1994-04-25 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting
Morning Session
1. Bigger meeting venue needed next year
明年需要更大的会场
WARREN BUFFETT: Put this over here.
WARREN BUFFETT：把这个放在这边。
CHARLIE MUNGER:
WARREN BUFFETT: Am I live yet? Yeah. Morning.
WARREN BUFFETT：我已经连上了吗？是的。早上好。
AUDIENCE: Morning.
AUDIENCE：早上好。
WARREN BUFFETT: We were a little worried today because we weren’t sure from the reservations whether we can handle everybody, but it looks to me like there may be a couple seats left up there. But I think next year, we’re going to have to find a different spot because it looks to me like we’re up about 600 this year from last year, and to be on the safe side we will seek out a larger spot. Now, there are certain implications to that because, as some of the more experienced of you know, a few years ago we were holding this meeting at the Joslyn Museum, which is a temple of culture. (Laughter) And we’ve now, of course, moved to an old vaudeville theater. And the only place in town that can hold us next year, I think, is the Ak-Sar-Ben Coliseum where they have keno and racetracks. (Laughter) We are sliding down the cultural chain — (laughter) — just as Charlie predicted years ago. He saw all this coming. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我们今天有点担心，因为从预订情况看不太确定能不能接待所有人，不过现在看来上面好像还剩两三个座位。但我想明年我们得换个地方了，因为看起来今年人数比去年多了大概600人，为了稳妥我们会找个更大的场地。当然，这会带来一些“文化含义”，因为有经验的朋友知道，几年前我们还在Joslyn Museum开会——那可是文化殿堂。（笑）而现在，我们搬到了一个旧的滑稽戏剧院。当然，明年全城恐怕只有Ak-Sar-Ben Coliseum能装下我们了，那里有基诺彩票和赛马场。（笑）我们正在文化链上一路下滑——（笑）——正如Charlie多年前预言的那样。他早就看到了这一切。（笑）
2. Buffett loses “Miss Congeniality” title to Munger
巴菲特把“最佳人缘奖”输给了芒格
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie — I have some rather distressing news to report. There are always a few people that vote against everyone on the slate for directors and there’s maybe a dozen or so people do that. And then there are others that single shot it, and they pick out people to vote against. And, this will come as news to Charlie, I haven’t told him yet. But he is the only one among our candidates for directors that received no negative votes this year. (Applause). Hold it — hold it. No need to applaud. I tell you, when you lose out the title of Miss Congeniality to Charlie, you know you’re in trouble. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie——我得报告一条有点“令人不安”的消息。总有少数人会反对董事候选名单上的所有人，大概十来位。另外还有人会“点名”反对某个人。今年有一件事Charlie还不知道，我也还没告诉他：在我们的董事候选人中，只有他一个人没收到任何反对票。（掌声）等等——等等——不必鼓掌。我得说，当你把“最佳人缘奖”输给了Charlie，你就知道麻烦了。（笑）
3. Meeting timetable
会议日程
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I’d like to tell you a little bit how we’ll run this. We will have the business meeting in a hurry with the cooperation of all of you, and then we will introduce our managers who are here, and then we will have a Q&A period. We will run that until 12 o’clock, at which point we’ll break, and then at 12:15, if the hardcore want to stick around, we will have another hour or so until about 1:15 of questions. So, you’re free to leave, of course, any time and I’ve pointed out in the past that it’s much better form if you leave while Charlie is talking rather than when I’m talking, but — (Laughter) Feel free anytime, but you can — if you’re panicked and you’re worried about being conspicuous by leaving, you will be able to leave at noon. We will have buses out front that will take you to the hotels or the airport or to any place in town in which we have a commercial interest. (Laughter) We encourage you staying around on that basis.
WARREN BUFFETT：接下来我简单说一下流程。我们先在大家的配合下尽快完成正式股东大会，然后介绍到场的各位经理人，接着进入问答环节。问答会一直进行到12点，届时我们休息一下；12点15分开始，如果铁杆观众愿意留下，我们会再来大约一小时的提问，直到1点15分左右。当然，大家随时可以离场。我以前也说过，如果你要走，最好选择在Charlie讲话时走，而不是我说话时走——（笑）随意哈，不过如果你“心里发慌”、担心走动太显眼，你可以等到中午离场。门口会有大巴送大家去酒店、机场，或者送去城里任何一个我们有商业利益的地方。（笑）基于这个理由，我们强烈鼓励大家多待一会儿。
4. Berkshire directors introduced
介绍伯克希尔董事
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s have the — let’s get the business of the meeting out of the way. Then we can get on to more interesting things. I will first introduce the Berkshire Hathaway directors that are present in addition to myself and — First of all, there’s Charlie, who is the vice chairman of Berkshire, and if the rest of you will stand. We have Susan T. Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase III, and Walter Scott Jr. And that’s it. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：我们先把正式事项完成，然后进入更有意思的部分。首先介绍一下今天到场的Berkshire Hathaway董事，除了我以外——首先是Charlie，他是Berkshire的副董事长，其他各位请起立：有Susan T. Buffett、Howard Buffett、Malcolm Chase III，以及Walter Scott Jr.。这就是全部。（掌声）
5. Meeting quorum
法定出席人数（Quorum）
WARREN BUFFETT: Also with us today are partners in the firm of Deloitte and Touche, our auditors, Mr. Ron Burgess and Mr. Craig Christiansen (PH). They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their firm’s audit of the accounts of Berkshire. Mr. Forrest Krutter, secretary of Berkshire. He will make a written record of the proceedings. Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons has been appointed inspector of election at this meeting. He will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. Proxy cards have been returned through last Friday representing 1,035,680 Berkshire shares to be voted by the proxy holders as indicated on the cards. That number of shares represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. We will conduct the business of the meeting and then adjourn to the formal meeting — and then adjourn the formal meeting. After that, we will entertain questions that you might have. First order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders. I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. who will place a motion before the meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT：今天到场的还有我们审计机构 Deloitte and Touche 的两位合伙人、我们的审计师 Mr. Ron Burgess 和 Mr. Craig Christiansen（PH）。他们可以就其事务所对 Berkshire 账目的审计回答适当的问题。还有 Berkshire 的秘书 Mr. Forrest Krutter，他将对本次会议的程序做书面记录。本次会议已任命 Mr. Robert M. Fitzsimmons 为选举监督员，他将对董事选举中投票数进行认证。本次会议指定的代理人为 Walter Scott Jr. 和 Marc D. Hamburg。截止上周五，我们已收到代理卡，代表 1,035,680 股 Berkshire 的股份，按照卡片所示由代理人行使投票。该等股份数量构成法定出席人数，因此我们将直接进入会议议程。我们将先处理会议的正式事项，然后宣布正式会议休会。之后，我们将回答各位可能提出的问题。第一项议程是宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。我请 Walter Scott Jr. 先生向大会提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with.
WALTER SCOTT：我动议免予宣读上次股东大会的会议记录。
WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second?
WARREN BUFFETT：有人附议吗？
VOICES: Seconded. Motion has been moved and seconded. Are there any comments or questions? Hearing none, we will vote on the motion by voice vote. (Laughter) All those in favor say aye.
VOICES：附议。该动议已有提出与附议。有没有意见或问题？如无，我们将对该动议进行口头表决。（笑）赞成者请说“aye”。
VOICES: Aye.
VOICES：Aye（赞成）。
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed? The motion is carried and it’s a vote. Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding entitled to vote and represented at the meeting?
WARREN BUFFETT：反对？动议通过，形成决议。秘书是否已准备关于本次会议享有表决权且出席或由代理出席之 Berkshire 流通在外股份数量的报告？
FORREST KRUTTER: Yes, I do. As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by first class mail to all shareholders of record on March 8, 1994, being the record date for this meeting, there were 1,177,750 shares of Berkshire common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting. Of that number, 1,035,680 shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through last Friday.
FORREST KRUTTER：是的。正如随本次会议通知一并以一类邮件于 1994 年 3 月 8 日（本次会议的股权登记日）寄送给所有在册股东的代理声明所载，Berkshire 普通股的流通在外股份为 1,177,750 股，每股在本次会议对各项动议享有一票表决权。其中，截止上周五通过代理方式出席本次会议的股份为 1,035,680 股。
6. Directors elected
董事选举
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. We will proceed to elect directors. If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person, he or she may do so. Also, if any shareholder that’s present has not turned in a proxy and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to meeting officials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot to you. Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves so that we may distribute them? Just raise your hand. I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting with respect to election of directors.
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。我们现在进行董事选举。若在场股东希望撤回先前寄送的代理并改为现场投票，可以这样做。另如有在场股东未提交代理、且希望领取选票以便亲自投票，也可以这样做。若您需要，请向过道的会议工作人员表明身份，他们会向您发放选票。需要选票的股东请举手示意以便我们分发。现在我请 Walter Scott Jr. 先生就董事选举向大会提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move that Warren Buffett, Susan Buffett, Howard Buffett, Malcolm Chase, Charles Munger, and Walter Scott be elected as directors.
WALTER SCOTT：我动议选举 Warren Buffett、Susan Buffett、Howard Buffett、Malcolm Chase、Charles Munger 和 Walter Scott 为董事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?
WARREN BUFFETT：有人附议吗？
VOICE: Seconded.
VOICE：附议。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. Are there any other nominations? Is there any discussion? Motions and nominations are ready to be acted upon. If there are any shareholders voting in person, they should now mark their ballots and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of elections. Seeing none, will the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections the ballot voting the proxies in accordance with the instructions they have received. Mr. Fitzsimmons, when you’re ready you may give your report.
WARREN BUFFETT：已提出并附议选举 Warren E. Buffett、Susan T. Buffett、Howard G. Buffett、Malcolm G. Chase III、Charles T. Munger 和 Walter Scott Jr. 为董事。是否还有其他提名？是否有需要讨论之处？动议与提名均已准备就绪，将进入表决。如有股东现场投票，请现在在选票上标记，并将选票交由选举监督员。若无人现场投票，请代理人依所接获的指示，亦将其代理投票的选票提交给选举监督员。Mr. Fitzsimmons，若您已准备好，请发表报告。
ROBERT FITZSIMMONS: My report is ready. The ballot of the proxy holders received through last Friday cast not less than a 1,035,407 votes for each nominee. That number far exceeds a majority of the number of all shares outstanding and a more precise count cannot change the results of the election. However, the certification required by Delaware law regarding the precise count of the votes, including the votes cast in person at this meeting, will be given to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting.
ROBERT FITZSIMMONS：我的报告已准备就绪。截止上周五收到的代理人选票，对每位被提名人的赞成票不少于 1,035,407 票。该数字远超流通在外全部股份的过半数，即便更精确的计票也不会改变选举结果。不过，依据 Delaware 法律要求，包括本次会议现场投票在内的精确计票认证，将提交秘书并随本次会议记录存档。
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Mr. Fitzsimmons. Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chase III, Charles T. Munger, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors. (Applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢您，Mr. Fitzsimmons。Warren E. Buffett、Susan T. Buffett、Howard G. Buffett、Malcolm G. Chase III、Charles T. Munger 和 Walter Scott Jr. 已当选为董事。（掌声）
7. Formal meeting adjourns
正式会议休会
WARREN BUFFETT: Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn? If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting.
WARREN BUFFETT：在我们休会之前，是否还有需要提交本次会议处理的事项？如果没有，我请 Walter Scott Jr. 先生向大会提出动议。
WALTER SCOTT: I move the meeting be adjourned.
WALTER SCOTT：我动议本次会议休会。
WARREN BUFFETT: Second?
WARREN BUFFETT：有人附议吗？
VOICES: Seconded. The motion to adjourn has been made and seconded. We will vote by voice. Is there any discussion? If not, all in favor say aye?
VOICES：附议。已就休会动议提出并附议。我们将进行口头表决。是否需要讨论？如无，赞成者请说“aye”？
VOICES: Aye
VOICES：Aye（赞成）
WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed say no, the meeting is adjourned. (Laughter) It’s democracy in Middle America. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：反对者请说“no”，会议休会。（笑）这就是美国中部的民主。（笑）
8. Berkshire managers introduced
Berkshire管理层介绍
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, I’d like to introduce some of the people that make this place work to you. And if you would hold your applause until the end because there are quite a number of our managers here. I’m not sure which ones for sure are here, some of them may be out tending the store as well. But, first of all, from Nebraska Furniture Mart, Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin. I’m not sure who’s here, but would you stand please, any of the Blumkins that are present? OK, we’ve — looks like Irv. I can’t quite see it. From Borsheims, is Susan Jacques here? Susan? There she is. Susan had a record day yesterday. She just — (applause) — Susan became CEO just a few months ago and she’s turning in records already. Keep it up. (Laughter) And from Central States Indemnity, we have the Kizers. I’m not sure which ones are here, but there’s Bill Sr., Bill Jr., John, and Dick. Kizers, stand up.
WARREN BUFFETT：现在，我想向大家介绍一些让这家公司运转的人。因为到场的经理人很多，请把掌声留到最后。我也不完全确定哪些人到了，有些人可能还在店里忙着。首先是来自 Nebraska Furniture Mart 的 Louie、Ron 和 Irv Blumkin。不确定具体谁在场，但请在场的 Blumkin 家族成员起立？好，看来是 Irv。我看得不太清楚。来自 Borsheims，Susan Jacques 在吗？Susan？她在那儿。Susan 昨天创下了纪录。她刚——（掌声）——Susan 几个月前才成为 CEO，现在已经不断创纪录了。继续保持。（笑）来自 Central States Indemnity 的是 Kizer 家族。我不确定具体哪些人到了，有 Bill Sr.、Bill Jr.、John 和 Dick。Kizer 一家，请起立。
I think I can see him — John. Don Wurster from National Indemnity. Rod Eldred from the Homestate Companies. Brad Kinstler from Cypress, our worker’s comp company. Ajit Jain, the big ticket writer in the East. And Mike Goldberg, who runs our real estate finance group and also generally oversees the insurance group. Mike. Gary Heldman from Fechheimers. Chuck Huggins from See’s, the candy man. Stan Lipsey from the Buffalo News. Chuck’s been with us, incidentally, twenty-odd years. Stan’s been working with me for well over 25 years. Frank Rooney and Jim Issler from H.H. Brown. Dave Hillstrom from Precision Steel. Ralph Schey from Scott Fetzer. Peter Lunder, who is with our newest acquisition, Dexter Shoe. And Harold Alfond, his partner, couldn’t be with us because his wife is ill. And finally, the manager that’s been with Charlie and me the longest, Harry Bottle from K&W. Harry, you here? There’s Harry. Harry saved our bacon back in 19 — what?
— 62 or so, when in some mad moment I went into the windmill business. And Harry got me out of it. (Laughter) That’s our group of managers and I appreciate it if you give them a hand. (Applause)
我应该能看到他——John。National Indemnity 的 Don Wurster。Homestate Companies 的 Rod Eldred。我们的工伤赔偿公司 Cypress 的 Brad Kinstler。东部“大单承保人” Ajit Jain。还有负责我们房地产金融业务、同时总体上监管保险业务的 Mike Goldberg。Mike。Fechheimers 的 Gary Heldman。See’s 的 “candy man” Chuck Huggins。The Buffalo News 的 Stan Lipsey。顺便说一句，Chuck 跟我们在一起已经二十多年了；而 Stan 与我共事已超过 25 年。H.H. Brown 的 Frank Rooney 和 Jim Issler。Precision Steel 的 Dave Hillstrom。Scott Fetzer 的 Ralph Schey。我们最新收购 Dexter Shoe 的 Peter Lunder。他的合伙人 Harold Alfond 因其妻子生病未能到场。最后，是与我和 Charlie 共事时间最长的经理人，来自 K&W 的 Harry Bottle。Harry，你在吗？那就是 Harry。早在 19——哪年来着？——大约 62 年，我一时疯狂跑去做风车业务，是 Harry 把我解救出来。（笑）这就是我们的一众经理人，感谢大家给他们热烈的掌声。（掌声）
9. Midwest Express adding flights to Omaha
中西快运航空增加飞往奥马哈的航班
WARREN BUFFETT: I have one piece of good news about next year for you. In addition to moving to larger quarters, they’re going to add nonstop air service from New York, Washington, and Los Angeles here in the next few months, Midwest Express. So, I hope they do very well with it and I hope that makes it easier for you to get into town.
WARREN BUFFETT：关于明年还有一条好消息。除了要换到更大的会场，Midwest Express 在接下来的几个月里将新增从 New York、Washington 和 Los Angeles 直飞到这里的航班。所以我希望他们运营顺利，也希望这能让各位来城里更方便。
10. Q&A logistics
问答流程
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, in this — for the next two hours and 15 minutes or so, we’ll have a session where we will take questions. We have seven zones, three on the main floor. We’ll go start over there with zone one and work across. On the main floor, if you’ll raise your hand, the person who is handling the mic will pass it to you and we’ll try to not repeat any individual in any one zone till everyone in that zone has had a chance to ask one question. So, after you’ve been on once, let other people get a shot. When we move up to the loge, we have one person there and in the case — and then we have three in the balcony, which is essentially full now. And we would, up there, we would appreciate it if you would you leave your seat and go to the person with the mic. It’ll be a little easier in both the loge and the balcony to handle it that way.
WARREN BUFFETT：接下来大约两个小时十五分钟我们进行问答。全场划分为七个提问区，主层有三个。我们从那边的一号区开始，依次往横向推进。主层这边，只要你举手，负责话筒的同事会把麦递给你；我们会尽量做到同一区内先保证每位有一次机会，避免重复。因此，提问过一次之后，请让其他人也上来试试。等我们移到夹层（loge）时，那边有一位同事负责；看台（balcony）上有三位，现在基本已经坐满了。请在夹层和看台的朋友离座，走到拿麦的人那里提问；这样在这两个区域会更容易组织。
And if you’ll go a little ahead of time, that way if there’s a line of two or three you can you can line up for questions in both the loge and balcony. So, whatever you’d care to ask. If you want an optimistic answer you’ll, of course, direct your question to Charlie. If you’d like a little more realism you’ll come to me and — (laughter).
另外，如果你能稍微提前到位，即便有两三个人排队，也能在夹层和看台两边更顺畅地排队提问。总之，欢迎随意提问。如果你想要一个乐观的答案，当然可以把问题抛给 Charlie；如果你希望“更现实”一点的答案，就问我——（笑）。
11. Derivatives: dangerous combination of “ignorance and borrowed money”
衍生品：“无知与借来的钱”的危险组合
WARREN BUFFETT: Let’s start over in zone 1. Sometimes we can’t see too well from up here, but — In fact, I can’t even see the monitor right now, but do we have one over there? And if you’ll identify yourself by name and your hometown, we’d appreciate it.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们从一区开始。有时候我们在台上看不太清楚——事实上我现在连显示器都看不到——那边有一位吗？请先报上您的名字和来自哪座城市，我们会很感激。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Michael Mullen (PH) from Omaha. Would you comment on the use of derivatives? I noticed that Dell computer stock was off 2 1/2 points Friday with the loss of derivatives.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Omaha 的 Michael Mullen（PH）。请评论一下衍生品的使用？我注意到周五 Dell 的股价因为衍生品亏损下跌了 2 又 1/2 点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Question is about derivatives. We have in this room the author of the best thing you can read on that. There was an article in Fortune about a month ago or so by Carol Loomis on derivatives, and far and away it’s the best article that has been written. We also have some people in the room that do business in derivatives from Salomon. And it’s a very broad subject. It — as we said last year, I think someone asked what might be the big financial story of the ’90s and we said we obviously don’t know, but that if we had to pick a topic that it could well be derivatives because they lend themselves to the use of unusual amounts of leverage and they’re sometimes not completely understood by the people involved. And any time you combine ignorance and borrowed money — (laughter) — you can get some pretty interesting consequences. (Laughter) Particularly when the numbers get vague. And you’ve seen that, of course, recently with the recent Procter and Gamble announcement.
WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于衍生品的。现场就有一位写过这方面“最值得一读”文章的作者。大约一个月前，Carol Loomis 在《Fortune》写了一篇关于衍生品的文章，迄今为止这是写得最好的。现场还有来自 Salomon、真正参与衍生品业务的人士。这是个非常宽泛的话题。正如我们去年所说，我记得有人问过“90 年代最大的金融故事可能是什么”，我们说显然我们不知道，但如果必须选一个主题，很可能会是衍生品，因为它天然容易使用非常规的大杠杆，而且有时参与者并不完全理解它。任何时候当“无知”和“借来的钱”——（笑）——结合在一起时，你都会看到相当“有趣”的后果。（笑）尤其当数字变得含糊时。最近 Procter and Gamble 的公告，大家已经见识到了这一点。
Now, I don’t know the details of the P&G derivatives, but I understand, at least from press reports, that what started out as interest rate swaps ended up with P&G writing puts on large quantities of U.S. and, I think, one other country’s bonds. And any time you go from selling soap to writing puts on bonds, you’ve made a big jump. (Laughter) And it — the ability to borrow enormous amounts of money combined with a chance to get either very rich or very poor very quickly, has historically been a recipe for trouble at some point. Derivatives are not going to go away. They serve useful purposes and all that, but I’m just saying that it has that potential. We’ve seen a little bit of that. I can’t think of anything that we’ve done that would — can you think of anything we do that approaches derivatives, Charlie? Directly?
我并不清楚 P&G 衍生品的细节，但据媒体报道，最初是利率互换，最终却变成了 P&G 卖出大量关于美国以及我记得还有另一国家债券的认沽期权。无论何时，当你从“卖肥皂”跨到“给债券卖认沽”，这都是一次巨大的跃迁。（笑）而一旦能借来巨额资金、又有机会在很短时间里要么暴富要么变得一贫如洗，从历史上看，这迟早会酿成麻烦。衍生品不会消失，它们确实有其有用之处等等，但我要说的是它确实具备那种潜在风险。我们已经见到了一些征兆。我想不出我们做过什么类似的事——Charlie，我们有哪件事在本质上接近衍生品吗？直接的那种？
意图+能力。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I may have to cut him off if he talks too long. (Laughter) Is there anything you would like to add to your already extensive remarks? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：他要是再多说两句我就得打断他了。（笑）你要不要在你那“长篇大论”上再补充些什么？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：不需要。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。
12. Berkshire participated in Cap Cities stock buyback
伯克希尔参与了 Capital Cities 的股票回购
WARREN BUFFETT: In that case we’ll go to zone 2. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：那我们就转到二区。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stevenson (PH). I’m a shareholder from Atlanta. My question involves the company’s investment in the stock of Cap Cities. It’s been my understanding in the past that that was regarded as one of the four, quote unquote, “permanent” holdings of the company. So I was a little bit confused by the disposition of one million shares. Could you clarify that? Was my previous misunderstanding — was my previous understanding incorrect? Or has there been some change or is there a third possibility?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Hugh Stevenson（PH），来自 Atlanta 的股东。我的问题是关于公司持有的 Cap Cities 股票。我过去的理解是，这被视为公司所谓“四大‘永久’持股”之一。所以我对卖出一百万股这件事有点困惑。您能解释一下吗？是我之前理解错了，还是情况发生了变化，或者说还有第三种可能？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we have classified the Washington Post Company and Cap Cities and GEICO and Coke in the category of permanent holdings. And — But in the case of three of those four, The Washington Post Company, I don’t know, maybe seven or eight years ago, GEICO some years back, and now Cap Cities, we have participated in tenders where the company has repurchased shares. Now the first two, the Post and GEICO, we participated proportionally. That was not feasible, and incidentally, not as attractive taxwise anymore. The 1968 Tax Act changed the desirability of proportional redemptions of shares, from our standpoint. That point has been missed by a lot of journalists in commenting on it, but it just so happens that the commentary that has been written has been obsolete, in some cases, by six or seven years. But, we did participate in the Cap Cities tender offer, just as we did in the Post and GEICO. We still are, by far, the largest shareholder of Cap Cities.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们把 The Washington Post Company、Cap Cities、GEICO 和 Coke 列为“永久持有”的范畴。不过，在这四家中的三家——The Washington Post Company（大概七八年前）、GEICO（数年前）以及现在的 Cap Cities——当这些公司回购股份、发起要约时，我们都有参与。前两次，即在 Post 和 GEICO 上，我们是按比例参与的。后来这种做法不可行了，而且顺带一提，从税务角度看也不再那么有吸引力。1968 年的 Tax Act（税法）从我们的立场改变了按比例赎回股份的吸引力。许多记者在评论中忽略了这一点，结果有些评论在六七年前就已经过时了。无论如何，我们这次确实参与了 Cap Cities 的要约回购，就像当年在 Post 和 GEICO 所做的一样。我们仍然、并且是远远地，保持着 Cap Cities 的最大股东地位。
We think it’s a superbly run operation in a business that looks a little tougher than it did 15 years ago, but looks a little bit better than it did 15 months ago. Charlie, you have anything?
我们认为这是一家管理极为出色的企业，所处行业比 15 年前看起来更艰难一些，但又比 15 个月前看起来好一些。Charlie，你要补充吗？
类似于现在的Google。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Uh, no. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：呃，没有。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s thinking it over now though before — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：不过他现在正在“仔细思考”——（笑）
13. Unlikely we’d buy company with no current cash flow
不太可能收购当前没有现金流的公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Howard Bask (PH) and I’m from Kansas City. And I’ve got a theoretical value question for you. If you were to buy a business and you bought it at its intrinsic value, what’s the minimum aftertax free cash flow yield you’d need to get?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好。我叫 Howard Bask（PH），来自 Kansas City。我有一个关于估值的理论性问题。如果你要收购一家企业，并且按其内在价值买入，你所要求的最低税后自由现金流收益率是多少？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, your question is if we were buying all of a business and we’re buying at what we thought was intrinsic value, what was the minimum —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你的问题是，如果我们要买下一家企业的全部股权，并按我们认为的内在价值买入，最低——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Correct.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: — present earning power or what the present — the minimum discount rate of future streams?
WARREN BUFFETT：——最低的当前盈利能力，还是说——未来现金流的最低折现率？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: No, what’s the minimum current after-tax free cash flow yield you’d…
AUDIENCE MEMBER：不是，是最低的当前税后自由现金流收益率，你会……
WARREN BUFFETT: We could conceivably buy a business — I don’t think we would be likely to — but we could we could conceivably buy a business that had no current after-tax cash flow. But, we would have to think it had a tremendous future. But we would not find — obviously the current figures, particularly in the kind of businesses we buy, tend to be representative, we think, of what’s going to happen in the future. But that would not necessarily have to be the case. You can argue, for example, in buying stocks, we bought GEICO at a time when it was losing significant money. We didn’t expect it to continue to lose significant money. But if we think the present value of the future earning power is attractive enough compared to the purchase price, we would not be overwhelmed by what the first year’s figure would be. Charlie, you want to add to that?
WARREN BUFFETT：从概念上讲，我们可能会收购一家——我并不认为这很可能发生——但我们“可能会”收购一家当前没有税后现金流的企业。不过那必须建立在我们认为其未来非常光明的前提下。显然，在我们通常收购的这类企业中，当前数据往往能代表未来的情况——这是我们的看法。但这并非铁律。比如在买股票时，我们曾在 GEICO 大幅亏损的时候买入。我们并不认为它会持续大幅亏损。只要我们认为未来盈利能力的现值相对于购入价格足够有吸引力，我们不会过度被第一年的数字所左右。Charlie，你要补充吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. We don’t care what we report in the first year or two of — after buying anything.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我们不在乎收购之后一两年报出来的数字如何。
AUDIENCE MEMBER OFF MIC: (INAUDIBLE) on average over the years (INAUDIBLE).
AUDIENCE MEMBER OFF MIC：（听不清）多年平均（听不清）。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would say that in a world of 7 percent long-term bond rates that we would certainly want to think we were discounting future after-tax streams of cash at at least a 10 percent rate. But that will depend on the certainty we feel about the business. The more certain we feel about a business, the closer we are willing to play it. We have to feel pretty certain about any business before we’re even interested at all. But there are still degrees of certainty, and — If we thought we were getting a stream of cash over the next 30 years that we felt extremely certain about, we would use a discount rate that would be somewhat less than if it was one where we thought we might get some surprises in five or 10 years — possibility existed. Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：我会说，在长期国债利率为 7% 的世界里，我们当然希望以至少 10% 的折现率来折现未来税后现金流。但这取决于我们对该业务确定性的把握。我们对业务越有把握，就越愿意把“安全边际”做得更窄一些。事实上，只有当我们对一家企业相当有把握时，我们才会感兴趣。但确定性也有层次之分——如果我们相信未来 30 年的现金流极其确定，我们会采用比那种“5 年或 10 年可能出现意外”的情形略低一些的折现率。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
14. Insurance business intrinsic value is well above book value
保险业务的内在价值远高于账面价值
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Morris Spence (PH) from Omaha, Nebraska. You’ve made comments on several occasions about the intrinsic business value of the insurance operations. And in this year’s report you state that the insurance business possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds book value by a large amount, larger, in fact, than is the case at any Berkshire — other Berkshire business. I was wondering if you would explain in greater detail why you believe that to be true.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Omaha, Nebraska 的 Morris Spence（PH）。您多次谈到保险业务的内在价值。在今年的报告中，您还指出保险业务的内在价值大幅高于账面价值，事实上高于 Berkshire 其他任何业务的差额。我想请您更详细地解释一下，为什么您认为这是对的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I — it’s very hard to quantify, as we’ve said many times in the report. But, I think that it’s clear that even taking fairly pessimistic assumptions, that the excess of intrinsic value over carrying value is higher, by some margin, for the insurance business. And I think that the table in the report that shows you what our cost to float has been over the years, and also what the trend of float has been over the years, would, unless you thought that table had no validity for the future, I think that that table would tend to the point you in the direction of saying the insurance business does have a very significant excess of intrinsic value over carrying value. Very hard number to put something on. But — and you don’t want to extrapolate that table out. But I think that table shows that we started with maybe 20 million of float and that we’re up to something close to three billion of float. And that that float has come to us at a cost that’s extremely attractive, on average, over the years.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯——正如我们在报告中多次说的，这很难精确量化。但是我认为，即便采用相当悲观的假设，保险业务的内在价值超出账面价值的幅度，依然明显更高。我也认为，报告里那张表，展示了多年来我们的 float 成本以及 float 的趋势——除非你认为那张表对未来毫无参考意义——否则它会引导你得出这样的结论：保险业务的内在价值显著高于其账面价值。要给出一个精确数字很难，而且你也不应该把那张表简单外推。但那张表显示，我们最初或许只有两千万的 float，如今已经接近三十亿。而且这些年，这部分 float 的平均获得成本极具吸引力。
And just to pick an example, last year, when we actually had an underwriting profit, the value of that float was something over $200 million. And that figure was a lot bigger than it was 10 years ago or 20 years ago. So that’s — that is a stream — last year was unusually favorable, but that is a — that’s a very significant stream of earnings, and it’s one we feel we have reasonably good prospects in. So we feel very good about the insurance business.
再举个例子，去年我们实现了承保盈利，那一年浮存金带来的价值就超过了2亿美元。而这个数字比10年前或20年前都大得多。所以——那是一条现金流——尽管去年异常有利，但那是一条非常重要的收益流，而且我们认为它的前景相当不错。因此，我们对保险业务感觉非常好。
15. Why Berkshire doesn’t split its stock
为什么 Berkshire 不拆股
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Zone 5?
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。五区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Cy Rademacher (PH) from Omaha. Is there any point at which your stock would rise to the point where you might split the stock?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Cy Rademacher（PH），来自 Omaha。请问是否存在某个股价水平会促使你们考虑拆股？
WARREN BUFFETT: Surprise, surprise. (Laughter) I think I’ll let Charlie answer that this year. (Laughs) He’s so popular with the shareholders that I can afford to let him take the tough questions. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：出人意料，又不意外。（笑）这个问题今年我让 Charlie 回答吧。（笑）他在股东中太受欢迎了，我可以放心把硬问题交给他。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think the answer is no. (Laughter and applause) I think the idea of carving ownerships in an enterprise into little, tiny $20 pieces is almost insane. And it’s quite inefficient to service a $20 account and I don’t see why there shouldn’t be a minimum as a condition of joining some enterprise. Certainly we’d all feel that way if we were organizing a private enterprise.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为答案是否定的。（笑与掌声）把一家企业的所有权切成一个个区区20美元的小碎片，这个主意几乎是疯狂的。维护一个20美元的账户效率极低；我不明白为什么加入某个企业不应该有最低门槛。要是我们在组织一家私人企业，我们肯定也会这么看。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we would not carve it up in $20 units. We find it very — it’s interesting because every company finds a way to fill up its common shareholder list. And you can start with the As and work through to the Zs and you’ll — every company in the New York Stock Exchange, one way or another, has attracted some constituency of shareholders. And frankly, we can’t imagine a better constituency than is in this room. I mean, we have — we don’t think we can improve on this group, and we followed certain policies that we think attracted certain types of shareholders and actually pushed away others. And that is part of our eugenics program here at Berkshire. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们不会把它切成20美元一份。很有意思的是，每家公司都会以某种方式把普通股东名册填满。你可以从A排到Z——纽约证交所的每家公司或多或少都吸引到了某类股东群体。坦率说，我们难以想象有比在座各位更好的股东群体。我们的意思是——我们不认为还能把这个群体改善到更好。我们遵循了一些政策，吸引了某些类型的股东，同时实际上也把另一些类型的股东挡在门外。这就是我们在 Berkshire 的“优生学计划”的一部分。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, just look around this room and as you mingle with one another. This is a very outstanding group of people. And why would anybody want a different kind of a group?
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，环顾这个会场、彼此交流一下。这是一群非常杰出的人。为什么还要换成别的类型的群体呢？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, if we cause — if we follow some policies that cause a whole bunch of people to buy Berkshire for the wrong reason, the only way they can buy it is to replace somebody in this room, or in this larger metaphorical room, of shareholders that we have. So someone in one of these seats gets up and somebody else walks in. The question is do we have a better audience? I don’t think so. So I think that — I think Charlie said it very well.
WARREN BUFFETT：是啊，如果我们采取某些政策，导致一大批人“基于错误的理由”来买 Berkshire，他们唯一能买到的方法就是把在座的某位股东——或者说我们这个更大“隐喻意义上的房间”里的股东——给替换掉。也就是说，有人从这些座位上站起来，另一个人坐进来。问题是，这样我们会得到一个“更好”的听众吗？我不这么认为。所以我觉得——Charlie 说得非常好。
16. Buffett is keeping his private jet
巴菲特将继续使用他的私人飞机
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Rob Na (PH) and I’m from Omaha, Nebraska. My question is, given the recent announcement of Midwest Express and their nonstop jet service between East and West Coasts, will this cut down on your use of “The Indefensible?” (Laughter) And will you use more commercial air travel?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Rob Na（PH），来自 Omaha, Nebraska。我的问题是，鉴于 Midwest Express 最近宣布将开通东西海岸之间的直飞航班，这会不会减少您对 “The Indefensible” 的使用？（笑）您会不会更多改用民航出行？
WARREN BUFFETT: This is a question planted by Charlie. (Laughter) I think you should know, I take it to the drugstore at the moment, and I — (Laughter) No, it’s just a question when I start sleeping in it at the hangar. Nothing will cut back on “The Indefensible.” It’s being painted right now, but I told them to make it last a long time. Charlie, though, was pointing out the merits of other kinds of transportation last night at the meeting of our managers. He might want to repeat those here.
WARREN BUFFETT：这是 Charlie 安排的提问。（笑）我想你应该知道，我现在恨不得把它开去药店买东西——（笑）不，真正的问题是我什么时候会开始在机库里睡在上面。没有什么能减少对 “The Indefensible” 的使用。它现在正在重新喷漆，但我告诉他们要让这漆能用很久。昨晚在我们的经理人会议上，Charlie 还在强调其他交通方式的优点。他也许愿意在这里再重复一遍。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I just pointed out that the back of the plane arrived at the same time as the front of the plane, invariably. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我只是指出一个事实：飞机尾部总是和机头同时到达。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: He’s even more of an authority on buses, incidentally, if anybody has his — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一下，如果有人想请教，他在公交车方面更是权威——（笑）
17. Buffett’s next goal in life
巴菲特的人生下一个目标
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.
WARREN BUFFETT：七区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name’s Allan Maxwell from Omaha. I’ve got two questions. What is your next goal in life now that you’re the richest man in the country?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Allan Maxwell，来自 Omaha。我有两个问题。既然您已经是全国最富有的人，您人生的下一个目标是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s easy. It’s to be the oldest man in the country. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：这很简单——成为全国最长寿的那个人。（笑与掌声）
18. “Two yardsticks” for judging management
“两把尺子”评估管理层
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Secondly, you talk about good management with corporations and that you try and buy companies with good management. I feel that I have about as much chance of meeting good managers, other than yourself, as I do bringing Richard Nixon back to life. How do I, as an average investor, find out what good management is?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：其次，您常谈到优秀的企业管理层，并且尽量收购拥有优秀管理层的公司。除了您本人之外，我觉得自己遇到一个好管理者的概率，差不多等于把 Richard Nixon 复活的概率。作为一个普通投资者，我如何判断什么是好的管理层？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think you judge management by two yardsticks. One is how well they run the business and I think you can learn a lot about that by reading about both what they’ve accomplished and what their competitors have accomplished, and seeing how they have allocated capital over time. You have to have some understanding of the hand they were dealt when they themselves got a chance to play the hand. But, if you understand something about the business they’re in — and you can’t understand it in every business, but you can find industries or companies where you can understand it — then you simply want to look at how well they have been doing in playing the hand, essentially, that’s been dealt with them. And then the second thing you want to figure out is how well that they treat their owners. And I think you can get a handle on that, oftentimes. A lot of times you can’t. I mean it — they’re many companies that obviously fall in — somewhere — in that 20th to 80th percentile and it’s a little hard to pick out where they do fall.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为评估管理层有两把尺子。第一，看他们把企业经营得如何。我觉得你可以通过阅读他们取得了什么、他们的竞争对手取得了什么，以及他们这些年如何进行资本配置，来学到很多东西。你必须理解他们接手时拿到的“底牌”是什么。当你对他们所处的业务有所了解——你不可能了解所有行业，但总能找到一些你能看懂的行业或公司——那么你就要看他们如何打好手中的“牌”。第二，看他们如何对待所有者。我认为很多时候你能抓住这一点，当然也有不少时候很难。我是说，有许多公司显然落在第20到第80百分位之间的某个位置，而要精确分辨它们处在其中的哪一段，确实不太容易。
But, I think you can usually figure out — I mean, it’s not hard to figure out that, say, Bill Gates, or Tom Murphy, or Don Keough, or people like that, are really outstanding managers. And it’s not hard to figure out who they’re working for. And I can give you some cases on the other end of the spectrum, too. It’s interesting how often the ones that, in my view, are the poor managers also turn out to be the ones that really don’t think that much about the shareholders, too. The two often go hand in hand. But, I think reading of reports — reading of competitors’ reports — I think you’ll get a fix on that in some cases. You don’t have to — you know, you don’t have to make a hundred correct judgments in this business or 50 correct judgments. You only have to make a few. And that’s all we try to do. And, generally speaking, the conclusions I’ve come to about managers have really come about the same way you can make yours.
但是，我认为你通常还是能分辨出来——比如说，Bill Gates、Tom Murphy、Don Keough 这些人，确实是杰出的管理者；而他们究竟在为谁服务，也不难判断。相反一端也有不少例子。有意思的是，在我看来那些管理能力差的人，往往也恰恰是不怎么把股东放在心上的人。这两点经常是相伴相生的。不过，我认为通过阅读年报——以及竞争对手的年报——在某些情况下你能把握住要点。在这个行业里，你不需要——你懂的——做对一百次判断，甚至不需要做对五十次判断。你只需要做对少数几次。我们所做的，也只是如此。总体而言，我对管理层的判断，基本上就是通过你也可以使用的同样方法得出的。
I mean they come about by reading reports rather than any intimate personal knowledge or — and knowing them personally at all. So it — you know, read the proxy statements, see what they think of — see how they treat themselves versus how they treat the shareholders, look at what they have accomplished, considering what the hand was that they were dealt when they took over compared to what is going on in the industry. And I think you can figure it out sometimes. You don’t have to figure out very often. Charlie?
我的意思是，这些判断主要来自阅读报告，而不是源于什么私人接触，或者对他们的私下了解。所以——去读代理声明（proxy statements），看看他们在意什么——看看他们如何对待自己与如何对待股东；结合他们接手时拿到的“底牌”，与行业同时期的情况对比，去看他们到底做出了什么成绩。我想，有时候你能看明白。你也不必次次都看明白。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
19. How Berkshire keeps great managers
如何留住卓越的经理人
WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, we’re back to zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们回到一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi there. My name is Lee. I’m from Palo Alto, California. In meeting Ajit Jain, I’ve been very impressed over the years. And I think I even met his parents once they came from India. Please comment on your deepest impressions of his personality and managerial skills, and also how you go about exactly keeping somebody who has such fine skills within the fold. He might go to Walt Disney someday and, you know, pull down 200 million.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：大家好。我叫 Lee，来自 Palo Alto, California。多年下来，我对 Ajit Jain 印象一直非常深。我记得他父母有次从 India 来，我还见过他们。请您谈谈对他性格与管理能力最深的印象，以及你们究竟如何把这样优秀的人才留在公司内部。他也许哪天会去 Walt Disney，然后你懂的，拿到 2 亿美元。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if he gets offered 200 million — (laughs) — we may not compete too vigorously at that level. (Laughter) We basically try to run a business so that — Charlie and I have two jobs. We have to identify and keep good managers interested after we’ve figured out who they are. And that often is a little different here, because I would say a majority of our managers are financially independent, so that they don’t go to work because they are worried about putting kids through school or putting food on the table. So they have to have some reason to go to work aside from that. They have to be treated fairly in terms of compensation, but they also have to figure it is better than playing golf every day or whatever it may be. And, so that’s one of the jobs we have and we basically attack that the same way — we look at what they do the same way we look at what we do. We’ve got a wonderful group of shareholders. Before I ran this, I had a partnership. I had a great group of partners. And essentially, I like to be left alone to do what I did.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，如果有人给他开 2 亿美元——（笑）——我们在那个价位大概也不会太激烈地竞争。（笑）我们的基本做法是这样——Charlie 和我有两项工作。第一是识别优秀的经理人，第二是在识别之后让他们持续保持兴趣。这在我们这里往往有点不同，因为我会说我们的大多数经理人财务上都已独立，他们不是因为担心子女上学或餐桌能不能摆上饭而去上班。所以他们需要一个超越这些的理由去上班。他们在薪酬上必须得到公平对待，同时还得觉得这比每天去打高尔夫或其他什么事情更有意义。于是这就是我们的一项工作，我们的思路很一致——我们看待他们所做之事的方式，和看待我们自己所做之事的方式一样。我们有一群很棒的股东。在我经营这家公司之前，我办过合伙事业，也拥有一群很棒的合伙人。而本质上，我喜欢被“放手”去做事。
I like to be judged on the scorecard at the end of the year rather than on every stroke, and not second guessed in a way that was inappropriate.
我更希望按“赛季末的记分牌”来被评判，而不是每一杆都被盯着，并且不希望遭遇不恰当的事后诸葛。
I like to have people who understood the environment in which I was operating. And so the important thing we do with managers, generally, is to find the .400 hitters and then not tell them how to swing, as I put in the report. The second thing we do is allocate capital. And aside from that, we play bridge. (Laughter) Pretty much what happens at Berkshire. So, with any of the managers you might name here, we try to make it interesting and fun for them to run their business. We try to have a compensation arrangement that’s appropriate for the kind of business they’re in. We have no company-wide compensation plan. We wouldn’t dream of having some compensation expert or consultant come in and screw it up. (Laughter) We try to — some businesses require a lot of capital that we’re in, some require no capital. Some are easy businesses where good profit margins are a cinch to come by, but we’re really paying for the extra beyond that.
我希望身边的人理解我所处的环境。所以，我们在管理上的核心做法之一，就是在报告里我提到过的：找到“打击率 .400 的打者”，然后别教他们怎么挥棒。第二件事是分配资本。除此之外，我们就去打桥牌。（笑）这基本就是 Berkshire 的日常。因此，不管你点名哪位经理人，我们都努力让他们经营业务变得有趣、有乐趣。我们设定与其行业属性相匹配的薪酬安排。我们没有公司层面的统一薪酬计划。我们绝不会让什么薪酬“专家”或顾问跑来把它搞砸。（笑）我们尽量做到——有的业务需要大量资本，有的几乎不需要；有的业务很容易挣钱，利润率轻松就能做出来，但我们真正付薪的是超越这些“轻松利润”的那一截增量表现。
Some are very tough businesses to make money in. And it would be crazy to have some huge framework that we try to place everybody in that — where one size would fit all. People, generally, are compensated relating in some manner that relates to how their business does as opposed to — there’s no reason to pay anybody based on how Berkshire does, because no one has responsibility for Berkshire except for Charlie and me. And we try to make them responsible for their own units, compensated based on how those units do. We try to understand the businesses they’re in, so we know what the difference between a good performance and a bad performance — And that’s about — that’s how we work with people.
也有一些业务很难赚钱。要是用一个庞大的统一框架去套所有人——所谓“一刀切”——那简直是疯了。总体上，人们的薪酬应该以其业务单元的表现为依据；没有任何理由按 Berkshire 的整体表现去给任何人发薪，因为除了 Charlie 和我，没有人对 Berkshire 负总责。我们要让他们对自己的单元负责，并按这些单元的表现来计酬。我们努力理解他们所在的业务，这样我们才知道“好与不好”的差别在哪里——这大体就是我们与人的合作方式。
We’ve had terrific luck over the years in retaining the managers that we wanted to retain. I think, largely, it’s because — particularly if they sell us a business — to a great extent, the next day they’re running it just as they were the day before. And they’re having as much fun running their business as I am running Berkshire. Charlie?
这些年来，我们在留住想留住的经理人方面非常顺利。我认为很大程度上是因为——尤其当他们把企业卖给我们之后——在很大范围内，第二天他们依然像前一天那样经营它。而他们经营自己业务所获得的乐趣，不亚于我经营 Berkshire 的乐趣。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’ve got nothing to add, but I think that concept of treating the other fellow the way you’d like to be treated if the roles were reversed — it’s so simple, when you stop to think about it, but — It’s a rare evening when Ajit and Warren aren’t talking once on the phone. It’s more than a business relationship, at least it seems that way to me.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我没有什么要补充的。但我觉得那条原则——“角色互换时你希望被如何对待，就如何对待对方”——当你停下来想一想，其实很简单——另外，几乎没有哪个晚上 Ajit 和 Warren 不会通一次电话。在我看来，这已不只是纯粹的业务关系。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, it is. It will stay that way, too.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，确实如此，而且以后也会如此。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, we like our businesses — our relationships — to be more than a business relationship
CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一下，我们希望我们的业务——我们的关系——超越纯粹的业务关系。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I are very — we basically — it’s a luxury but it’s a luxury that we should try to nurture — we get to work with people we like. And it makes life a lot simpler. It probably helps in that goal of being the oldest living American, too. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我和 Charlie 非常——本质上——这是一种“奢侈”，但也是值得我们努力去维护的奢侈——我们得以与自己喜欢的人一起工作。这让生活简单得多。大概也有助于达成“成为美国最长寿者”的目标。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and we tend to like people we admire. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，而我们往往喜欢那些我们敬佩的人。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, who do we like that we don’t admire, Charlie? (Laughter) Start naming names. These people have names. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：对啊，Charlie，我们有没有喜欢但不敬佩的人？（笑）开始点名吧。他们都是有名字的。（笑）
20. Guinness hurt by weak demand for scotch
由于苏格兰威士忌需求疲弱，Guinness 受挫
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Peter Bevelin from Sweden. How do you perceive Guinness long-term, economics growth-wise?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Peter Bevelin，来自 Sweden。您如何看待 Guinness 的长期前景，特别是在经济增长方面？
WARREN BUFFETT: Fitz — would you repeat that please, Fitz. What was it? What firm growthwise?
WARREN BUFFETT：Fitz——请再重复一遍，Fitz。是什么？哪家公司的增长前景？
VOICE: Guinness.
VOICE：Guinness。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Guinness.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Guinness。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Guinness. I’m not as much of an expert on Guinness’ products as Charlie is.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，Guinness。关于 Guinness 的产品，我可没有 Charlie 懂。
CHARLIE MUNGER: We approved that. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：这个我们已经批准了。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: You didn’t hear him. He said, “I approved that.” I made the decision to buy Guinness and Guinness has — it’s down somewhat from — actually, the price in pounds is about the same but the pound is at about $1.46 or -7 against an average of $1.80-something, so we’ve had a significant exchange loss on that. The — Guinness’ — despite the name — you know, the main product, of course, is scotch. And that’s where most of the money is made, although they make good money in brewing. But, distilling is the main business. And, you know, the usage of scotch, particularly in this country, the trends have not been strong at all, but that was true when we bought it, too. There are some countries around the world where it’s grown and there are certain countries where it’s a huge prestige item. I mean, in certain parts of the Far East, the more you pay for scotch, the better you think people think of you.
WARREN BUFFETT：你们可能没听到，他说“这是我批准的”。买入 Guinness 的决定是我做的，而 Guinness 的表现——相较当时有所下滑——实际上以英镑计价的股价差不多，但英镑兑美元当前约在 1.46 左右（或 1.47），而平均大概在 1.80 多，所以我们在汇兑上有显著损失。Guinness——虽然名字让人联想到啤酒——其主要产品当然是苏格兰威士忌（scotch），利润大头也在这里，尽管啤酒业务也赚钱，但蒸馏才是主业。而且你知道，scotch 的消费，尤其在美国，趋势一直不强，不过我们买入时也已如此。世界上有些国家的需求在增长，也有一些国家把它视为巨大的“面子”消费。比如在远东某些地区，你为 scotch 付得越多，你会觉得别人对你的评价越高。
Which I don’t understand completely, but I hope it continues. (Laughter) But — the scotch — worldwide scotch consumption has not been anything to write home about. Guinness makes a lot of money in the business. But, I would not — I don’t see anything in the — in published history that would lead you to believe that the growth prospects, in terms of physical volume, are high for scotch. The — Guinness itself, the beer, actually has shown pretty good growth rates in some countries. Actually, from a very tiny base in the U.S. as well. But, they will have to do well in distilling or — I mean that will govern the outcome of Guinness. I think Guinness is well run and it’s a very important company in that business. But, I wouldn’t count on a lot of physical growth. Charlie, what — any consumer insights?
我并不完全理解这种现象，但我希望它能持续下去。（笑）不过——就 scotch 而言——全球消费并没有值得大书特书的增长。Guinness 在这门生意里赚了不少钱，但我不认为——我没有在公开的历史资料里看到任何迹象能让人相信 scotch 的“实物销量”增长前景会很高。至于 Guinness 自身的啤酒，在一些国家的增速其实相当不错，在美国也从极小的基数起步有所增长。但他们必须在蒸馏业务上表现出色——我的意思是，这将决定 Guinness 的总体结果。我认为 Guinness 管理良好，而且在该行业中非常重要。但我不会指望有大量的“实物量”增长。Charlie，你有什么——消费者方面的见解吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。（笑）
21. Why Berkshire will be OK if Buffett dies suddenly
为什么即便 Warren Buffett 突然离世，Berkshire 也会没问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Arthur Coleus (PH) from Canton, Massachusetts. And I’d like to know how you’d respond to the question that my associates ask me when they say that Berkshire Hathaway has been a good investment up to now, but what happens to your investment if, God forbid, something happens to Mr. Warren Buffett?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Arthur Coleus（PH），来自 Canton, Massachusetts。我想知道，当别人问我这样一个问题时，您会如何回答：他们说 Berkshire Hathaway 迄今是一笔很好的投资，但如果，呃，上帝保佑不要发生，如果 Warren Buffett 先生出了什么事，你的投资会怎样？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m glad you didn’t say Charlie Munger. (Laughter) No, there — Berkshire will do just fine. We’ve got a wonderful group of businesses. I’ve told you the two things I do in life. And, in terms of the managers we have, you have to come in and really want to mess it up, I would think. And we don’t have anybody like that, in terms of succession plans at Berkshire. And then there’s the question of allocation of capital. And, you could do worse than just adding it to some of the positions that we already had. The ownership is — if I die tonight, the ownership structure does not change. So, you’ve the same large block of stock that has every interest in having good successor management as I would. I mean, there’s no — there would be no greater interest. And it is not a complicated business. I mean, you ought to worry more about, if you own Microsoft, about Bill Gates, I think, or something of the sort.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我很高兴你没有说 Charlie Munger。（笑）不是那样的——Berkshire 会很好。我们拥有一组非常棒的业务。我也告诉过你们我做的两件事。就我们现有的经理人而言，我想说，除非有人进来“存心把事情搞砸”。而在 Berkshire 的接班安排上，我们没有那样的人。接着是资本配置的问题。你完全可以不那么聪明，只是把资金加到我们已经持有的一些头寸上也行。至于所有权——如果我今晚去世，所有权结构不会改变。所以，仍然会有同样的大块持股，它对拥有优秀的继任管理层的关切与我完全一致。我的意思是，没有——不会有比这更强的关切。而且这不是一门复杂的生意。我是说，如果你持有 Microsoft，你更应该担心 Bill Gates，我想，或者类似的事情。
But, this place is, you know, we’ve got a group down here that are running these. You didn’t see me out at Borsheims selling any jewelry the other day. I mean, that’s somebody else’s job. So, I — it is not — it’s not very complicated. Incidentally, I think I’m in pretty good health. I mean this stuff (Coca-Cola) will do wonders for you if you’ll just try it. (Laughter) Charlie, do you want to add anything as the —?
但是，你知道，这儿有一群人在运转这些业务。前几天你也没看到我在 Borsheims 卖珠宝。我的意思是，那是别人该做的事。所以，我——这不是——这并不复杂。顺便说一句，我觉得我身体状况相当不错。我的意思是，这玩意儿（Coca-Cola）如果你愿意试试，会对你很有好处的。（笑）Charlie，作为——你要补充点什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. I think the prospects of Berkshire would be diminished — obviously diminished — if Warren were to drop off tomorrow morning. But it would still be one hell of a company and I think it would still do quite well. I used to do legal work, when I was young, for Charlie Skouras. I heard him once say, my business, which was movie theaters like this one, was off 25 percent last year, and last year was off 25 percent from the year before, and that was off 25 percent from the year before, and then he pounded the table and he’d say, “But it’s still one hell of a business.”
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我认为如果 Warren 明天早上就不在了，Berkshire 的前景会受损——显然会受损。但它仍然是一家“了不起的公司”，而且我认为它仍然会表现得相当不错。我年轻时曾为 Charlie Skouras 做过法律工作。我听他有一次说过：我的生意，也就是像这家剧院这样的电影院，去年下滑了 25%，而去年又比前一年下滑了 25%，再前一年也下滑了 25%，然后他拍着桌子说，“但这仍然是一门了不起的生意。”
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s not a formula we want to test, incidentally.
WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一下，这可不是我们想拿来实测的“公式”。
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, no. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：不，不。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: It is one hell of a business that we’ve got here. I mean — and if you saw what happened at Berkshire headquarters, you would not worry as much. There’s very little going on there that contributes to things. (Laughter) We’re, right now, at our peak of activity. This is it.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们拥有的确实是一桩“了不起的生意”。我的意思是——如果你看看 Berkshire 总部那边在发生什么，你就不会那么担心了。那儿没什么真正“推动事情发生”的活动。（笑）而我们现在，正处在“活动高峰”。也就是现在。
22. Easy answer: no reverse split, either
简单回答：也不会进行反向拆股（合股）
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, my name is Al Martin (PH) and my wife Terry (PH) is here with me. And I appreciate the invitation to attend this meeting. I was a little bit dubious and quite excited at that game Saturday night. I didn’t know which side was going to throw the game to the other one. But I did find out at the end. The first question, actually, was somewhat answered, but not fully. Has the board considered a reverse split? My experience has been that —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：首先，我叫 Al Martin（PH），我太太 Terry（PH）也一起来了。感谢邀请我参加这次会议。周六晚上的那场比赛让我既怀疑又兴奋，不知道最后会是谁“把比赛送给”对方，但到最后我找到了答案。第一个问题其实刚才部分回答了，但还不够——董事会是否考虑过反向拆股（合股）？我的经历是——
WARREN BUFFETT: Would you like to make that a motion? There was a motion for a reserve — reverse split. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：你愿意把这变成一个动议吗？这是一个关于“reserve——reverse split”的动议。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would say a two-for-one because if it were three or four-for-one I might end up with no shares. Or fractional shares. But, anyway, my experience has been that all of the stocks that have split have gone down in the next two or three months or the next two or three years, including one which you are drinking, which is a flat Coke. Also, I have observed Merck over the last several years to be hitting a low, which split three-forone. So, I think that, you know, the reasons for splitting stocks are to make it affordable. I found that every stock I ever bought was never affordable. I found the reason I bought it was because I couldn’t afford not to buy it. So that’s a different philosophy, I guess, as somewhat shared indirectly with the boards running the stock. The second question, which is — has to do with —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我倾向于“一拆二”，因为要是“一拆三”或“一拆四”，我可能最后就没有整股了，只剩零股。无论如何，我的经验是，凡是拆过股的股票，在接下来两三个月或两三年里都会下跌，包括你手里正在喝的那一位——没气的 Coke。还有，我观察到 Merck 在过去几年也走低，而它实施过“一拆三”。所以我认为，拆股的理由通常是“让它看起来买得起”。但我发现，我买过的每只股票都“买不起”；我买它们的原因恰恰是“我负担不起不买它们的代价”。这大概是另一套哲学，某种程度上也间接反映在董事会对股票的处理上。第二个问题，是关于——
WARREN BUFFETT: Hope it’s as easy as the first question. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：希望它像第一个问题一样好回答。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I didn’t want to wait for an answer of the first question for that reason, because it could be complicated and confusing and so forth.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：嗯，我之所以不等第一个问题的回答，就是因为这个问题可能会很复杂、很混乱，等等。
23. Hillary Clinton’s success as commodities trader
Hillary Clinton 大宗商品交易“成功”的启示
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The second question has to do with, could the board consider looking into a commodity broker, or a lawyer, or both, that could take action similar to Hillary Clinton’s? I think, you know, making your net worth go up by a factor of five overnight is more than enticing. Some of us might even want to wait for ten months to get a 100-to-1 return on the money.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：第二个问题是，董事会能否考虑找一个大宗商品经纪人，或律师，或两者兼有，去做一些类似 Hillary Clinton 的事情？我想，净资产一夜之间增长五倍，诱惑不言而喻。我们当中有些人甚至愿意等十个月去拿到 100 比 1 的回报。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I want to say — I want to say to you, when I saw that 530 percent in one day, it — Charlie has never done that for us. I mean — (laughter) — it really caused me to reassess succession plans at Berkshire. (Laughter) And Hillary may be free in a few years. (Laughter and applause) I hope you’re applauding over her coming to Berkshire, not — but I’ll leave that up — (Laughter) OK, that was their second question. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，我得说——当我看到“单日 530%”的时候——Charlie 从来没为我们做到过这一点。（笑）这确实让我重新审视了 Berkshire 的接班计划。（笑）再过几年说不定 Hillary 会“有空”。（笑与掌声）我希望大家鼓掌是为她来 Berkshire——而不是……这个我就不展开了——（笑）好了，这是他们的第二个问题。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That was my second question. Of course, in my experience, it’s been that most of us have thought through this situation and I guess it’s pretty speculative, but I found out that the rules and laws that are made for trading are interpreted rather than enforced. And I think that applied to this particular case, so let’s go on to the third question. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：那就是我的第二个问题。当然，以我的经验，多数人都思考过这种情形；我猜这相当投机。但我发现，交易相关的规则与法律更多是被“解读”，而不是被“执行”。我认为这适用于这个特定案例。所以我们进入第三个问题吧。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Alright. They’re getting easier. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：好吧。问题越来越容易了。（笑）
24. Blue Chip Stamps is a disaster under Buffett and Munger
在 Buffett 和 Munger 手里，Blue Chip Stamps 是场灾难
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This one is real easy. My wife was a collector of Blue Chip stamps for many, many years. And she brought some stamps with her. What should she do with them?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：这个问题很简单。我的妻子收藏 Blue Chip 邮票很多很多年了。她今天还带来了一些。她该怎么处理这些邮票？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that — we can give you a definitive answer to that. Charlie and I entered the trading stamp business to apply our wizardry to it in what, 1969 or so, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：这个——我们可以给你一个明确答案。Charlie 和我在大概 1969 年进入了交易邮票这个行业，准备用我们的“魔法”来施展身手，对吧，Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: We were doing what then, about 110 million?
WARREN BUFFETT：那时候年业务量是多少，1.1 亿左右？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, it went up to 120.
CHARLIE MUNGER：不对，后来涨到 1.2 亿。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. And then we arrived on the scene and we’re going to do what, about 400,000 this year?
WARREN BUFFETT：好吧。然后我们“到来”之后，今年要做到多少？大概 40 万？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (Laughter) That shows you what can be done when your management gets active. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：对。（笑）这就告诉你，一旦管理层“积极作为”，能取得多么“惊人”的成果。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have presided over a decline of 99 1/2 percent. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我们主导了一场 99 又 1/2 百分比的下滑。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. But, we’re waiting for a bounce — (Laughter) I would say this. The trading stamp business, as those of you who have followed all know, it only works because of the float. I mean, there — a very, very high percentage of the stamps in the ’60s were cashed in. We have some years that we’ve gone up to 99 percent, I believe — we sampled the returns — because they were given out in such quantity. But, our advice to anyone who has stamps is to save them because they’re going to be collector’s items, and besides if you bring them to us we have to give you merchandise for them. Tell her to keep them. They’ll do nothing but gain in value over years. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：对，对。不过我们在等“反弹”——（笑）我要说的是：交易邮票这门生意，关注过的人都知道，它成立仅仅因为有 float。我的意思是，60 年代有非常非常高比例的邮票被兑现过。有些年份我们抽样统计，兑付率高达 99%，因为发放量太大了。但是，我们给任何持有邮票的人的建议是：留着它们，因为它们会成为收藏品；再说了，你要是拿来找我们，我们还得拿商品去兑换。所以告诉她留着吧。随着岁月流逝，它们只会升值，不会贬值。（笑）
25. Stock split wouldn’t raise long-term average price
拆股并不会抬高长期的平均价格
WARREN BUFFETT: Going back, incidentally, to your point on the split. I think most people think that the stock would sell for more money split. A, we wouldn’t necessarily think that was advisable in the first place. But we — in the second place, we don’t think it would necessarily be true over a period of time. We think our stock is more likely to be rationally priced over time following the present policies than if we were to split it in some major way. And we don’t think the average price would necessarily be higher. We think that the volatility would probably be somewhat greater, and we see no way that volatility helps our shareholders as a group.
WARREN BUFFETT：顺便回到你关于拆股的观点。我想大多数人认为拆股后股价会更高。首先，A，我们并不一定认为这在原则上是明智的。其次，我们也不认为在一段时间内这件事必然成立。我们认为，按照当前的政策行事，我们的股票更可能在时间维度上被理性定价，而不是通过某种大幅拆股来实现。我们不认为长期的平均价格会因此更高。相反，我们认为波动性可能会更大，而我们看不出更大的波动性如何能作为一个整体去帮助我们的股东。
26. Fed Chairman Greenspan’s actions are “quite sound”
美联储主席 Greenspan 的作为“相当稳健”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：五区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Peg Gallagher from Omaha. Mr. Buffett, are you interested in influencing Mr. Greenspan at the Fed to stop raising interest rates?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Omaha 的 Peg Gallagher。Buffett 先生，您是否有意影响美联储的 Greenspan 先生，让他停止加息？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t have any influence with him. He was on the board of Cap Cities some years ago and I know him a bit. But I don’t think anyone would have any influence with Mr. Greenspan on that point. But, I generally think that his actions have been quite sound during his period as Fed chief. I mean, it’s part of the job of the Fed, as Mr. Martin said many years ago, was to take away the punchbowl at the party, occasionally. And that’s a very difficult, difficult policy to quantify working with markets day-by-day. And, of course, it’s always been the job of the Fed, basically, to lean against the wind. Which, of course, means if the wind changes, you fall flat on your face. But that’s another question. But the — I don’t — I think what he has done is probably been somewhat appropriate. I think he’s probably been surprised, a little bit, as to what has happened with long-term rates as he’s nudged up short-term rates.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不可能对他产生任何影响。他早年曾在 Cap Cities 的董事会任职，我对他有些了解。但我认为在这件事上，没有人能影响 Greenspan 先生。总体来说，我觉得他担任美联储主席期间的作为相当稳健。我的意思是，正如多年前 Martin 先生所说，美联储的职责之一就是在派对上偶尔把“潘趣酒碗”撤走。而这在与市场的日复一日互动中，是非常难以量化、非常困难的政策。当然，美联储的一项基本职责一直是“逆风而行”。这当然意味着一旦风向突变，你可能会“脸朝地”。但那是另一个问题。总之，我——我认为他所做的事大体上是恰当的。我想当他小幅上调短端利率时，对长期利率的反应他可能也略感意外。
I think he was hoping that — this is just a guess on my part — that action, sort of early in the cycle on the short-term rate front, would — might make people feel more confident about the longer-term rates and therefore that the yield curve would flatten some. I don’t know that. And, he may have been a little surprised on that. But it’s not an easy job he has. So, I would not second guess him myself. Charlie, how do you feel about him?
我猜他当时希望——这只是我的推测——在周期较早阶段对短端利率采取动作，会让人们对长期利率更有信心，从而使收益率曲线有所趋平。我并不确定。而对此他可能也有点意外。但他的工作并不容易。所以我不会事后诸葛去质疑他。Charlie，你怎么看他？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Fine. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：很好。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Greenspan is safe. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：Greenspan 安全了。（笑）
27. Don’t pay attention to what people say about stocks
别在意他人对股票的评说
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
MILLER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Lee Miller (PH) from St Louis. There was an article in the April 18th Barron’s that attempted to calculate the value behind each Berkshire Hathaway share. I’m sure you have some views on that and I’d be very interested in your perspective on that issue.
MILLER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 St Louis 的 Lee Miller（PH）。《Barron’s》4 月 18 日刊登了一篇文章，试图计算每股 Berkshire Hathaway 背后的价值。我相信您对这件事有看法，我也非常想听听您的观点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, there was an article about a week or so ago in Barron’s. The same fellow wrote an article about four years ago reaching pretty much the same conclusion, and I hope he hasn’t been short in between, but the — (Laughter) I would say this. It is not the way I would calculate the intrinsic value of Berkshire. But everyone in securities markets make choices on that. Every day somebody sells a few shares of Berkshire and someone sell — buys — and, you know, they are probably coming to differing opinions about valuation. I would say that I found it strange that apparently he forgot we were in the insurance business, but that — that’s not — (Applause). It really doesn’t make any difference. I mean, what — we don’t pay any attention to what people say about Coca-Cola stock or Gillette stock or any of those things. I mean, on any given day, two million shares of Coca-Cola may trade. That’s a lot of people selling, a lot of people buying.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，大概一周前《Barron’s》有一篇文章。同一位作者在四年前也写过一篇，结论差不多。我希望他这段时间里没有做空，不过——（笑）我要说的是：那不是我计算 Berkshire 内在价值的方法。但在证券市场里，每个人都会做自己的判断。每天都有些人卖出 Berkshire，也有人买入——你知道的，他们对估值大概有不同看法。我得说，我觉得奇怪的是，他显然“忘了”我们是保险业务，但那——那也无所谓——（掌声）。这其实无关紧要。我的意思是——我们不会在意别人对 Coca-Cola 或 Gillette 之类股票的评论。任何一天，可能都有两百万股 Coca-Cola 易手。卖的人很多，买的人也很多。
If you talk to one person, you’d hear one thing, and you’d talk to another — you really should not make decisions in securities based on what other people think. If you’re doing that, you should think about doing something else, because it’s — A public opinion poll will just — it will not get you rich on Wall Street. So you really want to stick with businesses that you feel you can somehow evaluate yourself. And, I don’t think — I mean Charlie and I, we don’t read anything about what business is going to be — the economy is going to do, or the market’s going to do, or what anybody — Anytime I see some article that says, you know, these analysts say this or that about some business, it just — it doesn’t mean anything to us. You cannot get rich with a weather vane.
如果你跟一个人谈会听到一种说法，跟另一个人谈又是另一种——你真的不应该根据他人的看法来做证券决策。如果你这么做，你应该考虑去做点别的，因为——民意调查不会让你在华尔街致富。所以你要坚持只投那些你自认为能评估的业务。而且，我不认为——我的意思是，我和 Charlie 不会去读那些关于某个行业、宏观经济或市场将如何、以及某些人怎么看的文章。每当我看到某篇文章写“某某分析师对某业务有何看法”，对我们而言——那毫无意义。你靠风向标是发不了财的。
28. Judge bank stock buybacks on case-by-case basis
银行回购应当逐案判断
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.
WARREN BUFFETT：七区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Edward Barr from Lexington, Kentucky, and I’d like to ask, given the amount of capital in the banking industry, do you think that more banks should be buying back significant amounts of their stock, like SunTrust, versus just the token amounts that they’re buying back or just the authorized amounts? And then also, related question in banking. Are they — are banks too focused on goodwill amortization when declining to buy other banks for cash, thereby using purchase accounting versus the normal practice in the industry of pooling accounting even when the stock they issue may be depressed or undervalued?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Lexington, Kentucky 的 Edward Barr。我想请问，鉴于银行业的资本规模，您是否认为应有更多银行像 SunTrust 那样回购大量股票，而不是只回购一些象征性的数量，或者仅仅回购已授权的额度？另外一个相关问题：在银行业中，他们——也就是银行——是否过于关注商誉摊销，从而在拒绝以现金收购其他银行时，选择采用 purchase accounting，而不是行业中通常的 pooling accounting，即便他们用于并购所发行的自家股票可能被压低或低估？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about the capital in the industry — that — you really have to look at that on a bank-by-bank basis and there is a lot more repurchasing of shares by banks taking place. You mentioned SunTrust, but National City is — they bought it back, I think, 5 percent of their — National City of Cleveland — bought back 5 percent of their stock in the first quarter. There’s much more repurchasing going on, and that’s simply a judgment call by management that — as to the level of capital they need going forward, and what level of capital enables them to earn the return on equity that they think appropriate and whether they — what they feel like paying for their own shares. So, I think you have to look at that on case-by-case. We certainly like it, if we were to own a bank, we would — or own shares in a bank — we would like the idea of the bank repurchasing its stock at a price that we thought was attractive.
WARREN BUFFETT：关于第一个问题，即行业内资本的问题——这个——确实需要按银行逐家评估。现在确实有更多银行在回购股票。你提到了 SunTrust，另外 National City——我记得是——National City of Cleveland——在第一季度回购了其约 5% 的股票。回购越来越多，这纯粹是管理层的判断：他们未来需要怎样的资本水平、什么样的资本水平能让他们实现认为合适的股本回报、以及他们愿意以什么价格回购自家股票。所以我认为这是需要逐案判断的。如果我们拥有一家银行——或者持有一家银行的股票——只要价格对我们有吸引力，我们当然乐见银行回购自家股票。
We would think that they probably knew more about their own bank than some other bank they were going to buy and that if the numbers are right, it’s an attractive way to use capital.
我们会认为，相比去收购的外部银行，他们对自家银行了解得更多；如果账算得过来，那就是一种有吸引力的资本使用方式。
29. We don’t pay attention to accounting of a transaction
我们不在意交易采用哪种会计处理
WARREN BUFFETT: Your second question about goodwill amortization and purchase accounting versus pooling: we care not — at Berkshire, it absolutely makes no difference to us what accounting treatment we get on something. We are interested in the economics of a transaction. Some banks — some businesses generally, most businesses perhaps — prefer pooling because they don’t like to take a goodwill amortization charge. We think our shareholders are smart enough, particularly if we make it clear to them — the accounting consequences — we think they’re smart enough to look through to the economic reality of what Berkshire’s businesses are all about. And I think that some managements sell short their own ownership group by doing various kinds of financial acrobatics in order to have the charges come in a certain way rather than, as you point out, often they might be better off buying for cash rather than using their own stock as currency, but they may prefer to use their own stock because they avoid goodwill charges. We’ve written a few things on goodwill in the past and past annual reports that might get to that subject.
WARREN BUFFETT：你的第二个问题是商誉摊销、purchase accounting 与 pooling 的取舍：我们不在意——在 Berkshire，我们对某项交易采用哪种会计处理“完全无所谓”。我们关心的是交易的经济实质。一些银行——更广泛地说，一些企业，甚至也许大多数企业——偏好 pooling，因为他们不喜欢确认商誉摊销。我们认为我们的股东足够聪明，尤其是在我们清楚解释会计后果的情况下——他们足够聪明，能看穿 Berkshire 业务背后的经济现实。我也认为，一些管理层为了让报表费用以某种方式呈现，会做出各种“财技”，从而亏待了自家的所有者群体；而正如你指出的，很多时候他们用现金收购会比用自家股票当“货币”更好，但他们可能更愿意用股票，以避免商誉摊销。我们以前在年报里写过一些关于商誉的内容，可以参考。
We don’t care what accounting — we sort of rewrite the accounting for any business that we’re looking at, because in our heads we want to have, in effect, a standardized way of looking at businesses. And if one company goes through pooling transactions and another goes through purchase transactions, we’re going to recast them in our own minds so that there is comparability. Charlie?
我们不在意采用何种会计处理——我们在评估任何一家企业时，都会在脑中“重写”其会计结果，因为我们想以一种事实上“标准化”的方式来看企业。若有公司采用 pooling、另一个采用 purchase，我们会在心里把它们重述到可比。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the published accounting results are in accordance with standard convention and they’re a place to start economic analysis. The figures are frequently quite silly on a functional basis. I’m not criticizing accounting conventions except for some. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，公开的会计结果遵循的是标准惯例，它们是进行经济分析的起点。从功能意义看，这些数字经常显得很“傻”。我并不是在批评会计惯例，除了某些例外。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。
CHARLIE MUNGER: But, I think it’s just a place to start thinking about economic reality. By their nature, they can’t tie perfectly — they can’t even tie very well — to economic reality.
CHARLIE MUNGER：但我认为那只是理解经济现实的起点。按其本性，它们无法与经济现实完美对应——甚至很难做到“较好”对应。
WARREN BUFFETT: We regard it is a negative when we find a management that’s preoccupied with accounting considerations. But, we find it so frequent that we can’t afford to use it as a total exclusionary factor. It really surprises me how many managements focus on accounting, and the time they spend on it, the — it’s really unproductive. If you find a management that doesn’t care about the accounting but does explain to you in clear terms what’s going on, I think you should regard that as a plus in owning a security.
WARREN BUFFETT：当我们发现某个管理层过度沉迷会计“呈现”时，我们会把它视为负面信号。但这种情况太常见，我们也无法据此“一票否决”。让我惊讶的是，有那么多管理层把大量时间花在会计上——那真的没什么产出。如果你遇到一个不纠结会计处理、却能用清晰语言解释业务实质的管理层，我认为你应当把这视为持有其证券的一个加分项。
30. Buffett praises new Salomon Brothers management
巴菲特称赞 Salomon Brothers 的新管理层
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Bill Ackman. I’m from New York City. And my question relates to the appeal of Salomon Brothers as an investment. You talked earlier about leverage and the dangers of leverage. Salomon is a business which is levered 30-to-1, which has very narrow margins, and earns a relatively modest return on equity, in light of the amount of leverage that they use. What is the appeal of the business to you?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Bill Ackman，来自 New York City。我的问题是关于把 Salomon Brothers 作为投资标的的吸引力。您刚才谈到杠杆及其危险性。Salomon 这门生意的杠杆率大约是 30 比 1，利润率很薄，在如此高杠杆下股本回报也相对一般。对您而言，这门生意的吸引力在哪里？
WARREN BUFFETT: We have here today the chief executive of Salomon, Inc., the parent company, and also the chief executive of Salomon Brothers, the investment banking arm. And, I would say one of the things we — Charlie and I — feel extraordinarily good about are the two fellows that are running that operation. They did an exceptional job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, as did John Macfarlane, who’s also here today. The three of them — I mentioned four people in the annual report — and Salomon wouldn’t be here today without those three. And it wouldn’t be the company in the future that it’s going to be without them. They did an absolutely fabulous job. It’s the sort of business that, as you point out, uses a lot of leverage. It doesn’t — in one way it doesn’t use as much as it looks like and in another way it uses even more than it looks like. But — it — the test will be: A, whether they control that business in a way that that leverage does not prove dangerous, and secondly, what kind of returns on equity they earn while using it.
WARREN BUFFETT：今天在场的有 Salomon, Inc.（母公司）的首席执行官，以及 Salomon Brothers（投行部门）的首席执行官。我想说，令我和 Charlie 特别放心的一点，就是执掌该业务的这两位。他们在极其艰难的环境下完成了出色的工作，John Macfarlane（他今天也在场）亦然。我在年报里提到过四个人——而没有这三位，Salomon 今天就不会还在；没有他们，Salomon 的未来也不会是现在这个样子。他们的表现绝对精彩。正如你指出的，这是一门高度依赖杠杆的生意。从某种角度看，它用的杠杆没有看上去那么多；从另一个角度看，它用的又比看上去更多。但——关键考验在于两点：第一，他们是否能把业务控制在让杠杆不至于带来危险的范围内；第二，在使用杠杆的同时，能取得怎样的股本回报。
You certainly should expect to earn somewhat higher returns on equity when you are necessarily exposed to a small amount of systemic risk and significant amounts of borrowed money, than you would in a business that’s an extremely plain vanilla business. But, I don’t know whether you’ve met Bob and Deryck, but, I think you’d feel better about having a leverage in their hands than about any other hand you can imagine. Charlie?
当你必然暴露于一定的系统性风险并使用大量借入资金时，你当然应当期望获得比“极其朴素的生意”更高一些的股本回报。不过，我不知道你是否见过 Bob 和 Deryck，但我认为，让杠杆掌握在他们手里，会比你能想象到的任何其他人手里都更让人踏实。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Why don’t we have those three gentlemen stand up?
CHARLIE MUNGER：让那三位先生起立一下，如何？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, you ought to give them a hand.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，应该为他们鼓掌。
CHARLIE MUNGER: They really have done a job for Berkshire in this last year.
CHARLIE MUNGER：过去一年里，他们确实为 Berkshire 立下了大功。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ll lead the applause for them. Where are they? There they are. (Applause). I mentioned this before, but it’s worth mentioning again. Deryck took on the job of being the operating head of Salomon Brothers on what, August 18th, 1991. He didn’t know what — he couldn’t know what he was getting into, exactly. He — two months later or three months later, we’d never had a conversation about compensation. He did not ask me for Berkshire, or my, guarantee for indemnification because he was walking in not knowing legal problems. We didn’t know what we would finally uncover. And he worked incredible hours to keep that place together, which was not easy. Bob Denham, I called — I guess on the 23rd or so, 20th. I called him on a Friday. I got home on a Saturday, the 24th of August. He was living a nice pleasant peaceful life in California. And had a first class law firm, a good group of clients, wife had a good job there.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，我来带头鼓掌。他们在哪里？在那里。（掌声）我以前提过，但值得再说一次。Deryck 大概是在 1991 年 8 月 18 日接任 Salomon Brothers 的运营主管。他当时并不知道——也不可能确切知道——自己将要面对什么。两三个月后，我们仍未谈过他的薪酬。他没有向我或 Berkshire 要求任何赔偿保证，因为走马上任时并不知道会有什么法律问题。我们也不知道最后会揭开些什么。他以近乎疯狂的工作强度把公司稳定下来，那并不容易。至于 Bob Denham，我大概是在 20 日或 23 日打电话给他。我在周五给他来电，8 月 24 日周六回到家时，他还在 California 过着安稳惬意的生活：顶尖律所、优质客户、太太也有体面的工作。
And I told him I was in a mess and there wasn’t any second choice and three days later he was back in New York and living in a small apartment in Battery City and handling the general counsel’s job at Salomon. They found John Macfarlane on that Sunday, on the 18th. I think he was running a triathlon or something. Not a practice that Charlie and I follow, but, ah — (Laughter) And he was yanked from that and came down, and I think John was over in New Jersey, but he holed up in the Downtown Athletic Club. And it was his job to keep funding what was then $150 billion balance sheet during a period when people right and left were canceling. It’s not because we weren’t a good credit, but because they just didn’t want to have anything to do with us for a while. And the World Bank and the State of Texas pension fund and CalPERS, all these people were shutting off funding at a time — and funding in a business is — gentleman just indicated — is the lifeblood of an enterprise like Salomon.
我告诉他“我这儿一团糟，且没有第二人选”。三天后他就回到 New York，住进 Battery City 的一套小公寓，担任 Salomon 的总法律顾问。至于 John Macfarlane，是在那个周日、也就是 18 日找到的。我记得他当时在参加铁人三项之类的活动——这不是我和 Charlie 会干的事，但，呃——（笑）他立即被叫停并赶来。我想 John 当时在 New Jersey，但他扎营在 Downtown Athletic Club。他的任务是在众多对手方左右退场、纷纷取消的情况下，维持当时高达 1,500 亿美元资产负债表的融资。不是因为我们信用不好，而是他们一时不想与我们有往来。World Bank、State of Texas 的养老金、CalPERS 等等都在关停资金支持——而资金之于这种业务——正如刚才那位先生所示——是像 Salomon 这样企业的生命线。
And so those three deserve an enormous hand by — really by the Salomon shareholders — but by this group in turn because we have an important investment. So I thank them publicly. (Applause)
因此，这三位理应得到热烈的掌声——不仅来自 Salomon 的股东，也来自在座各位，因为我们在其中有重要的投资。所以我要在此公开致谢。（掌声）
31. Wesco sold small savings and loan as regulations tightened after crisis
金融危机后监管趋严，Wesco 出售小型储贷协会
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Kelly Ranson from San Antonio, Texas. And I wondered if you could comment on the Mutual Savings and Loan. There was just a footnote that the deposits have been assumed by a federal savings bank. And also, what about the annual report for Wesco Financial that I know it used to be in the annual report for Berkshire. Just wondered if you could comment on that, please.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 San Antonio, Texas 的 Kelly Ranson。我想请您谈谈 Mutual Savings and Loan。年报脚注里只有一句话，说存款已由一家联邦储蓄银行承接。还有，关于 Wesco Financial 的年度报告——我记得以前它包含在 Berkshire 的年报里。能否请您就这两点评论一下？
WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about — we — our 80 percent-owned subsidiary Wesco Financial sold its ownership in Mutual Savings and Loan of Pasadena last year. I’ll let Charlie comment on that. And then the second question is about the Wesco report, which is available to any Berkshire shareholder simply by writing Wesco. But, we found that the stapling problems and other things made it a little difficult to keep adding that every year to the report. So, now we just — we make it available to anyone who would, at Berkshire, who would like to have it. But Charlie, want to comment on the sale of Mutual?
WARREN BUFFETT：这个问题是关于——我们持股 80% 的子公司 Wesco Financial 去年出售了其在 Pasadena 的 Mutual Savings and Loan 的股权。这件事我请 Charlie 来点评。第二个问题是 Wesco 的报告，任何 Berkshire 股东只需写信给 Wesco 就能索取。但我们发现每年把它装订进 Berkshire 年报会遇到装订等方面的小麻烦。所以现在我们——对任何想要的 Berkshire 股东，单独提供它。Charlie，你谈谈出售 Mutual 的原因？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. The savings and loan business became very much more heavily regulated after the huge nationwide collection of scandal and insolvency and so on. And meanwhile, we had a very small savings and loan association. And the combination of the new regulation, and the fact that it was a very small part of our operation, made us decide that we were better off without it. That does happen from time to time in Berkshire. We do exit once in a while. And, by the way, we would reserve the right to change our mind. I always liked Lord Keynes when he said that he got new facts or new insights, why he changed his mind and then he’d say, what do you do? So we changed our mind.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。经历全国范围的丑闻与资不抵债事件后，储贷行业的监管大为趋严。与此同时，我们拥有的是一家很小的储贷机构。更严的监管，加上它在我们业务中体量很小，这两点促使我们决定不再持有它。Berkshire 偶尔会做这种退出。顺便说一句，我们保留改变主意的权利。我一直喜欢 Lord Keynes 的那句话：当他获得新事实或新见解时，他就改变主意，然后问：“你会怎么做？”于是我们也改变了主意。
WARREN BUFFETT: They start — they asked our directors at Mutual to start going to school on Saturday, didn’t they, Charlie? Or something? I think that helped change our mind about Mutual.
WARREN BUFFETT：他们开始——他们要求我们在 Mutual 的董事周六去上课，是吧，Charlie？类似这样的事？我想这也促使我们改变了对 Mutual 的看法。
CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a time to vote with your feet. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：有时候该用脚投票了。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: And even your wallet.
WARREN BUFFETT：甚至用你的钱包投票。
32. Shoe industry is tough, but Dexter has great managers
制鞋业艰难，但 Dexter 拥有出色经理人
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) Chicago. Can you speak to some of the economic characteristics of the shoe industry that allow the business to be profitable and, in your view, attractive?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清）Chicago。您能谈谈制鞋行业的一些经济特性——哪些因素让这门生意有利润、并在您看来具有吸引力？
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t hear that. Did you hear that, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：我没听清。你听清了吗，Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wanted you to comment on the merits of the shoe industry.
CHARLIE MUNGER：他想让你评论一下制鞋行业的优劣。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think our feelings for the shoe industry are very clear from what’s been happening the last few years. We think it’s a great business to be in as long as you’re in with Frank Rooney and Jim Issler and Peter Lunder and Harold Alfond. Otherwise, it hasn’t been too good. The — we have a couple of extraordinary shoe operations, but they’re not extraordinary because we get our leather from different steers or anything of the sort. It’s — we have two companies, really three now that Lowell’s been brought in, too, but that have truly extraordinary records. I think those same managements would have been enormous successes in any business they’d gone into. But, they have gone into the — they are in the shoe business and the companies earn unusual returns on equity. They earn unusual returns on sale. They’ve got terrific trade reputations. And I think that to the extent we can find ways to expand in the shoe business while employing those managements, we’ll be very excited about doing so.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我想过去几年的情况已经清楚表达了我们对制鞋业的看法。只要你能与 Frank Rooney、Jim Issler、Peter Lunder 和 Harold Alfond 这样的人一起做，那就是一门很棒的生意；否则，它并不太好。我们有几家表现非凡的制鞋企业，但它们之所以非凡，并不是因为我们从不同的公牛身上取得了更好的皮料或类似原因。关键在于——我们有两家公司，实际上算上 Lowell 的并入现在是三家——它们的业绩记录都非常卓越。我认为这些管理层无论进入哪门生意都会取得巨大成功。但他们进入、并且身处的是制鞋业，而这些公司取得了不寻常的股本回报率与销售回报率，并且拥有极佳的行业口碑。我认为，只要我们能在继续启用这些管理层的前提下找到扩张制鞋业务的方法，我们会非常乐意去做。
来自脚的体验远不如来自手和口的体验。
It isn’t because we think that the shoe industry is any cinch, you know, per se, or anything of the sort. But we’ve got a lot of talent employed in the shoe business and whenever we’ve got talent we like to try and figure out a way to give them as big a domain as we can. And it’s not inconceivable that we would expand the shoe business, perhaps even significantly over time.
这并不是因为我们认为制鞋业本身就容易，或类似的理由。而是因为我们在制鞋业务中拥有大量人才——每当我们拥有人才，我们就愿意想办法给他们尽可能大的施展空间。随着时间推移，我们扩大制鞋业务、甚至显著扩大，并非不可想象。
33. Buffett on investing in tobacco companies
巴菲特谈投资烟草公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, thanks Mr. Buffett. My name is Stewart Hartman from Sioux City. After the brevity of the last question from section 4, I’ll try to be extremely brief. The — given the scrutiny that the tobacco business is going under right now, number one, what do you see as the business prospects for those huge cash cows? And, at any point, would that be attractive to you given their liability?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢您，Buffett 先生。我叫 Stewart Hartman，来自 Sioux City。延续四区上一位提问者的简短风格，我也尽量简短——鉴于烟草行业目前正受到的审视，第一，您怎么看这些“现金奶牛”的业务前景？其次，考虑到它们的潜在法律责任，是否在任何时点会对您有吸引力？
WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about the future of the tobacco business? I don’t — I probably know no more about that then you do because it’s fraught with questions that relate to societal attitudes and you can form an opinion on that just as well as I could. But, I would not like to have a significant percentage of my net worth in the tobacco business myself, but — They may have better futures than I envision. I don’t really think that I have special insights on that. Charlie, you —?
WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于烟草行业的未来？我——我大概并不比你知道得更多，因为这充满了与社会态度相关的不确定，你完全可以像我一样形成自己的判断。但就我个人而言，我不愿意把净资产中显著的一部分放在烟草行业上，不过——它们的未来也许会比我设想的更好。对此我并没有什么特别的洞见。Charlie，你——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: You have to come to a conclusion as to how society is going to want to treat — and the present administration for that matter. And the economics of the business may be fine, but that doesn’t mean it has a great future.
WARREN BUFFETT：你必须对社会（以及当届政府）将如何对待该行业形成结论。业务的经济性也许还不错，但这并不意味着它会有一个很好的未来。
34. “Hard to argue with the market”
“很难与市场争辩”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：五区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Harriet Morton from Seattle, Washington. I’m wondering, when you are considering an acquisition, how you look at the usefulness of the product?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Seattle, Washington 的 Harriet Morton。我想请问，当你考虑并购时，你如何看待被并购方产品的“有用性”？
WARREN BUFFETT: In looking at any business?
WARREN BUFFETT：是指看待任何业务时吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, obviously we look at what the market says is the utility. And the market has voted very heavily for Dexter Shoe, just to be an example. I don’t know many how many pairs of shoes they were turning out back in 1958 or thereabouts, but year after year, people have essentially voted for the utility of that product. There are 750 million or so 8-ounce servings of one product or another from the Coca-Cola Company consumed every day around the world. And there are those of us who think the utility is very high. I can’t make it through the day without a few. But there are other people that might rate it differently. But essentially, people are going to get thirsty and if this is the way they take care of their thirst better than — and they prefer that to other forms — then I would rate the utility high of the product. But, I think it’s hard to argue with the market on that. I mean, people — some people may think that, you know, listening to a rock concert is not something of high utility. Other people might think it’s terrific.
WARREN BUFFETT：对。很显然我们会看“市场如何评价其效用”。以 Dexter Shoe 为例，市场多年来一直“用脚投票”。我不知道 1958 年前后他们一年做多少双鞋，但年复一年，人们事实上一直在为那个产品的“有用性”投票。全世界每天大约消费 7.5 亿份可口可乐公司出品的 8 盎司饮料。我们当中有人认为它的“效用”非常高——我一天不喝几罐都难受。但也有人可能会有不同评价。归根结底，人总会口渴；如果这种方式更能解渴——而且他们偏好这种方式胜过其他形式——那我就会给这种产品的“有用性”打高分。但在这点上，我认为“很难与市场争辩”。比如，有些人觉得听摇滚演唱会“效用不高”，另一些人却觉得“棒极了”。
And so, we would judge that — I don’t think we would come to an independent decision that there was some great utility residing in some product that had been available to the public for a long time, but that the public and not endorsed in any way. Charlie?
因此，我们会据此评判——我不认为我们会“独立”得出某种结论：某个长期向公众出售、却从未被公众以任何方式认可的产品，居然蕴含“巨大的效用”。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s right. But, that’s averaged out. We’re in a bunch of high-utility products. I mean, nurses’ shoes, work shoes, casual shoes. We don’t have a lot of, what, Italian pumps? (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我同意。不过这是“平均下来”的结论。我们经营的产品大多“效用很高”，比如护士鞋、工鞋、休闲鞋。我们并没有太多那种，呃，意大利细高跟？（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Don’t rule it out, Charlie. We may be here next year defending it. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：别把话说死，Charlie。说不定明年我们还得在这里为它辩护呢。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, right, well. No, I’m just saying, if you judge the existing portfolio as indicating what the future’s likely to be like, why —
CHARLIE MUNGER：好吧好吧。我的意思是，如果你把现有产品组合作为未来可能样貌的指示，那么——
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, certainly a lot of essentials were sold out of Borsheims yesterday.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，至少昨天 Borsheims 的“生活必需品”卖空了不少。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. (Laughter and applause)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。（笑与掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: I hear my family clapping.
WARREN BUFFETT：我听到我家人也在拍手了。
35. No question from zone 6
六区没有问题
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
VOICE: We have no question up here.
VOICE：我们这边没有问题。
36. Insurers have “head in the sand” on catastrophes
保险业对巨灾风险“掩耳盗铃”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 7.
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，七区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Berkshire, uh, Buffett. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好，Berkshire 先生，呃，Buffett。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I have a niece here who has a son named Berkshire so it —
WARREN BUFFETT：我有个外甥女，她给儿子取名叫 Berkshire，所以——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Chris Blunt (PH) from Omaha. My first question is, in years past, we’ve had samples of various products. When are we going to have some Guinness?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Chris Blunt（PH），来自 Omaha。第一个问题是，往年我们都会拿到各类产品的试用品。我们什么时候能分到一些 Guinness？
WARREN BUFFETT: Some what now?
WARREN BUFFETT：什么东西？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Guinness samples?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Guinness 的试饮？
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And my second question is, in light of the multiple disasters that have taken place in LA, has that had any impact on the cats for Berkshire?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：第二个问题是，鉴于洛杉矶发生了多起灾害，这对 Berkshire 的“cats”有没有影响？
WARREN BUFFETT: On our super-cat business?
WARREN BUFFETT：是指我们的超额巨灾（super-cat）业务吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: The LA earthquake, which is originally — I believe the first estimate of insured damage was a billion-five, which struck us as kind of ludicrous, but has now escalated. The last official estimate, the one we use that’s a trigger in our policies, I think is either 4.5 billion or 4.8 billion. But it’s going to be higher than that. Our losses are fairly minor. If it gets to eight billion of insured damage, that would trigger another policy or two. But, I would say that the LA quake — which did considerably more damage, I think, than people would have anticipated from a 6.7 for various reasons having to do with how quakes operate — that quake is not going to turn out to be of any real — it’s not the kind of super-cat that a 15 or $20 billion hurricane which hit Florida or Long Island or New England would be. That’s the kind of — we could lose — or we could pay out — 6 or $700 million in sort of a worst case super-cat. Now our total premiums this year might be, say, 250 million or something in that area.
WARREN BUFFETT：洛杉矶地震，最初——我记得最初对保险损失的估计是15亿美元，我们觉得有点可笑，但现在已经上调。我们保单触发所采用的最新官方估计，我想是45亿或48亿美元。但最终会高于这个数。我们的损失相当小。如果投保损失达到80亿美元，可能还会触发一两份保单。不过我想说，洛杉矶这次地震——就我看，由于地震机制等多种原因，它造成的损害远超人们对一次6.7级地震的预期——但它不会成为那种真正意义上的超额巨灾；不像一场袭击 Florida、Long Island 或 New England 的150亿或200亿美元级别的飓风。那类情况下——在最坏情形里——我们可能会亏损（或赔付）6亿或7亿美元。而我们今年来自这块业务的总保费可能也就2.5亿美元上下。
So one super-cat in the wrong place would produce — and there could be more than one — could produce, we’ll say, a $400 million or thereabouts underwriting loss from that business. The LA quake is peanuts on that scale, but it wouldn’t have taken a whole lot more in terms of numbers on the Richter scale, if it happened to have an epicenter where it did, and be of the type that it was, relatively shallow, that we could have had that sort of thing happen. I think that the insurance industry has vastly underestimated — maybe not now, but up till a few years ago — the full potential of what a super-cat could do. But Hurricane Andrew and the LA quake may have been something of a wake-up call. They were far from a worst-case situation. A really big Type Five hurricane on Long Island would end up leaving a lot of very major insurance companies in significant trouble. We define our losses — essentially, 700 million sounds like a lot of money. It is a lot of money. But, there are limits on our policies. That is not true of people that are just writing the basic homeowners or business. Those losses could go off the chart.
因此，一次发生在“错误地点”的超额巨灾事件就可能——而且可能不止一起——让我们在这块业务上出现约4亿美元的承保亏损。以这个量级衡量，洛杉矶地震只是“小菜一碟”。但如果里氏震级再高一点，震中仍在同一位置、类型与这次类似（相对较浅），我们完全可能遭遇那种最坏情形。我认为保险业长期——也许现在不至于，但直到几年前确实如此——严重低估了超额巨灾的完整破坏力。Andrew 飓风与洛杉矶地震或许算是一次警钟，但它们远非最坏情形。一次真正强烈的五级飓风袭击 Long Island，足以让很多大型保险公司陷入重大麻烦。我们对自己的损失设定了上限——7亿美元听起来很多，确实很多，但我们的保单有责任限额；而那些承保基础房屋险或商业险的公司就没有这种限额保护，他们的损失可能“爆表”。
There were certain companies in the LA quake that thought they had a — what they call a “probable maximum loss” for California quakes. And the LA quake, which was far from the worst case you can imagine, turned out to far exceed those probable maximum losses. So, I think the industry has had, and may still have, its head in the sand a little bit, in terms of what can happen, either in terms of a quake in California or, more probably, in terms of a hurricane along the East Coast. So far this year we’re in reasonable shape, but that doesn’t mean much because, by far, the larger exposure is in hurricanes and essentially 50 percent of the hurricanes hit in September. And about — I think it’s about 15 percent would be in August. Close to 15 percent in October. So you have 80 percent, roughly, in those three months and there’s a little tail on both sides. But that’s when you find out whether you’ve had a good or bad year in the super-cat business, basically.
洛杉矶地震中，有些公司自以为对 California 地震的“最大可能损失（PML）”有把握；结果这次地震（还远非最坏情形）就大幅超出其 PML。由此我认为，行业过去一直、现在或许仍然在对可能发生的情形“掩耳盗铃”——无论是 California 的地震，还是更可能发生在东海岸的飓风。截至今年目前我们情况尚可，但这意义不大，因为我们最大的暴露来自飓风；大约50%的飓风发生在9月，约15%在8月，接近15%在10月——三个月合计约80%，前后还有一点尾部。基本上，也正是在那段时间你才能知道超额巨灾业务这一年是好是坏。
It’s a business we like at the right rates because there are very few people who can afford to write it at the level that the underlying company, the reinsured companies, need it. And we’re in a position, if the rates are right, to do significant business. Charlie?
只要费率合适，这是一门我们喜欢的业务，因为真正有能力按原保险公司、再保险公司所需规模去承保的机构很少。而只要费率到位，我们就有能力做相当可观的业务。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
37. Book recommendations
书籍推荐
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1,
WARREN BUFFETT：一区，
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Clayton Riley (PH) from Jacksonville, Florida. This is a little different than all the other questions, but what were the three best books you read last year outside of the investment field? Why don’t — even one will do.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Jacksonville, Florida 的 Clayton Riley（PH）。这个问题跟其他的不太一样：去年在投资领域之外，您读过的三本最好的书是什么？不然——哪怕只说一本也行。
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll give you — I’ll tout a book first that I’ve read but that isn’t available yet. But it will be in September. The woman who wrote it, I believe, is in the audience and it’s Ben Graham’s biography, which will be available in September, by Janet Lowe. And I’ve read it and I think those of you who are interested in investments, for sure, will enjoy it. She’s done a good job of capturing Ben. One of the books I enjoyed a lot was written also by a shareholder who is not here because he’s being sworn in, I believe today or tomorrow, maybe tomorrow, as head of the Voice of America. And that’s Geoff Cowan’s book, which is on “The People v. Clarence Darrow.” It’s the story of the Clarence Darrow trial for, essentially, jury bribery in Los Angeles back around 1912, when the McNamara brothers had bombed the LA Times. It’s a fascinating book.
WARREN BUFFETT：我先推荐一本我读过但尚未出版的书，它会在九月面世。作者是一位女士，我想她今天就在台下——这本书是 Ben Graham 的传记，由 Janet Lowe 撰写，将在九月发行。我已经读过了，我想凡是对投资感兴趣的各位，肯定会喜欢。她很好地捕捉到了 Ben 的风貌。另一本我非常喜欢的书的作者同样是一位股东，他今天没来，因为据我所知他今天或明天——也许是明天——要宣誓就任 Voice of America 的负责人。这本书是 Geoff Cowan 写的，题为《The People v. Clarence Darrow》。内容讲的是大约 1912 年在 Los Angeles、McNamara 兄弟炸毁 LA Times 之后，Clarence Darrow 因涉嫌贿赂陪审员而受审的故事。这是一本非常吸引人的书。
Geoff uncovered a lot of information that the previous biographies of Darrow didn’t have. I think you’d enjoy that. Charlie?
Geoff 挖掘出了许多此前 Darrow 传记里没有的资料。我想你们会喜欢。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I very much enjoyed Connie Bruck’s biography Master of the Game, which was a biography of Steve Ross, who headed Warner and later was, what, co-chairman of Time Warner.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我很喜欢 Connie Bruck 的传记《Master of the Game》，写的是 Steve Ross——他曾领导 Warner，后来是，嗯，Time Warner 的联席董事长。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, he’s a little more than co-chairman. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，他的头衔不止于联席董事长。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and — she’s a very insightful writer and it’s a very interesting story. I am rereading a book I really like, which is Van Doren’s biography of Benjamin Franklin, which came out in 1952, and I’d almost forgotten how good a book it was. And that’s available in paperback everywhere. We’ve never had anybody quite like Franklin in this country. Never again.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对，而且——她是一位很有洞见的作者，书也非常有意思。我正在重读一本我非常喜欢的书，是 Van Doren 写的 Benjamin Franklin 传记，1952 年出版，我几乎都忘了它有多好。现在各地都有平装本可买。我们这个国家从未有过、也不会再有像 Franklin 那样的人。
WARREN BUFFETT: He believed in compound interest, too, incidentally, as you may remember. (Laughter) What did he — he set up those two little funds, one in Philadelphia, one in Boston?
WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一下，他也信奉复利，你们或许记得。（笑）他——他设立的两个小基金是吧，一个在 Philadelphia，一个在 Boston？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, to demonstrate the advantages of compound interest. I think that’s the part Charlie’s rereading. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，为了展示复利的优势。我想这正是 Charlie 现在在重读的部分。（笑）
38. Nike and Reebok
Nike 和 Reebok
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for teaching me — teaching so much to all of us about business. My name is Mike Assail (PH) from New York City. You mentioned earlier that Berkshire’s shoe business was great, but that other shoe businesses were not so good. What are the uncertainties of the global brand leaders that Berkshire seems to like? They like Coke and Gillette. The global brand leaders in the shoe business being Nike and Reebok. What are their uncertainties, in terms of long-term competitive advantage, business economics, consumer behavior, and the other risk factors that you mentioned in the annual report this year? Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：感谢您对我——对我们所有人——在商业方面的教导。我叫 Mike Assail（PH），来自 New York City。您先前提到 Berkshire 的制鞋业务很棒，但其他制鞋业务就不那么好了。对于 Berkshire 似乎偏爱的“全球品牌领导者”，其不确定性体现在哪里？比如你们喜欢 Coke 和 Gillette；而在制鞋领域的全球品牌领袖是 Nike 和 Reebok。就长期竞争优势、业务经济性、消费者行为，以及您今年在年报中提到的其他风险因素而言，它们的不确定性是什么？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: So, you’re really asking about the future prospects of Nike and Reebok? Yeah. I don’t know that much about those businesses. We do have one person in this audience, at least, who owns a lot of Reebok. But I am not expressing a negative view in any way on that. I just — I don’t understand that — I don’t understand their competitive position and the likelihood of permanence of their competitive position over a 10 or 20 year period as well as I think I understand the position of Brown and Dexter. That doesn’t mean I think that it’s inferior. Doesn’t mean I think that we’ve got better businesses or anything. I think we’ve got very good businesses. But I — I’m not — I haven’t done the work and I’m not sure if I did the work I would understand them. I think they are harder to understand, frankly, and to develop a fix on, than our kinds. But, they may be easier for other people who just have a better insight into that kind of business.
WARREN BUFFETT：所以你的问题其实是关于 Nike 和 Reebok 的未来前景？是的。我对那些业务了解不多。我们在座至少有一位持有大量 Reebok 的人。但我并不是在表达任何负面观点。只是——我不够理解——我不如理解 Brown 和 Dexter 那样，去把握它们的竞争地位，以及这种竞争地位在未来10到20年保持稳定的可能性。这并不意味着我认为它们更差；也不意味着我认为我们拥有更好的业务或其他。我认为我们拥有非常好的业务。但我——我并没有做足功课，甚至即便做了，我也不确定能真正理解它们。坦率说，相较于我们的那类业务，它们更难理解、更难形成稳定判断。不过，或许对那些对这类业务有更好洞见的人来说，它们会更容易把握。
39. “You don’t have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results”
你不必做非凡的事情来获得非凡的成果
WARREN BUFFETT: Some businesses are a lot easier to understand than others. And Charlie and I don’t like difficult problems. I mean, we — if something is hard to figure, you know, we’d rather multiply by three than by pi. I mean it’s just easier for us. (Laughter) Charlie, you have any —?
WARREN BUFFETT：有些生意比另一些更容易理解。我和 Charlie 不喜欢难题。我的意思是——如果某件事很难搞明白，你知道的，我们宁可乘以 3，也不愿乘以 π。对我们来说就是更容易。（笑）Charlie，你有——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that is such an obvious point. And yet so many people think if they just hire somebody with the appropriate labels they can do something very difficult. That is one of the most dangerous ideas a human being can have. All kinds of things just intrinsically create problems. The other day I was dealing with a problem and I said, this thing — it’s a new building — and I said this thing has three things I’ve learned to fear: an architect, a contractor, and a hill. (Laughter) And — if you go at life like that, I think you, at least, make fewer mistakes than people who think they can do anything by just hiring somebody with a label.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，这一点太显而易见了。可还是有太多人以为只要雇来“标签对口”的人，就能搞定非常困难的事。这是人类能有的最危险的念头之一。很多事情本身就“自带麻烦”。前几天我处理一个问题时说到——那是栋新楼——我说这玩意儿集齐了三样让我学会害怕的东西：建筑师、承包商和一座山。（笑）如果你以这种方式面对人生，至少会比那些以为“找个对口标签的人就能搞定一切”的人犯更少的错。
WARREN BUFFETT: We don’t comment — excuse me, go ahead.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们不评论——打扰一下，你继续。
CHARLIE MUNGER: You don’t have to hire out your thinking if you keep it simple.
CHARLIE MUNGER：只要把事情保持简单，你就不必把“思考”外包出去。
WARREN BUFFETT: You don’t have to do — we’ve said this before — but you don’t have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results. And some people think that if you jump over a seven-foot bar that the ribbon they pin on you is going to be worth more money than if you step over a one-foot bar. And it just isn’t true in the investment world, at all. So, you can do very ordinary things. I mean, what is complicated about this? But, you know, we’re $3 billion pretax better off than we were a few years ago because of it. There’s nothing that I know about that product, or its distribution system, its finances, or anything, that, really, hundreds of thousands — or millions — of people aren’t capable of, that they don’t already know. They just don’t do anything about it. And similarly, if you get into some complicated business, you can get a report that’s a thousand pages thick and you got Ph.D.s working on it, but it doesn’t mean anything.
WARREN BUFFETT：你不必去做——我们以前说过——你不必做“非凡之事”才能得到“非凡之果”。有些人以为，跳过 7 英尺横杆所获的绶带，会比跨过 1 英尺横杆的更值钱。而在投资世界里，这根本不成立。所以，你可以做非常普通的事。我的意思是，这有什么复杂的？但你知道，因为这样做，我们如今税前比几年前好上了 30 亿美元。关于那个产品、它的分销体系、财务等等，我所知道的，没有哪一项是成千上万——甚至上百万人——做不到、或不是早已知道的。他们只是不去行动。同样地，如果你卷进一门复杂的生意，你能拿到一份上千页的报告，还有一堆博士在上面忙活，但那并不意味着什么。
You know, what you’ve got is a report but you don’t — it — you won’t understand that business, what it’s going to look like in 10 or 15 years. The big thing to do is avoid being wrong. (Laughter)
你知道，你拿到的是份报告，但你并不会——并不能——理解那门生意，或它在 10 到 15 年后会是什么样。最重要的是避免犯错。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: There are some things that are so intrinsically dangerous. Another of my heroes is Mark Twain, who looked at the promoters of his day and he said, “A mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar.” (Laughter) And that’s the way I’ve come to look at projections. I mean, basically, I can remember, Warren and I were offered $2 million worth of projections once in the course of buying a business and the book was this thick.
CHARLIE MUNGER：有些东西从本质上就很危险。我另一个偶像是 Mark Twain，他看着他那时代的推销者说过：“矿就是地里一个洞，洞的主人是个骗子。”（笑）我如今看“预测”基本也是这种眼光。还记得吗，有次我们收购一家公司时，对方给了我们价值 200 万美元的“预测资料”，书这么厚。
WARREN BUFFETT: For nothing.
WARREN BUFFETT：白送的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: And, if we were given it for nothing, and we wouldn’t open it.
CHARLIE MUNGER：就算白送，我们也懒得翻开。
WARREN BUFFETT: We almost paid 2 million not to look at it. (Laughter) It’s ridiculous. I do not understand why any buyer of a business looks at a bunch of projections put together by a seller or —
WARREN BUFFETT：我们几乎愿意付 200 万就为不看它。（笑）太可笑了。我不理解为什么任何买方要去看卖方拼凑的一堆预测，或者——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Or his agent.
CHARLIE MUNGER：或者他的代理人。
WARREN BUFFETT: — or his agent. I mean, it — you can almost say that it’s naive to think that that has any utility whatsoever. We just are not interested. If we don’t have some idea ourselves of what we think the future is, to sit there and listen to some other guy who’s trying to sell us the business or get a commission on it tell us what the future’s going to be — it — like I say, it’s very naïve.
WARREN BUFFETT：——或者他的代理人。我的意思是——认为那玩意儿有什么用，几乎可以说是天真。我们根本不感兴趣。如果我们对“自己认为的未来”没有点主意，却坐在那里听另一个想把生意卖给我们或想赚佣金的人来告诉我们“未来会怎样”——这就像我说的，非常天真。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and five years out.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是啊，还一讲就是五年后的事。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We had a line in the report one time, “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.” And — (laughter) — it’s quite applicable to projections of — by sellers — of businesses.
WARREN BUFFETT：没错。我们在年报里有句话：“别问理发师你要不要理发。”而——（笑）——这特别适用于由卖方提供的“业务预测”。
40. Cutting USAir’s costs will be “enormously tough”
削减 USAir 成本将“异常艰难”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Greg Elright (PH) from Washington, DC. In the last year, United Airlines and Northwest have resolved some of their financial problems by moving ownership over to the employees. With USAir’s current positions — uh, problems — what do you see as occurring with USAir and do you see any movement toward employee ownership? And how will that affect Berkshire’s interest in the company?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 Washington, DC 的 Greg Elright（PH）。去年，United Airlines 和 Northwest 通过把所有权转移给员工，解决了部分财务问题。鉴于 USAir 目前的处境——呃，问题——您认为 USAir 会发生什么变化？您是否看到其向员工持股方向发展的迹象？这会如何影响 Berkshire 在该公司的利益？
WARREN BUFFETT: USAir has a cost structure which is non-viable in today’s airline business. Now that, in an important way, involves its labor cost, but it involves other things, too. But it certainly involves its labor costs. And they’ve stated this publicly. And I think — and they have — they are talking with their unions about it and they’re talking with other people about other parts of their cost structure. And I think you’ll just see what unfolds in the next relatively few months, because there isn’t any question that the cost structure is out of line. I think the cost structure could be brought into line. But whether it will be brought into line or not is another is another question. And, looking backwards, the answer is not to get into businesses that need to solve problems like that. It’s to — but — that was a mistake I made. And I think in Seth Schofield you’ve got a manager who understands that business extremely well, who probably is as — in my view, anyway — is as well regarded and trusted by people who are going to have to make changes as anyone could be in that position.
WARREN BUFFETT：USAir 的成本结构在当今航空业中是不可持续的。这在很大程度上与其劳动力成本有关，但也涉及其他方面；不过，劳动力成本无疑是其中关键。他们已公开承认这一点。我认为——而且他们确实正在——就此与工会对话，同时也在与其他相关方讨论其成本结构的其他部分。我想在接下来的几个月里你会看到进展，因为毫无疑问其成本结构已经失衡。我认为成本结构“可以”被纠正，但是否“会”被纠正又是另一回事。回头看，正确的答案是不该涉足这种“需要先解决结构性难题”的业务——但——那是我犯过的一个错误。在 Seth Schofield 身上，你能看到一位对该业务极其熟悉的管理者；在我看来，在必须推动变革的人群里，他的声望与信任度大概是此类岗位里所能达到的最高水准之一。
But that may not be enough. I mean that — there’s enormous tensions when you need to take hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars out of the cost structure of any business. And when you need cooperative action, all by various groups, each one of which feels that maybe they’re having to give a little more than some other group, and understandably feels that way, you know that is an enormously tough negotiating job. I think Seth is as well-equipped for that as anyone. But I would not want to — you know, I cannot predict the outcome.
但这可能仍不够。我的意思是——当你需要从任何一家企业的成本结构里削减数以亿计美元时，巨大的紧张感必然产生。而且当你需要多个群体协同行动、而每一方都觉得自己“也许比别人让步更多”（这种感受完全可以理解）时，你就会明白这是一项“异常艰难”的谈判工作。我认为 Seth 在这方面的能力不亚于任何人，但我不愿——你知道的——我无法预测结果。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, do you —?
WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie，你——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if I were a union leader, I would give Seth whatever he wants because he’s not the kind of a fellow who would ask for more than he needs. And, it’s perfectly obvious that’s the correct decision on the labor side. But whether the obvious will be done or not is in the lap of the gods.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，如果我是工会领袖，我会把 Seth 要求的一切都给他，因为他不是那种“会狮子大开口”的人。而且，对劳方而言，这显然是正确的决策。但显而易见的事是否会被执行，就听天由命了。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s a lot of people with a lot of different motivations and, I mean, those are really tough questions. I mean, we — Charlie and I’ve been involved in that sort of thing a few times and frequently it works out, but it’s not preordained.
WARREN BUFFETT：牵涉很多人、很多不同的动机——这些问题确实非常棘手。我们——我和 Charlie——也参与过几次类似的事情，很多时候能有结果，但绝非命中注定。
41. We’re “not in any hurry” to retire
我们“并不急着”退休
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Sheldon Scizick (PH) from Chicago, Illinois. I have two questions. The first one is concerning Mr. Munger. We know what Mr. Buffett’s retirement plans are. I was wondering what yours — your plans for the future concerning Berkshire are?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Sheldon Scizick（PH），来自 Chicago, Illinois。我有两个问题。第一个是关于 Munger 先生的。我们知道 Buffett 先生的退休计划。我想知道您的——您对未来、关于 Berkshire 的计划是什么？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I have always preferred the system of retirement where you can’t quite tell from observing from the outside whether the man is working or retired. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我一直偏爱这样一种退休制度：从外部观察你几乎分不清这个人是在工作还是已经退休。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: He does it well, too. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：他把这件事干得很好。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: You know, a problem in many businesses, particularly the more bureaucratic ones, is that your employees retire, but they don’t tell you. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：你知道，很多企业，尤其官僚色彩更重的企业，会有个问题：你的员工已经退休了，但他们不会告诉你。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I think I can speak for Charlie on this one. Charlie and I are not in any hurry to retire. He’s trying to outlast me, actually. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：这点我可以替 Charlie 发言。我们俩都不急着退休。事实上，他还想比我活得更久。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。
42. Berkshire sold some Cap Cities shares in tender offer
Berkshire 在要约回购中卖出部分 Cap Cities
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My second question is, I was just curious why you sold a portion of Cap Cities?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我的第二个问题是，我只是好奇你们为什么卖出了部分 Cap Cities 的股份？
WARREN BUFFETT: We thought that — we thought it was a good idea for Cap Cities to have a tender offer. They had cash that we thought that they could not use in any — they were not likely to be able to use — in a better way than repurchasing their own shares because they do have some very good businesses. They, and we, felt that a tender offer would not be successful, in terms of attracting a number of shares unless Berkshire were tendering. We felt the price was reasonable to tender at. It turned out that the business was getting stronger during that period and various things were happening in media, so there were only 100,000 shares or so tendered outside of our million. That isn’t necessarily what we thought was going to happen going in, but that is what happened. It’s acceptable to us, but that doesn’t mean that it was the desired outcome. We would not have tendered all of our shares or anything of the sort. We want to remain a substantial shareholder of Cap Cities.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们认为——我们认为让 Cap Cities 发起一次要约回购是个好主意。他们手上有现金，而我们认为比起回购自家股票，他们不太可能有更好的用途，因为他们确实拥有一些非常好的业务。他们和我们都认为，如果 Berkshire 不参与要约，要约在吸引足够数量的股份方面将难以成功。我们认为当时的价格适合参与要约。结果是在那段时期，公司业务在走强，媒体行业也发生了种种变化，所以除我们提交的一百万股外，外部仅约有十万股参与要约。这并不完全是我们一开始预期的情形，但事实如此。对我们来说这是可以接受的，但并不代表那是我们期望的结果。我们不会把全部持股都拿去参加要约之类的。我们希望继续作为 Cap Cities 的重要股东。
We’ve always — most of the time we favored Cap Cities buying in its stock and it’s bought in a fair amount of stock since the ABC merger took place in 19 — started in 1986.
我们一直——在大多数时候——支持 Cap Cities 回购其股票；自 ABC 合并在 19——1986 年开始以来，他们也回购了相当数量的股份。
43. Structured settlements business isn’t big, but is “perfectly satisfactory”
结构化赔付业务规模不大，但“完全令人满意”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：五区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Matt Voke (PH). I’m from Omaha. In last year’s meeting you made reference to structured settlements. I was wondering, how is that business progressing for you?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好。我叫 Matt Voke（PH），来自 Omaha。去年股东会上您谈到过结构化赔付（structured settlements）。我想问，这项业务你们进展如何？
WARREN BUFFETT: Question’s about the structured settlement business, which is a business in which Berkshire guarantees, in effect, an annuity to some claimant of another — usually — of another insurance company, who suffered an injury and instead of getting a lump sum now wants to get a stream of payments over many years in the future, sometimes going out 75 years. We have set up a life company to do that business. We formerly did it all through our propertycasualty companies. And, we have done some business, but it’s not been a big business yet, and it may never be a big business. It’s a perfectly satisfactory business, but it’s not an important item at present in the analysis of Berkshire’s value. Are you getting — having a problem with sound out there on this or no? Just — no?
WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于结构化赔付业务。其本质是，Berkshire 为另一家——通常是另一家保险公司——的索赔人提供一种年金性质的保障：受害方不拿一笔性的一次性赔付，而是选择在未来很多年按期领取款项，有时期限可长达 75 年。我们专门设立了一家寿险公司来承做这类业务。此前都是通过我们的财产意外险公司来办理。我们已经做了一些单子，但目前规模并不大，将来也未必会很大。这是一项完全令人满意的业务，但在当前评估 Berkshire 价值时，它并不是重要项目。你们那边——这个部分的声音有问题吗？没有？好。
44. No comment on Wrigley
对 Wrigley 不置评
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is David Samra. I’m from San Francisco, California. In your annual report, I noticed you mention Wrigley as being a company that has worldwide dominance, somewhat like Coca-Cola and Gillette. And, was curious to know if you had looked at the company in any detail. And, if so, whether or not — if you decided not to invest, what were the reasons why?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 David Samra，来自 San Francisco, California。在你们的年报里我注意到，你提到 Wrigley 是一家具有全球主导地位的公司，有点像 Coca-Cola 和 Gillette。我想知道你是否对这家公司做过深入研究？如果做过、但决定不投资，原因是什么？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we wouldn’t want to comment on a company like that because we might or might not be buying it. We might or might not be selling it. We might or might not buy or sell it in the future. (Laughter) And, since it falls under that narrow definition of things that we don’t talk about — It’s a good illustration of a company that has a high market share worldwide, but you can understand the Wrigley Company just as well as I can. I have no insights in the — into the Wrigley Company that you wouldn’t have and I don’t — I wouldn’t want to go beyond that in giving you our evaluation of the company. I hate to disappoint you on those, but on specific securities, we are not too forthcoming sometimes. Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们不想就这样的公司发表评论，因为我们“可能”在买、也“可能”没在买；我们“可能”在卖、也“可能”没在卖；将来“可能”买或卖，也“可能”不会。（笑）既然它属于我们那类“不会谈论”的事项——它确实是全球高市占率公司的一个好例子，但你对 Wrigley 的理解并不逊于我。我没有任何你不具备的“特别洞见”，因此也不愿在我们对它的评价上说得更多。抱歉让你失望了，但在具体证券问题上，我们有时不会过于直言。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m good at not being forthcoming. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我很擅长“不直言”。（笑）
45. “No specific desire” to buy companies in certain parts of the world
对在世界某些地区收购公司“没有特定意愿”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 7.
WARREN BUFFETT：七区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Kathleen Ambrose (PH) from Omaha. I have a question regarding global diversification. Just in general, what do you look for in a company and, if so, as far as Europe or Latin America, if you’d like to be specific?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 Omaha 的 Kathleen Ambrose（PH）。我有一个关于全球多元化的问题。一般来说，你们在看一家公司的时候关注什么？如果可以具体一点，对于 Europe 或 Latin America，你们有什么偏好吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The question is about global diversification. All we want to be in is businesses that we understand, run by people that we like, and priced attractively compared to the future prospects. So, there is no specific desire to either be in the rest of Europe, or the rest of the world, or Far East, or to avoid it. It’s simply a factor that — it’s not a big factor. There may be more chances for growth in some countries. We — 80 percent of Coca-Cola’s earnings, roughly, will come from outside the United States. Eighty percent of Guinness’s earnings will come from outside the United States, but they’re domiciled outside the United States, whereas Coca-Cola is domiciled here. Certainly, in many cases, there are markets outside the United States that have way better prospects for growth than the U.S. market would have, but they probably have some other risks to them that this market may not have. But, we, you know, we like the international prospects, obviously, of a company like Coke. We like the international prospects of a company like Gillette.
WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于全球多元化。我们只想投资于：第一，我们能理解的业务；第二，由我们喜欢的人来经营；第三，相对于其未来前景定价有吸引力的公司。所以，我们并没有特定的愿望要进入 Europe、世界其他地区或 Far East，或者刻意回避它们。地域只是一个因素——而且不是大的因素。某些国家可能有更多增长机会。以我们持有的公司为例，Coca-Cola 大约 80% 的盈利来自美国以外；Guinness 也有 80% 的盈利来自美国以外，只是它的法定注册地在美国之外，而 Coca-Cola 的注册地在美国。当然，在很多情况下，美国之外的市场在增长前景上远胜美国本土市场，但它们也可能有本土市场所没有的其他风险。不过，显然，我们喜欢像 Coke 这样的公司的国际前景，也喜欢像 Gillette 这样的公司的国际前景。
Gillette earned 70 percent of its money outside this country. So, if you look — on a look-through basis — Coke — we might this year get something like $150 million of earnings, indirectly, for Berkshire’s interest from the rest of the world just through Coca-Cola alone. But, we don’t make any specific — we don’t think in terms of, I like this region so I want to be there or something of a sort. It’s something that’s specific to the companies we’re looking at, then we’ll try to evaluate that. Coke is expanding in China. Well, it — you know — I think that — I forget what they showed last year, maybe 38 percent growth, or something like that, in cases. Maybe — It’s nice to have markets like that that are relatively untapped. Actually, Gillette is expanding in China in a big way and the Chinese don’t shave as often. And more of them are what they call “dry shavers” than “wet shavers” there, which is electric shavers.
Gillette 有 70% 的利润来自美国以外。以“透视口径”来看，仅仅通过 Coca-Cola，我们今年可能就会间接从世界其他地区拿到大约 1.5 亿美元归属于 Berkshire 的利润。不过我们不会做任何地域性的“指定动作”——我们不会以“我喜欢某个地区所以要去那里”的思维来配置。我们是针对具体公司来评估地域因素。比如 Coke 在中国扩张，你知道的——我记不清去年的数字了，也许是出货量增长 38% 左右，诸如此类。拥有那样尚未充分开发的市场是很好的。实际上，Gillette 也在大举拓展中国市场，而中国人的刮胡频率没那么高，并且“干剃”的比例（即电动剃须）高于“湿剃”。
But you know, maybe we could stick something in the Coke that would — (laughter) Maybe a little synergy at Berkshire, finally. Who knows?
不过你知道，也许我们可以往 Coke 里“加点什么”——（笑）也许 Berkshire 终于能实现一点“协同效应”。谁知道呢？
46. Hurricanes are bigger insurance risk than riots
飓风对保险业的风险大于骚乱
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. I’m Marshall Patton (PH) from Bandera, Texas. And back to the insurance losses. What is the comparison between natural disasters, such as the earthquake, and so on, and the LA riots?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好。我是来自 Bandera, Texas 的 Marshall Patton（PH）。回到保险损失的话题。请问自然灾害（比如地震等）与洛杉矶骚乱相比，对损失的影响如何？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’m not sure what the connection — They, you know, they obviously can both lead to super-cats that we insure against, because if there is enough insured damage, it’s likely to trigger a payment under some of our policies. It would take some really big riot damage to get to our levels, because normally we don’t kick in now until an event gets up to at least, you know, $5 billion or so of insured damage under a very large majority of our policies. Something like a quake causes a fair amount of damage that is not insured, because of the extent that it’s highways and things of that sort, public buildings. A lot of that is not insured. But you get interesting questions on this. Usually we insure an event, but what’s an event? If you go back to the riots that occurred after Martin Luther King was shot, you had riots in dozens of cities. Is that one event or is that a multiple number of events? I mean, it was started by different people, but maybe arising from a common cause.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不太确定两者之间的关联——显然它们都可能导致我们承保的“super-cats（超额巨灾）”，因为一旦保险赔付损失达到足够规模，就很可能触发我们部分保单下的赔付。要让骚乱达到我们保单的触发水平，需要非常巨大的损失，因为在绝大多数保单下，如今通常要到单一事件的保险损失至少约 50 亿美元，我们才会“介入”。像地震这类事件，会造成相当多“不在保险覆盖内”的损失，因为涉及公路等基础设施、公共建筑等，很多并未投保。但这里面会出现有趣的问题：通常我们承保的是一个“事件”，那什么才算一个事件？回溯到 Martin Luther King 遇刺后的骚乱，几十座城市都发生了骚乱。那算一个事件，还是多个事件？我意思是，它们由不同的人引发，但或许出于同一原因。
Some of those things aren’t actually very well-defined, even after hundreds of years of insurance law and custom, the experience of that. But I would say that rioting is very unlikely to get to a level that triggers our policy. The big risks we face are quake and hurricanes, and hurricanes are a more significant risk than quake. They call them typhoons in the Pacific Ocean. But floods, tremendous damage from floods last year. But basically there’s not a lot of private flood insurance bought, so the insured losses do not get large. Just watch the Weather Channel. (Laughter)
这些问题即便在数百年的保险法律与行业惯例之后，仍未有明确定义。但我要说，骚乱极不可能达到触发我们保单的水平。我们面临的主要风险是地震与飓风，而飓风风险大于地震风险。在太平洋上它们被称为“台风”。至于洪水，去年洪水造成了巨大的破坏，但基本上私人洪水保险的投保量并不高，所以“保险赔付损失”并不会很大。多看看 Weather Channel 就知道了。（笑）
47. Why we have no short-term opinion on stocks
为什么我们对股票没有短期观点
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Diane West (PH) from Corona Del Mar, California. I know, Mr. Buffett, that you said that you don’t read what other people say about the market or the economy, but do either you or Charlie have an opinion about how you think things are going to go? Are you bullish or bearish?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Corona Del Mar, California 的 Diane West（PH）。我知道，Buffett 先生，您说过不看别人对市场或经济的看法，但您或 Charlie 是否对未来走势有任何观点？您是看多还是看空？
WARREN BUFFETT: You may have trouble believing this, but Charlie and I never have an opinion about the market because it wouldn’t be any good and it might interfere with the opinions we have that are good. (Laughter) If we’re right about a business, if we think a business is attractive, it would be very foolish for us to not take action on that because we thought something about what the market was going to do, or anything of that sort. Because we just don’t know. And to give up something that you do know and that is profitable for something that you don’t know and won’t know because of that, it just doesn’t make any sense to us, and it doesn’t really make any difference to us. I mean, I bought my first stock in, probably, April of 1942 when I was 11. And since then, I mean, actually World War II didn’t look so good at that time. I mean, the prospects, they really didn’t. I mean, you know, we were not doing well in the Pacific. I’m not sure I calculated that into my purchase of my three shares.
WARREN BUFFETT：你也许很难相信，但我和 Charlie 从不对市场持有观点，因为那没有任何用处，还可能干扰我们那些“有用的观点”。（笑）如果我们看准了一家企业、认为它很有吸引力，却因为自己“以为”市场将要怎样而不采取行动，那就太愚蠢了。因为我们根本不知道。用你确知且能赚钱的东西去换取你不知道、也不会因此而知道的东西，对我们毫无意义，也不会改变什么。举个例子，我大概在 1942 年 4 月、11 岁时买了第一只股票。从那以后——其实在当时，二战的形势并不好。我的意思是，前景确实不妙；在太平洋战场我们并不顺利。我也不确定自己在买那三股股票时有没有把这些“算进去”。
(Laughter) But I mean, just think of all the things that have happened since then, you know? Atomic weapons and major wars, presidents resigning, and all kinds of things, massive inflation at certain times. To give up what you’re doing well because of guesses about what’s going to happen in some macro way just doesn’t make any sense to us. The best thing that can happen from Berkshire’s standpoint — we don’t wish this on anybody — but is that over time is to have markets that go down a tremendous amount. I mean, we are going to be buyers of things over time. And if you’re going to be buyers of groceries over time, you like grocery prices to go down. If you’re going to be buying cars over time, you like car prices to go down. We buy businesses. We buy pieces of businesses: stocks. And we’re going to be much better off if we can buy those things at an attractive price than if we can’t. So we don’t have any fear at all. I mean, what we fear is an irrational bull market that’s sustained for some long period of time.
（笑）但我的意思是，想想自那以后发生的一切吧：核武器与重大战争、总统辞职、各种各样的事件、某些时期的高通胀。仅仅因为对某种宏观走向的猜测而放弃自己做得很好的事情，对我们毫无意义。站在 Berkshire 的立场——我们并不希望任何人遭遇不幸——长期来看，最好的情况是市场大幅下跌。因为我们会在时间维度上持续买入。如果你会长期买“杂货”，你就希望杂货价格下行；如果你会长期买车，你就希望车价下行。我们买企业，也买企业的一部分——股票。如果能以更有吸引力的价格买到这些东西，我们的处境就会好得多；反之则不然。所以我们一点也不害怕。真正让我们担心的，是非理性牛市长期持续。
You, as shareholders of Berkshire, unless you own your shares on borrowed money or are going to sell them in a very short period of time, are better off if stocks get cheaper, because it means that we can be doing more intelligent things on your behalf than would be the case otherwise. But we have no idea what — and we wouldn’t care what anybody thought about it. I mean, most of all ourselves. (Laughter) Charlie, do you have anything?
作为 Berkshire 的股东，除非你是借钱持股，或者很快就要卖出，否则股价越便宜对你越有利——因为这意味着我们可以代表你们做出更聪明的配置。至于“市场会怎样”，我们毫无头绪——也不在乎别人怎么想，尤其是不在乎“我们自己怎么想”。（笑）Charlie，你补充点什么吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I think the — if you’re agnostic about those macro factors and therefore devote all your time to thinking about the individual businesses and the individual opportunities, it’s just, it’s a way more efficient way to behave, at least with our particular talents and lacks thereof.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。我认为——如果你对那些宏观因素保持“不抱定见”，从而把全部时间用在具体企业与具体机会的思考上，至少以我们的能力与短板而言，这是一种高效得多的做法。
WARREN BUFFETT: If you’re right about the businesses, you’ll end up doing fine. We don’t know, and we don’t think about when something will happen. We think about what will happen. It’s fairly, it’s not so difficult to figure out what will happen. It’s impossible, in our view, to figure out when it will happen. So we focus on what will happen. This company in 1890 or thereabouts, the whole company sold for $2,000. It’s got a market value now of about 50-odd-billion, you know? Somebody could’ve said to the fellow who was buying this in 1890, you know, “You’re going to have a couple of great World Wars, and you know, you’ll have the panic of 1907, all these things will happen. And wouldn’t it be a better idea to wait?” (Laughter) We can’t afford that mistake, basically. Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：只要你对企业判断正确，最终就会得到好结果。我们既不知道、也不去想“何时”会发生什么；我们思考“会发生什么”。要判断“会发生什么”并不那么难；而在我们看来，判断“何时发生”是不可能的。所以我们专注于“会发生什么”。这家公司在大约 1890 年时，整家公司只卖了 2,000 美元；而现在市值大约 500 多亿美元，你懂的。有人当年本可以对 1890 年的买家说：“你会遭遇几场世界大战、1907 年的恐慌等等都会发生。是不是等一等更好？”（笑）从根本上说，我们承受不起那种错误。是的。
48. We’d rather buy an entire company, but stocks offer more bargains
我们更愿意收购整家公司，但公开市场的股票更常有便宜可捡
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, last year — I’m Tim Medley from Jackson, Mississippi — last year the question was asked about your preference for purchasing entire businesses versus parts of public companies. You mentioned you prefer to buy private businesses because of the tax advantages and your attraction to the people in those businesses. Are you finding today that there are better purchases within the private market versus in the public securities market?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生、Munger 先生，去年——我是来自 Jackson, Mississippi 的 Tim Medley——有人问到你们更偏好收购整家公司，还是购买上市公司的一部分股份。你们提到出于税收优势以及对那些企业经营者的认可，你们更偏好收购非上市公司。那现在看，相比公开证券市场，私有市场里是否能买到更好的标的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would answer that no. We do not — we very seldom find something to buy on a negotiated basis for an entire business. We have certain size requirements. A big limiting factor is it has to be something we can understand. I mean, that eliminates 95 percent of the businesses. And we don’t pay any attention to them, but we get lots of proposals for things that just are totally outside the boundaries of what we’ve already said we’re interested in. We prefer to buy entire businesses, or 80 percent or greater interest in businesses, partly for the tax reasons you mentioned, and frankly, we like it better. We just, it’s the kind of business we would like to build if we had our absolute druthers on it. Counter to that is we can usually get more for our money in wonderful businesses, in terms of buying little pieces of them in the market, because the market is far more inefficient in pricing businesses than is the negotiated market. You’re not going to buy any bargains, and I mean, you shouldn’t even approach the idea of buying a bargain in a negotiated purchase.
WARREN BUFFETT：我的回答是否定的。我们——很少能以协商方式买下一整家企业。我们对规模有一定要求；更大的限制是必须是我们能理解的业务。换句话说，这一下子筛掉了 95% 的企业。对那些我们不关注，但仍源源不断递到我们面前、完全超出我们既定范围的提案，我们也不会理会。我们确实更愿意收购整家公司，或至少 80% 以上的控股权，部分原因正如你说的出于税收考虑，也因为坦白讲我们更喜欢那样——如果完全由我们作主，我们就想那样去搭建业务。与之相反的是：在公开市场里分批买入优秀企业的一小部分（股票），通常更能物有所值，因为相对于协商市场，公开市场在给企业定价方面效率低得多。你几乎不可能在协商收购里捡到便宜——甚至不该带着“去捡便宜”的想法去谈。
You want to buy it from people who are going to run it for you. You want to buy it from people who are intelligent enough to price their business properly, and they are. I mean, that’s the way things are. The market does not do that. The market — in the stock market, you get a chance to buy businesses at foolish prices, and that is why we end up with a lot of money in marketable securities. If we absolutely had our choice, we would own a group of — we would own three times the number of businesses we own outright. We’re unlikely to get that opportunity over time, but periodically we’ll get the chance to find something that fits our test. And in between we will, when the market offers us the right prices, we will buy more, either businesses we already own pieces of, or we’ll buy one or two new ones. Something’s usually going on. There are tax advantages to owning all of them, but that’s more than offset by the fact that you’ll never get a chance to buy the whole Coca-Cola Company or the whole Gillette company.
你是在从将来要替你运营它的人手里买；你是在从足够聪明、会把自家企业定出合理价格的人手里买——而他们确实会这样做，事实如此。公开市场就不同了——在股票市场，你会遇到“愚蠢的价格”，这也是为什么我们最终把不少资金配置在可交易证券上的原因。如果完全由我们选择，我们希望全资拥有的企业数量是现在的三倍。长期看这种机会不太可能常有，但周期性地我们能找到符合我们标准的整家公司；在两次整购之间，只要市场价格合适，我们就会加仓已经持有其股份的企业，或新买一两家。总会有事在发生。全资拥有在税务上有优势，但这点优势远远抵不过这样一个事实：你几乎不可能买下整个 Coca-Cola Company 或整个 Gillette。
I mean, businesses like that, sensational businesses, are just not available. Sometimes you get a chance to make a sensible purchase in the market of such businesses. Charlie?
我的意思是，这类出众的企业根本不会对整购开放；但有时你能在公开市场上以合理价格买到它们的一部分。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s exactly right. And if you stop to think about it, if a hundred percent of a business is for sale, you’ve got — the average corporate buyer is being run by people who have the mindset of people buying with somebody else’s money. And we have the mindset of people buying with our own money. And there’s also a class of buyers for a hundred percent of businesses who are basically able and assured financial promoters. I’m talking about the leveraged buyout funds and so on. And those people tend to have the upside, but not the downside, in the private arrangements they’ve made with their investors. And naturally, they tend to be somewhat optimistic. And so we have formidable competition when we try and buy a hundred percent of businesses.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我完全同意。仔细想想看：当一家企业 100% 出售时，典型的企业买家往往是“拿别人钱买东西”的心态；而我们是“拿自己的钱买”。此外，还有一类买 100% 股权的，是能干且自信的金融推手——我说的是杠杆收购基金之类。他们往往通过私下安排“拿到上行，却不承担下行”，自然就倾向乐观。所以，当我们尝试买下整家公司时，面对的竞争是很强的。
WARREN BUFFETT: Most managers are better off, in terms of their personal equation, if they’re running something larger. And they’re also better off if they’re running something larger and more profitable. But the first condition alone will usually leave them better off. We’re only better off if we’re running something that’s more profitable. We also like it if it’s larger, too. But our equation, actually, our personal equation is actually different than a great many managers in that respect. Even if that didn’t operate, I think most managers psychically would enjoy running something larger. And if you can pay for it with other people’s money, I mean, that gets pretty attractive. You know, how much would — and let’s just say you’re a baseball fan — well, how much would you pay to own whatever your hometown, the Yankees? You might pay more if you were writing a check on someone else’s bank account than if you were writing it on your own. It’s been known to happen. (Laughter) And in corporate America, animal spirits are there.
WARREN BUFFETT：就“个人收益函数”而言，大多数职业经理人经营更大的东西，个人处境会更好；若更大且更赚钱，处境当然更好，但往往仅仅“更大”这一条就够了。我们只有在“更赚钱”时才更好，当然我们也喜欢“更大”，但我们的“个人收益函数”与许多经理人不同。即便撇开这些，我认为大多数经理人从心理上也更享受运营更大的东西；而且如果还可以用“别人的钱”来支付，那就更有吸引力了。你知道，假设你是棒球迷——为了买下你家乡的球队，Yankees 也好，你会出多少钱？如果开的是“别人的账户”的支票，你可能会比用自己的账户付更多——这种事并不少见。（笑）在美国企业界，“动物精神”一直存在。
And those are our competitors on buying entire businesses. In terms of buying securities, most managers don’t even think about it. It’s very interesting to me, because they’ll say that — they’ll have somebody else manage their money in terms of portfolio securities. Well, all that is is a portfolio of businesses. And I’ll say, “Well, why don’t you pick out your own portfolio?” And they’ll say, “That’s much too difficult.” And then some guy will come along with some business that they never heard of a week before and give them some figures and a few projections, and the guy thinks he knows enough to buy that business. It’s very puzzling to me sometimes.
而这些人正是我们在整购市场上的竞争对手。至于买证券，大多数经理人甚至不会去想这件事。这点对我很有意思：他们会把证券投资组合交给别人管理——可那其实就是“企业组合”。我问他们：“那你为什么不自己挑选组合？”他们说：“那太难了。”可是一周后从未听说过的一家公司来做个路演，给几组数字、几份预测，他却觉得自己“懂得够多，值得买”。这有时真让人费解。
49. Revealing Wesco’s estimated intrinsic value was a “quirk”
披露 Wesco 估算的内在价值是一次性的“例外”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4. Could you hold it a little closer to you? I can’t hear too well. It’s hard to hear. Is the mic on there?
WARREN BUFFETT：四区。你能把话筒靠近一点吗？我听不太清楚。很难听清。那边的话筒开着吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s on.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：开着。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I can hear that fine.
WARREN BUFFETT：好，现在能听清了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Let’s try it one more time. Dan Raider (PH) —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：那我们再试一次。我是 Dan Raider（PH）——
WARREN BUFFETT: Got it.
WARREN BUFFETT：收到了。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — San Mateo, California. This is a question for Mr. Munger. In your most recent letter to shareholders in Wesco’s annual report, you calculated the intrinsic value of Wesco at about $100 per share, and compared that to the then-current market price of Wesco of about $130 per share. In the same letter, you stated that it was unclear whether at then-current market prices Berkshire or Wesco presented a better value to prospective purchasers. In light of that, would you compare the intrinsic value of Berkshire to its current market price?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：——来自 San Mateo, California。这个问题问 Munger 先生。您在 Wesco 最新年度报告的致股东信中，将 Wesco 的每股内在价值估算为约 100 美元，并与当时约 130 美元的市场价作了比较。同一封信里，您还提到，在当时的市场价格下，Berkshire 或 Wesco 对潜在买家哪个更有价值尚不明确。基于此，您能否将 Berkshire 的内在价值与其当前市价作一比较？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, the answer to that is no. (Laughter) Berkshire has never calculated intrinsic value per share and reported it to the shareholders, and Wesco never did before this year. We changed our mind at Wesco because we really thought some of the buyers had gone a little crazy, and a lot of things were being said to prospective shareholders that, in our opinion, were unwise. And we don’t really like attracting — even though we’ve had nothing to do with it — we don’t like attracting people in at high prices that may not be wise. So we departed from our long precedent, and we did in the Wesco report make an estimate of intrinsic value per share. But we’re not changing the general policy. That was just a one-time quirk.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，答案是否定的。（笑）Berkshire 从未计算并向股东披露每股内在价值，Wesco 直到今年之前也没有这样做。我们之所以在 Wesco 改变做法，是因为我们确实认为一些买家有点疯狂，且有许多对潜在股东的说法在我们看来并不明智。而且我们并不喜欢——尽管这与我们无关——以不明智的高价吸引人买入。所以我们打破了长期先例，在 Wesco 的报告里给出了每股内在价值的估算。但我们并未改变总体政策；那只是一次性的“例外”。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, and also I think it’s true that the Wesco intrinsic value per share can be estimated by anyone within fairly close limits. It just isn’t that complicated because there aren’t a number of businesses there that have values different than carrying values, or where they are, they’re all footnoted, in terms of numbers. So it would be almost impossible to come up with numbers that are significantly different than the number Charlie put in there. Berkshire has assets that, number one of which would be the insurance business, that it’s clear have very significant excess values, but one person might estimate those at maybe three times what somebody else would estimate them at. That’s less true of our other businesses, but it’s still true in a way, so that Berkshire’s range would be somewhat greater. And as Charlie — we basically — we don’t want to disappoint people, but we also don’t want to disappoint ourselves. But we have our own yardsticks for what we think is doable.
WARREN BUFFETT：另外，我也认为 Wesco 的每股内在价值，任何人都能在相当接近的范围内估算出来。这并不复杂，因为其中并没有很多业务的价值与其账面价值有巨大差异；即便有，相关数字也都在脚注中列明。所以要得出与 Charlie 给出的数字显著不同的估算几乎不可能。Berkshire 拥有一些资产——首要的是保险业务——显然具有很大的超额价值，但不同的人对它的估算可能相差到三倍之多。对我们的其他业务，这种情况较少，但在某种程度上仍然存在，因此 Berkshire 的估值区间会更宽。并且正如 Charlie——我们的基本态度是——我们不想让别人失望，也不想让自己失望。但对“我们认为可实现的目标”，我们有自己的标尺。
We try to convey that as well as we can to the people who are partners in the business, and I think that we saw some things being published about Wesco that simply might have led to, and probably did lead to, some expectations that simply weren’t consonant with our own personal expectations. And that leaves us uncomfortable.
我们尽力把这些想法传达给与我们同为事业合伙人的人们。我认为外界对 Wesco 的一些报道，很容易——而且大概率确实——引导出与我们个人预期并不一致的期望。这让我们感到不安。
50. Risk is “inextricably wound up” in how long an asset is held
风险与持有期限“密不可分”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：五区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, my name is Charles Pyle (PH) from Ann Arbor, Michigan. I’d like to ask you to expound on your view of risk in the financial world, and I ask that against the background of what appear to be a number of inconsistencies between your view of risk and the conventional view of risk. I mention that in a recent article you pointed out inconsistency in the use of beta as a measure of risk, which is a common standard. And I mention that derivatives are dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing at derivatives through Salomon Brothers. And betting on hurricanes is dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing with hurricanes through insurance companies. So it appears that you have some view of risk that’s inconsistent with what would appear on the face of it to be the conventional view of risk.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我叫 Charles Pyle（PH），来自 Ann Arbor, Michigan。我想请您详细谈谈您对金融世界中“风险”的看法。之所以这样问，是因为您的风险观与传统风险观之间似乎存在若干不一致之处。比如，您在一篇近期文章中指出用 beta 衡量风险（这是一种常见标准）存在不一致；又比如，您认为衍生品是危险的，但通过 Salomon Brothers 参与衍生品却让您感到可控；再比如，押注飓风很危险，但通过保险公司参与“飓风风险”您也觉得可控。看起来，您对风险的理解与表面上的传统风险观并不一致。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we do define risk as the possibility of harm or injury. And in that respect we think it’s inextricably wound up in your time horizon for holding an asset. I mean, if your risk is that you’re going — if you intend to buy XYZ Corporation at 11:30 this morning and sell it out before the close today, I mean, that is, in our view, that is a very risky transaction. Because we think 50 percent of the time you’re going to suffer some harm or injury. If you have a time horizon on a business, we think the risk of buying something like Coca-Cola at the price we bought it at a few years ago is essentially, is so close to nil, in terms of our perspective holding period. But if you asked me the risk of buying Coca-Cola this morning and you’re going to sell it tomorrow morning, I say that is a very risky transaction. Now, as I pointed out in the annual report, it became very fashionable in the academic world, and then that spilled over into the financial markets, to define risk in terms of volatility, of which beta became a measure.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们把风险定义为“受到伤害或损失的可能性”。在这个意义上，我们认为风险与资产的持有期限“密不可分”。也就是说，如果你的“风险场景”是——今天上午 11:30 买入 XYZ Corporation 并在今天收盘前卖出——在我们看来，这是一次非常高风险的交易，因为我们认为你有 50% 的概率会遭受某种损害或损失。若你的持有期限是“企业视角”，那么以我们几年前买入 Coca-Cola 的价格来看，在我们的持有期框架内，其风险本质上“接近于零”。但如果你问我“今天早上买 Coca-Cola、明早卖出”的风险，我会说那是非常高风险的交易。正如我在年报中指出的，学术界曾风行（并外溢至金融市场）把“波动性”当作风险的定义，而 beta 成为了其度量。
But that is no measure of risk to us. The risk, in terms of our super-cat business, is not that we lose money in any given year. We know we’re going to lose money in some given day, that is for certain. And we’re extremely likely to lose money in a given year. Our time horizon of writing that business, you know, would be at least a decade. And we think the probability of losing money over a decade is low. So we feel that, in terms of our horizon of investment, that that is not a risky business. And it’s a whole lot less risky than writing something that’s much more predictable. Interesting thing is that using conventional measures of risk, something whose return varies from year to year between plus-20 percent and plus-80 percent is riskier, as defined, than something whose return is 5 percent a year every year. We just think the financial world has gone haywire in terms of measures of risk. We look at what we do — we are perfectly willing to lose money on a given transaction, arbitrage being an example, any given insurance policy being another example. We are perfectly willing to lose money on any given transaction.
但对我们来说，那并不是风险的度量。以我们的“超额巨灾（super-cat）”业务为例，风险不在于“某一年会不会亏钱”——我们知道“某一天一定会亏钱”，而且“某一年极有可能亏钱”。但我们经营该业务的时间视角至少是十年，我们认为“十年整体亏损”的概率很低。因此在我们的投资视角下，那并不是高风险业务，甚至比一些“看上去更可预测”的业务风险还低。有趣的是，用传统的风险衡量方法，年回报在 +20% 与 +80% 之间波动的标的，被定义为比“每年固定 5% 回报”的标的更“高风险”。我们只是认为金融世界在风险度量上“有些走偏了”。就我们自己的操作而言——我们完全接受“单笔交易可能亏损”，比如套利、或者某张保险保单——我们完全可以接受“单笔亏损”。
We are not willing to enter into transactions in which we think the probability of doing a number of mutually independent events, but of a similar type, has an expectancy of loss. And we hope that we are entering into our transactions where our calculations of those probabilities have validity. And to do so, we try to narrow it down. There are a whole bunch of things we just won’t do because we don’t think we can write the equation on them. But we, basically, Charlie and I by nature are pretty risk-averse. But we are very willing to enter into transactions — We, if we knew it was an honest coin, and someone wanted to give us seven-to-five or something of the sort on one flip, how much of Berkshire’s net worth would we put on that flip? Well we would — it would sound like a big number to you. It would not be a huge percentage of the net worth, but it would be a significant number. We will do things when probabilities favor us. Charlie?
我们不愿参与那种“由若干相互独立但同类的事件组成、其总体期望值为亏损”的交易。我们希望在进入交易时，我们对相关概率的计算是“有效”的。为此，我们会尽量“收窄范围”——一大堆“我们写不出概率方程”的事，我们干脆不碰。总体上，我和 Charlie 的天性都相当“厌恶风险”。但只要概率对我们有利，我们非常愿意参与交易——如果我们知道抛的是“公平的硬币”，有人愿意按“7 比 5 的赔率（seven-to-five）”让我们押一次，那我们会拿出多少 Berkshire 的净资产去押？答案会让你觉得数额不小；占净资产的比例不会巨大，但绝对值会相当可观。只要胜率在我们这边，我们就会出手。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we, I would say we try and think like Fermat and Pascal as if they’d never heard of modern finance theory. I really think that a lot of modern finance theory can only be described as disgusting. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我会说，我们尽量像 Fermat 和 Pascal 那样思考，仿佛从未听说过“现代金融理论”。我真心认为，现代金融理论中的相当一部分，只能用“令人作呕”来形容。（笑）
51. Buffett favors a “steeply progressive” consumption tax
巴菲特主张“高度累进”的消费税
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, I’m Paul Miller (PH) from Kansas City, Missouri. I’ve got two questions. First, not too long ago, I believe it was Fortune Magazine that ran an article regarding personal tax rates. And at the risk of misquoting you, my recollection is that you favored higher personal rates, rates even higher than those proposed by those in Washington. The second question is, I’ve heard Berkshire Hathaway referred to as nothing more than a highpriced rich man’s mutual fund. Would you care to comment on that also?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好，我是来自 Kansas City, Missouri 的 Paul Miller（PH）。我有两个问题。首先，不久前我记得是 Fortune Magazine 刊登了一篇关于个人税率的文章。恕我可能记错，我的印象是您支持更高的个人税率，甚至高于华盛顿方面提出的税率。第二个问题，我听说有人把 Berkshire Hathaway 称为不过是一个“高价、富人专属的共同基金”。您也愿意对此评价一下吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, on tax rates, if you ask me what I personally favor, I personally favor a steeply progressive consumption tax. That has a little more attention being paid to it now, although the “steeply progressive” might be modified by most of the advocates of the consumption tax, maybe to “mildly progressive” or something of the sort. There’s a Nunn-Domenici proposal along that line, and there are other people that are talking about it more. It may be examined by the new Kerrey-Danforth Commission, of which we’ve got a member in the audience. But I believe, in one way or another, I believe in progressive taxes. So I am not shocked in terms of my own situation, and I don’t think Charlie is particularly, about having a progressive income tax. Although, like I say, I think society would run better over time if it were a progressive consumption tax instead. Do you want the comment on the tax situation, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：关于税率，如果你问我个人偏好，我支持“高度累进”的消费税。现在这种想法受到更多关注，尽管多数消费税倡导者可能会把“高度累进”修正为“温和累进”之类。Nunn-Domenici 就有类似提案，其他人也在更多讨论。新成立的 Kerrey-Danforth Commission 或许会研究这个问题，我们的听众里就有其成员。总之，我在某种形式上相信“累进税制”。就我个人而言，我并不反感累进的所得税，我想 Charlie 也不会特别反感。虽然，正如我所说，从长远看，我认为社会若改为累进的消费税会运行得更好。Charlie，你要不要也说说税收？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think there is a point at which income taxes become quite counterproductive if their progression is too high. But I don’t think we’re there yet.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为当所得税的累进程度过高时，会出现明显的适得其反，但我不认为我们已经到了那一步。
WARREN BUFFETT: We think — at least I think — I’m extraordinarily well treated by this society, and I think most people with high incomes are. I think if you transported most of them to Bangladesh or Peru or something, they would find out how much of it is them and how much is the society. And I think there’s nothing better than a market system, in terms of motivating people and in terms of producing the goods and services that the society wants. But I do think it gets a little out of whack, in terms of what the productivity may be of an outstanding teacher compared to somebody who is good at figuring out the intrinsic value of businesses. I don’t have a better system on the income side, but I think society should figure out some way to make those who are particularly blessed, in a sense, that have talents that get paid off enormously in a market system, to give back a fair amount of that to the society that produces that.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们认为——至少我认为——我受这个社会“极为优待”，我也认为大多数高收入者是如此。如果把他们中的大多数送到 Bangladesh 或 Peru 之类的地方，他们会明白“自身因素”与“社会因素”各占多大比重。我相信在激励个人、并生产社会所需的商品与服务方面，市场体系是最好的。但我也认为在某些地方有点“失衡”，比如一位优秀教师的生产率，与一个善于评估企业内在价值的人相比。我没有更好的“所得分配”体系可提，但我认为社会应当想办法让那些被特别眷顾、在市场体系中凭才能获得巨额回报的人，向“孕育他们的社会”公平地回馈一部分。
52. Berkshire isn’t a “rich man’s mutual fund”
Berkshire 不是“富人的共同基金”
WARREN BUFFETT: The question about Berkshire being I think it was, was it rich man’s mutual fund or something like that? We don’t look at it that way at all. We look at it as a collection of businesses, and ideally we would own all of those businesses. So it’s, to the extent that a mutual fund owns stock in a lot of companies and diversifies among businesses and we try to own a lot of businesses ourselves, I guess that’s true. But I guess you could say the same thing of General Electric, or an operation like that. We are more prone to buy pieces of businesses than the typical manager, but we are trying to do, in a sense, the same thing Jack Welch is trying to do at General Electric, which is try to own a number of first-class businesses. He gets to put the imprint of his own management, which I think is very good, on those businesses, and we are more hands-off, both in the businesses we own outright and in the ones that we own pieces of. But we’re going at it the same way.
WARREN BUFFETT：关于把 Berkshire 称作——我想是这么说的——“富人的共同基金”？我们完全不是那样看。我们把它看作“企业的集合”，理想状态是我们全资拥有这些企业。就“共同基金持有许多公司股票、在不同业务间分散”这一点而言，而我们也努力拥有很多企业——从这个角度说，倒是相似。但你也可以对 General Electric 或类似的企业集团这么说。与典型管理者相比，我们更倾向于买“企业的一部分”（股票），但从某种意义上，我们在做的事与 Jack Welch 在 General Electric 所做的是相同的：努力拥有若干一流企业。他可以把我认为很优秀的“管理烙印”施加在那些企业上；而我们无论是对全资企业还是参股企业，都更“少干预”。但我们的“路径”本质上相同。
And General Electric has been very successful under Jack’s leadership, and doing it his way. We think, in terms of what we bring to the game, and the problems of putting money to work all the time, that our own system will work best for us. Charlie?
在 Jack 的领导下，General Electric 以他的方式非常成功。就我们自身能带来的能力、以及“要持续把资金派上用场”的约束而言，我们认为“我们的体系”对我们最为有效。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I’ve got nothing to add to that.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我没有什么要补充的。
53. Don’t need interest rate outlook to value companies
给公司估值不需要判断利率走势
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：一区。
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS: Hello, I’m Christopher Davis from New York City. I’m interested in that many of the holdings of Berkshire are in industries that are perceived as interest rate-sensitive industries, including Wells Fargo, Salomon, Freddie Mac, even GEICO. And yet you have an admitted sort of ambivalence towards interest rates or changes in interest rates. And it therefore seems that you don’t feel that those changes affect the fundamental attractiveness of those businesses. I thought maybe you could share your thoughts on what you see in these businesses that the investment community as a whole is ignoring.
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS：你好，我是来自 New York City 的 Christopher Davis。我注意到 Berkshire 的许多持股属于被视为对利率敏感的行业，包括 Wells Fargo、Salomon、Freddie Mac，甚至 GEICO。然而你们也坦承对利率及其变化并不太在意。由此看来，你们并不认为这些变化会影响这些业务的基本吸引力。或许你能分享一下：在这些业务中，你们看到了什么而投资圈整体却忽略了什么。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the value of every business, the value of a farm, the value of an apartment house, the value of any economic asset, is 100 percent sensitive to interest rates, because all you are doing in investing is transferring some money to somebody now in exchange for what you expect the stream of money to be, to come in, over a period of time. And the higher interest rates are, the less that present value is going to be. So every business, by its nature, whether it’s Coca-Cola or Gillette or Wells Fargo, is in its intrinsic valuation, is a hundred percent sensitive to interest rates. Now, the question as to whether a Wells Fargo or a Freddie Mac or whatever it may be, whether their business gets better or worse internally, as opposed to the valuation process, because of higher interest rates, that is not easy to figure. I mean, GEICO, if they write their insurance business at the same underwriting ratio — in other words they have the same loss and expense experience relative to premiums — they benefit by higher interest rates, obviously, over time, because they’re a float business, and the float is worth more to them.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，每一家企业的价值、农场的价值、公寓楼的价值、任何经济资产的价值，都在内在估值上对利率“完全敏感”，因为投资的本质是：你现在把一些钱转给对方，以换取你预期在未来一段时间里到来的现金流。利率越高，现值就越低。所以，无论是 Coca-Cola、Gillette，还是 Wells Fargo，任何企业从其内在估值角度看，都会完全受利率影响。至于 Wells Fargo、Freddie Mac 等，由于利率上升，它们的业务本身（相对于估值过程）会变好还是变坏，这就不容易判断了。比如 GEICO，如果其保险业务的承保比率不变——也就是损失与费用相对于保费的经验值保持不变——那么从长期看更高的利率显然对它有利，因为它是一门“浮存金”业务，而浮存金在更高利率下更有价值。
Now, externally, getting back to the valuation part, the present value of those earnings also becomes less then. But the present value of Coke’s earnings becomes less in a higher interest rate environment. Wells Fargo, it’s — whether they earn more or less money under any given interest rate scenario is hard to figure. There may be one short-term effect and there may be another longterm effect. So I do not have to have a view on interest rates — and I don’t have a view on interest rates — to make a decision as to an insurance business, or a mortgage guarantor business, or a banking business, or something of the sort, relative to making a judgment about Coke or Gillette. Charlie?
当然，从外部回到“估值层面”，这些收益的现值也会因此降低；但在更高利率环境下，Coke 的收益现值同样会降低。至于 Wells Fargo，在任何给定的利率情景下它究竟多赚还是少赚，确实很难判断——可能有一种短期效应，也可能有另一种长期效应。因此，我在做出关于保险、按揭担保或银行等业务的决策时，并不需要——而且我也没有——对利率的观点；这一点与我们判断 Coke 或 Gillette 时并无不同。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’ve got nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：无可补充。
54. “Retroactive” insurance is small part of our business
“追溯性”保险在我们业务中占比很小
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone two?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, I’m Benjamin Baron (PH) from New York. Could you speak about your insurance business a little bit? And especially the retroactive policies you’ve been writing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是来自 New York 的 Benjamin Baron（PH）。能否谈谈你们的保险业务？尤其是你们承保过的“追溯性”保单。
WARREN BUFFETT: Can we speak about the — you say the reinsurance business?
WARREN BUFFETT：你是说我们谈——再保险业务吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Retroactive —
CHARLIE MUNGER：是“追溯性的”——
WARREN BUFFETT: I heard the retroactive part, but the first part.
WARREN BUFFETT：我听到了“追溯性”那部分，但前半句没听清。
BENJAMIN BARON: The reinsurance and the retroactive, and also the market in Bermuda and how you see it as one of your potential markets.
BENJAMIN BARON：再保险与追溯性保单，还有 Bermuda 的市场，你们如何看它作为你们潜在市场之一。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the retroactive market is, what’s called “retroactive insurance,” has been pretty well eliminated by developments in accounting. So I would not expect us to really have any volume in retroactive-type policies. Now, when we write workers’ comp with a policy holder dividend, in effect that’s a retroactive policy. But that’s a relative — that’s small part of Berkshire’s business. Did I answer what you were driving at there?
WARREN BUFFETT：我认为所谓“追溯性保险（retroactive insurance）”的市场，随着会计处理的发展，基本已经不存在了。所以我不认为我们会在这类追溯性保单上有任何真正的规模。当然，当我们承保带“保单持有人红利”的工伤赔偿险（workers’ comp）时，实质上那就是一张“追溯性”保单。但这只是——在相对意义上——占 Berkshire 业务很小的一部分。我的回答有切中你的问题要点吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me?
WARREN BUFFETT：抱歉，什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清）
WARREN BUFFETT: Did you get that, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：你听清了吗，Charlie？
55. “You don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the tide goes out”
“只有当潮水退去，才知道谁在裸泳”
CHARLIE MUNGER: Just comment on the development of the insurance business in Bermuda.
CHARLIE MUNGER：简单评论一下 Bermuda 保险业的发展。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, Bermuda is simply a, you know, a new competitor. They’re not so new, I mean, there’ve been companies in Bermuda before. But in the last 15 months, 18 months, maybe there’s been 4 billion-plus raised. And because, for tax reasons — maybe other reasons as well, but certainly for tax reasons — that capacity has been concentrated in Bermuda-based, Bermuda-domiciled reinsurers. But essentially there’s no great difference between that type of competition and other reinsurers competition, except for the fact that that capacity is new and the money’s just been raised, and so there may be some greater pressure on the managers of those businesses to go out and write business promptly than on somebody that’s been around for 50 years. But it’s no plus for us any time new capacity enters any business that we’re in, and that certainly goes for the reinsurance business. Reinsurance business, by its nature, will be a business in which some very stupid things are done en masse periodically.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，Bermuda 其实就是，你知道的，一个新的竞争者。当然也不算太新——Bermuda 之前就有公司存在。但过去 15 到 18 个月，可能募集了 40 多亿美元。由于税收原因——也可能还有别的原因，但税收肯定是关键——这些“承保能力”集中到了设在 Bermuda、注册在 Bermuda 的再保险公司。总体上，这类竞争与其他再保险竞争并无本质不同，唯一不同是这批承保能力是“新钱”，刚募集到手，所以这些公司的管理层可能比“经营了 50 年”的老公司承受更大压力，要尽快出去“写保单”。对我们来说，只要有新承保能力进入我们所在的任何行业，都不是好事，再保当然也不例外。再保险行业的本性决定了：它会周期性地“集体干出非常愚蠢的事”。
I mean, you can be doing dumb things and not know it in reinsurance, and then all of a sudden wake up and find out, you know, the money is gone. And it’s what people have found out — and I used that line in the report a year ago — it’s what people have found out that were speculating on bonds with (inaudible) margins recently, that, you know, you don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the tide goes out. And — (laughter) — essentially that’s what happens in reinsurance. You don’t, you really don’t find out who’s been swimming naked until the wind blows at them.
我的意思是，在再保险里你可能一直在做蠢事却不自知，等到某一刻突然醒悟，发现钱已经没了。正如——我在去年的报告里用过那句话——那些最近用（听不清）保证金去投机债券的人所体会到的那样：你不会知道谁在裸泳，直到潮水退去。（笑）而这基本就是再保险里会发生的事。你不会，真的不会知道谁在裸泳，直到“风吹到他们身上”为止。
56. When cash “piles up,” it’s not through choice
现金“堆起来”并非我们的主动选择
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Whitney Anderson (PH) from Miami, Florida. And my question is, right now, we are reading about various analysts and how you should, in their individual opinion, adjust your more cash, more stocks, more bonds because of … How does Berkshire Hathaway feel about times of relative financial insecurity? Do you arrange for more cash reserves looking forward to a time when you might be able to buy? Or do you go along your path?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Miami, Florida 的 Whitney Anderson（PH）。我的问题是，如今我们看到许多分析师在各抒己见：因为……你应该多持现金、多持股票或多持债券。请问在相对“不太安全”的金融时期，Berkshire Hathaway 的态度是什么？你们会为“将来也许能买到标的”的时刻提前多备些现金吗？还是按你们原本的路径走？
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the question is do we sort of get into asset allocation by maintaining given levels of cash, depending on some kind of outlook or something of the sort? We don’t really think that way at all. If we have cash, it’s because we haven’t found anything intelligent to do with it that day, in the way of buying into the kind of businesses we like. And when we can’t find anything for a while, the cash piles up. But that’s not through choice, that’s because we’re failing at what we essentially are trying to do, which is to find things to buy, and — We make no attempt to guess whether cash is going to be worth more three months from now or six months from now or a year from now. So it is — you will never see — we don’t have any meetings of any kind anyway at Berkshire, but we would never have an asset allocation meeting. We would — (laughter) — keep looking. I mean, Charlie’s looking, I’m looking. Some of our managers are looking.
WARREN BUFFETT：我想你的问题是：我们会不会根据某种“前景判断”，维持一定比例的现金，从而做“资产配置”？我们完全不会那么想。我们手上有现金，只是因为当日没有找到把它用于“我们喜欢的那类企业”的聪明用法。若一段时间都找不到可买之物，现金就会“堆起来”。但这不是我们的“选择”，而是我们没做好本职——也就是“找到可买的东西”。我们不会去猜三个月、六个月或一年后的现金会更值钱还是更不值钱。所以——你永远见不到——Berkshire 本来也不开任何会议，但即便开会，我们也绝不会开“资产配置会”。我们只会——（笑）——继续找。我的意思是，Charlie 在找，我在找，我们的一些经理也在找。
We’re looking for things to buy that meet our tests, and if we showed no cash or short-term securities at year-end, we would love it, because it would mean that we’d found ways to employ the money in ways that we like. I think I would have to admit that if we have a lot of money around, we are a little dumber than usual. I mean, it tends to make you careless. And I would say that the best purchases are usually made when you have to sell something to raise the money to get them, because it just raises the bar a little bit that you jump over in the mental decisions. But we have, I don’t know what we’ll show, but certainly well over a billion dollars of cash around, and that’s not through choice. That is a — you can look at that as an index of failure on the part of your management. And we will be happy when we can buy businesses, or small pieces of businesses, that use up that money.
我们在寻找“符合我们标准”的可买之物；如果年末报表上一分钱现金或短期证券都没有，我们会很高兴——那意味着我们找到了自己喜欢的用钱方式。我要承认，如果我们账上有很多钱，我们就比平时“更笨一点”——它会让人松懈。我还会说，最好的买入通常发生在你必须卖掉点什么去筹钱的时候，因为这会让你在“心理决策的横杆”上抬高一点要求。当然我们现在——我不知道年末会披露多少——但肯定账上有十多亿美元的现金，这并非我们的选择。你可以把它视为“管理层没把钱用出去”的一种失败指标。等到我们能买到整家公司，或买到一些公司的“小份额”，把这些钱用掉，那我们就会感到高兴。
57. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as investments
将 Fannie Mae 和 Freddie Mac 作为投资标的
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 4.
WARREN BUFFETT：四区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Gentlemen, my name is Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona. I understand that 40 percent of all home mortgages have been securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the duopoly. I would, at the risk of asking you for a projection, since you’ve talked about projections before, I’d be interested in understanding what you think will happen to that market share over time for this duopoly. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：各位先生好，我叫 Richard Sercer，来自 Tucson, Arizona。我的理解是，全部住房按揭贷款中有 40% 被 Fannie Mae 和 Freddie Mac 这对双头垄断机构证券化。冒着被你们提醒“不要预测”的风险（你们刚谈过预测），我还是想知道，你们怎么看这对“双头”的市场份额随时间的变化。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer to that doesn’t involve much of a prediction. That market share is essentially certain to go up. That doesn’t mean that those are wonderful businesses to buy, but the market share is essentially certain to go up because the economics that those two entities possess, compared to other ways of intermediating money between investors and people who want to borrow, no one else has those economics. So what holds the share of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae down is the fact that they are only allowed to loan roughly $200,000 on any mortgage. That’s a limiting factor. It’s probably been a good thing for them that it has been a limiting factor, but they are shut out of part of the market. But the market that they are in, they essentially have economics that other people can’t touch for intermediating money, including the savings and loan business that we were in. We had a business that intermediated money, went out and got it from depositors and lent it to people who wanted to borrow on a home. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae do it the same way.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这个答案不太需要预测。它们的市场份额几乎可以确定会上升。这并不意味着它们就是非常值得买的生意，但份额几乎确定会上升，原因在于：与投资者和借款者之间其他资金中介方式相比，这两家机构具备的“经济性”（成本/融资结构优势）是别人不具备的。压制 Freddie Mac 和 Fannie Mae 份额的，是它们在单笔按揭上的放贷额度大约只能到 20 万美元这一“限额”。这是个约束因素。这个约束或许反而对它们是好事，但它也让它们被排除在一部分市场之外。可是在它们所处的那块市场里，它们在资金中介方面拥有别人无法匹敌的经济性——包括我们曾经从事过的储贷业务在内。我们那门生意也是做资金中介：向储户吸收资金，再贷给想买房的人。Freddie Mac 和 Fannie Mae 做的是同样的功能。
They don’t do it exactly the same way, but they perform the same function. And they could do it so much more cheaply than we could do it by having branches or anything of the sort and paying the insurance fee we paid. They’re going to get the business. They should get the business. And so their market share will grow. Charlie?
它们做法并不完全一样，但履行的是同一功能。相较我们设立网点之类的做法、以及支付我们所付的存款保险费，它们能以低得多的成本来完成同样的事。它们会拿到这门生意，也理应如此。因此，它们的市场份额会增长。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that’s right. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为没错。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: You’re doing great. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：你表现得很好。（笑）
58. Increased information speed doesn’t affect our decisions
信息传播加速并未影响我们的决策
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5.
WARREN BUFFETT：五区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, I’m Sarah Pruitt (PH) from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. And I wondered if you feel that the speed with which information is available and disseminated today has affected your business-buying decision process. And do you believe that speed has caused you to miss opportunities?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：早上好，我是来自 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 的 Sarah Pruitt（PH）。我想请问，如今信息获取与传播速度的加快，是否影响了你们购买企业的决策流程？你们认为这种“速度”是否让你们错过过机会？
WARREN BUFFETT: Question about seas expanding?
WARREN BUFFETT：关于海洋扩张的问题？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. Does the speed of information today affect our decision-making process?
CHARLIE MUNGER：不是。是问当今的信息速度是否影响我们的决策流程。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, we — I would say that we perform about like we were doing 30 or 40 years ago. I mean — (laughter) — we read annual reports. It isn’t the — the speed of information really doesn’t make any difference to us. It’s the processing and finally coming to some judgment that actually has some utility, that is, that it’s a judgment about the price of a business or a part of a business, a security, versus what it’s essentially worth. And none of that involves anything to do, really, with quick information. It involves getting good information. But usually that — it’s not — we’re not looking for needles in haystacks or anything of the sort. You know, we like haystacks, not needles, basically. And we want it to shout at us. And I would say that, well, virtually everything we’ve done has been reading public reports, and then maybe asking questions around to ascertain trade positions or product strengths or something of that sort. But we never have to — we can make decisions very fast.
WARREN BUFFETT：不会——我得说，我们的做法和 30、40 年前差不多。我的意思是——（笑）——我们读年报。信息的“速度”对我们真的没什么影响。关键在于处理信息，并最终形成“有用的判断”——也就是对一家企业或其一部分（证券）的价格与其内在价值之间关系的判断。这与“快速信息”其实没什么关系；要的是“有效信息”。通常来说——我们并不是在草堆里找针。你知道，我们基本上“喜欢草堆，而不是针”，而且要那种会“朝我们大喊”的东西。我会说，我们几乎所有操作都来源于阅读公开报告，然后再四处打听，以确认行业地位、产品强弱之类的情况。但我们从不需要——我们可以非常迅速地做决定。
I mean, we get called on a business — or we can make up our mind whether we’re interested in two or three minutes. That takes no time. We may have to do a little checking on a few things subsequently. But we don’t need to get — I can’t think of anything where we really need lots of price data or things like that extremely fast to make any decisions. We’ve got good management information systems in our operating businesses, but that’s just another — that’s a question of keeping inventories where they should be and all of that sort of thing. I don’t think the invest — I think you could be in someplace where the mails were delayed three weeks, and the quotations were delayed three weeks, and I think you could do just fine in investing.
我的意思是，我们接到一家企业的电话——两三分钟内就能判断是否感兴趣。这几乎不耗时间。此后我们可能还会核实一些细节。但我们不需要——我想不出有什么决策需要我们以极快速度获取大量价格数据之类的东西。我们的被投企业里有不错的经营信息系统，但那只是另外一回事——例如把库存维持在应有水平之类的管理问题。我不认为投——我认为你即便身处一个邮件延迟三周、行情报价也延迟三周的地方，也一样能把投资做得很好。
59. Why a stock buyback is unlikely
为何回购股票不太可能发生
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 6.
WARREN BUFFETT：六区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: James Pan (PH), New York City. I have a two-parter question. One, do you think the stock price of Berkshire Hathaway is trading within 15 percent of its intrinsic value currently? And two, if you think Berkshire Hathaway is undervalued with the amount of cash you have on your balance sheet, would you consider a buyback?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 James Pan（PH），来自 New York City。我有两个问题。其一，您认为 Berkshire Hathaway 目前的股价是否在其内在价值的±15%范围内交易？其二，如果您认为 Berkshire Hathaway 被低估，且你们资产负债表上有充足现金，是否会考虑回购？
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer about a buyback is that we generally have felt that market conditions that would make Berkshire attractively priced is probably going to make other things even more attractively priced, because we think our shareholders are more rational than the shareholders of many companies. It’s more likely that we will find some wonderful business at a silly price than we will find Berkshire at a silly price as we go along. So — (applause) that tends to eliminate repurchases. But it doesn’t rule them out, but it explains why the circumstances will not arise very often where repurchases would make good sense.
WARREN BUFFETT：关于回购的回答是：一般而言，让 Berkshire 价格变得有吸引力的市场环境，往往会让其他标的的价格“更”有吸引力，因为我们认为我们的股东比很多公司的股东更理性。沿着时间轴看，我们更可能在市场上找到“以愚蠢价格出售的优秀企业”，而不是“以愚蠢价格出售的 Berkshire”。所以——（掌声）这通常会把回购排除在外。当然这并非绝对禁止，但解释了为何“回购很划算”的情形并不常见。
60. Why we don’t estimate our intrinsic value
我们为何不公布内在价值的估算
WARREN BUFFETT: In terms of giving you a number on intrinsic value, I don’t want to spoil your fun. I mean, you really should work that one out for yourself. (Laughter) Charlie is the expert on intrinsic — Do you have any comment for him, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：至于给你一个内在价值的数字，我不想破坏你们的乐趣。我的意思是，这个数你们真的应该自己算。（笑）Charlie 是“内在价值”的专家——你要不要评论一下，Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, your attitude on that subject reminds me of a famous headmaster who used to address the graduating class every year. And he’d say, “You know,” he says, “Five percent of you people are going to end up criminals.” And he says, “I know exactly who you are.” (Laughter) And he said, “But I’m not going to tell you, because it would deprive your lives of a sense of excitement.” (Laughter) If you stop to think about it, the companies that constantly told their shareholders what the intrinsic value was were the real estate holding companies in corporate form. And I must say, that the amount of folly and misbehavior that crept into that process was disgusting. We would be just associating with a bad group if we were to change our ways.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，你在这个话题上的态度让我想起一位著名的校长，他每年对毕业班讲话都会说：“你们当中有5%的人最终会变成罪犯。”接着他说：“我确切知道你们是谁。”（笑）然后他说：“但我不会告诉你们，因为那会剥夺你们人生中的‘悬念感’。”（笑）仔细想想，那些不断向股东“告知内在价值”的公司，主要是公司化的房地产控股公司。而我必须说，这个过程中渗入的愚蠢与不当行为，令人作呕。若我们改变做法去那样做，只是把自己与“不良群体”绑在一起。
WARREN BUFFETT: Bill Zeckendorf Sr. I think was probably the first one to do that, with Webb and Knapp back in the late ’50s. I still have those annual reports. And he would announce, you know, like, to eight decimal places what the intrinsic value of Webb and Knapp was. And he did it right till the day they filed for Chapter 11. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我记得最早那么做的大概是 Bill Zeckendorf Sr.，在上世纪50年代末掌管 Webb and Knapp 时。我现在还留着那些年报。他会把 Webb and Knapp 的“内在价值”精确到小数点后八位地“宣布”。而这种做法一直持续到公司申请 Chapter 11 破产保护那一天为止。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I remember that well, because somebody said that he fell into bankruptcy. And somebody else said, “How can you fall off a pancake?” (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我记得很清楚，因为有人说他“跌进了破产”。另一个人接话说：“你怎么能从一张薄煎饼上摔下来呢？”（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Beware of people that give you a lot of numbers about their businesses. I mean, in terms of projections or valuations or that sort of thing. We try to give you all of the numbers that we would use ourselves in making our own calculations of value. We really — if you read the Berkshire reports, you essentially — you have all the information that Charlie and I would use in making a decision about the security. And if there’s anything really lacking in that respect, you know, we would actually — we would truly appreciate hearing from you, because we want to have that kind of information in the report. But then we want you to make the calculation. But we’ve stuck, I mean, that material, for example, on the float in the insurance business, we consider that quite relevant, obviously, because we use up almost a page printing it. It’s pretty serious stuff at Berkshire. (Laughter) But that is relevant. I mean, your interpretation may be different than mine or Charlie’s, but those are important numbers. And we could give you a lot of baloney about satisfied policyholders, you know, in Lincoln, Nebraska.
WARREN BUFFETT：要警惕那些给你一堆数字的人——我指的是各类“预测”“估值”之类的东西。我们努力向你提供我们自己在进行价值计算时会用到的全部数字。实际上——如果你读了 Berkshire 的报告，基本上——你已经拥有了我和 Charlie 会用来做投资决策的全部信息。如果在这方面确有欠缺，我们真的——非常欢迎你指出来，因为我们希望把那类信息补进报告。但接下来计算要由你来做。我们一直坚持，比如保险业务的“浮存金”那一页材料——显然我们认为它非常相关，因为我们用了将近整整一页来列示。在 Berkshire，这可是“严肃内容”。（笑）它确实相关。你的解读可能与我或 Charlie 的不同，但那些数字很重要。我们当然也可以给你看一堆“废话”，比如在 Lincoln, Nebraska 有多少满意的保单持有人。
It wouldn’t tell you a thing about what the company’s worth — and have pictures of them, and happy, you know, receiving the check from the agent and all of that. (Laughter) We’re not going to do that.
那对“公司价值”毫无帮助——再配上他们从代理人手里开心领支票的照片，诸如此类。（笑）我们不会去做这种事。
61. Buffett on Peter Lynch
巴菲特谈 Peter Lynch
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1.
WARREN BUFFETT：一区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mike Macy (PH) from Indianapolis. I have really enjoyed reading your annual letters and your annual report, and I’ve gone back and read all of the older ones, too. They’re terrific. I have also enjoyed reading the two books by Peter Lynch, and I see a lot of commonalities between the two of you, the way you think, your philosophy, et cetera. I’d certainly appreciate it if you’d make a few comments on what you think of Peter Lynch, the things he says in his two books, and the advice that he gives to investors. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Indianapolis 的 Mike Macy（PH）。我非常喜欢阅读您的年度股东信和年报，也回头把更早的都读了一遍，写得很出色。我也很喜欢 Peter Lynch 的两本书，我看到你们在思维方式、投资哲学等方面有很多共通之处。若您能谈谈您对 Peter Lynch 的看法、他在那两本书中的观点，以及他给予投资者的建议，我将不胜感激。谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I know Peter. I don’t know him well, but we’ve played bridge together in Omaha as a matter of fact. I like him personally, and obviously he has an outstanding record. And he has written those two books, which have been bestsellers, about his investment philosophy. I don’t really have anything — you know, I’m not going to embroider on his. There’s certainly a fair amount of overlap. There’s some difference. Peter, obviously, likes to diversify a lot more than I do. He owns more stocks than the names of companies I can remember. I mean, but that’s Peter. (Laughter) And, you know, I’ve said in investing, in the past, that there’s more than one way to get to heaven. And there isn’t a true religion in this, but there’s some very useful religions. And Peter’s got one, and I think we’ve got one that’s useful, too. And there is a lot of overlap.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认识 Peter。谈不上很熟，但我们确实在 Omaha 一起打过桥牌。我个人很喜欢他，而且显然他有着非常出色的业绩。他写的那两本书也是畅销书，阐述了他的投资哲学。对他的观点我没有什么要再“锦上添花”的——你知道的。我们之间确实有相当多的重叠，也有一些差异。显然，Peter 比我更喜欢分散化；他持有的股票数量多到超过我能记住的公司名字数量。我的意思是，但这就是 Peter。（笑）我过去也说过，在投资里“通往天堂的路不止一条”。这里并不存在唯一的“真宗教”，但有一些“很好用的宗教”。Peter 有他那一套，我认为我们也有一套同样好用的。而且两者之间有很多重叠。
But I would not do as well if I tried to do it the way Peter does it, and he probably wouldn’t do as well if he tried to do it exactly the way I’d do it. I like him personally very much. He’s a high-grade guy.
但如果我照着 Peter 的方式去做，表现可能不会那么好；而他若完全按我的方式来做，结果也未必更好。我个人非常喜欢他，他是个非常优秀的人。
62. We’ll only write insurance when prices make sense
只有当价格合理时我们才会承保
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2.
WARREN BUFFETT：二区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Dave Lankes (PH). I’m a senior editor at Business Insurance Magazine. A two-part question for you. Can you explain a little bit regarding your primary insurance operations? What drove up written premiums by more than 50 percent last year, and if you expect that to continue this year? And then regarding your earlier comments on the stupid things reinsurers can do en masse, can you explain what potential pitfalls that the new cat facilities in Bermuda will have to avoid that you feel Berkshire Hathaway won’t fall into?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生、Munger 先生，我叫 Dave Lankes（PH），是 Business Insurance Magazine 的高级编辑。有两个问题。其一，请介绍一下你们的“primary insurance”业务：去年签单保费增长超过50%的驱动因素是什么？今年是否会延续？其二，结合你们此前谈到“再保险公司会集体做蠢事”，Bermuda 的新“cat facilities（巨灾平台）”需要规避哪些潜在陷阱，而你们认为 Berkshire Hathaway 不会踩到？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the first question about our primary insurance figures, you’ll find it way in the back someplace. But they’re a little distorted because we bought Central States Indemnity, what would it be, late in the year ’92. So there’s a lot more premium volume in there for Central States in ’93 than there was in ’92. Our basic — National Indemnity’s basic insurance, which is commercial, auto, and general liability, premium volume was fairly flat, the Homestate operation fairly flat, Cypress up somewhat. But those numbers were not anything like the changes — So our business last year, pro forma for including Central States Indemnity for all of ’92, would not have shown a dramatic change. There really hasn’t been much happening in our primary business, except that it’s been run, it’s done very well, but it is not growing or exploding. And that’s true this year as well as last year. It’s a good business.
WARREN BUFFETT：首先关于我们的“primary insurance”数据，你可以在年报靠后的位置找到。数据有些失真，因为我们在1992年末收购了 Central States Indemnity，所以1993年计入 Central States 的保费量远高于1992年。我们的基础业务——National Indemnity 的基础险（商业险、车险与一般责任险）保费规模基本持平；Homestate 业务也基本持平；Cypress 略有增长。但这些数字远没有你看到的那种变化——如果把 Central States Indemnity 按“全年并表”的方式回溯到1992年，我们去年的业务并不会显示出剧烈变化。总体看，我们的 primary 业务并没有发生太多事：运营良好、表现出色，但不是在高速增长或爆发。今年与去年一样。它是一门不错的生意。
And it could grow in certain kinds of markets very substantially, but it is not growing in this market, and it did not grow last year, although its underwriting was very good. In the reinsurance business, I think, essentially, the difference in our reinsurance business from many others, you know — it doesn’t include them all in a place like Bermuda — is essentially the difference that may exist in our operations and securities versus other people. We will offer reinsurance at any time in very large quantities at prices we think make sense. But we won’t do business if we don’t think it makes sense, just like we will buy securities, to the extent of the cash we have available, if they make sense. But we have no interest in being in the stock market per say just to be in it. We want to own securities that make sense to us.
它在某些市场环境下可能实现相当可观的增长，但在当前市场没有增长，去年也没有增长——尽管承保结果很好。至于再保险业务，我认为我们与许多同行（并不专指在 Bermuda 的所有公司）的本质区别，类似于我们在证券投资上的作风与他人的不同：只要价格合理，我们随时愿意、并能在很大规模上提供再保险；但如果价格不合理，我们就不会做，正如我们只有在价格合理且有现金可用时才会买入证券一样。我们对“仅仅为了在股市里而待在股市里（per say）”毫无兴趣；我们只愿意持有对我们而言“讲得通”的证券。
I think for most managements, if the only thing they’re in is the reinsurance business, they may like it better when prices make sense, but they will, I think they will be prone to do quite a bit of business when prices don’t make sense as well, because there’s no alternative, except to give the money back to the owners. And that is not something that most managements, you know, do somersaults over. (Laughter) So, I think we are in a favored position, essentially being — having the flexibility of capital allocation that lets us take the lack of business with a certain equanimity that most managements probably can’t, because of their sole focus on the business. Rates will get silly, in all likelihood, after a period when nothing much happens, when you’ve had a couple of years of good experience. We price to what we think is exposure. We don’t price to experience.
我想对大多数管理层而言，如果他们唯一的业务就是再保险，他们当然喜欢“价格合理”的时期；但在“价格不合理”的时期，他们也倾向于做不少生意，因为别无选择——除非把钱还给股东。而这并不是多数管理层会“翻跟头去做”的事（笑）。因此，我们处在一个更有利的位置：本质上，我们拥有资本配置的灵活性，可以对“没有业务可做”保持一种多数只做单一业务的管理层很难做到的“坦然”。在经历一段“风平浪静、承保结果不错”的时期后，定价多半会变得“愚蠢”。我们的定价依据是“风险暴露（exposure）”，而不是“历史经验（experience）”。
拿工资养活自己的基本上必须做点什么。
I mean, the fact that there was no big hurricane last year — I forget the name of the one that was coming in at North Carolina and then veered out essentially — but to us, it has nothing to do with the rates next year whether that hurricane actually came in in a big way or veered out into the Atlantic again. I mean, we are pricing to exposure. And everyone says that, but the market tends to price and respond to experience, and generally to recent experience. That’s why all the retrocessional operations in London, you know, in the spiral, went busted, because they priced, in our view, they priced to experience rather than to exposure. It’s very hard not to do that, to be there year after year with business coming by and investors expecting this of you and not do that. But we will never knowingly do that. We may get influenced subconsciously in some way to do that, but we will not do that any more than we will accept stock market norms as being the proper way for us to invest money and equities. Basically, when you lay out money or accept insurance risks, you really have to think for yourself. You cannot let the market think for you. Charlie?
举例说，去年并没有大的飓风——我忘了那次在 North Carolina 登陆前又转向外海的名字了——但无论它是否登陆、还是再次偏出 Atlantic，都与我们“下一年的费率”无关。我们是按“暴露”定价。人人都这么说，但市场往往按“经验”定价，且通常是按“最近经验”定价。这就是为什么伦敦市场那些再转分保业务在“螺旋（spiral）”里集体爆雷：在我们看来，他们按“经验”而不是按“暴露”来定价。要不这么干其实很难——年复一年，案子源源不断、投资者有所期待——但我们绝不会“明知故犯”。即便潜意识里可能受到些影响，我们也不会那样做，就像我们不会把“股市常规”当作我们投资股票资金的正确方式一样。归根到底，不管是出资还是承担保险风险，你都必须独立思考，而不能让市场替你思考。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think Berkshire is basically a very old-fashioned kind of a place. And it tries to exert discipline to stay old-fashioned. And I don’t mean old-fashioned stupid, I mean, you know, the eternal verity, so to speak, basic mathematics, you know, basic horse sense, basic fear, basic discriminations regarding human nature, all very old-fashioned. And if you just do that with a certain amount of discipline, I think it’s likely to work out quite well.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我认为 Berkshire 本质上是一个“非常老派”的地方，并且努力以纪律来保持“老派”。我说的“老派”不是“愚昧陈旧”，而是那些所谓“永恒的真理”：基本数学、基本常识、适度的敬畏、对人性的基本辨别——这些都很“老派”。只要用一定的纪律去践行这些，我认为结果往往会相当不错。
63. Praise from Sandy Gottesman
来自 Sandy Gottesman 的赞誉
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3.
WARREN BUFFETT：三区。
DAVID GOTTESMAN: David Gottesman from New York. It’s no wonder that this meeting draws stockholders from all over the country. And despite the talk about age today, I’m happy to say this meeting gets better every year. Berkshire stands unique in American business as a company whose name has become synonymous with management excellence. Unlike many American corporations, we, as stockholders, don’t have to worry about reorganizations, large write-offs, massive restructurings, overstated earnings, and overpaid executives with strategic visions. Instead, year in and year out, we enjoy the benefits of the common sense and brilliance of Charlie and Warren. (APPLAUSE)
DAVID GOTTESMAN：我是来自 New York 的 David Gottesman。难怪这场会议能吸引全美各地的股东前来。尽管今天谈到“年龄”，我仍很高兴地说，这次会议一年比一年更好。Berkshire 在 American business 中独树一帜，它的名字已成为“卓越管理”的同义词。不像许多美国公司那样，我们作为股东无需担心重组、大额核销、巨额结构调整、夸大利润，或那些拿着高薪且满口“战略愿景”的高管。相反，年复一年，我们享受到 Charlie 和 Warren 的常识与才智带来的成果。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: What did you say your name was? (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：你说你叫什么来着？（笑）
DAVID GOTTESMAN: I want to add to that, to say nothing of your good humor. It’s easy to take such consistently outstanding results for granted, but we in this room are the direct beneficiaries of their efforts. By our presence here today, we show our appreciation to them for their exceptional performance. But we can also demonstrate in another way. I would like to suggest we give them a rousing hand of applause for a job well done. Thank you. (APPLAUSE)
DAVID GOTTESMAN：我还要补充一点——更不用说你们出色的幽默感。持续如此卓越的成绩很容易被人视作理所当然，但我们在座各位正是他们努力的直接受益者。今天我们来到这里，本身就是在对他们的杰出表现表示感谢；但我们也可以用另一种方式表达。我建议，为他们的卓越工作，献上热烈的掌声。谢谢。（掌声）
WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. That was Sandy Gottesman. We’ve worked together for 30-odd years, and he’s finally got that down. I appreciate that, Sandy. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。这位是 Sandy Gottesman。我们合作三十多年了，他终于把这段话“说顺溜”了。谢谢你，Sandy。（笑）
64. Brief adjournment
简短休会
WARREN BUFFETT: With that, we will adjourn. And anyone who wants to stay around, we’ll reconvene in 15 minutes, and then we’ll be here till about 1:15.
WARREN BUFFETT：就此我们先休会。愿意留下的朋友，15 分钟后我们再继续；接下来会一直进行到大约 1:15。
Afternoon Session
65. No comment on Guinness investment
不对Guinness投资置评
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2 now. Well, I don’t know where zone 2 is, but we’ll — (laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：现在是二区。嗯，我不知道二区在哪儿，但我们就——（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you feel basically the same about your investment in Guinness now as when you made the investment, in terms of the company?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：就公司本身而言，您现在对Guinness这笔投资的看法，是否与最初买入时基本相同？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn’t like to comment on anything that we own, in terms of how we rate them as desirability or anything. I mean, whether it’s Coke or Gillette or anything that — we made decisions at a given time, at a given price, which you can figure out by looking at our purchases. But we may be buying or selling any of those securities right as we talk. And we simply don’t think it’s in the interest of Berkshire shareholders as a group to be talking about things that we could be buying or selling.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不想就我们持有的任何标的发表评论，比如它们的“吸引力评级”之类。不论是Coke、Gillette，还是其他什么——我们都是在特定时间、特定价格做出的决定，你可以从我们的买入记录看出来。但此刻我们可能正在买入或卖出其中任何一只证券。我们认为，讨论可能买卖的标的，不符合Berkshire股东整体的利益。
66. World Book’s sales slide: “I wish I knew the answer”
World Book销量下滑：“真希望我知道原因”
WARREN BUFFETT: OK?
WARREN BUFFETT：好吧？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, David Winters, from Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. Just wondering, World Book’s had a tough time lately, and I’m wondering if there’s things you’re doing to try to improve that. And also, The Buffalo News has been fabulous. And I’m kind of wondering what’s driving The Buffalo News?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是David Winters，来自Mountain Lakes, New Jersey。想请问，World Book最近表现艰难，你们有没有采取什么措施来改善？另外，The Buffalo News表现非常出色。我也想知道是什么在驱动The Buffalo News的优秀表现？
WARREN BUFFETT: Buffalo News is doing what?
WARREN BUFFETT：Buffalo News表现怎样？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Fabulously.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：非常出色。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it’s doing well, right. Well, I would say you got to give credit Stan Lipsey — I’m not sure whether Stan’s here right now, but — who’s been running the News. World Book, in terms of unit sales — as we put in the report — have fallen off significantly the last few years. It’s actually surprising, in a sense, how well the profits have held up because they’ve done a good job, a very good job, in that respect. And as we put in the report, we don’t know the answer, precisely. We are, Ralph Schey is — has taken some actions — is taking some actions — that he thinks will improve the operations. Ralph’s record as a manager is absolutely at the top of the list. I mean, it — I wrote about it in the 1992 report. In 1993, Ralph did even better. I mean, it was a — fabulous. I think, probably, may have been 110 or so million pre-tax on 90-some million of average equity capital, or something of the sort. So it’s a fabulous record.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，表现不错。嗯，我想功劳应归于一直管理这份报纸的Stan Lipsey——我不确定他现在是否在场。至于World Book，就像我们在报告中写的，按册数计算的销量在过去几年明显下滑。从某种意义上说，利润能保持得这么好还挺令人惊讶，因为他们在这方面做得很到位、非常到位。而且正如我们在报告里所说，我们并不知道确切原因。我们这边，Ralph Schey已经——并正在——采取一些他认为能改善运营的措施。Ralph作为管理者的业绩绝对是一流水平。我在1992年的报告里写过；到1993年，Ralph做得更好，简直——非常出色。我记得，大概是在平均股本九千多万美元的基础上，取得了一亿一千多万美元的税前利润，或类似的规模。所以这是一份了不起的成绩单。
But Encyclopedia Britannica, as you probably know, ran at a loss last year. The encyclopedia business has been very — has been poor. Could be due to electronic competition, could be due to recruiting problems for salespeople. Obviously, it can be a combination of many factors. If we knew the answer, we’d have — you wouldn’t be seeing those figures right now. But it is a top item of attention for Ralph. He takes anything that’s not performing as well as before very seriously. And we will see what happens. But I don’t have a prediction on it. I wish I knew the answer. I don’t see any variables to, in any intelligent way, tell you or — we put in the report the best we could do on that. The profitability has, like I say, has been pretty good. But obviously, current trends of new sales will catch up with us at some point, unless we boost unit sales. I don’t think our market share, if you look at print encyclopedias, has fallen. But I can’t be sure of that, but I think that’s probably true.
不过，Encyclopedia Britannica，你们可能知道，去年是亏损的。整个百科全书行业的表现一直——一直很差。原因可能是电子化竞争，也可能是招募销售人员的困难，显然也可能是多种因素叠加。如果我们知道答案，你现在看到的数字就不会是那个样子了。但这件事是Ralph的头等关注。他对任何“较以往逊色”的业务都非常严肃看待。我们会拭目以待，但我没有预测。真希望我知道答案。我看不到哪些变量能让我们以一种有意义的方式告诉你——我们在报告里已经尽力说明。正如我说的，盈利能力还不错。但很显然，如果我们不能提升单册销量，当前新销售的趋势终将反噬我们。我不认为如果只看纸质百科全书，我们的市场份额下降了；我不能完全确定，但我觉得大概率如此。
But there are an awful lot of encyclopedias going out there as part of a bundled product with computer sales.
不过，现在有大量百科全书作为捆绑产品随电脑销售而出货。
67. Breaking up Berkshire wouldn’t help
拆分 Berkshire 不会有帮助
WARREN BUFFETT: How are we going to do this, is there?
WARREN BUFFETT：我们要怎么进行，这里有——？
VOICE: We got three now.
VOICE：我们现在有三个了。
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, I’ll let you hand the mic to whomever, you —
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我让你把麦克风交给任何一位，你——
VOICE: (Inaudible) three.
VOICE：（听不清）three。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lee again, from Palo Alto. By Omaha standards you are a relatively young man. And every year, you point out that Berkshire’s size now precludes you from making the great, relatively small trades which made your reputation. How much thought have you given to breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：又是我，Lee，来自 Palo Alto。按 Omaha 的标准，您还算相对年轻。您每年都会指出，Berkshire 的规模如今使您无法像早年那样做那些规模较小却很出色的交易，而这些交易奠定了您的名声。您是否考虑过把 Berkshire 拆分成更小的实体？
WARREN BUFFETT: How much what?
WARREN BUFFETT：考虑多少什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How much thought have you given into breaking up Berkshire into smaller entities, which would allow you to make those nice, small, wonderful trades that you made from the beginning?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：您对把 Berkshire 拆成更小的实体这件事考虑过多少？这样您就能像当初那样，做那些精妙的小额交易了。
WARREN BUFFETT: It wouldn’t do any good to break into smaller entities, because I’d still own, you know, we’d still have 10 billion-plus of capital to be responsible for, wherever it would be. So, the — we could distribute it out to the shareholders, and let them make their own decisions, obviously. And any time we thought that we weren’t going to get more than a dollar of value per dollar retained, that, obviously, would be the course to follow. But there’s no magic to creating multiple little — I mean, we could call Berkshire Two, Berkshire Three, Berkshire Four, but you still got the problem. There’s $10 billion to invest, and it doesn’t really solve anything. Charlie, do you have any thoughts on that?
WARREN BUFFETT：把它拆成小实体并没有好处，因为我仍然要——你知道的——负责管理超过100亿美元的资本，不管它们被放在哪儿。当然，我们也可以把钱分配给股东，让他们自己做决定。只要我们认为“每留存1美元赚不到超过1美元的价值”，那么分配出去显然就是应当采取的路径。但“造出一堆小公司”并没有魔力——我们可以起名叫 Berkshire Two、Berkshire Three、Berkshire Four，可问题依旧：你还是得投资100亿美元，这并不能解决什么。Charlie，你怎么看？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, the — Berkshire is incredibly decentralized, in the — in terms of power and decisions resting in the operating divisions. In terms of the marketable securities, it’s incredibly centralized. And so far, we have not had any big penalty from not being able to do the things that we did when we were young. Eventually we will reach the penalty.
CHARLIE MUNGER：不需要。Berkshire 在经营层面——也就是权力与决策下放到各运营子公司——极度去中心化；但在可交易证券层面又高度集中化。到目前为止，因为无法再做年轻时那种事情，我们并没有遭受太大的“惩罚”。当然，最终会面临这方面的代价。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I think we’re — there’s no question we could earn higher percentage returns working with $100,000, though, than $10 billion. But, yeah — but it hasn’t hurt us as much as we thought it would, as size has increased. But your universe of opportunity shrinks. But it shrinks no matter — I mean, you can set it up in 20 bank accounts or one bank account, but you still — the universe still has to fit the 10 billion, in aggregate.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我认为——毫无疑问，拿10万美元干活，回报率会比拿100亿美元高得多。不过，随着规模扩大，对我们的伤害没有我们原先想象的那么大。但“机会空间”确实会收缩。无论如何它都会收缩——我的意思是，你可以把钱分在20个账户里，也可以放在一个账户里，但归根结底，你面对的机会空间都必须“容纳”那100亿美元。
68. “Absolutely sensational job” by General Dynamics management
General Dynamics 管理层完成了“绝对精彩的工作”
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, how are we doing this? Do we have another zone over there? Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：现在，我们怎么进行？那边还有一个分区吗？有。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Michael Bunyaner (PH), New York City. Two questions. One, last year you discussed in your annual report your investment in General Dynamics. And you also gave your proxy to the company and its management. This year, it appears you have sold the stock.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 Michael Bunyaner（PH），来自 New York City。有两个问题。第一，去年你在年报中讨论了你们对 General Dynamics 的投资，你还把你的代理投票交给了公司及其管理层。今年看来你们已经卖出了这只股票。
WARREN BUFFETT: This year, what?
WARREN BUFFETT：今年，什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This year, it appears that you have sold the stock in General Dynamics. What has changed that you sold 20 percent of your stake? This is question number one, and I have number two.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：今年看来你们已经卖出了 General Dynamics 的股票。你们为什么会卖出 20% 的持股？这是第一个问题，我还有第二个问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Probably inappropriate to be talking about what we’re buying or selling, except to the extent that we make a public — have to make a public announcement, which, on something like General Dynamics, we’ve got 13G requirements if we change by more than 5 percent. And we also have — as long as we own more than 10 percent — we have monthly reporting requirements under Form 4. We think the management of General Dynamics has done an absolutely sensational job. Obviously, also it isn’t the kind of business, basically, that we have a 20-year view on, or something of the sort. So, it’s — the shareholders of General Dynamics have been extraordinarily well-served by the management of that company. And we’ve — we’re thankful, because we prospered accordingly.
WARREN BUFFETT：谈论我们正在买卖的标的不太合适，除非到了我们必须公开披露的程度。以 General Dynamics 为例，如果持股变动超过 5%，我们要履行 13G 披露；只要持股超过 10%，我们还需要按 Form 4 做月度申报。我们认为 General Dynamics 的管理层完成了绝对精彩的工作。当然，这基本上也不是我们会以 20 年视角去看待的那类业务。所以——General Dynamics 的股东受益于该公司管理层的表现，而我们也因此受益、心怀感激。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But should I take from this comment that you have changed your view about the business itself?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：但我是否可以从您的话里理解为，你们已经改变了对这项业务本身的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: Pardon me?
WARREN BUFFETT：抱歉，什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should I take from your comment that you have changed your view about the business itself?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是否可以从您的评论中理解为，你们已经改变了对这项业务本身的看法？
WARREN BUFFETT: No, no. I think you take my comments as saying just what I’ve said. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：不，不。我的意思就是我刚才字面所说的。（笑）
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. (Laughter) Question number two, could you tell me —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好的。（笑）第二个问题，您能否——
WARREN BUFFETT: I think we want to give people a chance around the room, and then when, in the zone you’re in, when a second question comes along, it will be fine. But we want to get as many people in this hour as we can, because this is the hard core here.
WARREN BUFFETT：我想我们要让会场各处的人都有机会；等轮到你所在的分区再提第二个问题也可以。不过我们希望在这一小时里尽可能多让大家发问，因为这里都是铁杆观众。
69. No encouragement for short-term stockholders
不鼓励短期股东
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It appeared to me that in 1993 the variation between the stock price for the high and the low was much greater than years in the past. Would you mind commenting on that?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：在我看来，1993 年股价的高低波动幅度比以往多年都要大。您介意对此评论一下吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there was more volatility in the price of Berkshire last year. And as I put in the annual report, the stock overperformed the business last year. Now, over any 10 or 20 or 30-year history, every year the stock is going to perform a little differently, at least, from the business. I mean, it may slightly underperform, or slightly overperform. We would prefer that those variations be as small as possible. But there was more variability last year than historically’s been the case. Although we’ve had one or two other — we had a few years like that. We — Our best way to handle that is to give all the information we can to shareholders and prospective shareholders, and follow policies that we think will induce the investment-oriented with long time horizons to join us, and not to encourage other people. But, occasionally — you know, we can’t guarantee that result. One of the things that was interesting to me, I don’t know whether it was three months ago or when, but I happened to be talking to the [NYSE] specialist, terrific specialist, Jimmy Maguire.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，去年 Berkshire 的股价确实更为波动。而且正如我在年报中所写，那一年股票的表现超过了公司的经营表现。事实上，在任何一个 10 年、20 年或 30 年的区间里，每一年股票的表现至少都会与公司的经营表现略有不同——可能略微跑输，也可能略微跑赢。我们更希望这种偏离尽可能小。但去年确实比历史上大多数年份波动更大，尽管我们过去也有一两年——或者说少数几年——出现过类似情况。我们应对这种情况的最佳方式，是尽可能向现有与潜在股东提供信息，并坚持我们认为能够吸引“长期、以投资为导向”的股东加入的政策，同时不去鼓励其他类型的参与者。当然，偶尔——你知道——我们无法保证一定达成这样的结果。有件事让我印象深刻：大概三个月前（我记不清具体时间），我碰巧与 [NYSE] 的专营商、非常出色的 Jimmy Maguire 聊天。
He had to leave, but he was here earlier in the session. And I think, at the time, the stock was around 16,000 or something like that. And he had some rather significant stop-loss orders on the books at 15-5, or thereabouts, involving some hundreds of shares. And that to me is a signal that, you know, we have some people that are — in my view — are not really the kind of owners that we would like to attract. Because why somebody wants to put in an order to sell something for 15,500 that they don’t want to sell at 16,000 is beyond me, but — (Laughter) The idea of people using stop-loss orders with Berkshire, obviously — it tells me that we’ve got some people in that are using it as trading vehicle of some sort, or have some totally noninvestment-type calculations in their mind. I don’t think we have very many of them. But obviously, if we have enough people like that, you will have a more volatile stock than if you have a whole bunch of people who look at it as something that they’re going to hold for the rest of their life.
他现在已经离开了，但之前在场。当时股价大约在 16,000 左右。他账上在 15,500 附近挂着一些相当规模的止损单，涉及数百股。在我看来，这说明我们有一些——以我的视角——并非我们希望吸引的那种股东。因为我实在不理解，为什么有人会下单在 15,500 卖出，而在 16,000 时却不想卖——（笑）在 Berkshire 上使用止损单这件事本身就说明：我们确实存在一些把它当作某种交易工具的人，或者他们心里装着与投资无关的那一套算法。我认为这类人不多。但显然，如果这类人多起来，股价波动就会比那些把它当作“打算持有一辈子”的人更多时更大。
And the stock did go down at that time and hit 15,500. And there were — that — I think it was close to 300 shares, which is 4 1/2 million dollars’ worth of stock. And somebody made a decision, apparently, that they — or some small number of people — made a decision that they wanted to sell something at 15,500 that they could have sold for 16,000. The lower it went, the better they liked it, apparently. I mean, the better they liked the sale. (Laughter) Which, you know, has always struck me as like having a house that you like, and you’re living in, and, you know, it’s worth $100,000 and you tell your broker, you know, if anybody ever comes along and offers 90, you want to sell it. I mean, it doesn’t — (laughter) — make any sense to me.
当时股价确实下到了 15,500。大概——我记得接近 300 股，按金额算是 450 万美元左右。显然，有人——或者少数几个人——做出了一个决定：在可以 16,000 卖出的情况下，反而要在 15,500 卖出。价格越往下，他们越愿意卖——我的意思是，他们越“喜欢”这个卖出。（笑）在我看来，这就像你有一套很喜欢、自己也住着的房子，价值 100,000 美元，却告诉经纪人：如果有人出 90,000，就卖掉。对我来说——（笑）——这完全说不通。
But it has — I would say that there’s been some small — I think, relatively small — tendency for people to get — relatively few people — but to get more interested in the price of the stock in terms of — and thinking of it in terms of whether it’s going to go up or down in the next six months, than might formerly have been the case. I think we’re unusually well-blessed in that respect, in that we’ve got people who basically want to own it for a very long time. But to the extent that you get people who were owning it because they think the stock market’s going to go up, or something of that sort’s going to happen, that is not good news from our standpoint, and it will increase the volatility in it. We will do nothing to encourage that.
不过，我会说，出现了一种轻微的——我认为相对轻微的——倾向：有少数人比过去更关注“股价在未来六个月会上涨还是下跌”。在这方面我们其实非常幸运，因为我们的股东大多是希望长期持有的人。但如果持有人当中出现一些人，他们买入只是因为觉得股市要上涨，或类似的原因，这对我们而言并不是好消息，而且会加大股价波动。我们不会做任何鼓励这种行为的事情。
70. Berkshire benefits when the stock market falls
当股市下跌时，Berkshire 受益
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Mr. Buffett, Steve Lang (PH) from Toronto. I was just curious about when you were saying that one of the best things that could happen to shareholders is the — the market goes down and you’re able to buy good businesses at foolish prices. And then a little on, you were saying that we could judge your ability to do what it is that you feel you should be doing by how much cash you have in the account at any given point in time, and —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的，Buffett 先生，我是来自 Toronto 的 Steve Lang（PH）。我对您的一点说法很好奇：您说对股东而言最好的事情之一是——市场下跌，而你们能以“愚蠢的价格”买到好企业。随后您又提到，我们可以通过你们在任何时点账户里的现金规模来判断你们是否在做你们认为应该做的事，而——
WARREN BUFFETT: By what?
WARREN BUFFETT：通过什么？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: By the amount of cash that you have in the account. In other words, I guess, what you feel you’re supposed to be doing is investing the cash in good businesses. So I’m just wondering about that kind of dichotomy. Where does the cash come from if the market does go down, if you’ve been successful in your first ability? Would that be from the cash flow on the operations of the business from the float?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：通过你们账户里的现金规模。换句话说，我想你们“该做的事”就是把现金投资到好企业。所以我在想这两者之间的“二分”。如果市场真的下跌，而你们在第一件事上“做得成功”，那么现金从哪里来？是来自业务经营的现金流，来自浮存金吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that —?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是——？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So really, the success of the company then is, to some degree, the fact that you’re able to dollar-cost average into the market on an ongoing basis? Is that right?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：所以，从某种程度上讲，公司之所以成功，是因为你们能持续地把资金分散投入市场、相当于实行“定投”？对吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it isn’t that precise. But A, we do generate cash in considerable amounts, so that we will not husband cash, simply because we think the market’s going to go down, in order to buy something. But obviously, as cash comes in, we’re always looking for things to do. And the cheaper that the market is generally, the more likely it is that we will find something that we understand and that we like, and that the price will be attractive, and that we will do it. But it isn’t like we can change around the whole portfolio then, because that doesn’t gain us anything. I mean, we’d be selling things at lower prices to buy things at lower prices. But to the extent that we have net cash coming in — which we do, and which we will have — on balance, we’re, you know, we’re adding to our businesses at more attractive prices than would be the other case. And it’s no prediction on any given company. I mean, whether it’s Gillette or Coke, or anything.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，没那么精确。首先，我们确实会产生可观的现金，所以我们不会因为“觉得市场将下跌”而特意囤现金来等着买东西。当然，现金不断流入时，我们一直在寻找可做之事。市场整体越便宜，我们就越有可能找到自己理解、也喜欢、而且价格有吸引力的标的，并付诸行动。但这并不是说我们会把整个投资组合来个“大挪移”，因为那并没有任何好处——等于是在更低价卖出现有持仓去更低价买别的而已。只要我们有净现金流入——确实有、而且未来也会有——总体上，你知道，我们就能以更有吸引力的价格为我们的业务“加仓”，而不是相反。这并不是对任何单一公司的预测——无论是 Gillette、Coke，还是其他。
It might be something we already own, it might be something we don’t own. But we welcome the chance to buy more shares. We’re not wishing it on anybody. But if you asked us next month whether Berkshire would be better off if the whole stock market were down 50 percent or where it is now, we would be better off if it was down 50 percent, whether we had any cash on hand now or not, because we would be generating cash to buy things.
可能是我们已持有的，也可能是我们未持有的。但我们欢迎“买更多股份”的机会。我们并不希望任何人遭殃。但如果你下个月问我们：整个股市若下跌 50% 相比维持现状，Berkshire 哪个更受益？答案是：下跌 50% 更有利——不管我们手头当下有没有现金——因为我们会持续产生现金去买东西。
71. Salomon’s compensation: “Far from ideal”
Salomon 的薪酬：“远非理想”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Byron Ransdell (PH) from Raleigh, North Carolina. Thanks for your hospitality to this weekend.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 Raleigh, North Carolina 的 Byron Ransdell（PH）。感谢你们本周末的款待。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we thank you for coming, too.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们也感谢你的到来。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question concerns Salomon, Inc., and more specifically, Salomon Brothers. I know that you were on the board of directors, I think, from ’87 to the current time. Very much interested in compensation there, and maybe on the compensation committee. Between 1987 and 1992, Salomon’s financial results were quite dismal in a very lumpy way, but overall, quite dismal. In your opinion, if the compensation had been rational during this time, would Salomon have shown results that would make it a quite decent business?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我的问题与 Salomon, Inc. 有关，更具体说是 Salomon Brothers。我知道您自 1987 年起一直在董事会任职到现在。我对那里的薪酬很感兴趣，您也许还在薪酬委员会。1987 到 1992 年间，Salomon 的财务业绩时好时坏但总体相当糟糕。依您看，如果当时的薪酬更为理性，Salomon 是否会交出让其成为一家相当不错企业的业绩？
WARREN BUFFETT: Would Salomon — if the compensation —
WARREN BUFFETT：如果 Salomon——在薪酬——
CHARLIE MUNGER: If the past compensation —
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果过去的薪酬——
WARREN BUFFETT: — had been more rational —
WARREN BUFFETT：——更为理性——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — decisions had been more rational, ’87 to the current time, would Salomon have done better? Yeah, was that it?
CHARLIE MUNGER：——如果 1987 年至今的相关决策更理性，Salomon 会不会做得更好？对，是这个意思吗？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的，先生。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would — yeah, I would say that, if the present people and the present compensation philosophy — which allows for very large payments for very large results — I think the company would have done better, yeah. It — you’re going to see very big numbers paid in Wall Street. That’s the nature of it. The trick is to pay them only when you’re getting very big results for the owners. I mean, it — there’s no way you’re going to pay numbers that look like numbers in other industries, and get great results for owners. But if you pay these big numbers, I think you should be getting very good results for owners. And there — the old system was not — I mean, it wasn’t totally off the mark on that. But it was far from an ideal system, in my view.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会——是的，我会说，如果当时就采用现在的人选与薪酬理念——即在取得非常出色业绩时可以支付非常高的薪酬——我认为公司会做得更好。华尔街会出现很大的薪酬数字，这是其本性。关键在于：只有当为所有者带来非常出色的结果时才支付这些高薪。我的意思是，你不可能按其他行业那样的薪酬水平去付钱，还指望为所有者拿到出色回报；但如果你付了这些大数字，我认为你就应该为所有者拿到非常好的结果。至于——旧的体系并不是——我的意思是它并非全然离谱，但在我看来，它离“理想的体系”差得远。
72. Unlikely to write put options on Coca-Cola again
未来不太可能再对 Coca-Cola 卖出看跌期权
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren, I have one question. Last year you were using Coca-Cola puts as a way to increase income, and conversely, if they were exercised, as a way of increasing your position. Do you still use puts in this type on investments you wish to add to? (BREAK IN RECORDING)
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Warren，我有一个问题。去年你们通过卖出 Coca-Cola 的看跌期权来增加收益；相反，如果被行权，也能作为增加持仓的一种方式。对于你们想加仓的标的，你们现在还会用这种卖出看跌期权的方式吗？（录音中断）
WARREN BUFFETT: — five million shares, as I remember, of Coke sometime in the early fall or thereby — I don’t remember exactly — last year. And the puts, I think the premium was around 7 1/2 million dollars, and they were priced around 35. We have not done that very often, and we’re unlikely to do very much of it. For one thing, there are position limits on puts, which don’t apply to us, but they apply to the brokers for which we do them. And those position limits were not clear before that. But we could probably write puts on that same amount by doing it through a bunch of different brokers. It’s not something we’re really very likely to do. I was happy to do it, and in that particular case, we made 7 1/2 million dollars. But we’re better off, probably — if we like something well enough to write a put on it, we’re probably better off buying the security itself, and particularly since we can’t do it in the kind of quantities that really would make it meaningful to Berkshire.
WARREN BUFFETT：——如果我记得没错，去年初秋前后我们对大约 500 万股 Coke 卖出了看跌期权。我不记得确切时间了。那批期权的权利金大约是 750 万美元，执行价在 35 左右。我们并不常做这种事，未来也不太可能多做。其一是看跌期权有“持仓限额”，虽然不适用于我们，但适用于为我们执行的券商；在那之前这些限额还不甚明晰。理论上我们可以通过多个券商来分散写出相同规模的期权，但这并非我们会常用的做法。那一单我很满意，确实赚了 750 万美元；但如果我们对某标的喜欢到愿意卖出看跌期权的程度，或许直接买入标的本身更好——尤其是考虑到我们无法用“对 Berkshire 真正有意义”的规模来做这类期权。
There are securities I would not mind writing puts for 10 million shares or something, but I — that probably — it’s probably allowable for us to do it. It’s not allowed — we’d probably have to do it through multiple brokers to get the job done. And on balance, I don’t think it’s as useful a way to spend my time as just looking for securities to buy outright. Charlie, you have anything?
有些证券我并不介意对 1,000 万股规模卖出看跌期权，但——那大概对我们是允许的；却并不被券商的限额“允许”，我们可能不得不通过多家券商分拆完成。总体上，我觉得这不如直接找标的买入更值得我花时间。Charlie，你补充吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有。
73 .Don’t believe reports on what we’re buying or selling
关于我们买卖的新闻大多不可信
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m from West Point. And my name is Rogers. A couple of months ago, there were stories in The World-Herald that Berkshire Hathaway had taken a large position in Philip Morris, and UST. But in your annual report, I don’t see anything about that. Can you comment?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我来自 West Point，我叫 Rogers。几个月前，《The World-Herald》报道 Berkshire Hathaway 建立了 Philip Morris 和 UST 的大额头寸。但在你们的年报里我没看到这方面的信息。您能评论一下吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I would say, in the last two years maybe — I’m just approximating — I’ve probably seen reports in either The Wall Street Journal, or USA Today — maybe picked up by The Associated Press, or in The Herald, but in papers of some significance — I’ve probably seen stories that we were buying maybe any one of 10 companies in aggregate over that period of time. I would say a significant majority were erroneous. We don’t correct the erroneous ones, because if we don’t correct the erroneous ones — if we correct the erroneous ones, and don’t say anything about the correct ones, in effect we’re identifying the correct ones, too. So we will never comment on those stories, no matter how ridiculous they are. And it’s interesting because, you know, they keep getting printed. And frankly, from our standpoint, the fact that most of them are inaccurate is probably useful to us.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我想说，在过去两年里——只是大致估计——我在《The Wall Street Journal》或《USA Today》上，或被《The Associated Press》采编、或出现在《The Herald》这类较有影响力的报纸上，大概看到过十来家“我们在买入”的传闻。我会说，其中“显著多数”是错误的。我们不会去纠正这些错误的报道，因为如果我们只纠正错误的——而对正确的只字不提——实际上也等于“指认了正确的”。所以无论这些报道多么离谱，我们都不会评论。有意思的是，它们还是会不断被刊发。坦率地说，从我们的角度看，大多数报道不准确这件事，反而可能对我们有利。
We don’t do anything to encourage it, but it — the fact that people are reading that we are buying A, B, C, or X, Y, Z when we aren’t — you know, that’s — I don’t think people should be buying stocks because they’re reading in the paper that we’re buying something. But if they do, they may get cured of it at some point. Maybe the newspapers will even get cured of writing the stories when they don’t know, you know, what the facts are. But it’s something we live with, and we’ll probably continue to live with. And I would say that based on history, if you read something about us buying or selling something, other than through reports we’ve filed with the SEC or regulatory bodies, the chances are well over 50 percent — that I can tell you, based on history, is correct — well over 50 percent that it’s wrong.
我们不会主动去“鼓励”这种传闻，但当人们在我们并未买入时读到“我们正在买 A、B、C 或 X、Y、Z”时——你知道的——我并不认为人们应该因为读到“我们在买”就去买股票。但如果他们真的这么做，总有一天会“被纠正”。也许媒体在不清楚事实时写这类报道，也会有一天“被纠正”。总之，这是我们必须与之共存的事，而且大概还会继续下去。基于历史，如果你读到“我们在买/卖某标的”的新闻，而它不是来自我们提交给 SEC 或其他监管机构的文件，那么它“出错的概率”远大于 50%——这是我能基于历史明确告诉你的。
74. Unlikely Berkshire will be a Dow or S&P 500 stock
Berkshire 不太可能被纳入 Dow 或 S&P 500 指数成分股
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you expect that Berkshire will become one of the Standard & Poor 500 stocks, or a Dow Jones stock?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：您是否预计 Berkshire 会成为 Standard & Poor 500 的成分股之一，或成为 Dow Jones 指数成分股？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think it’s unlikely it ever becomes a Dow Jones stock. I don’t know what the criteria are for the S&P 500. But I imagine there’s some reason why we don’t fit. I don’t know whether they have questions about number of shares outstanding or — I’ve never checked with S&P. I wouldn’t be surprised if we have the largest market capitalization of any company that isn’t in the S&P, although I don’t know that. But they may have some criteria that preclude Berkshire being part of it. I’ve always thought it would be very interesting, for those of you who like to think about such things, that if we were part of the S&P 500, and enough people became indexed so that 60 percent of the market was indexed, and if Charlie and I wouldn’t sell, which we wouldn’t, it’d be an interesting proposition as to how the index funds would ever get their 60 percent if they tried to replicate the S&P.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为成为 Dow Jones 成分股的可能性不大。至于 S&P 500 的纳入标准我并不清楚，但我想应该有某些原因使我们不符合。我不知道他们是否对流通股数之类的问题有要求——我从未向 S&P 询问过。若我们恰好是未被纳入 S&P 的公司中市值最大的，我也不会惊讶，尽管我并不确定。但他们可能确有一些标准把 Berkshire 排除在外。我一直觉得有件事很有意思，供喜欢思考这类问题的人玩味：如果我们被纳入 S&P 500，且足够多的人进行指数化投资，以致市场 60% 被指数化；而 Charlie 和我不会卖（我们确实不会），那么当指数基金试图复制 S&P 时，它们如何获得那 60% 的份额就会成为一个有趣的命题。
It’d be — I don’t know whether they have rules even about concentration of ownership. That same line of thinking might have applied to Walmart, or some company. Because just take the extreme example of a company that had 90 percent of its stock owned by one individual, and 12 percent of the money in the market were indexed, and the 90 percent wouldn’t sell, it would bring back the Northern Pacific Corner or something of the sort. In any event, I don’t think that’s going to be a problem. And I don’t think we are going to end up being in either index, so —
这将是——我不知道他们是否还有关于股权集中度的规则。同样的思路也可能适用于 Walmart 或某些公司。举个极端例子：如果一家公司 90% 的股份由某个个人持有，而市场上有 12% 的资金进行指数化投资，且那 90% 坚决不卖，这就会让人想到 Northern Pacific Corner 之类的情形。无论如何，我不认为这会成为一个问题。我也不认为我们最终会进入这两个指数，所以——
75. Diversify if you don’t understand businesses
如果你不懂业务，就要分散投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is Aaron Morris (PH). I’m from California. What I wanted to know was how you think about how large a position you’re willing to take in a given security, both in your case, where you have new cash coming in that you can invest, and in the case of an investor, where they have a fixed amount of capital, and they’re trying to decide what’s the most (inaudible) security that they really love?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我叫 Aaron Morris（PH），来自 California。我想了解的是：对于单一证券，您如何考虑愿意投入多大的头寸？既包括你们这种有新增现金可投资的情况，也包括普通投资者只有固定资本、需要在自己最（听不清）喜欢的证券之间做出选择的情形。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie and I have — probably at our present size, we will never find anything that we get as much money into as we want. Don’t you think that’s probably true, Charlie? If we really like it?
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，就我们现在的体量，Charlie 和我——大概再也找不到能按我们想要的规模投进去的标的了。Charlie，你不觉得这是事实吗？假如我们真的很喜欢的话？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think that’s quite likely.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我觉得很可能如此。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so we will probably never hit the limit. We would love to. We’d love to find something we felt that strongly about, and occasionally we do. But we won’t get as much money into it as we would wish, or as if we were running a million dollars of our own money or some number like that, so — We are willing to put a lot of money into a single security. When I ran the partnership, the limit I got to was about 40 percent in a single stock. I think Charlie, when you ran your partnership, you had more than 40 percent in —
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，所以我们大概永远到不了“满仓上限”。我们很希望如此——很希望找到让我们如此强烈认同的标的，偶尔也会遇到。但我们无法像所愿那样投那么多钱，也无法像只管理一百万美元自有资金那样重仓——诸如此类。我们愿意在单一证券上投入大量资金。我管理合伙基金时，单一股票最高做到过约 40%。我想 Charlie 你当年管理合伙基金时，单一持仓超过 40%——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Sure. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：当然。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: And we would do the same thing if we were running smaller partnerships, or our own capital were smaller and we were running that ourselves. Because, no, we’re not going to do that unless we think we understand the business very well, and we think the nature of the business, what we’re paying for it, the people running it, and all of that lead up to virtually no risk, and — But you find those things, occasionally. And we would put — assuming it were that much more attractive than the second, and third, and fourth choices — we would put a big percentage of our net worth in it. We only advise you to do that — well, we probably don’t advise you to do it all, maybe — but we would only advise you to do it, if you’re doing it based on your conclusions about — your own ideas of value, and something that you really feel you know enough to buy the whole business, if your funds were sufficient, and it was being offered to you. You ought to really understand the business. But people do that all the time, incidentally, in private businesses, which have got terrible prospects.
WARREN BUFFETT：如果我们在管理更小的合伙基金，或者自有资本更小、并由我们亲自打理，我们也会这么做。因为，只有当我们非常了解一门业务，并且认为业务性质、支付的价格、管理团队等各方面综合起来几乎不构成风险时，我们才会那样重仓——而这类机会只是偶尔出现。只要它比我们的第二、第三、第四选择显著更有吸引力，我们就会把很大比例的净资产押上去。我们只会建议你在一种情况下这么做——嗯，也许我们根本不会建议你这么做——但如果要建议，那前提是：你基于自己的价值结论去行动；你真的了解得足够多——如果资金允许、且有人把整家公司报价卖给你——你愿意把整家公司买下来。你必须真正理解这门业务。顺便说一句，在私营企业领域，人们经常这么做，尽管那些生意的前景很糟糕。
I mean, they buy dry cleaning establishments, or filling stations, or whatever, and they put very high —franchises of some kind — they put a very high percentage of their net worth into something — a business that’s very risky, basically. I mean, it — People put all their money in a farm, you know. It’s a business. It’s subject to all kinds of business risk. So it’s not crazy, if you understand the business well, and if the price is sufficiently attractive, to put a very significant percentage of your net worth in. If you don’t understand businesses, then you’re better off diversifying and fairly widely diversifying. Zone — go ahead. Sorry
我的意思是，他们会买干洗店、加油站之类，或者某种特许经营，把自己很大比例的净资产押在某个项目上——而这些业务本质上风险很大。再比如把全部资金投入一个农场——那也是一门生意，同样面临各种经营风险。所以，如果你真正了解这门业务、而且价格足够有吸引力，把你净资产中相当大的一部分押进去并非疯狂之举。相反，如果你并不懂业务，那就应该分散投资，且要充分分散。分区——继续吧。抱歉。
CHARLIE: Berkshire has a substantial shareholder whose father accumulated the original position, and when he died he left a very large estate, practically all of which was in two securities, Berkshire and one other outstanding company. A bank was co-trustee. And the bank trust officer said you’ve got to diversify this. And, you know, it was a very large estate. And the young man who was co-trustee with the bank said, “Well,” he says, “you know, if my father believed the way you do, he might have been a trust officer in a bank instead of — (laughter) — leaving this large estate.” (Applause) And that young man holds the Berkshire to this day. And I suppose the bank is still giving the same advice. (Laughter)
CHARLIE：Berkshire 有一位大股东，他父亲早年建立了最初的持仓。父亲去世时留下了一个很大的遗产，几乎全部集中在两只证券上：Berkshire 和另一家非常优秀的公司。某家银行是共同受托人。银行的信托官说：必须分散投资。你要知道，那是一笔很大的遗产。与银行共同担任受托人的那位年轻人说：“嗯，”他说，“如果我父亲像你这样想，他大概会去当银行的信托官，而不是——（笑）——留下这笔巨额遗产。”（掌声）那位年轻人直到今天仍持有 Berkshire。我猜那家银行至今还在给出同样的建议。（笑）
76. We don’t like to “give you our answers” on Coca-Cola
关于 Coca-Cola 我们不喜欢“直接告诉你答案”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, this is Chuck Peterson (PH) from Omaha. And I was just wondering if you could comment on the Coca-Cola Company — you haven’t really talked about it too much today — in regards to what you foresee over the next five years, the earnings per share growth, and where this growth is, perhaps, going to come from.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 Omaha 的 Chuck Peterson（PH）。想请您谈谈 Coca-Cola Company——您今天还没怎么谈到——您对未来五年的展望、每股收益的增长，以及这些增长可能来自哪里。
WARREN BUFFETT: Was that the question, about the growth of Coke?
WARREN BUFFETT：问题是关于 Coke 的增长吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: You really have to come to your own conclusion. Coca-Cola Company writes — their annual reports are extremely good. I mean, they’re very informative. You know, you — My guess is that, at least, if you read a few of the reports, you’d absolutely know as much about the Coca-Cola Company as I would. But in the end, you have to make your own decisions about growth potential, profitability potential, and all that. But the one thing I can assure you is that, probably, if you spend a relatively small amount of time on it, the facts that you will have available to you for making a decision on that question will be just as good, essentially, as the facts you’d get if you’d worked at the Coca-Cola Company for 20 years, or if you were a food and beverage analyst in Wall Street or anything of the sort. That’s the kind of businesses we like to look at, are things that we think we can understand that way. And they’re also businesses that, usually, I think you could understand that way. But we don’t like you to give you our answers.
WARREN BUFFETT：你们确实需要自己得出结论。Coca-Cola Company 的年报写得非常好——信息量很大。我的意思是——我猜，只要你读几份年报，你对 Coca-Cola Company 的了解就完全不亚于我。但最终，你必须自己判断增长潜力、盈利能力，等等。我能确定的一点是：只要花不多的时间，你为作出判断而能获得的事实，基本上不逊于你在 Coca-Cola Company 工作 20 年，或在华尔街做食品饮料分析师所掌握的事实。我们喜欢研究的就是这类业务：用这种方式就能看懂的业务。我也认为，通常你们也能用这种方式看懂。但我们不喜欢把我们的答案直接告诉你们。
I mean, that would not be a good idea.
我的意思是，那可不是个好主意。
77. Allianz deal was “close to a wash”
与 Allianz 的交易“基本扯平”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: David — I’m sorry — David Swab (PH) from Austin, Texas. I have a question pertaining to the convertible bonds that were outstanding for about four years. Any thoughts on, if you’re a teacher, to grade if that was a good deal, bad deal, how the money was employed compared to the cost of getting out of the bonds? Any thoughts?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：David——抱歉——我是来自 Austin, Texas 的 David Swab（PH）。我想问一下那笔大约存续了四年的可转债。若您是一位老师，会如何打分：这是一笔好交易还是坏交易？募集的资金与赎回成本相比，使用效果如何？有什么看法吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie what? Did you get that?
WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie，什么？你听清了吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: He wants to know if you think, in retrospect, your deal with Allianz was a good deal for Berkshire.
CHARLIE MUNGER：他想知道，回头看，你和 Allianz 的那笔交易对 Berkshire 来说是不是一笔好交易。
WARREN BUFFETT: No, I would say that if I knew everything at the time that we did the Allianz deal — which was a convertible shareholder coupon debenture — if I knew everything now — then — that I know now, would we have done it? Probably pretty close. We had relatively few bonds converted when we called — when he called them. And so — that — it really wasn’t a negative in that sense. But if we’d had more — we could have easily had a lot more converted. And that would not have been so good, obviously, if we’d ended up selling a lot of stock at 11,800 or whatever it was. It’s very hard to measure exactly what we did with the 400 million or so that we took in at the time. So, money being fungible, separating that 400 million from other resources to measure the — what happened on the plus side from having the money — is hard to do. But my guess is, if you could play the whole hand over again, it probably was maybe a tiny minus to have issued them. What do you think, Charlie?
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我会说，如果在与 Allianz 达成那笔交易（那是一笔可转换的“shareholder coupon debenture”）时，我们就知道后来所知道的一切——我们还会不会做？大概差不多会做。我们在（对方）被赎回时，转股的债券相对较少，所以就那方面并不算负面。但如果转股更多——其实很容易就会更多——那显然就不妙了，因为我们可能要在 11,800 之类的价位卖出大量股票。至于当时拿到的大约 4 亿美元，我们具体把它用于什么、带来了什么增量收益，其实很难精确评估。资金是可替代的，要把那 4 亿与其他资金剥离开来、单独衡量“因这笔钱而带来的收益”，并不容易。但我猜，如果可以重来一遍，发行它们可能是略微的负面。你怎么看，Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s certainly close to a wash.
CHARLIE MUNGER：总体上看基本扯平。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Now, you could ask about USAir, and that is one we would have been well to duck. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：当然，你也可以问问 USAir——那一笔我们本该躲开的。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: And I might say Charlie had nothing to do with that decision. (Laughter) He didn’t even know about it till I did it. And when he knew about it, hmmm. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：我得补充一句，Charlie 和那个决策毫无关系。（笑）我做了之后他才知道——而当他知道时，嗯哼。（笑）
78. “Size is a disadvantage” in buying and selling
买卖中“规模是一种劣势”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Joe Sirdevan from Toronto. With respect to Berkshire’s non-permanent, but large — and therefore, illiquid — holdings, what is your strategy for managing market impact on sales, given the intense scrutiny that Berkshire’s under by the market?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 Toronto 的 Joe Sirdevan。关于 Berkshire 那些非永久性但规模很大——因此流动性较差——的持仓，在市场对 Berkshire 高度关注的情况下，你们在决定减持这些头寸时，如何管理抛售对市场的冲击？
WARREN BUFFETT: I didn’t get that either. You get that?
WARREN BUFFETT：我也没太听清。你听明白了吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I’m not hearing that very well.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我听得不是很清楚。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I don’t know whether you’re too close to the mic — we’re having a little trouble on that.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我不确定是不是你离麦太近——我们这边听起来有点问题。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Speak a little more slowly.
CHARLIE MUNGER：请说慢一点。
WARREN BUFFETT: Or maybe the monitor can repeat that and — would you repeat the question?
WARREN BUFFETT：或者请场控重复一下——请你再把问题说一遍？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sorry. Just with respect to Berkshire’s large non-permanent holdings that are, therefore, illiquid, I’m just wondering what your strategy is for managing market impact when you do decide to sell portions of those holdings, given the intense scrutiny you’re under?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：抱歉。就是针对 Berkshire 那些规模很大、因此流动性较差且并非永久持有的头寸，在你们决定减持其中一部分时，面对外界对你们的高度关注，你们如何管理对市场的冲击？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, question about the things we might sell, and what’s going to happen to the market when we sell them. That depends. I mean, it can be a very significant impact. It can be a negligible impact. And it depends on market conditions, it depends on whether we might sell in a couple of large blocks to some institutions, it depends on — it could be, you know, there could be a tender off or something of the sort we would sell through. So, it’s hard to measure. But it is a disadvantage. Size is a disadvantage, you’re absolutely correct in the basic point, both in buying and in selling. And we don’t know any way around that. We allow for it, in terms of what we expect, you know, the kind of possibilities we need to see. And we do — we sell so infrequently, that it’s not a crusher of a negative point, but it’s a negative we have that you do not.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，你的问题是关于我们可能卖出的持仓，以及我们卖出时市场会发生什么。这要看情况。有时影响会很大，有时可以忽略。这取决于市场状况，也取决于我们是否会以一两笔大宗交易卖给机构；还取决于——比如是否会通过要约收购之类的渠道卖出。所以很难精确衡量。但这确实是一种劣势。规模是一种劣势——你在基本判断上完全正确——无论在买还是在卖上如此。我们没有什么办法绕开它。我们在预期中会把这一点算进去，也就是我们需要看到怎样的可能性。再者，我们卖得极少，因此这点负面不会“压垮”我们，但它确实是我们有而你们没有的一个负面因素。
79. No key man insurance for Buffett and Munger
Buffett 和 Munger 没有“关键人物保险”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Anna (inaudible). I’m from Roanoke, Virginia. Does Berkshire Hathaway or any of its subsidiaries have key man insurance on you and Mr. Munger?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我叫 Anna（听不清），来自 Roanoke, Virginia。Berkshire Hathaway 或其任何子公司是否为您和 Munger 先生投保了关键人物保险（key man insurance）？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Does Berkshire have key man insurance on —
CHARLIE MUNGER：Berkshire 是否为——投保了关键人物保险？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, no. No. We have no life insurance, to my knowledge, on anyone except the maybe standard — the group life contracts people have. We have no key man insurance. It really doesn’t — it wouldn’t be material. I mean, that if we have a market value of 18 billion or something like that, if it really didn’t — if it — a one — if it made a 1 percent difference, it’d be $180 million. And basically, the math of intelligently selling insurance is better than the math of intelligently buying insurance. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，没有。没有。据我所知，除了也许是标准配置——员工团体人寿保险之外，我们并没有为任何人投保寿险。我们没有关键人物保险。这并不——这不会是个实质性因素。我的意思是，如果我们的市值是 180 亿美元左右，即便——哪怕——产生 1% 的影响，也不过 1.8 亿美元。而从根本上讲，“聪明地卖保险”的数学要优于“聪明地买保险”的数学。（笑与掌声）
80. Guinness-VNMH restructuring was “logical”
Guinness-VNMH 重组是“合乎逻辑的”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I’m Barry Siskind (PH) from Mesa, Arizona. Long-time admirer of yours. Question pertains to Guinness. I remember reading in a publication I greatly respect, Outstanding Investor Digest by [editor] Henry Emerson in New York, that back in — I think it was ’58 or ’59, you made an investment in Cuba, decided to never to make an investment outside the United States again at that time. Have subsequently invested in Guinness. I’m a fellow investor in Guinness. I’ve invested in Guinness for — and its sister company, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy — for over five years. And I’m very happy with those investments, by the way. There’s been a restructuring, as you know, of the Guinness-LVMH relationship, where Guinness no longer owns 24 percent of LVMH. Rather, it owns only its distilling, or I should say, alcoholic beverage-related businesses —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Buffett 先生，我是来自 Mesa, Arizona 的 Barry Siskind（PH），仰慕您已久。问题与 Guinness 有关。我记得在我非常尊敬的刊物《Outstanding Investor Digest》（New York 的编辑是 Henry Emerson）上读到过，早在——我想是 1958 或 1959 年——您曾在 Cuba 投资，并当时决定此后不再在 United States 之外投资。后来您又投资了 Guinness。我也是 Guinness 的投资者。我持有 Guinness——以及其姐妹公司 Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy——已超过五年，对这些投资非常满意。正如您所知，Guinness 与 LVMH 的关系经历了重组，Guinness 不再持有 LVMH 24% 的股份，而是仅持有其蒸馏业务，或者说，酒类相关业务——
WARREN BUFFETT: The Moët Hennessy part.
WARREN BUFFETT：就是 Moët Hennessy 那部分。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right, the Moët Hennessy part. The other parts of LVMH are showing better results these days, namely the Louis Vuitton luggage, as well as the Christian Dior perfume. They’ve also expanded into the newspaper business this past year, a business that you understand. Do you intend to look at the possibility, first of all, of participating in those businesses that you no longer own now — with the restructured Guinness-LVMH deal — through some other form? And the second question relates to the currency risk inherent in the Guinness investment, having bought it at about $1.80, as you mentioned, pound sterling now down to about $1.48. The cost of hedging foreign currency through the FX has diminished through the combination of lower interest rates in the U.K., and higher interest rates, most recently in the U.S., to just about zero. I take it we’re all investors in companies, not speculators in currencies. So, the second part of the question is, do you intend to do anything about the currency risk portion of that investment?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：对，Moët Hennessy 那部分。LVMH 的其他业务近来表现更好，尤其是 Louis Vuitton 行李箱和 Christian Dior 香水。他们去年还扩张进入报业，这是您熟悉的行业。首先，您是否打算通过其他方式参与那些在 Guinness-LVMH 重组后你们已不再持有的业务？第二个问题与 Guinness 投资中的汇率风险有关：正如您提到的，买入时汇率大约是 1 美元兑 1.80 英镑，现在英镑跌到约 1.48。由于 U.K. 降息与 U.S. 近期加息的组合，通过 FX 对冲外汇的成本几乎降到零。我理解我们都是投资公司而非投机汇率的人。那么，关于这笔投资的汇率风险部分，您是否打算采取任何措施？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well LVMH, which as you mentioned was 24 percent owned by Guinness — you know, that’s one of thousands of securities that we could be a buyer or a seller of. So, I really don’t want to comment on LVMH’s specific attractiveness, or lack thereof. And Guinness, I think what Guinness did was quite logical. I mean, their interest in that operation was basically through the distribution advantages that it gave to Guinness’s own brands around the world, to be hooked up with Moët Hennessy, and vice versa. So, I think what they did was logical. You can — the question of the exchange rate and all of that — the exchange rate, in terms of what they got in the spirits business, versus what they gave up in the luggage business, as in Christian Dior and a few things. You can form your own opinion on that. But I think the logic was sound. But in terms of whether we want to be in LVMH by itself, that’s like any other security, which we really can’t answer.
WARREN BUFFETT：至于 LVMH，正如你所说，过去 Guinness 持有其 24% 的股份——那只是成千上万只我们可能买卖的证券之一。因此我不想评价 LVMH 的“特别吸引力”或“不吸引力”。关于 Guinness，我认为他们所做的事相当合乎逻辑。也就是说，他们与 Moët Hennessy 互相“绑定”，主要是看中它为 Guinness 自有品牌在全球带来的分销优势，反之亦然。所以我认为他们的做法合乎逻辑。至于汇率问题——用汇率来衡量他们在烈酒业务中获得的，与在行李箱（如 Christian Dior 等业务）中让渡掉的，你可以形成自己的看法。但在我看来，其逻辑是站得住脚的。至于我们是否会单独持有 LVMH，那就和其他任何证券一样，属于我们无法回答的问题。
81. Berkshire doesn’t hedge currencies
Berkshire 不对冲货币
WARREN BUFFETT: Second question related to —
WARREN BUFFETT：第二个问题与——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Hedging.
CHARLIE MUNGER：对冲。
WARREN BUFFETT: Hedge. Yeah, the hedging of currency —
WARREN BUFFETT：对冲。是的，关于货币对冲——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Do we hedge?
CHARLIE MUNGER：我们会对冲吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: The answer to that is we don’t. And Coca-Cola, as I mentioned, gets 80 percent of their earnings from a variety of currencies, the yen and the mark being two very important ones. They’re going to be getting a very high percentage five years from now, 10 years from now. They do certain currency transactions, but it’s a practical matter. If you own Coca-Cola, you own a bunch of foreign bonds with coupons on them, denominated in local currencies, that go on forever. Now, should you try and engage in currency swaps on all those coupons — you don’t know what those coupons are yet, because you don’t know how much they’re going to earn in Japan or Germany, but you do know it’s going to go on for decades, and it’s — they’re going to be very significant sums. Should you try and engage in a whole bunch of currency swaps to go on out and convert all that stream into dollars or anything? We basically don’t think it’s worth it. We don’t think our opinion on currencies is any good.
WARREN BUFFETT：答案是，我们不会。而且正如我提到的，Coca-Cola 的盈利有 80% 来自多种货币，其中日元和马克非常重要。五年、十年后，这个比例仍会很高。他们会做一些实务层面的外汇交易，但打个比方：如果你持有 Coca-Cola，其实就像持有一摞以各地“本币”计息、且“永续”付息的海外债券。那你应该试图把所有这些“票息”都做货币互换吗——你甚至还不知道这些票息是多少，因为你不知道他们在日本或德国具体会赚多少，但你知道这会持续数十年，金额也会相当可观。你要不要做一大堆互换，把这整条现金流全换成美元之类？我们的基本看法是“划不来”。我们不认为自己对汇率的判断有任何优势。
We don’t think — we think the market probably know — well, we know it knows as much about it — it probably knows more about currencies, but it — we don’t know — we do not know more than the market does about currencies. So there are costs to hedging. And even though interest rate structures may cause the curve to look flat going out forward, so that, in effect, there’s no contango on it, there’s still the cost — there are costs in it. Now, it’s a relatively efficient market, so that they’re not huge. But we see no reason to incur those costs with what we regard as a — totally, a 50-50 proposition. And it really doesn’t go out that far anyway. I mean, we could do it for a couple of years. But if you take that — the way we look at businesses, being the discounted flow of future cash out between now and Judgment Day, we can’t really hedge that kind of a risk anyway. We could keep rolling hedges, but there’s a cost to it that we don’t want to incur.
我们不认为——我们觉得市场大概更懂汇率——至少和我们一样懂，甚至更懂；反正我们并不比市场更懂汇率。因此，对冲是有成本的。即便利率结构让远期曲线看起来很平（实际等于没有“contango”），也仍然存在成本。外汇市场相对有效，所以这些成本不算巨大，但既然我们把汇率视为“完全五五开的命题”，就没有理由去付这笔成本。而且这些对冲也做不了多远——我们可以做一两年；但以我们看企业的方式——把“从现在到最后审判之日（Judgment Day）”的未来现金流折现——这种风险根本无法真正对冲。你可以不停“滚动对冲”，但那会产生我们不愿意承担的成本。
We don’t — we wouldn’t worry a whole lot about whether some portion of our earnings, whether it’s from Guinness, whether it’s from Coke, whether it’s from Gillette, are denominated at some mixture of marks, and pounds, and yen, and dollars, or whether they’re all in dollars. We’d slightly prefer if it were all in dollars, but we don’t lose sleep over the fact that it may be coming from a mix of currencies like that. We wouldn’t like it, in terms of, obviously, some very weak currencies.
我们不——我们不会过分在意我们的部分利润——无论来自 Guinness、Coke 还是 Gillette——是以马克、英镑、日元与美元的某种组合计价，还是全部以美元计价。我们略微更偏好“全部美元”，但对“多币种组合”的事实并不会寝食不安。显然，如果涉及一些非常疲弱的货币，我们就不会喜欢了。
82. Insurance intrinsic value far exceeds book value
保险业务的内在价值远高于账面价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Lawrence Grawning (PH), Mill Valley, California. On page 13 of the annual report, in — talking about the insurance operation, you say that it possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a “large amount — larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.” To refine an earlier question that was asked, could you tell me whether you mean that it is larger in — by a percentage or in absolute dollars, that is —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 Lawrence Grawning（PH），来自 Mill Valley, California。在年报第 13 页谈到保险业务时，您说它的内在价值较账面价值有“大幅度”超出，“事实上高于 Berkshire 其他任何业务的情况”。我想细化之前的问题：这个“更大”指的是“百分比更大”，还是“绝对金额更大”？
WARREN BUFFETT: By absolute dollars. And —
WARREN BUFFETT：按绝对金额算。并且——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That’s what you’re referring to?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：您指的是这个？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, by absolute — it’s very hard to stick a percentage figure on the insurance business, because we have so much capital in there that — And then — and we have other businesses. I think that the — we’ve got businesses with a book value of in the tens of millions that are worth in the many hundreds of millions. So, you couldn’t apply that to the insurance company (Inaudible). So, it’s absolute dollars. But in terms of absolute dollars, we think the excess of intrinsic value over carrying value — at least I do — is substantially greater for the insurance business than any other business we own. Charlie, do you have any —
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，按绝对金额——很难给保险业务贴上一个“百分比”的标签，因为我们在那里面投入的资本很多——另外我们还有其他业务。比如，我们有些业务的账面价值只有几千万，但实际价值达数亿美元。所以这种“百分比”的说法并不适用于保险公司（听不清）。因此是按绝对金额来衡量。从绝对金额看，我认为——至少我认为——保险业务“内在价值—账面价值”的超额显著高于我们拥有的其他任何业务。Charlie，你有——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No —
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有——
WARREN BUFFETT: — thoughts on that?
WARREN BUFFETT：——什么看法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: — that’s exactly right.
CHARLIE MUNGER：——完全正确。
83. No concerns on Coca-Cola succession
对 Coca-Cola 接班问题不担心
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Joe Little (PH), Vancouver, Canada. Does the management succession issue for the top job at Coca-Cola concern you?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Joe Little（PH），Vancouver, Canada。Coca-Cola 最高管理职位的接班问题，会让您担心吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Management picture, you’d do what with the —?
WARREN BUFFETT：管理层的情况，你是想——？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The management succession issue over the next several years.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：未来几年管理层接班的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，是的。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The top job. Does that concern you?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：最高职位。您担心吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: At Coca-Cola —
WARREN BUFFETT：在 Coca-Cola——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：是的。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think any announcement that — from that would come with — from CocaCola.
WARREN BUFFETT：我想任何相关公告——都会由 Coca-Cola 自己发布。
CHARLIE MUNGER: He said do you like it?
CHARLIE MUNGER：他的意思是你是否满意？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Does it concern you?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：它会让您担心吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Does it concern you?
CHARLIE MUNGER：会让您担心吗？
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, I’m not concerned at all, no. No, Coca-Cola is very well managed. (Laughs)
WARREN BUFFETT：哦，我一点也不担心。不，Coca-Cola 的管理非常好。（笑）
84. Salomon CEO’s $24M bonus target “hellishly hard to hit”
Salomon CEO 2400 万美元奖金目标“极难达成”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chris Stavrou (PH) from New York. According to the latest Salomon Brothers proxy, if [Chairman and CEO] Deryck [Maughan] earns 30 percent on allocated equity of Salomon Brothers, provided that that’s at least 10 percent above the return for competitors, he could earn a bonus of $24 million. My question is whether that return number is reduced by a charge for preferred dividends?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：Chris Stavrou（PH），来自 New York。根据最新的 Salomon Brothers 代理文件，如果（董事长兼 CEO）Deryck（Maughan）在分配到 Salomon Brothers 的权益上取得 30% 的回报，且至少比竞争对手高出 10%，他可获得 2400 万美元的奖金。我的问题是，这个回报数据是否在计算时扣除了优先股股息？
WARREN BUFFETT: I, Charlie, do you remember on the comp committee —?
WARREN BUFFETT：我——Charlie，你还记得薪酬委员会上——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I can’t remember the detail on that.
CHARLIE MUNGER：我记不清细节了。
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the equity — I — my — I’m fairly sure, but I’m not positive, that the equity figure would include our preferred, but not non-convertible preferreds. And it would apply to the earnings applicable to the — to our preferred plus common, but not — but it would be after dividends on non-convertible preferred. But I, you know, I’m not on the comp committee, and I have not read the description that carefully.
WARREN BUFFETT：我觉得权益——我——我基本确定（但不敢百分百肯定），该“权益”口径会包括我们的可转换优先股，但不包括不可转换优先股；对应收益应当是“归属于我们的优先股加普通股”的收益，但会在扣除不可转换优先股股息之后。不过你知道，我不在薪酬委员会，也没有那么仔细地读相关描述。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I am, and I can’t remember. (Laughter) But I will tell you, one thing I do remember about that, and that is a target which would be one — would be hellishly hard to hit.
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我在，但我也记不得了。（笑）不过有一点我记得很清楚：那个目标——极其难以达成。
WARREN BUFFETT: It’d be unbelievable. I mean —
WARREN BUFFETT：那将是不可思议的。我的意思是——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That’s is, you’re talking about Babe Ruth —
CHARLIE MUNGER：也就是，你在谈论 Babe Ruth——
WARREN BUFFETT: Squared.
WARREN BUFFETT：的平方。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, doing 150 home runs in a season instead of a — if that happens, you’ll be very glad to pay the money. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：对，一季打出 150 支本垒打而不是——如果真那样，你会很乐意付这笔钱的。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Very. Under either calculation, yeah. It really — but it, you know, I’m glad it’s there. (Laughs) I hope Deryck’s paying attention to it.
WARREN BUFFETT：非常乐意。无论按哪种口径都是如此。实际上——不过你知道，我很高兴有这个条款。（笑）我希望 Deryck 正在认真盯着它。
85. Salomon is a “better company than it was some years back”
Salomon 比“若干年前”更好的一家公司
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I’m Chris Davis again, from New York. I wanted to ask if you — I feel there’s such a huge discrepancy between the valuation of some of your holdings versus others, in terms of the market valuation, in terms of price-to-earnings, price-to-book. In your opinion, do the growth prospects of Salomon Brothers, or the quality — or your anticipation of your ability to clip the coupons at Salomon Brothers — justify such a dramatic discount to the growth prospects of Coca-Cola or Gillette, in terms of our ability as Berkshire shareholders to clip those coupons? And if you could explain, or perhaps share your thoughts on why the market perception, if it is — justifies that distinction?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：你好，我是来自 New York 的 Chris Davis，又见面了。我想请问：我感觉你们的一些持仓与另一些持仓在市场定价上有很大差异，比如市值、按市盈率（P/E）、市净率（P/B）来看都有明显差距。在您看来，Salomon Brothers 的成长前景、或其资产质量——或者说，您对在 Salomon Brothers “剪息票”（持续收取现金回报）能力的预期——是否能合理解释它相对于 Coca-Cola 或 Gillette 成长预期所体现出的巨大折价？以及，若市场确实如此看待，您能否解释或分享一下，为什么这种市场认知（如果属实）在您看来是合理的？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’m not sure I can answer that question without getting into a discussion of the relative merits of the two companies — or the three companies — you mentioned, at these prices, but — Salomon and Coca-Cola are obviously very different kinds of businesses, or Salomon and Gillette. And Charlie and I do our best to try to understand the businesses. Obviously, it’s easier to understand the future of a Coca-Cola than it is a Salomon. But that doesn’t mean it’s a better buy. And what you see at any given time in our holdings is partly the historical accident, even, of when we bought, and when we had money available, and all that. But it reflected an affirmative decision at that point, obviously. Our guess would be that the — you know, we would feel reasonably good about anything that we owned, in terms of the price at which we bought it, and the facts at the time we bought it. And the facts change over time. Salomon, I think, is a better company now than it was some years back.
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，如果不触及你提到的两三家公司的相对优劣（且是按当前价格看），我不确定能完全回答。但 Salomon 与 Coca-Cola 显然是截然不同的业务，Salomon 与 Gillette 也是。Charlie 和我会尽最大努力去理解所投的业务。显而易见，相比 Salomon，更容易看懂 Coca-Cola 的长期未来，但这并不等于它就是更划算的买卖。你在任何时点看到的我们的持仓组合，部分也包含“历史偶然因素”——例如我们买入的时点、当时手头资金的可用性，等等；但当时显然都反映了我们的正面决策。我们的判断是：就买入价格与当时事实背景而言，我们对所持任何资产基本都感到满意。而事实会随时间变化。我认为，Salomon 现在确实比若干年前是一家更好的公司。
But it’s still in a business that’s — can be very volatile, and it has a small amount — as does any investment banking firm and as any commercial banking firm — of systemic risk. I mean, you can’t get rid of that. Charlie, you want to?
不过，它所处的业务——波动性仍可能很大，而且与任何投资银行、商业银行一样，存在一定程度的系统性风险。这一点无法消除。Charlie，你要补充吗？
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I’ve got nothing to add.
CHARLIE MUNGER：没有可补充的。
86. Calculating intrinsic value
计算内在价值
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. Sean Barry, Regina, Canada. Mr. Buffett, you’ve indicated that most of us in this room could acquire a lot of the information that you and Charlie acquire through the annual reports. Yet you both also indicated that the GAAP rules, a lot of times, leave a little to be desired. Could you perhaps give an indication as to how you and Charlie come up with the economic value, or the intrinsic value, of the businesses that you finally decide to invest in? And a little bit about the process that you go through with that? Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：谢谢。Sean Barry，Regina，Canada。Buffett 先生，您提到我们在座的大多数人都可以通过年报获取到您和 Charlie 获取的很多信息。同时你们也多次指出 GAAP 规则在很多时候并不尽如人意。您能否解释一下，您和 Charlie 是如何得出你们最终决定投资的那些企业的 economic value 或 intrinsic value？以及你们为此所采用的大致流程？谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the — in the 1992 annual report, we discuss that a fair amount. But the economic value of any asset, essentially, is the present value, the appropriate interest rate, of all the future streams of cash going in or out of the business. And there are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don’t think we have the faintest idea what that future stream will look like. And if we don’t have the faintest idea what the future stream is going to look like, we don’t have the faintest idea what it’s worth, now. Now that — So, if you think you know what the price of a stock should be today, but you don’t think you have any idea what the stream of cash will be over the next 20 years, you’ve got cognitive dissonance, I guess, is what they call it. (Laughter) The — So we are looking for things where we feel — fairly high degree of probability — that we can come within a range of looking at those numbers out over a period of time, and then we discount them back.
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯——我们在 1992 年的年报里已经相当详细地讨论过这个问题。但任何资产的 economic value，本质上就是以“适当利率”折现的、该企业未来所有现金流入或流出的现值。对于很多类型的企业，Charlie 和我觉得我们连“未来现金流大致长什么样”都不敢说有把握。而如果我们连“未来现金流的样子”都没有一点把握，那我们现在也就对“它值多少钱”没有一点把握。也就是说——如果你自以为知道今天这只股票应该值多少钱，却又承认你对未来 20 年的现金流毫无概念，那么你就处在所谓“认知失调”（笑）。所以我们要寻找的是：在“相当高的概率”下，我们能够对未来一段时期的这些数字估出一个合理区间，然后把它们折现回来。
And we are more concerned with the certainty of those numbers than we are with getting the one that looks absolutely the cheapest, but based upon numbers that we don’t have any — we don’t have great confidence in. And that’s basically what economic value is all about. The numbers in any accounting report mean nothing, per se, as to economic value. They are guidelines to tell you something about how to get at economic value. But they don’t tell you anything. It — there are no answers in the financial statements. There are guidelines to enable you to figure out the answer. And to figure out that answer, you have to understand something about business. You don’t have to understand a lot about mathematics. I mean, the math is not complicated. But you do have to understand something about the business. But that’s the same thing you would do if you were going to buy an apartment house, or a farm, or any other small business you might be interested in. You would try to figure out what you are laying out currently, and what you are likely to get back over time, and how certain you felt about getting it, and how it compared to other alternatives.
我们比起去找“看起来最便宜、但建立在我们并不自信的数字之上”的标的，更在意这些数字的确定性——这基本就是 economic value 的全部。任何会计报表里的数字，本身并不能告诉你经济价值；它们只是“指引”，帮助你如何靠近经济价值；但它们“本身”并不给出答案。财务报表里没有答案，只有帮助你“自己算出答案”的指引。要算出那个答案，你得理解一些“生意经”；你不需要太多数学（数学并不复杂），但你确实需要理解“这门生意”。这和你要买一栋公寓楼、一座农场或任何一家小企业时的做法一样：你要弄清现在投入多少、未来大致能拿回多少、你对拿回来的确定性感到多大把握，以及和其他可选项相比如何。
That’s all we do, we just do it with large businesses, basically. The accounting figures are very helpful to us, in the sense that they generally guide us to what we should be thinking about. And of course, if we find numbers where it looks like people are taking the most optimistic interpretation of things that they can under GAAP and all of that, we get very worried about people who look like they massage the numbers in any way. And there are plenty of people that do.
我们所做的也就这些，只不过对象基本上是“大企业”。会计数字对我们很有帮助，因为它们通常会“指引我们该想些什么”。当然，如果我们发现某些数字看起来是在 GAAP 允许范围内用了“最乐观的解读”，我们就会对这些“任何方式都要美化数字”的人高度警惕——这样的人并不少见。
87. Growth alone doesn’t make a company a good investment
仅有增长并不能让一家公司成为好投资
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 3?
WARREN BUFFETT：三区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Howard Bask (PH). I’m from Kansas City. When you are estimating a growth rate on a company (inaudible), a very predictable company, I imagine you apply a big margin of safety to it. What kind of rate do you generally apply? I mean, high single digits?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是 Howard Bask（PH），来自 Kansas City。当你们为一家（听不清）非常可预测的公司估算增长率时，我想你们会留出较大的安全边际。一般会用什么样的增长率？比如，高个位数（%）？
WARREN BUFFETT: In the margin of safety, or —
WARREN BUFFETT：你是指安全边际，还是——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What kind of growth rate would you, on a predictable company, might you —
AUDIENCE MEMBER：在一家公司很可预测的情况下，你们会采用怎样的增长率——
WARREN BUFFETT: We are willing to —
WARREN BUFFETT：我们甚至愿意——
AUDIENCE MEMBER: — stab at?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：——去估算？
WARREN BUFFETT: — buy companies that aren’t going to grow at all.
WARREN BUFFETT：——买那些完全不增长的公司。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.
AUDIENCE MEMBER：好。
WARREN BUFFETT: It — assuming we get enough for our money when we do it. So, it — we are not looking — we are looking at projecting numbers out, as to what kind of cash we think we’ll get back over time. But you know, would you rather have a savings — if you’re going to put a million dollars in a savings account, would you rather have something that paid you 10 percent a year and never changed, or would you rather have something that paid you 2 percent a year and increased at 10 percent a year? Well, you can work out the math to answer those questions. But you can certainly have a situation where there’s absolutely no growth in the business, and it’s a much better investment than some company that’s going to grow at very substantial rates, particularly if they’re going to need capital in order to grow. There’s a huge difference in the business that grows and requires a lot of capital to do so, and the business that grows, and doesn’t require capital. And I would say that, generally, financial analysts do not give adequate weight to the difference in those.
WARREN BUFFETT：当然，前提是我们付出的钱“物有所值”。我们关注的不是“去找增长”，而是把数字往前推，看长期能回收多少现金。打个比方：如果你要把 100 万美元存进一个账户，你更愿意每年固定拿 10% 且永不变化，还是每年拿 2% 但这个 2% 会以每年 10% 递增？这些可以用数学算出来。但现实中，完全没有增长的生意，完全可能比一家高增长公司更好的投资——尤其当后者为了增长需要大量资本时。“需要大量资本才能增长”的生意，与“增长却几乎不需要资本”的生意，两者差别巨大。而我认为，普遍来说，金融分析师并没有充分重视这一区别。
In fact, it’s amazing how little attention is paid to that. Believe me, if you’re investing, you should pay a lot of attention to it. Charlie?
事实上，人们对这点关注之少令人吃惊。相信我，如果你在投资，你应当高度重视它。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I agree with that. But it’s fairly simple, but it’s not so simple it can all be explained in one sentence. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我同意。道理相对简单，但还不到“用一句话就能解释清楚”的程度。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Our — some of our best businesses that we own outright don’t grow. But they throw off lots of money, which we can use to buy something else. And therefore, our capital is growing, without physical growth being in the business. And we are much better off being in that kind of situation [than] being in some business that, itself, is growing, but that takes up all the money in order to grow, and doesn’t produce at high returns as we go along. A lot of managements don’t understand that very well, actually.
WARREN BUFFETT：我们全资拥有的一些“最棒的生意”并不增长，但它们源源不断地吐现，让我们去买别的东西。于是我们的资本在增长，尽管这些生意本身并无“物理上的扩张”。与其去做那些“自身在成长、却把所有资金都吃进去、且回报并不高”的业务，我们处在这种“不增长但大量吐现”的局面要好得多。事实上，很多管理层并不真正理解这一点。
88. Capital allocation shouldn’t be delegated
资本配置不应被授权他人代为决策
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 1?
WARREN BUFFETT：一区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Byron Wien from New York. You said that you decentralized the operating decisions, but centralized the capital allocation decisions. What kind of staff do you have in Omaha to help you with the capital allocation decisions and the stock selection decisions you make? Or do you and Charlie do that, pretty much, by yourselves?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：我是来自 New York 的 Byron Wien。您说你们在经营决策上去中心化，但在资本配置决策上高度集中。那么在 Omaha，你们有什么样的团队来协助做资本配置与选股决策？还是基本上由您和 Charlie 两个人亲自完成？
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don’t have any staff to help us on it. I mean, basically we tell them to mail all the money to Omaha — (laughter) — and then when we get there, we put our arms around it. (Laughs) And we allocate all the capital ourselves. I mean, that is our job. And we don’t feel we should delegate, I mean, we wouldn’t do it anyway. Our personalities aren’t such that we would delegate our — allocating our own money to someone — letting somebody else allocate our own money. But we feel that’s our job. And it’s interesting, and we’ve — I’ve written about this in the past — that that’s an important job for most managements. There’s some companies where it’s not, but it’s a — it usually is a very important job for most managements.
WARREN BUFFETT：对，我们没有任何团队来帮这件事。基本上，我们只需要告诉大家把钱都寄到 Omaha——（笑）——等钱到了，我们就把它们“紧紧抱住”。（笑）然后所有资本都由我们亲自配置。那是我们的工作。我们不认为应该把这事授权出去，事实上我们也不会那么做。我们的性格也不是那种会把“分配自己资金”的权力交给别人的人。我们认为这是我们的职责。有意思的是——我以前也写过——对大多数管理层而言，这是一项极其重要的工作。虽然对某些公司不一定如此，但对大多数公司，这通常都是非常重要的工作。
And if you take a CEO that’s in a job for 10 years, and he has a business that earns, say, 12 percent on equity, and he’s — and he pays out a third, that means he’s got 8 percent per year of equity. I mean, when you think of his tenure in office, how much capital he’s allocated, it’s an enormous factor over time. And yet, probably relatively few chief executives are either trained for, or are selected on, the basis of their ability to allocate capital. I mean, they get there through other routes. So, I’ve said it’s like somebody playing the piano all their life, and then getting to Carnegie Hall and they hand him a violin. I mean, it is a different function than most — than the route — than the functions that exist along the routes to the CEO’s job at most companies. And so many CEOs, when they get there, think they can solve it by either having a staff that does it, or by hiring consultants, or whatever it may be.
再想想一个任期 10 年的 CEO，如果他的企业股东权益回报率是 12%，每年分红三分之一，也就意味着每年有 8% 的权益留存。把任期拉长来看，他需要配置的资本量非常可观。然而，真正接受过“资本配置”训练、或以“资本配置能力”为选拔标准而走上 CEO 岗位的人，恐怕并不多——大多是通过其他路径上位。因此我说，这好比一个人一辈子练的是钢琴，结果到了 Carnegie Hall 却被递上一把小提琴。资本配置与多数人成为 CEO 的成长路径上那些职能，是完全不同的。而很多 CEO 上任后以为可以靠一个幕僚团队、或请咨询公司，就能把这事解决掉。
And in our view, that is — and that’s a terrible mistake, because it’s — it is, if not the key function of the CEO, it’s one of two or three key functions at say 80 or 90 percent of all companies. And if you can’t do it yourself, you’re going to make a lot of mistakes. You may make a lot of mistakes even if you do it yourself. But if you — You know, you wouldn’t want anybody in any other position of that importance in the company essentially saying, “I don’t know how to do this, so I’m going to have somebody else do it,” when it’s their key responsibility. But that’s the way it works in business. And Charlie and I take responsibility for all capital allocation decisions, other than just, sort of, routine expenditures at the operating businesses. And we don’t get into those at all. I mean, if our managers are spending three or four million dollars a year on machinery — or if one of them is, I mean — on machinery, equipment, plants, new leases — we have no review process on that.
在我们看来，这是——而且是个严重错误。因为在 80%—90% 的公司里，资本配置要么就是 CEO 的核心职能，要么至少是两三项核心职能之一。如果你自己不会做，就会犯很多错；即便你亲自做，也可能犯错。但你懂的，你不会希望公司里任何同等重要岗位的人说：“我不会做这件事，所以交给别人干吧”，而这恰恰是他的关键职责。可现实中的企业常常如此。除了各经营单位的日常性开支外，所有资本配置决策都由我和 Charlie 负责；那些日常开支我们完全不插手。比如我们的经理人每年花三四百万美元买机器、设备、厂房、签新租约——我们没有任何“总部审批流程”。
We don’t have a staff at headquarters. We don’t waste the time to do that. We think those people know how to allocate the money that relates to the actual operations of their business. We think, in terms of the capital that is generated above that, that that’s our job. Charlie, anything —?
我们总部没有“人员编制”。我们不会把时间浪费在那上面。我们认为一线经理最懂如何配置与其实际运营相关的资金。至于超出运营所需之外生成的资本，那就是我们的工作。Charlie，你要补充点——？
CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say we have practically nobody at headquarters in Omaha. One of the reasons Warren shines up so well is, you know, he’s being compared to practically nobody. (Laughter)
CHARLIE MUNGER：我会说，我们在 Omaha 的总部几乎没人。Warren 看起来格外出色的原因之一是，你知道，他的“对比参照物”几乎为零。（笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I might say if — one interesting — when we’re having this meeting, for example, I think there’s one person there in the office. I mean, the rest of them are down here helping on the meeting. I mean, it —
WARREN BUFFETT：我还得说件有意思的事——就拿这次年会来说，我想办公室里大概只剩一个人，其余的人都在会场这边张罗年会。也就是说——
CHARLIE MUNGER: Here we are, Warren and I are selling candy and encyclopedias, and so forth. The chief financial officer of Berkshire Hathaway is handling the microphones. I mean, this makes Southwest Airlines look like they don’t understand —
CHARLIE MUNGER：你看，我们俩在这儿卖糖、卖百科全书，等等。Berkshire Hathaway 的首席财务官在那边举着麦克风。相比之下，这都让 Southwest Airlines 看起来好像不懂——
WARREN BUFFETT: Cost control. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT：成本控制。（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: — cost accounting, yeah. It’s a very old-fashioned place. And by the way, speaking of hawking our merchandise, if any of you have safety deposit boxes full of Berkshire Hathaway certificates, and have children or grandchildren who don’t have World Book in print in the house, you are making a very serious error. That is a marvelous thing for — to have in the house with —
CHARLIE MUNGER：——成本核算，没错。我们这是家非常“老派”的公司。顺便说到推销自家商品：如果你们谁的保险箱里放着一堆 Berkshire Hathaway 股票，而家里孩子或孙辈却没有一套印刷版 World Book，那你就在犯大错了。那是一件放在家里——
WARREN BUFFETT: And the discount only applies —
WARREN BUFFETT：而且折扣只在——
CHARLIE MUNGER: — full of young people.
CHARLIE MUNGER：——有一屋子年轻人的时候最合适。
WAWRREN BUFFETT: The discount only applies today — (laughs) — incidentally. I think that’s right.
WAWRREN BUFFETT：折扣只在今天有效——（笑）——顺便提醒一下。我想是这样的。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It is. That is, it may not be selling too well because of the current vogue for encyclopedias on computers. And by the way, those encyclopedias that are available are inferior compared to World Book, which is very user-friendly for children, and I like it that way myself. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER：没错。如今因为电脑上的百科很流行，纸质百科可能卖得不太好。顺带一提，那些电子百科不如 World Book——后者对孩子非常友好，我自己也很喜欢这种形式。然后——
WARREN BUFFETT: We —
WARREN BUFFETT：我们——
CHARLIE MUNGER: That is one product you really ought to buy.
CHARLIE MUNGER：这是你们真的该买的一件产品。
WARREN BUFFETT: We both use it, personally. I mean, I keep a set at the office, and a set at home. And I —
WARREN BUFFETT：我们俩自己都在用。我办公室放一套，家里也放一套。而且我——
CHARLIE MUNGER: I give away more of that product —
CHARLIE MUNGER：我送出的这件产品——
WARREN BUFFETT: — I use it a lot.
WARREN BUFFETT：——用得很多。
CHARLIE MUNGER: — than other product that Berkshire Hathaway makes in any subsidiary. It’s a perfectly fabulous human achievement. To edit a thing, to — that user friendly, with that much wisdom encapsulated. It is a — it’s a fabulous thing.
CHARLIE MUNGER：——比 Berkshire Hathaway 任何子公司生产的其他产品都多。它是了不起的人类成就：把这么多知识编辑得如此友好易用。这真是——太棒了。
89. Keynes: Great “wisdom” about investing
Keynes：关于投资的“智慧”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2?
WARREN BUFFETT：二区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) from Houston, Texas. From time to time, you have quoted John Maynard Keynes, the British economist. So, I would assume that you have read the investment writings very extensively. What are two or three investment lessons, in your opinion, one can learn from that economist?
AUDIENCE MEMBER：（听不清），来自 Houston, Texas。您时常引用英国经济学家 John Maynard Keynes。所以我想您应该非常广泛地读过他的投资著作。在您看来，从这位经济学家那里可以学到哪两三条投资教训？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I forget which, I think it’s chapter eight of “The General Theory,” do you remember Charlie? Or is it chapter —
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我忘了具体是哪一章了，我想是《The General Theory》的第八章，Charlie，你记得吗？还是第——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
CHARLIE MUNGER：不记得。
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one chapter in “The General Theory” that relates to markets, and the psychology of markets, and the behavior of market participants and so on, that probably is, aside from Ben Graham’s two chapters, eight and 20, in “The Intelligent Investor” — I think you’ll find you’ll get as much wisdom from reading that as anything written in investments. And you’ll know it when you see it in “The General Theory.” It’s a chapter that jumps out to you about securities and so on. And I — could be chapter eight, but I may be wrong on that. But I would recommend reading that. Keynes and Graham, from vastly different starting points, came to the same conclusion at about the same time in the ’30s, as to the soundest way to invest over time. They differed some on their ideas on diversification. Keynes believed in diversifying far less than did Graham.
WARREN BUFFETT：《The General Theory》中有一章专门谈市场、市场心理以及市场参与者行为等内容。我认为，除了 Ben Graham 在《The Intelligent Investor》中的第八章与第二十章之外，你从那一章所获得的投资智慧，可能不亚于任何投资著作。当你在《The General Theory》中读到它时，你会立刻意识到：那一章关于证券等问题的论述格外“跳脱”。我想可能是第八章，但也可能记错。不过我强烈建议去读。Keynes 和 Graham 从截然不同的出发点出发，却在 20 世纪 30 年代几乎同一时间得出了同样的结论：关于长期投资最稳健的方法。他们在分散化理念上有所不同；Keynes 主张的分散程度远低于 Graham。
But Keynes started off with the wrong theory, I would say, in the ’20s and essentially tried to predict business cycles in markets, and then shifted to fundamental analysis of businesses in the ’30s, and did extremely well. And about the same time, Graham was writing his first material. I think Janet Lowe, in her book on Ben Graham, actually has a little correspondence that took place between Keynes and Ben. So I would advise you to read that. And there’s some letters of his that he — of Keynes’ — that he wrote to co-trustees of life insurance societies, and colleges, and so on, that I think you’d find interesting, too.
但在我看来，Keynes 在 20 年代起步时采用了错误的理论——他基本上试图预测市场中的商业周期；随后在 30 年代转向对企业进行基本面分析，并取得了非常出色的成绩。与此大致同时，Graham 也开始撰写他的第一批作品。我记得 Janet Lowe 在她关于 Ben Graham 的书中，确实收录了 Keynes 与 Ben 之间的一些通信。我建议你去读一读那些内容。另外，Keynes 还写过一些致寿险社团、大学等共同受托人的信件，我想你也会觉得很有意思。
All letters are written and copyrighted by Warren E. Buffett and is reproduced here with his permission. The letter must not be reproduced, copied, sold, or otherwise distributed without the permission of Warren E. Buffett.
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