2006-02-28 Warren Buffett.How to Minimize Investment Returns

2006-02-28 Warren Buffett.How to Minimize Investment Returns


How to Minimize Investment Returns
如何把投资回报降到最低

It’s been an easy matter for Berkshire and other owners of American equities to prosper over the years. Between December 31, 1899 and December 31, 1999, to give a really long-term example, the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497. (Guess what annual growth rate is required to produce this result; the surprising answer is at the end of this section.) This huge rise came about for a simple reason: Over the century American businesses did extraordinarily well and investors rode the wave of their prosperity. Businesses continue to do well. But now shareholders, through a series of self-inflicted wounds, are in a major way cutting the returns they will realize from their investments.
多年来,Berkshire 以及其他持有美国股票的投资者要想获得富足,是一件很容易的事。用一个真正“超长期”的例子来说:从 1899 年 12 月 31 日到 1999 年 12 月 31 日,道琼斯指数从 66 点涨到 11,497 点。(你猜猜需要怎样的年化增长率才能得到这个结果;令人意外的答案在本节末尾。)这种巨幅上涨背后只有一个简单原因:在整个世纪里,美国企业做得异常出色,而投资者只是顺势搭上了它们繁荣的浪潮。企业现在仍在做得很好。但如今,股东们通过一系列“自我伤害”的行为,正在以一种重大的方式削减自己最终能从投资中获得的回报。

The explanation of how this is happening begins with a fundamental truth: With unimportant exceptions, such as bankruptcies in which some of a company’s losses are borne by creditors, the most that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgment Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn. True, by buying and selling that is clever or lucky, investor A may take more than his share of the pie at the expense of investor B. And, yes, all investors feel richer when stocks soar. But an owner can exit only by having someone take his place. If one investor sells high, another must buy high. For owners as a whole, there is simply no magic — no shower of money from outer space — that will enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that created by the companies themselves.
要解释这种情况如何发生,得从一个基本事实说起:除了一些无关紧要的例外(比如破产时部分损失由债权人承担),从现在到审判日(Judgment Day),所有者整体能够赚到的最多的钱,只能等于其企业整体赚到的钱。确实,通过足够聪明或足够幸运的买卖,投资者 A 可能以投资者 B 为代价,多分走一块“馅饼”。而且,当股价暴涨时,所有投资者都会感觉更富有。但所有者要退出,必须有人接替他的位置;一个人如果“高位卖出”,就必然有人“高位买入”。对整体所有者而言,这里面没有任何魔法——不会有来自外太空的“金钱雨”——让他们从公司中提取超过公司自身创造的财富。

Indeed, owners must earn less than their businesses earn because of “frictional” costs. And that’s my point: These costs are now being incurred in amounts that will cause shareholders to earn far less than they historically have.
事实上,所有者赚到的必然比企业赚到的少,因为存在各种“摩擦成本(frictional costs)”。这正是我想强调的:如今这些成本被以一种规模惊人的方式支付着,结果将导致股东获得的回报远低于他们历史上曾经得到的水平。

To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family — generation after generation — becomes richer by the aggregate amount earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually. Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
为了理解这道“收费”是如何膨胀的,不妨做个想象:假设所有美国公司过去、现在、将来都由一个家族拥有。我们把他们叫作 Gotrocks。这个家族在缴纳股息税之后,一代又一代地变得更富有,其财富每年增加的总额等于其公司赚到的总额。如今这大约是每年 7,000 亿美元。当然,这个家族会花掉其中一部分,但它储蓄下来的部分会不断为其复利增长。在 Gotrocks 家里,每个人都以同样速度变富,一切和谐。

But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers — for a fee, of course — obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The Gotrocks still own all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
但现在再假设:有几个能说会道的“帮手(Helpers)”找上门来,说服家族中的每一个成员都尝试通过买入某些亲戚手中的持股、并卖给亲戚另一些持股,来“智胜”自己的亲戚。当然,这些交易需要付费,而 Helpers 很乐意代劳。Gotrocks 仍然拥有“整个美国企业界”,交易只是在家族内部重新分配“谁拥有什么”。于是,这个家族每年的财富增量就变成:美国企业的总盈利减去支付的佣金。家族成员交易越多,他们能分到的“馅饼”就越小,而 Helpers 分到的那一块就越大。经纪型的 Helpers 对此心知肚明:交易活跃对他们最有利,因此他们会用各种方式鼓励大家频繁交易。

After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so well at this new “beatmy-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers. These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a manager — yes, us — and get the job done professionally.” These manager-Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes of Helpers.
过了一阵子,多数家族成员意识到:在这场新的“打败我兄弟(beat-my-brother)”游戏里,他们并没有做得更好。这时又出现了另一类 Helpers。这些新人告诉 Gotrocks 家族的每个人:你单打独斗根本不可能智胜家族其他人。建议的“药方”是:“雇一个经理人——没错,就是我们——让这件事专业化地完成。”这些管理型 Helpers 继续使用经纪型 Helpers 来执行交易;经理人甚至可能把交易做得更频繁,好让经纪人赚得更多。总体而言,“馅饼”里流向两类 Helpers 的份额进一步增大。

The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the worse. The solution? More help, of course.
家族的失望加深了。现在每个人都雇了专业人士,但整体财务状况反而更糟。解决方案?当然是——需要更多帮助。

It arrives in the form of financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this assistance. By now its members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
更多帮助以“理财规划师”和“机构顾问”的形式出现:他们介入并建议 Gotrocks 如何挑选管理型 Helpers。被搞得晕头转向的家族欢迎这份协助。到这时,家族成员已经知道:自己既选不出好股票,也选不出好的“选股者”。那么问题来了:既然连这两件事都做不好,他们又为什么会期待自己能选对顾问?但这个问题并没有在 Gotrocks 脑海里出现,而顾问型 Helpers 当然也不会提醒他们去想这一点。

The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems lost, a fourth group — we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers— appears. These friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are occurring because the existing Helpers — brokers, managers, consultants — are not sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,” the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
Gotrocks 家族如今要养着三类昂贵的 Helpers,发现成绩更差了,于是陷入绝望。但就在希望似乎彻底破灭之际,第四类人出现了——我们叫他们 hyper-Helpers(超级帮手)。这些和善的人告诉 Gotrocks:他们之所以结果不理想,是因为现有的 Helpers——经纪人、经理人、顾问——动力不足,只是在敷衍了事。“你们还能指望一群僵尸做出什么结果呢?”这些新 Helpers 问道。

The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money. Brimming with self-confidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent payments — in addition to stiff fixed fees — are what each family member must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
这些新来的帮手给出一个“惊人地简单”的解决方案:多付钱。他们信心满满地宣称:除了高昂的固定费用之外,还必须支付巨额的“或有报酬”(也就是业绩提成),每个家族成员只有这样掏钱,才能真正在这场较量中胜过自己的亲戚。

The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation, the family decides to pay up.
家族里更敏锐的一些人看出来:有些 hyper-Helpers 其实就是换了制服的 manager-Helpers,只不过胸前缝上了更性感的名字,比如 HEDGE FUND 或 PRIVATE EQUITY。可这些新 Helpers 向 Gotrocks 保证:这身“行头”至关重要,它会赋予穿戴者魔法般的力量,就像温文尔雅的 Clark Kent 换上 Superman 制服后获得的那样。被这个解释安抚后,家族决定照付不误。

And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would go in their entirety to owners — if they all just stayed in their rocking chairs — is now going to a swelling army of Helpers. Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses — and large fixed fees to boot — when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally crooked).
这就是我们今天的处境:如果所有人都老老实实坐在摇椅里不动,本该全部归属于所有者的那部分企业盈利,如今正源源不断流向一支不断膨胀的 Helpers 大军。其中最昂贵的,是近来流行的一种“利润分成”安排:当 Helpers 聪明或走运时,他们能拿走很大一部分胜利果实;而当 Helpers 愚蠢或倒霉(有时甚至不诚实)时,家族成员却要独自承担所有损失——而且还要照样支付高额固定费用。

A sufficient number of arrangements like this — heads, the Helper takes much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the privilege of doing so — may make it more accurate to call the family the Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the burden of paying Helpers may cause American equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to no one.
这类安排只要足够多——正面:Helper 拿走大部分收益;反面:Gotrocks 亏钱,还要为“亏钱的特权”付出高昂代价——那把这个家族叫作 Hadrocks(有石头砸在头上的人)也许更贴切。事实上,今天这个家族的各类摩擦成本,很可能已经高达美国企业整体盈利的 20%。换句话说,支付给 Helpers 的负担,可能会让美国股票投资者整体只能赚到“如果他们什么都不做、也不听任何人”时本该赚到的收益的 80% 左右。

Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion*: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.*
很久以前,Sir Isaac Newton 为我们提出了三大运动定律,这是天才之作。但 Sir Isaac 的天赋并不包含投资:他在 South Sea Bubble 中亏了一大笔,后来解释说:“我能计算星辰的运动,却无法计算人类的疯狂。”如果这次亏损没有给他造成心理阴影,Sir Isaac 很可能还会发现“第四运动定律”:对整体投资者而言,运动越多,回报越少。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Here’s the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section: To get very specific, the Dow increased from 65.73 to 11,497.12 in the 20th century, and that amounts to a gain of 5.3% compounded annually. (Investors would also have received dividends, of course.) To achieve an equal rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to rise by December 31, 2099 to — brace yourself — precisely 2,011,011.23. But I’m willing to settle for 2,000,000; six years into this century, the Dow has gained not at all.
这就是本节开头提出问题的答案:具体来说,20 世纪道琼斯指数从 65.73 上涨到 11,497.12,相当于年复合增长 5.3%。(当然,投资者还会获得股息。)如果要在 21 世纪实现同样的增长率,那么到 2099 年 12 月 31 日,道指必须涨到——做好心理准备——精确的 2,011,011.23 点。不过我愿意把目标下调到 2,000,000;因为在本世纪过去的六年里,道指几乎一点都没涨。

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