1996-03-01 Warren Buffett.Convertible Preferred Stocks

Refer To：《1996-03-01 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Convertible Preferred Stocks

可转换优先股

As many of you will remember, Berkshire made five private purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period and the time seems right to discuss their status. Here are the particulars:

你们中的很多人会记得：在 1987–91 年间，Berkshire 私下买入了五笔可转换优先股。现在时机成熟，可以谈谈它们的现状。具体情况如下：

In each case we had the option of sticking with these preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from their fixed-income characteristics. The option we had to convert was a kicker.

在每一笔交易中，我们都有选择：要么把这些优先股当作固定收益证券继续持有，要么把它们转换成普通股。一开始，它们对我们的价值主要来自固定收益属性；我们手里的转换权只是“额外甜头”（kicker）。

Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Percs" - described in the 1991 Annual Report - is not included in the table because that security was a modified form of common stock whose fixed-income characteristics contributed only a minor portion of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Percs automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, the five securities in the table were set to become common stocks only if we wished them to - a crucial difference.

我们以 3 亿美元私下买入的 American Express “Percs”（在 1991 年年报中有描述）不在这张表里，因为那种证券更像一种改造过的普通股，其固定收益特征对初始价值贡献很小。我们买入三年后，Percs 会自动转换为普通股。相比之下，表中这五项证券只有在我们自己愿意的情况下才会变成普通股——这个差异至关重要。

When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately" exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income securities they replaced. We beat this expectation - but only because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects." Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused me some well-deserved heartburn.

当初我们买入这些可转换证券时，我曾告诉你：我们预计它们的税后回报会“适度”高于它们所替代的中期固定收益证券。我们确实超过了这个预期——但只因为其中某一只证券表现极好。我也告诉过你：这些证券整体而言，“不会产生我们在找到经济前景极佳的企业时所能实现的那种回报。”不幸的是，这个预测兑现了。最后，我还说过：“几乎在任何情况下，我们都预计这些优先股会把本金加股息还给我们。”这句话我现在真想收回。Winston Churchill 曾说过：“吃回自己的话从没让我消化不良。”但我那句“我们几乎不可能在这些优先股上亏钱”的断言，却让我吃了些应得的胃痛。

Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake - of a kind, however, never recognized on financial statements.

我们表现最好的持仓是 Gillette——从一开始我们就告诉过你，它是一门优越的生意。讽刺的是，这也是我犯下最大错误的一笔买入——不过这种错误在财务报表里永远不会被识别出来。

We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given that this would have been a huge private placement carrying important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to have Berkshire opt for common.

我们在 1989 年以 6 亿美元买入了 Gillette 的优先股，该优先股可转换为 4,800 万股（拆股调整后）的普通股。若把这 6 亿美元换一种方式使用，我很可能可以直接从公司买到 6,000 万股普通股。当时普通股市价约 10.50 美元；考虑到这会是一笔规模巨大的私下配售、且附带重要限制，我很可能至少能以 5% 的折扣买入。我无法完全确定，但很可能 Gillette 的管理层同样乐意让 Berkshire 直接选择普通股。

But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which point the company - quite properly - called the issue, moving to do that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend 1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70 million.

但我当时“聪明过头”了，没有这么做。相反，我们在不到两年的时间里拿到了一些额外的股息收入（优先股收益率与普通股收益率之间的差额），随后公司——完全合理地——赎回了这只证券，并且尽可能快地完成了赎回。如果当初我谈的是普通股而不是优先股，那么到 1995 年年底，我们本可以多赚 6.25 亿美元，扣掉那段时间的“额外”股息约 7,000 万美元。

In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the company at a modest discount.

在 Champion 这笔投资中，公司以成本的 115% 赎回我们优先股的条款，迫使我们在去年 8 月作出一次退出动作——而我们其实更愿意把时间往后拖延。在这次事件里，我们在赎回生效前把优先股转换为普通股，并以一个不大的折扣价把这些股票卖回给公司。

Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper industry - actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing - so our choice in August was whether to sell in the market or to the company. Champion's management had always been candid and honorable in dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was moderate - about 19% after tax from a six-year investment - but the preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986 Annual Report.)

Charlie 和我从来没有对造纸行业形成过什么强烈信念——事实上，在我 54 年投资生涯里，我都记不起自己什么时候持有过一家纸品生产商的普通股——因此我们 8 月的选择只是：把股票卖给市场，还是卖回给公司。Champion 的管理层一直坦诚正直地对待我们，而且也希望回购普通股，所以我们把股票卖给了公司。我们在 Champion 的资本利得中等——六年投资的税后回报约 19%——但这只优先股在我们持有期间一直提供了不错的税后股息收益率。（顺便说一句，媒体对财产与意外险公司在股息上的税后收益率常常夸大。媒体忽略了 1987 年生效的一项税法变化：它显著降低了适用于保险公司的 dividends received credit（股息抵扣/股息扣除优惠）。细节可参见我们 1986 年年报。）

愿意买入住宅相关的周期性行业，比如，砖块。

Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996, the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding banker, and we love being associated with him.

我们的 First Empire 优先股将于 1996 年 3 月 31 日被赎回——这是允许的最早日期。我们对持有经营良好的银行股很放心，因此会转换并继续持有 First Empire 的普通股。公司 CEO Bob Wilmers 是一位出色的银行家，我们很高兴能与他建立这样的合作关系。

Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire. Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60 - Salomon interim chairman, that is - because of an earlier purchase of a fixed-income security.

我们另外两只优先股表现令人失望，尽管 Salomon 的优先股相对它所替代的固定收益证券，略微跑赢。但 Charlie 和我在这项持仓上投入的管理时间，远远超过它对 Berkshire 的经济意义。我当然从没想过：因为此前买了一只固定收益证券，我会在 60 岁时“换一份新工作”——也就是担任 Salomon 的临时董事长。

Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking." Even the most charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my point.

我们在 1987 年买入 Salomon 优先股后不久，我写过一句话：我对投行行业的方向或未来盈利能力“并没有特别洞见”。即便是最宽容的评论者，也会得出结论：此后发生的一切，恰恰证明了我这句话。

To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the 9% dividend is currently quite attractive.

到目前为止，我们把 Salomon 优先股转换为普通股的选择权并没有体现出价值。并且，自从我承诺买入这只优先股以来，道琼斯工业指数翻了一倍，经纪券商板块表现也差不多。这意味着：我当初因为看中了转换期权的价值而选择 Salomon，这个决定必须被评为“很差”。即便如此，在一些艰难条件下，这只优先股仍作为固定收益工具持续兑现承诺，而其 9% 的股息率目前相当有吸引力。

Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99, and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that we will yet find value in our right to convert.

如果不转换，这只优先股的条款要求在 1995–99 年间每年 10 月 31 日赎回该发行量的 20%；去年按期赎回了我们最初 7 亿美元中的 1.4 亿美元。（有些媒体把这称为“出售”，但一项高级证券到期被赎回，并不是“卖出”。）尽管我们去年并未选择把到期的那部分优先股转换为普通股，但我们还有四次“转换的机会”，我认为我们最终仍很可能会在转换权上找到价值。

I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year's report. The company's results improved in 1995, but it still faces significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.

我在去年的报告中已长篇讨论过 USAir 投资。公司在 1995 年的经营结果有所改善，但仍面临显著问题。对我们有利的一面是：我们的优先股在结构设计上很不错。例如，尽管自 1994 年 6 月以来我们一直没有收到股息，但公司欠我们的股息金额会以“高于最优惠贷款利率（prime rate）5%”的利率复利滚存。不利的一面是：我们面对的是一个信用很弱的主体。

We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it's fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at 60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let's hope the market is right.

我们对 USAir 优先股的感觉比一年前好得多，但它的最终价值究竟如何，你的猜测并不比我差。（事实上，考虑到我在这笔投资上的记录，公平地说：你的猜测可能还会比我更准。）到年末，我们把这只优先股（没有公开市场）按面值的 60% 入账；而 USAir 还发行了一只次级优先股，除转换价格外，在各方面都明显不如我们的那只，但当时的交易价格却是面值的 82%。在我写这段话时，那只次级优先股已经涨到面值的 97%。希望市场是对的。

Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette, our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term fixed-income issues that they replaced.

总体而言，我们的优先股投资表现不错，但这句话之所以成立，只因为有一个超级大赢家——Gillette。抛开 Gillette 不谈，我们这批优先股整体带来的税后回报，充其量也只是与它们当初所替代的中期固定收益证券大致相当。

未来往往是剧烈变化的，5个标的押中1个，而其余4个因为留有安全边际，在剧烈变化中还过得去，这是可以期望的局面。

1996-03-01 Warren Buffett.Convertible Preferred Stocks

1996-03-01 Warren Buffett.Convertible Preferred Stocks

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