2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Foreign Currencies

Refer To：《2005-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Foreign Currencies

外汇

Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange contracts at yearend, spread among 12 currencies. As I mentioned last year, holdings of this kind are a decided change for us. Before March 2002, neither Berkshire nor I had ever traded in currencies. But the evidence grows that our trade policies will put unremitting pressure on the dollar for many years to come — so since 2002 we’ve heeded that warning in setting our investment course. (As W.C. Fields once said when asked for a handout: “Sorry, son, all my money’s tied up in currency.”)

截至年末，Berkshire 持有约 214 亿美元的外汇合约（foreign exchange contracts），分散在 12 种货币上。正如我去年提到的，这类持仓对我们而言是一个明显的改变。在 2002 年 3 月之前，无论是 Berkshire 还是我本人，都从未交易过货币。但越来越多的证据表明：我们的贸易政策会在未来多年对美元施加持续不断的压力（unremitting pressure）。因此，自 2002 年以来，我们在制定投资路线时就把这条警告当真了。（正如 W.C. Fields 曾在被人讨钱时说的：“抱歉，孩子，我所有的钱都被‘绑’在货币里了。”）

Be clear on one point: In no way does our thinking about currencies rest on doubts about America. We live in an extraordinarily rich country, the product of a system that values market economics, the rule of law and equality of opportunity. Our economy is far and away the strongest in the world and will continue to be. We are lucky to live here.

有一点要说清楚：我们对货币的看法，丝毫不建立在对美国的怀疑之上。我们生活在一个极其富裕的国家，这得益于一种重视市场经济、法治以及机会平等的制度。我们的经济实力远远强于世界其他国家，并且将继续如此。能生活在这里，我们很幸运。

But as I argued in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune, (available at berkshirehathaway.com), our country’s trade practices are weighing down the dollar. The decline in its value has already been substantial, but is nevertheless likely to continue. Without policy changes, currency markets could even become disorderly and generate spillover effects, both political and financial. No one knows whether these problems will materialize. But such a scenario is a far-from-remote possibility that policymakers should be considering now. Their bent, however, is to lean toward not-so-benign neglect: A 318-page Congressional study of the consequences of unremitting trade deficits was published in November 2000 and has been gathering dust ever since. The study was ordered after the deficit hit a then-alarming $263 billion in 1999; by last year it had risen to $618 billion.

但正如我在 2003 年 11 月 10 日《Fortune》的一篇文章（可在 berkshirehathaway.com 查到）里所论证的，我们国家的贸易做法正在拖累美元。美元价值的下跌已经相当显著，但仍很可能会继续。若政策不变，外汇市场甚至可能出现无序波动（disorderly），并产生外溢效应（spillover effects），既可能是政治层面的，也可能是金融层面的。没人知道这些问题是否一定会出现，但这种情景并非遥不可及，决策者现在就应当开始认真考虑。然而，他们的倾向却是走向一种不那么“温和”的放任（not-so-benign neglect）：2000 年 11 月，一份长达 318 页、研究持续贸易逆差后果的国会报告发布后，至今一直在吃灰。这份研究是在 1999 年贸易逆差达到当时令人警惕的 2,630 亿美元之后下令开展的；而到去年，逆差已上升到 6,180 亿美元。

Charlie and I, it should be emphasized, believe that true trade — that is, the exchange of goods and services with other countries — is enormously beneficial for both us and them. Last year we had $1.15 trillion of such honest-to-God trade and the more of this, the better. But, as noted, our country also purchased an additional $618 billion in goods and services from the rest of the world that was unreciprocated. That is a staggering figure and one that has important consequences.

必须强调的是，Charlie 和我相信：真正的贸易——也就是与其他国家交换商品与服务——对我们和他们都极其有利。去年我们有 1.15 万亿美元这种货真价实的贸易，而且这种贸易越多越好。但是，正如前面所说，我们国家还额外从世界其他地方购买了 6,180 亿美元的商品与服务，却没有得到对等回报（unreciprocated）。这是一个惊人的数字，并且会带来重要后果。

The balancing item to this one-way pseudo-trade — in economics there is always an offset — is a transfer of wealth from the U.S. to the rest of the world. The transfer may materialize in the form of IOUs our private or governmental institutions give to foreigners, or by way of their assuming ownership of our assets, such as stocks and real estate. In either case, Americans end up owning a reduced portion of our country while non-Americans own a greater part. This force-feeding of American wealth to the rest of the world is now proceeding at the rate of $1.8 billion daily, an increase of 20% since I wrote you last year. Consequently, other countries and their citizens now own a net of about $3 trillion of the U.S. A decade ago their net ownership was negligible.

这种单向“伪贸易”（pseudo-trade）在会计上必然会有一个平衡项——经济学里总有对冲（offset）——那就是：财富从美国向世界其他地区转移。这种转移可能表现为：我们私营或政府机构给外国人的 IOU（欠条/债权凭证）；也可能表现为：外国人获得我们资产的所有权，比如股票与房地产。无论哪一种，结果都是：美国人最终拥有的“本国份额”减少，而非美国人拥有的份额增加。我们把美国财富“强行喂给”世界其他地区的过程，正以每天 18 亿美元的速度推进，比我去年写信给你时的速度又增加了 20%。因此，如今其他国家及其公民对美国的净拥有（net ownership）已达到约 3 万亿美元；而在十年前，他们的净拥有几乎可以忽略不计。

The mention of trillions numbs most brains. A further source of confusion is that the current account deficit (the sum of three items, the most important by far being the trade deficit) and our national budget deficit are often lumped as “twins.” They are anything but. They have different causes and different consequences.

提到“万亿”会让大多数人的大脑直接麻木。另一个混淆来源是：经常账户逆差（current account deficit，三项之和，其中最重要的一项就是贸易逆差）与国家财政预算赤字（national budget deficit）常被合并称作“双胞胎”（twins）。但它们完全不是一回事：成因不同，后果也不同。

A budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and their citizens have no net ownership of the U.S., 100% of our country’s output belongs to our citizens under any budget scenario, even one involving a huge deficit.

预算赤字并不会减少“国民蛋糕”中属于美国人的那一份。只要其他国家及其公民对美国没有净所有权，那么在任何预算情景下——哪怕是巨额预算赤字——我们国家产出的 100% 仍属于我们的公民。

As a rich “family” awash in goods, Americans will argue through their legislators as to how government should redistribute the national output — that is who pays taxes and who receives governmental benefits. If “entitlement” promises from an earlier day have to be reexamined, “family members” will angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain. Maybe taxes will go up; maybe promises will be modified; maybe more internal debt will be issued. But when the fight is finished, all of the family’s huge pie remains available for its members, however it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.

作为一个物资充盈的富裕“大家庭”，美国人会通过立法者争论：政府应该如何重新分配国家产出——也就是谁缴税、谁获得政府福利。如果过去作出的“福利权利”（entitlement）承诺必须重新审视，“家庭成员”就会愤怒地在内部争吵：谁来承受痛苦。也许税会提高；也许承诺会被修改；也许会发行更多内部债务。但无论争论结果如何，这个家庭巨大的蛋糕仍然全部留在家庭内部供成员分配——不管怎么分，总之不必把任何一片送到国外。

Large and persisting current account deficits produce an entirely different result. As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like a family that consistently overspends its income. As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the “finance company” and less for itself.

规模巨大且持续的经常账户逆差，会带来完全不同的结果。随着时间推移，国外对我们的索取权（claims）不断累积，我们对自己产出的“所有权份额”就会越来越少。某种意义上，世界其他地区正在对美国的产出享受一项不断增长的“特许权使用费”（royalty）。在这里，我们就像一个长期入不敷出的家庭：时间越久，这个家庭发现自己工作越来越像是在为“金融公司”打工，而不是为自己。

Should we continue to run current account deficits comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the U.S. by other countries and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. And, if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would need to send a net of $.55 trillion of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the U.S. investments then held by foreigners. At that date, a decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18 trillion (assuming low inflation, which is far from a sure thing). Therefore, our U.S. “family” would then be delivering 3% of its annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the past. In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.

如果我们继续维持当前这种规模相当的经常账户逆差，那么十年后，其他国家及其公民对美国的净拥有（net ownership）将大约达到 11 万亿美元。并且，如果外国投资者在这部分净持有上只赚取 5% 的回报，那么我们每年就需要向海外净输出 0.55 万亿美元的商品与服务，仅仅用来“支付利息/服务”外国人届时持有的美国投资。到那时——十年之后——我们的 GDP 可能约为 18 万亿美元（假设低通胀，而这并不确定）。因此，我们这个美国“家庭”将把每年产出的 3% 交付给世界其他地区，作为对过去放纵消费的“贡赋”（tribute）。在这种情况下，不同于预算赤字的情形，儿子确实要为父辈的罪孽买单（the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers）。

This annual royalty paid the world — which would not disappear unless the U.S. massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses — would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country that is now aspiring to an “Ownership Society” will not find happiness in — and I’ll use hyperbole here for emphasis — a “Sharecropper’s Society.” But that’s precisely where our trade policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.

这种每年向世界支付的“特许权使用费”（royalty）——除非美国出现大幅度的低消费，并开始长期、持续地实现巨额贸易顺差，否则它不会消失——无疑会在美国引发显著的政治动荡。美国人依然会过得很好，甚至会比现在更好，因为经济仍在增长。但他们会对“永远向海外债权人/资产所有者缴纳贡赋”这件事感到强烈不满。一个如今正追求“Ownership Society（拥有者社会）”的国家，不会在——我这里用夸张手法强调——“Sharecropper’s Society（佃农社会）”里找到幸福。但这正是我们两党（Republicans 和 Democrats）共同支持的贸易政策正在把我们带去的方向。

高负债，并且以银行融资为主，本来该有的样子决定了细节上的表现。

Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of government, have stated that our current-account deficits cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29-30, 2004 say: “The staff noted that outsized external deficits could not be sustained indefinitely.” But, despite the constant handwringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions to tame the burgeoning imbalance.

许多美国金融界的知名人士——无论在政府内外——都表示：我们的经常账户逆差不可能持续。比如，美联储公开市场委员会（Federal Reserve Open Market Committee）2004 年 6 月 29-30 日会议纪要写道：“工作人员指出，过度扩大的对外逆差不可能无限期持续。”但尽管这些大人物不断“忧心忡忡”，他们却没有提出任何实质性建议来抑制这份不断扩大的失衡。

In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned that “a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer.” And so far it hasn’t. Yet policymakers continue to hope for a “soft landing,” meanwhile counseling other countries to stimulate (read “inflate”) their economies and Americans to save more. In my view these admonitions miss the mark: There are deep-rooted structural problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge current-account deficit unless trade policies either change materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could prove unsettling to financial markets.

在我 16 个月前为《Fortune》写的那篇文章中，我警告说：“美元温和下跌并不能解决问题。”迄今为止也确实如此。然而，政策制定者仍在寄望于“软着陆”（soft landing），同时劝告其他国家刺激（也就是“通胀化”inflate）其经济、并劝告美国人多储蓄。在我看来，这些告诫都没有击中要害：除非贸易政策发生实质改变，或者美元出现一种可能令金融市场不安的深度贬值，否则有一些根深蒂固的结构性问题，会使美国继续维持巨额经常账户逆差。

Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam Smith: “What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.”

支持维持现状贸易政策的人，喜欢引用 Adam Smith 的话：“一个家庭在经营上的谨慎，在一个大国的经营中也很难算是愚蠢。如果外国能以比我们自己制造更低的价格提供某种商品，那么最好就用我们本国工业产出的某一部分去购买——而这部分产出应当投入在我们更具优势的领域。”

I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith’s statement refers to trade of product for product, not of wealth for product as our country is doing to the tune of $.6 trillion annually. Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that “prudence” consisted of his “family” selling off part of its farm every day in order to finance its overconsumption. Yet that is just what the “great kingdom” called the United States is doing.

我同意。但请注意：Smith 先生这句话谈的是“用产品换产品”的贸易，而不是像我们国家现在这样“用财富换产品”——规模达到每年 0.6 万亿美元。此外，我确信他绝不会建议说：所谓“谨慎”，就是让他的“家庭”为了资助自己的过度消费，每天卖掉农场的一部分。但这恰恰就是这个名为 United States 的“伟大王国”正在做的事。

If the U.S. was running a $.6 trillion current-account surplus, commentators worldwide would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme form of “mercantilism” — a long-discredited economic strategy under which countries fostered exports, discouraged imports, and piled up treasure. would condemn such a policy as well. But, in effect if not in intent, the rest of the world is practicing mercantilism in respect to the U.S., an act made possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit history. Indeed, the world would never let any other country use a credit card denominated in its own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours. Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine: they may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are rich junkies as well.

如果美国现在运行的是每年 0.6 万亿美元的经常账户顺差，全球评论界一定会猛烈谴责我们的政策，把它视为一种极端的“重商主义”（mercantilism）——这是一种早已被否定的经济策略：国家鼓励出口、抑制进口、并囤积财富（treasure）。我也会谴责这种政策。但现实是：即便不是出于本意，世界其他地区在对待美国时，实际上正在践行重商主义——而这种行为之所以成为可能，是因为我们拥有庞大的资产储备，以及无可挑剔的信用历史。事实上，世界绝不会允许任何其他国家像我们这样，以本国货币计价的信用卡如此无节制地刷下去。眼下，大多数外国投资者仍显得很淡定（sanguine）：他们也许把我们看作“消费成瘾者”，但他们知道我们同时也是“富有的瘾君子”。

Our spendthrift behavior won’t, however, be tolerated indefinitely. And though it’s impossible to forecast just when and how the trade problem will be resolved, it’s improbable that the resolution will foster an increase in the value of our currency relative to that of our trading partners.

不过，我们这种挥霍无度（spendthrift）的行为不可能永远被容忍。虽然不可能预测贸易问题会在何时、以何种方式得到解决，但几乎可以确定：最终的解决方式不太可能推动我们的货币相对贸易伙伴升值。

We hope the U.S. adopts policies that will quickly and substantially reduce the current-account deficit. True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record losses on its foreign-exchange contracts. But Berkshire’s resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets, and both a strong dollar and a low-inflation environment are very much in our interest.

我们希望美国能采取政策，迅速且大幅度地降低经常账户逆差。确实，若迅速解决问题，很可能会让 Berkshire 在外汇合约上记录亏损。但 Berkshire 的资源仍高度集中在以美元计价的资产上；美元强势与低通胀环境都非常符合我们的利益。

If you wish to keep abreast of trade and currency matters, read The Financial Times.This London-based paper has long been the leading source for daily international financial news and now has an excellent American edition. Both its reporting and commentary on trade are first-class.

如果你希望持续跟进贸易与货币问题，可以读《The Financial Times》。这份总部在伦敦的报纸长期以来一直是每日国际金融新闻的最佳来源，如今也有非常出色的美国版。它对贸易的报道与评论都是一流的。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And, again, our usual caveat: macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may well turn out to be wrong in our currency judgments. (Indeed, the fact that so many pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.) If so, our mistake will be very public. The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all of Berkshire’s assets in dollars even as they declined significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake.

再强调一次我们一贯的提醒：宏观经济（macro-economics）是一场艰难的游戏，真正证明自己擅长的人很少——Charlie 和我也包括在内。我们对货币的判断很可能是错的。（事实上，眼下如此多的评论员都在预测美元走弱，这反而让我们不安。）如果我们错了，我们的错误会非常公开地暴露出来。讽刺的是：如果我们选择相反的路线——即便美元资产显著贬值，我们仍把 Berkshire 的全部资产都留在美元里——那我们的错误反而不会被任何人注意到。

John Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” (Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may be derided but never does an individual lemming get criticized.) From a reputational standpoint, Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign-exchange commitment. But we believe in managing Berkshire as if we owned 100% of it ourselves. And, were that the case, we would not be following a dollar-only policy.

John Maynard Keynes 在他那本杰作《The General Theory》中说过：“世俗智慧告诉我们：在名声方面，循规蹈矩地失败，比离经叛道地成功要更好。”（用更不优雅的话说：旅鼠（lemmings）这个群体可能会被嘲笑，但从不会有人去批评某一只具体的旅鼠。）从声誉角度看，Charlie 和我在外汇承诺（foreign-exchange commitment）上承担着明确风险。但我们相信：应当像我们自己拥有 Berkshire 100% 一样去经营它。若真是那样，我们不会奉行“只持美元”的政策。

2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Foreign Currencies

2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Foreign Currencies

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