1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Last year we made a prediction: “A reduction [in Berkshire’s net worth] is almost certain in at least one of the next three years.” During much of 1990’s second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or 7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06, or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.

去年我们做了一个预测：“在未来三年中，至少有一年（Berkshire 的净资产）几乎肯定会出现下降。”在1990年下半年的大部分时间里，我们似乎很快就能证明这一预测是准确的。但是，年底股票价格的一些回升使我们在1990年结束时净资产增加了3.62亿美元，即7.3%。在过去的26年里（即自现任管理层接手以来），我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到了4612.06美元，年复合增长率为23.2%。

Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market value. Last year I told you that though these companies—Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post—had fine businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The market prices of the two media companies have since fallen significantly—for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss later—and the price of Coca-Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our “permanent four,” though far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier.

我们在1990年的增长率有些平淡，因为我们的四大普通股重仓股在总市值上几乎没有变化。去年我告诉过你们，尽管这些公司——Capital Cities/ABC、Coca-Cola、GEICO 和 Washington Post——拥有优良的业务和卓越的管理层，但人们对这些特质的广泛认可已将这四家公司的股价推向了极高的水平。自那以后，两家媒体公司的市场价格大幅下跌——原因在于行业发展的演变，这是有充分理由的，我稍后会讨论——而 Coca-Cola 的股价则大幅上涨，我也认为这是有充分理由的。总的来说，我们的“永久四大重仓股”在1990年年底的价格虽然远称不上诱人，但比一年前要稍微具有吸引力一些。

Berkshire’s 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.

Berkshire 过去26年的记录对于预测未来的结果是毫无意义的；我们也希望，这仅仅一年的记录同样如此。我们继续将内在价值的年均增长率目标定为15%。但是，正如我们总是不厌其烦地告诉你们的那样，随着我们现在达到53亿美元的资本基数不断增加，这个目标变得越来越难以实现。

If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well. However, Berkshire’s corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10% premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded. (The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.

如果我们确实达到了15%的平均水平，我们的股东应该会收益颇丰。然而，只有当某位特定股东最终出售其股份时，其相对于内在价值的比例与买入时存在的比例相同时，Berkshire 的公司收益才会为该股东带来完全相同的收益。例如，如果你以高于内在价值10%的溢价买入；如果随后内在价值每年增长15%；如果你然后以10%的溢价卖出，你自己的回报率将相应地为15%的复合增长率。（该计算假设没有支付股息。）但是，如果你以高溢价买入并以较低的溢价卖出，你的投资结果将略逊于公司所取得的业绩。

Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is why Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell 23%.

理想情况下，每一位 Berkshire 股东在其持有期间的收益应与公司的业绩密切吻合。这就是为什么 Berkshire 的副主席兼我的合伙人 Charlie Munger 以及我，希望 Berkshire 的股价能够始终围绕其内在价值进行交易。相较于过去两年无视价值的剧烈波动，我们更偏爱这种稳定性：在1989年，内在价值的增长低于账面价值（账面价值增长了44%），而市场价格却飙升了85%；在1990年，账面价值和内在价值仅小幅增长，而市场价格却下跌了23%。

Berkshire’s intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin. We can’t tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact, differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books.

Berkshire 的内在价值持续大幅超过账面价值。我们无法告诉你确切的差额，因为内在价值必然是一个估计值；事实上，我和 Charlie 在评估时可能会有10%的差异。然而，我们确实知道，我们拥有一些非凡的企业，它们的价值远高于账面上的记录价值。

Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent deployment of these funds.

我们企业中存在的大部分额外价值是由目前管理这些企业的经理人们创造的。Charlie 和我可以毫无顾忌地夸奖这群人，因为他们所具备的才能与我们的培养毫无关系：这些超级巨星天生如此。我们的工作仅仅是识别有才华的经理人，并提供一个让他们施展才华的环境。在他们完成工作后，他们将现金寄回总部，而我们则面临唯一的另一项任务：明智地部署这些资金。

My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.

我在运营中的角色，或许通过去年秋天关于我孙女 Emily 及其四岁生日派对的一个小故事来阐述最为合适。参加派对的有其他孩子、慈爱的亲戚，以及当地的艺人小丑 Beemer，他的表演中包含了魔术。

Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a “magic wand” over “the box of wonders.” Green handkerchiefs went into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones. Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily, emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face aglow, she exulted: “Gee, I’m really good at this.”

表演开始时，Beemer 请 Emily 帮忙，在“奇迹盒子”上挥动“魔术棒”。绿色的手帕放进盒子里，Emily 挥动魔术棒，Beemer 取出了蓝色的手帕。散开的手帕放进去，随着 Emily 威严的一挥，拿出来时竟打成了结。经过四次这样一次比一次更令人惊奇的变化后，Emily 再也无法自持。她满脸通红，欢呼道：“天哪，我真的很擅长这个。”

And that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire’s business magicians—the Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph Schey. They deserve your applause.

这就概括了我对 Berkshire 的企业魔术师们——Blumkins、Friedman 家族、Mike Goldberg、Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 和 Ralph Schey——所做业绩的贡献。他们值得你们的掌声。

Sources of Reported Earnings

报告收益的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示了 Berkshire 报告收益的主要来源。在本次陈述中，商誉摊销和其他主要的购买价格会计调整并未计入其适用的特定业务中，而是汇总并单独列出。这一程序使您能够查看我们这些业务在未被我们收购时的报告收益。我曾在过去的报告中解释过，为什么这种陈述方式对投资者和管理者来说，比使用公认会计原则（GAAP）的方式更有用，因为 GAAP 要求按业务逐项进行购买价格调整。当然，我们在表中显示的净利润总额与我们经过审计的财务报表中的 GAAP 总额是完全一致的。

Much additional information about these businesses is given on pages 39-46, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 56. His letter also contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking industry that I have seen.

关于这些业务的更多附加信息请见第39-46页，在那里您还会发现按 GAAP 基础报告的分部收益。有关 Wesco 业务的信息，我敦促您阅读 Charlie Munger 的信，该信从第56页开始。他的信中还包含了对我所见过的银行业最清晰、最深刻的讨论。

We refer you also to pages 47-53, where we have rearranged Berkshire’s financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more in estimating Berkshire’s intrinsic value than consolidated figures would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non- operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase- price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们还建议您参阅第47-53页，我们将 Berkshire 的财务数据重新编排为四个部分。这些部分与 Charlie 和我思考业务的方式相对应，与合并后的数据相比，它们应该能更好地帮助您估算 Berkshire 的内在价值。这些页面上展示了以下部分的资产负债表和收益表：(1) 我们的保险业务，并逐项列出了其主要投资头寸；(2) 我们的制造、出版和零售业务，撇除某些非经营性资产和购买价格会计调整；(3) 我们从事金融类业务的子公司，即 Mutual Savings 和 Scott Fetzer Financial；(4) 一个“所有其他”类别，包括第 (2) 部分公司持有的非经营性资产（主要是可上市证券）、所有购买价格会计调整，以及 Wesco 和 Berkshire 母公司的各项资产和债务。

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.

如果你将这四个部分的收益和净资产结合起来，你将得到与我们 GAAP 报表中显示的总额相符的结果。然而，我想要强调的是，这种四类陈述方式并不在我们的审计师权限范围之内，他们绝不会对其背书。

“Look-Through” Earnings

“透视”收益

The term “earnings” has a precise ring to it. And when an earnings figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor’s certificate, a naive reader might think it comparable in certitude to pi, calculated to dozens of decimal places.

“收益”一词听起来很精确。当一个收益数字附带一份无保留意见的审计师证明时，天真的读者可能会认为它的确定性可以与计算到小数点后几十位的 pi 相媲美。

In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually truth will surface, but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands. Indeed, some important American fortunes have been created by the monetization of accounting mirages.

然而在现实中，当一个骗子领导报告收益的公司时，收益可以像腻子一样具有可塑性。真相最终会浮出水面，但在此期间，大量的金钱可能会易手。事实上，一些重要的美国财富正是通过将会计幻象变现而创造出来的。

Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of chicanery, I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in 1936. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many times since found their way into the financial statements of major American corporations and been duly certified by big-name auditors. Clearly, investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true “economic earnings” accruing to them.

会计领域的花招并非新鲜事。对于那些研究欺诈行为的人，我在第22页附上了 Appendix A，这是 Ben Graham 在1936年写的一篇关于会计实务的、此前未发表过的讽刺文章。哀哉，自那时起，类似于他所嘲讽的过度行为曾多次出现在主要美国公司的财务报表中，并得到了知名审计师的正规认证。显然，投资者必须时刻保持警惕，在尝试计算归属于他们的真正“经济收益”时，将会计数字视为起点而非终点。

Berkshire’s own reported earnings are misleading in a different, but important, way: We have huge investments in companies (“investees”) whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we receive. The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Our 17% share of the company’s earnings amounted to more than $83 million last year. Yet only about $530,000 ($600,000 of dividends it paid us less some $70,000 of tax) is counted in Berkshire’s GAAP earnings. The residual $82 million-plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings, which work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books.

Berkshire 自身报告的收益在另一个重要方面具有误导性：我们在一些公司（“被投资公司”）拥有巨额投资，这些公司的收益远超其股息，而我们仅在收到的股息范围内记录我们所占的收益份额。最极端的例子是 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.。去年，我们在这家公司所占17%的收益份额超过了8300万美元。然而，在 Berkshire 的 GAAP 收益中仅计入了约53万美元（它支付给我们的60万美元股息减去约7万美元的税款）。剩余的8200多万美元作为留存收益留在 Cap Cities，它们为我们的利益而运作，但在我们的账簿上却未予记录。

Our perspective on such “forgotten-but-not-gone” earnings is simple: The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their ownership and subsequent utilization is all-important. We care not whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest; we do care who owns the tree and what’s next done with it.

我们对这种“被遗忘但未消失”的收益的看法很简单：它们的会计处理方式并不重要，但它们的所有权和随后的利用才是最重要的。我们并不关心审计师是否听到了森林里树木倒下的声音；我们关心的是谁拥有这棵树，以及接下来将如何处理它。

When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares, the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable franchise in the world. (Coke also, of course, uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing ways.) Instead of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to us in dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares. That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would report far greater “earnings.”

当 Coca-Cola 使用留存收益来回购其股份时，该公司增加了我们在我所认为的世界最有价值特许经营权中的持股比例。（当然，Coke 也会以许多其他增加价值的方式使用留存收益。）如果不回购股票，Coca-Cola 本可以将这些资金以股息的形式支付给我们，然后我们可以用这些资金购买更多的 Coke 股票。但那将是一个效率较低的情景：由于我们需要为股息收入缴纳税款，我们无法像 Coke 代替我们行事那样，将我们的持股比例提高到同样的程度。然而，如果遵循这种效率较低的程序，Berkshire 报告的“收益”将会大得多。

I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of “look-through” results, calculated as follows: Take $250 million, which is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our investees; subtract $30 million, for the incremental taxes we would have owed had that $250 million been paid to us in dividends; and add the remainder, $220 million, to our reported operating earnings of $371 million. Thus our 1990 “look-through earnings” were about $590 million.

我认为思考我们收益的最佳方式是采用“透视”结果，计算方法如下：取2.5亿美元，这大约是我们所占的被投资公司在1990年留存的营业收益份额；减去3000万美元，这是如果那2.5亿美元以股息形式支付给我们时，我们本应缴纳的新增税款；然后将剩余的2.2亿美元加到我们报告的3.71亿美元营业收益中。因此，我们1990年的“透视收益”约为5.9亿美元。

As I mentioned last year, we hope to have look-through earnings grow about 15% annually. In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate but in 1991 we will fall far short of it. Our Gillette preferred has been called and we will convert it into common stock on April 1. This will reduce reported earnings by about $35 million annually and look-through earnings by a much smaller, but still significant, amount. Additionally, our media earnings—both direct and look-through—appear sure to decline. Whatever the results, we will post you annually on how we are doing on a look-through basis.

正如我去年提到的，我们希望透视收益每年增长约15%。1990年我们大幅超过了这一增长率，但在1991年我们将远低于这一水平。我们的 Gillette 优先股已被赎回，我们将在4月1日将其转换为普通股。这将使每年报告的收益减少约3500万美元，透视收益减少的数额较小，但仍然显著。此外，我们的媒体收益——无论是直接收益还是透视收益——看来注定会下降。无论结果如何，我们每年都会向你们通报我们在透视基础上的表现。

一个不分红、不回购股票的公司，投资收益率只跟利润的增速有关。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险业务

Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.

再看一眼第51页的数据，其中汇总了我们非保险业务的收益和资产负债表。1990年的平均净资产税后收益率为51%，这一结果可以使该集团在1989年的 Fortune 500 中排名第20位左右。

Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First, leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned, not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on assets—a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns—our group would rank in Fortune’s top ten.

有两个因素使这一回报更加非凡。首先，这并非由杠杆产生：我们几乎所有的主要设施都是自有的，而非租赁，而且这些业务所欠的少量债务基本上被它们持有的现金所抵消。事实上，如果衡量指标是资产回报率——这种计算排除了债务对回报的影响——我们的集团将在 Fortune 的前十名之列。

Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing, candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating managers, not fortuitous industry economics.

同样重要的是，我们的回报并非来自那些对所有参与者都有极佳经济效益的行业，如香烟或电视网络台。相反，它来自一群经营家具零售、糖果、吸尘器甚至钢铁仓储等平凡领域的企业。解释很明确：我们非凡的回报源于卓越的运营经理，而非偶然的行业经济环境。

Let’s look at the larger operations:

让我们来看看规模较大的业务：

• It was a poor year for retailing—particularly for big-ticket items—but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim’s. Sales were up 18%. That’s both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since Borsheim’s operates but one establishment.

对零售业来说，这是糟糕的一年——尤其是大件商品——但似乎没人把这件事告诉 Borsheim’s 的 Ike Friedman。该公司的销售额增长了 18%。由于 Borsheim’s 仅经营一家门店，这既是同店销售增长率，也是全店销售增长率。

But, oh, what an establishment! We can’t be sure about the fact (because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the U.S., except for Tiffany’s New York store.

但是，噢，那是怎样的一家店啊！我们无法确定事实（因为大多数高级珠宝零售商都是私营的），但我们相信，这家珠宝店的营业额除了 Tiffany’s 的纽约店之外，在美国是最高的。

Borsheim’s could not do nearly that well if our customers came only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about 600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha’s jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically. Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.

如果我们的客户仅来自人口约 60 万的 Omaha 大都会区，Borsheim’s 绝不可能做得这么好。我们长期以来在 Omaha 地区的珠宝业务中占有巨大份额，因此在该市场的增长必然有限。但每年来自非中西部地区客户的业务都在大幅增长。许多人亲自光顾门店。然而，还有大量其他人通过邮寄方式购买，你会发现这种方式很有趣。

These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and value—say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range—and we then send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

这些客户要求选择某种类型和价值的珠宝——比如 10,000 到 20,000 美元范围内的祖母绿——然后我们寄给他们 5 到 10 件符合其要求的物品供其挑选。去年，我们邮寄了大约 1,500 份各类组合，价值从不足 1,000 美元到数十万美元不等。

The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no one at Borsheim’s has ever met. (They must always have been well recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades. Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our “honor-system” works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.

这些精选品被寄往全国各地，其中有些人的身份 Borsheim’s 甚至没人见过。（不过，他们必须总是经过良好的推荐。）虽然 1990 年的邮寄数量创下了纪录，但 Ike 几十年来一直向远方寄送商品。厌世者听到我们的“荣誉制度”运作得如此之好，一定会感到沮丧：我们尚未经历过因客户不诚实而造成的损失。

We attract business nationwide because we have several advantages that competitors can’t match. The most important item in the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18% are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include in “cost of goods sold.”) Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs, sells at prices that high-cost competitors can’t touch and thereby constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim’s. What works with diapers works with diamonds.

我们之所以能吸引全国的业务，是因为我们拥有竞争对手无法企及的几项优势。这个等式中最重要的项是我们的运营成本，约占销售额的 18%，而典型的竞争对手约为 40%。（这 18% 中包括了租金和采购成本，一些上市公司将其计入“销货成本”。）正如 Wal-Mart 凭借其 15% 的运营成本，以高成本竞争对手无法企及的价格销售，从而不断增加其市场份额一样，Borsheim’s 也是如此。适用于尿布的原则同样适用于钻石。

高能耗的脑子是问题，高能耗的商业模式也是。

Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry phenomenon from an Omaha location.

我们的低价创造了巨大的销量，这反过来又使我们能够拥有极其广泛的商品库存，规模是典型高级珠宝店的 10 倍或更多。再加上我们的选择广度、低价以及卓越的服务，你就能理解 Ike 及其家人是如何在 Omaha 这个地方打造出一个全国性的珠宝奇迹的。

And family it is. Ike’s crew always includes son Alan and sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy—that’s often—they are joined by Ike’s wife, Roz, and his daughters, Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike’s cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally, you’ll find Ike’s 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim’s runs rings around competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o’clock will arrive?

这确实是家族的力量。Ike 的团队中总是包括儿子 Alan 以及女婿 Marvin Cohn 和 Donald Yale。忙碌的时候——这种情况经常发生——Ike 的妻子 Roz 以及女儿 Janis 和 Susie 也会加入。此外，Louie（Nebraska Furniture Mart 的主席，也是 Ike 的堂兄弟）的妻子 Fran Blumkin 也经常来帮忙。最后，你会发现 Ike 89 岁的老母亲 Rebecca 大多数下午都在店里，手里拿着一份 Wall Street Journal。有了这样一份家族的投入，Borsheim’s 能够远胜那些经理们只想着几点钟下班的竞争对手，又有什么好惊讶的呢？

• While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records at Borsheim’s, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though again the fact can’t be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close to double the volume of any other home furnishings store in the country.

当 Fran Blumkin 在帮助 Friedman 家族在 Borsheim’s 创造纪录时，她的儿子们 Irv 和 Ron，以及丈夫 Louie，也在 The Nebraska Furniture Mart 创造着纪录。我们仅有的一家门店销售额达到了 1.59 亿美元，比 1989 年增长了 4%。虽然事实再次无法得到最终证实，但我们相信 NFM 的销售额接近美国任何其他家具店的两倍。

The NFM formula for success parallels that of Borsheim’s. First, operating costs are rock-bottom—15% in 1990 against about 40% for Levitz, the country’s largest furniture retailer, and 25% for Circuit City Stores, the leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances. Second, NFM’s low costs allow the business to price well below all competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain prices allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise available anywhere.

NFM 的成功方程式与 Borsheim’s 如出一辙。首先，运营成本极低——1990 年仅为 15%，而美国最大的家具零售商 Levitz 约为 40%，领先的电子和家电折扣零售商 Circuit City Stores 为 25%。其次，NFM 的低成本使得该业务的定价远低于所有竞争对手。事实上，各大连锁店深知将面临什么，因此都避开 Omaha。第三，廉价带来的巨大销量使我们能够拥有任何地方都无法比拟的最广泛的商品选择。

Some idea of NFM’s merchandising power can be gleaned from a recent report of consumer behavior in Des Moines, which showed that NFM was Number 3 in popularity among 20 furniture retailers serving that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that 19 of those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is 130 miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that between Washington and Philadelphia in order to shop with us, even though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, NFM, like Borsheim’s, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves—not by the traditional method of opening new stores but rather by creating an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the crowds.

从最近一份关于 Des Moines 消费者行为的报告中，可以略窥 NFM 的营销实力。该报告显示，在服务于该市的 20 家家具零售商中，NFM 的受欢迎程度排名第三。这听起来可能没什么大不了，直到你意识到这 20 家零售商中有 19 家就位于 Des Moines，而我们的商店却在 130 英里之外。这意味着顾客为了来我们这里购物，需要驱车行驶相当于 Washington 到 Philadelphia 之间的距离，尽管他们家门口就有众多的选择。实际上，NFM 和 Borsheim’s 一样，极大地扩展了其服务的领地——不是通过传统的开设新店的方法，而是通过利用价格和品种创造一个不可抗拒的磁场来吸引人群。

Last year at the Mart there occurred an historic event: I experienced a counterrevelation. Regular readers of this report know that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better: In Berkshire’s first synergistic explosion, NFM put a See’s candy cart in the store late last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the full-fledged stores See’s operates in California. This success contradicts all tenets of retailing. With the Blumkins, though, the impossible is routine.

去年在 Mart 发生了一件具有历史意义的事件：我经历了一次“反向启示”。本报告的常客都知道，我长期以来一直蔑视企业高管们关于“协同效应”的吹嘘，嘲笑此类说法是那些为愚蠢收购辩护的恶棍们的最后避难所。但现在我有了更好的认识：在 Berkshire 的第一次协同效应爆发中，NFM 去年年底在店内放置了一个 See’s 糖果小车，卖出的糖果比 See’s 在 California 经营的一些成熟分店还要多。这一成功违背了所有零售业准则。不过，对于 Blumkins 家族来说，化不可能为常规是家常便饭。

• At See’s, physical volume set a record in 1990—but only barely and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell. Our poundage volume at Christmas dropped slightly, though our dollar sales were up because of a 5% price increase.

在 See’s，1990 年的实物销量创下了纪录——但仅仅是勉强达到，且全靠年初的良好销售势头。在 Kuwait 遭入侵后，美国西部的商场客流量有所下降。虽然我们在圣诞节期间的重量销量略有下降，但由于 5% 的提价，我们的美元销售额有所增长。

That increase, and better control of expenses, improved profit margins. Against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the nineteen years we have owned See’s. Chuck’s imprint on the business—a virtual fanaticism about quality and service—is visible at all of our 225 stores.

提价以及对费用的更好控制提高了利润率。在零售环境疲软的背景下，Chuck Huggins 取得了出色的业绩，正如他在我们拥有 See’s 的 19 年间每年所做的那样。Chuck 在业务上打下的烙印——对质量和服务的近乎狂热——在我们全部 225 家分店中都清晰可见。

One happening in 1990 illustrates the close bond between See’s and its customers. After 15 years of operation, our store in Albuquerque was endangered: The landlord would not renew our lease, wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall and even so to pay a much higher rent. These changes would have wiped out the store’s profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set a date for closing the store.

1990 年发生的一件事说明了 See’s 与其客户之间的紧密联系。经营 15 年后，我们在 Albuquerque 的门店面临危机：房东不愿续签租约，而是想让我们搬到商场内一个较差的位置，即便如此还要支付高得多的租金。这些变化原本会抹去该店的利润。在长时间的谈判无果后，我们定下了关闭该店的日期。

On her own, the store’s manager, Ann Filkins, then took action, urging customers to protest the closing. Some 263 responded by sending letters and making phone calls to See’s headquarters in San Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott the mall. An alert reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied with this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a satisfactory deal. (He, too, proved susceptible to a counterrevelation.)

店长 Ann Filkins 自发采取了行动，敦促顾客抗议关店。约有 263 人通过向 See’s 位于 San Francisco 的总部致信和打电话做出了回应，有些人甚至威胁要抵制该商场。Albuquerque 报社的一位敏锐记者报道了这个故事。有了消费者起义的证据，我们的房东提供了一份令人满意的协议。（事实证明，他也容易受到“反向启示”的影响。）

Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every loyalist and sent each a gift certificate. He repeated his thanks in a newspaper ad that listed the names of all 263. The sequel: Christmas sales in Albuquerque were up substantially.

Chuck 随后亲自写信感谢每一位忠诚的顾客，并向每人寄送了一张礼品券。他在报纸广告中再次表达了谢意，并列出了所有 263 人的名字。后续情况是：Albuquerque 的圣诞销售额大幅增长。

• Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News. The business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle—to be fully made up in the next upturn—or whether the business has slipped in a way that permanently reduces intrinsic business values.

Charlie 和我对过去一年媒体行业的发展感到意外，其中包括像我们的 Buffalo News 这样的报纸。该业务在经济衰退初期表现出的脆弱性远超以往。问题在于，这种侵蚀仅仅是异常周期的一部分——将在下一次好转中完全弥补——还是该业务已经陷入了一种永久性降低内在商业价值的下滑之中。

Since I didn’t predict what has happened, you may question the value of my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I’ll proffer a judgment: While many media businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.

既然我没有预测到已经发生的事情，你可能会质疑我对将要发生的事情所做预测的价值。尽管如此，我还是要提供一个判断：虽然与一般的美国工业相比，许多媒体业务仍将是经济奇迹，但事实证明，它们将远不如我、行业或贷款人在仅仅几年前所认为的那样神奇。

事实会变化的。

The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News—though all remain fine businesses.

媒体业务过去之所以如此杰出，并非因为实物增长，而是因为大多数参与者所拥有的非同寻常的定价权。然而，现在广告费用的增长非常缓慢。此外，一些很少或根本不做媒体广告的零售商（尽管他们有时使用邮政服务）已逐渐在某些商品类别中占据了市场份额。最重要的一点是，纸质和电子广告渠道的数量都大幅增加。结果是，广告费用更加分散，广告卖方的定价权已经减弱。这些情况实质性地降低了我们主要媒体投资的内在价值，也降低了我们的经营单位 Buffalo News 的价值——尽管它们目前仍是优良的业务。

Notwithstanding the problems, Stan Lipsey’s management of the News continues to be superb. During 1990, our earnings held up much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only 5%. In the last few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was far greater.

尽管存在这些问题，Stan Lipsey 对 News 的管理依然卓越。1990 年间，我们的收益表现比大多数大都市报纸好得多，仅下降了 5%。然而，在当年的最后几个月里，下降的速度要快得多。

I can safely make two promises about the News in 1991: (1) Stan will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers; and (2) earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown in the demand for newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991 and the paper’s labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real squeeze.

我可以稳妥地对 1991 年的 News 做出两个承诺：(1) Stan 将再次在报纸出版商中名列前茅；(2) 收益将大幅下降。尽管对新闻纸的需求有所放缓，但 1991 年每吨的平均价格将显著提高，报纸的劳动力成本也将大幅增加。由于收入在此期间可能下降，我们面临着真正的利润挤压。

Profits may be off but our pride in the product remains. We continue to have a larger “news hole”—the portion of the paper devoted to news—than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the increase resulted from a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages. Regardless of earnings pressures, we will maintain at least a 50% news hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.

利润可能会下降，但我们对产品的自豪感依然如故。我们继续保持着比任何同类报纸都更大的“新闻版面（news hole）”——即报纸中专门用于新闻的部分。1990 年，这一比例从 1989 年的 50.1% 上升到 52.3%。哀哉，这一增长是因为广告页数的减少，而非新闻页数的增加。无论面临怎样的收益压力，我们都将维持至少 50% 的新闻版面。削减产品质量绝不是应对逆境的正确方式。

广告和内容的比例至今都是个问题，包括字节的推荐引擎。

• The news at Fechheimer, our manufacturer and retailer of uniforms, is all good with one exception: George Heldman, at 69, has decided to retire. I tried to talk him out of it but he had one irrefutable argument: With four other Heldmans—Bob, Fred, Gary and Roger—to carry on, he was leaving us with an abundance of managerial talent.

关于我们制服制造和零售商 Fechheimer 的消息全是好消息，但有一个例外：69 岁的 George Heldman 决定退休。我曾试图劝阻他，但他有一个无可辩驳的理由：有其他四位 Heldman 家族成员——Bob、Fred、Gary 和 Roger——继续留任，他给我们留下了极其丰厚的管理才华。

Fechheimer’s operating performance improved considerably in 1990, as many of the problems we encountered in integrating the large acquisition we made in 1988 were moderated or solved. However, several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the “Sources” table to be flat. In the retail operation, we continue to add stores and now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for Fechheimer.

Fechheimer 的经营业绩在 1990 年有了显著改善，因为我们在整合 1988 年那桩大型收购时遇到的大多数问题都得到了缓解或解决。然而，由于几个不寻常的项目，导致“来源”表中报告的收益持平。在零售业务方面，我们继续增加门店，目前在 22 个州拥有 42 家店。总体而言，Fechheimer 的前景看起来非常出色。

这跟鞋子的假设有相似的地方，H. H. Brown Shoe Co.（工作鞋/靴），Lowell Shoe Inc.（女鞋/护士鞋），可能因为其他服装和鞋子都是跟随潮流的，需要的变化太快。

• At Scott Fetzer, Ralph Schey runs 19 businesses with a mastery few bring to running one. In addition to overseeing three entities listed on page 6—World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturing—Ralph directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.

在 Scott Fetzer，Ralph Schey 管理着 19 家业务，他展现出的那种驾驭能力是很少有人能在管理一家公司时做到的。除了监督第 6 页列出的三个实体——World Book、Kirby 和 Scott Fetzer Manufacturing——之外，Ralph 还领导着一项金融业务，该业务在 1990 年创造了 1220 万美元的税前利润纪录。

Were Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.

如果 Scott Fetzer 是一家独立的公司，就净资产收益率而言，它将排在 Fortune 500 的前列，尽管它所从事的业务并非人们预期的那种经济冠军。这些卓越的业绩直接归功于 Ralph。

At World Book, earnings improved on a small decrease in unit volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less in 1990 than 1989 and the benefits of decentralization are being realized. World Book remains far and away the leader in United States encyclopedia sales and we are growing internationally, though from a small base.

在 World Book，尽管单位销量小幅下降，但收益有所提高。我们去中心化行动的成本在 1990 年比 1989 年大幅减少，而去中心化的好处正在显现。World Book 依然是美国百科全书销售领域遥遥领先的领导者，虽然基数较小，但我们在国际市场上也在增长。

Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our new vacuum cleaner, The Generation 3, which was an unqualified success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both start-up expenditures and “learning-curve” problems we encountered in manufacturing the new product. International business, whose dramatic growth I described last year, had a further 20% sales gain in 1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent earnings at Kirby in 1991.

在新款吸尘器 Generation 3 的助力下，Kirby 的单位销量在 1990 年大幅增长，这是一款取得了绝对成功的创新产品。由于制造新产品时遇到的启动支出和“学习曲线”问题，收益的增长速度没有销售额那么快。去年我描述过国际业务的剧烈增长，其在 1990 年又实现了 20% 的销售增长。在近期提价的帮助下，我们预计 Kirby 在 1991 年将获得出色的收益。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Campbell Hausfeld, its largest unit, had a particularly fine year. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million, more than 30% of which came from products introduced during the last five years.

在 Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 内部，其最大的单位 Campbell Hausfeld 表现尤为出色。这家公司是全美领先的中小型空气压缩机生产商，实现了创纪录的 1.09 亿美元销售额，其中超过 30% 来自过去五年推出的产品。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990 although earnings were $133 million. This does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote growth. Indeed, they diligently pursue both goals.

观察我们非保险业务的数据，你会发现尽管 1990 年的收益为 1.33 亿美元，但净资产仅增加了 4700 万美元。这并不意味着我们的经理人在加强业务特许权或促进增长的投资方面有任何吝啬。事实上，他们都在勤奋地追求这两个目标。

But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result: In the past five years they have funneled well over 80% of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities.

但他们也绝不会在没有充分理由的情况下部署资本。结果是：在过去的五年里，他们将超过 80% 的收益汇给了 Charlie 和我，用于新的商业和投资机会。

BRK的重要假设：资本的重新配置。

Insurance Operations

保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

下表是我们惯常使用的财产-因果保险行业关键数据的更新版本：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107—111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合成本率（combined ratio）代表总保险成本（已发生损失加上费用）与保费收入的对比：比例低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 则表示亏损。比例越高，当年的情况就越糟糕。如果考虑到保险公司通过持有投保人资金（“浮存金”）所赚取的投资收益，在不计股东提供资金收益的情况下，107 至 111 之间的综合成本率通常会产生整体盈亏平衡的结果。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow at an average of 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.

基于过去报告中陈述的原因，我们预计该行业的已发生损失将以年均 10% 的速度增长，即使在通货膨胀率远低于此的时期也是如此。（在过去的 25 年里，已发生损失实际上以更快的速度增长，即 11%。）如果保费增长在此期间大幅滞后于这 10% 的增长率，承保亏损将会加剧，尽管行业在业务转差时往往会少提准备金，这可能会暂时掩盖亏损的规模。

Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10% and underwriting results therefore worsened. (In our table, however, the severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry’s 1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trendline.) The combined ratio will again increase in 1991, probably by about two points.

去年保费增长远未达到所需的 10%，因此承保业绩有所恶化。（然而，在我们的表中，1990 年恶化的严重程度被掩盖了，因为行业在 1989 年因 Hurricane Hugo 造成的损失使得那一年的比例略高于趋势线。）1991 年的综合成本率将再次增加，可能增加约两个点。

Results will improve only when most insurance managements become so fearful that they run from business, even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist. At some point these managements will indeed get the message: The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging. But so far that point hasn’t gotten across: Insurance managers continue to dig—sullenly but vigorously.

只有当大多数保险管理层变得如此恐惧，以至于即便在价格远高于现状的情况下也避开业务时，业绩才会改善。在某个时刻，这些管理层确实会领悟到一个道理：当你发现自己身处洞穴之中，最重要的事情就是停止挖掘。但到目前为止，这一点还没有被接受：保险经理们仍在挖掘——虽然郁郁寡欢，却干劲十足。

The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur. Absent such a shock, one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses become large enough to raise management fear to a level that would spur major price increases. When that moment arrives, Berkshire will be ready—both financially and psychologically—to write huge amounts of business.

如果发生重大的物理或金融灾难，情况会迅速改变。若没有此类冲击，可能还需要一两年的时间，承保损失才会大到足以将管理层的恐惧推向促使大幅提价的水平。当那一刻到来时，Berkshire 将在财务和心理上做好准备，承接巨额业务。

In the meantime, our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory. In the next section of this report we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results. From that discussion, you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager, Mike Goldberg, and his cadre of stars, Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, and Don Wurster.

与此同时，我们的保险业务规模依然很小，但令人满意。在本报告的下一节中，我们将为您提供一个评估保险业绩的框架。通过那场讨论，您将理解为什么我对我们的保险经理 Mike Goldberg 及其明星团队——Rod Eldred、Dinos Iordanou、Ajit Jain 和 Don Wurster 的表现如此热忱。

In assessing our insurance results over the next few years, you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile. If this line of business expands, as it may, our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you might expect: In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations and in an occasional year we will fall far below them.

在评估我们未来几年的保险业绩时，你应该意识到我们正在追求的一种业务类型，这可能会导致业绩异常波动。如果这项业务如预期般扩张，我们的承保经验将偏离你可能预期的趋势线：在大多数年份，我们将略微超出预期，而在偶尔的年份，我们将远低于预期。

The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have become a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes (“super-cats”), which could for example be hurricanes, windstorms or earthquakes. The buyers of these policies are reinsurance companies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers and that wish to “lay off,” or rid themselves, of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity. Because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress—perhaps even chaos—in the insurance business, they seek financially strong sellers. And here we have a major competitive advantage: In the industry, our strength is unmatched.

我预测的波动性反映了一个事实：我们已经成为真正重大灾难（“super-cats”）保险的大卖家，例如飓风、风暴或地震。这些保单的买家是再保险公司，它们本身从事为初级保险公司提供灾难保障的业务，并希望“卸下”或摆脱其在特大严重灾难中的部分风险敞口。由于这些买家对此类保单的赔付需求只会在保险业极度紧张——甚至是混乱——的时刻出现，因此他们寻求财务实力雄厚的卖方。在这方面，我们拥有重大的竞争优势：在行业内，我们的实力是无与伦比的。

A typical super-cat contract is complicated. But in a plain- vanilla instance we might write a one-year, $10 million policy providing that the buyer, a reinsurer, would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results: (1) specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount; and (2) aggregate losses for the insurance industry of, say, more than $5 billion. Under virtually all circumstances, loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met.

一个典型的 super-cat 合同很复杂。但在一个简单的例子中，我们可能会签发一份为期一年、保额为 1000 万美元的保单，规定只有在灾难导致两个结果时，买方（即再保险公司）才能获得该笔赔付：(1) 再保险公司的特定损失超过某个门槛金额；(2) 整个保险行业的总损失（例如）超过 50 亿美元。在几乎所有情况下，满足第二个条件的损失水平也会导致第一个条件被满足。

For this $10 million policy, we might receive a premium of, say, $3 million. Say, also, that we take in annual premiums of $100 million from super-cat policies of all kinds. In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to $100 million or a loss of well over $200 million. Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do; we are concentrating it. Therefore, our yearly combined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100—120, but will instead be close to either zero or 300%.

对于这一份 1000 万美元的保单，我们可能会收到例如 300 万美元的保费。再假设，我们每年从各种“超级灾难（super-cat）”保单中获得 1 亿美元的总保费。在这种情况下，我们在任何特定的年份里，极有可能要么报告接近 1 亿美元的利润，要么报告远超 2 亿美元的亏损。请注意，我们并没有像通常的保险公司那样分散风险，而是在集中风险。因此，我们这项业务的年度综合成本率（combined ratio）几乎绝不会落在行业通行的 100 到 120 之间，而是会接近 0 或 300%。

Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings. And if they have the ability to do so, they often lack the desire. They may back away, for example, because they write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on super- cat reinsurance. In addition, most corporate managements believe that their shareholders dislike volatility in results.

大多数保险公司在财务上无法忍受这样的波动。即便他们有这种能力，往往也缺乏这种意愿。例如，他们可能会退缩，因为他们承保了大量的初级财产保险，这会使他们在遭受“超级灾难”再保险重大损失的同时，由于基础业务的表现也极其糟糕而陷入困境。此外，大多数公司管理层认为他们的股东讨厌业绩波动。

We can take a different tack: Our business in primary property insurance is small and we believe that Berkshire shareholders, if properly informed, can handle unusual volatility in profits so long as the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long-term results. (Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.)

我们可以采取不同的策略：我们的初级财产保险业务规模较小，而且我们相信，只要这些波动带有可能带来长期优异回报的前景，Berkshire 的股东们在获得充分信息的情况下，能够应对利润中不寻常的波动。（Charlie 和我总是更喜欢有波动的 15% 回报，而不是平稳的 12%。）

We want to emphasize three points: (1) While we expect our super-cat business to produce satisfactory results over, say, a decade, we’re sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an occasional year; (2) Our expectations can be based on little more than subjective judgments—for this kind of insurance, historical loss data are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today; and (3) Though we expect to write significant quantities of super-cat business, we will do so only at prices we believe to be commensurate with risk. If competitors become optimistic, our volume will fall. This insurance has, in fact, tended in recent years to be woefully underpriced; most sellers have left the field on stretchers.

我们要强调三点：(1) 虽然我们预计我们的“超级灾难”业务在例如十年的周期内会产生令人满意的结果，但我们确信，它至少在偶尔的年份里会产生绝对糟糕的结果；(2) 我们的预期基本上只能基于主观判断——对于这类保险，历史损失数据在我们决定今天应该收取多少保费时，价值非常有限；(3) 尽管我们希望承接大量的“超级灾难”业务，但我们只会在我们认为与风险相匹配的价格下这样做。如果竞争对手变得乐观，我们的业务量就会下降。事实上，这类保险近年来往往定价低得可怜；大多数卖家都是躺在担架上离开战场的。

At the moment, we believe Berkshire to be the largest U.S. writer of super-cat business. So when a major quake occurs in an urban area or a winter storm rages across Europe, light a candle for us.

目前，我们相信 Berkshire 是 U.S. 最大的“超级灾难”业务承保商。因此，当市区发生大地震或冬季风暴席卷 Europe 时，请为我们点亮一根蜡烛（祈祷）。

Measuring Insurance Performance

衡量保险业绩

In the previous section I mentioned “float,” the funds of others that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold. Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth—that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.

在前一节中，我提到了“float（浮存金）”，即保险公司在经营业务过程中暂时持有的他人资金。由于这些资金可用于投资，典型的财产-责任险公司可以承受超过保费 7% 至 11% 的损失和费用，并在业务上依然实现盈亏平衡。同样，这一计算不包括保险公司在净资产（即股东提供的资金）上实现的收益。

However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer.

然而，这一 7% 至 11% 的范围存在许多例外。例如，针对农作物冰雹损失的保险几乎完全不产生浮存金。这类业务的保费在冰雹威胁即将来临前支付给保险公司，如果农民遭受损失，他几乎会立即获得赔付。因此，对于农作物冰雹保险来说，100 的综合成本率不会给保险公司带来任何利润。

At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance “long- tail” business, in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and to the insurer’s lawyers as well).

在另一个极端，针对医生、律师和会计师潜在责任的 malpractice（专业责任保险）与年保费量相比，会产生极高比例的浮存金。浮存金之所以产生，是因为索赔往往在所谓的侵权行为发生很久之后才提出，而且由于漫长的诉讼，赔付可能会被进一步推迟。业界将专业责任险和某些其他类型的责任险称为“long-tail（长尾）”业务，这是考虑到保险公司可以长期持有大笔资金，而这些资金最终将支付给索赔人及其律师（以及保险公司的律师）。

In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch, though, is that “long-tail” means exactly that: Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.

在长尾业务的情况下，115（甚至更高）的综合成本率也可以被证明是有利可图的，因为浮存金产生的收益将超过索赔和费用超出保费的 15%。然而，问题在于，“长尾”的确切含义正是如此：某一年承保的责任险业务，最初推测产生的综合成本率为 115，但随着岁月流逝，当所有索赔最终结案时，可能会给保险公司带来 200、300 甚至更糟糕的打击。

The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses; aiming for 110—115 is business suicide.

这项业务的陷阱强制要求一个经常被忽视的经营原则：尽管某些长尾业务线在 110 或 115 的综合成本率下可能被证明是有利可图的，但保险公司若将这些比率作为定价目标，最终总会发现这是无利可图的。相反，定价必须提供健康的“安全边际（margin of safety）”，以抵御那些不断给保险业带来昂贵意外的社会趋势。将目标定在 100 本身就可能导致重大亏损；而将目标定在 110—115 简直是商业自杀。

All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer’s profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio—and it’s true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float developed.

话虽如此，衡量保险公司盈利能力的标准应该是什么？分析师和管理层通常关注综合成本率——诚然，这个尺度通常能很好地衡量一家公司的盈利排名。然而，我们认为一个更好的衡量标准是：将承保亏损与所产生的浮存金进行对比。

This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost translates into a poor business.

这种“亏损/浮存金”比率，就像任何用于评估保险业绩的统计数据一样，在短期内是毫无意义的：季度的承保数据甚至年度数据都过多地基于估算，因此没有太大用处。但当这一比率涵盖了数年的跨度时，它就能大致显示出保险经营所产生的资金成本。极低的资金成本象征着一项优良的业务；而高成本则意味着一项差劲的业务。

On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data we have computed a “cost of funds developed from insurance.”

在下一页，我们展示了自我们进入该行业以来，保险集团每年的承保亏损（如果有的话），并将该底线与我们在年内持有的平均浮存金联系起来。根据这些数据，我们计算出了“由保险产生的资金成本”。

The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents’ balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored.

浮存金（float）的数字是由损失准备金、损失调整费用准备金以及未赚保费准备金的总额，减去代理人余额、预付收购成本以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用而得出的。对于某些保险公司，其他项目也应纳入计算，但在我们的案例中，这些项目并不重要，因此被忽略了。

During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years, such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government.

1990 年间，我们持有约 16 亿美元的浮存金，这些资金最终注定要流向他人手中。我们在这一年承担的承保亏损为 2700 万美元，因此我们的保险业务为我们产生资金的成本约为 1.6%。如表所示，我们在某些年份实现了承保盈利，在这些情况下，我们的资金成本低于零。而在其他年份，例如 1984 年，我们为浮存金支付了极高的代价。不过，在我们从事保险业的 24 年中，有 19 年产生的资金成本低于政府支付的成本（国债利率）。

There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won’t know our true 1967—1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax-efficient.

这一计算有两个重要的限制条件。首先，“胖女人还没开始漱口，更不用说开唱了”（意指事情远未结束），直到几十年后这一时期的所有损失都结算完毕，我们才会知道 1967 年至 1990 年真正的资金成本。其次，浮存金对股东的价值在一定程度上因以下事实而受到削弱：股东必须投入自己的资金来支持保险业务，并且这些资金赚取的投资收益还要面临双重征税。直接投资在税务上会更有效率。

The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire.

间接投资给股东带来的税务惩罚实际上是相当大的。尽管计算必然是不精确的，但我估计普通保险公司的所有者会发现，税务惩罚会使他们的浮存金成本增加约一个百分点。我也认为这大致是 Berkshire 的正确数值。

Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty) is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive—and if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.

计算保险业务的资金成本，可以让任何分析它的人确定该项业务对股东而言是正价值还是负价值。如果这一成本（包括税务惩罚）高于替代资金来源的成本，那么其价值就是负的。如果成本较低，价值就是正的——如果成本显著降低，那么这项保险业务就是一个非常宝贵的资产。

So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO’s growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially, GEICO’s policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But handsome is as handsome does: GEICO’s unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for policyholders.)

到目前为止，Berkshire 一直属于“显著降低”阵营。更具戏剧性的是 GEICO 的数据，我们目前持有该公司 48% 的权益，且该公司通常在承保上是盈利的。GEICO 的增长产生了规模日益庞大的投资资金，其有效成本远低于零。从本质上讲，GEICO 的投保人作为一个整体，是在向公司支付浮存金的利息，而不是相反。（但“行美方见貌美”：GEICO 非同寻常的盈利能力源于其非凡的经营效率和对风险的细致分类，这一组合反过来又使投保人能够享受极低的价格。）

Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance—and history indicates that is an almost impossible task—their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.

另一方面，许多知名的保险公司承担着承保亏损/浮存金成本，加上税务惩罚，为所有者带来了负面结果。此外，这些公司与行业内所有其他公司一样，在灾难性损失面前非常脆弱，这些损失可能会超过其再保险保障，并使它们的浮存金成本飙升至无法衡量的程度。除非这些公司能够实质性地改善其承保业绩——而历史表明这几乎是一项不可能完成的任务——否则它们的股东所经历的结果，将类似于一家支付给存款人的利息高于其贷款利息的银行所有者所承受的结果。

非常形象的比喻。

All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the benefits produced by the float.

总而言之，保险业务对我们非常眷顾。我们以平均而言合理的成本扩大了我们的浮存金，并且由于我们在这些低成本资金上获得了良好的回报，我们进一步实现了繁荣。诚然，我们的股东承担了额外的税收，但到目前为止，浮存金产生的收益已远远补偿了这项成本。

A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg’s arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.

关于我们的记录，一个特别令人鼓舞的点是，尽管在 Mike Goldberg 到任之前你们的主席犯过一些巨大的错误，但我们依然取得了这样的成绩。保险业提供了大量的犯错机会，而当机会敲门时，我往往都会应门。多年以后，这些错误的账单仍在不断寄来：在保险业，愚蠢行为是没有诉讼时效的。

The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one—among all the fine businesses we own—that has the greatest potential.

计算我们保险业务的内在价值，总是比计算（比如说）我们的糖果或报纸公司的价值要困难得多。然而，无论以何种标准衡量，该业务的价值都远高于其账面价值。此外，尽管这项业务周期性地给我们带来麻烦，但在我们拥有的所有优秀业务中，它是潜力最大的一个。

Marketable Securities

可上市证券

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下面我们列出了价值超过 1 亿美元的普通股持仓。这些投资中有一小部分属于 Berkshire 持股不足 100% 的子公司。

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.

近乎懒散的沉稳依然是我们投资风格的基石：今年，对于我们的六大重仓股中的五只，我们既没有买入也没有卖出过一股。唯一的例外是 Wells Fargo，这是一家管理卓越、高回报的银行业务，我们将其持股比例增加到了略低于 10% 的水平，这是在未经 Federal Reserve Board 批准的情况下我们所能持有的最高限额。我们持仓中约六分之一是在 1989 年买入的，其余部分是在 1990 年买入的。

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity—a common ratio in this industry—mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the “institutional imperative:” the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

银行业并非我们的心头好。当资产是净资产的 20 倍时——这是该行业常见的比例——仅涉及一小部分资产的错误就可能摧毁大部分净资产。而在许多大银行中，错误一直是常态而非例外。大多数错误源于我们去年在讨论“制度性强制力（institutional imperative）”时描述的一种管理失败：即高管们倾向于盲目模仿同行的行为，无论这样做有多么愚蠢。在贷款方面，许多银行家以旅鼠般的狂热玩着“跟随领导者”的游戏；现在，他们正经历着旅鼠般的命运。

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a “cheap” price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

由于 20:1 的杠杆放大了管理优势和劣势的影响，我们对以“便宜”的价格购买管理不善的银行股票没有兴趣。相反，我们唯一的兴趣是以公平的价格买入管理良好的银行。

和保险业的浮存金不一样，银行存款不能长期锁定，再往深想一想更有问题，储户和放在银行里的存款天生不稳定，“人一旦害怕，就是真的害怕”，“任何资本金要求，都无法真正保护你免于一场“真实的挤兑”，参考：《2018-02-24 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will be modest – at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment decisions.

至少在未来几年内，浮存金可能会缓慢增长。当我们最终经历浮存金下降时，降幅将是温和的——任何单一年份最多下降3%左右。与银行存款或包含退保选项的人寿保险保单不同，财产意外险的浮存金是不能被提取的。这意味着财产意外险公司在金融普遍承压时期不会经历大规模的“挤兑”，这一特性对伯克希尔至关重要，也是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。

Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.

查理和我绝不会以依赖陌生人善意的方式来运营伯克希尔——甚至也不会依赖那些自身可能面临流动性问题的朋友。在2008-2009年的危机期间，我们乐于持有美国国库券——大量的国库券——这使我们不必依赖银行或商业票据等金融资源。我们有意将伯克希尔打造成能够从容抵御经济中断的模式，包括像长期市场关闭这样的极端情况。

存当出现急速变化、系统性风险的时候，存款端出现挤兑，贷款又不能同步收回，再叠加20倍的杠杆，存在清零的风险，这也是中央银行和存款保险制度存在的原因。

把“不稳定的钱”借给别人，是银行的第1个结构性矛盾；钱又是完全同质化的产品，这是第2个结构性矛盾，你无法让一笔钱（贷款）比竞争对手的"更好"。在这个行业里，唯一可见的竞争力指标就是利差与规模增速，而拉高利差的方式包括：（1）短借长贷但又不敢拉的太长，2023年的硅谷银行（SVB）是很好的例子；（2）放松贷款标准、追逐更高风险的借款人。

这是一个极具破坏力的机制：当同行在房地产泡沫或某类高收益资产上赚钱时，保守的银行在短期内"看起来落后"——客户流失、股东施压。更要命的是，"好的信贷标准"与"激进的信贷标准"在贷款发放的那一刻不容易区分，差异要等到信用周期的下行段才能暴露。

巴菲特的评论中基本上把“制度性强制力（institutional imperative）”和银行业做了强关联，在这样一个极易诱发“制度性强制力”的行业里，极其出色的管理层是银行的关键变量。

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another—Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: “I’m no genius,” he said. “I’m smart in spots—but I stay around those spots.”)

对于 Wells Fargo，我们认为我们得到了业内最好的管理者 Carl Reichardt 和 Paul Hazen。在很多方面，Carl 和 Paul 的组合让我想起另一对搭档——Capital Cities/ABC 的 Tom Murphy 和 Dan Burke。首先，每一对组合都比其各部分之和更强大，因为每一位合伙人都理解、信任并钦佩对方。其次，这两个管理团队都给予能干的人丰厚的报酬，但都极其厌恶拥有超出需要的员工人数。第三，无论利润处于创纪录水平还是面临压力，两支团队都会同样积极地缩减成本。最后，两者都坚持自己理解的领域，让他们的能力而不是自我意识来决定他们的尝试。（IBM 的 Thomas J. Watson Sr. 也遵循同样的规则：“我不是天才，”他说，“我在某些方面很聪明——但我只待在那些领域周围。”）

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled—often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well—investors understandably concluded that no bank’s numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

我们在 1990 年对 Wells Fargo 的购买得益于银行股市场的混乱。这种乱局是理所应当的：昔日备受推崇的银行那些愚蠢的贷款决策月复一月地被公之于众。随着一笔又一笔巨额亏损被揭露——而且往往紧随管理层关于“一切安好”的保证之后——投资者理所当然地认为，没有任何一家银行的数据是值得信赖的。借着他们逃离银行股的机会，我们以 2.9 亿美元买入了 Wells Fargo 10% 的权益，这还不到其税后收益的五倍，不到其税前收益的三倍。

Wells Fargo is big—it has $56 billion in assets—and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

Wells Fargo 规模庞大——它拥有 560 亿美元的资产——且净资产收益率一直超过 20%，资产回报率为 1.25%。我们购买该银行十分之一的股份，可以大致等同于我们买下了一家具有相同财务特征、资产规模为 50 亿美元银行的 100% 股权。但如果我们真的去进行这样一笔收购，我们需要支付的金额大约是投资 Wells Fargo 所花的 2.9 亿美元的两倍。此外，那家开出溢价的高价银行还会给我们带来另一个问题：我们无法找到一个 Carl Reichardt 来管理它。近年来，Wells Fargo 的高管比银行业中任何其他人都更受猎头青睐；然而，没有人能够挖走这位“院长”。

Of course, ownership of a bank—or about any other business—is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic—the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market’s major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

当然，拥有一家银行——或几乎任何其他业务——都绝非没有风险。California 的银行面临着大地震的特定风险，地震可能给借款人造成足够的破坏，进而摧毁向他们提供贷款的银行。第二个风险是系统性的——即可能发生极其严重的经济萎缩或金融恐慌，以至于几乎危及所有高杠杆机构，无论其经营得多么明智。最后，市场目前主要的担忧是，由于过度建设，West Coast 的房地产价值将会暴跌，并给资助了这一扩张的银行带来巨额损失。由于 Wells Fargo 是领先的房地产贷款人，它被认为特别脆弱。

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank’s loans—not just its real estate loans—were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

这些可能性都不能被排除。然而，前两种情况发生的概率很低，即使房地产价值出现实质性下跌，也不太可能给管理良好的机构带来重大问题。考虑一下数学计算：Wells Fargo 目前在扣除超过 3 亿美元的贷款损失支出后，每年税前收入仍远超 10 亿美元。如果 1991 年该银行全部 480 亿美元贷款中的 10%——不仅仅是房地产贷款——出现问题，且这些问题导致的损失（包括利息损失）平均占本金的 30%，该公司也大约能达到盈亏平衡。

1、特定地区的风险；（2）金融危机的风险；（3）特定业务的风险，巴菲特的结论是前两者概率低，第三个风险真实但可以用数学测算承受能力。

可以相信前几大银行是“大而不倒”的，任何政府都很承受大型银行倒闭的风险，中国的银行更不担心前两者的风险，特别是第（2）点，大银行很难发生挤兑，可能都没有实施操作的方法。

但是对于新加坡的银行，比如，DBS，巴菲特列举的三个风险要真实的多。2023年硅谷银行（SVB）的崩溃是个可以参考的例子，由于持有大量长期国债，利率上升导致资产端浮亏，引起储户担忧后存款大规模流出，银行被迫在市场最差的时候贱卖长期资产，两边同时崩塌。

SVB 给了一个现代版本：数字化提款速度可以把“挤兑”从几天压缩到几小时——官方材料披露，2023-03-09 单日流出约 420 亿美元存款，且第二天还有大量提款指令排队；同时 90%+ 存款为未保险存款，先天更容易在恐慌中迁移。这也解释了为什么美国事后动用了系统性风险例外来保护未保险存款人，而中国的银行可能采用了最低成本的策略。

A year like that—which we consider only a low-level possibility, not a likelihood—would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.

像那样的一年——我们认为这只是一种极低的可能性，而非必然——并不会让我们感到困扰。事实上，在 Berkshire，我们非常乐意收购那些在一年内不产生回报、但随后预期能以不断增长的净资产获得 20% 回报的业务，或对其进行资本项目投资。尽管如此，由于担心 California 发生类似于 New England 经历过的房地产灾难，Wells Fargo 的股价在 1990 年的短短几个月内下跌了近 50%。即便我们在大跌前的价位已经买入了一些股份，我们依然对这种下跌表示欢迎，因为它使我们能够以全新的、惊恐的价格买入更多股份。

Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. (It’s the seller of food who doesn’t like declining prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint—even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand—because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.

那些预期一生中会持续购买投资资产的投资者，应当对市场波动采取类似的态：然而，许多人却不合逻辑地在股价上涨时感到欣喜若狂，在股价下跌时感到闷闷不乐。他们在面对食物价格时却不会表现出这种困惑：因为知道自己永远是食物的购买者，他们欢迎价格下跌，而对价格上涨感到不满。（不喜欢价格下跌的是食物的卖方。）同样地，在 Buffalo News，我们会为新闻纸价格的下跌而欢呼——即便这意味着我们必须减记手头始终持有的大量新闻纸库存的价值——因为我们知道我们将永远购买这种产品。

Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire’s investments. We will be buying businesses—or small parts of businesses, called stocks—year in, year out as long as I live (and longer, if Berkshire’s directors attend the seances I have scheduled). Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.

同样的逻辑指导着我们对 Berkshire 投资的思考。只要我活着（如果 Berkshire 的董事们能参加我安排的降神会，我活得还会更久），我们年复一年地购买企业——或者称为“股票”的企业小部分所有权。基于这些意愿，企业价格的下跌对我们有利，而价格的上涨则对我们有害。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism—some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It’s optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

低价最常见的原因是悲观情绪——有时是普遍性的，有时是针对特定公司或行业的。我们希望在这种环境中开展业务，并不是因为我们喜欢悲观，而是因为我们喜欢它所产生的价格。乐观情绪才是理性买家的敌人。

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What’s required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell’s observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: “Most men would rather die than think. Many do.”

然而，这并不意味着仅仅因为某项业务或股票不受欢迎，它就是一项明智的购买；逆向投资的方法与随大流的策略同样愚蠢。投资需要的是思考而非民意调查。遗憾的是，Bertrand Russell 对普通生活的观察在金融界有着异乎寻常的约束力：“大多数人宁愿死也不愿思考。事实上，很多人确实死了。”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this, however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)

去年我们另一个重大的投资组合变动是大幅增持了 RJR Nabisco 的债券，这是我们最初在 1989 年底买入的证券。到 1990 年底，我们在这些证券上投资了 4.4 亿美元，这一数额与其市场价值大致相符。（然而，在我写这篇文章时，它们的市场价值已经上涨了超过 1.5 亿美元。）

Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire’s results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any category of investment, so long as we understand the business we’re buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly. (Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of open-mindedness: “I can’t understand why more people aren’t bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.”)

正如买入银行股对我们来说非同寻常一样，购买低于投资级别的债券也是如此。但是，能让我们感兴趣且规模大到足以对 Berkshire 的业绩产生价值影响的机会非常罕见。因此，我们会考虑任何类别的投资，只要我们理解所进入的行业，并相信价格与价值之间可能存在显著差异。（Woody Allen 在另一个语境下指出过开放心态的优势：“我不明白为什么更多的人不是双性恋，因为这能让你在周六晚上约会的机会增加一倍。”）

In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned “fallen angels”—bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the Washington Public Power Supply System.

过去，我们曾成功购买过一些低于投资级别的债券，尽管这些都是老式的“坠落天使（fallen angels）”——即最初属于投资级别，但在发行人陷入困境时被降级的债券。在 1984 年的年度报告中，我们描述了购买其中一个坠落天使——Washington Public Power Supply System 的逻辑。

A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s—”junk bonds” that were far below investment- grade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990—even before the recession dealt its blows—the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.

20 世纪 80 年代，一种变异的坠落天使闯入了投资领域——即发行时就远低于投资级别的“垃圾债券（junk bonds）”。随着那十年的推进，新发行的“人造垃圾”变得越来越垃圾，最终可预见的结果发生了：垃圾债券名副其实。在 1990 年——甚至在经济衰退造成打击之前——金融界的天空就因破产公司的尸体横行而变得昏暗。

The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn’t happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We’ll acknowledge that such an attention-getter would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence would be a deadly—and unnecessary—accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.

债务的信徒们曾向我们保证，这种崩溃不会发生：我们被告知，巨额债务将促使经营管理者以前所未有的方式集中精力，这就像在汽车方向盘上装一把匕首，可以预见这会使驾驶员格外小心地行驶。我们承认，这种引人注目的方式确实会造就一名非常警觉的司机。但另一个必然的结果是，如果汽车撞上哪怕是最微小的坑洼或一片薄冰，都会引发一场致命的且不必要的意外。商业之路布满了坑洼；一个要求避开所有坑洼的计划，注定是一个走向灾难的计划。

In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: “Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety.” Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.

在《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）的最后一章中，Ben Graham 有力地驳斥了“匕首论”：“如果面临将稳健投资的秘诀浓缩为三个字的挑战，我们大胆提出这个座右铭：安全边际（Margin of Safety）。”在读到这句话 42 年后的今天，我依然认为这三个字是正确的。投资者未能留意这一简单信息，导致他们在 1990 年代初期遭受了惊人的损失。

At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious “kill- ‘em-at-birth” case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it exceeded the station’s gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode—or else the station was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)

在债务狂热的高峰期，人们炮制出了一些注定失败的资本结构：在某些案例中，发行的债务如此之多，以至于即便拥有极其理想的经营业绩，也无法产生足够的资金来偿还债务。几年前一个尤为恶劣的“胎死腹中”案例涉及收购 Tampa 的一家成熟电视台，收购时背负的债务如此沉重，以至于利息支出竟然超过了该电台的总营收。即便你假设所有的劳动力、节目和服务都是捐赠而非购买的，这种资本结构也要求营收出现爆炸式增长——否则该电台注定破产。（资助这笔收购的许多债券都卖给了如今已倒闭的储蓄和贷款协会；作为纳税人，你正在为这种愚蠢行为买单。）

All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the “scholarly” research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds. (Beware of past-performance “proofs” in finance: If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

这一切现在看来似乎不可思议。然而，在这些劣行发生时，推销“匕首”的投资银行家们指着学术界的“学术”研究，报告称多年来从低等级债券中获得的高利息足以弥补其较高的违约率。因此，那些和蔼可亲的推销员们说，多元化的垃圾债券组合将产生比高等级债券组合更高的净回报。（警惕金融界关于“过去表现”的证明：如果历史书是致富的关键，那么 Fortune 400 强将由图书馆管理员组成。）

There was a flaw in the salesmen’s logic—one that a first- year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version served at Jonestown.)

这些推销员的逻辑中存在一个缺陷——这是一个统计学一年级学生都被教导要识别的缺陷。他们做出了一个假设，即“新铸造的垃圾债券”群体与“低等级的坠落天使”群体是完全相同的，因此，后者的违约经验对于预测新发行债券的违约经验具有参考意义。（这就像是在喝下 Jonestown 提供的 Kool-Aid 之前，先去查阅这种饮料的历史死亡率一样，是一个类似的错误。）

The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.

这两个群体在几个关键方面当然是不同的。首先，“坠落天使”的管理者几乎无一例外地渴望恢复投资级地位，并为此目标而努力。而垃圾债券的操盘手通常是完全不同的一类人。他们的行为很像海洛因成瘾者，精力不是放在寻找摆脱债务负担的疗法上，而是放在寻找下一次“毒瘾”发作的快感（即新的债务支持）上。此外，管理典型“坠落天使”的高管们的受托责任意识，往往比那些发行垃圾债券的“金融狂徒（financiopath）”要敏锐得多——尽管并非总是如此。

Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street’s enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn’t care to those who didn’t think—and there was no shortage of either.

Wall Street 很少在乎这些区别。一如既往，这条街对一个创意的热情与其价值无关，而是与其能产生的收入成正比。成山的垃圾债券被那些不在乎的人卖给了那些不思考的人——而这两者都不缺。

Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these is on a day with no “y” in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the field, now that it is in disarray.

垃圾债券依然是一个地雷区，即便现在的价格往往只是发行价的一小部分。正如我们去年所说的，我们从未买过新发行的垃圾债券。（购买这些债券的唯一时间是名字里不带“y”的日子，意即永远不买。）然而，既然该领域现在陷入了混乱，我们愿意观察一下。

In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company’s credit is considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of equity, and in general is being run well.

就 RJR Nabisco 而言，我们认为该公司的信用状况明显好于一段时间以来人们普遍的认知，而且我们获得的回报率以及资本增值的潜力，足以补偿我们承担的风险（尽管风险远非为零）。RJR 以有利的价格出售了资产，增加了大量权益，而且总体经营状况良好。

However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as the junk market continues to unravel.

然而，当我们环顾这一领域时，大多数低等级债券看起来仍然没有吸引力。20 世纪 80 年代 Wall Street 的“杰作”甚至比我们想象的还要糟糕：许多重要的企业已经受到了致命的打击。不过，随着垃圾债券市场的继续瓦解，我们将继续寻找机会。

Convertible Preferred Stocks

可转换优先股

We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. and $300 million of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1. Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.

我们继续持有早先报告中描述的可转换优先股：7 亿美元的 Salomon Inc，6 亿美元的 The Gillette Company，3.58 亿美元的 USAir Group, Inc. 以及 3 亿美元的 Champion International Corp.。我们在 Gillette 的持仓将于 4 月 1 日转换为 1200 万股普通股。综合权衡利率、信用质量以及相关普通股的价格，我们可以评估到 1990 年底，我们在 Salomon 和 Champion 的持仓价值与买入成本相当，Gillette 的价值略高，而 USAir 的价值则大幅缩水。

In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I committed an “unforced error.”) The company’s troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil.

在购买 USAir 时，你们的主席展现了“精妙”的时机把握：我几乎是在该业务陷入严重困境的精确时刻杀入其中的。（没人逼我；用网球术语来说，我犯了一个“非受迫性失误”。）该公司的麻烦既源于行业环境，也源于整合 Piedmont 时遇到的投产后困难，这本是我应该预料到的痛苦，因为几乎所有的航空公司合并之后都会出现运营动荡。

In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type product, it’s impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor.

Ed Colodny 和 Seth Schofield 很快解决了第二个问题：该航空公司现在的服务评分非常出色。事实证明，全行业的问题要严重得多。自我们购买以来，航空业的经济状况以惊人的速度恶化，某些运营商采取的“神风特攻队”式（自杀式）定价策略加速了这一过程。这种定价给所有运营商带来的麻烦说明了一个重要的事实：在销售同质化产品的行业中，你不可能比你最愚蠢的竞争对手聪明多少。

However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made it.

然而，除非该行业在未来几年内全军覆没，否则我们的 USAir 投资应该能转危为安。Ed 和 Seth 通过对运营进行重大调整，果断地应对了当前的动荡。即便如此，我们的投资现在也比我刚进入时更不安全了。

长期的经济前景是显而易见的，但是背负重资产的压力仍然是个死亡的陷阱。

Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred, convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.

我们的可转换优先股是相对简单的证券，但我必须警告你们，如果以史为鉴，你们可能会不时读到有关它们的错误或误导性言论。例如，去年有几位媒体人士计算出我们所有优先股的价值等同于它们可转换成的普通股价值。按照他们的逻辑，如果我们以 38 美元转换的 Salomon 优先股，在 Salomon 普通股售价为 22.80 美元时，其价值仅为面值的 60%。但这种推理逻辑有一个小问题：按照这个逻辑，你必须得出一个结论，即可转换优先股的所有价值都存在于转换权中，而 Salomon 的不可转换优先股的价值将为零，无论其票面利率或赎回条款如何。

The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may be worth more because of their conversion options.

你应该记住的一点是，我们可转换优先股的大部分价值源自其固定收益特性。这意味着这些证券的价值不可能低于作为不可转换优先股所具有的价值，并且由于拥有转换期权，其价值可能会更高。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in January. No description better fitted Colman than “gentleman”—a word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will miss Colman so much.

我深感遗憾，不得不以提到我的朋友、Gillette 的首席执行官 Colman Mockler, Jr. 在一月去世的消息来结束本节报告。没有比“君子（gentleman）”一词更适合形容 Colman 的了——这个词象征着正直、勇气和谦逊。将这些品质与 Colman 所拥有的幽默感和卓越的商业能力结合起来，你就能理解为什么我认为与他共事是一种纯粹的快乐，以及为什么我，和所有认识他的人，会如此怀念 Colman。

A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company’s success in shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus its energies on coming up with something better, even though its existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.

就在 Colman 去世前几天，Gillette 在《Forbes》的一篇封面文章中受到了高度赞扬。其主题很简单：该公司在剃须产品领域的成功并非源于营销手段（尽管它反复展示了这方面的天赋），而是源于其对质量的执着。这种心态使其始终致力于研发更好的产品，即使其现有产品已经处于该领域的顶尖水平。在这样描绘 Gillette 的同时，《Forbes》实际上也为 Colman 画了一幅肖像。

Help! Help!

救命！救命！

Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire. And, as we constantly preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work: Several businesses have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages of our interest in making acquisitions. (Any good ad salesman will tell you that trying to sell something without advertising is like winking at a girl in the dark.)

常客们都知道，我会厚颜无耻地利用年度致股东信来尝试为 Berkshire 收购企业。而且，正如我们在 Buffalo News 经常宣扬的那样，广告确实有效：有几家企业找上门来，就是因为有人在这些篇幅中读到了我们对进行收购的兴趣。（任何优秀的广告推销员都会告诉你，不打广告就想卖东西，就像在黑暗中对姑娘挤眉弄眼。）

In Appendix B (on pages 26-27) I’ve reproduced the essence of a letter I wrote a few years back to the owner/manager of a desirable business. If you have no personal connection with a business that might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can pass this report along to him.

在第 26-27 页的 Appendix B 中，我转载了我几年前写给一位心仪企业的业主兼经理的信函要点。如果你本人与我们可能感兴趣的企业没有联系，但你的朋友有，或许你可以把这份报告转交给他。

Here’s the sort of business we are looking for:

以下是我们正在寻找的企业类型：

(1)Large purchases (at least 10 million of after-tax earnings),

规模巨大的收购（税后收益至少为 1000 万美元）；

(2)Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),

经证明且持续的盈利能力（我们对未来的预测几乎没有兴趣，也不看好“转危为安”的情况）；

(3)Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

在负债极少或不负债的情况下，能够获得良好净资产收益率的企业；

(4)Management in place (we can’t supply it),

现成的管理层（我们无法提供管理人员）；

(5)Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

业务简单（如果涉及大量技术，我们将无法理解它）；

(6)An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

明确的报价（我们不想在价格不明的情况下进行哪怕是初步的谈判，以免浪费我们或卖方的时间）。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer—customarily within five minutes—as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会参与非友好型收购。我们可以承诺完全保密，并能在极短的时间内——通常在五分钟内——给出我们是否有兴趣的答复。我们倾向于以现金购买，但当我们获得的内在商业价值与我们付出的对等时，也会考虑发行股票。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin- Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner- managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的收购模式是符合 Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman 家族模范的那种。在这些案例中，公司的所有者兼经理人希望筹集大量现金，有时是为了他们自己，但通常是为了他们的家人或不参与经营的股东。与此同时，这些经理人希望保持重要的所有权地位，并继续像过去一样经营公司。我们认为，对于有此类目标的业主来说，我们是特别合适的合作伙伴。我们邀请潜在的卖方通过联系过去与我们合作过的人来了解我们。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”

我和 Charlie 经常接到一些完全不符合我们标准的收购邀约：我们发现，如果你登广告说想买牧羊犬，会有很多人打电话来推销他们的可卡犬。一首乡村歌曲中的歌词表达了我们对风险投资、转亏为盈型企业或拍卖式销售的感觉：“当电话没响时，你就知道那是我。”

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.

除了对上述企业的收购感兴趣外，我们还对通过协商购买大宗但非控股的股份感兴趣，类似于我们在 Capital Cities、Salomon、Gillette、USAir 和 Champion 所持有的股份。然而，我们对接收关于在普通股票市场中可能进行的投资建议不感兴趣。

Miscellaneous

其他事项

Ken Chace has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age for directors at Berkshire (and won’t!), but Ken, at 75 and living in Maine, simply decided to cut back his activities.

Ken Chace 已决定不再在即将举行的年度会议上竞选连任董事。在 Berkshire，我们没有董事强制退休年龄（以后也不会有！），但 75 岁且住在 Maine 的 Ken 只是决定缩减他的活动。

Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after Buffett Partnership, Ltd. assumed control of Berkshire early in 1965. Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken: He ran the operation well, he was always 100% straight with me about its problems, and he generated the funds that allowed us to diversify into insurance.

1965 年初，在 Buffett Partnership, Ltd. 取得 Berkshire 的控制权后，Ken 是我管理纺织业务的首选。虽然我执着于纺织业务是一个经济上的错误，但我选择 Ken 并没有错：他经营得很好，在面对问题时始终对我 100% 坦诚，并且他产生的资金让我们得以向保险业转型。

My wife, Susan, will be nominated to succeed Ken. She is now the second largest shareholder of Berkshire and if she outlives me will inherit all of my stock and effectively control the company. She knows, and agrees, with my thoughts on successor management and also shares my view that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses and important investments should be sold simply because some very high bid is received for one or all.

我的妻子 Susan 将被提名为 Ken 的继任者。她目前是 Berkshire 的第二大股东，如果她比我长寿，她将继承我所有的股票并实际控制公司。她了解并同意我对继任管理层的想法，同时也认同我的观点，即无论是 Berkshire 还是其子公司业务和重要投资，都不应仅仅因为收到一个非常高的报价就将其出售。

I feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers should not depend on my health—which, it should be added, is excellent—and I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead, both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning the fortune to society.

我强烈认为，我们企业及其经理人的命运不应取决于我的健康状况——顺便说一句，我的健康状况非常好——并且我已经做好了相应的计划。我或我妻子的遗产计划都不是为了保存家族财富；相反，两者的目的都是为了保留 Berkshire 的特质，并将财富回馈社会。

Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things: (1) None of my stock would have to be sold; (2) Both a controlling shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would follow me; and (3) Berkshire’s earnings would increase by $1 million annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, The Indefensible (ignoring my wish that it be buried with me).

如果我明天去世，你可以确定三件事：(1) 我的股票一股都不必出售；(2) 拥有与我相似理念的控股股东和管理人员都将追随我；(3) Berkshire 的年度收益将增加 100 万美元，因为 Charlie 会立即卖掉我们的公务机——“不可辩解号（The Indefensible）”（无视我想让它陪葬的愿望）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1990 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.8 million, and 2,600 charities were recipients.

Berkshire 1990 年的股东指定捐款计划中，约 97.3% 的合资格股份参与了其中。通过该计划捐出的款项达 580 万美元，共有 2,600 家慈善机构受益。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 54-55. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1991 will be ineligible for the 1991 program.

我们建议新股东阅读第 54-55 页关于股东指定捐款计划的说明。要参加未来的计划，您必须确保您的股份是以实际所有者的姓名登记的，而不是登记在经纪人、银行或托管机构的代持名下。截至 1991 年 8 月 31 日未以此方式登记的股份将不具备参加 1991 年计划的资格。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

除了 Berkshire 分发的股东指定捐款外，我们各经营业务的经理人也会进行捐赠，包括商品在内，每年平均约为 150 万美元。这些捐赠用于支持当地慈善机构（如 The United Way），并为我们的业务带来了大致相当的收益。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

然而，无论是我们的经营经理人还是母公司的高管，都不会动用 Berkshire 的资金去捐助全国性的宏大项目或他们个人特别感兴趣的慈善活动，除非他们是以股东身份进行的。如果您的员工（包括您的首席执行官）希望向他们的母校或其他有个人感情的机构捐款，我们认为他们应该使用自己的钱，而不是您的钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 29, 1991. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,300, about a 100-fold increase from ten years ago.

今年的年度会议将于 1991 年 4 月 29 日（周一）上午 9:30 在 Omaha 市中心的 Orpheum Theater 举行。去年的出席人数增加到创纪录的 1,300 人，比十年前增加了约 100 倍。

We recommend getting your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim’s and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting, and return after it ends.

我们建议您尽早预订以下酒店之一：(1) The Radisson-Redick Tower，这是一家位于 Orpheum 街对面的精致小型酒店（88 间客房）；(2) 规模大得多的 Red Lion Hotel，距离 Orpheum 约 5 分钟步行路程；或 (3) Marriott，位于 West Omaha，距离 Borsheim’s 约 100 码，距离市中心 20 分钟车程。我们将在 Marriott 安排班车，分别于 8:30 和 8:45 出发前往会场，并在会议结束后返回。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.

Charlie 和我总是很享受这次会议，希望您也能参加。股东的素质反映在我们收到的问题质量上：我们从未在任何地方参加过能持续呈现如此高水平、且极具“所有者意识”之智能问题的年度会议。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.

委托代管材料的附件说明了如何获取参会所需的入场证。由于工作日 Orpheum 周边的停车位可能比较紧张，我们已经为股东们联系好了附近的几个停车场。附件中也包含这些停车场的信息。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See’s Candy cart and see for yourself the dawn of synergism at Berkshire.

像往常一样，会议结束后我们将有巴士送您前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart 和 Borsheim’s，稍后还会送您前往市中心酒店或机场。我希望您能预留充足的时间，充分探索这两家店的魅力。提前到达的朋友可以在一周中的任何一天参观 Furniture Mart；它在周六上午 10 点到下午 5:30 开放，周日中午到下午 5:30 开放。在那儿时，别忘了在 See’s Candy 的手推车前停一停，亲眼看看 Berkshire 内部“协同效应”的曙光。

Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 28. At our Sunday opening last year you made Ike very happy: After totaling the day’s volume, he suggested to me that we start holding annual meetings quarterly. Join us at Borsheim’s even if you just come to watch; it’s a show you shouldn’t miss.

Borsheim’s 通常在周日歇业，但我们将在 4 月 28 日（周日）中午到下午 6 点专门为股东及其客人开放。在去年的周日特别开放日，你们让 Ike 非常开心：在统计完当天的销售额后，他向我建议我们应该开始每季度举行一次股东年会。即使您只是来看看，也请加入我们；这是一场不容错过的精彩演出。

Last year the first question at the annual meeting was asked by 11-year-old Nicholas Kenner, a third-generation shareholder from New York City. Nicholas plays rough: “How come the stock is down?” he fired at me. My answer was not memorable.

去年年度会议上的第一个问题是由来自 New York City 的第三代股东、11 岁的 Nicholas Kenner 提出的。Nicholas 出招很猛，他冲着我开火道：“为什么股价下跌了？”我的回答乏善可陈，不值一提。

We hope that other business engagements won’t keep Nicholas away from this year’s meeting. If he attends, he will be offered the chance to again ask the first question; Charlie and I want to tackle him while we’re fresh. This year, however, it’s Charlie’s turn to answer.

我们希望 Nicholas 不会因为其他商务邀约而缺席今年的会议。如果他出席，他将获得再次提问第一个问题的机会；Charlie 和我想在精力充沛的时候对付他。不过，今年轮到 Charlie 来回答了。

March 1, 1991

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

1991-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

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