In 1994 seven slim accounting experts, all intelligent and experienced, unanimously decided that stock options granted to a company's employees were a corporate expense. Six fat CPAs, with similar credentials, unanimously declared these grants were no such thing.
1994年，七位身材苗条、聪明且经验丰富的会计专家一致认为，授予公司员工的股票期权属于公司费用。六位身材肥胖、资历相当的注册会计师（CPA）则一致宣称此类授予压根算不上费用。
Can it really be that girth, rather than intellect, determines one's accounting principles? Yes indeed, in this case. Obesity -- of a monetary sort -- almost certainly explained the split vote.
难道真是腰围而不是智力决定了一个人的会计原则？在这个案例里，确实如此。这里的“肥胖”——是指金钱层面的肥胖——几乎可以肯定地解释了这种分歧。
The seven proponents of expense recognition were the members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, who earned $313,000 annually. Their six adversaries were the managing partners of the (then) Big Six accounting firms, who were raking in multiples of the pay received by their public-interest brethren.
主张将其列为费用的七人是Financial Accounting Standards Board的成员，他们每年薪资为313,000美元。与之对立的六人是当时Big Six会计师事务所的管理合伙人，他们的收入是这些公共利益同僚的数倍。
In this duel the Big Six were prodded by corporate CEOs, who fought ferociously to bury the huge and growing cost of options, in order to keep their reported earnings artificially high. And in the pre-Enron world of client-influenced accounting, their auditors were only too happy to lend their support.
在这场对决中，Big Six受到了企业CEO的怂恿，这些CEO竭力掩埋不断膨胀的期权成本，以便人为地维持报表利润的高位。而在Enron事件前那个客户影响会计判断的世界里，他们的审计师也乐于提供支持。
The members of Congress decided to adjudicate the fight -- who, after all, could be better equipped to evaluate accounting standards? -- and then watched as corporate CEOs and their auditors stormed the Capitol. These forces simply blew away the opposition. By an 88-9 vote, U.S. senators made a number of their largest campaign contributors ecstatic by declaring option grants to be expense-free. Darwin could have foreseen this result: It was survival of the fattest.
Congress成员决定裁决这场争论——毕竟，还有谁更适合评判会计准则呢？——随后他们眼看着企业CEO及其审计师蜂拥而至国会山。这股力量轻而易举地击溃了反对者。以88比9的投票结果，U.S. senators通过了将期权授予视为“无费用”的决定，让多位最大的竞选金主欢欣鼓舞。达尔文早已能预见这个结果：这是“最胖者生存”。
The argument, it should be emphasized, was not about the use of options. Companies could then, as now, compensate employees in any manner they wished. They could use cash, cars, trips to Hawaii or options as rewards -- whatever they felt would be most effective in motivating employees.
需要强调的是，争论并不是关于是否可以使用期权。那时和现在一样，公司可以按照自己的意愿对员工进行激励：可以用现金、汽车、夏威夷旅行或者期权——任何他们认为最能激励员工的方式。
But those other forms of compensation had to be recorded as an expense, whereas options -- which were, and still are, awarded in wildly disproportionate amounts to the top dogs -- simply weren't counted.
但其他形式的报酬必须计入费用，而期权——当时如此、现在亦然——大量倾斜授予高层，却被直接不计入费用。
The CEOs wanting to keep it that way put forth several arguments. One was that options are hard to value. That is nonsense: I've bought and sold options for 40 years and know their pricing to be highly sophisticated. It's far more problematic to calculate the useful life of machinery, a difficulty that makes the annual depreciation charge merely a guess. No one, however, argues that this imprecision does away with a company's need to record depreciation expense. Likewise, pension expense in corporate America is calculated under wildly varying assumptions, and CPAs regularly allow whatever assumption management picks.
想维持现状的CEO们提出了好几个理由。其一是“期权难以估值”。这纯属无稽之谈：我买卖期权已有40年，深知其定价模型非常成熟。相比之下，估算机器设备的使用年限更棘手，年度折旧额往往只是“估计值”。然而没人据此主张企业可以不计折旧。同理，美国公司的养老金费用在千差万别的假设下计算，CPA也经常接受管理层挑选的任何假设。
Believe me, CEOs know what their option grants are worth. That's why they fight for them.
相信我，CEO非常清楚自己拿到的期权值多少钱——这正是他们如此争取它们的原因。
It's also argued that options should not lead to a corporate expense being recorded because they do not involve a cash outlay by the company. But neither do grants of restricted stock cause cash to be disbursed -- and yet the value of such grants is routinely expensed.
还有人辩称，期权不应计入公司费用，因为它们并不产生现金支出。但授予restricted stock也不会立即付出现金——然而其价值照样被常规计入费用。
Furthermore, there is a hidden, but very real, cash cost to a company when it issues options. If my company, Berkshire, were to give me a 10-year option on 1,000 shares of A stock at today's market price, it would be compensating me with an asset that has a cash value of at least $20 million -- an amount the company could receive today if it sold a similar option in the marketplace. Giving an employee something that alternatively could be sold for hard cash has the same consequences for a company as giving him cash. Incidentally, the day an employee receives an option, he can engage in various market maneuvers that will deliver him immediate cash, even if the market price of his company's stock is below the option's exercise price.
此外，公司发放期权还存在一项隐藏但确实存在的现金成本。假设我的公司Berkshire今天按市价授予我一份10年期、标的为1,000股A类股票的期权，那就是用一个至少价值2,000万美元的资产来补偿我——如果公司把类似期权卖到市场上，今天就能拿到这笔现金。给员工某个“也可以卖成真金白银”的东西，对公司来说与直接给现金没有区别。顺带说一句，员工拿到期权当天就可以通过各种市场操作获取即时现金，即使公司股价当时低于行权价也可以实现。
Finally, those against expensing of options advance what I would call the "useful fairy-tale" argument. They say that because the country needs young, innovative companies, many of which are large issuers of options, it would harm the national interest to call option compensation an expense and thereby penalize the "earnings" of these budding enterprises.
最后，反对将期权列支的人还搬出了我称之为“好用的童话”的论点：他们说国家需要年轻、创新型公司，而这些公司往往大量发放期权；如果把期权薪酬算作费用、从而压低这些新生企业的“利润”，就会损害国家利益。
Why, then, require cash compensation to be recorded as an expense given that it, too, penalizes earnings of young, promising companies? Indeed, why not have these companies issue options in place of cash for utility and rent payments -- and then pretend that these expenses, as well, don't exist? Berkshire will be happy to receive options in lieu of cash for many of the goods and services that we sell corporate America.
那么，为什么现金薪酬要计入费用——这同样会“伤害”有前途的年轻公司的利润？事实上，为什么不让这些公司用期权代替现金去支付水电和租金——然后假装这些费用也不存在呢？对于我们向美国企业出售的诸多商品与服务，Berkshire乐意接受用期权来“替代现金”。
At Berkshire we frequently buy companies that awarded options to their employees -- and then we do away with the option program. When such a company is negotiating a sale to us, its management rightly expects us to proffer a new performance-based cash program to substitute for the option compensation being lost. These managers -- and we -- have no trouble calculating the cost to the company of the vanishing program. And in making the substitution, of course, we take on a substantial expense, even though the company that was acquired had never recorded a cost for its option program.
在Berkshire，我们经常收购那些给员工发期权的公司——随后我们会取消期权计划。当这些公司与我们谈出售时，其管理层理所当然地期待我们提供新的“基于绩效的现金激励”来替代失去的期权。这些管理者——以及我们——都能轻松算出“消失的期权计划”对公司的成本。当然，在进行替代时，我们确实承担了可观的费用，尽管被收购的公司从未在账上记录过其期权计划的成本。
Companies tell their shareholders that options do more to attract, retain and motivate employees than does cash. I believe that's often true. These companies should keep issuing options. But they also should account for this expense just like any other.
公司对股东说，期权在吸引、留住、激励员工方面的效果胜过现金。我相信这往往属实。这些公司可以继续发放期权。但同样必须像对待其他费用那样，把它们记入费用。
A number of senators, led by Carl Levin and John McCain, are now revisiting the subject of properly accounting for options. They believe that American businesses, large or small, can stand honest reporting, and that after Enron-Andersen, no less will do.
由Carl Levin与John McCain牵头的多位参议员正在重审“如何恰当核算期权”这个议题。他们相信，无论大小，美国企业都经得起诚实的报告；在Enron-Andersen之后，低于此标准的做法都不可接受。
I think it is normally unwise for Congress to meddle with accounting standards. In this case, though, Congress fathered an improper standard -- and I cheer its return to the crime scene.
我通常认为Congress插手会计准则并不明智。但在这个案例里，是Congress亲手制造了一个不当的标准——我欢迎他们“重返案发现场”。
This time Congress should listen to the slim accountants. The logic behind their thinking is simple:
这一次，Congress应该听听这些“苗条会计师”的意见。他们的逻辑很简单：
1. If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they?
1）如果期权不是一种薪酬，那它是什么？
2. If compensation isn't an expense, what is it?
2）如果薪酬不是费用，那什么是费用？
3. And if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?
3）如果费用不该计入利润计算，那它们究竟该被记到哪里？
The writer is chief executive officer of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a diversified holding company, and a director of the The Washington Post Co., which has an investment in Berkshire Hathaway.
作者是Berkshire Hathaway Inc.的首席执行官，这是一家多元化控股公司；同时担任The Washington Post Co.的董事，该公司持有对Berkshire Hathaway的投资。