1989-02-28 Warren Buffett.Arbitrage

Refer To：《1989-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Arbitrage

套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)

在过去的报告中，我们曾告诉过你们，我们的保险子公司有时会从事套利操作，把它作为持有短期现金等价物的一种替代方式。当然，我们更愿意做大额长期投资，但我们常常是现金比好主意更多。在这种时候，套利有时不仅能提供远高于 Treasury Bills 的回报，而且同样重要的是，它还能压制我们放松长期投资标准的诱惑。（每当我们讨论完一项套利承诺后，Charlie 通常都会以这样一句话作结：“好吧，至少这能让你不至于去泡酒吧。”）

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about $147 million.

在 1988 年，我们从套利中获得了异常丰厚的利润，无论按绝对金额还是按回报率衡量都是如此。我们在平均约 1.47 亿美元的投入资金上，取得了大约 7,800 万美元的税前收益。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.

这种活动规模，值得我们对套利及我们对待套利的方法作一些较为详细的讨论。过去，这个词只适用于在两个不同市场上同时买卖证券或外汇。其目标是利用那些可能存在的微小价差，比如说，Royal Dutch 股票分别以 guilders 在 Amsterdam、以 pounds 在 London、以及以 dollars 在 New York 交易时所出现的差异。有些人可能会把这称作“剥头皮”；你大概不会惊讶，从业者更愿意采用法语词 arbitrage。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage—or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called—has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.

自第一次世界大战以来，套利——或者如今有时被称为“risk arbitrage”——的定义已经扩展到包括从已宣布的公司事件中谋取利润，例如公司出售、合并、资本重组、组织重整、清算、自我收购要约等等。在大多数情况下，套利者预期无论股票市场如何波动都能获利。他通常面临的主要风险，反而是那个已经宣布的事件最终不会发生。

这里没有解释为什么没有从事“Long-short”的套利模式。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory—quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.

套利领域有时也会出现一些离奇而偏门的机会。我在 24 岁、于 New York 的 Graham-Newman Corp. 工作时，就参与过这样一笔。Rockwood & Co. 是一家位于 Brooklyn 的巧克力制品公司，盈利能力有限。它在 1941 年、可可豆价格为每磅 5 美分时，采用了 LIFO 存货计价法。到了 1954 年，由于可可豆一度短缺，价格飙升至每磅 60 多美分。因此，Rockwood 想要迅速处置掉其价值高昂的存货——必须赶在价格回落之前完成。但如果公司只是简单把这些可可豆卖掉，那么它就要为这笔收入缴纳接近 50% 的税。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.

1954 年的 Tax Code 伸出了援手。其中有一项相当冷僻的条款：如果企业把存货分配给股东，且此举属于缩减公司业务范围计划的一部分，那么原本应就 LIFO 利润缴纳的税款就可以免除。Rockwood 决定终止其一项业务——可可脂销售业务——并宣称其 1,300 万磅可可豆库存归属于这一业务。因此，公司提出以其不再需要的可可豆来回购本公司股票，交换条件是每股支付 80 磅可可豆。

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.

有几个星期，我忙着买股票、卖可可豆，并且不时去 Schroeder Trust，把股票凭证换成仓单。利润相当不错，而我唯一的开销只是地铁代币。

The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

Rockwood 重组方案的设计者，是当时一位尚不为人所知、但才华横溢的 Chicago 人，32 岁的 Jay Pritzker。如果你熟悉 Jay 此后的成就，你就不会惊讶于这项操作对 Rockwood 持续持有的股东来说，也带来了相当不错的结果。从要约收购开始前不久到完成后不久，Rockwood 股价从 15 涨到了 100，尽管当时公司正遭受巨额经营亏损。有时候，股票估值里真正起作用的东西，并不只是市盈率。

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)

近些年来，大多数套利操作都与收购有关，既有友好收购，也有敌意收购。并购热潮四处蔓延，反垄断挑战几乎不存在，而出价又常常一级一级往上抬，在这种环境下，套利者可谓大获其利。他们并不需要什么特别天赋就能赚到钱；诀窍——套用 Peter Sellers 那部电影里的说法——不过就是“Being There”。在 Wall Street，那句老谚语也被改写了：“给一个人一条鱼，你能喂饱他一天；教会他怎么做套利，你就能喂饱他一辈子。”（不过，如果他是在 Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage 学出来的，那最后给他供饭的，也许会是一家州立机构。）

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire—a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

要评估一项套利机会，你必须回答四个问题：（1）所承诺的事件真正发生的可能性有多大？（2）你的资金会被占用多久？（3）有没有可能出现更好的情况——例如出现竞争性收购报价？以及（4）如果由于反垄断行动、融资故障等原因，事件最终没有发生，那么结果会怎样？

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.

Arcata Corp. 是我们若干带有偶然色彩的套利经历之一，很能说明这一行里的曲折变化。1981 年 9 月 28 日，Arcata 的董事原则上同意将公司出售给 Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.（KKR）；无论在当时还是现在，KKR 都是一家大型杠杆收购公司。Arcata 从事印刷和林业产品业务，而它还有另一项特别之处：1978 年，美国政府为了扩建 Redwood National Park，征收了 Arcata 的 10,700 英亩林地，其中主要是原始红杉林。政府分几次为这片土地支付了 9,790 万美元，但 Arcata 认为这笔补偿严重不足，并对此提出争议。双方还对从土地被征收到最终付款之间这段期间应适用的利率存在分歧。授权法案规定的是 6% 的单利；而 Arcata 主张应适用远高得多、并且按复利计算的利率。

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.

收购一家涉及大额、高度投机性诉讼请求权的公司，无论这项请求权是公司有利的一方还是不利的一方，都会带来谈判难题。为了解决这个问题，KKR 提出的条件是：每股 Arcata 支付 37.00 美元，外加政府未来就那片红杉林额外支付金额中的三分之二。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.

在评估这项套利机会时，我们必须问自己，KKR 是否会把这笔交易真正完成，因为在其他条件之外，它的报价还取决于其能否获得“令人满意的融资”。这种条款对卖方来说总是危险的：它给了一个求婚者在求婚和结婚之间热情消退时一个轻易退出的通道。不过，我们对这种可能性并不是特别担心，因为 KKR 过去完成交易的记录一直不错。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须问自己，如果 KKR 这笔交易真的流产了，会发生什么；而在这一点上，我们也感到相当安心：Arcata 的管理层和董事们已经把这家公司兜售了一段时间，而且显然铁了心要把它卖掉。如果 KKR 退出，Arcata 很可能还会找到另一个买家，当然，价格也许会低一些。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后，我们还得问自己，那项红杉索赔权究竟可能值多少钱。你们的董事长——一个连榆树和橡树都分不清的人——在这个问题上倒毫无困难：他冷静地把这项索赔估值为介于零和很多很多之间。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40%—not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.

我们从 9 月 30 日开始买入 Arcata 股票，当时股价大约是 33.50 美元；在八周内，我们买入了大约 40 万股，也就是公司约 5% 的股份。最初的公告称，每股 37.00 美元的收购价将在 1982 年 1 月支付。因此，如果一切都进展完美，我们本来可以实现约 40% 的年化回报率——这还没有把那项红杉索赔权算进去，而那本来会是锦上添花。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up—even though the closing had been postponed—reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.

但事情并没有完美进行。12 月时，公告称交割将略有延迟。尽管如此，双方还是在 1 月 4 日签署了正式协议。受到鼓舞后，我们提高了持股比例，以大约每股 38.00 美元的价格继续买入，使持股增至 655,000 股，也就是公司 7% 以上的股份。即便交割已经推迟，我们仍愿意提高买入价格，这反映出我们对于红杉索赔权的判断，更偏向于“很多很多”，而不是“零”。

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”

然后，到了 2 月 25 日，贷款方表示，鉴于“住房行业严重低迷及其对 Arcata 前景的影响”，他们要对融资条款再作一次“重新审视”。股东大会也再次被推迟，延到 4 月举行。一位 Arcata 发言人表示，他“并不认为这笔收购本身的命运已受到威胁”。当套利者听到这种安抚性表态时，他们脑中立刻会闪过那句老话：“他撒起谎来，就像货币贬值前夜的财政部长一样。”

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.

到了 3 月 12 日，KKR 表示其先前的交易方案行不通了，先是把报价降到 33.50 美元，两天后又把报价提高到 35.00 美元。然而在 3 月 15 日，董事会拒绝了这一报价，转而接受了另一组买家的方案：每股 37.50 美元，外加未来任何红杉索赔回收金额的一半。股东随后批准了这项交易，而每股 37.50 美元的对价于 6 月 4 日支付完成。

We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim—was more than satisfactory.

我们收到的是 2,460 万美元，而成本为 2,290 万美元；我们的平均持有期接近六个月。考虑到这笔交易过程中遭遇了这么多波折，我们取得了 15% 的年化回报率——而且这还完全没有把红杉索赔权的任何价值算进去——这个结果已经相当令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.

不过，最精彩的部分还在后头。审判法官指定了两个委员会，一个负责评估林木价值，另一个负责研究利率问题。到了 1987 年 1 月，第一个委员会认定这些红杉价值 2.757 亿美元，而第二个委员会则建议采用复合计算的综合回报率，算下来大约为 14%。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

1987 年 8 月，法官支持了这些结论，这意味着 Arcata 将应收约 6 亿美元净额。随后，政府提起了上诉。不过在 1988 年，就在上诉尚未开庭审理之前，这项索赔以 5.19 亿美元达成和解。因此，我们每股又额外收到 29.48 美元，总计约 1,930 万美元。到 1989 年，我们还将再收到大约 80 万美元。

Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)

Berkshire 的套利活动与许多套利者不同。首先，我们每年只参与少数几笔、而且通常是规模很大的交易。大多数从业者会参与很多笔交易——也许一年 50 笔甚至更多。手里有这么多项目，他们就必须把大部分时间都花在跟踪交易进展以及相关股票的市场波动上。这不是 Charlie 和我想要度过人生的方式。（如果发财的代价只是整天盯着行情带看，那又有什么意思呢？）

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will—and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.

正因为我们分散得很少，所以一笔特别赚钱或特别亏钱的交易，对我们全年套利结果的影响，会远远大于对一般套利机构的影响。到目前为止，Berkshire 还没有遇到过一次真正糟糕的经历。但这种事迟早会发生——而一旦发生，我们会把那些血淋淋的细节如实告诉你们。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

我们与某些套利操作的另一个不同之处在于，我们只参与那些已经公开宣布的交易。我们不会根据传闻进行交易，也不会试图猜测谁会成为收购对象。我们只是读报纸，思考少数几个大的交易命题，然后依据我们自己对概率的判断来行动。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

到年底时，我们唯一一项重大的套利头寸，是 3,342,000 股 RJR Nabisco，成本为 2.818 亿美元，市值为 3.045 亿美元。到 1 月，我们把持股增加到大约 400 万股；到 2 月，则已将全部头寸清空。当我们把持股交给收购 RJR 的 KKR 进行要约出售时，大约有 300 万股被接受，而退回的股票则立即在市场上卖出。我们的税前利润达到 6,400 万美元，比预期还要好。

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”

更早些时候，在 RJR 的竞购战中又出现了一张熟悉的面孔：Jay Pritzker，他是 First Boston 财团的一员，而该财团提出了一项以税务安排为导向的报价。借用 Yogi Berra 的一句话：“一切又像似曾相识般重演了一遍。”

During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.

在大多数按正常情况我们本会买入 RJR 的时间里，由于 Salomon 参与了一个竞购财团，我们在这只股票上的交易活动受到了限制。通常情况下，Charlie 和我虽然是 Salomon 的董事，但都会被隔离在其并购业务信息之外。我们自己就要求这样安排：这些信息对我们没有任何好处，事实上，反而偶尔会妨碍 Berkshire 的套利操作。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.

不过，Salomon 在 RJR 交易中拟作出的承诺规模异常巨大，因此要求所有董事都必须充分知情并参与其中。因此，Berkshire 对 RJR 的买入只发生在两个时点：第一次是在管理层宣布收购计划后紧接着的那几天，也就是 Salomon 尚未介入之前；第二次则是在相隔相当长一段时间之后，也就是 RJR 董事会作出支持 KKR 的决定之后。由于我们无法在其他时间买入，我们的董事身份让 Berkshire 付出了相当可观的代价。

Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.

考虑到 Berkshire 在 1988 年取得了良好成绩，你可能会以为我们将在 1989 年大举投入套利。恰恰相反，我们预计会待在场边观望。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down—because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个令人愉快的原因是，我们持有的现金减少了——因为我们在那些预期会持有很长很长时间的股票上的仓位大幅增加了。正如本报告的老读者所知道的，我们的新投资承诺，并不是基于对股票市场短期前景的判断。相反，它们反映的是我们对特定公司长期商业前景的看法。对于一年之后股票市场、利率或商业活动会处在什么位置，我们没有看法，过去没有，现在没有，将来也不会有。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”

即使我们手头有很多现金，我们在 1989 年大概也不会做太多套利。收购领域已经发展出一些不同寻常的过度现象。正如 Dorothy 所说：“Toto，我觉得我们已经不在 Kansas 了。”

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled—and, in our view, often unwarranted—optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”

我们不知道这种过度现象还会持续多久，也不知道究竟是什么会改变政府、贷款人和买方的态度——正是这些态度在助长这种局面。但我们确实知道：别人处理自己事务时越缺乏审慎，我们处理自己事务时就越应该保持审慎。我们无意参与那些反映出买方和贷款人毫无节制——而且在我们看来往往毫无依据——乐观情绪的套利交易。在我们的行动中，我们会牢记 Herb Stein 的智慧：“如果某件事不可能永远持续下去，那它终究会结束。”

1989-02-28 Warren Buffett.Arbitrage

1989-02-28 Warren Buffett.Arbitrage

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