1990-03-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
我们在1989年的净值增长为15.15亿美元，增幅为44.4%。在过去25年间（即现管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到4296.01美元，年复合增长率为23.8%。
What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals.
然而，真正重要的是内在价值——也就是我们所有子公司在理性估值下的总和。假如拥有完美的预见能力，这个数值可以通过将未来所有的现金流（流入与流出）按当前利率折现来计算。以此方式估值，不论是制造马车鞭的公司还是运营手机业务的公司，在经济上都站在同一层面。
Back when Berkshire’s book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire’s intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.
当年伯克希尔的账面价值是19.46美元时，其内在价值其实略低于此，因为账面价值全部被绑定在一个并不值这个价格的纺织业务中。而现在，我们大部分的业务的实际价值远超账面价值。这种从“折价”到“溢价”的可喜转变，意味着伯克希尔的内在商业价值的复合增长率略高于我们每年23.8%的账面价值增长率。
The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.
“后视镜”是一回事，“挡风玻璃”是另一回事。我们账面价值的很大一部分体现在股权证券上，除个别例外，这些证券在资产负债表上以当前市值计价。到了年底，这些证券的市值相较其内在商业价值来说，比以往任何时候都更高。其中一个原因是1989年的股市行情非常活跃；更重要的是，这些企业的优点已被广泛认可。曾几何时，它们的股价被严重低估，而如今则不再如此。
We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This ‘til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire’s value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately “corrected” the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our “catch-up” rewards have been realized, which means we’ll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.
我们将继续持有我们的大部分核心持仓，无论它们的市场价格相较内在价值如何。这种“至死不渝”的态度，加上这些持仓目前所体现出的高价，意味着它们在未来不太可能像过去那样大幅拉升伯克希尔的价值。换句话说，我们迄今为止的业绩得益于“双重红利”：（1）我们投资组合中的公司在内在价值上取得了卓越增长；（2）随着市场逐步“修正”这些公司的股价，使其估值相对于普通企业更为合理，我们也获得了额外的收益。我们仍将受益于这些企业未来在内在价值上的良好增长。但“补涨”的收益已经兑现，因此未来我们只能依靠“单重红利”了。
We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.
我们还面临另一个障碍：在一个有限的世界里，高增长率注定会自我终结。如果增长的基数很小，这一规律可能暂时不起作用。但当基数膨胀之后，盛宴就将结束——高增长最终会为自己铸下沉锚。
Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: “That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain…in two days, more than the sun - and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria.” Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. “The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public.”
卡尔·萨根曾风趣地描述了这种现象，他思考那些每15分钟就分裂一次的细菌的命运。他说：“这意味着每小时翻四倍，每天翻96次。虽然一只细菌的重量只有一万亿分之一克，但在一天的狂热无性繁殖之后，它们的后代总重量将相当于一座山……再过两天，就超过太阳——而再久一点，宇宙中的一切都将是细菌构成的。”但萨根安慰道：这种指数增长总会遇到阻碍，“细菌会用尽食物，或者互相中毒，或者害羞到不愿在公共场合繁殖。”
Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless, Sagan’s observations apply. From Berkshire’s present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.
即便在最糟糕的日子里，Charlie Munger（伯克希尔的副董事长，也是我的合伙人）和我也从不把伯克希尔看作一只细菌。而更令人遗憾的是，我们也找不到每15分钟就能让净值翻倍的方法。当然，我们一点也不羞于在公众面前“繁殖”——指的是财务上。然而，萨根的观察依然适用。从现在伯克希尔49亿美元的净值起步，要实现15%的年均账面价值增长，要比我们从2200万美元开始实现23.8%的增长要难得多。
Taxes
税务
Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire’s share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.
我们在1989年获得的15亿美元收益是在计提了大约7.12亿美元所得税费用之后实现的。此外，伯克希尔所持五家主要被投资企业所缴纳所得税中，按我们的持股比例分摊的份额约为1.75亿美元。
Of this year’s tax charge, about $172 million will be paid currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.
在本年度的税负中，大约1.72亿美元需要即刻缴纳；其余的5.4亿美元为递延税项。几乎所有的递延部分都与我们普通股投资中1989年未实现利润的增长有关。对于这一部分增长，我们按34%的税率计提了税务准备。
We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2 billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.
我们对1987年和1988年产生的所有未实现收益也按相同的税率（34%）进行了准备。但正如我们去年所解释的，1987年之前积累的约12亿美元未实现收益，是按当时生效的28%税率计提税务准备的。
A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth, by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.
一项新的会计准则可能将被采纳，要求公司针对所有收益——无论哪一年产生的——都按当前适用的税率进行准备。若税率为34%，这一规定将使我们增加约7100万美元的递延所得税负债，并相应减少我们的净资产，这是因为我们需要将1987年前的未实现收益的税率从28%提高6个百分点。由于该提议引起了广泛争议，且最终形式尚不明确，我们尚未作出调整。
As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
如你在第27页的资产负债表所见，如果我们在年末按市价出售所有证券，我们将需缴纳超过11亿美元的税款。但这11亿美元的税务负债是否等同，或哪怕相似于，年终15天后应付给贸易债权人的11亿美元负债？显然不是——尽管这两项在审计后的净资产上具有相同的影响，即同样减少11亿美元。
On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
那么，是否因为这部分递延税负只有在我们出售股票时才会触发，而我们绝大部分股票并无出售打算，因此这项负债就是无意义的会计虚构？答案仍然是否定的。
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This “loan” is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of “transfer” tax on $224 million of gains.
从经济角度看，这项负债更像是从美国财政部那里获得的一笔无息贷款，其偿还时间完全取决于我们的选择（当然，除非国会修改税法，对未实现收益提前征税）。此外，这种“贷款”还有一些特别之处：它只能用于支持我们持有这些升值了的股票，而且其金额每天会随着市场价格波动而变化，也会因税率变动而周期性调整。实质上，这项递延税款更像是一种巨额的“资产转移税”，只有当我们选择从一个资产转换到另一个资产时才需缴纳。事实上，在1989年我们出售了一些相对较小的持仓，在2.24亿美元的增值收益中产生了约7600万美元的“转移”税。
Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let’s look at an extreme comparison.
由于税法的运作方式，我们所偏好的“睡美人”式投资策略——只要成功——在数学上明显优于更频繁交易的方式。让我们来看一个极端对比。
Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad.
假设伯克希尔起初只有1美元，我们将它投资在一项年末翻倍的资产中并随后卖出。再假设我们用扣税后的收益每年继续重复这一过程，连续19年每年都翻一番。20年后，我们每年所缴的34%资本利得税累计将向政府缴纳约13,000美元，我们则剩下约25,250美元。不错的成绩。
If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.
但如果我们进行了一项惊人的长期投资，在这20年中它自己翻了20倍，那么1美元会增长至1,048,576美元。如果那时我们选择变现，将缴纳大约356,500美元的34%税金，最终剩下约692,000美元。
The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.
这两个结果之间如此惊人的差异，仅仅是因为缴税时点不同。有趣的是，政府从方案二中获得的收益与我们一样，按27:1的比例增长——它会收到356,500美元的税，而不是13,000美元——尽管这笔钱它得等更久。
We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after-tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that’s exactly what Charlie and I did.
我们必须强调，我们之所以采取偏好长期投资的策略，并不是因为这些数学计算。事实上，频繁地从一个投资转向另一个投资，我们可能获得更高的税后收益。很多年前，我和Charlie确实是这么做的。
Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop.
现在，我们宁愿原地不动，即使这意味着回报率略低。理由很简单：我们发现，优秀的商业关系极其稀有且令人愉悦，我们希望将这些关系都保留下来。
This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.
这个决定对我们来说尤其容易，因为我们相信这些关系将带来良好的——即便可能不是最优的——财务回报。考虑到这一点，我们认为，舍弃与我们熟知且钦佩的人相处的时光，而转向与我们不熟悉、而且人品更趋于普通的人共事，是毫无意义的。那就像“为了钱而结婚”——在大多数情况下都是个错误，而如果你已经富有，那就更是疯狂。
Sources of Reported Earnings
报告收益的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表列示了伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。在本表中，商誉摊销以及其他主要的购买价格会计调整未直接计入相关业务单元的账面收益中，而是被单独列示。这种做法可以让你看到这些业务在未被我们收购时的收益表现。我在以往报告中已解释过，我们认为这种呈现方式比依照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）——按业务逐项计入购买价格调整——更有助于投资者和管理层理解。这张表中列示的净收益总额，当然与我们审计财报中的GAAP净利润完全一致。
Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have reprinted on page 71 Charlie’s May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S. League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent decision to resign.
关于这些业务的更多信息，请参阅第37至39页的《业务分部》部分，以及第40至44页的《管理层讨论》部分。在这些部分，你也可以看到我们按GAAP标准报告的分部收益。至于Wesco的业务，我强烈建议你阅读Charlie Munger的致股东信，从第54页开始。此外，在第71页我们还重印了Charlie于1989年5月30日致美国储蓄机构联盟的信件，表达了我们对其政策的极度失望以及随之作出的辞职决定。
(000s omitted)
----------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------------- ----------------------
1989 1988 1989 1988
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(24,400) $(11,081) $(12,259) $ (1,045)
Net Investment Income ... 243,599 231,250 213,642 197,779
Buffalo News .............. 46,047 42,429 27,771 25,462
Fechheimer ................ 12,621 14,152 6,789 7,720
Kirby ..................... 26,114 26,891 16,803 17,842
Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 17,070 18,439 8,441 9,099
Scott Fetzer
Manufacturing Group .... 33,165 28,542 19,996 17,640
See's Candies ............. 34,235 32,473 20,626 19,671
Wesco - other than Insurance 13,008 16,133 9,810 10,650
World Book ................ 25,583 27,890 16,372 18,021
Amortization of Goodwill .. (3,387) (2,806) (3,372) (2,806)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Charges ........ (5,740) (6,342) (6,668) (7,340)
Interest Expense* ......... (42,389) (35,613) (27,098) (23,212)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (5,867) (4,966) (3,814) (3,217)
Other ..................... 23,755 41,059 12,863 27,177
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings .......... 393,414 418,450 299,902 313,441
Sales of Securities ......... 223,810 131,671 147,575 85,829
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Total Earnings - All Entities $617,224 $550,121 $447,477 $399,270
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and
Mutual Savings & Loan.We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
同时请参阅第45—51页，我们将 Berkshire 的财务数据按四个板块重新编排。这四个板块对应了我与 Charlie 对业务的思考方式，并有助于你计算 Berkshire 的内在价值。上述页面分别列示了以下板块的资产负债表与损益表：（1）我们的保险业务，并逐项列出其主要投资头寸；（2）我们的制造、出版与零售业务，剔除某些非经营性资产与购买价款会计调整；（3）从事金融类业务的子公司，即 Mutual Savings 与 Scott Fetzer Financial；以及（4）“其他”类别，包含（2）中公司所持有的非经营性资产（主要为可流通证券）、全部购买价款会计调整，以及 Wesco 与 Berkshire 母公司的各项资产与负债。
If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.
若你将这四个板块的收益与净值相加，其合计数将与我们按 GAAP 报表所示完全一致。不过我要强调，这种“四分类”呈现并不在我们审计师的业务范围内，他们并未对其背书。
In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about \$45 million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investees totaled about \$212 million last year, not counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If this \$212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been close to \$500 million rather than the \$300 million shown in the table.
除报告的自有收益外，我们还从被投资企业中受益于大量、但按标准会计规则不得并入报告的收益。第15页列示了五家主要被投资企业，我们在1989年收到的税后股息约为4500万美元。然而，我们按持股份额对应的这些被投资企业的留存收益在去年合计约2.12亿美元（未计 GEICO 与 Coca-Cola 所实现的大额资本利得）。若这2.12亿美元以股息形式分配给我们，在补缴相应税款后，我们自身的经营性收益将接近5亿美元，而不是表中所示的3亿美元。
The question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are - and even think they may be more valuable. The reason for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these cases.
你需要判断的问题是：这些未分配收益对我们而言是否与已报告收益同等有价值。我们的看法是：**是**——甚至可能**更**有价值。之所以得出这种“林中之鸟或许比手中两只更值钱”的结论，原因在于：这些被投资企业所保留的收益将由才干出众、以所有者为导向的管理者进行再投资，有时他们在本企业内部对资金的运用优于我们在本部能实现的配置。我不会对大多数管理层作出如此慷慨的评价，但在这些具体案例中，这是恰当的。
In our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best measured by a "look-through" approach, in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our "look-through" earnings must grow at about the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in order to reach this 15% goal.
在我们看来，衡量 Berkshire 基础盈利力的最佳方式是“穿透式（look-through）”口径：把我们按持股比例对应的被投资企业**留存的**经营性收益附加到我们自身**报告的**经营性收益上（两者均不计资本利得）。若要让我们的内在商业价值以年均约15%的速度增长，我们的“穿透式”收益也必须以大致相同的速度增长。为实现这一15%的目标，我们既需要现有被投资企业持续贡献，也需要不时新增优质被投资对象。
Non-Insurance Operations
非保险业务
In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing and retail operations “The Sainted Seven.” With our acquisition of Borsheim’s early in 1989, the challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed: Let’s call the group “The Sainted Seven Plus One.”
过去，我们把主要的制造、出版与零售业务称作“The Sainted Seven”。1989年初收购了 Borsheim’s 之后，我们试图找一个既头韵又贴切的新称呼，但没成功：那就把这个组合称为“The Sainted Seven Plus One”。
This divine assemblage - Borsheim’s, The Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s Candies, World Book - is a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.
这一“神圣组合”——Borsheim’s、The Buffalo News、Fechheimer Bros.、Kirby、Nebraska Furniture Mart、Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group、See’s Candies、World Book——所涵盖的业务在经济属性上从“优秀”到“卓越”不等；而其管理者则是“卓越到卓越”。
这些企业都不行了，包括See’s Candies（规模太小）。
Most of these managers have no need to work for a living; they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that’s exactly what they do. Their combined financial statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers - the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - I feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his 1927 New York Yankees.
这些管理者大多不是为了谋生而工作；他们之所以登场，是因为他们热爱“击出全垒打”。事实上他们也确实做到了。第49页展示的合并财务报表（包括若干较小业务）清楚地表明了其业绩之出众。按历史成本会计口径计算，这些业务的税后收益相当于平均权益资本的57%。更重要的是，这一回报是在没有净杠杆的情况下取得的：现金等价物与有息债务大体相当。每当我念到这些管理者的名字——Blumkin 家族、Friedman 家族、Heldman 家族、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 和 Ralph Schey——我所感受到的那种光辉，正如 Miller Huggins 在宣布其 1927 年 New York Yankees 首发阵容时必然拥有的那般。
Let’s take a look, business by business:
我们逐个业务来看看：
o In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim’s met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim’s managing genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.
o 在并入 Berkshire 的第一年，Borsheim’s 达到了所有预期。销售额大幅增长，如今已显著高于公司四年前迁至现址时的两倍。在迁址前的六年，销售额也曾翻番。Ike Friedman 是 Borsheim’s 的经营奇才——我说的就是这个意思——他只有一种速度：快进。
If you haven’t been there, you’ve never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim’s. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store’s tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes ’round and ’round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.
如果你没去过那里，你就从未见过像 Borsheim’s 那样的珠宝店。由于在单一地点就能实现庞大的交易量，这家店可以在所有价位上都维持极为丰富的商品选择。也正因为如此，它能把费用率控制在其他提供类似商品的珠宝店的大约三分之一。严格的费用控制叠加非凡的采购能力，使其能提供远低于其他珠宝商的价格，而低价又带来更大的销量，如此形成良性循环。在季节性旺日，店内客流量高达 4,000 人次。
Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. “If you don’t know jewelry, know your jeweler” makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.
Ike Friedman 不仅是一位出色的企业家、卓越的现场掌控者，更是一个正直的人。我们在未审计的情况下就收购了这家企业，而所有的意外惊喜都来自正面。“If you don’t know jewelry, know your jeweler”（如果你不懂珠宝，就要认识可信赖的珠宝商）这句话，不论你是在购买整个企业还是一颗小小的钻石，都是有道理的。
A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I’m part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop’s Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.
有个故事可以说明我为何如此欣赏 Ike：每两年，我都会参加一个非正式的小组，聚在一起娱乐并探讨一些话题。去年九月，我们在 Santa Fe 的 Bishop’s Lodge 聚会时，邀请了 Ike、他的妻子 Roz 和他的儿子 Alan 来给我们讲解珠宝与珠宝行业的知识。
Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive - Bishop’s Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. “See that safe?” he said. “This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn’t know what it is.” I breathed easier. Ike went on: “See those two big fellows with guns on their hips? They’ll be guarding the safe all night.” I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: “And besides, Warren,” he confided, “the jewels aren’t in the safe.”
Ike 决定惊艳大家，所以他从 Omaha 带来了约 2,000 万美元的特别华贵的货品。我多少有些担心——Bishop’s Lodge 毕竟不是 Fort Knox——他演讲前一晚的欢迎派对上，我把顾虑告诉了 Ike。Ike 把我拉到一旁：“看到那个保险箱了吗？”他说，“今天下午我们换了密码，现在连酒店管理层都不知道。”我松了口气。Ike 接着说：“看到那两个腰间别着枪的壮汉了吗？他们会整晚守着保险箱。”我这才准备回到派对。但 Ike 又贴近说道：“还有，Warren，”他压低声音，“珠宝并不在那个保险箱里。”
How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.
有这样的人物，我们怎么会失手——尤其是他还有一个才华横溢、精力充沛的家族团队：Alan、Marvin Cohn 与 Don Yale。
这个家伙写一本书，讲了自己是如何把公司卖给巴菲特的。
o At See’s Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first in many years.
o 在 See’s Candies，我们的销售重量增长了 8%，即便 1988 年本身已是创纪录的一年。1989 年的表现包括同店销售重量的优异增长，这是我们多年未有的首次。
Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4 million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make See’s special.
广告在这一出色表现中发挥了重要作用。我们把广告总投入从 400 万美元提高到 500 万美元，同时我们的代理商 Hal Riney & Partners, Inc. 提供的文案精准传达了 See’s 的独特之处。
In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses, such as See’s, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At See’s, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for this result.
在我们的媒体业务（例如 The Buffalo News）里，我们销售广告；在其他业务（如 See’s）里，我们是广告购买方。当我们作为买方时，会严格践行作为卖方时的主张。在 See’s，我们去年把报纸广告支出提高到三倍以上，达到我所记得的销售占比的最高水平。回报非常可观，我们要感谢 Hal Riney，以及精准投放的报纸广告的力量。
See’s splendid performances have become routine. But there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.
See’s 的出色表现已成“日常”。但 Chuck Huggins 的管理绝非“日常”：他每天深入生产与销售各环节，把质量与服务的理念传递给成千上万的员工——我们每年要生产与配送超过 2,700 万磅的糖果。对于一家拥有 225 家门店、并有庞大邮购与电话业务的公司而言，要做到几乎每位顾客都满意绝非易事，而在 Chuck 手里却显得游刃有余。
o The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500 - quit in May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family/management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.
o The Nebraska Furniture Mart 在 1989 年实现了创纪录的销售与优异的利润，但也有一件令人遗憾的事。Mrs. B——Rose Blumkin，52 年前以 500 美元创建这家公司——因在地毯部门的改造与运营问题上与 Blumkin 家族/管理层其他成员意见不合，于 5 月选择离开。
Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American, but in this particular case I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past three years, while the store’s other departments increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).
Mrs. B 也许做出的明智商业决策比任何在世的美国人都多，但在这个具体问题上，我认为家族其他成员完全正确：过去三年里，门店其他部门的销售增长了 24%，而地毯部门的销售却下降了 17%（这绝非因为 Mrs. B 缺乏销售能力——她一贯个人销售额远超店内任何一位销售）。
You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger’s heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age 96 she has started a new business selling - what else? - carpet and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.
你会高兴地知道，Mrs. B 仍让 Horatio Alger 笔下的英雄相形见绌。她在 96 岁时又开了家新公司，卖——还能是什么呢？——地毯与家具。而且一如既往，每周工作七天。
At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.
在 The Mart，Louie、Ron 与 Irv Blumkin 继续推动全美规模最大、表现最成功的家居卖场前进。他们既是杰出的商人，也是卓越的管理者，与他们合作令人愉快。他们敏锐度的一个注脚：1989 年第四季度，地毯部门在 Omaha 市场的消费者份额达 75.3%，较一年前的 67.7% 大幅提升，且是最近竞争对手的六倍多。
NFM and Borsheim’s follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors’; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.
NFM 与 Borsheim’s 的成功公式如出一辙：（1）在单一地点提供无与伦比的商品深度与广度；（2）行业内最低的运营成本；（3）极为精明的采购（部分得益于庞大采购量）；（4）远低于竞争对手的毛利率，因而价格也更低；（5）家族成员随时在场，提供友好而个性化的服务。
Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989 - off a record 1988 - and remains the paper’s largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut space purchases in 1989; our experience at See’s and NFM would indicate they made a major mistake.
再为报纸打一次 call：NFM 在当地报纸的版面投放 1989 年同比增加了 20% 以上——在 1988 年创纪录的高基数之上——并继续稳居该报最大 ROP 广告客户（ROP 指印在报纸上的版面广告，不含预印插页）。据我所知，Omaha 可能是唯一一个由家居卖场领跑广告投放的城市。许多零售商在 1989 年削减了版面购买；我们在 See’s 与 NFM 的经验显示——那是一个重大错误。
o The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration - the percentage of local households that purchase it each day. Second, in “news hole” - the portion of the paper devoted to news - the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news-rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.
o 1989 年，The Buffalo News 在三方面继续大放异彩：其一，在主要都会报纸中（含日报与周日报），该报的家庭渗透率——即本地家庭每日购买比例——位居第一；其二，就“news hole”（用于新闻内容的版面比例）而言，1989 年达到 50.1%，高于 1988 年的 49.5%，再次使其在新闻信息密度上领先于美国同类报纸；其三，在许多大报利润下滑的一年里，该报实现了连续第七年的利润新高。
To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single “megaphone.” A low-penetration paper is a far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.
在某种程度上，这三点是相互关联的，尽管显而易见，高比例的 news hole 本身会显著压低利润。然而，大而高效的 news hole 能吸引更广谱的读者，从而提升渗透率。高渗透率又使报纸对零售商尤其有价值，因为它让他们得以用同一个“扩音器”触达整个社区。渗透率低的报纸对许多广告主的吸引力要小得多，最终将在广告价格与利润两方面受损。
It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the News, has been falling - from 1,113,000 in 1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988. Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County. Last year - with population at least 5% lower - the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase in penetration.
需要强调的是，我们出色的渗透率既非偶然也非自然而然。The News 的大本营 Erie County 人口一直在下降——从 1970 年的 1,113,000，降至 1980 年的 1,015,000，再到 1988 年的估计 966,000。而发行量讲述着不同的故事：1975 年，也就是我们推出周日报之前不久，历史悠久的 Buffalo 报纸 Courier-Express 在 Erie County 的周日报销量为 207,500 份。去年——在人口至少下降 5% 的情况下——The News 的平均销量达到 292,700 份。我相信，在其他任何主要的周日报市场中，都难以见到如此幅度的渗透率提升。
When this kind of gain is made - and when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town - someone is doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that is frequently late, because of production problems or distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content.
当出现这样的增长——并且一份报纸在本城获得无与伦比的认可——必然有人在做正确的事情。在这里，主要功劳显然属于我们的长期主编 Murray Light，他每日打造的信息丰富、有用且有趣的产品。发行与生产部门也居功至伟：不论编辑内容多强，只要因生产或配送问题导致报纸经常迟到，就会流失读者。
Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan’s managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a talented manager who knows - and cares - about every nut and bolt of the business.
The News 的出版人 Stan Lipsey 让利润充分匹配了产品实力。我认为，在相同环境下，Stan 的管理能力较一位“平均水平”的经理，至少能多带来 5 个百分点的利润率。这是相当惊人的表现，只有那种既懂业务、又关心业务每个细枝末节的卓越管理者才能做到。
Stan’s knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business were spent on the news side and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.
需要强调的是，Stan 的知识与才能也延伸到编辑产品。他早年在新闻口任职，在 1972 年为 Omaha 的 Sun Newspaper 赢得普利策奖的一系列报道中发挥了关键作用。二十余年来，不论顺境逆境，Stan 与我并肩作战——我无法想象更好的合作伙伴。
o At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - continue their extraordinary performance. Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.
o 在 Fechheimer，Heldman 家族——Bob、George、Gary、Roger 与 Fred——依旧表现不凡。1989 年利润略有下滑，原因在于整合 1988 年一宗大型收购时遇到问题。这些问题会随着时间得到解决。与此同时，Fechheimer 的投入资本回报依然出色。
Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year’s annual meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That’s only a slight exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.
与我们的所有管理者一样，Heldman 一家对业务细节把握非同一般。去年年会上我打趣说：当一名囚犯走进 San Quentin 时，Bob 和 George 大概都知道他的衬衫尺码。这只是一点点夸张：无论谈论的是国内哪个地区，他们都清楚主要客户与竞争态势的实情。
Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We’re much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed.
尽管我们在四年前就收购了 Fechheimer，但我与 Charlie 从未去过其任何工厂或辛辛那提总部。我们更像是“孤独的 Maytag 维修工”：Heldman 交付的“管理产品”太好，以至于从不需要“售后服务”。
o Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group - World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500. And he’s running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.
o Ralph Schey 继续出色管理我们规模最大的板块——World Book、Kirby 与 Scott Fetzer 制造企业。自我们收购以来，这些业务的合计收益年年增长，投入资本回报持续卓越。若单独列示，Ralph 掌舵的企业规模足以进入《财富》500 强；按股本回报率衡量，他的成绩足以跻身前 10% 的高位。
For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago’s Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us.
多年来，World Book 一直在芝加哥 Merchandise Mart 的单一地点运营。鉴于租约即将到期，业务正分散到四处办公。此次搬迁成本不小；尽管如此，1989 年利润仍保持良好。再过一年，这些搬迁成本才会完全消化。
Kirby’s business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in 1990.
去年 Kirby 业务尤为强劲，出口销售大幅增长。其国际业务两年内翻倍、四年内增长五倍；销量占比由 5% 提升至 20%。我们 1989 年最大规模的资本开支投向 Kirby，以筹备 1990 年的一次重大机型更替。
Kirby 是一家生产与销售高端**家用清洁系统（吸尘/地毯清洁等）的公司，历史上通过上门演示（in-home demonstrations）**的直销网络销售；它原属 Berkshire 的 Scott Fetzer 集团。2021 年，Berkshire 将 Kirby 出售给位于芝加哥的 Right Lane（Right Lane Industries / Right Lane Capital）。
Ralph’s operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.
Ralph 所辖业务贡献了非保险板块（见第 49 页）总利润的大约 40%。在 1986 年初收购 Scott Fetzer 时，能把 Ralph 这位经理人“并入”我们，重要性与并入那些业务本身同等。不仅盈利卓著，Ralph 的资本管理也极为出色。这些能力为 Berkshire 源源不断地产生资金，进而使我们得以开展许多其他盈利性投入。
And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.
至此，我们对“1927 年的 Yankees 阵容”给出了自己的答案。
Insurance Operations
保险业务
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
下面显示的是我们通常表格的更新版本，展示了财产意外保险行业的关键数字：
Statutory
Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate
in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)
------------- ------------------ ------------- ----------------
1981 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6
1982 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.5
1983 5.0 112.0 6.8 3.8
1984 8.5 118.0 16.9 3.8
1985 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.0
1986 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.6
1987 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.1
1988 4.4 105.4 5.5 3.3
1989 (Est.) 2.1 110.4 8.7 4.2
Source: A.M. Best Co.The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合赔付率（combined ratio）表示保险业的总成本（已发生损失加费用）与保费收入的比值：低于100表示承保盈利，高于100表示亏损。在计入保险公司持有保单持有人资金（“float”）所获得的投资收益后，综合赔付率在107—111区间通常可实现整体盈亏平衡，但不包括股东所提供资本带来的投资收益。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.
基于我们在此前报告中阐述的原因，我们预计行业“已发生损失”将以大约10%的年率增长，即便总体通胀显著低于这一水平。（事实上，在过去25年里，已发生损失的增速更高，达11%。）如果同期保费增长显著落后于这10%的增速，承保亏损将会扩大；不过当行业景气转差时，普遍存在的**准备金提取不足（underreserve）**倾向，可能在一段时间内掩盖亏损规模。
Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was “almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.” This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year’s forecast. Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it down.
去年我们指出，综合赔付率的上升“几乎肯定会持续——并且很可能在至少两年内加速”。今年我们不再预测“加速”，但其他判断需重申去年的结论：保费增速远低于每年所需的10%。同时请记住，10%的增速也只能稳住综合赔付率，而不能使其下降。
The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a “normal” year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree.
1989年综合赔付率的上升略超我们预期，原因在于当年巨灾（以 Hurricane Hugo 为首）异常严重。就异常因素而言，大概贡献了约2个百分点的抬升。若1990年更接近“常态”，则综合赔付率应仅会在1989年受巨灾推高的基数上小幅上行；但到1991年，该比率很可能会有更明显的上升。
Commentators frequently discuss the “underwriting cycle” and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry’s fundamental economics.
评论者经常谈论“承保周期（underwriting cycle）”，并猜测其何时拐点。若该术语被理解为一种“节律性”，我们认为这是个容易误导的称谓，会造成对行业基本经济学的错误认识。
The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new “corrected” rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.
在若干十年前，当行业与监管者以某种“卡特尔”（cartel）式的方式协同经营时，这个术语是适用的。彼时综合赔付率之所以呈现“节律性”波动，源于两种滞后：其一，行业基于历史数据进行分析并据此制定新的“修正”费率，随后几乎所有公司都会同步执行；其二，当时几乎所有保单的期限为一至三年，错价保单需要较长时间才能到期，使新费率对收入的影响被延后。这两种滞后效应使综合赔付率的表现颇似交流电的“交替”波动。同时，缺乏显著的价格竞争，保证了周期平均的行业利润尚属可观。
The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at independently-established prices. Such a configuration - whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies - is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.
卡特尔时代早已远去。如今行业中有数以百计的参与者，以各自独立定价销售近似“商品化”的产品。这种结构——无论所售是钢材还是保险保单——在除了一种情形之外几乎必然导致低于正常水平的盈利能力：即可用承保能力（usable capacity）短缺。这种短缺出现的频率与持续时间，将决定该行业的长期平均盈利水平。
In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is, it’s considered appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.
在大多数行业中，“产能”以物理口径描述；而在保险业，“产能”通常以财务口径界定：即净值为Y的公司，承保业务量不应超过X。但在实践中，这类约束往往无效：监管者、经纪人和客户对那些透支自身资源的公司惩戒迟缓，对于公司高估（虚增）真实资本也常默许。因此，只要公司愿意，极少的资本也能支撑巨量业务。从根本上说，任何时点行业“产能”的多少，主要取决于保险管理者的心理状态。
All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry’s profits. Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely - and most assuredly is not happening now.
在以上认识基础上，预测行业利润并不困难：只有在产能短缺时，行业才会取得良好利润；而只有当保险公司感到恐惧时，短缺才会出现。这种情形并不常见——而且可以肯定，现在并未出现。
Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989’s catastrophes - Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake - will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won’t grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.
一些分析师认为，近期加诸保险业的更为沉重的税负，以及1989年的巨灾——Hurricane Hugo 与加州地震——将显著推升价格。我们不同意。这些不利因素并未消除保险公司在当前价格水平下承接业务的热情。因此，1990年的保费规模不会增长10%，这意味着承保端的负面趋势不会逆转。
The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices. And we’re a long way from that point.
与此同时，业界会说需要更高的价格，才能获得与美国普通企业相匹配的盈利能力。当然会这样说。钢铁行业也是如此。但“需要”和“愿望”与行业的长期盈利能力无关。决定结果的是经济基本面。只有当几乎所有保险公司在价格更高的情况下仍然拒接业务时，保险业的盈利能力才会改善。而我们距离那一点还很遥远。
Berkshire’s premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in 1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit.
Berkshire 的保费规模在1990年可能降至约1.5亿美元（1986年的峰值为10亿美元），部分原因是我们的传统业务持续收缩，部分原因是我们从 Fireman’s Fund 接收其7%业务的合同已于去年8月到期。无论降幅多大，都不会令我们困扰。对于在数学期望上为亏损的保险业务，我们没有兴趣；即便在我们认为具有盈利期望的交易中，失望也已经足够多了。
However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns “CAT covers,” which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies (and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer’s money.)
不过，只要定价合适，我们的食欲很足，1989年的一个故事可以说明这一点。故事与“CAT covers”有关，即再保险合同：原保险公司（以及再保险公司自身）为防范单一巨灾（如龙卷风或飓风）导致大量保单同时发生损失而购买的保障。在这些合同中，原保险公司可能自留单一事件的损失至多比如1,000万美元，并在该水平之上分层购买再保险。当损失超过自留额时，再保险人通常支付超额部分的95%（直至合同限额），原保险人承担其余5%。（要求原保险人在每一层保留5%，使其在每笔理赔中都拥有经济利害关系，从而避免其“挥霍”再保险人的资金。）
CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium. This provision protects the primary company from being “bare” for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event. The duration of “an event” is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under this definition, a wide-spread storm, causing damage for three days, will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause. If the storm lasts four days, however, the primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event.
CAT covers 通常为一年期，并带有一次自动恢复条款：若原保险公司因一次巨灾用尽了保障，需在当年剩余期间另付保费购买第二份保障。该条款保护原保险公司在第一次巨灾之后即便在短时间内也不至于“裸奔”。合同通常将“一次事件”的持续时间限定为由原保险公司指定的任何连续72小时。在此定义下，若一次范围广泛的风暴由同一气候成因引起并持续三天，则被视为单一事件；但若风暴持续四天，原保险公司将提报索赔，圈定其损失最大的连续72小时作为一个事件，超出该时段的损失则视为另一次事件。
In 1989, two unusual things happened. First, Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured loss, at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit within weeks, causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate, even well after the event. Slammed by these two - or possibly three - major catastrophes, some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection, either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so.
1989年发生了两件不同寻常的事。其一，Hurricane Hugo 造成了40亿美元以上的保险损失，但其进程使得 Carolinas 的巨大损害比 Caribbean 的同等严重损害晚了略多于72小时。其二，加州地震在数周内接踵而至，即便在事发后相当长时间，保险损失仍难以估计。在这两起——甚至可能三起——重大巨灾的冲击下，一些原保险公司以及许多自身也购买了 CAT 保障的再保险公司，要么用尽了自动恢复后的第二份保障，要么不确定是否已经用尽。
At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money - perhaps twice because of the reinstatements - and not taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a CAT premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of protection purchased. For some years, we’ve thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business.
在那时，CAT 保单的卖方已经亏损惨重——由于恢复条款的存在，可能是“两次”亏损——而收取的保费并不多。受多种变量影响，CAT 保费通常约为所购保障额度的3%至15%。多年来，我们一直认为这种保费水平偏低，因此远离这门业务。
But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare, and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds, there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much-needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage, advertising that proposition in trade publications. Though we did not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount.
但由于1989年的灾害使许多保险公司实际上或可能处于“裸奔”状态，也让大多数 CAT 承保人“舔舐伤口”，地震之后，市场立即出现了对巨灾保障的迫切短缺。价格立刻变得诱人，尤其是 CAT 承保人自己需要购买的再保险。与此同时，Berkshire Hathaway 立刻提出愿意承保最高2.5亿美元的巨灾保障，并在行业刊物上刊登了这一条件。尽管我们没有拿到所有寻求的业务，但在忙碌的十天里我们确实落实了相当可观的承保量。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes write $250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage. But they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large percentage of the business with other companies. When they can’t “lay off” in size, they disappear from the market.
我们愿意为明天就可能发生的损失押上如此巨额的风险资金，这使我们与世界上任何再保险公司都与众不同。诚然，也有公司有时会签下2.5亿美元，甚至更大额度的巨灾再保险保单。但那只是在它们能够将其中很大比例**再分保（lay off）**给其他公司的情况下。一旦无法大规模“分出”，它们就会从市场上消失。
Berkshire’s policy, conversely, is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent. And in our case, that’s a lot.
与之相反，Berkshire 的方针是自留我们签下的业务，而非分出。当费率蕴含正的盈利期望时，我们愿意在审慎的前提下尽可能多地承担风险。就我们而言，这个“尽可能多”可以非常之大。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other company because of two factors: (1) by the standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our insurance companies of about $6 billion - the second highest amount in the United States; and (2) we simply don’t care what earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached intelligently.
我们愿意、也能够为自有账户承担比任何其他公司更多的再保险风险，原因有二：（1）按监管会计口径，我们保险子公司的净资产约为60亿美元——全美第二高；（2）只要导致这些利润（或亏损）的决策是理性作出的，我们对按季度、甚至按年度披露的收益数字并不在意。
Obviously, if we write $250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves, there is some probability that we will lose the full $250 million in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it is not zero. If we had a loss of that magnitude, our after-tax cost would be about $165 million. Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our well-being.
显然，如果我们签下2.5亿美元的巨灾保障并全部自留，那么在某个季度把整笔2.5亿美元都亏掉的概率确实存在。这个概率很低，但并非为零。若发生如此规模的损失，我们的税后成本大约为1.65亿美元。尽管这远超 Berkshire 一个普通季度的盈利，但其伤害只在“自尊心”，不会动摇我们的“身体健康”。
非常出色的细账。
This posture is one few insurance managements will assume. Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity. But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single-quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises, over time, to produce superior results. I can understand their thinking: What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders. We are willing to look foolish as long as we don’t feel we have acted foolishly.
这种姿态鲜有保险管理层愿意采取。通常，他们乐于在几乎注定只能获得平庸股本回报的条件下大量承保，但却不愿让自己暴露于某个季度“难堪的亏损”之中——即便造成该亏损的管理策略从长期看有望带来更优的结果。我理解他们的想法：对所有者最好的，未必对管理者最好。幸运的是，Charlie 和我既有完全的“岗位安全”，又在财务利益上与股东完全一致。只要我们不觉得自己做了愚蠢的事，我们就不在乎看起来是否“愚蠢”。
Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we become less competitive only when capacity is abundant. Of course, we don’t follow this policy in the interest of stabilization - we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action. Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case, Adam Smith’s invisible hand works as advertised.
顺带一提，我们的运作方式使我们成为行业中的稳定器：当产能短缺时，我们提供巨量产能；当产能充裕时，我们才变得不那么具有竞争性。当然，我们并非为了“稳定”而这样做——之所以这样做，是因为我们相信这才是最明智、最赚钱的行事路径。尽管如此，我们的行为确实起到了稳定市场的作用。在这种情况下，Adam Smith 的“看不见的手”确实如宣传般运作。
Currently, we hold an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume. This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment income from policyholder funds large. This pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off.
目前，与保费规模相比，我们持有的 float（浮存金） 异常庞大。与1989年一样，这一状况在未来几年应当会带来相当可观的保险端综合结果：承保亏损可控，而来源于保单持有人资金的投资收益可观。不过，随着浮存金逐步回落，这种令人愉快的形势也会逐渐弱化。
At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, Phil Urban, and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality.
然而，在某个时点，我们将会迎来大量高利润业务的承保机会。Mike Goldberg 及其管理团队——Rod Eldred、Dinos Iordanou、Ajit Jain、Phil Urban 与 Don Wurster——正持续为这一时刻做好充足准备。
Marketable Securities
有价证券
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
在为我们的保险公司选择可流通证券时，我们通常在五大类别中进行取舍：（1）长期普通股投资；（2）中期固定收益证券；（3）长期固定收益证券；（4）短期现金等价物；以及（5）短期套利性承诺。
We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories; we just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
在这些类别之间取舍时，我们没有特定偏好；我们只是持续在其中寻找以“数学期望”衡量的最高税后回报，并始终将选择限定在我们自认为理解的投资备选上。我们的标准与“最大化当期可报告收益”毫无关系；相反，我们的目标是最大化最终净值。
o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
o 下文列示我们市值超过1亿美元的普通股持仓。其中有一小部分属于 Berkshire 持股未达100% 的子公司所持有的投资。
12/31/89
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ................ $ 517,500 $1,692,375
23,350,000 The Coca-Cola Co. ....................... 1,023,920 1,803,787
2,400,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ........ 71,729 161,100
6,850,000 GEICO Corp. ............................. 45,713 1,044,625
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ............. 9,731 486,366This list of companies is the same as last year’s and in only one case has the number of shares changed: Our holdings of Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23,350,000.
这份公司名单与去年的相同，只有一项持股数量发生了变化：我们对 Coca-Cola 的持仓从1988年年末的14,172,500股增至23,350,000股。
This Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to investment opportunities, no matter how obscure or well-disguised they may be. I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or 1936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son, the family grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each. In this excursion into high-margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the product.
这笔 Coca-Cola 投资再次说明：无论机会多么隐秘或伪装得多好，你们的董事长对投资机会的反应速度都“快得惊人”。我第一次喝 Coca-Cola 应该是在1935或1936年。可以确定的是，1936年我开始从家族杂货店 Buffett & Son 以25美分6瓶的价格进货 Cokes，再以每瓶5美分的价格在街坊邻里销售。在这次高毛利零售的尝试中，我如实见识到该产品非凡的消费者吸引力与商业潜力。
I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers, anthracite producers, textile businesses, trading-stamp issuers, and the like. (If you think I’m making this up, I can supply the names.) Only in the summer of 1988 did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.
在之后的52年里，随着 Coke 席卷全球，我持续留意到这些特质。然而在此期间，我却谨慎地连一股股票都没买，反而把大量净资产配置到有轨电车公司、风车制造商、无烟煤生产商、纺织企业、交易邮票发行商等类似领域。（如果你以为我在编故事，我可以把名字一一列给你。）直到1988年夏天，我的大脑才终于和我的眼睛“接上了线”。
What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After drifting somewhat in the 1970’s, Coca-Cola had in 1981 become a new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO. Roberto, along with Don Keough, once my across-the-street neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the company’s policies and then energetically carried them out. What was already the world’s most ubiquitous product gained new momentum, with sales overseas virtually exploding.
当时我看到的既清晰又令人着迷。经历了上世纪70年代的些许漂移后，Coca-Cola 在1981年 Roberto Goizueta 出任 CEO 时焕然一新。Roberto 与 Don Keough（他曾是我在 Omaha 马路对面的邻居）先是重新审视并聚焦公司的策略，随后大力推进执行。早已无处不在的全球性产品获得了新的动能，海外销量几乎呈爆炸式增长。
Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills, Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally, the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder’s dream.
凭借营销与财务才能的罕见融合，Roberto 同时最大化了产品的成长与这份成长带给股东的回报。通常，消费品公司的 CEO 会受天性或经验影响，让营销或财务之一压倒另一方，导致失衡；在 Roberto 手中，营销与财务配合得天衣无缝，结果堪称股东的梦想。
Of course, we should have started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I’ve learned my lesson: My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years.
当然，我们本该更早开始买 Coke，最好在 Roberto 和 Don 接手不久就行动。事实上，如果我当年头脑清醒，我会在1936年劝我祖父卖掉那家杂货店，把所得全部投入 Coca-Cola 股票。我已经吸取教训：下一次遇到显而易见的好主意，我的反应时间将大幅缩短到远少于50年。
需要足够充分的事实。
As I mentioned earlier, the yearend prices of our major investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline. A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all - it might in fact work to our eventual benefit - but it would cause at least a one-year reduction in Berkshire’s net worth. We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next three years. Indeed, it would take only about a 10% year-to-year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire’s net worth down.
正如我先前提到的，我们主要被投资公司的年末股价相较其内在价值比以往高出许多。虽然这些价格尚不至于“高得流鼻血”，但显然容易受到整体市场下跌的冲击。它们的价格下跌一点也不会让我们不安——事实上可能反而有利于我们的长期利益——但这至少会使 Berkshire 的净值在一年里出现下降。我们认为在未来三年中至少有一年几乎肯定会出现这种下降。实际上，只需我们的投资组合总价值同比下跌大约10%，就足以使 Berkshire 的净值回落。
We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio companies. They are high-grade, talented, and shareholder-oriented. The exceptional results we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities.
我们持股公司的管理层依然出类拔萃。他们素质高、才干强，并以股东为导向。我们与他们共同投资所取得的非凡业绩，准确地反映了他们非凡的个人品质。
o We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989, and that’s the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly good-sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: “Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.”) We will engage in arbitrage from time to time - sometimes on a large scale - but only when we like the odds.
o 去年我们说过，预计1989年的套利活动会很少，事实也如此。套利头寸是短期现金等价物的替代品，而我们在年内一段时间现金水平较低。在其余时间，我们的现金头寸相当可观，但仍选择不进行套利。主要原因是许多公司交易在我们看来毫无经济意义；对这类交易做套利，太接近“更傻者游戏”（greater-fool game）。（正如华尔街人士 Ray DeVoe 所言：“Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.”）我们会不时参与套利——有时规模还不小——但只在我们认为胜算合意的时候。
o Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium- and long-term fixed-income securities. In the long-terms, just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS) bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to high. During the year we sold a number of the low-coupon issues, which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15%-17% annually, tax-free. Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical high-grade tax-exempts then commanded. We have kept all of our high-coupon WPPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992, and we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid-1990s.
o 撇开下一部分将讨论的三只可转债优先股不谈，我们在中长期固定收益证券上大幅减仓。就长期债而言，我们几乎唯一的持仓是 Washington Public Power Supply Systems（WPPSS）债券，票息从低到高不等。年内我们卖出了一批低票息品种，这些债券最初是我们以极大折价买入的。自买入以来，其中许多价格大致翻倍，同时每年还向我们支付15%—17%的免税收益。我们卖出时的价格仅略低于当时典型的高评级免税债所能获得的价格。我们保留了所有高票息的 WPPSS 债券。其中一部分已被通知在1991与1992年赎回，其余我们预计将在1990年代初至中期被赎回。
We also sold many of our medium-term tax-exempt bonds during the year. When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them - regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase - if something we liked better came along. Something did - and concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of tax-exempt bonds was about $51 million pre-tax.
我们在年内也卖出了许多中期免税债券。当初买入这些债券时我们就说过，如果出现我们更喜欢的标的——不论价格较买入时更高或更低——我们都会乐于卖出。事实确实如此——同时我们以小幅获利的价格抛售了其中大多数。总体而言，我们在1989年出售免税债券获得的税前利润约为5,100万美元。
o The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.
o 债券出售所得连同年初的多余现金以及随后通过盈利产生的现金，用于购买三只可转换优先股。首笔交易在7月完成：我们购入 The Gillette Co. 优先股6亿美元，股息8 3/4%，10年强制赎回，并可按每股50美元转换为普通股。随后我们购入 USAir Group, Inc. 优先股3.58亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股60美元转换为普通股。最后在年末我们购入 Champion International Corp. 优先股3亿美元，10年强制赎回、股息9 1/4%，可按每股38美元转换为普通股。
Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we own are either non-salable or non-convertible for considerable periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from short-term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the board of Gillette, but I am not on the board of USAir or Champion. (I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can’t handle any more.)
不同于标准的可转换优先股，我们持有的这些要么在相当长时间内不可出售，要么不可转换，因此我们无法从普通股的短期价格波动中获利。我已进入 Gillette 的董事会，但并未出任 USAir 或 Champion 的董事。（我非常享受我所参与的董事会，但已无力再兼任更多。）
Gillette’s business is very much the kind we like. Charlie and I think we understand the company’s economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future. (If you haven’t tried Gillette’s new Sensor razor, go right out and get one.) However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business (in which we have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible preferred), the airline industry, or the paper industry. This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries: we’re agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics.
Gillette 的业务非常符合我们的偏好。Charlie 和我认为我们理解该公司的经济特性，因此相信可以对其未来做出相当理性的判断。（如果你还没用过 Gillette 的新款 Sensor 剃刀，赶紧去买一把。）然而，我们没有能力预测投行业务（我们通过1987年购入 Salomon 可转优而在该领域持有头寸）、航空业或造纸业的经济学走向。这并不意味着我们预言这些行业的前景消极：我们是不可知论者（agnostics），不是无神论者（atheists）。但鉴于我们对这些业务缺乏强烈信念，就意味着在这些投资上必须采用不同于我们在“经济属性极佳”的企业上所用的结构。
In one major respect, however, these purchases are not different: We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades.
然而在一个重要方面，这些投资并无不同：我们只愿与我们喜欢、尊敬且信任的人结伴。Salomon 的 John Gutfreund、Gillette 的 Colman Mockler, Jr.、USAir 的 Ed Colodny，以及 Champion 的 Andy Sigler 完全符合这一标准。
They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted voting rights on a fully-converted basis, an arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.
反过来，他们也对我们表达了充分信任，在每个案例中都坚持赋予我们的优先股按完全转换基准（fully-converted basis）享有无限制表决权——这在公司金融中远非标准安排。实质上，他们信任我们会以理性的所有者自居，着眼明天而非只顾今天；正如我们信任他们会成为理性的管理者，既考虑今天，也着眼明天。
The preferred-stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the performance of our investees, but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette, under Colman’s management, will far exceed that return and believe that John, Ed, and Andy will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh.
我们谈妥的优先股结构，如果行业经济状况拖累被投企业的表现，将只为我们带来平庸的回报；但若它们能取得与美国整体工业相当的回报率，则会为我们带来相当可观的结果。我们相信，在 Colman 的管理下，Gillette 将远超这一回报；同时也相信 John、Ed 与 Andy 只要不遭遇严酷的行业环境，也将达到该水准。
安全边际。
Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get, though, the result will be disappointing, because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained only a preferred-stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well.
在几乎任何情形下，我们都预期这些优先股能收回本金并获得股息。但若仅止于此，结果将令人失望，因为我们为此放弃了灵活性，因而会错过这一整十年必然出现的一些重要机会。在那种情境下，我们仅仅获得了一个优先股收益率——而在那个时期，典型的优先股对我们本来毫无吸引力。Berkshire 要想从这四笔优先股投资中获得令人满意的结果，唯一的办法是被投公司的普通股表现良好。
Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire’s investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred-stock purchase. The help will come from the fact that each company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose Chairman and Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire’s investments, indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical, and objective. We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their own businesses but who nevertheless, at certain moments, appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.
要实现这一点，需要良好的管理与至少可接受的行业环境。但我们相信 Berkshire 的投资也会有所助益，并且在未来岁月中，各被投公司的其他股东也会从我们的优先股投资中获益。助益在于：每家公司如今都有了一位重要、稳定且真正关心企业的股东，其董事长与副董事长通过 Berkshire 的投资，实际上把他们自己的大量资金也间接投入了这些事业。在与被投公司互动时，Charlie 和我将保持支持、理性分析与客观立场。我们清楚自己正与经验老到、对自身业务驾轻就熟的 CEO 合作，但他们在某些时刻也会珍视一个与其行业或既往决策没有牵连的人，来帮助检验他们的思考。
As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market. Nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of 80% or more of a fine business with a fine management. But both opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated resources.
总体而言，这些可转换优先股的回报，不会等同于我们在发现一家“经济前景极佳而市场尚未充分认可”的企业时所能取得的回报；也不及我们最偏好的资本配置方式——以80%或以上的控股比例收购一家优秀企业并配以优秀管理层——所带来的回报吸引力。但这两类机会都很罕见，尤其是在与我们当前与可预见资源相匹配的规模上更是如此。
In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock investments should produce returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios and that we can play a minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the investee companies.
总而言之，Charlie 和我认为，这些优先股投资应能带来略高于多数固定收益组合的回报；同时，我们也能在被投公司中扮演一个小而有趣且具有建设性的角色。
Zero-Coupon Securities
零息证券
In September, Berkshire issued $902.6 million principal amount of Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures, which are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice and a flawless execution.
9月，Berkshire 发行了面值总额为9.026亿美元的零息可转换次级债券（Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures），该债券现已在 New York Stock Exchange 上市。Salomon Brothers 以极为出色的方式承销了本次发行，为我们提供了有益的建议并实现了无瑕疵的执行。
Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest, usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time between issuance and maturity.
当然，大多数债券要求定期支付利息，通常为半年付一次。与之相反，零息债券无需当前支付利息；投资者通过以显著低于到期面值的折价买入，以此获取收益。其有效利率由发行价、到期价值以及发行至到期的时间共同决定。
In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only 44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were $400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).
就我们而言，本次债券按到期面值的44.314%发行，期限15年。对购买者来说，这在数学上等同于名义5.5%利率、半年复利的现值折算。由于我们每1美元面值仅收到0.4431美元，发行募集所得为4亿美元（扣除约950万美元的发行费用前）。
The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway. Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value.
本次债券的面额为每张10,000美元，每张可转换为0.4515股 Berkshire Hathaway 普通股。由于一张1万美元面额债券的发行价格为4,431美元，这意味着转换价相当于每股9,815美元，较当时市价溢价15%。自1992年9月28日之后，Berkshire 可按债券的累积价值（发行价按5.5%半年复利累积）在任何时间行使赎回权；而在两个特定日期——1994年9月28日与1999年9月28日——债券持有人可要求 Berkshire 以累积价值回购其所持债券。
For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5% interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.
就税务而言，尽管我们并未向债券持有人支付现金利息，但 Berkshire 每年有权税前扣除按5.5%计提的利息。因此，因税负减少而带来的净效果是正向现金流——这是一项非常重要的好处。由于存在一些不可知变量，我们无法精确计算本次融资的实际有效利率，但在任何情况下都将远低于5.5%。与此相对称的是：任何对该债券负有纳税义务的持有人，即便未收到现金，也必须就这5.5%的计提利息每年缴税。
Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola) resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that subject, let’s travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten.
我们的债券以及去年发行类似债券的其他一些公司（尤其是 Loews 和 Motorola）的债券，都不同于近年发行的大部分零息债券。对于后者，Charlie 和我过去一直直言批评，未来也会如此。正如下文我将解释的，这类债券经常以极具迷惑性的方式被使用，给投资者带来致命后果。但在讨论那个话题之前，让我们回到“伊甸园”，回到苹果尚未被咬下的一刻。
If you’re my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S. Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S. households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that’s precisely what the Series E was.
如果你和我同龄，你很可能在二战期间就买过第一只“零息债”，那就是著名的 Series E U.S. Savings Bond——历史上销量最广的债券。（战后，全美每两户家庭中就有一户持有。）当然，当时没人称 Series E 为“零息债”（这个术语恐怕尚未被发明），但它本质上正是零息债。
These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.
这些债券的面额最小可至18.75美元，以此金额可购买10年后到期、面值25美元的美国政府债务，给购买者带来2.9%年复利回报。彼时这很有吸引力：2.9%的利率高于当时政府债的一般水平，且持有人几乎不面临市场波动风险——因为可在任何时点兑现，仅在利息上作些小幅让渡。
A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate - say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semi-annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other investors with long-term liabilities, “reinvestment risk” of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed was huge quantities of “Savings Bond Equivalents.”
在上一个十年，另一种形式的美国财政部零息工具也出现了，同样温和且有用。普通债券的一个问题在于：即便其票面利率为10%，持有人也不能确保实现10%的复利回报。要达成标称回报，每一张半年期息票在收到时都必须以10%再投资。若当期市场利率只有6%或7%，持有人在债券存续期内就无法按标称利率实现复利。对养老基金等拥有长期负债的投资者而言，这类“再投资风险”可能相当严峻。Savings Bonds 原本可解决此问题，但其仅向个人发行且面额不大。大型买家需要的是大量的“储蓄债等价物（Savings Bond Equivalents）”。
Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful investment bankers (led, I’m happy to say, by Salomon Brothers). They created the instrument desired by “stripping” the semi-annual coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S. Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zero-coupon bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10% for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts, recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited to their needs.
这时，一些巧思独具、且在此案例中极为有用的投行人士（让我高兴的是，以 Salomon Brothers 为首）登场了。他们通过把标准政府债的半年期息票“剥离（stripping）”，创造出市场所需的工具。每张被分离出来的息票，本质上就像一张 Savings Bond，因为它代表未来某一时点的一笔确定支付。例如，从一只2010年到期的美国政府债中剥离出40张半年期息票，你就得到40只零息债，期限从6个月到20年不等；这些息票可按相同期限打包后销售。若当前各期限利率均为10%，则6个月期的价格约为到期面值的95.24%，而20年期约为14.20%。购买任何给定期限的持有人，都被锁定为整个持有期获得10%复利。近年来，政府债的大规模“剥离”已十分普遍，因为从养老金到个人 IRA 账户的长期投资者都认识到，这些高评级零息工具非常契合他们的需求。
But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970’s other than long-term zero-coupon obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.
但华尔街常见的一幕又上演了：聪明人起初所做之事，愚者最终也会去做。过去几年里，信用质量不断恶化的发行人以巨大规模发行了零息债券（以及其功能等价物——以物抵息债，PIK bonds，以半年派发额外的PIK债替代现金利息）。对这些发行人而言，零息（或PIK）债有一个压倒性优势：承诺“不支付任何东西”是不可能违约的。事实上，若 LDC 政府在20世纪70年代只发行长期零息债，如今它们将拥有完美无瑕的债务人记录。
This principle at work - that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time - has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back, purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is, operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.
这一原理在实践中的含义——只要郑重承诺长期“什么都不付”，你就可以长期不违约——并未被那些试图为愈发脆弱交易融资的推手与投行家忽略。但放贷人接受它花了一段时间：杠杆收购热刚兴起时，收购方只能在相对稳健的基础上借款，即保守估计的自由现金流——即经营利润 + 折旧与摊销 − 正常化资本开支——足以覆盖利息并小幅偿还本金。
Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett O’Hara “I’ll think about it tomorrow” position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank’s lending officer and gushes: “I don’t know how I’ll ever repay you.”
后来，随着交易撮合者的肾上腺素飙升，企业被以如此之高的价格收购，以至于全部自由现金流都不得不用于支付利息，本金偿还则一无所有。实际上，借款人在本金偿付上采取了 Scarlett O’Hara 式的“明天再说”，而这被一种新型放贷人——“原始发行垃圾债”的买家——所接受。债务从“要偿还”变成了“要再融资”。这让我想起《The New Yorker》的一幅漫画：心怀感激的借款人起身与银行放贷官握手，滔滔不绝地说：“我都不知道该怎么偿还你们。”
Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions, they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company’s ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay.
很快，借款人发现即便这种宽松的新标准也束手束脚。为了诱使放贷人买单更荒唐的交易，他们发明了一个骇人听闻的指标——EBDIT（Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes）——来检验公司支付利息的能力。用这把“截短的尺子”，借款人以“折旧不需要当前现金支出”为由，把折旧当作可以忽略的费用。
Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.
这种态度显然是妄想。在95%的美国企业中，长期看与折旧大致相当的资本开支是刚性必需，与人工或水电一样真实。哪怕是辍学的高中生也知道，贷款买车需要的收入不只要覆盖利息与日常费用，还要覆盖合理计算的折旧。若他拿着 EBDIT 去跟银行谈，早就被笑出门了。
Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up, the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-and-stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital expenditures.
当然，企业在某个月可以跳过资本支出，就像人可以一天甚至一周不吃饭。但如果长期跳过且不补回，机体会衰弱并最终死亡。此外，时断时续的“补给”长期看会让人或企业比“规律饮食”更不健康。作为商人，Charlie 和我乐见那些无法为资本开支提供资金的竞争对手。
You might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street’s ingenuity. If so, you haven’t been paying attention during the past few years. Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing deals to other promoters with more “imagination.”
你或许以为，把折旧这样的重大费用一笔抹去、把糟糕交易包装成好交易，已经触及华尔街“创意”的极限。若你这么想，那说明你最近几年并未留心。推手们需要找到方式来自圆其说更高价的并购，否则他们就有——天哪！——把交易输给更有“想象力”的对手的风险。
So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the let’s-ignore-it corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful to do so only with clients’ money, not their own. (Calling these managers “professionals” is actually too kind; they should be designated “promotees.”)
于是，推手们与其投行伙伴穿过“镜中世界”，宣称 EBDIT 只应与现金利息对比——这意味着在评估交易可行性时，可以忽略零息或 PIK 债上计提且复利的利息。此法不仅把折旧打入“忽略角”，还以同样方式处理了通常占比不小的利息费用。可耻的是，许多所谓的专业投资经理也随之起舞——不过他们通常很谨慎地只用客户的钱，而非自己的。（称他们为“professionals”其实太客气；更准确的称呼是“promotees”。）
Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100 million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these issues would typically be very high, which means that the situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69 million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds. Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.
按这种新标准，一家税前赚1亿美元、当期需支付9000万美元现金利息的企业，可以再发一笔零息或 PIK 债，新增每年6000万美元的计提利息，这些利息会复利滚动，但几年内无需支付。此类债券的利率通常极高，意味着第二年可能变成9000万现金利息加6900万计提利息，随着复利推进依次递增。这样的高息再融资方案，几年前还只在“码头边缘”恰如其分地存在，不久便成了几乎所有大型投行的“现代金融”范本。
毕竟有个说法，在某些地方根本不需要这样的说法。
When they make these offerings, investment bankers display their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the future for companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun: Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these with what actually happened.
当他们推销这些发行时，投资银行家会展现他们“幽默”的一面：他们为几个月前还几乎没听说过的公司，提供延伸到未来五年以上的利润表与资产负债表预测。如果有人给你看这样的预测，我建议你也加入这场“乐趣”：请那位投行人士拿出他所在公司在过去几年年初为自己编制的一年期预算，然后把那些预算与实际发生的情况做个对比。
Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: “the bezzle,” defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel poorer.
不久前，Ken Galbraith 在其机智而深刻的《The Great Crash》中创造了一个新的经济学术语：“the bezzle”，指的是尚未被发现的挪用款的现存规模。这个金融怪物有一种魔力：挪用者因“bezzle”的金额而更富，被挪用者却尚未感到更穷。
Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, “wealth” would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.
Galbraith 教授敏锐地指出，应当把这笔金额加入“National Wealth”，以便我们得知“Psychic National Wealth”（心理国民财富）。从逻辑上说，一个想要强烈感受繁荣的社会，会既鼓励公民去挪用，又尽量不去侦查犯罪。由此，“财富”会迅速膨胀，尽管没有做出哪怕一尔格的生产性劳动。
The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the real-world nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience “income” without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually - and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest - magically creates “earnings” for bondholders of $150 million. As long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and repeatedly say “I believe,” there is no limit to how much “income” can be created by the zero-coupon bond.
与“bezzle”的讽刺性胡扯相比，零息债在现实世界中的胡扯更为夸张。通过零息债，契约的一方可以获得“收入”，而对手方并未感受到支出的痛苦。按我们的例子，一家每年只能赚1亿美元、因此也只具备支付如此规模利息能力的公司，却能“魔法般”地为债券持有人创造出1.5亿美元的“收益”。只要主要投资者愿意戴上他们的 Peter Pan 翅膀、反复念叨“I believe”，零息债所能“创造”的“收入”便没有上限。
Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow. Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it, transactions are the mother’s milk of finance.
华尔街以一种“未开化之民对车轮或犁”的热忱来欢迎这一发明。终于，有了一个工具，使得交易价格不再受实际盈利能力的约束。结果显而易见：交易会更多——荒唐的价格总能吸引卖家。正如 Jesse Unruh 可能会说的，交易是金融的“母乳”。
The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out. This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals - and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures.
对推手与投行而言，零息或 PIK 债还有一层额外吸引力：从愚行到失败之间的时间可以被拉长。这可不是小好处。如果在必须直面全部成本之前有很长一段时间，推手们就能在早期交易的“因果报应”上门前，连续做出一串愚蠢交易——并收取大量费用。
But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually be the source of his wealth.
但归根结底，无论是冶金炼金术还是金融炼金术，都会失败。一个“劣质”的业务，不能通过会计把戏或资本结构花招被变成“金子般”的业务。自称金融炼金术士的人或许会致富，但其财富通常来自轻信的投资者，而非业务成就。
Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed. (We’ve not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it’s just that some variations have far more potential for mischief than others.
我们还应补充一点：尽管存在各种缺点，许多零息与 PIK 债并不会违约。事实上我们也持有过一些；如果其市场足够受挫，我们可能会再买入。（不过，我们从未考虑过弱资质发行人的新发债。）没有哪种金融工具本身就是“邪恶”的；只是某些变体更容易惹是生非。
The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zero-coupon issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zero-coupon fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.
“惹事生非”的桂冠应当颁给无法按期支付利息的零息债发行人。我们的建议是：每当有投行人士开始谈论 EBDIT——或者有人设计出一种资本结构，使得在扣除充足资本开支后当期现金流仍无法从容支付全部利息（包括应付与计提）——请把你的钱包拉链拉上。反客为主，建议推手及其昂贵随从接受“零息收费”——把他们的报酬递延到零息债全部兑付之后再拿。到那时再看看他们对这笔交易还能有多少热情。
Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors against the promoter’s propensity to indulge in excess. Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the banker’s conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years, unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not encountered heavy traffic.
我们对投资银行家的评论或许显得苛刻。但我与 Charlie——以我们那种无可救药的“老派”方式——认为，他们应当履行把关者的角色，保护投资者免受推手恣意放纵的伤害。毕竟，推手在人类历史上在收钱这件事上的判断与克制，与酗酒者在喝酒这件事上的判断与克制如出一辙。至少，投行的行为应达到一个负责任的酒保的标准：在必要时，拒绝从“下一杯酒”中赚取利润，以免把一个醉汉送上公路。不幸的是，近些年许多一流投行觉得“酒保道德”是无法忍受的约束。最近，在华尔街走“高尚之路”的人，并未遇到拥堵。
One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds, using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks.
还有一条令人不安的脚注：零息债这场荒唐的成本不会仅由直接参与者承担。某些储贷协会大量买入了此类债券，资金来自FSLIC 保险的存款。为了拼凑体面的利润，这些买家在账面上记录了——却并未收到——极高的利息收入。许多协会如今陷入严重困境。倘若它们对脆弱借款人的贷款成功了，协会的所有者会把利润装进口袋；而在更多贷款失败的案例中，买单的将是纳税人。借用 Jackie Mason 的话改述：在这些协会里，真正该戴头套的人是管理者。
Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)
前二十五年的错误（精简版）
To quote Robert Benchley, “Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down.” Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it’s a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let’s take a quick look at the last 25 years.
借用 Robert Benchley 的话：“养条狗会教会男孩忠诚、坚持，以及在躺下前要原地转三圈。”这正是经验的局限之处。尽管如此，在犯下新错误之前回顾旧错误仍是个好主意。那就让我们快速回望过去25年。
o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.
o 我的第一个错误，当然，是买下 Berkshire 的控制权。尽管我知道它的业务——纺织制造——前景黯淡，但因为价格看起来便宜，我还是被诱惑去买入。早年我做过不少此类“便宜股”的买卖，也算颇有收获，不过到 1965 年遇到 Berkshire 时，我已逐渐意识到这并非理想策略。
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the “cigar butt” approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the “bargain purchase” will make that puff all profit.
如果你以足够低的价格买入一只股票，通常公司运势总会出现一点“小插曲”，让你有机会体面地获利了结，尽管其长期表现可能很糟。我把这称为“烟蒂式”（cigar butt）的投资法。街边捡到一截只剩最后一口的雪茄，抽头并不大，但因为“便宜买来”，那一口就全是利润。
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original “bargain” price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
除非你是清算人，否则用这种方法买企业是愚蠢的。第一，最初“捡便宜”的价格，多半并没有你想的那么划算。在一个艰难的行业里，解决了一个问题，很快就会冒出另一个——厨房里从来不止一只蟑螂。第二，你获得的任何初始优势，都会被业务的低回报迅速侵蚀。举例说，如果你花 800 万美元买下一家企业，立刻卖掉或清算能得到 1,000 万美元，你会取得很高的回报。但若十年后才以 1,000 万美元卖掉，而这十年里每年只把成本的几个百分点作为分红或利润，那这笔投资就会让人失望。时间是优秀企业的朋友，是平庸企业的敌人。
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, “My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot.”
你或许觉得这个道理显而易见，但我是吃了苦头才学会的——事实上，还是学了好几遍。买下 Berkshire 不久，我又通过一家名为 Diversified Retailing 的公司（后来并入 Berkshire）收购了巴尔的摩的百货公司 Hochschild Kohn。我以大幅低于账面价值的价格买入，团队一流，交易还附带一些“额外好处”——未入账的房地产价值和相当可观的 LIFO 库存缓冲。我怎么会失手呢？所—以—说——三年后我很幸运地以接近买入价把它卖掉了。与 Hochschild Kohn 结束“公司婚姻”后，我的回忆就像那首乡村歌曲里丈夫的心情：“My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot（我的妻子跟我最好的朋友跑了，而我仍深深想念他）。”
I could give you other personal examples of “bargain-purchase” folly but I’m sure you get the picture: It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.
我还能举出不少“便宜买入而犯傻”的亲身例子，但你大概已经懂了要点：以公道价买入一家优秀公司，远胜于以极佳价买入一家平庸公司。Charlie 很早就明白了这一点；而我学得慢一些。不过现在，无论收购整家公司还是买入普通股，我们都追求一流业务+一流管理的组合。
o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire’s textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.
o 这直接引出一个相关教训：再好的骑师也需要好马，烂马骑不出成绩。Berkshire 的纺织业务和 Hochschild, Kohn 的管理者都能干且正直。同样的管理者，如果被放到经济属性良好的业务里，会取得漂亮的战绩。但在“流沙”里奔跑，是不可能前进的。
I’ve said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn’t been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: “I was Snow White, but I drifted.”
我多次说过：当一个以聪明著称的管理层去接手一个以糟糕经济性著称的业务时，保持“名声不变”的往往是业务的糟糕。我只希望自己别那么卖力地去“制造案例”。我的表现正如 Mae West 的那句自嘲：“I was Snow White, but I drifted.（我曾是白雪公主，但我走偏了。）”
o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.
o 还有一个相关教训：从易而行。经过25年对各类企业的收购与管理，Charlie 和我并没有学会如何解决困难的商业问题；我们学会的是如何回避它们。我们之所以能取得一定成功，是因为我们专注于寻找那些一英尺高、可以迈过去的栏杆，而不是企图练就七英尺栏杆也能一跃而过的本领。
The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we’ve done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.
这个结论听起来也许“不够体面”，但在商业与投资中，坚持做容易且显而易见的事，通常比解决难题更能赚钱。偶尔也必须直面硬仗，比如我们在 Buffalo 创办周日报的时候。另一些情况下，当一家出色的企业遭遇一次性但可解决的巨大问题时，会出现极佳的投资机会，多年前的 American Express 与 GEICO 便是例证。总体而言，避龙比屠龙更让我们受益。
o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call “the institutional imperative.” In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative’s existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn’t so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
o 我最意外的发现：商业中有一种看不见的力量至关重要，我们可以称之为“制度性必然（the institutional imperative）”。在商学院时，没人暗示过它的存在；刚踏入商业世界时，我也并未直觉地理解它。我曾以为体面、聪明且经验丰富的经理人会自然而然地做出理性决策。但随着时间推移，我发现并非如此：一旦制度性必然发挥作用，理性常常会枯萎。
For example: (1) As if governed by Newton’s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
比如：（1）仿佛受牛顿第一定律支配，机构会抗拒改变其当前方向；（2）正如工作会膨胀以填满可用时间，公司项目或并购会自发出现以消耗可用资金；（3）领导者的任何业务“渴望”，哪怕愚蠢，其下属都会迅速拿出详尽的收益率与战略研究予以背书；（4）同业公司的行为——不论是扩张、并购、制定高管薪酬等——都会被盲目模仿。
第一：不可逆转；第二：卡住的正好是脖子的位置；第三、第四：自发的寻找一切作死的方式。
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
让企业走上这些道路的，是制度动力学，而非贪婪或愚蠢——尽管这些道路往往被事实证明是误导。在因忽视这种力量而付出昂贵代价之后，我努力以尽量降低其影响的方式来组织和管理 Berkshire。此外，Charlie 和我也尝试将投资集中在那些对这一问题保持警觉的公司。
o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won’t prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We’ve never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.
o 在犯过其他一些错误后，我学到：只与我喜欢、信任并敬重的人一起做生意。正如我之前强调的，这一原则本身并不能保证成功：一家二流的纺织或百货公司，并不会因为其经理人是“你乐于让女儿嫁给的人”就繁荣起来。然而，如果在经济属性尚可的业务里，所有者——或投资者——能与这样的人结伴，便能创造奇迹。反过来，无论某项业务前景多吸引人，我们都不愿与缺乏令人称道品质的经理人合作。与坏人做成好买卖，我们从未成功过。
o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn’t make. It’s no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one’s area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire’s shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.
o 我一些最糟糕的错误，并不为公众所见。那些是我看得懂、也看到了优点却没有去做的股票与企业收购。错过自己能力圈以外的机会无可厚非；但我也错过过端到面前、且完全在我能力圈之内的极大机会。对 Berkshire 的股东（包括我自己）而言，这种犹豫不决的代价极其巨大。
o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.
o 我们一贯保守的财务政策，看上去似乎是个错误，但在我看来并非如此。回头看，若在 Berkshire 采用更高但仍属常规的杠杆率，本可取得明显高于我们23.8%历史均值的股本回报。即便在1965年，我们或许也能判断：更高杠杆带来“只有好处”的概率达99%；相对应地，我们也会看到：受外部或内部冲击因素影响，即便是常规负债率也有**1%**的可能让结果落在“暂时痛苦与违约”之间的某处。
We wouldn’t have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.
我们不喜欢99:1这样的赔率——将来也不会。我们认为，小概率的困境或羞辱，不能被高概率的额外回报所抵消。只要你的行动是理性的，结果自然会不错；在大多数这种情形中，杠杆只是加速器。Charlie 和我从不着急：我们更享受过程，胜过收益——尽管我们也学会了与后者愉快相处。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.
我们希望再过25年时，能够汇报“前五十年”的错误。若2015年我们仍在并写下这段篇章，你可以肯定：这一章节所占的篇幅会远多于当前这些页。
Miscellaneous
杂项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望收购更多与现有业务相似的企业，也欢迎得到一些帮助。如果你拥有符合下列标准的企业，请给我来电，或者更好的是，写信联系。
Here’s what we’re looking for:
我们在寻找的是：
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 规模较大的收购（年税后利润至少 1,000 万美元），
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
(2) 已被证明的持续盈利能力（我们对未来预测兴趣不大，对“扭亏为盈”型情形也不感兴趣），
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 在几乎无负债或低负债情况下，能取得良好股本回报的企业，
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(4) 现有管理团队健全（我们无法提供管理层），
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(5) 业务简单（如果技术成分太多，我们就看不懂），
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 一个要约价格（若价格未知，我们不想浪费彼此时间，哪怕只是初步讨论）。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行非友好式收购。我们承诺完全保密，并会非常迅速地给出是否感兴趣的答复——通常在五分钟内。我们偏好以现金收购，但在所获内在业务价值与所付出等值时，也会考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最偏爱的收购形式，是符合 Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman 模式的。在这类案例中，公司所有者-经理人希望实现大量现金流入，有时是为他们自己，但更多是为其家人或不活跃股东；同时，这些经理人希望继续作为重要股东，像过去一样经营公司。对于有此类目标的所有者，我们认为自己非常契合。我们也欢迎潜在卖方与我们过去合作过的人联系，以便进一步了解我们。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by a Goldwynism: “Please include me out.”
Charlie 和我经常收到一些与我们标准相差甚远的收购提议：我们发现，若你宣传自己想买 collies，就会有很多人打来电话，想把他们的 cocker spaniels 卖给你。对于新创项目、扭亏型企业或拍卖式出售，我们的兴趣可用一句 Goldwynism 来表达：“Please include me out.”
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of investment.
除了上述整家公司收购外，我们也对协商购买大额但非控股的股票感兴趣，类似我们在 Capital Cities、Salomon、Gillette、USAir 和 Champion 的持股。去年我们说过对大额购入可转换优先股特别感兴趣。我们现在对此仍有食欲，但已接近我们认为适宜的最大仓位，因此空间有限。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962 quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my “bargain” purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W, rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance, acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company’s profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this space for future bulletins on Harry’s triumphs.
两年前，我跟你们讲过 Harry Bottle：1962 年，他在我控股的第一家工业公司 Dempster Mill Manufacturing（我的一桩“便宜货”）中迅速收拾了一个大烂摊子；24 年后他又一次出手相救，这次是帮一家名为 K&W Products 的小型 Berkshire 子公司（生产汽车化工品）解决问题。正如我当时报告的那样，Harry 很快压降了 K&W 的占用资本，理顺了生产、削减了成本，并把利润提升了四倍。你可能以为他会喘口气。但去年已 70 岁的 Harry 跑去参加了一场破产拍卖，并以极低的代价拿下了一条与 K&W 天然契合的产品线。靠这一步好棋，公司盈利能力很可能再提高 50%。请继续关注这里关于 Harry 凯旋的后续简报。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire’s stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire of Henderson Brothers, Inc. (“HBI”), continues his outstanding performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in transaction costs.
在 New York Stock Exchange 上做 Berkshire 股票做市已逾一年的我们的专营商——Henderson Brothers, Inc.（“HBI”）的 Jim Maguire——表现依旧出色。我们挂牌之前，经纪商买卖价差常常高达市价的 3% 甚至更多。Jim 将价差维持在不超过 50 点，这在当前股价下远低于 1%。买卖股票的股东显著受益于这笔交易成本的下降。
Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.
鉴于与 Jim、HBI 以及 NYSE 的合作体验让我们十分满意，我也在 NYSE 发布的一系列广告中表达了相同看法。通常我避免做推荐背书，但这一次我很高兴能公开称赞交易所。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7 million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before Berkshire’s entire net worth is consumed by its jet.
去年夏天，我们卖掉了三年前以 85 万美元购入的公司飞机，又花 670 万美元买了一架二手喷气机。还记得第 5 页里细菌倍增数学题的读者，大概会理解性地惊慌：如果我们的净值继续按当前速度增长，而更换飞机的成本也继续按现已确立的**年复利 100%**上涨，那用不了多久，Berkshire 的全部净值都要被自家飞机“吃光”。
Charlie doesn’t like it when I equate the jet with bacteria; he feels it’s degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I’m sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict between intellect and glands, he pled: “Help me, Oh Lord, to become chaste - but not yet.”
Charlie 不喜欢我把喷气机和细菌相提并论；他觉得这是对细菌的侮辱。他心中的“体面出行”，是有空调的巴士——只有在有特价票时，才会“升级”享受这一奢侈。我对飞机的态度，可以用一段（我敢说并不确凿）归于 St. Augustine 的祈祷来概括：当他考虑放下尘世享乐、成为一名神职人员时，在理智与荷尔蒙的拉扯中，他祈求道：“主啊，请帮助我成为贞洁之人——但不是现在。”
Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested “The Charles T. Munger.” Charlie countered with “The Aberration.” We finally settled on “The Indefensible.”
给飞机取名可不容易。我最初提议叫 “The Charles T. Munger”。Charlie 反击道：“The Aberration（离经叛道）。”我们最终定为 “The Indefensible（无可辩解）”。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and 2,550 charities were recipients.
约有 96.9% 的符合条件股份参与了 Berkshire 1989 年的股东指定捐赠计划。通过该计划捐出的金额为 590 万美元，受赠的慈善机构共有 2,550 家。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.
我们敦促新股东阅读第 52–53 页对股东指定捐赠计划的说明。若你希望参加未来的计划，我们强烈建议你立即确认你的股份登记在实际所有人名下，而不是券商、银行或托管机构的名义账户。未在 1990 年 8 月 31 日前完成此类登记的股份，将无资格参加 1990 年度的计划。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000, very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at Joslyn Museum. So this year’s meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim’s. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
今年的股东大会将于 1990 年 4 月 30 日（周一）上午 9:30 举行。去年到会人数增至约 1,000 人，已非常接近 Joslyn Museum 的 Witherspoon Hall 的座位上限。因此今年会议将移至 Orpheum Theatre，位于 Omaha 市中心，距 Red Lion Hotel 约四分之一英里。Radisson-Redick Tower 是一家更小但不错的酒店，就在 Orpheum 对街。你也可以选择住在西 Omaha 的 Marriott，离 Borsheim’s 大约 100 码。我们会在 Marriott 安排大巴，于 8:30 和 8:45 发车，会议结束后再送回。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
Charlie 和我总是很享受这场会议，也希望你能到场。我们股东的素质反映在提问的质量上：我们从未在任何地方参加过一场年会，能像这儿一样持续涌现如此高水平、与所有者相关的聪明问题。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.
我们的委托书材料附带说明了如何获取入场所需的凭证卡。由于工作日 Orpheum 周边停车紧张，我们已为股东协调了若干附近停车场可供使用。附页也包含这些信息。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.
照例，我们会在会后安排大巴送大家去 Nebraska Furniture Mart 与 Borsheim’s，之后再送往市中心酒店或机场。希望你能预留充足时间，尽情发掘两家店的魅力。提前抵达的朋友可在一周中的任何一天造访 Furniture Mart；周六营业时间为上午 10 点至下午 5:30，周日为中午 12 点至下午 5:30。
Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders.
Borsheim’s 通常周日不营业，但 4 月 29 日（周日）我们将于中午 12 点至下午 6 点为股东及其来宾特别开放。Ike 喜欢“上演好戏”，你可以相信他会为我们的股东准备一些非常特别的内容。
In this letter we’ve had a lot to say about rates of compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the 29th.
在这封信里，我们已经谈了很多复利率的话题。如果你能承受自己那天的“收益率”转为负值——我承认这想法不太美妙——那就 29 号去见见 Ike 吧。
Warren E. Buffett March 2, 1990 Chairman of the Board
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