情况下，这些好处全部或几乎全部以价格形式传导给客户。决定性因素在于企业“经济特许地位”（franchise）的强弱，以及该特许地位的盈利能力是否受监管。

For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut, prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.

例如，当企业特许地位强且税后利润受到相对精确的监管时（如电力公用事业），企业税率的变动主要会反映在价格上，而非利润上。减税通常会很快导致降价；增税则会推动涨价，尽管往往不那么迅速。

A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market "regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect, performs much the same function in dealing with the price-competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore, tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.

另一种情形出现在“价格竞争型”行业，其中企业通常拥有很弱的特许地位。在此等行业中，自由市场会以滞后且不规则但总体有效的方式“调节”税后利润。实质上，市场在应对价格竞争型行业时发挥的作用，与 Public Utilities Commission 面对电力公用事业时的作用颇为相似。因此，在这些行业里，税制变动最终对价格的影响大于对利润的影响。

In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down prices.

而对那些未受监管、且拥有强大特许地位的业务而言，情况则不同：企业及其股东会成为减税的主要受益者。其受益之大，类似一家电力公司若没有监管者强制压价时的处境。

Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise, think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?

我们全资或参股的许多业务都具备这样的特许地位。因此，减税的收益主要落入我们口袋，而非客户口袋。这样表述或许不够“政治正确”，但无法否认。若你倾向于反对这一点，不妨想想你所在地区最顶尖的脑外科医生或律师。如今个人最高税率由 50% 下调至 28%，你真会指望这位专家（其专业领域中的本地“特许权持有者”）调低收费吗？

Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number of our operating businesses and investees should be severely tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988 tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say, five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us to see both.

不过，关于“较低税率将有利于我们若干经营性业务与被投企业”的结论，你的喜悦应被我们的另一项判断大幅冲淡：计划于 1988 年实施的个人与公司税率在我们看来全然不现实。这些税率极可能给 Washington 带来与物价稳定不相容的财政难题。因此，我们相信最终——比如在五年内——更高的税率或更高的通胀几乎必将出现；若两者同时出现，也不令人意外。

o Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from 28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to arise from capital gains. For example, our three major investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to eventually deliver us capital gains.

o 自 1987 年起，公司层面的资本利得税率由 28% 上调至 34%。此举将对 Berkshire 构成重要的不利影响，因为我们预计未来（如同过去）很大一部分业务价值增值来自资本利得。举例而言，年末我们三项主要投资持仓——Cap Cities、GEICO 与 Washington Post——的市值合计超过 17 亿美元，接近 Berkshire 净资产总额的 75%，但它们每年仅向我们贡献约 900 万美元的收入。相应地，这三家公司都高度留存利润，我们预期这些留存最终将转化为我们的资本利得。

The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.

新法对未来实现的所有收益适用更高税率，且包括法案生效前已存在的未实现收益。年末我们在股票投资中的此类未实现收益为 12 亿美元。由于 GAAP 规定未实现收益对应的递延税款应按上一年度 28% 的税率（而非当前 34%）列示，新法对我们资产负债表的影响会有所滞后。该规定预计很快会改变；一旦改变，约 7,300 万美元将从我们的 GAAP 净资产中消失并转入递延税项账户。

o Dividend and interest income received by our insurance companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law. First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual 80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds: interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will only be 85% tax-exempt.

o 在新法下，我们保险公司的股息与利息收入将被大幅加税。其一，所有公司从其他美国公司获得的股息中有 20% 计税（旧法为 15%）。其二，仅针对财产/意外险公司，关于剩余 80% 的处理发生变化：若分红所对应的股票购于 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后，则其中 15% 计税。其三，同样仅针对财产/意外险公司，涉及免税债：保险公司在 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后购买的此类债券，其利息仅有 85% 免税。

The last two changes are very important. They mean that our income from the investments we make in future years will be significantly lower than would have been the case under the old law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least 10% from what we could previously have expected.

后两项变动极为重要。它们意味着我们今后年份所做投资所产生的收入将显著低于旧法下的水平。就我个人的最佳估计，仅这些变化最终就会把我们保险业务的可得盈利能力较先前预期至少压低 10%。

o The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income. Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.

o 新税法还实质性地改变了财产/意外险公司的纳税时间安排。一项新规则要求我们在纳税申报中对赔款准备金进行贴现，这将减少可抵扣额并增加应税所得。另一项将在六年内分步实施的规则要求我们将未到期保费准备金的 20% 计入应税所得。

非常细化的规则。

Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning 21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you died.

这两项规则都不改变我们对你们报告中的年度税费计提数额，但都会大幅加快实际缴纳进度。也就是说，过去递延的税款将被前置（front-ended），这一变化将显著削弱我们业务的盈利能力。打个比方来说明其代价：如果你一到 21 岁就被要求立刻为此后终生应得的全部收入缴税，那么无论是你一生的财富还是你的遗产，都会远低于那种只在你去世时才需缴清所得税的情形。

Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say. Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.

细心的读者可能会发现我们表述中的不一致之处。此前在讨论价格竞争型行业的公司时，我们认为加税或减税对这些公司本身影响较小，主要会被转嫁给客户。但现在我们却说，即便 Berkshire 的财产/意外险业务所处行业竞争极为激烈，加税仍将影响其利润。

The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major players will generally contend with similar tax equations.

之所以该行业可能是我们一般规则的例外，原因在于各大保险公司面临的税务“算式”并不相同。差异显著，原因包括：新的 alternative minimum tax（替代性最低税）会对部分公司产生重大影响而对另一些则影响不大；某些大型保险公司拥有巨额亏损结转，至少在数年内可在很大程度上屏蔽其所得免于较高税负；还有一些大型保险公司的经营结果将并入含非保险业务公司的合并申报。上述差异将导致财产/意外险行业的边际税率差别很大。而在大多数其他价格竞争型行业（如铝、汽车与百货零售），主要参与者通常面临相似的税务算式，情况并非如此。

The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.

财产/意外险公司缺乏共同的税制算式，这意味着行业所承受的加税很可能无法像典型的价格竞争型行业那样在相当程度上转嫁给客户。换句话说，保险公司自身将承担相当大份额的新税负。

o A partial offset to these burdens is a “fresh start” adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31, 1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however, reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past - undiscounted except in special cases such as structured settlements.) The net effect of the “fresh start” is to give us a double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and earlier years.

o 抵消这些负担的一项部分性因素是 1987 年 1 月 1 日发生的“fresh start（重新起算）”调整：出于税务目的，我们将 1986 年 12 月 31 日的赔款准备金转换为新要求的贴现口径。（但在给你们的报告中，准备金的口径将与以往完全一致——除结构化赔付等特殊情形外不折现。）“fresh start”的净效果是给予我们一次“双重抵扣”：对那些我们已发生但尚未支付、且在 1986 年及更早年度已作为成本全额扣除的部分保险损失，我们在 1987 年及未来年度还将获得税前扣除。

The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the $30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in important respects, will become more severe as time passes.

这一变化带来的净资产增加尚未反映在我们的财务报表中。按现行 GAAP 规则（可能会变更），该收益将在未来几年以内通过较低的税费逐步体现在损益表，从而进入净资产。我们预计“fresh-start”调整带来的总收益将在 3,000–4,000 万美元区间。但需注意，这是一项一次性收益；而其他与保险相关的税改负面影响不仅具有持续性，而且在若干重要方面会随着时间推移而加重。

o The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example, were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be - shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the sales of our properties than they would have if the properties had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change in the law will very materially affect many companies. Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc. that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at all. My impression is that this important change in the law has not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

o 新税法废除了 General Utilities Doctrine。这意味着自 1987 年起，公司清算将面临双重征税：一层在公司层面，另一层在股东层面。过去，公司层面的税负可以避免。举例说，若 Berkshire 被清算——当然我们绝不会这么做——在新法下，假定每笔交易价格相同，股东从出售我们资产中获得的金额将远低于过去的水平。尽管此结果对我们而言仅属理论，但这一法律变更将对许多公司产生十分重大的影响。因此，它也会影响我们对潜在投资的评估。比如，打算出售的石油与天然气生产企业、部分媒体公司、不动产公司等，由于 General Utilities Doctrine 被废止，其股东可实现的价值很可能显著下降——尽管这些公司的运营经济性本身并未出现任何不利变化。我的印象是，这一重要的法律变更尚未被投资者或管理者充分理解。

This section of our report has been longer and more complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law are many and important, particularly for property/casualty insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with any precision.

本报告的这一部分比我期望的更长、也更复杂。但法律的变动既多且重，尤其对财产/意外险公司而言。正如我所指出的，新法将伤及 Berkshire 的业绩，但这种负面影响无法被精确量化。

Miscellaneous

杂项

We bought a corporate jet last year. What you have heard about such planes is true: they are very expensive and a luxury in situations like ours where little travel to out-of-the-way places is required. And planes not only cost a lot to operate, they cost a lot just to look at. Pre-tax, cost of capital plus depreciation on a new $15 million plane probably runs $3 million annually. On our own plane, bought for $850,000 used, such costs run close to $200,000 annually.

我们去年买了一架公务机。关于这种飞机的传闻都是真的：它们非常昂贵，对于像我们这种很少需要飞往偏僻地点的情况而言，更是一种奢侈。飞机不仅运营成本很高，光“摆在那里”也很花钱。以税前口径计算，一架价值 1,500 万美元的新机，其资本成本加折旧每年大概要 300 万美元。我们自用的飞机是以 85 万美元购入的二手机型，这类成本每年接近 20 万美元。

Cognizant of such figures, your Chairman, unfortunately, has in the past made a number of rather intemperate remarks about corporate jets. Accordingly, prior to our purchase, I was forced into my Galileo mode. I promptly experienced the necessary "counter-revelation" and travel is now considerably easier—and considerably costlier—than in the past. Whether Berkshire will get its money’s worth from the plane is an open question, but I will work at achieving some business triumph that I can (no matter how dubiously) attribute to it. I’m afraid Ben Franklin had my number. Said he: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."

考虑到这些数字，很不幸，你们的董事长过去对公务机发表过不少过激的评论。因此，在我们买机之前，我不得不进入自己的 Galileo 模式。我很快得到了必要的“反向启示”，如今出行比过去方便多了——也贵多了。Berkshire 是否能从这架飞机上物有所值尚未可知，但我会努力促成一些可以（无论理由多么牵强）归功于它的商业胜利。我担心 Ben Franklin 早已看穿我。他说过：“成为理性生物真是方便，因为这能让人找到或编造出一切想做之事的理由。”

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1986 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,934 charities were recipients.

约 97% 的符合资格股份参与了 Berkshire 1986 年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划捐出的款项为 400 万美元，共有 1,934 家慈善机构受益。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 58 and 59. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1987 will be ineligible for the 1987 program.

我们敦促新股东阅读第 58–59 页关于股东指定捐赠计划的说明。若希望参与未来的项目，我们强烈建议您立即确认您的股份以实际所有者名义登记，而非以“street 名义”或代理人名义登记。凡在 1987 年 9 月 30 日仍未按实际所有者名义登记的股份，将无法参与 1987 年的计划。

* * *

Last year almost 450 people attended our shareholders’ meeting, up from about 250 the year before (and from about a dozen ten years ago). I hope you can join us on May 19th in Omaha. Charlie and I like to answer owner-related questions and I can promise you that our shareholders will pose many good ones. Finishing up the questions may take quite a while - we had about 65 last year so you should feel free to leave once your own have been answered.

去年大约有 450 人参加了我们的股东大会，高于前一年的约 250 人（而十年前只有十来个人）。我希望你能在 May 19th 来 Omaha 与我们相聚。Charlie 和我喜欢回答与所有者相关的问题，我可以保证我们的股东会提出许多好问题。完成所有提问可能需要相当长时间——去年我们大约回答了 65 个问题——所以一旦你的问题已经得到解答，你可以随时离场。

Last year, after the meeting, one shareholder from New Jersey and another from New York went to the Furniture Mart, where each purchased a $5,000 Oriental rug from Mrs. B. (To be precise, they purchased rugs that might cost $10,000 elsewhere for which they were charged about $5,000.) Mrs. B was pleased - but not satisfied - and she will be looking for you at the store after this year’s meeting. Unless our shareholders top last year’s record, I’ll be in trouble. So do me (and yourself) a favor, and go see her.

去年，会后有一位来自 New Jersey 的股东和另一位来自 New York 的股东来到 the Furniture Mart，各自从 Mrs. B. 那里买了一张 5,000 美元的东方地毯。（更准确地说，他们买的是在别处可能要价 10,000 美元的地毯，而在她那里只收了约 5,000 美元。）Mrs. B. 很高兴——但还不满足——今年会后她会在店里等着你。除非我们的股东们打破去年的纪录，否则我就麻烦了。请帮我一个忙（也算帮你自己），去看看她。

February 27, 1987

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

Appendix

As you’ve probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the “O” (for “old”) column we have shown what the company’s 1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the “N” (for “new”) column we have shown Scott Fetzer’s GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire.

正如你们可能已经猜到，Company O 和 Company N 指的都是同一项业务——Scott Fetzer。在“O”（代表“old”）这一栏，我们展示了如果我们未收购该公司，其 1986 年按 GAAP 口径的利润会是多少；在“N”（代表“new”）这一栏，我们展示了按 Berkshire 实际报告的 Scott Fetzer 的 GAAP 利润。

It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both “companies” generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.

需要强调的是，这两栏呈现的是完全相同的经济实质——也就是相同的销售、工资、税金等。而且这两家“公司”为所有者创造的现金金额也相同。唯一的差异在于会计处理。

So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?

那么，各位“哲学家”，哪一栏更接近真相？管理者与投资者应当聚焦哪一组数字？

Before we tackle those questions, let’s look at what produces the disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.

在回答这些问题之前，先来看 O 与 N 之间差异的来源。我们在若干方面会作简化，但这种简化不应导致分析或结论上的不准确。

The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Scott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by “purchase-price adjustments.” In Scott Fetzer’s case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So we paid a premium of $142.6 million.

O 与 N 的差异之所以出现，是因为我们为 Scott Fetzer 支付的对价与其账面净资产不同。按 GAAP，这类差额——无论溢价还是折价——必须通过“purchase-price adjustments（购买价调整）”入账。在 Scott Fetzer 的案例中，我们为账面记录为 1.724 亿美元的净资产支付了 3.15 亿美元，因此我们支付了 1.426 亿美元的溢价。

The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current values. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer’s inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount from current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.

对任何已付溢价进行会计处理的第一步，是将流动资产的账面价值调整至当前价值。实践中，这一要求通常不影响应收款（其惯常以现值计量），但往往会影响存货。由于 2,290 万美元的 LIFO reserve（LIFO 备抵）以及其他会计复杂因素，Scott Fetzer 的存货账户较当前价值折让了 3,730 万美元。因此，作为我们的第一步会计处理，我们用 1.426 亿美元溢价中的 3,730 万美元来提高存货的账面价值。

Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate.

若在调整流动资产后仍有溢价余额，下一步是将固定资产调整至当前价值。在我们的案例中，这一调整还需要做一些与递延税相关的会计“杂技”。既然这是简化讨论，我就跳过细节，直接给出结论：固定资产增加 6,800 万美元，递延所得税负债减少 1,300 万美元。完成这笔合计 8,100 万美元的调整后，我们还剩下 2,430 万美元的溢价待分配。

Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded pension liabilities. In Scott Fetzer’s case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.

若我们的情形需要，接下来还应进行两步：其一，将除 Goodwill 之外的无形资产调整至当前公允价值；其二，将负债重述为当前公允价值（这一要求通常只影响长期债务与未提存的养老金负债）。但在 Scott Fetzer 的案例中，这两步都无须进行。

The final accounting adjustment we needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as “excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired”). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet of Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.

在为所有资产与负债确认公允市场价值之后，我们需要做的最后一项会计调整，是将剩余溢价分配至 Goodwill（技术上称为“excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired”，即购买成本超过所收购净资产公允价值的差额）。该剩余金额为 2,430 万美元。于是，收购前 Scott Fetzer 的资产负债表（下文 O 栏概括所示）经此次收购被转化为 N 栏所示的资产负债表。从经济实质上看，两份资产负债表描绘的是同样的资产与负债——但正如你所见，某些数字存在显著差异。

The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of the earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed to the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:

在资产负债表中 N 栏较高的数字，带来了先前利润表 N 栏中较低的收益。这是资产重估入账以及被重估资产需计提折旧或摊销所致。资产数额越高，计入收益表的年度折旧或摊销费用就越高。由于资产负债表重估而流入利润表的费用在先前的利润表中已编号如下：

1、$4,979,000 for non-cash inventory costs resulting, primarily, from reductions that Scott Fetzer made in its inventories during 1986; charges of this kind are apt to be small or non-existent in future years.

$4,979,000：非现金的存货成本，主要源于 Scott Fetzer 在 1986 年的存货减少；此类费用在未来几年可能很小，甚至不存在。

2、$5,054,000 for extra depreciation attributable to the write-up of fixed assets; a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

$5,054,000：由于固定资产重估产生的额外折旧；未来大概还将每年计提类似金额，持续约 12 年。

3、$595,000 for amortization of Goodwill; this charge will be made annually for 39 more years in a slightly larger amount because our purchase was made on January 6 and, therefore, the 1986 figure applies to only 98% of the year.

$595,000：Goodwill 的摊销；由于我们的收购发生在 1 月 6 日，1986 年的金额仅覆盖全年 98%，因此未来 39 年每年的摊销额会略高于此数。

4、$998,000 for deferred-tax acrobatics that are beyond my ability to explain briefly (or perhaps even non-briefly); a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

$998,000：与递延税相关的“会计杂技”（我难以简要解释，甚至难以不简要地解释）；未来大概还将每年计提类似金额，持续约 12 年。

It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The “new” Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the “old” Scott Fetzer would have, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the “old” and “new” company might differ widely.

需要明确的是，这些新产生的会计成本合计 $11.6 million，在所得税口径下均不可抵扣。尽管两套 GAAP 利润数字差异很大，“new” Scott Fetzer 与 “old” Scott Fetzer 实际缴纳的税额完全相同。就经营利润而言，未来也将如此。不过，若发生极不可能的情形——Scott Fetzer 出售其某项业务——“old” 与 “new” 公司的税务后果可能会大相径庭。

By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the “old” and “new” Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the higher inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.

到 1986 年末，“old” 与 “new” Scott Fetzer 的净资产差额已因新实体计入收益的额外 $11.6 million 从 $142.6 million 降至 $131.0 million。随着岁月推移，类似的费用计提将使大部分溢价逐步消失，两份资产负债表将逐步趋同。不过，新资产负债表上确立的较高土地价值以及大部分较高的存货价值将会保留，除非处置土地或进一步降低存货水平。

* * *

What does all this mean for owners? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth some given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day?

这一切对所有者意味着什么？Berkshire 的股东买到的是一家在 1986 年赚了 4,020 万美元的企业，还是一家赚了 2,860 万美元的企业？那 1,160 万美元的新产生费用对我们而言是否是真正的经济成本？投资者是否应该为 Company O 的股票支付比 Company N 更高的价格？如果一家企业的价值等于某个盈利倍数，那么我们收购的前一天，Scott Fetzer 是否远比次日更有价值？

If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called “owner earnings.” These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N’s items (1) and (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)

如果我们认真思考这些问题，就能对所谓的“所有者收益（owner earnings）”获得一些洞见。其定义为：(a) 报告利润，外加 (b) 折旧、耗竭、摊销以及某些其他非现金费用（如 Company N 的第(1)与第(4)项），再减去 (c) 为使企业充分维持其长期竞争地位与单位销量所必须资本化的厂房、设备等支出的年均额。（如果为了维持竞争地位与单位销量需要追加营运资本，则该增量也应计入 (c)。不过，采用 LIFO 存货法的企业在单位销量不变时通常不需要追加营运资本。）

Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since( c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figure, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes’s observation: “I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong.”

我们的所有者收益公式不会像 GAAP 那样给出“看似精确”的数字，因为 (c) 必然是一个估计——而且有时很难估计。尽管如此，我们认为用于估值的相关指标是所有者收益而非 GAAP 利润——无论是投资者买股票，还是管理者收购整家公司。我们赞同 Keynes 的话：“我宁愿含糊其辞地正确，也不愿精确地错误。”

The approach we have outlined produces “owner earnings” for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you should be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because( c) is necessarily the same in both cases.

我们所述的方法会得到 Company O 与 Company N 完全相同的“所有者收益”，这意味着估值也应完全相同——这与常识一致。之所以如此，是因为在 O 与 N 两栏中，(a)+(b) 的和相同，而 (c) 在两种情况下也必然相同。

And what do Charlie and I, as owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe ( c) is very close to the “old” company’s (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the “new” company’s (b) number of $19.9 million. Therefore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.

作为所有者与管理者，Charlie 和我认为 Scott Fetzer 的所有者收益应取何值？在当前情况下，我们认为 (c) 非常接近“old” 公司 (b) 的 830 万美元，远低于“new” 公司 (b) 的 1,990 万美元。因此，我们认为用 O 栏中的报告利润要比用 N 栏更能刻画所有者收益。换言之，Scott Fetzer 的所有者收益显著高于我们按 GAAP 报告的数字。

That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when ( c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.

这当然是令人愉快的状况。但此类测算通常不会给出如此美好的消息。大多数管理者大概都会承认：从长期看，仅为保持单位销量与竞争地位，就需要支出超过 (b) 的金额。一旦出现这种刚性要求——也就是 (c) 超过 (b)——GAAP 利润就会高估所有者收益，而且这种高估往往相当可观。近年来石油行业就提供了一个显著例证：若多数大型石油公司每年只花费 (b)，它们在实际价值上收缩几乎是板上钉钉。

通胀导致重置成本的增加。

All of this points up the absurdity of the “cash flow” numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract ( c) . Most sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations were to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.

上述一切都凸显了 Wall Street 报告中常见“现金流（cash flow）”数字的荒谬：这些数字常规地计算 (a)+(b)，却不扣除 (c)。多数投行的售卖手册也充斥这种误导性的呈现，它们暗示被出售的企业就像商业版的 Pyramids——永远最先进、永不需要替换、改进或整修。事实上，倘若全体美国公司同时通过顶尖投行挂牌出售——而且你还相信了那些推介手册的描述——那么政府对全国厂房与设备开支的预测恐怕要下调 90%。

“Cash Flow”, true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But “cash flow” is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, ( c) is always significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.

诚然，“Cash Flow”在某些房地产或其他类型企业的描述中可作有用的速记——这类企业前期投入巨大，此后仅需极小投入。比如只持有一座桥或一个超长寿命气田的公司。但对制造业、零售业、采掘业与公共事业等企业，“cash flow”毫无意义，因为对它们而言，(c) 永远是重要项。固然，这类企业在某一年也许可以延后资本支出，但在五到十年的维度上必须投入，否则业务就会衰败。

Why, then, are “cash flow” numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to justify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn’t add (b) without subtracting ( c) : though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they’ll go away, the same is not true for ( c) . The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring ( c) is headed for certain trouble.

那么，为何“cash flow”数字如今如此受欢迎？对此我们承认自己带着些许犬儒：这些数字经常被企业与证券的销售者用来为不合理之事强作辩护（从而把不该卖的东西卖出去）。当 (a)——即 GAAP 利润——单看之下不足以覆盖垃圾债券的债务服务或支撑一个愚蠢的股价时，销售人员把焦点转向 (a)+(b) 就变得“恰到好处”。但你不应在不扣除 (c) 的情况下加上 (b)：牙医说“如果你忽视你的牙，它们会消失”，这话没错；但 (c) 并不如此。任何把企业的偿债能力或股票估值等同于 (a)+(b) 而忽视 (c) 的公司或投资者，都必然走向麻烦。

* * *

To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to ( c) . (The two items are not identical, of course. For example, at See’s we annually make capitalized expenditures that exceed depreciation by $500,000 to $1 million, simply to hold our ground competitively.) Our conviction about this point is the reason we show our amortization and other purchase-price adjustment items separately in the table on page 8 and is also our reason for viewing the earnings of the individual businesses as reported there as much more closely approximating owner earnings than the GAAP figures.

总而言之：就 Scott Fetzer 及我们其他业务而言，在历史成本口径下（即不计入无形资产摊销与其他购买价调整），我们认为 (b) 与 (c) 的金额相当接近。（当然两者并非完全一致。举例来说，在 See’s，我们每年为保持竞争地位而进行的资本化支出会比折旧多 50 万至 100 万美元。）基于此判断，我们在第 8 页的表格中单列了摊销与其他购买价调整项目；同样基于此，我们认为该表所列各业务的盈利比 GAAP 数字更接近所有者收益。

前面已有描述，没有增长的资本投入就是费用。

Questioning GAAP figures may seem impious to some. After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the “truth” about our business. But the accountants’ job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.

质疑 GAAP 数字在一些人看来或许“不够虔敬”。毕竟，我们付钱给会计师，不就是为了让他们告诉我们关于业务的“真相”吗？但会计师的工作是记录，而不是评估；评估的职责落在投资者与管理者身上。

Accounting numbers, of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.

当然，会计数字是商业的语言，对评估企业价值与追踪其进展大有裨益。若没有这些数字，Charlie 和我也会无所适从：它们总是我们评估自有业务与他人业务的起点。不过，管理者与所有者需要记住：会计只是商业思考的辅助，而绝非其替代品。

1987-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1987-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Sources of Reported Earnings

The Fechheimer Bros. Co.

Insurance Operations

Marketable Securities

NHP, Inc.

Taxation

Miscellaneous

Appendix

热门主题

Recent Articles

1987-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2014-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2015-02-27 Warren Buffett.Intrinsic Value

2023-09-16 Satya Nadella.Why we need re-founders

2024-03-13 Satya Nadella.AI, chip shortage, empathy, and poetry