2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Insurance

Refer To：《2005-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

Insurance

保险业务

Since Berkshire purchased National Indemnity (“NICO”) in 1967, property-casualty insurance has been our core business and the propellant of our growth. Insurance has provided a fountain of funds with which we’ve acquired the securities and businesses that now give us an ever-widening variety of earnings streams. So in this section, I will be spending a little time telling you how we got where we are.

自从 Berkshire 在 1967 年收购 National Indemnity（“NICO”）以来，财产-意外险（property-casualty insurance）一直是我们的核心业务，也是推动我们增长的推进剂（propellant）。保险为我们提供了源源不断的资金之泉，使我们得以收购证券与企业，而这些资产如今又为我们带来了越来越多元的盈利来源。因此在这一部分，我会花一点时间讲讲我们是如何走到今天的。

The source of our insurance funds is “float,” which is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide — insurance protection — is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 purchase has now increased — both by way of internal growth and acquisitions — to $46.1 billion.

我们保险资金的来源是“float”（浮存金），也就是一笔不属于我们、但我们暂时持有的资金。我们的浮存金大多来自两个原因：（1）保费是预先收取的，但我们提供的服务——保险保障——是在一段时间内逐步交付的，这段期间通常覆盖一年；（2）今天发生的损失事件，并不一定会让我们立刻支付理赔，因为有时损失需要很多年后才会被报告（石棉相关损失就是例子）、协商并最终结案。我们在 1967 年收购时带来的 2,000 万美元浮存金，如今已通过内生增长与收购扩大到 461 亿美元。

Float is wonderful — if it doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an underwriting profit is achieved — as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 38 years we have been in the insurance business — float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.

浮存金很美妙——前提是它的“价格”不高。它的成本由承保结果（underwriting results）决定，也就是：我们最终要支付的费用与赔付，与我们已经收取的保费相比究竟如何。当我们取得承保利润（underwriting profit）时——这在 Berkshire 从事保险业务的 38 年里大约有一半年份做到了——浮存金就不只是“免费”，甚至比免费还好：在这些年份里，我们实际上是“拿着别人的钱还能收取报酬”。但对大多数保险公司而言，日子要艰难得多：整体来看，财产-意外险行业几乎总是处于承保亏损状态。当亏损很大时，浮存金就会变得昂贵，甚至带来毁灭性后果。

Insurers have generally earned poor returns for a simple reason: They sell a commodity-like product. Policy forms are standard, and the product is available from many suppliers, some of whom are mutual companies (“owned” by policyholders rather than stockholders) with profit goals that are limited. Moreover, most insureds don’t care from whom they buy. Customers by the millions say “I need some Gillette blades” or “I’ll have a Coke” but we wait in vain for “I’d like a National Indemnity policy, please.” Consequently, price competition in insurance is usually fierce. Think airline seats.

保险公司通常回报很差，原因很简单：它们卖的是一种近似大宗商品的产品（commodity-like）。保单条款（policy forms）相当标准化，市场上供应者众多，其中一些还是互助保险公司（mutual companies，“由保单持有人而非股东‘拥有’”），其盈利目标天然受限。更重要的是，大多数被保险人并不在乎从谁那里买保险。成千上万的消费者会说“我需要一些 Gillette 刀片”或“我要一杯 Coke”，但我们却很难听到有人说“请给我一份 National Indemnity 的保单。”因此，保险行业的价格竞争通常异常激烈。想想航空公司机票座位就知道了。

So, you may ask, how do Berkshire’s insurance operations overcome the dismal economics of the industry and achieve some measure of enduring competitive advantage? We’ve attacked that problem in several ways. Let’s look first at NICO’s strategy.

那么你可能会问：Berkshire 的保险业务是如何克服行业糟糕的经济性，并获得某种可持续的竞争优势的？我们从几个方向去解决这个问题。先从 NICO 的策略讲起。

When we purchased the company — a specialist in commercial auto and general liability insurance — it did not appear to have any attributes that would overcome the industry’s chronic troubles. It was not well-known, had no informational advantage (the company has never had an actuary), was not a low-cost operator, and sold through general agents, a method many people thought outdated. Nevertheless, for almost all of the past 38 years, NICO has been a star performer. Indeed, had we not made this acquisition, Berkshire would be lucky to be worth half of what it is today.

当我们收购这家公司时——它专注于商业车险（commercial auto）和一般责任险（general liability insurance）——它看起来并不具备任何足以克服行业长期困境的优势。它不出名，没有信息优势（公司从来没有雇过精算师），也不是低成本运营者，而且通过一般代理人（general agents）渠道销售——许多人认为这种方式已经过时。尽管如此，在过去 38 年中的几乎所有年份里，NICO 都是明星级的表现者。事实上，如果当年我们没有完成这笔收购，Berkshire 今天的价值能有现在的一半就算走运了。

What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers — but they left us.

我们真正的优势，是一种大多数保险公司根本无法复制的管理者心态（managerial mindset）。看看对页的数据：你能想象有任何一家上市公司，会主动拥抱一种商业模式——它会导致我们在 1986 到 1999 年间经历的那种营收下滑吗？必须强调的是，这种断崖式下滑并不是因为拿不到业务。只要我们愿意降价，市场上有“数十亿美元”的保费规模可以轻易被 NICO 拿到。但我们始终坚持：定价的目标是赚取利润，而不是去匹配我们最乐观的竞争对手的价格。我们从未离开客户——是客户离开了我们。

Most American businesses harbor an “institutional imperative” that rejects extended decreases in volume. What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did business contract last year but that it will continue to drop? In insurance, the urge to keep writing business is also intensified because the consequences of foolishly-priced policies may not become apparent for some time. If an insurer is optimistic in its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated, and years may pass before true loss costs are revealed (a form of self-deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s).

大多数美国企业都有一种“制度性冲动”（institutional imperative），它会本能地排斥长期的业务量下降。哪个 CEO 愿意向股东报告：不仅去年业务收缩了，而且未来还会继续下滑？而在保险业，这种“继续承保、继续做大规模”的冲动会更强，因为愚蠢定价的保单所带来的后果，往往要过一段时间才会显现。如果一家保险公司在准备金计提（reserving）上过于乐观，那么其报表利润就会被高估，而且可能要过很多年，真实的损失成本才会暴露出来。（这是一种自我欺骗，其形式几乎在 1970 年代初毁掉了 GEICO。）

* It takes a long time to learn the true profitability of any given year. First, many claims are received after the end of the year, and we must estimate how many of these there will be and what they will cost. (In insurance jargon, these claims are termed IBNR — incurred but not reported.) Second, claims often take years, or even decades, to settle, which means there can be many surprises along the way. For these reasons, the results in this column simply represent our best estimate at the end of 2004 as to how we have done in prior years. Profit margins for the years through 1999 are probably close to correct because these years are “mature,” in the sense that they have few claims still outstanding. The more recent the year, the more guesswork is involved. In particular, the results shown for 2003 and 2004 are apt to change significantly.

要真正弄清某一年到底赚没赚钱，需要很长时间。首先，很多理赔会在年底之后才收到，我们必须估计会有多少此类理赔、以及它们将花多少钱。（用保险行话说，这类理赔叫 IBNR——incurred but not reported，已发生但未报案。）其次，理赔往往需要多年、甚至几十年才能结案，这意味着过程中可能不断出现意外。基于这些原因，本栏里的结果仅代表我们在 2004 年末对过往年份经营表现的“最佳估计”。截至 1999 年的那些年份，其利润率大概率较为接近真实情况，因为这些年份已经“成熟”（mature）：仍未结清的理赔很少。年份越近，猜测成分越大。尤其是表中 2003 年和 2004 年的结果，很可能会发生显著变化。

Finally, there is a fear factor at work, in that a shrinking business usually leads to layoffs. To avoid pink slips, employees will rationalize inadequate pricing, telling themselves that poorly-priced business must be tolerated in order to keep the organization intact and the distribution system happy. If this course isn’t followed, these employees will argue, the company will not participate in the recovery that they invariably feel is just around the corner.

最后，还有一个“恐惧因素”在起作用：业务收缩通常会导致裁员。为了避免拿到解雇通知（pink slips），员工会为不合理的定价找理由——告诉自己：为了让组织不散、让销售/渠道体系满意，必须容忍那些定价过低的业务。他们还会争辩说，如果不这么做，公司就无法参与到他们“总觉得就在眼前”的那轮复苏中。

To combat employees’ natural tendency to save their own skins, we have always promised NICO’s workforce that no one will be fired because of declining volume, however severe the contraction. (This is not Donald Trump’s sort of place.) NICO is not labor-intensive, and, as the table suggests, can live with excess overhead. It can’t live, however, with underpriced business and the breakdown in underwriting discipline that accompanies it. An insurance organization that doesn’t care deeply about underwriting at a profit this year is unlikely to care next year either.

为了对抗员工“先保自己饭碗”的自然倾向，我们一直向 NICO 的员工承诺：无论业务萎缩得多严重，都不会因为保费规模下降而解雇任何人。（这里不是 Donald Trump 那种地方。）NICO 并不是劳动密集型企业，而且正如表格所示，它可以承受一定的冗余管理费用（excess overhead）。但它承受不了的是：低价承保，以及随之而来的承保纪律（underwriting discipline）崩坏。一个今年都不在乎“以盈利承保”的保险组织，明年也大概率不会在乎。

嘴欠的地方，20年后吃点小亏。

Naturally, a business that follows a no-layoff policy must be especially careful to avoid overstaffing when times are good. Thirty years ago Tom Murphy, then CEO of Cap Cities, drove this point home to me with a hypothetical tale about an employee who asked his boss for permission to hire an assistant. The employee assumed that adding $20,000 to the annual payroll would be inconsequential. But his boss told him the proposal should be evaluated as a $3 million decision, given that an additional person would probably cost at least that amount over his lifetime, factoring in raises, benefits and other expenses (more people, more toilet paper). And unless the company fell on very hard times, the employee added would be unlikely to be dismissed, however marginal his contribution to the business.

当然，一个实行“不裁员政策”的企业，在景气时就必须格外小心，避免人员扩张过头。三十年前，Cap Cities 的 CEO Tom Murphy 用一个假想故事把这个道理牢牢钉进了我的脑子：某位员工向老板申请许可，想招一个助理。这位员工以为，每年多付 2 万美元工资无关紧要。但老板告诉他：这个提议应该被当作一项 300 万美元的决策来评估——因为算上加薪、福利以及其他开销，一个新增员工在其职业生涯里很可能至少要花掉这么多钱（人多了，厕纸也用得更多）。并且，除非公司遭遇极其艰难的时期，否则这个新增员工很可能不会被解雇——无论他对业务的贡献多么边际化。

It takes real fortitude — embedded deep within a company’s culture — to operate as NICO does. Anyone examining the table can scan the years from 1986 to 1999 quickly. But living day after day with dwindling volume — while competitors are boasting of growth and reaping Wall Street’s applause — is an experience few managers can tolerate. NICO, however, has had four CEOs since its formation in 1940 and none have bent. (It should be noted that only one of the four graduated from college. Our experience tells us that extraordinary business ability is largely innate.)

要像 NICO 这样运作，需要真正的坚韧（fortitude），而且这种坚韧必须深深嵌入公司的文化之中。任何看这张表的人，都可以很快扫过 1986 到 1999 年。但在现实中，日复一日地承受业务量不断萎缩——与此同时竞争对手吹嘘增长、收获华尔街掌声——这种体验几乎没几个管理者能忍受。然而，NICO 自 1940 年成立以来换过四位 CEO，没有一位弯过腰。（值得一提的是，这四位里只有一位大学毕业。我们的经验告诉我们：非凡的商业能力在很大程度上是天生的。）

The current managerial star — make that superstar — at NICO is Don Wurster (yes, he’s “the graduate”), who has been running things since 1989. His slugging percentage is right up there with Barry Bonds’ because, like Barry, Don will accept a walk rather than swing at a bad pitch. Don has now amassed $950 million of float at NICO that over time is almost certain to be proved the negative-cost kind. Because insurance prices are falling, Don’s volume will soon decline very significantly and, as it does, Charlie and I will applaud him ever more loudly.

NICO 现任的管理明星——不，应该说是超级明星——是 Don Wurster（没错，他就是“那个毕业生”），自 1989 年起一直负责公司运营。他的“长打率”（slugging percentage）几乎可以和 Barry Bonds 相提并论，因为和 Barry 一样，Don 宁可接受保送（walk），也不愿对一个坏球挥棒。Don 迄今已在 NICO 累积了 9.5 亿美元的浮存金（float），从长期看，几乎可以确定会被证明是那种“负成本”的浮存金。由于保险价格正在下行，Don 的保费规模很快会显著下降；而当这种下降发生时，Charlie 和我会更加热烈地为他鼓掌。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Another way to prosper in a commodity-type business is to be the low-cost operator. Among auto insurers operating on a broad scale, GEICO holds that cherished title. For NICO, as we have seen, an ebb-and-flow business model makes sense. But a company holding a low-cost advantage must pursue an unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy. And that’s just what we do at GEICO.

在类似大宗商品（commodity-type）的行业里，另一个致胜之道是成为低成本运营者（low-cost operator）。在全国性规模经营的车险公司中，GEICO 拥有这个令人向往的头衔。对 NICO 来说，正如我们所见，“涨落有致”（ebb-and-flow）的经营模式是合理的。但一家拥有低成本优势的公司，必须采取“油门踩到底、永不松脚”的策略（unrelenting foot-to-the-floor strategy）。这正是我们在 GEICO 所做的。

NICO、GEICO，两种应对商品化产品的策略。

A century ago, when autos first appeared, the property-casualty industry operated as a cartel. The major companies, most of which were based in the Northeast, established “bureau” rates and that was it. No one cut prices to attract business. Instead, insurers competed for strong, well-regarded agents, a focus that produced high commissions for agents and high prices for consumers.

大约一个世纪前，当汽车刚出现时，财产-意外险行业以一种“卡特尔”（cartel）的方式运作。几家大公司——多数位于美国东北部——制定所谓的“bureau”统一费率，就这么定了。没有人会通过降价来吸引业务。相反，保险公司竞争的是那些强势、声望高的代理人；这种竞争导致代理人佣金很高、消费者价格也很高。

In 1922, State Farm was formed by George Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, who aimed to take advantage of the pricing umbrella maintained by the high-cost giants of the industry. State Farm employed a “captive” agency force, a system keeping its acquisition costs lower than those incurred by the bureau insurers (whose “independent” agents successfully played off one company against another). With its low-cost structure, State Farm eventually captured about 25% of the personal lines (auto and homeowners) business, far outdistancing its once-mighty competitors. Allstate, formed in 1931, put a similar distribution system into place and soon became the runner-up in personal lines to State Farm. Capitalism had worked its magic, and these low-cost operations looked unstoppable.

1922 年，来自伊利诺伊州 Merna 的农民 George Mecherle 创立了 State Farm，目的是利用行业高成本巨头维持的“价格保护伞”（pricing umbrella）。State Farm 采用“专属”（captive）代理人体系，使其获客成本低于那些“bureau 保险公司”（它们依赖“独立”（independent）代理人，而独立代理人会在多家公司之间周旋比价，从而抬高保险公司的获客成本）。凭借低成本结构，State Farm 最终拿下了约 25% 的个人险（personal lines：车险与房屋险）市场份额，远远甩开昔日强大的竞争对手。成立于 1931 年的 Allstate 也建立了类似的渠道体系，很快成为个人险领域仅次于 State Farm 的第二名。资本主义施展了它的魔法：这些低成本运营看起来势不可挡。

But a man named Leo Goodwin had an idea for an even more efficient auto insurer and, with a skimpy $200,000, started GEICO in 1936. Goodwin’s plan was to eliminate the agent entirely and to deal instead directly with the auto owner. Why, he asked himself, should there be any unnecessary and expensive links in the distribution mechanism when the product, auto insurance, was both mandatory and costly. Purchasers of business insurance, he reasoned, might well require professional advice, but most consumers knew what they needed in an auto policy. That was a powerful insight.

但有个叫 Leo Goodwin 的人，想出了一个更高效率的车险公司模式，并用区区 20 万美元在 1936 年创办了 GEICO。Goodwin 的计划是把代理人这一环彻底拿掉，直接与车主交易。他问自己：既然车险既是强制性的（mandatory）又昂贵，那么在销售分销机制里，为什么要保留那些不必要且昂贵的链条（links）？他认为，购买商业保险的客户可能确实需要专业建议，但大多数消费者其实清楚一份车险保单需要什么。这是一个非常强的洞见。

Originally, GEICO mailed its low-cost message to a limited audience of government employees. Later, it widened its horizons and shifted its marketing emphasis to the phone, working inquiries that came from broadcast and print advertising. And today the Internet is coming on strong.

最初，GEICO 把“低成本”理念通过邮寄（mailed）的方式传递给一个小众群体：政府雇员。后来，公司拓宽视野，把营销重点转向电话（phone），通过广播与印刷广告带来的咨询电话来促成投保。而今天，互联网正在强势崛起。

Between 1936 and 1975, GEICO grew from a standing start to a 4% market share, becoming the country’s fourth largest auto insurer. During most of this period, the company was superbly managed, achieving both excellent volume gains and high profits. It looked unstoppable. But after my friend and hero Lorimer Davidson retired as CEO in 1970, his successors soon made a huge mistake by under-reserving for losses. This produced faulty cost information, which in turn produced inadequate pricing. By 1976, GEICO was on the brink of failure.

1936 到 1975 年间，GEICO 从零起步增长到 4% 的市场份额，成为美国第四大车险公司。在这段时期的大部分时间里，公司管理极其出色，同时实现了可观的规模增长与高利润。它看起来同样势不可挡。但在我的朋友与英雄 Lorimer Davidson 于 1970 年卸任 CEO 之后，继任者很快犯下一个巨大错误：对损失准备金计提不足（under-reserving for losses）。这导致成本信息失真，进而导致定价不足。到 1976 年，GEICO 已濒临失败。

Jack Byrne then joined GEICO as CEO and, almost single-handedly, saved the company by heroic efforts that included major price increases. Though GEICO’s survival required these, policyholders fled the company, and by 1980 its market share had fallen to 1.8%. Subsequently, the company embarked on some unwise diversification moves. This shift of emphasis away from its extraordinary core business stunted GEICO’s growth, and by 1993 its market share had grown only fractionally, to 1.9%. Then Tony Nicely took charge.

随后 Jack Byrne 出任 GEICO 的 CEO，几乎凭一己之力通过一系列英雄式举措挽救了公司，其中包括大幅提价。虽然 GEICO 的生存必须如此，但保单持有人纷纷逃离，到 1980 年其市场份额跌至 1.8%。之后，公司又进行了一些不明智的多元化尝试。这种把重心从其非凡核心业务上移开的做法抑制了 GEICO 的增长，到 1993 年其市场份额只略微回升到 1.9%。随后，Tony Nicely 接手。

And what a difference that’s made: In 2005 GEICO will probably secure a 6% market share. Better yet, Tony has matched growth with profitability. Indeed, GEICO delivers all of its constituents major benefits: In 2004 its customers saved $1 billion or so compared to what they would otherwise have paid for coverage, its associates earned a $191 million profit-sharing bonus that averaged 24.3% of salary, and its owner — that’s us — enjoyed excellent financial returns.

而 Tony 上任带来的变化之大，令人惊叹：到 2005 年，GEICO 很可能将拿下 6% 的市场份额。更重要的是，Tony 做到了“增长与盈利并行”。事实上，GEICO 给所有利益相关方都带来了重大好处：2004 年，GEICO 的客户相比其他方案大约节省了 10 亿美元的保费；GEICO 的员工（associates）拿到了 1.91 亿美元的利润分享奖金，平均相当于工资的 24.3%；而它的所有者——也就是我们——则享受了极佳的财务回报。

There’s more good news. When Jack Byrne was rescuing the company in 1976, New Jersey refused to grant him the rates he needed to operate profitably. He therefore promptly — and properly — withdrew from the state. Subsequently, GEICO avoided both New Jersey and Massachusetts, recognizing them as two jurisdictions in which insurers were destined to struggle.

还有更多好消息。1976 年 Jack Byrne 在拯救公司时，新泽西州拒绝批准他需要的费率，导致他无法实现盈利运营。因此他立刻——而且是正确地——退出了该州。此后，GEICO 也一直回避新泽西与马萨诸塞，因为我们认为：这两个司法辖区（jurisdictions）里，保险公司注定会举步维艰。

In 2003, however, New Jersey took a new look at its chronic auto-insurance problems and enacted legislation that would curb fraud and allow insurers a fair playing field. Even so, one might have expected the state’s bureaucracy to make change slow and difficult.

不过在 2003 年，新泽西重新审视了其长期存在的车险问题，并通过立法以遏制欺诈，同时让保险公司能够在一个公平的环境中竞争。即便如此，人们可能仍会预期：州政府官僚体系会让改革推进缓慢、执行艰难。

But just the opposite occurred. Holly Bakke, the New Jersey insurance commissioner, who would be a success in any line of work, was determined to turn the law’s intent into reality. With her staff’s cooperation, GEICO ironed out the details for re-entering the state and was licensed last August. Since then, we’ve received a response from New Jersey drivers that is multiples of my expectations.

然而，事实恰恰相反。新泽西保险监管官 Holly Bakke——无论做哪一行都能成功的人——决心把法律的“意图”变成现实。在她和团队的配合下，GEICO 把重新进入该州的各项细节都理顺了，并在去年 8 月拿到了执照。从那以后，新泽西司机给我们的反馈，远远超出我的预期，成倍增长。

We are now serving 140,000 policyholders — about 4% of the New Jersey market — and saving them substantial sums (as we do drivers everywhere). Word-of-mouth recommendations within the state are causing inquiries to pour in. And once we hear from a New Jersey prospect, our closure rate — the percentage of policies issued to inquiries received — is far higher in the state than it is nationally.

我们现在服务着 140,000 名投保人——约占新泽西市场的 4%——并为他们节省了可观的费用（就像我们在所有地区为车主做的一样）。州内的口碑推荐使得咨询量不断涌入。而且，一旦新泽西的潜在客户（prospect）联系到我们，我们的“成交率”（closure rate：咨询转化为出单的比例）在该州显著高于全国水平。

We make no claim, of course, that we can save everyone money. Some companies, using rating systems that are different from ours, will offer certain classes of drivers a lower rate than we do. But we believe GEICO offers the lowest price more often than any other national company that serves all segments of the public. In addition, in most states, including New Jersey, Berkshire shareholders receive an 8% discount. So gamble fifteen minutes of your time and go to GEICO.com — or call 800-847-7536 — to see whether you can save big money (which you might want to use, of course, to buy other Berkshire products).

当然，我们并不声称能让每个人都省钱。某些公司采用与我们不同的评级（rating）体系，会对某些类别的司机给出比我们更低的费率。但我们相信：在服务所有公众细分人群（all segments of the public）的全国性公司中，GEICO 以更高的频率提供最低价格。除此之外，在大多数州（包括新泽西），Berkshire 股东还能享受 8% 的折扣。所以，拿 15 分钟赌一把，去 GEICO.com 看看——或者拨打 800-847-7536——看看你是否能省下一大笔钱（当然，你也许会想把省下的钱用来购买其他 Berkshire 的产品）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Reinsurance — insurance sold to other insurers who wish to lay off part of the risks they have assumed — should not be a commodity product. At bottom, any insurance policy is simply a promise, and as everyone knows, promises vary enormously in their quality.

再保险（Reinsurance）——也就是卖给其他保险公司的保险；这些公司希望把自己已经承担的一部分风险转移出去（lay off）——按理说不应该是一种大宗商品式的产品（commodity product）。归根结底，任何保险保单不过是一种承诺（promise），而众所周知，承诺的质量差异极大。

NICO和Ajit的再保险是真正的重点，而不是Geico。

At the primary insurance level, nevertheless, just who makes the promise is often of minor importance. In personal-lines insurance, for example, states levy assessments on solvent companies to pay the policyholders of companies that go broke. In the business-insurance field, the same arrangement applies to workers’ compensation policies. “Protected” policies of these types account for about 60% of the property-casualty industry’s volume. Prudently-run insurers are irritated by the need to subsidize poor or reckless management elsewhere, but that’s the way it is.

然而在原保险（primary insurance）的层面，“承诺是谁做出的”往往并没那么重要。比如在个人险（personal-lines）中，州政府会向仍具偿付能力的公司征收评估费（assessments），用来赔付那些破产公司的保单持有人。在商业险领域，工伤赔偿险（workers’ compensation）也有同样安排。这类被“保护”的保单大约占财产-意外险行业保费规模的 60%。经营谨慎的保险公司当然会对“被迫补贴别处糟糕或鲁莽的管理”感到恼火，但现实就是如此。

Other forms of business insurance at the primary level involve promises that carry greater risks for the insured. When Reliance Insurance and Home Insurance were run into the ground, for example, their promises proved to be worthless. Consequently, many holders of their business policies (other than those covering workers’ compensation) suffered painful losses.

而原保险层面的其他商业险，则意味着被保险人要承担更高的“承诺风险”。例如，当 Reliance Insurance 和 Home Insurance 被经营到破产时，它们的承诺就被证明一文不值。结果，许多持有它们商业险保单的人（工伤赔偿险除外）遭受了痛苦的损失。

The solvency risk in primary policies, however, pales in comparison to that lurking in reinsurance policies. When a reinsurer goes broke, staggering losses almost always strike the primary companies it has dealt with. This risk is far from minor: GEICO has suffered tens of millions in losses from its careless selection of reinsurers in the early 1980s.

但即便如此，原保险保单的偿付能力风险（solvency risk），与再保险保单中潜伏的风险相比，也显得小巫见大巫。一旦再保险公司破产，与其交易过的原保险公司几乎总会遭受惊人的损失。这种风险绝非细枝末节：GEICO 就曾因为在 1980 年代初不谨慎地选择再保险人（reinsurers），而遭受过数千万美元的损失。

Were a true mega-catastrophe to occur in the next decade or two — and that’s a real possibility — some reinsurers would not survive. The largest insured loss to date is the World Trade Center disaster, which cost the insurance industry an estimated $35 billion. Hurricane Andrew cost insurers about $15.5 billion in 1992 (though that loss would be far higher in today’s dollars). Both events rocked the insurance and reinsurance world. But a $100 billion event, or even a larger catastrophe, remains a possibility if either a particularly severe earthquake or hurricane hits just the wrong place. Four significant hurricanes struck Florida during 2004, causing an aggregate of $25 billion or so in insured losses. Two of these — Charley and Ivan — could have done at least three times the damage they did had they entered the U.S. not far from their actual landing points.

如果在未来一二十年发生一次真正的“超级灾难”（true mega-catastrophe）——这确实有可能——一些再保险公司将无法生存。迄今为止最大的已保险损失是 World Trade Center 灾难，给保险业造成的损失估计约 350 亿美元。1992 年的 Hurricane Andrew 给保险公司造成的损失约 155 亿美元（按今天币值，这个数字会高得多）。这两件事都震撼了保险与再保险世界。但如果一次特别严重的地震或飓风在“最糟的地点”登陆，1000 亿美元级别的事件——甚至更大的灾难——仍然是可能发生的。2004 年有四场重要飓风袭击佛罗里达，合计造成约 250 亿美元的已保险损失。其中两场——Charley 和 Ivan——如果进入美国的位置离其实际登陆点稍有偏差，造成的损失至少可能是现实的三倍。

Many insurers regard a $100 billion industry loss as “unthinkable” and won’t even plan for it. But at Berkshire, we are fully prepared. Our share of the loss would probably be 3% to 5%, and earnings from our investments and other businesses would comfortably exceed that cost. When “the day after” arrives, Berkshire’s checks will clear.

许多保险公司认为“保险业损失 1000 亿美元”是不可想象（unthinkable）的，甚至不会为此做规划。但在 Berkshire，我们完全做好了准备。我们承担的损失份额大概会是 3% 到 5%；而我们投资与其他业务的盈利，将足以轻松覆盖这项成本。当“灾后第二天”（the day after）到来时，Berkshire 开出的支票一定能兑付。

Though the hurricanes hit us with a $1.25 billion loss, our reinsurance operations did well last year. At General Re, Joe Brandon has restored a long-admired culture of underwriting discipline that, for a time, had lost its way. The excellent results he realized in 2004 on current business, however, were offset by adverse developments from the years before he took the helm. At NICO’s reinsurance operation, Ajit Jain continues to successfully underwrite huge risks that no other reinsurer is willing or able to accept. Ajit’s value to Berkshire is enormous.

尽管这些飓风让我们遭受了 12.5 亿美元的损失，我们的再保险业务去年仍表现不错。在 General Re，Joe Brandon 重新恢复了那种长期以来令人钦佩的“承保纪律文化”（underwriting discipline），而这套文化在一段时间里曾经迷失方向。不过，他在 2004 年对当前业务实现的优异结果，被他上任之前那些年份的负面发展（adverse developments）所抵消。在 NICO 的再保险业务中，Ajit Jain 继续成功承保那些其他任何再保险人都不愿意或无法承接的巨大风险。Ajit 对 Berkshire 的价值极其巨大。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our insurance managers, maximizing the competitive strengths I’ve mentioned in this section, again delivered first-class underwriting results last year. As a consequence, our float was better than costless. Here’s the scorecard:

我们的保险业务经理们，充分发挥了我在本节提到的竞争优势，去年再次交出了“一流”的承保结果。于是，我们的浮存金（float）不仅是“无成本”的，甚至是“负成本”的。下面是成绩单：

Berkshire’s float increased $1.9 billion in 2004, even though a few insureds opted to commute (that is, unwind) certain reinsurance contracts. We agree to such commutations only when we believe the economics are favorable to us (after giving due weight to what we might earn in the future on the money we are returning).

2004 年，Berkshire 的浮存金增加了 19 亿美元，尽管有少数被保险方选择对某些再保险合同进行“commute”（也就是提前结清、解除/反向平仓这些合同）。我们只有在确信对我们而言经济上划算时才会同意这种 commutation（并且会充分考虑：我们把钱退回去之后，未来本可以用这笔钱赚到多少收益）。

To summarize, last year we were paid more than $1.5 billion to hold an average of about $45.2 billion. In 2005 pricing will be less attractive than it has been. Nevertheless, absent a mega-catastrophe, we have a decent chance of achieving no-cost float again this year.

总结一下：去年我们“拿着”平均约 452 亿美元的资金，不仅没付成本，反而被支付了超过 15 亿美元。2005 年的定价会比过去更不吸引人。尽管如此，只要不发生超级灾难（mega-catastrophe），我们今年仍有相当机会再次实现“无成本浮存金”。

2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Insurance

2005-02-28 Warren Buffett.Insurance

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