2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire’s loss in net worth during 2001 was $3.77 billion, which decreased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.2%. Over the last 37 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $37,920, a rate of 22.6% compounded annually.*

伯克希尔在 2001 年的净资产减少了 37.7 亿美元，这使得我们 A 类与 B 类股票的每股账面价值都下降了 6.2%。在过去 37 年（也就是现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 37,920 美元，年复合增长率为 22.6%。*

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

本报告中使用的所有数据都以伯克希尔 A 类股为口径。A 类股是在 1996 年之前公司唯一发行在外的股票，B 类股在经济权益上相当于 A 类股的 1/30。

Per-share intrinsic grew somewhat faster than book value during these 37 years, and in 2001 it probably decreased a bit less. We explain intrinsic value in our Owner’s Manual, which begins on page 62. I urge new shareholders to read this manual to become familiar with Berkshire’s key economic principles.

在这 37 年里，每股内在价值的增长速度略快于账面价值；而在 2001 年，它的下降幅度可能也略小一些。我们在《Owner’s Manual》中解释了“内在价值”，该手册从第 62 页开始。我建议新股东阅读这份手册，以熟悉伯克希尔的关键经济原则。

Two years ago, reporting on 1999, I said that we had experienced both the worst absolute and relative performance in our history. I added that “relative results are what concern us,” a viewpoint I’ve had since forming my first investment partnership on May 5, 1956. Meeting with my seven founding limited partners that evening, I gave them a short paper titled “The Ground Rules” that included this sentence: “Whether we do a good job or a poor job is to be measured against the general experience in securities.” We initially used the Dow Jones Industrials as our benchmark, but shifted to the S&P 500 when that index became widely used. Our comparative record since 1965 is chronicled on the facing page; last year Berkshire’s advantage was 5.7 percentage points.

两年前，在回顾 1999 年时，我说过我们经历了历史上“绝对表现最差”和“相对表现最差”的一年。我还补充说：“相对结果才是我们真正关心的”，这一观点自我在 1956 年 5 月 5 日成立第一家投资合伙企业以来一直未变。那天晚上我与七位创始有限合伙人见面，给了他们一份名为《The Ground Rules》的短文，其中有这样一句话：“我们做得好还是做得差，应当以证券市场的一般表现作为衡量标准。”起初我们用 Dow Jones Industrials 作为基准，后来当 S&P 500 被广泛采用后，我们就改用它。自 1965 年以来，我们的相对成绩记录在对页；去年伯克希尔的优势是 5.7 个百分点。

Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that “you can’t eat relative performance.” But if you expect — as Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, and I do — that owning the S&P 500 will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index must prove rewarding. Just as you can eat well throughout the year if you own a profitable, but highly seasonal, business such as See’s (which loses considerable money during the summer months) so, too, can you regularly feast on investment returns that beat the averages, however variable the absolute numbers may be.

有人不同意我们把焦点放在相对数据上，理由是“相对表现不能当饭吃”。但如果你像 Charlie Munger（伯克希尔副董事长）和我一样，认为长期持有 S&P 500 会带来相当令人满意的结果，那么对长期投资者来说，每年在该指数之上取得一点点优势，必然会带来丰厚回报。就像你拥有一家盈利但高度季节性的企业（例如 See’s——夏季月份会亏不少钱），你依然可以在一年中的大多数时间吃得不错；同样地，只要你的投资回报能持续跑赢平均水平——哪怕绝对数字波动很大——你也能经常“饱餐一顿”。

Though our corporate performance last year was satisfactory, my performance was anything but. I manage most of Berkshire’s equity portfolio, and my results were poor, just as they have been for several years. Of even more importance, I allowed General Re to take on business without a safeguard I knew was important, and on September 11th, this error caught up with us. I’ll tell you more about my mistake later and what we are doing to correct it.

虽然我们公司去年的整体经营表现还算令人满意，但我个人的表现却糟糕透顶。我管理着伯克希尔大部分股票投资组合，而我的结果很差——过去几年也是如此。更重要的是，我允许 General Re 在承保业务上没有设置一道我明知很关键的“安全阀”就去接单，而在 9 月 11 日，这个错误终于反噬了我们。稍后我会更具体地告诉你我犯了什么错，以及我们正在采取哪些措施来纠正它。

Another of my 1956 Ground Rules remains applicable: “I cannot promise results to partners.” But Charlie and I can promise that your economic result from Berkshire will parallel ours during the period of your ownership: We will not take cash compensation, restricted stock or option grants that would make our results superior to yours.

我在 1956 年《The Ground Rules》里还有一条规则至今仍然适用：“我不能向合伙人承诺结果。”但 Charlie 和我可以承诺：在你持有伯克希尔期间，你从伯克希尔获得的经济结果将与我们自己的结果同步——我们不会领取现金薪酬，不会拿限制性股票，也不会获得期权授予，从而让我们的回报高于你们的回报。

Additionally, I will keep well over 99% of my net worth in Berkshire. My wife and I have never sold a share nor do we intend to. Charlie and I are disgusted by the situation, so common in the last few years, in which shareholders have suffered billions in losses while the CEOs, promoters, and other higher-ups who fathered these disasters have walked away with extraordinary wealth. Indeed, many of these people were urging investors to buy shares while concurrently dumping their own, sometimes using methods that hid their actions. To their shame, these business leaders view shareholders as patsies, not partners.

此外，我会把远远超过 99% 的净资产放在伯克希尔里。我和妻子从未卖出过一股，也无意卖出。Charlie 和我对近几年一种司空见惯的现象感到作呕：股东承受了数十亿美元的损失，而那些一手酿成灾难的 CEO、推销者以及其他高层却带着惊人的财富全身而退。事实上，很多人一边鼓动投资者买入股票，一边同时抛售自己的持股，有时还使用掩盖其行为的方法。可耻的是，这些企业领导者把股东当作“冤大头”，而不是合作伙伴。

Though Enron has become the symbol for shareholder abuse, there is no shortage of egregious conduct elsewhere in corporate America. One story I’ve heard illustrates the all-too-common attitude of managers toward owners: A gorgeous woman slinks up to a CEO at a party and through moist lips purrs, “I’ll do anything — anything — you want. Just tell me what you would like.” With no hesitation, he replies, “Reprice my options.”

尽管 Enron 已经成了侵害股东利益的象征，但在美国企业界，类似的恶劣行为绝不稀缺。我听到的一个故事，生动说明了管理者对所有者那种过于常见的态度：在一个派对上，一位艳丽女子扭着身子贴近一位 CEO，用湿润的嘴唇低声呢喃：“我愿意为你做任何事——任何事——只要你说你想要什么。”他毫不犹豫地回答：“把我的期权行权价重定价（调低）。”

One final thought about Berkshire: In the future we won’t come close to replicating our past record. To be sure, Charlie and I will strive for above-average performance and will not be satisfied with less. But two conditions at Berkshire are far different from what they once were: Then, we could often buy businesses and securities at much lower valuations than now prevail; and more important, we were then working with far less money than we now have. Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our investment in Washington Post in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the combination of ten such ideas and a triple in the value of each would increase the net worth of Berkshire by only ¼ of 1%. We need “elephants” to make significant gains now — and they are hard to find.

关于伯克希尔，我最后再说一点：未来我们不可能再接近复制过去的记录。当然，Charlie 和我会努力争取高于平均水平的表现，也不会满足于低于平均水平。但伯克希尔现在有两项条件，与从前大不相同：其一，如今我们很难再像过去那样，以远低于当前水平的估值买入企业和证券；其二、更重要的是，我们现在管理的资金规模远远超过当年。很多年前，一个“好”的 1,000 万美元点子就能让我们大有斩获（例如我们在 1973 年投资 Washington Post、在 1976 年投资 GEICO）。而今天，即使把十个这样的点子加在一起，并且每个点子的规模再翻三倍，伯克希尔净资产也只会增加 0.25%（四分之一个百分点）。现在要想取得显著增长，我们需要“elephants（大象级机会）”——而它们很难找到。

On the positive side, we have as fine an array of operating managers as exists at any company. (You can read about many of them in a new book by Robert P. Miles: The Warren Buffett CEO.) In large part, moreover, they are running businesses with economic characteristics ranging from good to superb. The ability, energy and loyalty of these managers is simply extraordinary. We now have completed 37 Berkshire years without having a CEO of an operating business elect to leave us to work elsewhere.

从积极的一面看，我们拥有几乎任何公司都难以匹敌的一流运营管理者团队。（你可以在 Robert P. Miles 的一本新书里读到其中许多人的故事：《The Warren Buffett CEO》。）此外，他们所经营的业务在经济特性上从“不错”到“极佳”不等。这样的管理者能力、精力与忠诚度，简直非同寻常。我们已走过伯克希尔 37 年历史，从未有一家运营企业的 CEO 主动选择离开我们去别处工作。

Our star-studded group grew in 2001. First, we completed the purchases of two businesses that we had agreed to buy in 2000 — Shaw and Johns Manville. Then we acquired two others, MiTek and XTRA, and contracted to buy two more: Larson-Juhl, an acquisition that has just closed, and Fruit of the Loom, which will close shortly if creditors approve our offer. All of these businesses are led by smart, seasoned and trustworthy CEOs.

我们这支群星璀璨的团队在 2001 年进一步壮大。首先，我们完成了两家在 2000 年就已达成收购协议的企业的收购——Shaw 和 Johns Manville。随后我们又收购了另外两家：MiTek 和 XTRA，并签约将再收购两家：Larson-Juhl（这笔收购刚刚完成交割）以及 Fruit of the Loom（若债权人批准我们的报价，将很快完成交割）。所有这些企业都由聪明、老练且值得信赖的 CEO 领导。

Additionally, all of our purchases last year were for cash, which means our shareholders became owners of these additional businesses without relinquishing any interest in the fine companies they already owned. We will continue to follow our familiar formula, striving to increase the value of the excellent businesses we have, adding new businesses of similar quality, and issuing shares only grudgingly.

此外，我们去年所有收购都以现金完成，这意味着股东在不放弃已拥有那些优质企业任何权益的情况下，又成为这些新增企业的主人。我们会继续遵循一贯的公式：努力提升现有优质企业的价值，增添同等质量的新企业，并且只在万不得已时才勉强发行股票。

Acquisitions of 2001

2001 年的收购

A few days before last year’s annual meeting, I received a heavy package from St. Louis, containing an unprepossessing chunk of metal whose function I couldn’t imagine. There was a letter in the package, though, from Gene Toombs, CEO of a company called MiTek. He explained that MiTek is the world’s leading producer of this thing I’d received, a “connector plate,” which is used in making roofing trusses. Gene also said that the U.K. parent of MiTek wished to sell the company and that Berkshire seemed to him the ideal buyer. Liking the sound of his letter, I gave Gene a call. It took me only a minute to realize that he was our kind of manager and MiTek our kind of business. We made a cash offer to the U.K. owner and before long had a deal.

在去年年会召开前几天，我收到一个从 St. Louis 寄来的沉重包裹，里面是一块其貌不扬的金属疙瘩，我完全想象不出它能做什么。不过包裹里还有一封信，来自一家名为 MiTek 的公司 CEO Gene Toombs。他解释说，MiTek 是我收到的这种东西——一种“connector plate（连接板）”——的全球最大生产商，这种连接板用于制作屋顶桁架。Gene 还说，MiTek 的英国母公司希望出售这家公司，而在他看来，Berkshire 是理想的买家。我喜欢这封信的语气，于是给 Gene 打了电话。我只花了一分钟就意识到：他是我们喜欢的那类经理人，而 MiTek 也是我们喜欢的那类企业。我们向英国股东提出现金报价，不久便达成了交易。

Gene’s managerial crew is exceptionally enthusiastic about the company and wanted to participate in the purchase. Therefore, we arranged for 55 members of the MiTek team to buy 10% of the company, with each putting up a minimum of $100,000 in cash. Many borrowed money so they could participate.

Gene 的管理团队对公司极其热情，也希望能参与这次收购。因此，我们安排 MiTek 团队中的 55 名成员购买公司 10% 的股权，每人至少拿出 10 万美元现金出资。很多人为了参与还借了钱。

As they would not be if they had options, all of these managers are true owners. They face the downside of decisions as well as the upside. They incur a cost of capital. And they can’t “reprice” their stakes: What they paid is what they live with.

如果他们拿的是期权，他们就不会是这样——而现在，这些经理人都是真正的所有者。他们既要承担决策带来的下行风险，也能享受上行收益。他们要付出资本成本。而且他们没法把自己的持股“重新定价”：他们付了多少，就得接受多少，买定离手、与之共存。

Charlie and I love the high-grade, truly entrepreneurial attitude that exists at MiTek, and we predict it will be a winner for all involved.

Charlie 和我非常欣赏 MiTek 里那种高质量、真正创业者式的精神面貌，我们预测它会成为所有相关方的赢家。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In early 2000, my friend, Julian Robertson, announced that he would terminate his investment partnership, Tiger Fund, and that he would liquidate it entirely except for four large holdings. One of these was XTRA, a leading lessor of truck trailers. I then called Julian, asking whether he might consider selling his XTRA block or whether, for that matter, the company’s management might entertain an offer for the entire company. Julian referred me to Lew Rubin, XTRA’s CEO. He and I had a nice conversation, but it was apparent that no deal was to be done.

2000 年初，我的朋友 Julian Robertson 宣布他将结束自己的投资合伙企业 Tiger Fund，并将除四个大持仓之外的全部头寸清算。其中一个持仓是 XTRA——一家领先的卡车拖车租赁公司。随后我给 Julian 打电话，问他是否愿意出售手中的 XTRA 大宗股份；或者更进一步，公司管理层是否可能愿意考虑对整个公司的收购要约。Julian 把我介绍给 XTRA 的 CEO Lew Rubin。我俩聊得不错，但很明显，这事儿当时做不成。

Then in June 2001, Julian called to say that he had decided to sell his XTRA shares, and I resumed conversations with Lew. The XTRA board accepted a proposal we made, which was to be effectuated through a tender offer expiring on September 11th. The tender conditions included the usual “out,” allowing us to withdraw if the stock market were to close before the offer’s expiration. Throughout much of the 11th, Lew went through a particularly wrenching experience: First, he had a son-in-law working in the World Trade Center who couldn’t be located; and second, he knew we had the option of backing away from our purchase. The story ended happily: Lew’s son-in-law escaped serious harm, and Berkshire completed the transaction.

到了 2001 年 6 月，Julian 来电说他决定出售所持的 XTRA 股票，我便恢复了与 Lew 的沟通。XTRA 董事会接受了我们提出的方案：通过要约收购（tender offer）来完成交易，而要约到期日正是 9 月 11 日。要约条款里包含一个常见的“退出条款”（out）：如果在要约到期前股市关闭，我们可以撤回收购。在 11 日当天的大部分时间里，Lew 经历了极其煎熬的双重折磨：第一，他的女婿在 World Trade Center 工作，却一度下落不明；第二，他知道我们在条款上有权选择退出、不完成收购。幸运的是，结局是好的：Lew 的女婿没有遭受严重伤害，而 Berkshire 也完成了这笔交易。

Trailer leasing is a cyclical business but one in which we should earn decent returns over time. Lew brings a new talent to Berkshire, and we hope to expand in leasing.

拖车租赁是周期性行业，但长期来看，我们应该能获得不错的回报。Lew 为 Berkshire 带来了新的能力，我们也希望在租赁业务上进一步扩张。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

On December 3rd, I received a call from Craig Ponzio, owner of Larson-Juhl, the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames. Craig had bought the company in 1981 (after first working at its manufacturing plant while attending college) and thereafter increased its sales from $3 million to $300 million. Though I had never heard of Larson-Juhl before Craig’s call, a few minutes talk with him made me think we would strike a deal. He was straightforward in describing the business, cared about who bought it, and was realistic as to price. Two days later, Craig and Steve McKenzie, his CEO, came to Omaha and in ninety minutes we reached an agreement. In ten days we had signed a contract.

12 月 3 日，我接到 Craig Ponzio 的电话，他是 Larson-Juhl 的所有者——这家公司是美国定制相框行业的龙头。Craig 在 1981 年买下了这家公司（在上大学期间，他曾先在其制造工厂工作），随后把销售额从 300 万美元做到了 3 亿美元。尽管在 Craig 打来电话之前我从未听说过 Larson-Juhl，但和他聊了几分钟后，我就觉得我们很可能会达成交易：他坦率地描述业务，关心买家是谁，并且对价格非常务实。两天后，Craig 和他的 CEO Steve McKenzie 来到 Omaha，我们在 90 分钟内就谈妥了。10 天内我们签署了合同。

Larson-Juhl serves about 18,000 framing shops in the U.S. and is also the industry leader in Canada and much of Europe. We expect to see opportunities for making complementary acquisitions in the future.

Larson-Juhl 为美国约 18,000 家装裱店提供服务，同时也是加拿大以及欧洲大部分地区的行业领导者。我们预计，未来会出现一些机会，让我们进行互补型收购（complementary acquisitions）。

* * * * * * * * * * *

As I write this letter, creditors are considering an offer we have made for Fruit of the Loom. The company entered bankruptcy a few years back, a victim both of too much debt and poor management. And, a good many years before that, I had some Fruit of the Loom experience of my own.

当我写这封信时，债权人正在评估我们对 Fruit of the Loom 提出的收购要约。这家公司几年前进入破产程序，既是高负债的受害者，也是糟糕管理的受害者。而更早很多年前，我自己也与 Fruit of the Loom 打过交道。

In August 1955, I was one of five employees, including two secretaries, working for the three managers of Graham-Newman Corporation, a New York investment company. Graham-Newman controlled Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron (“P&R”), an anthracite producer that had excess cash, a tax loss carryforward, and a declining business. At the time, I had a significant portion of my limited net worth invested in P&R shares, reflecting my faith in the business talents of my bosses, Ben Graham, Jerry Newman and Howard (Micky) Newman.

1955 年 8 月，我是 Graham-Newman Corporation（纽约一家投资公司）的五名员工之一（其中包括两位秘书），我们为公司的三位经理工作。Graham-Newman 控制着 Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron（“P&R”），这是一家无烟煤生产商，手里有多余现金、可结转的税务亏损（tax loss carryforward），但业务在走下坡路。当时，我把自己有限净资产中相当大的一部分投在 P&R 股票上，这体现了我对老板们——Ben Graham、Jerry Newman 和 Howard (Micky) Newman——商业才能的信心。

This faith was rewarded when P&R purchased the Union Underwear Company from Jack Goldfarb for $15 million. Union (though it was then only a licensee of the name) produced Fruit of the Loom underwear. The company possessed $5 million in cash — $2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase — and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)

这种信心得到了回报：P&R 以 1,500 万美元从 Jack Goldfarb 手中买下了 Union Underwear Company。Union（尽管当时它只是该名称的被许可使用者）生产 Fruit of the Loom 内衣。该公司账上有 500 万美元现金——其中 250 万美元被 P&R 用作收购款的一部分——并且税前利润约 300 万美元，而这些利润可以利用 P&R 的税务状况进行“遮蔽”（sheltered）。还有，别忘了：剩余应付的 1,250 万美元中，有足足 900 万美元是用无息票据（non-interest-bearing notes）支付的，票据以 Union 超过 100 万美元利润部分的 50% 来偿付。（那真是个好时代；光是想到这种交易，我都起鸡皮疙瘩。）

Subsequently, Union bought the licensor of the Fruit of the Loom name and, along with P&R, was merged into Northwest Industries. Fruit went on to achieve annual pre-tax earnings exceeding $200 million.

随后，Union 买下了 Fruit of the Loom 这一名称的授权方（licensor），并与 P&R 一起并入 Northwest Industries。此后，Fruit 的年度税前利润一度超过 2 亿美元。

John Holland was responsible for Fruit’s operations in its most bountiful years. In 1996, however, John retired, and management loaded the company with debt, in part to make a series of acquisitions that proved disappointing. Bankruptcy followed. John was then rehired, and he undertook a major reworking of operations. Before John’s return, deliveries were chaotic, costs soared and relations with key customers deteriorated. While correcting these problems, John also reduced employment from a bloated 40,000 to 23,000. In short, he’s been restoring the old Fruit of the Loom, albeit in a much more competitive environment.

在 Fruit 最辉煌的那些年里，John Holland 负责其运营。然而在 1996 年 John 退休后，管理层让公司背上了沉重债务，部分原因是为了进行一系列收购——但这些收购的结果令人失望。随后公司进入破产程序。此后 John 被重新请回，他对运营进行了大刀阔斧的重整。在 John 回归之前，发货混乱、成本飙升、与关键客户的关系恶化。John 在纠正这些问题的同时，还把臃肿的员工规模从 4 万人削减到 2.3 万人。总之，他正在恢复“老 Fruit of the Loom”的面貌——只不过是在一个竞争更激烈得多的环境里。

Stepping into Fruit’s bankruptcy proceedings, we made a proposal to creditors to which we attached no financing conditions, even though our offer had to remain outstanding for many months. We did, however, insist on a very unusual proviso: John had to be available to continue serving as CEO after we took over. To us, John and the brand are Fruit’s key assets.

我们介入 Fruit 的破产重整程序后，向债权人提出了一份方案，并且没有附加任何融资条件，尽管我们的报价必须在很多个月内持续有效。我们确实坚持了一个非常不寻常的附带条款：在我们接手之后，John 必须能够继续担任 CEO。对我们来说，John 和品牌是 Fruit 最关键的资产。

I was helped in this transaction by my friend and former boss, Micky Newman, now 81. What goes around truly does come around.

在这笔交易中，我得到了我的朋友、也是我以前的老板 Micky Newman 的帮助。他现在 81 岁了。世界的回旋镖，真是绕了一圈又回到了原点。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our operating companies made several “bolt-on” acquisitions during the year, and I can’t resist telling you about one. In December, Frank Rooney called to tell me H.H. Brown was buying the inventory and trademarks of Acme Boot for $700,000.

我们旗下运营公司当年还做了几笔“bolt-on（附加式）”收购，我忍不住想讲其中一笔。12 月，Frank Rooney 打电话告诉我，H.H. Brown 以 70 万美元买下了 Acme Boot 的库存和商标。

That sounds like small potatoes. But — would you believe it? — Acme was the second purchase of P&R, an acquisition that took place just before I left Graham-Newman in the spring of 1956. The price was $3.2 million, part of it again paid with non-interest bearing notes, for a business with sales of $7 million.

听起来这只是“小打小闹”。但——你信吗？——Acme 正是 P&R 的第二笔收购，而那笔收购发生在 1956 年春天我离开 Graham-Newman 之前不久。当时的价格是 320 万美元，其中一部分同样用无息票据支付；而这家公司当时的销售额是 700 万美元。

After P&R merged with Northwest, Acme grew to be the world’s largest bootmaker, delivering annual profits many multiples of what the company had cost P&R. But the business eventually hit the skids and never recovered, and that resulted in our purchasing Acme’s remnants.

在 P&R 并入 Northwest 之后，Acme 成长为全球最大的靴子制造商，其年度利润是当初 P&R 收购成本的很多倍。但这门生意后来终于“栽了跟头”，并且再也没恢复过来，这就导致我们如今得以收购 Acme 的残余资产。

In the frontispiece to Security Analysis, Ben Graham and Dave Dodd quoted Horace: “Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor.” Fifty-two years after I first read those lines, my appreciation for what they say about business and investments continues to grow.

在《Security Analysis》的卷首插页里，Ben Graham 和 Dave Dodd 引用了 Horace 的一句话：“Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor.”在我第一次读到这句话 52 年之后，我对它在商业与投资上的含义，仍然越来越能体会。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to bolt-on acquisitions, our managers continually look for ways to grow internally. In that regard, here’s a postscript to a story I told you two years ago about R.C. Willey’s move to Boise. As you may remember, Bill Child, R.C. Willey’s chairman, wanted to extend his home-furnishings operation beyond Utah, a state in which his company does more than $300 million of business (up, it should be noted, from $250,000 when Bill took over 48 years ago). The company achieved this dominant position, moreover, with a “closed on Sunday” policy that defied conventional retailing wisdom. I was skeptical that this policy could succeed in Boise or, for that matter, anyplace outside of Utah. After all, Sunday is the day many consumers most like to shop.

除了“bolt-on（附加式）”收购之外，我们的经理人也在持续寻找内部增长的方法。就此，我想补充一个两年前我讲过的故事：R.C. Willey 进军 Boise 的后续。你可能还记得，R.C. Willey 董事长 Bill Child 想把家居用品业务扩展到 Utah 之外——在 Utah 这个州，他的公司年营收已超过 3 亿美元（需要特别说明的是，Bill 在 48 年前接手时，公司业务规模只有 25 万美元）。更厉害的是，公司是在坚持“周日关门”的政策下取得这种主导地位的——这完全违背了传统零售的常识。我当时怀疑，这种政策在 Boise 甚至在 Utah 之外的任何地方都行不通。毕竟，周日是很多消费者最喜欢购物的一天。

Bill then insisted on something extraordinary: He would invest $11 million of his own money to build the Boise store and would sell it to Berkshire at cost (without interest!) if the venture succeeded. If it failed, Bill would keep the store and eat the loss on its disposal. As I told you in the 1999 annual report, the store immediately became a huge success — and it has since grown.

随后 Bill 坚持做了一件极不寻常的事：他愿意用自己的 1,100 万美元建 Boise 的门店，如果这次尝试成功，他将以成本价把门店卖给 Berkshire（而且不收利息！）；如果失败，他就自己留下门店，并承担处置门店的损失。正如我在 1999 年年报中告诉你们的，这家店一开业就取得巨大成功——并且此后还在持续增长。

Shortly after the Boise opening, Bill suggested we try Las Vegas, and this time I was even more skeptical. How could we do business in a metropolis of that size and be closed on Sundays, a day that all of our competitors would be exploiting? Buoyed by the Boise experience, however, we proceeded to locate in Henderson, a mushrooming city adjacent to Las Vegas.

Boise 店开业不久，Bill 又建议我们试试 Las Vegas，而这一次我更怀疑：在这样规模的都市里，如果周日关门，我们怎么做生意？周日正是所有竞争对手都会全力“收割”的日子。但在 Boise 经验的鼓舞下，我们还是决定在 Henderson 落地——这是 Las Vegas 旁边一个正在快速膨胀的新城。

The result: This store outsells all others in the R.C. Willey chain, doing a volume of business that far exceeds the volume of any competitor and that is twice what I had anticipated. I cut the ribbon at the grand opening in October — this was after a “soft” opening and a few weeks of exceptional sales — and, just as I did at Boise, I suggested to the crowd that the new store was my idea.

结果是：这家店成了 R.C. Willey 连锁里销量最高的门店，其营业额不仅远远超过任何竞争对手，也达到了我原先预期的两倍。我在 10 月的盛大开业时剪了彩——此前经历了“soft（试营业式）”开业以及几周的爆炸销售——而且就像在 Boise 时一样，我对人群暗示：这家新店是我提的主意。

It didn’t work. Today, when I pontificate about retailing, Berkshire people just say, “What does Bill think?” (I’m going to draw the line, however, if he suggests that we also close on Saturdays.)

没用。如今，当我在零售问题上高谈阔论时，伯克希尔的人只会说：“Bill 怎么想？”（不过，如果他建议我们连周六也关门，我就要划清界限了。）

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

财产/意外险（Property/Casualty Insurance）的经济学

Our main business – though we have others of great importance – is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们的主营业务——尽管我们还有其他同样重要的业务——是保险。因此，要理解 Berkshire，你必须先懂得如何评估一家保险公司。决定性的关键因素有三点：（1）这门生意能产生多少 float（浮存金）；（2）这些 float 的成本；以及（3）最关键的：这两个因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an“underwriting loss,”which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.

首先，float 是“我们持有但不拥有”的钱。在保险业务中，float 的产生源于一个时间差：保费先收进来，而赔款后付出去；这个间隔有时会延续很多年。在这段时间里，保险公司把这笔钱拿去投资——这当然令人愉快。但这种愉快通常伴随一个隐忧：保险公司收取的保费，往往不足以覆盖它最终必须支付的损失和费用。结果就出现了承保亏损（“underwriting loss”），而这恰恰就是 float 的成本。保险业务之所以有价值，是因为它长期的 float 成本低于公司在其他渠道获取资金所要付出的成本；反过来，如果 float 成本高于市场资金利率，这门生意就是“烂柠檬”（lemon）。

Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in about half of the years in which we’ve operated; that is, we’ve actually been paid for holding other people’s money. Over the last few years, however, our cost has been too high, and in 2001 it was terrible.

从历史上看，Berkshire 获得 float 的成本一直非常低。事实上，在我们经营保险的这些年份里，大约有一半年份的成本甚至低于零——也就是说，我们拿着别人的钱，非但不付成本，反而“被付钱”。但过去几年里，我们的成本过高，而 2001 年更是糟糕透顶。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 35 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float – which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume – by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表（按间隔列示）展示了自我们 35 年前通过收购 National Indemnity Company 进入保险业以来，Berkshire 保险业务各个板块所产生的 float。（National Indemnity 的传统业务线被归入 “Other Primary” 板块。）在这张表里，我们计算 float 的方法是：将净赔款准备金（net loss reserves）、理赔费用准备金（loss adjustment reserves）、分入再保险项下持有资金（funds held under reinsurance assumed）和未到期保费准备金（unearned premium reserves）相加，然后再减去与保险相关的应收款（insurance-related receivables）、预付收购成本（prepaid acquisition costs）、预付税款（prepaid taxes）以及适用于分入再保险的递延费用（deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance）。（明白了吗？）

Last year I told you that, barring a mega-catastrophe, our cost of float would probably drop from its 2000 level of 6%. I had in mind natural catastrophes when I said that, but instead we were hit by a man-made catastrophe on September 11th — an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history. Our float cost therefore came in at a staggering 12.8%. It was our worst year in float cost since 1984, and a result that to a significant degree, as I will explain in the next section, we brought upon ourselves.

去年我告诉你们，除非发生“超级巨灾”（mega-catastrophe），我们的 float 成本大概率会从 2000 年的 6% 水平下降。我当时说的“巨灾”指的是自然灾害，但结果我们在 9 月 11 日遭遇的却是人为巨灾——这起事件给整个保险业带来了史上最大的单次损失。因此，我们的 float 成本最终高达令人瞠目的 12.8%。这是自 1984 年以来我们 float 成本最糟糕的一年；而且正如我将在下一节解释的，这个结果在相当程度上是我们自己“招来的”。

If no mega-catastrophe occurs, I — once again — expect the cost of our float to be low in the coming year. We will indeed need a low cost, as will all insurers. Some years back, float costing, say, 4% was tolerable because government bonds yielded twice as much, and stocks prospectively offered still loftier returns. Today, fat returns are nowhere to be found (at least we can’t find them) and short-term funds earn less than 2%. Under these conditions, each of our insurance operations, save one, must deliver an underwriting profit if it is to be judged a good business. The exception is our retroactive reinsurance operation (a business we explained in last year’s annual report), which has desirable economics even though it currently hits us with an annual underwriting loss of about $425 million.

如果未来一年不发生“超级巨灾”，我——再一次——预计我们的 float 成本会很低。我们确实需要低成本，所有保险公司也都需要。若干年前，假设 float 成本是 4%，这还算可以忍受，因为政府债券收益率往往有它的两倍，而股票在前景上还能提供更高的回报。但今天，高回报到处都找不到（至少我们找不到），短期资金的收益还不到 2%。在这种条件下，我们每一家保险运营（除了一个例外）都必须实现承保盈利（underwriting profit），才配得上“好生意”的评价。例外是我们的追溯再保险（retroactive reinsurance）业务（我们在去年的年报中解释过），尽管它目前每年会让我们产生大约 4.25 亿美元的承保亏损，但其经济性仍然很有吸引力。

Principles of Insurance Underwriting

保险承保原则

When property/casualty companies are judged by their cost of float, very few stack up as satisfactory businesses. And interestingly — unlike the situation prevailing in many other industries — neither size nor brand name determines an insurer’s profitability. Indeed, many of the biggest and best-known companies regularly deliver mediocre results. What counts in this business is underwriting discipline. The winners are those that unfailingly stick to three key principles:

当你用 float 成本来衡量财产/意外险公司时，真正称得上“令人满意的生意”的并不多。有意思的是——这点与许多其他行业不同——保险公司的盈利能力既不由规模决定，也不由品牌名气决定。事实上，许多规模最大、名气最响的公司，长期交出的成绩都相当平庸。在这个行业里，真正决定成败的是承保纪律（underwriting discipline）。赢家一定会毫不动摇地遵循三条关键原则：

They accept only those risks that they are able to properly evaluate (staying within their circle of competence) and that, after they have evaluated all relevant factors including remote loss scenarios, carry the expectancy of profit. These insurers ignore market-share considerations and are sanguine about losing business to competitors that are offering foolish prices or policy conditions.

他们只承保那些自己能够正确评估的风险（守在自己的能力圈内），并且在评估了所有相关因素（包括极端的、遥远的损失情景）之后，仍然具备盈利期望（expectancy of profit）的风险。这类保险公司不在乎市场份额，看到竞争对手用愚蠢的价格或条款抢走生意也能泰然处之。

They limit the business they accept in a manner that guarantees they will suffer no aggregation of losses from a single event or from related events that will threaten their solvency. They ceaselessly search for possible correlation among seemingly-unrelated risks.

他们会限制承保规模，以确保不会因为单一事件或相关事件而出现损失“聚集”（aggregation），从而威胁自身偿付能力（solvency）。他们会不知疲倦地寻找表面上互不相关风险之间的潜在相关性（correlation）。

They avoid business involving moral risk: No matter what the rate, trying to write good contracts with bad people doesn’t work. While most policyholders and clients are honorable and ethical, doing business with the few exceptions is usually expensive, sometimes extraordinarily so.

他们会回避涉及道德风险（moral risk）的业务：无论费率多高，想和坏人签出“好合同”都行不通。虽然绝大多数投保人和客户都正直守信，但和少数例外做生意通常代价高昂，有时甚至高得离谱。

The events of September 11th made it clear that our implementation of rules 1 and 2 at General Re had been dangerously weak. In setting prices and also in evaluating aggregation risk, we had either overlooked or dismissed the possibility of large-scale terrorism losses. That was a relevant underwriting factor, and we ignored it.

9 月 11 日的事件清楚表明，我们在 General Re 对第 1 条和第 2 条的执行存在危险的薄弱环节。在定价以及评估损失聚集风险时，我们要么忽视了、要么轻视了“大规模恐怖主义损失”的可能性。这是一个必须纳入承保考量的因素，而我们却把它忽略了。

In pricing property coverages, for example, we had looked to the past and taken into account only costs we might expect to incur from windstorm, fire, explosion and earthquake. But what will be the largest insured property loss in history (after adding related business-interruption claims) originated from none of these forces. In short, all of us in the industry made a fundamental underwriting mistake by focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge terrorism risk for which we received no premium.

例如，在给财产险定价时，我们一直在回头看历史，只把可能发生的风暴、火灾、爆炸和地震等成本纳入考虑。但历史上最大的“已投保财产损失”（再加上相关的营业中断索赔）却并非源自这些力量。简而言之，我们整个行业都犯了一个根本性的承保错误：我们盯着“经验”（experience），而不是“暴露”（exposure），于是承担了巨大的恐怖主义风险，却没有收取任何对应的保费。

Experience, of course, is a highly useful starting point in underwriting most coverages. For example, it’s important for insurers writing California earthquake policies to know how many quakes in the state during the past century have registered 6.0 or greater on the Richter scale. This information will not tell you the exact probability of a big quake next year, or where in the state it might happen. But the statistic has utility, particularly if you are writing a huge statewide policy, as National Indemnity has done in recent years.

当然，在承保多数险种时，“经验”是一个非常有用的起点。比如，对承保 California 地震保单的保险公司来说，了解过去一百年里该州发生过多少次里氏震级达到或超过 6.0 的地震非常重要。这些信息并不能告诉你明年发生大地震的确切概率，也无法告诉你会发生在州内哪个位置。但这些统计仍然有用——尤其是当你承保的是覆盖全州的大额保单时，就像 National Indemnity 近些年所做的那样。

At certain times, however, using experience as a guide to pricing is not only useless, but actually dangerous. Late in a bull market, for example, large losses from directors and officers liability insurance (“D&O”) are likely to be relatively rare. When stocks are rising, there are a scarcity of targets to sue, and both questionable accounting and management chicanery often go undetected. At that juncture, experience on high-limit D&O may look great.

但在某些时候，用“经验”来指导定价不仅没用，反而危险。举例来说，在牛市的后期，董事及高管责任险（directors and officers liability insurance，“D&O”）出现巨额赔付的情况往往相对少见。股价上涨时，可起诉的“靶子”更少；可疑的会计处理和管理层的花招也常常不易被发现。在那个阶段，高限额 D&O 的历史经验看起来会非常漂亮。

But that’s just when exposure is likely to be exploding, by way of ridiculous public offerings, earnings manipulation, chain-letter-like stock promotions and a potpourri of other unsavory activities. When stocks fall, these sins surface, hammering investors with losses that can run into the hundreds of billions. Juries deciding whether those losses should be borne by small investors or big insurance companies can be expected to hit insurers with verdicts that bear little relation to those delivered in bull-market days. Even one jumbo judgment, moreover, can cause settlement costs in later cases to mushroom. Consequently, the correct rate for D&O “excess” (meaning the insurer or reinsurer will pay losses above a high threshold) might well, if based on exposure, be five or more times the premium dictated by experience.

但恰恰就在这时，“暴露”往往在迅速膨胀：荒唐的公开发行、利润操纵、类似“连锁信”的股票推销，以及一大锅其他不体面的勾当。当股价下跌，这些罪过就会浮出水面，给投资者造成可能高达数千亿美元的损失。陪审团在裁决这些损失该由小投资者承担还是由大型保险公司承担时，很可能会给保险公司判出与牛市时期判决几乎毫无关联的天价裁决。更何况，仅仅一个超级巨额判决，就可能让后续案件的和解成本呈蘑菇式膨胀。因此，D&O 的“超额责任”（“excess”，即保险公司或再保险公司承担超过很高门槛之上的损失）的合理费率，如果依据“暴露”来定价，很可能是依据“经验”所给出的保费的五倍甚至更多。

Insurers have always found it costly to ignore new exposures. Doing that in the case of terrorism, however, could literally bankrupt the industry. No one knows the probability of a nuclear detonation in a major metropolis this year (or even multiple detonations, given that a terrorist organization able to construct one bomb might not stop there). Nor can anyone, with assurance, assess the probability in this year, or another, of deadly biological or chemical agents being introduced simultaneously (say, through ventilation systems) into multiple office buildings and manufacturing plants. An attack like that would produce astronomical workers’ compensation claims.

保险业忽视新的风险暴露，一向代价高昂。但在恐怖主义这个问题上，忽视新暴露甚至可能把整个行业拖入破产。没有人知道今年在某个大都市发生核爆炸的概率（甚至也可能是多次爆炸——如果某个恐怖组织能造出一枚炸弹，它未必会就此收手）。同样，也没有人能够有把握地评估今年或未来某一年，致命的生物或化学制剂是否会被同时投放到多座办公楼和制造工厂（例如通过通风系统）。这样的袭击会带来天文数字般的工伤赔偿（workers’ compensation）索赔。

Here’s what we do know:

我们知道的是：

(a) The probability of such mind-boggling disasters, though likely very low at present, is not zero.

(a) 这类令人瞠目结舌的灾难发生的概率，尽管目前看起来很低，但并非为零。

(b) The probabilities are increasing, in an irregular and immeasurable manner, as knowledge and materials become available to those who wish us ill. Fear may recede with time, but the danger won’t — the war against terrorism can never be won. The best the nation can achieve is a long succession of stalemates. There can be no checkmate against hydra-headed foes.

(b) 随着相关知识与材料逐步落入心怀恶意者之手，这些概率会以不规则且无法度量的方式上升。恐惧可能会随时间淡去，但危险不会——反恐战争不可能真正“赢”。国家所能达到的最好结果，只能是漫长的一连串僵局。面对多头怪（hydra-headed）式的对手，不可能实现“将死”（checkmate）。

(c) Until now, insurers and reinsurers have blithely assumed the financial consequences from the incalculable risks I have described.

(d) Under a “close-to-worst-case” scenario, which could conceivably involve $1 trillion of damage, the insurance industry would be destroyed unless it manages in some manner to dramatically limit its assumption of terrorism risks. Only the U.S. Government has the resources to absorb such a blow. If it is unwilling to do so on a prospective basis, the general citizenry must bear its own risks and count on the Government to come to its rescue after a disaster occurs.

(d) 在一种“接近最坏情况”的情景下（理论上可能造成 1 万亿美元的损失），如果保险业不能以某种方式大幅限制其对恐怖主义风险的承担，整个行业将被摧毁。只有美国政府拥有吸收这种打击的资源。如果政府不愿意在事前（prospective basis）承担，那么普通民众就必须自担风险，并指望灾难发生后政府再来救助。

Why, you might ask, didn’t I recognize the above facts before September 11th? The answer, sadly, is that I did — but I didn’t convert thought into action. I violated the Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn’t count; building arks does. I consequently let Berkshire operate with a dangerous level of risk — at General Re in particular. I’m sorry to say that much risk for which we haven’t been compensated remains on our books, but it is running off by the day.

你可能会问：为什么我在 9 月 11 日之前没有意识到上述事实？遗憾的答案是：我意识到了——但我没有把思考转化为行动。我违反了“诺亚规则”（Noah rule）：预测下雨不算数，造方舟才算数。因此，我让 Berkshire 在一个危险的风险水平下运作——尤其是在 General Re。我很遗憾地说，我们账上仍然留有不少没有获得补偿的风险，但这些风险每天都在自然到期、逐步消退（running off）。

At Berkshire, it should be noted, we have for some years been willing to assume more risk than any other insurer has knowingly taken on. That’s still the case. We are perfectly willing to lose $2 billion to $2½ billion in a single event (as we did on September 11th) if we have been paid properly for assuming the risk that caused the loss (which on that occasion we weren’t).

需要说明的是，多年来 Berkshire 一直愿意承担任何其他保险公司都不会“明知故犯”去承担的更高风险。现在仍然如此。只要我们为承担导致损失的风险收到了合理的报酬（而 9 月 11 日那次我们没有），我们完全愿意在单一事件中损失 20 亿到 25 亿美元（就像 9 月 11 日那样）。

Indeed, we have a major competitive advantage because of our tolerance for huge losses. Berkshire has massive liquid resources, substantial non-insurance earnings, a favorable tax position and a knowledgeable shareholder constituency willing to accept volatility in earnings. This unique combination enables us to assume risks that far exceed the appetite of even our largest competitors. Over time, insuring these jumbo risks should be profitable, though periodically they will bring on a terrible year.

事实上，我们对巨大损失的容忍度构成了一项重要的竞争优势。Berkshire 拥有巨额流动资源、可观的非保险业务收益、有利的税务位置，以及一群理解并愿意接受盈利波动的股东。这样的独特组合，使我们能够承担的风险远远超出即便是最大竞争对手的胃口。从长期看，为这些“巨无霸”风险提供保险应当是有利可图的，尽管它们会在某些年份带来非常惨烈的结果。

The bottom-line today is that we will write some coverage for terrorist-related losses, including a few non-correlated policies with very large limits. But we will not knowingly expose Berkshire to losses beyond what we can comfortably handle. We will control our total exposure, no matter what the competition does.

归根到底，我们今天仍会为与恐怖主义相关的损失承保一些保障，包括少数彼此不相关但限额很高的保单。但我们不会在明知的情况下，让 Berkshire 暴露于超过我们可以从容承受的损失水平。无论竞争对手怎么做，我们都会控制自己的总体暴露（total exposure）。

Insurance Operations in 2001

2001 年的保险业务运营

Over the years, our insurance business has provided ever-growing, low-cost funds that have fueled much of Berkshire’s growth. Charlie and I believe this will continue to be the case. But we stumbled in a big way in 2001, largely because of underwriting losses at General Re.

多年来，我们的保险业务持续提供规模不断增长、成本很低的资金，这些资金推动了 Berkshire 很大一部分增长。Charlie 和我相信，这种情况仍会延续。但在 2001 年，我们栽了一个大跟头，主要原因是 General Re 的承保亏损。

In the past I have assured you that General Re was underwriting with discipline — and I have been proven wrong. Though its managers’ intentions were good, the company broke each of the three underwriting rules I set forth in the last section and has paid a huge price for doing so. One obvious cause for its failure is that it did not reserve correctly — more about this in the next section — and therefore severely miscalculated the cost of the product it was selling. Not knowing your costs will cause problems in any business. In long-tail reinsurance, where years of unawareness will promote and prolong severe underpricing, ignorance of true costs is dynamite.

过去我曾向你们保证 General Re 的承保是有纪律的——事实证明我错了。尽管管理层的意图是好的，但公司违反了我在上一节提出的三条承保规则中的每一条，并为此付出了巨大的代价。其失败的一个明显原因是：准备金计提不正确——下一节我会详细谈——因此严重误判了它所销售产品的成本。任何生意，不知道自己的成本都会出问题。在长尾再保险（long-tail reinsurance）中，这种问题尤其致命：多年对真实成本的无知，会促成并延长严重的低价承保；在这种业务里，对真实成本的无知就是炸药（dynamite）。

Additionally, General Re was overly-competitive in going after, and retaining, business. While all concerned may intend to underwrite with care, it is nonetheless difficult for able, hard-driving professionals to curb their urge to prevail over competitors. If “winning,” however, is equated with market share rather than profits, trouble awaits. “No” must be an important part of any underwriter’s vocabulary.

此外，General Re 在争取并维持业务时竞争心过强。即使所有相关人员都打算谨慎承保，但对那些能力强、拼劲足的专业人士来说，要克制住“赢过对手”的冲动依然很难。然而，如果把“赢”理解成市场份额而不是利润，麻烦就会在前面等着你。“不”（No）必须成为任何承保人的重要词汇之一。

At the risk of sounding Pollyannaish, I now assure you that underwriting discipline is being restored at General Re (and its Cologne Re subsidiary) with appropriate urgency. Joe Brandon was appointed General Re’s CEO in September and, along with Tad Montross, its new president, is committed to producing underwriting profits. Last fall, Charlie and I read Jack Welch’s terrific book, Jack, Straight from the Gut (get a copy!). In discussing it, we agreed that Joe has many of Jack’s characteristics: He is smart, energetic, hands-on, and expects much of both himself and his organization.

冒着听起来有点过于乐观（Pollyannaish）的风险，我现在可以向你们保证：General Re（以及其 Cologne Re 子公司）的承保纪律正在以应有的紧迫感恢复之中。Joe Brandon 在 9 月被任命为 General Re 的 CEO；他与新任总裁 Tad Montross 一起，致力于实现承保盈利。去年秋天，Charlie 和我读了 Jack Welch 那本很棒的书《Jack, Straight from the Gut》（去弄一本！）。我们讨论时一致认为，Joe 身上有 Jack 的许多特质：聪明、精力充沛、亲力亲为，并且对自己和组织都要求很高。

When it was an independent company, General Re often shone, and now it also has the considerable strengths Berkshire brings to the table. With that added advantage and with underwriting discipline restored, General Re should be a huge asset for Berkshire. I predict that Joe and Tad will make it so.

当 General Re 还是一家独立公司时，它经常表现耀眼；而现在，它还拥有 Berkshire 带到桌面上的诸多重要优势。有了这种额外加持，并且承保纪律得以恢复，General Re 应当会成为 Berkshire 的一项巨大资产。我预测 Joe 和 Tad 会把它变成现实。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At the National Indemnity reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to add enormous value to Berkshire. Working with only 18 associates, Ajit manages one of the world’s largest reinsurance operations measured by assets, and the largest, based upon the size of individual risks assumed.

在 National Indemnity 的再保险业务中，Ajit Jain 依然在为 Berkshire 创造巨大的价值。Ajit 只带着 18 名同事，却管理着一家以资产规模衡量位居全球前列的再保险运营；若按单笔承担风险的规模衡量，更是全球最大。

I have known the details of almost every policy that Ajit has written since he came with us in 1986, and never on even a single occasion have I seen him break any of our three underwriting rules. His extraordinary discipline, of course, does not eliminate losses; it does, however, prevent foolish losses. And that’s the key: Just as is the case in investing, insurers produce outstanding long-term results primarily by avoiding dumb decisions, rather than by making brilliant ones.

自 1986 年他加入我们以来，Ajit 承保的几乎每一张保单细节我都清楚，而且从未有哪怕一次见过他违反我们那三条承保规则。他非凡的纪律性当然不能消除损失；但它能避免“愚蠢的损失”。而这正是关键：就像投资一样，保险公司之所以能在长期取得卓越成绩，主要靠的是避免做蠢事，而不是靠偶尔做出天才之举。

Since September 11th, Ajit has been particularly busy. Among the policies we have written and retained entirely for our own account are (1) $578 million of property coverage for a South American refinery once a loss there exceeds $1 billion; (2) $1 billion of non-cancelable third-party liability coverage for losses arising from acts of terrorism at several large international airlines; (3) £500 million of property coverage on a large North Sea oil platform, covering losses from terrorism and sabotage, above £600 million that the insured retained or reinsured elsewhere; and (4) significant coverage on the Sears Tower, including losses caused by terrorism, above a $500 million threshold. We have written many other jumbo risks as well, such as protection for the World Cup Soccer Tournament and the 2002 Winter Olympics. In all cases, however, we have attempted to avoid writing groups of policies from which losses might seriously aggregate. We will not, for example, write coverages on a large number of office and apartment towers in a single metropolis without excluding losses from both a nuclear explosion and the fires that would follow it.

自 9 月 11 日以来，Ajit 尤其忙碌。我们签下并完全自留（retained entirely for our own account）的保单包括：（1）为南美一座炼油厂提供 5.78 亿美元的财产险保障——在该炼油厂损失超过 10 亿美元之后开始赔付；（2）为数家大型国际航空公司提供 10 亿美元、不可取消（non-cancelable）的第三方责任险保障，覆盖因恐怖主义行为引发的损失；（3）为北海一座大型海上油气平台提供 5 亿英镑的财产险保障，覆盖恐怖袭击与蓄意破坏造成的损失——在 6 亿英镑以上部分才赔付（其中 6 亿英镑由被保险人自留或在别处再保险）；以及（4）为 Sears Tower 提供相当规模的保障，包括恐怖主义造成的损失——在 5 亿美元门槛之上才赔付。我们还承保了许多其他“巨无霸”风险，例如为 World Cup Soccer Tournament 和 2002 Winter Olympics 提供保障。但无论如何，我们都会尽量避免承保一组可能导致损失严重“聚集”的保单。比如，我们不会在同一座大都市里，为大量办公楼和公寓塔楼提供保障，除非明确排除“核爆炸”以及其后引发的火灾造成的损失。

No one can match the speed with which Ajit can offer huge policies. After September 11th, his quickness to respond, always important, has become a major competitive advantage. So, too, has our unsurpassed financial strength. Some reinsurers — particularly those who, in turn, are accustomed to laying off much of their business on a second layer of reinsurers known as retrocessionaires — are in a weakened condition and would have difficulty surviving a second mega-cat. When a daisy chain of retrocessionaires exists, a single weak link can pose trouble for all. In assessing the soundness of their reinsurance protection, insurers must therefore apply a stress test to all participants in the chain, and must contemplate a catastrophe loss occurring during a very unfavorable economic environment. After all, you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. At Berkshire, we retain our risks and depend on no one. And whatever the world’s problems, our checks will clear.

没有人能在提供巨额保单报价这件事上，比 Ajit 更快。9 月 11 日之后，他这种迅速反应的能力——本就重要——变成了我们一项重大的竞争优势。同样，我们无与伦比的财务实力也是优势之一。有些再保险公司——尤其是那些习惯于把相当一部分业务再向外“转分”（laying off），交给第二层再保险人（称为 retrocessionaires，追溯分保人/再分保人）的公司——如今处于虚弱状态，可能很难扛过第二次超级巨灾。当 retrocessionaires 形成“雏菊链”（daisy chain）时，链条中的一个薄弱环节就可能给所有参与者带来麻烦。因此，保险公司在评估其再保险保护的稳健性时，必须对链条中所有参与方进行压力测试，并设想在极其不利的经济环境下发生一次灾难性损失。毕竟，只有潮水退去，你才知道谁在裸泳。Berkshire 则不同：我们自留风险，不依赖任何人。无论世界发生什么，我们开出的支票都能兑现。

Ajit’s business will ebb and flow — but his underwriting principles won’t waver. It’s impossible to overstate his value to Berkshire.

Ajit 的业务规模会潮起潮落——但他的承保原则不会动摇。他对 Berkshire 的价值再怎么强调都不过分。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

GEICO, by far our largest primary insurer, made major progress in 2001, thanks to Tony Nicely, its CEO, and his associates. Quite simply, Tony is an owner’s dream.

GEICO——迄今为止我们最大的直保公司——在 2001 年取得了重大进展，这要归功于其 CEO Tony Nicely 及其同事。简单说，Tony 就是“所有者梦寐以求”的那种经理人。

GEICO’s premium volume grew 6.6% last year, its float grew $308 million, and it achieved an underwriting profit of $221 million. This means we were actually paid that amount last year to hold the $4.25 billion in float, which of course doesn’t belong to Berkshire but can be used by us for investment.

GEICO 去年保费规模增长了 6.6%，float 增加了 3.08 亿美元，并实现了承保利润 2.21 亿美元。这意味着，我们去年实际上“被付了”2.21 亿美元来持有 42.5 亿美元的 float——这笔钱当然不属于 Berkshire，但可以被我们用于投资。

The only disappointment at GEICO in 2001 — and it’s an important one — was our inability to add policyholders. Our preferred customers (81% of our total) grew by 1.6% but our standard and non-standard policies fell by 10.1%. Overall, policies in force fell .8%.

GEICO 在 2001 年唯一令人失望的地方——而且很重要——是我们没能增加保单持有人数量。我们的优选客户（占总数的 81%）增长了 1.6%，但标准与非标准保单下降了 10.1%。总体而言，在保保单数（policies in force）下降了 0.8%。

New business has improved in recent months. Our closure rate from telephone inquiries has climbed, and our Internet business continues its steady growth. We, therefore, expect at least a modest gain in policy count during 2002. Tony and I are eager to commit much more to marketing than the $219 million we spent last year, but at the moment we cannot see how to do so effectively. In the meantime, our operating costs are low and far below those of our major competitors; our prices are attractive; and our float is cost-free and growing.

近几个月，新业务有所改善。来自电话咨询的转化率（closure rate）上升了，我们的互联网业务也在稳步增长。因此，我们预计 2002 年保单数量至少会有温和增长。Tony 和我都很希望在市场营销上投入远高于去年 2.19 亿美元的金额，但目前我们看不出如何能把这笔钱更有效地花出去。与此同时，我们的运营成本很低，远低于主要竞争对手；我们的价格有吸引力；我们的 float 是零成本并且在增长。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our other primary insurers delivered their usual fine results last year. These operations, run by Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Michael Stearns, Don Towle and Don Wurster had combined premium volume of $579 million, up 40% over 2000. Their float increased 14.5% to $685 million, and they recorded an underwriting profit of $30 million. In aggregate, these companies are one of the finest insurance operations in the country, and their 2002 prospects look excellent.

我们其他直保公司去年也交出了它们一贯的优异成绩。这些业务由 Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Michael Stearns、Don Towle 以及 Don Wurster 负责运营，合计保费规模为 5.79 亿美元，比 2000 年增长 40%。它们的 float 增加了 14.5% 至 6.85 亿美元，并录得承保利润 3,000 万美元。总体来看，这些公司合在一起构成了全美最出色的保险运营之一，而它们在 2002 年的前景看起来非常好。

“Loss Development” and Insurance Accounting

“损失发展（Loss Development）”与保险会计

Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking. When companies or investment professionals use terms such as “EBITDA” and “pro forma,” they want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed. (In golf, my score is frequently below par on a pro forma basis: I have firm plans to “restructure” my putting stroke and therefore only count the swings I take before reaching the green.)

糟糕的术语是良好思考的敌人。当公司或投资专业人士使用诸如 “EBITDA” 和 “pro forma” 之类的词时，他们往往希望你不加思索地接受一些危险且有缺陷的概念。（在高尔夫里，我的成绩经常在 “pro forma” 口径下低于标准杆：因为我有明确计划要“重组”我的推杆动作，所以我只计算球到达果岭之前的挥杆次数。）

In insurance reporting, “loss development” is a widely used term — and one that is seriously misleading. First, a definition: Loss reserves at an insurer are not funds tucked away for a rainy day, but rather a liability account. If properly calculated, the liability states the amount that an insurer will have to pay for all losses (including associated costs) that have occurred prior to the reporting date but have not yet been paid. When calculating the reserve, the insurer will have been notified of many of the losses it is destined to pay, but others will not yet have been reported to it. These losses are called IBNR, for incurred but not reported. Indeed, in some cases (involving, say, product liability or embezzlement) the insured itself will not yet be aware that a loss has occurred.

在保险披露里，“loss development（损失发展）”是一个被广泛使用的词——而且严重误导。先给个定义：保险公司的损失准备金（loss reserves）不是“留着以备不时之需”的一笔钱，而是一个负债科目（liability account）。如果计算得当，这项负债代表保险公司必须为截至报告日之前已经发生、但尚未支付的所有损失（包括相关费用）最终要付出的金额。在计算准备金时，保险公司已经接到通知的损失有很多，但还有一些损失尚未向它报案。这些损失被称为 IBNR，即 incurred but not reported（已发生但未报案）。事实上，在某些情况下（例如产品责任或监守自盗），连被保险人自己都可能尚未意识到损失已经发生。

It’s clearly difficult for an insurer to put a figure on the ultimate cost of all such reported and unreported events. But the ability to do so with reasonable accuracy is vital. Otherwise the insurer’s managers won’t know what its actual loss costs are and how these compare to the premiums being charged. GEICO got into huge trouble in the early 1970s because for several years it severely underreserved, and therefore believed its product (insurance protection) was costing considerably less than was truly the case. Consequently, the company sailed blissfully along, underpricing its product and selling more and more policies at ever-larger losses.

显然，要为这些已报案与未报案事件的最终成本给出一个数字，对保险公司来说非常困难。但能以合理精度做到这一点至关重要。否则，保险公司的管理层就无法知道真实的损失成本是多少，也无法把这些成本与所收取的保费进行对比。GEICO 在 1970 年代初陷入巨大麻烦，正是因为它连续几年严重少计准备金（underreserved），从而误以为其产品（保险保障）的成本远低于真实水平。结果，公司就“开开心心”地一路航行：不断以过低价格销售保险，保单越卖越多，亏损也越来越大。

When it becomes evident that reserves at past reporting dates understated the liability that truly existed at the time, companies speak of “loss development.” In the year discovered, these shortfalls penalize reported earnings because the “catch-up” costs from prior years must be added to current-year costs when results are calculated. This is what happened at General Re in 2001: a staggering $800 million of loss costs that actually occurred in earlier years, but that were not then recorded, were belatedly recognized last year and charged against current earnings. The mistake was an honest one, I can assure you of that. Nevertheless, for several years, this underreserving caused us to believe that our costs were much lower than they truly were, an error that contributed to woefully inadequate pricing. Additionally, the overstated profit figures led us to pay substantial incentive compensation that we should not have and to incur income taxes far earlier than was necessary.

当事实表明，过去报告日的准备金低估了当时真实存在的负债时，公司就会说发生了“loss development（损失发展）”。在被发现的那一年，这些缺口会惩罚当期的已披露利润，因为在计算当期结果时，必须把前些年遗漏的“补提”成本计入当年成本。这就是 General Re 在 2001 年发生的情况：高达 8 亿美元的损失成本其实发生在更早的年份，但当时没有记录；去年才迟迟确认，并计入当期收益中。我可以向你保证，这个错误是无意的、诚实的。尽管如此，多年来的少计准备金让我们误以为成本远低于真实水平，这一错误又导致我们在定价上严重不足。除此之外，被夸大的利润数字还使我们支付了本不该支付的大额激励薪酬，并且比必要时间更早地缴纳了所得税。

We recommend scrapping the term “loss development” and its equally ugly twin, “reserve strengthening.” (Can you imagine an insurer, upon finding its reserves excessive, describing the reduction that follows as “reserve weakening”?) “Loss development” suggests to investors that some natural, uncontrollable event has occurred in the current year, and “reserve strengthening” implies that adequate amounts have been further buttressed. The truth, however, is that management made an error in estimation that in turn produced an error in the earnings previously reported. The losses didn’t “develop” — they were there all along. What developed was management’s understanding of the losses (or, in the instances of chicanery, management’s willingness to finally fess up).

我们建议把 “loss development（损失发展）” 这个术语扔掉，同时也把它同样丑陋的孪生词 “reserve strengthening（加强准备金）” 扔掉。（你能想象一家保险公司发现准备金计提过多时，会把随后的减少描述为 “reserve weakening（削弱准备金）” 吗？）“loss development” 会让投资者误以为当年发生了某种自然的、不可控的事件；而 “reserve strengthening” 又暗示原本就足够的准备金被进一步加固。但真相是：管理层在估计上犯了错，继而导致此前披露的利润也错了。损失并没有“发展出来”——它一直都在那里。真正“发展”的，是管理层对损失的理解（或者在耍花招的情况下，是管理层终于愿意认账）。

A more forthright label for the phenomenon at issue would be “loss costs we failed to recognize when they occurred” (or maybe just “oops”). Underreserving, it should be noted, is a common — and serious — problem throughout the property/casualty insurance industry. At Berkshire we told you of our own problems with underestimation in 1984 and 1986. Generally, however, our reserving has been conservative.

对这种现象，更坦率的标签应该叫“发生时我们未能确认的损失成本”（或者干脆叫“哎呀”）。需要指出的是，少计准备金（underreserving）在财产/意外险行业里非常常见，而且问题严重。Berkshire 在 1984 年和 1986 年就曾向你们坦承过我们自身低估的问题。不过总体而言，我们的准备金计提一直偏保守。

Major underreserving is common in cases of companies struggling for survival. In effect, insurance accounting is a self-graded exam, in that the insurer gives some figures to its auditing firm and generally doesn’t get an argument. (What the auditor gets, however, is a letter from management that is designed to take his firm off the hook if the numbers later look silly.) A company experiencing financial difficulties — of a kind that, if truly faced, could put it out of business — seldom proves to be a tough grader. Who, after all, wants to prepare his own execution papers?

在那些为生存而挣扎的公司里，严重少计准备金非常常见。某种意义上，保险会计就像一份“自己给自己打分”的考试：保险公司把一些数字提供给审计机构，通常也不会遭到太多争论。（不过审计师会拿到一封管理层签字的说明信，目的在于：如果这些数字以后看起来很荒唐，让审计师事务所能免责。）一家遇到财务困境的公司——这种困境如果真正直面，可能会让它倒闭——很少会做个“严厉的评分者”。毕竟，谁愿意自己准备自己的行刑文件呢？

Even when companies have the best of intentions, it’s not easy to reserve properly. I’ve told the story in the past about the fellow traveling abroad whose sister called to tell him that their dad had died. The brother replied that it was impossible for him to get home for the funeral; he volunteered, however, to shoulder its cost. Upon returning, the brother received a bill from the mortuary for $4,500, which he promptly paid. A month later, and a month after that also, he paid $10 pursuant to an add-on invoice. When a third $10 invoice came, he called his sister for an explanation. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried dad in a rented suit.”

即便企业动机再好，要把准备金计提正确也不容易。我以前讲过一个故事：有个人在国外旅行，他妹妹来电话说父亲去世了。哥哥说自己不可能赶回去参加葬礼，但愿意承担葬礼费用。回国后，哥哥收到殡仪馆账单 4,500 美元，立刻付清。一个月后、又一个月后，他又分别按附加账单付了 10 美元。当第三张 10 美元账单来了，他打电话问妹妹怎么回事。妹妹说：“哦，我忘了告诉你：我们给爸下葬时，用的是一套租来的西装。”

There are a lot of “rented suits” buried in the past operations of insurance companies. Sometimes the problems they signify lie dormant for decades, as was the case with asbestos liability, before virulently manifesting themselves. Difficult as the job may be, it’s management’s responsibility to adequately account for all possibilities. Conservatism is essential. When a claims manager walks into the CEO’s office and says “Guess what just happened,” his boss, if a veteran, does not expect to hear it’s good news. Surprises in the insurance world have been far from symmetrical in their effect on earnings.

保险公司的历史运营里，埋着很多“租来的西装”。它们所代表的问题有时会潜伏几十年才发作——就像石棉责任（asbestos liability）那样——一旦爆发便来势凶猛。尽管这份工作再难，管理层也必须对所有可能性作出充分的会计反映。保守性至关重要。当理赔经理走进 CEO 办公室说“你猜刚发生了什么”，如果 CEO 是老手，他并不期待听到的是好消息。保险世界里的“意外”，对利润的影响从来不是对称的。

Because of this one-sided experience, it is folly to suggest, as some are doing, that all property/casualty insurance reserves be discounted, an approach reflecting the fact that they will be paid in the future and that therefore their present value is less than the stated liability for them. Discounting might be acceptable if reserves could be precisely established. They can’t, however, because a myriad of forces — judicial broadening of policy language and medical inflation, to name just two chronic problems — are constantly working to make reserves inadequate. Discounting would exacerbate this already-serious situation and, additionally, would provide a new tool for the companies that are inclined to fudge.

正因为这种单边经验（坏消息多、好消息少），有人主张把所有财产/意外险准备金都做折现（discount），理由是这些赔付发生在未来，所以其现值小于账面负债——这种建议是愚蠢的。若准备金能被精确测算，折现或许还能接受。但事实是做不到：无数力量——比如司法对保单条款的扩大解释、医疗通胀（medical inflation）等长期顽疾——不断推动准备金走向不足。折现只会让本已严重的问题雪上加霜；而且还会给那些爱“动手脚”的公司提供一件新工具。

I’d say that the effects from telling a profit-challenged insurance CEO to lower reserves through discounting would be comparable to those that would ensue if a father told his 16-year-old son to have a normal sex life. Neither party needs that kind of push.

如果你告诉一位利润压力很大的保险公司 CEO：通过折现把准备金降下来——其后果，大概就像一个父亲对 16 岁儿子说“去过正常的性生活”一样。双方都不需要这种“鼓励”。

Sources of Reported Earnings

已披露利润的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments (primarily relating to “goodwill”) are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In recent years, our “expense” for goodwill amortization has been large. Going forward, generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) will no longer require amortization of goodwill. This change will increase our reported earnings (though not our true economic earnings) and simplify this section of the report.

下表展示了 Berkshire 已披露利润的主要来源。在这种呈现方式中，购并会计调整（purchase-accounting adjustments，主要与 “goodwill（商誉）”相关）不会分配到具体对应的业务上，而是汇总后单独列示。这样做可以让你看到：如果这些业务不是我们买来的，它们本应如何报告其利润。近年来，我们因商誉摊销（goodwill amortization）而计入的“费用”数额很大。往后，通用会计准则（GAAP）将不再要求对商誉进行摊销。这个变化会提高我们已披露的利润（但不会提高我们真实的经济利润），并且会简化本节内容。

Here are some highlights (and lowlights) from 2001 relating to our non-insurance activities:

下面是一些与 2001 年非保险业务相关的亮点（以及槽点）：

• Our shoe operations (included in “other businesses”) lost $46.2 million pre-tax, with profits at H.H. Brown and Justin swamped by losses at Dexter.

我们的鞋类业务（归入 “other businesses”）税前亏损 4,620 万美元：H.H. Brown 和 Justin 的利润被 Dexter 的亏损完全淹没。

I’ve made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in a major way: (1) buying it in the first place;(2) paying for it with stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious. I would like to lay these mistakes on Charlie (or anyone else, for that matter) but they were mine. Dexter, prior to our purchase — and indeed for a few years after — prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem, and I was wrong.

关于 Dexter，我做过三个决定，给你们造成了重大伤害：（1）一开始就不该买它；（2）用股票来支付收购价；（3）在运营明显需要改变时拖拖拉拉、迟迟不动。我很想把这些错误甩锅给 Charlie（或任何其他人），但这确实都是我的错。Dexter 在我们收购之前——事实上甚至在收购后的几年里——尽管面对残酷的低成本海外竞争，仍然经营得不错。我当时判断 Dexter 可以继续应对这个问题，但我错了。

We have now placed the Dexter operation — which is still substantial in size — under the management of Frank Rooney and Jim Issler at H.H. Brown. These men have performed outstandingly for Berkshire, skillfully contending with the extraordinary changes that have bedeviled the footwear industry. During part of 2002, Dexter will be hurt by unprofitable sales commitments it made last year. After that, we believe our shoe business will be reasonably profitable.

我们现在已把规模仍然相当可观的 Dexter 业务，交由 H.H. Brown 的 Frank Rooney 和 Jim Issler 管理。这两位一直为 Berkshire 做得非常出色，并且能够娴熟应对鞋业那些令人头疼的剧烈变化。在 2002 年的部分时间里，Dexter 还会受到去年签下的、并不赚钱的销售承诺所拖累。此后，我们认为我们的鞋类业务将会实现较为合理的盈利水平。

• MidAmerican Energy, of which we own 76% on a fully-diluted basis, had a good year in 2001. Its reported earnings should also increase considerably in 2002 given that the company has been shouldering a large charge for the amortization of goodwill and that this “cost” will disappear under the new GAAP rules.

MidAmerican Energy（按完全稀释口径 fully-diluted basis 计算，我们持有 76%）在 2001 年表现不错。鉴于该公司一直承担着一笔很大的商誉摊销（goodwill amortization）费用，而在新的 GAAP 规则下这项“成本”将消失，MidAmerican 在 2002 年的已披露利润也应会显著增加。

Last year MidAmerican swapped some properties in England, adding Yorkshire Electric, with its 2.1 million customers. We are now serving 3.6 million customers in the U.K. and are its 2nd largest electric utility. We have an equally important operation in Iowa as well as major generating facilities in California and the Philippines.

去年，MidAmerican 通过资产置换（swapped some properties）在英格兰增加了 Yorkshire Electric，其客户数为 210 万。我们目前在英国服务 360 万客户，已成为英国第二大电力公用事业公司。我们在 Iowa 也有同样重要的业务，并在 California 和 the Philippines 拥有大型发电设施。

At MidAmerican — this may surprise you — we also own the second-largest residential real estate brokerage business in the country. We are market-share leaders in a number of large cities, primarily in the Midwest, and have recently acquired important firms in Atlanta and Southern California. Last year, operating under various names that are locally familiar, we handled about 106,000 transactions involving properties worth nearly $20 billion. Ron Peltier has built this business for us, and it’s likely he will make more acquisitions in 2002 and the years to come.

在 MidAmerican——这可能会让你吃惊——我们还拥有全美第二大的住宅房地产经纪（residential real estate brokerage）业务。我们在多个大城市是市场份额领先者，主要集中在 Midwest，并且最近收购了 Atlanta 和 Southern California 的重要公司。去年，我们以若干在当地耳熟能详的品牌名运营，处理了约 106,000 笔交易，涉及的物业价值接近 200 亿美元。Ron Peltier 为我们打造了这项业务，他很可能会在 2002 年及未来几年继续进行更多收购。

• Considering the recessionary environment plaguing them, our retailing operations did well in 2001. In jewelry, same-store sales fell 7.6% and pre-tax margins were 8.9% versus 10.7% in 2000. Return on invested capital remains high.

考虑到零售行业正受衰退环境折磨，我们的零售业务在 2001 年表现不错。珠宝业务方面，同店销售（same-store sales）下降 7.6%，税前毛利率（pre-tax margins）为 8.9%，而 2000 年为 10.7%。投入资本回报率（return on invested capital）依然很高。

Same-store sales at our home-furnishings retailers were unchanged and so was the margin — 9.1% pre-tax — these operations earned. Here, too, return on invested capital is excellent.

我们的家居用品零售商同店销售没有变化，利润率也没有变化——税前 9.1%——这些业务赚到的就是这个水平。这里同样，投入资本回报率非常出色。

We continue to expand in both jewelry and home-furnishings. Of particular note, Nebraska Furniture Mart is constructing a mammoth 450,000 square foot store that will serve the greater Kansas City area beginning in the fall of 2003. Despite Bill Child’s counter-successes, we will keep this store open on Sundays.

我们在珠宝与家居用品两块都在持续扩张。尤其值得一提的是，Nebraska Furniture Mart 正在建设一座巨型门店，面积达 450,000 平方英尺，将从 2003 年秋季开始服务大 Kansas City 地区。尽管 Bill Child 的“反常识”做法屡屡成功，我们仍会让这家店在周日营业。

• The large acquisitions we initiated in late 2000 — Shaw, Johns Manville and Benjamin Moore — all came through their first year with us in great fashion. Charlie and I knew at the time of our purchases that we were in good hands with Bob Shaw, Jerry Henry and Yvan Dupuy, respectively — and we admire their work even more now. Together these businesses earned about $659 million pre-tax.

我们在 2000 年末启动的大型收购——Shaw、Johns Manville 和 Benjamin Moore——在并入后的第一年都表现得非常出色。Charlie 和我在收购时就知道，我们分别把企业交到了 Bob Shaw、Jerry Henry 和 Yvan Dupuy 的好手里——而现在我们对他们的工作更加钦佩。这三家企业合计实现税前利润约 6.59 亿美元。

Shortly after yearend we exchanged 4,740 Berkshire A shares (or their equivalent in B shares) for the 12.7% minority interest in Shaw, which means we now own 100% of the company. Shaw is our largest non-insurance operation and will play a big part in Berkshire’s future.

年末后不久，我们用 4,740 股 Berkshire A 类股（或等值的 B 类股）交换了 Shaw 的 12.7% 少数股东权益，这意味着我们现在 100% 持有这家公司。Shaw 是我们最大的非保险业务，并将在 Berkshire 的未来中扮演重要角色。

• All of the income shown for Flight Services in 2001 — and a bit more — came from FlightSafety, our pilot-training subsidiary. Its earnings increased 2.5%, though return on invested capital fell slightly because of the $258 million investment we made last year in simulators and other fixed assets. My 84-year-old friend, Al Ueltschi, continues to run FlightSafety with the same enthusiasm and competitive spirit that he has exhibited since 1951, when he invested $10,000 to start the company. If I line Al up with a bunch of 60-year-olds at the annual meeting, you will not be able to pick him out.

2001 年 Flight Services 所列示的全部收益——甚至还略多一点——都来自我们的飞行员培训子公司 FlightSafety。其利润增长了 2.5%，但投入资本回报率略有下降，因为我们去年在模拟机（simulators）和其他固定资产上投入了 2.58 亿美元。我那位 84 岁的朋友 Al Ueltschi 仍以与 1951 年（他以 1 万美元创业）时同样的热情与竞争精神经营着 FlightSafety。如果我在年会上把 Al 和一堆 60 岁的人排在一起，你肯定认不出他是哪一个。

After September 11th, training for commercial airlines fell, and today it remains depressed. However, training for business and general aviation, our main activity, is at near-normal levels and should continue to grow. In 2002, we expect to spend $162 million for 27 simulators, a sum far in excess of our annual depreciation charge of $95 million. Those who believe that EBITDA is in any way equivalent to true earnings are welcome to pick up the tab.

9 月 11 日之后，商用航空的培训需求下降，至今仍然低迷。不过，商务与通用航空（business and general aviation）培训——这是我们的主要业务——已接近正常水平，并且应会继续增长。2002 年，我们预计将花费 1.62 亿美元购买 27 台模拟机，这个数额远高于我们每年 9,500 万美元的折旧费用。凡是认为 EBITDA 在任何意义上等同于真实利润的人，欢迎来把这笔账单结了。

Our NetJets® fractional ownership program sold a record number of planes last year and also showed a gain of 21.9% in service income from management fees and hourly charges. Nevertheless, it operated at a small loss, versus a small profit in 2000. We made a little money in the U.S., but these earnings were more than offset by European losses. Measured by the value of our customers’ planes, NetJets accounts for about half of the industry. We believe the other participants, in aggregate, lost significant money.

我们的 NetJets® 分时所有权（fractional ownership）项目去年卖出了创纪录数量的飞机，并且来自管理费与按小时计费的服务收入增长了 21.9%。尽管如此，该业务仍小幅亏损，而 2000 年则是小幅盈利。我们在美国赚了一点钱，但这些收益被欧洲的亏损完全抵消。按客户飞机的价值衡量，NetJets 约占行业一半份额。我们相信其他参与者总体上亏了不少钱。

Maintaining a premier level of safety, security and service was always expensive, and the cost of sticking to those standards was exacerbated by September 11th. No matter how much the cost, we will continue to be the industry leader in all three respects. An uncompromising insistence on delivering only the best to his customers is embedded in the DNA of Rich Santulli, CEO of the company and the inventor of fractional ownership. I’m delighted with his fanaticism on these matters for both the company’s sake and my family’s: I believe the Buffetts fly more fractional-ownership hours — we log in excess of 800 annually — than does any other family. In case you’re wondering, we use exactly the same planes and crews that serve NetJet’s other customers.

维持一流的安全性、安保与服务水准一向成本高昂，而 9 月 11 日之后，坚持这些标准的成本更是被进一步推高。不管代价多大，我们都会继续在这三方面保持行业领先。对客户只提供“最好”的那种不妥协坚持，早已写进公司 CEO、也是分时所有权（fractional ownership）发明者 Rich Santulli 的 DNA 里。无论是对公司还是对我家而言，我都很高兴他在这些问题上的“偏执”：我相信 Buffett 家族飞的分时所有权小时数——我们每年超过 800 小时——比任何其他家庭都多。顺便说一句，如果你在好奇：我们使用的飞机与机组，和 NetJets 的其他客户完全一样。

NetJets experienced a spurt in new orders shortly after September 11th, but its sales pace has since returned to normal. Per-customer usage declined somewhat during the year, probably because of the recession.

9 月 11 日之后不久，NetJets 的新订单曾短暂激增，但此后销售节奏已回归正常。每位客户的使用量在当年略有下降，原因很可能是经济衰退。

Both we and our customers derive significant operational benefits from our being the runaway leader in the fractional ownership business. We have more than 300 planes constantly on the go in the U.S. and can therefore be wherever a customer needs us on very short notice. The ubiquity of our fleet also reduces our “positioning” costs below those incurred by operators with smaller fleets.

我们和客户都能从我们在分时所有权业务中“遥遥领先”的地位里获得显著的运营优势。我们在美国有 300 多架飞机持续运行，因此几乎能在极短时间内出现在客户需要的任何地方。机队的广泛覆盖也让我们的“调机/定位”（positioning）成本低于机队规模更小的运营者。

These advantages of scale, and others we have, give NetJets a significant economic edge over competition. Under the competitive conditions likely to prevail for a few years, however, our advantage will at best produce modest profits.

这些规模优势，以及我们拥有的其他优势，使 NetJets 在经济性上相对竞争对手具备明显优势。不过，在未来几年大概率持续的竞争环境下，这些优势充其量只能带来温和的利润。

• Our finance and financial products line of business now includes XTRA, General Re Securities (which is in a run-off mode that will continue for an extended period) and a few other relatively small operations. The bulk of the assets and liabilities in this segment, however, arise from a few fixed-income strategies, involving highly-liquid AAA securities, that I manage. This activity, which only makes sense when certain market relationships exist, has produced good returns in the past and has reasonable prospects for continuing to do so over the next year or two.

我们的金融与金融产品业务线如今包括 XTRA、General Re Securities（正处于 run-off，也就是逐步收缩/自然到期退出模式，且会持续较长时间）以及其他一些相对较小的业务。不过，这个板块的大部分资产与负债，来自我所管理的若干固定收益策略，标的为高流动性的 AAA 级证券。这类操作只有在某些市场关系成立时才有意义。过去它带来了不错的回报，并且在未来一两年里仍有合理的延续前景。

Investments

投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2001 are itemized.

下面我们列示了我们的普通股投资组合。截至 2001 年末，市值超过 5 亿美元的持仓会被逐项列出。

We made few changes in our portfolio during 2001. As a group, our larger holdings have performed poorly in the last few years, some because of disappointing operating results. Charlie and I still like the basic businesses of all the companies we own. But we do not believe Berkshire’s equity holdings as a group are undervalued.

2001 年我们对投资组合几乎没有做什么调整。总体而言，我们较大的持仓在过去几年表现不佳，其中一些原因是经营业绩令人失望。Charlie 和我仍然喜欢我们所持有的所有公司的基本业务。但我们并不认为 Berkshire 的股票投资组合整体被低估。

Our restrained enthusiasm for these securities is matched by decidedly lukewarm feelings about the prospects for stocks in general over the next decade or so. I expressed my views about equity returns in a speech I gave at an Allen and Company meeting in July (which was a follow-up to a similar presentation I had made two years earlier) and an edited version of my comments appeared in a December 10th Fortune article. I’m enclosing a copy of that article. You can also view the Fortune version of my 1999 talk at our website www.berkshirehathaway.com.

我们对这些证券的克制热情，也与我们对未来十年左右整体股市前景“相当温吞”的看法相一致。我在 7 月参加 Allen and Company 的一次会议时做过一场演讲，阐述了我对股票回报的观点（那次演讲是对两年前类似发言的延续），而我讲话的删节版刊登在 12 月 10 日《Fortune》的一篇文章中。我随信附上该文的复印件。你也可以在我们的网站 www.berkshirehathaway.com上看到《Fortune》版本的 1999 年演讲内容。

Charlie and I believe that American business will do fine over time but think that today’s equity prices presage only moderate returns for investors. The market outperformed business for a very long period, and that phenomenon had to end. A market that no more than parallels business progress, however, is likely to leave many investors disappointed, particularly those relatively new to the game.

Charlie 和我相信，美国企业长期来看会做得不错，但我们认为当前的股价预示投资者只能获得中等回报。市场在很长一段时间里跑赢了企业本身，而这种现象必然要结束。然而，一个最多只能与企业进步“并行”的市场，很可能让许多投资者失望，尤其是那些入场时间不长的新玩家。

Here’s one for those who enjoy an odd coincidence: The Great Bubble ended on March 10, 2000 (though we didn’t realize that fact until some months later). On that day, the NASDAQ (recently 1,731) hit its all-time high of 5,132. That same day, Berkshire shares traded at $40,800, their lowest price since mid-1997.

给喜欢“奇特巧合”的人再来一个：The Great Bubble 在 2000 年 3 月 10 日终结（虽然我们直到几个月后才意识到这一点）。那天，NASDAQ（最近为 1,731）创下历史高点 5,132。同一天，Berkshire 股票成交价为 40,800 美元，这是自 1997 年年中以来的最低价。

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During 2001, we were somewhat more active than usual in “junk” bonds. These are not, we should emphasize, suitable investments for the general public, because too often these securities live up to their name. We have never purchased a newly-issued junk bond, which is the only kind most investors are urged to buy. When losses occur in this field, furthermore, they are often disastrous: Many issues end up at a small fraction of their original offering price and some become entirely worthless.

在 2001 年，我们在“junk（垃圾）”债券上的操作比平时更积极一些。我们要强调的是：这类投资并不适合普通公众，因为这些证券往往真的名副其实。我们从未购买过新发行的垃圾债——而这恰恰是大多数投资者被鼓动去买的那一种。此外，这个领域一旦发生亏损，往往是灾难性的：很多债券最终价格跌到发行价的一小部分，有些甚至会彻底归零。

Despite these dangers, we periodically find a few — a very few — junk securities that are interesting to us. And, so far, our 50-year experience in distressed debt has proven rewarding. In our 1984 annual report, we described our purchases of Washington Public Power System bonds when that issuer fell into disrepute. We’ve also, over the years, stepped into other apparent calamities such as Chrysler Financial, Texaco and RJR Nabisco — all of which returned to grace. Still, if we stay active in junk bonds, you can expect us to have losses from time to time.

尽管风险如此，我们仍会周期性地发现极少数——非常非常少——对我们有吸引力的垃圾债。并且截至目前，我们 50 年的困境债（distressed debt）经验证明回报可观。在 1984 年的年报中，我们曾描述过当 Washington Public Power System 声誉扫地时，我们买入其债券的经历。多年来，我们也介入过其他看似灾难的局面，比如 Chrysler Financial、Texaco 和 RJR Nabisco——它们后来都恢复了体面。不过，即便我们继续参与垃圾债，你也应该预期我们会不时出现亏损。

Occasionally, a purchase of distressed bonds leads us into something bigger. Early in the Fruit of the Loom bankruptcy, we purchased the company’s public and bank debt at about 50% of face value. This was an unusual bankruptcy in that interest payments on senior debt were continued without interruption, which meant we earned about a 15% current return. Our holdings grew to 10% of Fruit’s senior debt, which will probably end up returning us about 70% of face value. Through this investment, we indirectly reduced our purchase price for the whole company by a small amount.

有时，购买困境债会把我们带入更大的交易。Fruit of the Loom 破产初期，我们以大约面值 50% 的价格买入了该公司的公开债务与银行债务。这次破产很不寻常：高级债（senior debt）的利息支付从未中断，这意味着我们获得了约 15% 的当期收益。我们的持仓最终增长到 Fruit 高级债的 10%，而这部分投资很可能最终回收约面值的 70%。通过这笔投资，我们以一种间接方式把整家公司收购价小幅压低了一点。

In late 2000, we began purchasing the obligations of FINOVA Group, a troubled finance company, and that, too, led to our making a major transaction. FINOVA then had about $11 billion of debt outstanding, of which we purchased 13% at about two-thirds of face value. We expected the company to go into bankruptcy, but believed that liquidation of its assets would produce a payoff for creditors that would be well above our cost. As default loomed in early 2001, we joined forces with Leucadia National Corporation to present the company with a prepackaged plan for bankruptcy.

在 2000 年末，我们开始买入 FINOVA Group——一家陷入困境的金融公司——的债务，而这同样把我们引向了一笔重大交易。当时 FINOVA 约有 110 亿美元未偿债务，其中我们买入了 13%，价格约为面值的三分之二。我们预计公司会进入破产程序，但认为其资产清算给债权人的回收将显著高于我们的成本。随着 2001 年初违约迫近，我们与 Leucadia National Corporation 联手，向公司提交了一份预打包（prepackaged）的破产方案。

The plan as subsequently modified (and I’m simplifying here) provided that creditors would be paid 70% of face value (along with full interest) and that they would receive a newly-issued 7½% note for the 30% of their claims not satisfied by cash. To fund FINOVA’s 70% distribution, Leucadia and Berkshire formed a jointly-owned entity — mellifluently christened Berkadia — that borrowed $5.6 billion through FleetBoston and, in turn, re-lent this sum to FINOVA, concurrently obtaining a priority claim on its assets. Berkshire guaranteed 90% of the Berkadia borrowing and also has a secondary guarantee on the 10% for which Leucadia has primary responsibility. (Did I mention that I am simplifying?).

随后经修改后的方案（我这里做了简化）规定：债权人将收到其债权面值的 70% 现金偿付（并且利息全额支付），而对剩余 30% 未被现金满足的部分，债权人将收到一笔新发行的 7.5% 票据（note）。为了给 FINOVA 的这笔 70% 分配提供资金，Leucadia 与 Berkshire 共同成立了一家合资实体——名字起得很顺口：Berkadia。Berkadia 通过 FleetBoston 借入 56 亿美元，并将这笔钱转贷给 FINOVA，同时取得对其资产的优先索偿权（priority claim）。Berkshire 为 Berkadia 的借款提供 90% 的担保，并且对剩余 10%（由 Leucadia 承担主要担保责任的部分）还提供了次级担保。（我有说过我是在“简化”吗？）

There is a spread of about two percentage points between what Berkadia pays on its borrowing and what it receives from FINOVA, with this spread flowing 90% to Berkshire and 10% to Leucadia. As I write this, each loan has been paid down to $3.9 billion.

Berkadia 在借款成本与从 FINOVA 收取的利息之间存在约 2 个百分点的利差，这个利差收益中 90% 归 Berkshire，10% 归 Leucadia。截至我写这段文字时，两笔贷款的余额都已偿还到 39 亿美元。

As part of the bankruptcy plan, which was approved on August 10, 2001, Berkshire also agreed to offer 70% of face value for up to $500 million principal amount of the $3.25 billion of new 7½% bonds that were issued by FINOVA. (Of these, we had already received $426.8 million in principal amount because of our 13% ownership of the original debt.) Our offer, which was to run until September 26, 2001, could be withdrawn under a variety of conditions, one of which became operative if the New York Stock Exchange closed during the offering period. When that indeed occurred in the week of September 11th, we promptly terminated the offer.

作为经 2001 年 8 月 10 日获批的破产方案的一部分，Berkshire 还同意：对 FINOVA 新发行的 32.5 亿美元、票息 7.5% 的新债券，提供一项要约——以面值 70% 的价格，最多收购其中 5 亿美元本金。（其中，因为我们持有原始债务的 13%，我们已经获得了 4.268 亿美元本金的新债。）我们的要约原定持续到 2001 年 9 月 26 日，并可在多种条件下撤回，其中一项条件是：在要约期间如果 New York Stock Exchange 关闭，要约即可撤回。当这一情况确实在 9 月 11 日那周发生后，我们迅速终止了该要约。

Many of FINOVA’s loans involve aircraft assets whose values were significantly diminished by the events of September 11th. Other receivables held by the company also were imperiled by the economic consequences of the attack that day. FINOVA’s prospects, therefore, are not as good as when we made our proposal to the bankruptcy court. Nevertheless we feel that overall the transaction will prove satisfactory for Berkshire. Leucadia has day-to-day operating responsibility for FINOVA, and we have long been impressed with the business acumen and managerial talent of its key executives.

FINOVA 的贷款中有不少以飞机资产为抵押，而 9 月 11 日事件显著削弱了这些资产的价值。公司持有的其他应收款也因当天袭击带来的经济后果而面临风险。因此，FINOVA 的前景已不如我们向破产法院提出方案时那般乐观。尽管如此，我们仍认为总体而言这笔交易会让 Berkshire 觉得满意。Leucadia 负责 FINOVA 的日常经营，而我们长期以来一直很欣赏其核心高管的商业判断力与管理才能。

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It’s déjà vu time again: In early 1965, when the investment partnership I ran took control of Berkshire, that company had its main banking relationships with First National Bank of Boston and a large New York City bank. Previously, I had done no business with either.

又到了“似曾相识”的时刻：1965 年初，当我管理的投资合伙企业取得 Berkshire 的控制权时，这家公司主要的银行往来对象是 First National Bank of Boston 和纽约市的一家大型银行。在此之前，我与这两家银行都没有任何业务往来。

Fast forward to 1969, when I wanted Berkshire to buy the Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford. We needed $10 million, and I contacted both banks. There was no response from New York. However, two representatives of the Boston bank immediately came to Omaha. They told me they would supply the money for our purchase and that we would work out the details later.

时间快进到 1969 年：我希望 Berkshire 收购 Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford。我们需要 1,000 万美元，我就联系了那两家银行。纽约那家毫无回应；但波士顿那家银行却立刻派了两位代表来到 Omaha。他们告诉我：这笔钱他们会提供，具体细节我们以后再谈。

For the next three decades, we borrowed almost nothing from banks. (Debt is a four-letter word around Berkshire.) Then, in February, when we were structuring the FINOVA transaction, I again called Boston, where First National had morphed into FleetBoston. Chad Gifford, the company’s president, responded just as Bill Brown and Ira Stepanian had back in 1969 — “you’ve got the money and we’ll work out the details later.”

接下来的三十年里，我们几乎不向银行借钱。（在 Berkshire，“债务”是个四个字母的脏词——暗指不受欢迎。）后来到了今年 2 月，我们在设计 FINOVA 交易结构时，我又给波士顿打了电话——那时 First National 已经演变成 FleetBoston。公司总裁 Chad Gifford 的反应，和 1969 年 Bill Brown 与 Ira Stepanian 的反应如出一辙：“钱你已经有了，细节我们以后再谈。”

And that’s just what happened. FleetBoston syndicated a loan for $6 billion (as it turned out, we didn’t need $400 million of it), and it was quickly oversubscribed by 17 banks throughout the world. Sooooo . . . if you ever need $6 billion, just give Chad a call — assuming, that is, your credit is AAA.

事情也确实就这么办成了。FleetBoston 牵头组织了一笔 60 亿美元的银团贷款（结果我们并不需要其中 4 亿美元），而且很快就被全球 17 家银行超额认购。所以……如果你哪天也需要 60 亿美元，只要给 Chad 打个电话就行——当然前提是，你的信用评级得是 AAA。

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One more point about our investments: The media often report that “Buffett is buying” this or that security, having picked up the “fact” from reports that Berkshire files. These accounts are sometimes correct, but at other times the transactions Berkshire reports are actually being made by Lou Simpson, who runs a $2 billion portfolio for GEICO that is quite independent of me. Normally, Lou does not tell me what he is buying or selling, and I learn of his activities only when I look at a GEICO portfolio summary that I receive a few days after the end of each month. Lou’s thinking, of course, is quite similar to mine, but we usually end up in different securities. That’s largely because he’s working with less money and can therefore invest in smaller companies than I. Oh, yes, there’s also another minor difference between us: In recent years, Lou’s performance has been far better than mine.

再补充一点关于我们投资的事情：媒体常常报道“Buffett 正在买入”某某证券，所谓“事实依据”来自 Berkshire 提交的申报文件。这类报道有时是对的，但有时 Berkshire 披露的交易其实是 Lou Simpson 在做——他为 GEICO 管理着一只规模 20 亿美元、且与我相当独立的投资组合。通常情况下，Lou 不会告诉我他在买什么、卖什么；我只有在每个月结束后几天，看到一份 GEICO 投资组合摘要时，才会了解他的动作。当然，Lou 的思路与我非常相近，但我们最终往往买的是不同的证券。主要原因是他管理的钱更少，因此可以投资于规模更小的公司。哦，是的，我们之间还有一个小小的差别：近几年，Lou 的业绩比我好得多。

Charitable Contributions

慈善捐赠

Berkshire follows a highly unusual policy in respect to charitable contributions — but it’s one that Charlie and I believe is both rational and fair to owners.

Berkshire 在慈善捐赠方面采取了一项非常不寻常的政策——但 Charlie 和我认为，这既理性又公平，符合所有者的利益。

First, we let our operating subsidiaries make their own charitable decisions, requesting only that the owners/managers who once ran these as independent companies make all donations to their personal charities from their own funds, instead of using company money. When our managers are using company funds, we trust them to make gifts in a manner that delivers commensurate tangible or intangible benefits to the operations they manage. Last year contributions from Berkshire subsidiaries totaled $19.2 million.

首先，我们让各个运营子公司自行作出慈善决定；我们只提出一个要求：那些曾以独立公司身份运营这些业务的所有者/管理者，应当用自己的钱去捐给他们个人偏好的慈善机构，而不是动用公司资金。当我们的经理人在使用公司资金捐赠时，我们相信他们会以能为其所管理业务带来相称的、可见或不可见收益的方式去做捐赠。去年，Berkshire 各子公司的捐赠总额为 1,920 万美元。

At the parent company level, we make no contributions except those designated by shareholders. We do not match contributions made by directors or employees, nor do we give to the favorite charities of the Buffetts or the Mungers. However, prior to our purchasing them, a few of our subsidiaries had employee-match programs and we feel fine about their continuing them: It’s not our style to tamper with successful business cultures.

在母公司层面，我们不做任何捐赠，除非是股东指定的捐赠。我们不为董事或员工的捐赠做配捐（match），也不会捐给 Buffett 家族或 Munger 家族偏好的慈善机构。不过，在我们收购它们之前，少数子公司原本就有员工配捐计划，我们也乐于让它们继续：去干预成功的企业文化，并不是我们的风格。

To implement our owners’ charitable desires, each year we notify registered holders of A shares (A’s represent 86.6% of our equity capital) of a per-share amount that they can instruct us to contribute to as many as three charities. Shareholders name the charity; Berkshire writes the check. Any organization that qualifies under the Internal Revenue Code can be designated by shareholders. Last year Berkshire made contributions of $16.7 million at the direction of 5,700 shareholders, who named 3,550 charities as recipients. Since we started this program, our shareholders’ gifts have totaled $181 million.

为了落实所有者的慈善意愿，每年我们都会通知 A 类股的登记持有人（A 类股代表我们 86.6% 的权益资本），告知他们一个“每股可捐赠金额”，股东可以指示我们把这笔钱捐给最多三家慈善机构。慈善机构由股东指定；支票由 Berkshire 开出。凡是符合 Internal Revenue Code（美国国税法典）规定条件的组织，都可以被股东指定。去年，Berkshire 按照 5,700 名股东的指示捐出了 1,670 万美元，受赠方共计 3,550 家慈善机构。自该项目启动以来，股东指示的捐赠累计已达 1.81 亿美元。

Most public corporations eschew gifts to religious institutions. These, however, are favorite charities of our shareholders, who last year named 437 churches and synagogues to receive gifts. Additionally, 790 schools were recipients. A few of our larger shareholders, including Charlie and me, designate their personal foundations to get gifts, so that those entities can, in turn, disburse their funds widely.

多数上市公司会刻意回避向宗教机构捐赠。但宗教机构却是我们股东最偏好的受赠对象之一：去年股东指定了 437 家教堂和犹太会堂（synagogues）作为受赠方。此外，有 790 所学校也获得捐赠。我们一些较大的股东（包括 Charlie 和我）会指定把捐赠汇入自己的私人基金会，然后再由这些基金会把资金更广泛地分配出去。

I get a few letters every week criticizing Berkshire for contributing to Planned Parenthood. These letters are usually prompted by an organization that wishes to see boycotts of Berkshire products. The letters are invariably polite and sincere, but their writers are unaware of a key point: It’s not Berkshire, but rather its owners who are making charitable decisions — and these owners are about as diverse in their opinions as you can imagine. For example, they are probably on both sides of the abortion issue in roughly the same proportion as the American population. We’ll follow their instructions, whether they designate Planned Parenthood or Metro Right to Life, just as long as the charity possesses 501(c)(3) status. It’s as if we paid a dividend, which the shareholder then donated. Our form of disbursement, however, is more tax-efficient.

我每周都会收到几封信，批评 Berkshire 把钱捐给 Planned Parenthood。这些信通常由某个组织鼓动，意在推动抵制 Berkshire 产品。来信者一贯礼貌而真诚，但他们并不知道一个关键点：做慈善决定的不是 Berkshire，而是其所有者——而这些所有者在观点上多元到超乎你的想象。比如，在堕胎问题上，他们大概率会像美国总体人口一样，正反两派比例相近。只要受赠机构具备 501(c)(3) 资格，无论股东指定 Planned Parenthood 还是 Metro Right to Life，我们都会照办。这就像我们先发放股息，然后股东再去捐赠一样；只不过我们这种分配方式在税务上更有效率。

In neither the purchase of goods nor the hiring of personnel, do we ever consider the religious views, the gender, the race or the sexual orientation of the persons we are dealing with. It would not only be wrong to do so, it would be idiotic. We need all of the talent we can find, and we have learned that able and trustworthy managers, employees and suppliers come from a very wide spectrum of humanity.

无论是购买商品还是雇用人员，我们从不考虑对方的宗教观点、性别、种族或性取向。这样做不仅是错误的，而且是愚蠢的。我们需要我们能找到的一切人才；而我们也已经学到，能力强且值得信赖的经理人、员工与供应商，来自人类非常广阔的光谱。

* * * * * * * * * * *

To participate in our future charitable contribution programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2002 will be ineligible for the 2002 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

要参与我们未来的慈善捐赠项目，你必须持有以实际所有者姓名登记的 A 类股，而不是以经纪商、银行或托管机构的代持名义（nominee name）登记的股票。未在 2002 年 8 月 31 日前完成上述登记的股份，将无法参加 2002 年的项目。当你收到我们寄出的捐赠表格后，请尽快寄回。逾期收到的指定将不予受理。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

This year’s annual meeting will be on Saturday, May 4, and we will again be at the Civic Auditorium. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches can be bought at the Civic’s concession stands.) Except for that interlude, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. Give us your best shot.

今年的年会将在 5 月 4 日（星期六）举行，地点仍在 Civic Auditorium。大门早上 7 点开放，8:30 开始放电影，9:30 正式开会。中午会有一个短暂的用餐休息时间。（三明治可以在 Civic 的小卖部买到。）除了这段插曲外，Charlie 和我将一直回答问题到 3:30。尽管放马过来。

For at least the next year, the Civic, located downtown, is the only site available to us. We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare sure to occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will have a new Convention Center with plenty of parking facilities. Assuming that we then head for the Center, I will poll shareholders to see whether you wish to return to the Monday meeting that was standard until 2000. We will decide that vote based on a count of shareholders, not shares. (This is not a system, however, we will ever institute to decide who should be CEO.)

至少在接下来一年里，位于市中心的 Civic 是我们唯一可用的场地。因此，为了避免工作日必然出现的交通与停车噩梦，我们必须把会议安排在周六或周日。不过，Omaha 很快会拥有一座新的 Convention Center，并配备充足的停车设施。假如我们之后转到新中心，我会就你们是否希望回到 2000 年之前“周一开会”的传统方式，向股东发起投票。投票将按“股东人数”计票，而不是按“持股数量”计票。（当然，我们永远不会用这种制度来决定谁该当 CEO。）

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.

随本报告附上的代理材料（proxy material）里有一份附件，解释了你如何获取进入会场及参加其他活动所需的证件（credential）。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。他们每年都为我们做得非常出色，我在此致谢。

In our usual fashion, we will run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the buses will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

按惯例，我们会从规模较大的酒店安排巴士前往会场。会议结束后，巴士也会把大家送回酒店，并提供前往 Nebraska Furniture Mart、Borsheim’s 以及机场的班次。即便如此，你可能还是会发现有辆车更方便。

We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year that I’m not going to detail all of the products that we will be selling at the meeting. But come prepared to carry home everything from bricks to candy. And underwear, of course. Assuming our Fruit of the Loom purchase has closed by May 4, we will be selling Fruit’s latest styles, which will make you your neighborhood’s fashion leader. Buy a lifetime supply.

今年我们新增了很多公司，我就不逐一细说年会现场会卖哪些产品了。但你要做好准备，带回家的东西从砖头到糖果应有尽有——当然，还有内衣。假如我们对 Fruit of the Loom 的收购在 5 月 4 日前完成交割，我们还会销售 Fruit 的最新款式，让你成为你们社区的时尚风向标。买上一辈子的量吧。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.

GEICO 会设立一个展台，届时将有来自全国各地的多位资深顾问驻场，随时为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能给股东一个特别折扣（通常为 8%）。在我们经营的 49 个司法辖区中，有 41 个允许我们提供这项特别优惠。带上你现有保险的相关信息，看看我们能不能帮你省钱。

At the Omaha airport on Saturday, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home. And, if you buy a fraction of a plane, we might even throw in a three-pack of briefs or boxers.

在周六的 Omaha 机场，我们会像往常一样摆出一批 NetJets® 的飞机供你参观。想看哪架飞机，只要在 Civic 找到工作人员问一下就行。如果你在周末买了我们认为“数量合适”的商品，你可能真的需要一架自己的飞机把它们运回家。而如果你买的是“一架飞机的一个份额”，我们甚至可能再送你一套三条装的内裤（briefs 或 boxers）。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 75-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having ”Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM five years ago, and sales during the ”Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $11.5 million in 2001.

位于 72nd Street（Dodge 与 Pacific 之间）的一块 75 英亩地块上的 Nebraska Furniture Mart，今年仍将提供 “Berkshire Weekend” 价格，也就是给股东提供通常只对员工开放的折扣。我们五年前在 NFM 推出这项特别价格，周末期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2001 年的 1,150 万美元。

To get the discount, you must make your purchases on Thursday, May 2 through Monday, May 6 and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.

要获得折扣，你必须在 5 月 2 日（周四）至 5 月 6 日（周一）期间购物，并出示你的年会入场证件（meeting credential）。这段时间的特别价格甚至也适用于若干知名厂商的产品——这些厂商平时对折扣有“铁律”，但出于股东周末的精神，破例给了你们优惠。我们感谢他们的合作。NFM 的营业时间为：工作日 10:00–21:00，周六与周日 10:00–18:00。

Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 3. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, May 5. Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me). Come by and let us perform a walletectomy on you.

Borsheim’s——全美最大的珠宝店（仅次于 Tiffany’s 的 Manhattan 门店）——将举办两场“仅限股东”的活动。第一场是鸡尾酒会：5 月 3 日（周五）18:00–22:00。第二场主活动（main gala）：5 月 5 日（周日）9:00–17:00。股东价格从周四到周一都适用，所以如果你想避开周五晚和周日的人潮，可以选择其他时间前来，并表明你是股东。周六我们营业到 18:00。Borsheim’s 的毛利率比主要竞争对手足足低 20 个百分点，所以你买得越多，省得越多（至少我太太和女儿是这么告诉我的）。过来吧，让我们对你的钱包做个“切除手术”（walletectomy）。

In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have some of the world’s top bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. We expect Bob and Petra Hamman along with Sharon Osberg to host tables. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded!

在 Borsheim’s 外面的商场里，我们会在周日下午安排一些世界顶级的桥牌专家与股东同桌对弈。我们预计 Bob 和 Petra Hamman 以及 Sharon Osberg 会来坐镇开桌。两届美国国际象棋冠军 Patrick Wolff 也会在商场里接受所有挑战者——而且是蒙眼对弈！

Last year, Patrick played as many as six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and this year will try for seven. Finally, Bill Robertie, one of only two players who have twice won the backgammon world championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game. Come to the mall on Sunday for the Mensa Olympics.

去年，Patrick 最多同时下过六盘棋——而且眼罩一直戴得稳稳的——今年他要挑战同时下七盘。最后，Bill Robertie（全世界只有两位曾两次赢得西洋双陆棋世界冠军的选手之一）也会到场，检验你在这项游戏上的水平。周日到商场来参加 “Mensa Olympics”（门萨奥林匹克）吧。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.

Gorat’s——我最喜欢的牛排馆——将在 5 月 5 日（周日）再次只对 Berkshire 股东开放，营业时间为下午 4 点到晚上 10 点。请记住：周日去 Gorat’s 必须预订。要预订，请在 4 月 1 日致电 402-551-3733（但别提前打）。如果周日订满了，就试试你在 Omaha 期间其他晚上的时段。想显得有品位，就点一份三分熟的 T-bone，再加双份薯饼（hash browns）。

The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at 7 p.m. on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Royals will play the Oklahoma RedHawks. Last year, in an attempt to emulate the career switch of Babe Ruth, I gave up pitching and tried batting. Bob Gibson, an Omaha native, was on the mound and I was terrified, fearing Bob’s famous brush-back pitch. Instead, he delivered a fast ball in the strike zone, and with a Mark McGwire-like swing, I managed to connect for a hard grounder, which inexplicably died in the infield. I didn’t run it out: At my age, I get winded playing a hand of bridge.

按惯例的棒球赛将于周六晚 7 点在 Rosenblatt Stadium 举行。今年 Omaha Royals 将对阵 Oklahoma RedHawks。去年，为了模仿 Babe Ruth 的职业转型，我放弃投球改去打击。当时在投手丘上的是 Omaha 本地人 Bob Gibson，我吓坏了，生怕他来一记著名的“贴身球”（brush-back pitch）。结果他投了一颗落在好球带的快球，我用一个 Mark McGwire 式的大挥棒居然打中了，击出一个强劲的滚地球——但莫名其妙地在内野“死”掉了。我也没全力跑垒：到我这把年纪，打牌打一手桥都能把我累得气喘。

I’m not sure what will take place at the ballpark this year, but come out and be surprised. Our proxy statement contains instructions for obtaining tickets to the game. Those people ordering tickets to the annual meeting will receive a booklet containing all manner of information that should help you enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action in town. So come for Woodstock Weekend and join our Celebration of Capitalism at the Civic.

我不确定今年球场会发生什么，但你可以来，保证有惊喜。我们的委托书声明（proxy statement）里包含了获取球赛门票的说明。订购年会门票的人会收到一本小册子，里面有各种信息，能帮助你在 Omaha 玩得尽兴。城里活动会很多。所以，来参加 Woodstock Weekend 吧，到 Civic 和我们一起庆祝资本主义（Celebration of Capitalism）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, I would like to thank the wonderful and incredibly productive crew at World Headquarters (all 5,246.5 square feet of it) who make my job so easy. Berkshire added about 40,000 employees last year, bringing our workforce to 110,000. At headquarters we added one employee and now have 14.8. (I’ve tried in vain to get JoEllen Rieck to change her workweek from four days to five; I think she likes the national recognition she gains by being .8.)

最后，我要感谢 World Headquarters 那支出色且高产的团队（总部总面积也就 5,246.5 平方英尺），他们让我的工作变得如此轻松。Berkshire 去年新增约 40,000 名员工，使我们的员工总数达到 110,000。总部这边我们只新增了 1 名员工，现在一共是 14.8 人。（我一直徒劳地想让 JoEllen Rieck 把每周四天的工作制改成五天；我觉得她很享受自己因为那 “0.8” 而获得的全国知名度。）

The smooth handling of the array of duties that come with our current size and scope – as well as some additional activities almost unique to Berkshire, such as our shareholder gala and designated-gifts program – takes a very special group of people. And that we most definitely have.

要把我们如今规模与范围所带来的那一大堆职责处理得井井有条——再加上一些几乎只有 Berkshire 才有的额外活动，比如股东晚会与指定捐赠计划——需要一群非常特别的人。而我们确实拥有这样一群人。

February 28, 2002

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2002-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Acquisitions of 2001

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

Principles of Insurance Underwriting

Insurance Operations in 2001

“Loss Development” and Insurance Accounting

Sources of Reported Earnings

Investments

Charitable Contributions

The Annual Meeting

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