2008-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2008-02 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 
 
Our gain in net worth during 2007 was $12.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 11%.  Over the last 43 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $78,008, a rate of 21.1% compounded annually.*
2007 年，我们的净资产增加了 123 亿美元，使我们的 A 类和 B 类股票每股账面价值增长了 11%。在过去 43 年（即自现任管理层接管以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 78,008 美元，年复合增长率为 21.1%*。

Overall, our 76 operating businesses did well last year.  The few that had problems were primarily those linked to housing, among them our brick, carpet and real estate brokerage operations.  Their setbacks are minor and temporary.  Our competitive position in these businesses remains strong, and we have firstclass CEOs who run them right, in good times or bad.
总体而言，我们旗下 76 家运营企业在去年表现良好。出现问题的少数业务主要与住房相关，包括我们的砖块、地毯和房地产经纪业务。这些挫折规模较小且为暂时性的。在这些业务中，我们的竞争地位依然稳固，而且我们拥有一流的 CEO，无论顺境逆境都能把企业管理好。

Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the “weakened lending practices” I described in last year’s letter.  John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: “It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine.”
然而，一些大型金融机构经历了惊人的问题，原因在于它们参与了我在去年股东信中所描述的“放松的放贷做法”。Wells Fargo 的 CEO John Stumpf 恰当地剖析了许多放贷机构近来的行为：“有趣的是，当旧的亏钱方式似乎已经足够好用时，这个行业又发明了新的亏钱方式。”

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, “Please, God, Just One More Bubble.”  Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise.  That conviction made a borrower’s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA – house price appreciation – would cure all problems.  Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief.  As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed.  You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.
你或许还记得 2003 年硅谷的一句车尾贴标语：“上帝啊，再给我们来一个泡沫吧。”不幸的是，这个愿望很快就被满足了，因为几乎所有美国人都开始相信房价会永远上涨。基于这种信念，借款人的收入和现金权益在放贷者眼中似乎变得无足轻重，资金被一铲一铲地倾倒出去，放贷者笃定 HPA（房价升值）会解决所有问题。如今，我们的国家正在为这种错误的信念承受广泛的痛苦。随着房价下跌，大量金融愚行正被揭露。只有当潮水退去，你才知道谁在裸泳——而我们在一些最大的金融机构所目睹的景象，十分难看。

Turning to happier thoughts, we can report that Berkshire’s newest acquisitions of size, TTI and Iscar, led by their CEOs, Paul Andrews and Jacob Harpaz respectively, performed magnificently in 2007.  Iscar is as impressive a manufacturing operation as I’ve seen, a view I reported last year and that was confirmed by a visit I made in the fall to its extraordinary plant in Korea.
再说些更令人高兴的事情，我们可以报告，Berkshire 最新的两笔大型收购——TTI 和 Iscar——在各自 CEO Paul Andrews 和 Jacob Harpaz 的带领下，2007 年表现出色。Iscar 是我所见过最令人印象深刻的制造企业之一，这一看法我在去年已提及，并在我秋季到其位于韩国的卓越工厂参观后再次得到确认。

Finally, our insurance business – the cornerstone of Berkshire – had an excellent year.  Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business – more about them later.  But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.
最后，我们的保险业务——Berkshire 的基石——全年表现优异。部分原因在于我们拥有行业内最强的保险管理团队——稍后我会展开谈。但我们在 2007 年也非常幸运，连续第二年未遭遇重大承保灾害。

That party is over.  It’s a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008.  Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise.  Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so.  If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse.  So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.
这场派对已经结束。可以肯定的是，包含我们在内的保险行业利润率将在 2008 年显著下降。价格在下行，风险敞口却不可避免地上升。即便美国连续第三年灾害较轻，行业利润率也可能缩小约四个百分点。如果狂风咆哮或大地震颤，结果会更糟。因此，请为未来数年保险业务盈利的下行做好准备。

Yardsticks
衡量标准

Berkshire has two major areas of value.  The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents.  At yearend these totaled $141 billion (not counting those in our finance or utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value).
Berkshire 的价值主要来自两个方面。第一是我们的投资：股票、债券和现金等价物。年末这些合计为 1,410 亿美元（不包含我们金融或公用事业业务中的相关资产——这些被归入第二个价值篮子）。

*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares.  Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A.
*本报告中所有每股数据均针对 Berkshire 的 A 股。B 股对应数值为 A 股的 1/30。

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments.  This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur.  Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses.  Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average breakeven results or better in the future.  If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保险浮存金——即我们在保险业务中暂时持有、但并不属于我们的资金——为我们的投资提供了 590 亿美元的资金。只要保险承保达到盈亏平衡，这笔浮存金就是“免费的”，也就是说，我们收到的保费等于我们发生的赔付与费用。当然，保险承保具有波动性，利润与亏损之间会不规则摇摆。然而，从整体历史来看，我们是盈利的，我预计未来平均将实现盈亏平衡或更好。若能做到这一点，我们的投资就可以被视为为 Berkshire 股东提供的、不受负担的价值来源。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance.  These earnings are delivered by our 66 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 76.  In our early years, we focused on the investment side.  During the past two decades, however, we have put ever more emphasis on the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses.
Berkshire 的第二个价值组成部分是来自投资与保险之外的收益。这部分收益由我们 66 家非保险子公司贡献，详见第 76 页。早年我们更侧重于投资端。然而在过去二十年里，我们越来越重视来自非保险业务的收益增长。

The following tables illustrate this shift.  In the first we tabulate per-share investments at 14-year intervals.  We exclude those applicable to minority interests.
下表展示了这种转变。第一张表以 14 年为间隔列示了每股投资额（不含少数股东权益对应的部分）。
 
For the entire 42 years, our compounded annual gain in per-share investments was 27.1%.  But the trend has been downward as we increasingly used our available funds to buy operating businesses.
在整整 42 年里，我们每股投资的年复合增长率为 27.1%。但这一趋势一直在下行，因为我们越来越多地将可用资金用于收购运营性企业。

Here’s the record on how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have grown, again on a pershare basis and after applicable minority interests.
下面是我们的非保险业务盈利增长记录，同样以每股口径呈现，并已扣除相应的少数股东权益影响。


 
For the entire period, the compounded annual gain was 17.8%, with gains accelerating as our focus shifted.
在整个期间，年复合增长率为 17.8%；随着我们重心的转移，增速还有所加快。

Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities.  Berkshire’s past record can’t be duplicated or even approached.  Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.
虽然这些表格有助于形成历史视角并对估值有所裨益，但在预测未来可能性方面却完全具有误导性。Berkshire 过去的成绩既无法复制，甚至也难以接近。我们目前的资产与收益基数过于庞大，未来很难再取得超常规的增益。

Charlie Munger, my partner at Berkshire, and I will continue to measure our progress by the two yardsticks I have just described and will regularly update you on the results.  Though we can’t come close to duplicating the past, we will do our best to make sure the future is not disappointing.
在 Berkshire，我的合伙人 Charlie Munger 和我将继续以我刚刚描述的两把“衡量尺”来评估我们的进展，并定期向你们汇报结果。尽管我们无法接近复制过去，但我们会尽最大努力确保未来不会令人失望。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire.  This is an unusual group in several ways.  First, most of them have no financial need to work.  Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money.
在我们的努力中，加入 Berkshire 的经理人将给予我们巨大的助力。这个群体在多方面都很特殊。首先，他们大多数并不需要为钱而工作。许多人以可观的价格将自己的企业卖给了我们，但他们继续经营这些企业，是出于热爱，而非出于金钱需求。

Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.
他们当然希望获得公平的报酬，但单凭金钱并不是他们努力且高效工作的原因。

A second, somewhat related, point about these managers is that they have exactly the job they want for the rest of their working years.  At almost any other company, key managers below the top aspire to keep climbing the pyramid.  For them, the subsidiary or division they manage today is a way station – or so they hope.  Indeed, if they are in their present positions five years from now, they may well feel like failures.
第二点——与上述相关——这些经理人拥有的是他们在余下职业生涯中真正想要的工作。在几乎任何其他公司，非最高层的关键经理人都渴望继续往“金字塔”上爬。对他们而言，今天管理的子公司或事业部只是中转站——至少他们希望如此。的确，如果五年后他们还在现在的位置上，他们很可能会觉得自己失败了。

Conversely, our CEOs’ scorecards for success are not whether they obtain my job but instead are the long-term performances of their businesses.  Their decisions flow from a here-today, here-forever mindset.  I think our rare and hard-to-replicate managerial structure gives Berkshire a real advantage.
与此相反，我们的 CEO 评判成功的“成绩单”并不是他们能否获得我的职位，而是他们所负责企业的长期表现。他们的决策源于“今日在此、永远在此”的思维方式。我认为，我们这种罕见且难以复制的管理结构赋予 Berkshire 实实在在的优势。

Acquisitions
并购

Though our managers may be the best, we will need large and sensible acquisitions to get the growth in operating earnings we wish.  Here, we made little progress in 2007 until very late in the year.  Then, on Christmas day, Charlie and I finally earned our paychecks by contracting for the largest cash purchase in Berkshire’s history.
尽管我们的经理人可能是最优秀的，但要实现我们期望的经营利润增长，我们仍需要体量大且理性的并购。在这方面，2007 年我们进展不大，直到年底才出现转机。随后，在圣诞节当天，Charlie 和我终于值回“薪水”——签下了 Berkshire 历史上最大的一笔现金收购。

The seeds of this transaction were planted in 1954.  That fall, only three months into a new job, I was sent by my employers, Ben Graham and Jerry Newman, to a shareholders’ meeting of Rockwood Chocolate in Brooklyn.  A young fellow had recently taken control of this company, a manufacturer of assorted cocoa-based items.  He had then initiated a one-of-a-kind tender, offering 80 pounds of cocoa beans for each share of Rockwood stock.  I described this transaction in a section of the 1988 annual report that explained arbitrage.  I also told you that Jay Pritzker – the young fellow mentioned above – was the business genius behind this tax-efficient idea, the possibilities for which had escaped all the other experts who had thought about buying Rockwood, including my bosses, Ben and Jerry.
这笔交易的种子种于 1954 年。那年秋天，我刚入职三个月，就被雇主 Ben Graham 和 Jerry Newman 派去布鲁克林参加 Rockwood Chocolate 的股东大会。这家公司是一家可可制品制造商，刚被一位年轻人接管。他随后发起了一项独一无二的要约，以每股 Rockwood 股票换取 80 磅可可豆。我在 1988 年年报中解释套利的一节描述过这笔交易。我也曾告诉你们，这位名叫 Jay Pritzker 的年轻人——上文提到的那位——是这一高效节税构想背后的商业天才；这种可能性当时并未被其他所有考虑收购 Rockwood 的专家所察觉，包括我的上司 Ben 和 Jerry 在内。

At the meeting, Jay was friendly and gave me an education on the 1954 tax code.  I came away very impressed.  Thereafter, I avidly followed Jay’s business dealings, which were many and brilliant.  His valued partner was his brother, Bob, who for nearly 50 years ran Marmon Group, the home for most of the Pritzker businesses.
在会上，Jay 平易近人，并给我上了一堂关于 1954 年税法的课。我离场时印象深刻。此后，我热切关注 Jay 的商业活动——多且精彩。他的重要合作伙伴是他的兄弟 Bob，后者近 50 年来一直经营 Marmon Group，这是大多数 Pritzker 家族企业的“母港”。

Jay died in 1999, and Bob retired early in 2002.  Around then, the Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors.  Marmon’s largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers.  The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 billion.  All told, Marmon has $7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees.
Jay 于 1999 年去世，Bob 于 2002 年初退休。其后，Pritzker 家族决定逐步出售或重组部分持股，包括 Marmon——一家通过九大板块运营 125 项业务的公司。Marmon 最大的业务是 Union Tank Car，与其加拿大对应企业合计拥有 94,000 节铁路罐车，租赁给各类托运人。该车队的原始成本为 51 亿美元。总体而言，Marmon 的年销售额为 70 亿美元，员工约 20,000 人。

We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years.  Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings.  Prior to our entry into the picture, the Pritzker family received substantial consideration from Marmon’s distribution of cash, investments and certain businesses.
我们将很快收购 Marmon 60% 的股权，并在六年内基本完成剩余股权的收购。我们的初始支出为 45 亿美元，后续收购价格将依据与盈利挂钩的公式确定。在我们介入之前，Pritzker 家族已通过 Marmon 分派现金、投资及剥离部分业务而获得了大量对价。

This deal was done in the way Jay would have liked.  We arrived at a price using only Marmon’s financial statements, employing no advisors and engaging in no nit-picking.  I knew that the business would be exactly as the Pritzkers represented, and they knew that we would close on the dot, however chaotic financial markets might be.  During the past year, many large deals have been renegotiated or killed entirely.  With the Pritzkers, as with Berkshire, a deal is a deal.
这笔交易的达成方式，正合 Jay 的心意。我们只依据 Marmon 的财务报表就达成了价格，不聘请任何顾问，也不事琐碎苛求。我相信该业务与 Pritzker 家族所陈述的完全一致，而他们也相信无论金融市场如何动荡，我们都会准时完成交割。过去一年，许多大型交易被重新谈判或干脆流产。而与 Pritzker 家族打交道，如同与 Berkshire 一样，交易就是交易。

Marmon’s CEO, Frank Ptak, works closely with a long-time associate, John Nichols.  John was formerly the highly successful CEO of Illinois Tool Works (ITW), where he teamed with Frank to run a mix of industrial businesses.  Take a look at their ITW record; you’ll be impressed.
Marmon 的 CEO Frank Ptak 与其长期合作伙伴 John Nichols 密切协作。John 曾任 Illinois Tool Works（ITW）的高绩效 CEO，在那里他与 Frank 携手经营多元化的工业业务。看看他们在 ITW 的战绩；你会印象深刻。

Byron Trott of Goldman Sachs – whose praises I sang in the 2003 report – facilitated the Marmon transaction.  Byron is the rare investment banker who puts himself in his client’s shoes.  Charlie and I trust him completely.
Goldman Sachs 的 Byron Trott——我在 2003 年报告中已称赞过他——促成了这笔 Marmon 交易。Byron 是少有的能真正站在客户立场思考的投行家。Charlie 和我完全信任他。

You’ll like the code name that Goldman Sachs assigned the deal.  Marmon entered the auto business in 1902 and exited it in 1933.  Along the way it manufactured the Wasp, a car that won the first Indianapolis 500 race, held in 1911.  So this deal was labeled “Indy 500.”
你会喜欢 Goldman Sachs 给这笔交易起的代号。Marmon 于 1902 年进入汽车业务，并于 1933 年退出。在此期间它生产过 Wasp，这款车赢得了 1911 年首届 Indianapolis 500 大赛的冠军。因此，这笔交易被命名为 “Indy 500”。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
In May 2006, I spoke at a lunch at Ben Bridge, our Seattle-based jewelry chain.  The audience was a number of its vendors, among them Dennis Ulrich, owner of a company that manufactured gold jewelry.
2006 年 5 月，我在我们位于西雅图的珠宝连锁 Ben Bridge 的一场午餐会上发言。听众是该公司的多家供应商，其中包括一家黄金珠宝制造公司的所有者 Dennis Ulrich。

In January 2007, Dennis called me, suggesting that with Berkshire’s support he could build a large jewelry supplier.  We soon made a deal for his business, simultaneously purchasing a supplier of about equal size.  The new company, Richline Group, has since made two smaller acquisitions.  Even with those, Richline is far below the earnings threshold we normally require for purchases.  I’m willing to bet, however, that Dennis – with the help of his partner, Dave Meleski – will build a large operation, earning good returns on capital employed.
2007 年 1 月，Dennis 打电话给我，建议在 Berkshire 的支持下，他可以打造一家大型珠宝供应商。我们很快就他的业务达成了交易，同时还收购了一家规模相当的供应商。新公司 Richline Group 此后又完成了两笔较小的并购。尽管如此，Richline 的盈利仍远低于我们通常的收购门槛。不过我愿意打赌，Dennis——在其合伙人 Dave Meleski 的协助下——会把业务做大，并获得良好的资本回报。

Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
企业类型——极佳、良好与糟糕

Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on.  And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.
让我们看看什么样的企业会让我们眼前一亮。同时，也谈谈我们希望回避的公司类型。

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag.  We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%.  When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases.  It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
我和 Charlie 寻找具备以下特征的公司：a）我们看得懂的业务；b）长期经济特性良好；c）有能力且值得信赖的管理层；d）合理的价格标签。我们偏好买下整个公司，或者在管理层愿作我们伙伴时，至少持有 80%。当无法获得此类优质控股型收购时，我们也乐于通过二级市场购买伟大企业的一小部分股权。拥有一部分 Hope Diamond 要胜过把整块人造水晶握在手里。

A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital.  The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns.  Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success.  Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
真正伟大的企业必须拥有可持续的“护城河”，以守护其出色的投入资本回报。资本主义的动力机制决定了：凡是能获得高回报的商业“城堡”，竞争者都会一再攻城。因此，像成为行业低成本生产者（GEICO、Costco）或拥有强大的全球品牌（Coca-Cola、Gillette、American Express）这样的坚固壁垒，是长期成功的关键。商业史充斥着“Roman Candles”式的公司——它们的护城河被证明是虚幻的，很快就被跨越。

Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change.  Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty.  A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
我们强调“可持续”，这使我们排除那些处于快速且持续变革行业的公司。尽管资本主义的“创造性破坏”对社会大有裨益，但它排除了投资的确定性。若护城河必须不断重建，最终就等同于没有护城河。

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager.  Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers.  Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
此外，这一标准也排除了那些成败系于“名帅”的企业。诚然，卓越的 CEO 对任何企业都是巨大的资产，Berkshire 也不乏此类经理人。他们的能力创造了数十亿美元的价值——若换作普通 CEO 掌舵，这些价值很可能根本不会出现。

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great.  A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future.  The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes.  You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.
但是，如果一家企业要依赖“超级明星”才能取得卓越业绩，那么这家企业本身就称不上伟大。由本地顶尖脑外科医生领衔的医疗合伙机构，也许能获得超额且增长的收益，但这对其未来并无太多说明。一旦这位医生离开，合伙机构的护城河也随之消失。相反，你可以相信 Mayo Clinic 的护城河会持续存在，尽管你未必叫得出它的 CEO 名字。

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business.  If that comes with rapid organic growth, great.  But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding.  We will  simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere.  There’s no  rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it.  Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.
我们在企业中寻找的是：处于稳定行业中的长期竞争优势。如果还能伴随快速的内生增长，那当然更好。即便没有内生增长，这类企业同样值得拥有。我们会把企业丰厚的利润拿去在别处购买类似的企业。并没有“钱必须投回赚到它的地方”的规则。事实上，这样做往往是错误的：真正伟大的企业，凭借有形资产获得高额回报，但从长期看，它们无法把大部分盈利在内部以高回报率持续再投资。

Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy.  The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow.  Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years.  Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.
以我们的 See’s Candy 这家“梦想企业”的原型为例。它所在的盒装巧克力行业并不吸引人：美国的人均消费极低且没有增长。许多曾经重要的品牌已消失，而在过去 40 年里，只有三家公司获得了超过象征性的利润。事实上，我相信 See’s 虽然主要收入只来自少数几个州，却贡献了整个行业近一半的利润。

At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972.  (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.)  Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually.  Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.
1972 年 Blue Chip Stamps 收购 See’s 时，其年度糖果销量为 1,600 万磅。（当时我和 Charlie 控制着 Blue Chip，后来将其并入 Berkshire。）去年 See’s 的销量为 3,100 万磅，年均增速仅 2%。然而，See’s 家族 50 年来打造的持久竞争优势，随后又由 Chuck Huggins 和 Brad Kinstler 进一步加强，为 Berkshire 带来了非凡的回报。

We bought See’s for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million.  The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million.  (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.)  Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital.  Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations.  First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable.  Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
我们以 2,500 万美元买下 See’s 时，其销售额为 3,000 万美元，税前利润不到 500 万美元。当时经营业务所需资本为 800 万美元。（每年有几个月还需要少量季节性负债。）由此，公司在投入资本上的税前回报达 60%。两点因素帮助将经营所需资金降至最低：第一，产品现金销售，从而消除了应收账款；第二，生产与配送周期短，从而将存货压到最低。

Last year See’s sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million.  The capital now required to run the business is $40 million.  This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business.  In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion.  All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip).  After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses.  Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us.  (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)
去年 See’s 的销售额为 3.83 亿美元，税前利润为 8,200 万美元。如今运营该业务所需资本为 4,000 万美元。这意味着自 1972 年以来，我们仅需再投资 3,200 万美元，便能支撑业务有限的物理扩张——以及相当“不有限”的财务扩张。同时期累计税前利润已达 13.5 亿美元。除这 3,200 万美元外，全部利润都上缴给了 Berkshire（早年则交给 Blue Chip）。在缴纳公司所得税后，我们用剩余资金去收购其他有吸引力的企业。正如 Adam and Eve 开启了最终导致 60 亿人口的活动一样，See’s 为我们“繁衍”出了多条新的现金流。（“要生养众多”这一圣经训令，在 Berkshire 我们是认真的。）
 
There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America.  Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth.  That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
在美国企业界，像 See’s 这样的公司并不多见。通常，将盈利从 500 万美元提升到 8,200 万美元的公司，往往需要大约 4 亿美元的资本性投入来支撑增长。原因在于，成长中的企业既有随销售增长按比例上升的营运资金需求，也有大量固定资产投入需求。

A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment.  There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets.  But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation.  It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements.  Ask Microsoft or Google.
一家企业若需要大量增资来驱动增长，最终也完全可能成为一项令人满意的投资。延续上面的例子，用 4 亿美元净有形资产赚到 8,200 万美元税前利润，并不寒碜。但对所有者而言，这与 See’s 的等式有天壤之别。更理想的是几乎不需要重大资本开支，却能源源不断扩大盈利的企业——去问问 Microsoft 或 Google 就知道了。

One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety.  This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of.  It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.
一个“良好但称不上惊艳”的商业经济学范例是我们的 FlightSafety。这家公司为客户创造的价值不亚于我所知的任何企业。它也具备持久的竞争优势：在飞行训练中选择非最优供应商，就像外科手术只图最低报价。

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow.  When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million.  Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million.  But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced.  (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.)  Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion.  Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996.  That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.
尽管如此，这项业务若要增长，就需要对盈利进行大量再投资。我们在 1996 年收购 FlightSafety 时，其税前经营利润为 1.11 亿美元，固定资产净投资为 5.7 亿美元。自收购以来，累计折旧为 9.23 亿美元；但资本开支合计达到 16.35 亿美元，其中大部分用于采购与不断推出的新机型相匹配的模拟机。（一台模拟机成本可超过 1,200 万美元，我们共拥有 273 台。）目前我们的固定资产（扣除折旧后）为 10.79 亿美元。2007 年税前经营利润为 2.7 亿美元，较 1996 年增加 1.59 亿美元。就这 5.09 亿美元的增量投资而言，回报“不错”，但远非 See’s 式的卓越。

Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business.  Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations.  For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category.  We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
因此，若仅以经济回报衡量，FlightSafety 是一家“优秀但不非凡”的企业。它“多投才能多赚”的体验，正是大多数公司所面对的现实。比如，我们对受监管公用事业的大额投资就完全属于这一类。十年后我们将在这项业务上赚到更多的钱，但为此需要投入数十亿美元。

Now let’s move to the gruesome.  The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money.  Think airlines.  Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers.  Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
现在说说“糟糕至极”的类型。最糟糕的企业是那种增长很快、需要大量资本来支撑增长，但最终几乎赚不到钱的公司。想想航空业。从 Wright Brothers 的年代起，行业内一直难以形成持久的竞争优势。事实上，如果当年 Kitty Hawk 现场有一位有远见的资本家，朝 Orville 开一枪，倒可能是对其后继者的大恩大德。

The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable.  Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it.  And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989.  As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid.  But we then got very lucky.  In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain.  In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt.  Twice.
自首次飞行以来，航空业对资本的渴求从未满足过。投资者被增长所诱惑，把资金倒进了无底洞，而他们本该被这种增长吓退。羞愧的是，1989 年我让 Berkshire 购买了 U.S. Air 的优先股，亲自参与了这场愚蠢。当我们的支票墨迹未干，公司就陷入急转直下，不久连优先股股息都停发了。随后我们走了大运：在航空业周期性、但总是被误导的乐观情绪又一次来临时，我们在 1998 年竟然高位卖出了持股并获得了可观收益。在我们卖出后的十年里，这家公司破产了两次。

To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.”  The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass.  The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added.  Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.
总结一下，可以把企业想象成三类“储蓄账户”。“极佳”的账户支付异常高的利率，且会随时间推移不断上升；“良好”的账户支付颇具吸引力的利率，而且新增存款也能享受同样的回报；“糟糕”的账户不仅利率低得令人失望，还要求你不断以同样令人失望的回报继续往里加钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
And now it’s confession time.  It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe.  In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.
现在该“忏悔”了。需要说明的是，我接下来要谈到的错误，并非由任何顾问、董事会或投行推动。用网球术语讲，它们都是“非受迫性失误”。

To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase.  The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million.  Fortunately, he caved.  Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.
首先，我几乎把 See’s 的收购搞砸了。卖方要价 3,000 万美元，而我坚持不超过 2,500 万美元。幸运的是，他妥协了。否则我就会打退堂鼓，而那 13.5 亿美元的后来收益就会落入别人手中。

About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million.  The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it.  I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth.  They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.
在收购 See’s 的差不多同一时期，当时掌管 Capital Cities Broadcasting 的 Tom Murphy 打电话给我，开价 3,500 万美元，出售 Dallas-Fort Worth 的 NBC 电视台。该电视台与 Capital Cities 正在收购的 Fort Worth 报纸捆绑，而根据“交叉持有”规则，Murph 必须剥离电视台。我很清楚，电视台是类似 See’s 的业务：几乎无需资本投入，且增长前景极佳；经营简单，并源源不断向所有者“洒钱”。

Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being.  He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work.  In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear.  But I didn’t listen.
更何况，Murph 当时（直到现在）都是我的至交，我钦佩他既是卓越的管理者，又是出色的人。他对电视业务了如指掌；若不是确信这笔收购一定可行，他不会打这个电话。等于是他在我耳边轻声说“买”。但我没听。

In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion – almost all available to its owner for other purposes.  Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million.  Why did I say “no”?  The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me.  (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)
到 2006 年，这家电视台实现了 7,300 万美元税前利润；自我拒绝那笔交易以来，其累计利润至少达 10 亿美元——几乎全部可供所有者用于其他用途。而且，这项资产如今的资本价值约为 8 亿美元。我当初为什么说“不”？唯一的解释是我的大脑去度假了，却忘了通知我。（我的表现像 Molly Ivins 描述过的一位政客：“如果他的智商再低一点，你就得一天给他浇两次水。”）

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A).  What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years.  But that’s just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely.  That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion.  In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business – one now valued at $220 billion – to buy a worthless business.
最后，我说“行”的 Dexter（鞋业）更是一个更糟糕的错误：1993 年我用 4.33 亿美元的 Berkshire 股票（A 股 25,203 股）收购了它。我当初判断的“持久竞争优势”几年内就烟消云散。但这只是开始：使用 Berkshire 股票支付对价，让我把这个错误“几何级放大”。这一举动使 Berkshire 股东付出的代价不是 4 亿美元，而是 35 亿美元。本质上，我拿走了一家极其优秀企业 1.6% 的股权——这家公司如今市值 2,200 亿美元——去换一桩一文不值的生意。

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made.  But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that.  A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”
迄今为止，Dexter 是我做过的最糟糕的一笔交易。但将来我还会犯更多错误——你可以对此下注。正如 Bobby Bare 的乡村歌曲里一句歌词所言，恰好说明并购中常常发生的事：“上床时我从没遇到丑女人，但醒来时确实有过几次。”

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire.  Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics.  Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis.  So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们来审视 Berkshire 的四大运营板块。每个板块的资产负债表和损益结构差异极大。因此，把它们混在一起会妨碍分析。我们会将其作为四家独立的业务来呈现——这也是我和 Charlie 看待它们的方式。

Insurance
保险

The best anecdote I’ve heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney, who asked his wife, Ann, “When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be president?”  To which she replied, “Honey, you weren’t in my wildest dreams.”
我在当前总统竞选中听到的最佳轶事来自 Mitt Romney。他问妻子 Ann：“我们年轻的时候，你可曾在你最狂野的梦想里想过我会当总统？”她回答：“亲爱的，你可从不在我最狂野的梦里出现。”

When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation.  Here’s how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:
1967 年我们首次进入财产/意外伤害保险业务时，即便在我最狂野的梦想里，也没想到会发展到今天的规模。以下是我们在收购 National Indemnity 后前五年的业绩记录：


 
To put it charitably, we were a slow starter.  But things changed.  Here’s the record of the last five years:
客气点说，我们起步很慢。但后来情况有了变化。以下是最近五年的业绩记录：

 
 
This metamorphosis has been accomplished by some extraordinary managers.  Let’s look at what each has achieved.
这种蜕变要归功于几位非凡的经理人。让我们看看他们各自取得了什么成就。

• GEICO possesses the widest moat of any of our insurers, one carefully protected and expanded by Tony Nicely, its CEO.  Last year – again – GEICO had the best growth record among major auto insurers, increasing its market share to 7.2%.  When Berkshire acquired control in 1995, that share was 2.5%.  Not coincidentally, annual ad expenditures by GEICO have increased from $31 million to $751 million during the same period.
• 在我们的各家保险公司中，GEICO 的护城河最宽，这一道护城河由其 CEO Tony Nicely 精心守护并不断拓展。去年，GEICO 再次在主要汽车保险公司中录得最佳增长，市场份额提升至 7.2%。当 Berkshire 于 1995 年取得控股权时，这一份额仅为 2.5%。并非巧合的是，同期 GEICO 的年度广告支出从 3,100 万美元增至 7.51 亿美元。

Tony, now 64, joined GEICO at 18.  Every day since, he has been passionate about the company – proud of how it could both save money for its customers and provide growth opportunities for its associates.  Even now, with sales at $12 billion, Tony feels GEICO is just getting started.  So do I.
Tony 现年 64 岁，18 岁加入 GEICO。从那时起，他每天都对公司充满热情——既为能为客户省钱而自豪，也为能为同事提供成长机会而自豪。即便如今销售额已达 120 亿美元，Tony 仍觉得 GEICO 刚刚起步。我也一样。

Here’s some evidence.  In the last three years, GEICO has increased its share of the motorcycle market from 2.1% to 6%.  We’ve also recently begun writing policies on ATVs and RVs.  And in November we wrote our first commercial auto policy.  GEICO and National Indemnity are working together in the commercial field, and early results are very encouraging.
证据如下：过去三年，GEICO 在摩托车市场的份额从 2.1% 提升到 6%。我们也刚开始承保 ATV 和 RV。并且在 11 月签下了第一单商用汽车保单。GEICO 与 National Indemnity 正在商业领域协同作战，早期结果非常令人鼓舞。

Even in aggregate, these lines will remain a small fraction of our personal auto volume.  Nevertheless, they should deliver a growing stream of underwriting profits and float.
即使合并来看，这些业务仍只占我们个人车险规模的一小部分。尽管如此，它们应当会带来不断增长的承保利润与浮存金。

• General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of “home-grown” float – $23 billion at yearend.  This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire.  Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.
• 我们的国际再保险公司 General Re，是迄今我们最大的“自产”浮存金来源——年末达 230 亿美元。如今，这块业务已成为 Berkshire 的一项巨大利资产。然而，我们的持有之初并不顺利。

For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline.  This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re.  The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.
几十年来，General Re 是再保险行业的 Tiffany，因其承保技艺与纪律而备受赞誉。不幸的是，这一声誉比事实基础“活得更久”。我在 1998 年决定与 General Re 合并时，完全忽略了这一缺陷。1998 年的 General Re，经营方式已不同于 1968 或 1978 年。

Now, thanks to Joe Brandon, General Re’s CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, the luster of the company has been restored.  Joe and Tad have been running the business for six years and have been doing first-class business in a first-class way, to use the words of J. P. Morgan.  They have restored discipline to underwriting, reserving and the selection of clients.
如今，多亏 General Re 的 CEO Joe Brandon 及其合作伙伴 Tad Montross，公司光彩重现。用 J. P. Morgan 的话说，Joe 和 Tad 六年来“以一流方式做一流生意”。他们在承保、准备金与客户选择方面重建了纪律。

Their job was made more difficult by costly and time-consuming legacy problems, both in the U.S. and abroad.  Despite that diversion, Joe and Tad have delivered excellent underwriting results while skillfully repositioning the company for the future.
无论在美国还是海外，昂贵又耗时的历史遗留问题都让他们的工作更加艰难。尽管精力被分散，Joe 和 Tad 仍交出了优异的承保成绩，同时巧妙地为公司的未来完成了再定位。

• Since joining Berkshire in 1986, Ajit Jain has built a truly great specialty reinsurance operation from scratch.  For one-of-a-kind mammoth transactions, the world now turns to him.
• 自 1986 年加入 Berkshire 以来，Ajit Jain 白手起家打造了一家真正伟大的特殊再保险业务。面对独一无二的巨型交易，如今全世界都会找他。

Last year I told you in detail about the Equitas transfer of huge, but capped, liabilities to Berkshire for a single premium of $7.1 billion.  At this very early date, our experience has been good.  But this doesn’t tell us much because it’s just one straw in a fifty-year-or-more wind.  What we know for sure, however, is that the London team who joined us, headed by Scott Moser, is first-rate and has become a valuable asset for our insurance business.
去年我详细介绍了 Equitas 将巨额但封顶的负债以 71 亿美元单次保费转移给 Berkshire 的交易。就目前这一早期阶段而言，我们的体验不错。但这说明不了太多，因为这只是在长达五十年或更久的风中的“一根草”。可以确定的是，由 Scott Moser 领衔加入我们的伦敦团队是一流的，已成为我们保险业务的宝贵资产。

• Finally, we have our smaller operations, which serve specialized segments of the insurance market.  In aggregate, these companies have performed extraordinarily well, earning aboveaverage underwriting profits and delivering valuable float for investment.
• 最后，我们还有一些规模较小的业务板块，服务于保险市场的细分领域。总体来看，这些公司表现极为出色，获得了超过行业平均水平的承保利润，并提供了宝贵的可供投资的浮存金。

Last year BoatU.S., headed by Bill Oakerson, was added to the group.  This company manages an association of about 650,000 boat owners, providing them services similar to those offered by AAA auto clubs to drivers.  Among the association’s offerings is boat insurance.  Learn more about this operation by visiting its display at the annual meeting.
去年，由 Bill Oakerson 领导的 BoatU.S. 加入了该组合。该公司管理着一个拥有约 65 万名船主的协会，为其提供类似 AAA 汽车俱乐部向司机提供的各类服务，其中包括船只保险。可在股东年会现场参观其展台以进一步了解该业务。

Below we show the record of our four categories of property/casualty insurance.
下面展示我们四类财产/意外伤害保险业务的业绩记录。


 
Regulated Utility Business
受监管公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations.  The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
Berkshire 持有 MidAmerican Energy Holdings 87.4%（摊薄后）的股权，后者拥有多元的公用事业资产。最大的几项分别是：(1) Yorkshire Electricity 与 Northern Electric，合计 380 万电力客户，使其成为英国第三大电力分销商；(2) MidAmerican Energy，主要在爱荷华州服务 72 万电力客户；(3) Pacific Power 与 Rocky Mountain Power，在美国西部六个州服务约 170 万电力客户；(4) Kern River 与 Northern Natural 两条天然气管道，输送约占美国天然气消费量 8% 的气量。

Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel.  It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise.  Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
我们在 MidAmerican 的合伙人是 Walter Scott，以及两位出色的经理人 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel。各方拥有多少投票权并不重要；只有在我们一致认为明智时，才会推进重大决策。与 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 合作八年，更加印证了我最初的看法：Berkshire 不可能拥有更好的伙伴了。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America.  This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents.  Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower.  We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
颇显“错位”的是，MidAmerican 还拥有美国第二大房地产经纪公司 HomeServices of America。该公司通过 20 家本地品牌运营，拥有 18,800 名经纪人。去年住宅销售放缓，2008 年可能更慢。尽管如此，只要价格合理，我们仍将继续收购优质的经纪业务。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operation:
以下是 MidAmerican 运营的一些关键数据：

 
We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 per share in 1999, a year in which its per-share earnings were $2.59.  Why the odd figure of $35.05?  I originally decided the business was worth $35.00 per share to Berkshire.  Now, I’m a “one-price” guy (remember See’s?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire’s offer.  But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05.  With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me.  At the time, it hurt.
1999 年，我们同意以每股 35.05 美元的价格购买 MidAmerican 的 35,464,337 股；当年其每股收益为 2.59 美元。为何是 35.05 这个奇怪的数字？起初我认定这家公司对 Berkshire 的价值是每股 35.00 美元。我要价一口价（还记得 See’s 吗？），MidAmerican 的投行代表连日来都无法说服我加价。最终，他们在我“软弱”的一刻逮住了机会，我让步说可以到 35.05 美元。我解释说，这样他们就可以对客户交代——已从我身上挤出了“最后一枚五分镍币”。彼时，这确实“有点疼”。

Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 to help finance the acquisition of one of our pipelines.  Lastly, in 2006, when MidAmerican bought PacifiCorp, we purchased 23,268,793 shares at $145 per share.
之后在 2002 年，Berkshire 以每股 60 美元购入 6,700,000 股，以帮助融资我们的一项管道收购。最后在 2006 年，MidAmerican 收购 PacifiCorp 时，我们又以每股 145 美元购买了 23,268,793 股。

In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 per share.  However, 77¢ of that was non-recurring – a reduction in deferred tax at our British utility, resulting from a lowering of the U.K. corporate tax rate.  So call normalized earnings $15.01 per share.  And yes, I’m glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.
2007 年，MidAmerican 的每股收益为 15.78 美元。不过其中有 0.77 美元是一次性因素——英国业务因英国公司税率下调而减少递延税款。因此，归一化后的每股收益为 15.01 美元。没错，我很庆幸当初“松口”多给了那一枚五分镍币。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront.  Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire 在这一板块的业务几乎无所不包。下面先看一下该组整体的资产负债表与收益表摘要。


 
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 23% on average tangible net worth last year.  It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return.  Clearly we own some terrific businesses.  We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.
这个“杂牌军”从棒棒糖到房车什么都卖，去年在平均有形净资产上取得了令人满意的 23% 回报。值得注意的是，这些业务在实现该回报时只使用了很小的财务杠杆。显然，我们拥有一些非常出色的企业。然而，我们购买其中许多企业时支付了远高于净资产的溢价——这一点体现在资产负债表中的商誉项目里——这也使得以我们平均账面成本计算的收益率降至 9.8%。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
以下是本板块几家公司的要点更新：

• Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville and MiTek were all hurt in 2007 by the sharp housing downturn, with their pre-tax earnings declining 27%, 41%, 38%, and 9% respectively.  Overall, these companies earned $941 million pre-tax compared to $1.296 billion in 2006.
• 受 2007 年房地产大幅下行影响，Shaw、Acme Brick、Johns Manville 和 MiTek 的税前利润分别下降 27%、41%、38% 和 9%。总体而言，这些公司合计实现税前利润 9.41 亿美元，而 2006 年为 12.96 亿美元。

Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings.  You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.
去年，Shaw、MiTek 和 Acme 签约了若干“补强型”并购，有助于未来盈利。可以肯定的是，他们还会继续物色类似机会。

• In a tough year for retailing, our standouts were See’s, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
• 在零售业艰难的一年里，表现突出的有 See’s、Borsheims 和 Nebraska Furniture Mart。

Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See’s.  We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire.  But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance.  The move could not have worked out better.  In his two years, profits at See’s have increased more than 50%.
两年前，Brad Kinstler 出任 See’s 的 CEO。在 Berkshire，我们很少把经理人从一个行业调到另一个行业。但 Brad 是个例外，他此前管理过我们的制服公司 Fechheimer 和 Cypress Insurance。事实证明这一任命再合适不过。在他上任的两年里，See’s 的利润增长了 50% 以上。

At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend.  Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store.  I was skeptical, but Susan was right.
在 Borsheims，销售额增长了 15.1%，其中股东周末期间增长 27% 的推动不小。两年前，Susan Jacques 建议我们改造并扩张门店。我当时持保留态度，但实践证明 Susan 是对的。

Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman.  Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994.  She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates.  That beats having an MBA degree any time.
Susan 25 年前以每小时 4 美元的售货员身份加入 Borsheims。尽管她缺乏管理背景，但我在 1994 年毫不犹豫地任命她为 CEO。她聪明，热爱业务，也热爱同事——这比拥有 MBA 学位更有价值。

(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes.  Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity.  Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire’s earnings since we purchased it early in 2006.  She is an owner’s dream.  It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect.  Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)
（顺便说一句：我和 Charlie 并不迷信履历。我们更看重头脑、热情与诚信。我们的另一位优秀经理人是 Cathy Baron Tamraz，自 2006 年初收购 Business Wire 以来，她显著提升了公司的盈利。她是所有者梦寐以求的合作对象——挡在 Cathy 与潜在业务之间绝对是“危险”的。需要说明的是，Cathy 的职业生涯起步是出租车司机。）

Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million.  These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country.  In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.
最后，Nebraska Furniture Mart 创下了盈利纪录，我们在 Omaha 和 Kansas City 的两家门店各自实现约 4 亿美元的销售。毫无疑问，这是全美最顶尖的两家家居卖场。在很多家具零售商表现“灾难性”的一年里，Kansas City 门店销售增长 8%，Omaha 门店增长 6%。

Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance.  Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.
上述成绩要归功于出色的 Blumkin 兄弟——Ron 和 Irv。他们既是我的挚友，也是了不起的企业家。

• Iscar continues its wondrous ways.  Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive.  The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China.  For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable.  Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China.  In effect, we’ve now moved the brains to the tungsten.  Major opportunities for growth await Iscar.  Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.
• Iscar 延续了其非凡表现。其产品是小型硬质合金刀具，可显著提升大型且昂贵机床的生产效率。硬质合金的原材料是钨，产自中国。几十年来，Iscar 将钨运到以色列，由“头脑”把它变得更有价值。2007 年底，Iscar 在中国大连开设了大型工厂。实质上，我们把“头脑”搬到了“钨”的身边。Iscar 面前有重大的增长机遇，而由 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman 领导的管理团队，必将最大化把握这些机会。

• Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million.  Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies – as runaway leaders in their fields – fully participated.
• 航班服务业务在 2007 年创下纪录，税前利润同比增长 49% 至 5.47 亿美元。全球公务航空行业在这一年表现非凡，而我们在各自领域处于遥遥领先地位的两家公司也充分受益。

FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings.  We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots.  Bruce Whitman, the company’s CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.
我们的飞行员培训业务 FlightSafety，收入增长 14%，税前利润增长 20%。我们估计，约 58% 的美国企业飞行员由我们培训。公司 CEO Bruce Whitman 于 2003 年从高级飞行训练之父 Al Ueltschi 手中接过领导权，并证明自己不负所托。

At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader.  We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined.  Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.
在发明了公务机分权所有模式的 NetJets，我们同样保持着无可挑战的领先地位。我们目前在美国运营 487 架飞机，在欧洲运营 135 架；该机队规模超过三大主要竞争对手总和的两倍。由于我们在大型客舱市场的份额接近 90%，从价值角度看我们的领先优势更为显著。

The NetJets brand – with its promise of safety, service and security – grows stronger every year.  Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli.  If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn’t do better than Rich.  No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn’t stop.
NetJets 品牌以“安全、服务与保障”为承诺，每年都更为强大。其背后是 Richard Santulli 的热忱。如果要挑一个人与您同处战壕，没有人比 Rich 更合适。无论有什么障碍，他从不止步。

Europe is the best example of how Rich’s tenacity leads to success.  For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million.  After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction.  Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.
欧洲业务最能说明 Rich 的韧性如何带来成功。最初十年我们在那里的财务进展寥寥，累计亏损达到 2.12 亿美元。在 Rich 聘请 Mark Booth 负责欧洲业务之后，我们开始获得牵引力。如今势头真正形成，去年利润实现三倍增长。

In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there.  It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service.  Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities – but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.
去年 11 月，我们的董事们在 Columbus 的 NetJets 总部召开会议，实地参观了其复杂精密的运行体系。该体系每天要指挥大约 1,000 架次航班，风雨无阻，客户期待的是一流服务。我们的董事们对设施与能力印象深刻——而对 Rich 及其团队的印象更为深刻。
 
Finance and Finance Products
金融与金融产品

Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes.  Clayton’s market share hit a record 31% last year.  But industry volume continues to shrink:  Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton.  (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)
本类别的主要业务是 Clayton Homes，它是美国最大的装配式住宅制造商与营销商。Clayton 去年市场份额创下 31% 的纪录。但行业总量仍在萎缩：去年装配式住宅销量为 96,000 套，低于我们在 2003 年收购 Clayton 时的 131,000 套。（需要记住的是，当时有评论家批评其董事会在周期底部出售公司。）

Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers.  That’s why we include Clayton’s operation in this finance section.  Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well.  Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.
虽然 Clayton 通过住宅制造与零售两端盈利，但其利润大头来自一项 110 亿美元的贷款组合，覆盖 300,000 名借款人。这也是我们把 Clayton 列入本“金融”板块的原因。尽管 2007 年房地产金融问题层出不穷，Clayton 的贷款组合表现良好。全年逾期、止赎与损失的比率与我们此前持有年份的经验相近。

Clayton’s loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire.  For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire’s borrowing cost – a fee that amounted to $85 million last year.  Clayton’s 2007 pre-tax earnings of $526 million are after its paying this fee.  The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in “other” in the following table.
Clayton 的贷款组合由 Berkshire 提供融资。对此项资金，我们向 Clayton 收取高于 Berkshire 自身融资成本 1 个百分点的费用——去年该费用合计 8,500 万美元。Clayton 2007 年 5.26 亿美元的税前利润已扣除了这项费用。该交易的另一面是，Berkshire 记录了 8,500 万美元收入，在下表中的“其他”项目列示。

 
The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture.  Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA.  That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire.  The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA’s earnings.
表中所列的租赁业务包括租赁拖车的 XTRA 与租赁家具的 CORT。2007 年拖车利用率显著下降，导致 XTRA 盈利下滑。该公司去年还借入 4 亿美元并将所得分配给 Berkshire。由此带来的更高利息支出进一步压缩了 XTRA 的盈利。

Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold.  Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership.  More will come.
Clayton、XTRA 与 CORT 都是优质业务，由 Kevin Clayton、Bill Franz 与 Paul Arnold 高效管理。在 Berkshire 持有期间，它们都做过“补强型”并购。未来还会有更多此类动作。

Investments
投资

We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.
下表列示了我们年末的普通股投资，逐项披露市值至少 6 亿美元的持仓。

 
Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees.  In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%.  The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble.  Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.
总体而言，我们对被投企业的经营表现感到非常满意。2007 年，我们持仓前四的大型公司中，有三家——American Express、Coca-Cola 和 Procter & Gamble——每股收益分别增长了 12%、14% 和 14%。第四家 Wells Fargo 因房地产泡沫破裂出现小幅盈利下滑。尽管如此，我认为其内在价值仍有所上升，哪怕幅度不大。

In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852.  P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively.  Start-ups are not our game.
还有个“奇妙的渊源”：American Express 和 Wells Fargo 都是由 Henry Wells 与 William Fargo 创立的，前者在 1850 年，后者在 1852 年。P&G 与 Coke 分别始创于 1837 年与 1886 年。初创公司并不是我们的“赛道”。

I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year.  Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own.  The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions.  The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” – a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors – have widened during the year.  All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.
我必须强调，我们不会用某一年的股价表现来衡量投资进展。我们按自有企业的两套方法来评估其表现。第一项检验是盈利的改善，并据行业环境作适当调整。第二项（更主观）是它们的“护城河”——即令竞争者难以应对的优势——在这一年是否拓宽。我们的“四大持仓”在这项检验上全都得分为正。

We made one large sale last year.  In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion.  Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion.  By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina’s management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves.  In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies.  So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.
去年我们做了一笔大规模减持。2002 与 2003 年，Berkshire 以 4.88 亿美元买入 PetroChina 1.3% 的股权，当时这一定价相当于对整家公司约 370 亿美元的估值。那时我与 Charlie 认为其价值约为 1,000 亿美元。到 2007 年，两大因素显著抬升了其价值：油价大幅上行，以及 PetroChina 管理层在油气储量建设上表现出色。去年下半年，公司市值升至 2,750 亿美元，较之其他大型石油公司，这与我们当初的内在价值判断相当。于是我们以 40 亿美元卖出了所持股份。
 
A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain.  This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government – defense, social security, you name it – for about four hours. 
附注：我们就 PetroChina 的收益向 IRS 缴纳了 12 亿美元税款。这笔钱足以支付美国政府——国防、社保，等等——大约四个小时的全部开支。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage.  (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.)  Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.
去年我告诉过你们，Berkshire 有 62 份由我管理的衍生品合约。（在 General Re 的清偿账本里我们还留有少量。）如今，这类合约增至 94 份，分属两大类别。

First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default.  These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013.  At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.
第一类是我们卖出的 54 份合约：若纳入若干高收益债指数的特定债券发生违约，我们需作出赔付。这些合约的到期时间分布在 2009 至 2013 年。年末我们已收取合约权利金 32 亿美元；已支付损失 4.72 亿美元；在最坏情况下（极不可能发生），我们还可能需额外支付 47 亿美元。

We are certain to make many more payments.  But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold.  Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet.
我们肯定还会发生更多赔付。但我相信，仅就权利金收入本身，这些合约就会证明是有利可图的，更不用说这笔巨额资金在我们持有期间还能产生的收益。年末针对这部分风险敞口确认的负债为 18 亿美元，列示于资产负债表的“衍生合约负债”。

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices).  These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market.  We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion.  The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written.  Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.
第二类合约为我们在四个股票指数（S&P 500 加三个海外指数）上卖出的多种认沽期权。这些期权的原始期限为 15 或 20 年，执行价为卖出当日的市场点位。我们已收取 45 亿美元权利金，并在年末计提 46 亿美元负债。此类认沽仅在到期日（介于 2019 至 2027 年）可被行权，且只有当届时相关指数低于卖出日点位时，Berkshire 才需要支付。我仍相信，这些合约总体将是盈利的；此外，在 15 或 20 年的持有期内，我们还能从权利金的投资中获得可观收益。

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important.  First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.
关于我们的衍生合约，有两点尤为重要。第一，在所有情况下我们都持有对方支付的资金，这意味着我们不存在对手方风险。

Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio.  In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding.  Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.
第二，衍生合约的会计规则不同于我们投资组合的会计处理。在投资组合中，公允价值变动计入 Berkshire 资产负债表的净值，但除非我们出售（或减记）持仓，否则不影响当期损益。衍生合约的价值变动则必须在每个季度计入利润表。

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little.  He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either.  You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run.  That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.
因此，即便我与 Charlie 认为这些头寸的内在价值变化不大，我们的衍生仓位有时也会让报告利润出现大幅波动。我们不会被这些波动困扰——哪怕单季波动轻易就可能超过 10 亿美元——也希望你们同样不受影响。你会记得，在巨灾保险业务上，我们总是愿意用短期报表利润的波动，去换取长期净值的更大增长。这同样是我们在衍生品上的哲学。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S.  Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world.  And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.
2007 年，美元相对主要货币进一步走弱，原因并不神秘：美国人更喜欢购买外国制造的产品，而世界其他地方对美国制造的产品偏好不及此。其必然结果是，美国每天向全世界“输送”约 20 亿美元的借据与资产。久而久之，这会给美元带来压力。

When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens.  That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit.  Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar.  But ponder this:  In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion.  Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007.  Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007.  So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.
当美元走弱时，我们的产品对外国买家更便宜，而他们的产品对美国消费者更昂贵。这正是“贬值可弥补贸易逆差”的理论依据。事实上，美元的大幅下跌无疑在一定程度上缓解了美国的赤字。但请思考：2002 年，欧元平均 0.946 美元，我们对德国（第五大贸易伙伴）的逆差为 360 亿美元；而 2007 年，欧元平均 1.37 美元，我们对德逆差却升至 450 亿美元。类似地，加元在 2002 年平均 0.64 美元、2007 年平均 0.93 美元，我们对加拿大的逆差也从 500 亿美元增至 640 亿美元。至少到目前为止，美元暴跌并未在很大程度上使我们的贸易活动回归平衡。

There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses.  This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments.  Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S.  When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here.  Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?
最近关于主权财富基金及其收购美国企业大额股权的讨论很多。这是我们自作自受，并非外国政府的阴谋。我们的贸易算式注定会带来对美国的大规模外资流入。当我们每天“强喂”世界其他地区 20 亿美元时，他们必须在美国找些东西来投资。既然如此，当他们选择股票而非债券时，我们为何要抱怨？

Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc.  Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do.  In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect.  Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.
我国货币走弱并非 OPEC、中国等的错。其他发达国家同样依赖进口石油、同样要与中国进口商品竞争。美国在制定理性的贸易政策时，不应挑国家来惩罚或挑行业来保护。我们也不应采取容易引发报复的行动，从而减少美国的出口——这才是真正能让我国与世界各国双赢的贸易。

Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later.  Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort.  (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)
不过，我们的立法者应当认识到当前失衡不可持续，并应尽早采取能够实质性缩减逆差的政策。否则，我们每天向全球“强喂”的 20 亿美元，可能会造成一种令人不快的“全球性消化不良”。（关于我国贸易逆差不可持续性的更多评论，可参阅 Alan Greenspan 2004 年 11 月 19 日的讲话、联邦公开市场委员会 2004 年 6 月 29 日会议纪要，以及 Ben Bernanke 2007 年 9 月 11 日的声明。）

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007.  That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real.  Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable.  After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti.  As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.
在 Berkshire，我们在 2007 年仅持有一项直接的货币头寸——请屏住呼吸——巴西雷亚尔。就在不久之前，用美元去换雷亚尔还是不可想象的。毕竟，在过去一个世纪里，巴西先后有五种货币最终几乎沦为“彩纸”。正如许多货币周期性枯萎甚至消亡的国家那样，富有的巴西人有时会把大量资金存放在美国以保值。

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years.  Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199.  Every year the real went up and the dollar fell.  Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.
但任何走这条看似稳妥道路的巴西人，在过去五年里都会损失其净资产的一半。以下是 2002 年底至 2007 年底雷亚尔兑美元的年度（指数化）记录：100、122、133、152、166、199。每一年雷亚尔都在升值、美元都在贬值。而且，在此期间很长一段时间里，巴西政府实际上还在通过在市场上买入美元来压制雷亚尔升值并支撑美元。

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies.  For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par.  At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but.  (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)
过去五年，我们的直接货币头寸带来了 23 亿美元的税前利润；此外，我们还通过持有以外币计价的美国公司债而获利。例如，2001 与 2002 年我们以票面 57% 的价格买入了 3.1 亿欧元的 Amazon.com, Inc. 2010 年到期、票息 6 7/8 的债券。当时，Amazon 债券被定价为“垃圾”信用，尽管它完全不是。（没错，Virginia，市场有时确实会荒唐地低效——或者至少，除了某些名校商学院的金融系之外，你几乎到处都能找到这样的低效。）

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us.  The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002.  Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million.  Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47.  In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them.  Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend.  Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar.  Currencies do matter.
Amazon 债券的欧元计价对我们而言是进一步且重要的吸引点。我们在 2002 年买入时，欧元约为 0.95 美元。因此，我们的美元成本仅为 1.69 亿美元。如今该债券以票面 102% 交易，而欧元价值 1.47 美元。2005 与 2006 年，我们部分持券被赎回，收到 2.53 亿美元；年末剩余债券估值为 1.62 亿美元。在我们 2.46 亿美元的已实现与未实现收益中，约有 1.18 亿美元归因于美元走弱。货币，确实很重要。

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings.  Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S.  Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce evergrowing prosperity for its citizens.
在 Berkshire，我们将努力进一步提高直接与间接的海外收益占比。即便成功，我们的资产与收益仍将主要集中在美国。尽管这个国家并不完美、且总会面临各种问题，但美国的法治、对市场反应灵敏的经济体系以及对“凭能力取胜”的信念，几乎可以确定会持续为其公民创造不断增长的繁荣。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates.  The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities.  And that would still leave the board with two backups.
正如我先前所说，我们早已为 CEO 接班做好准备，因为我们有三位出色的内部候选人。若我因去世或能力减退而无法履职，董事会非常清楚会选谁。即便如此，董事会仍会有两位备选。

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments.  All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called.  The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises.  The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.
去年我还说过，我们会尽快完成 Berkshire 投资岗位的接班计划。如今我们确已确定了四位可接替我管理投资的候选人。他们目前都在管理可观规模的资金，并表示如获邀将非常愿意加入 Berkshire。董事会了解四人的优势，并预期在需要时聘用其中一位或多位。这些候选人从年轻到中年、从小有积累到颇为富足，他们希望为 Berkshire 工作的理由超越了报酬本身。

(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)
（我已不情愿地放弃了“死后继续管理投资组合”的念头——也就此放弃了我给“跳出盒子思考”赋予新含义的希望。）
 
Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings
异想天开的数字——上市公司如何“榨汁”利润

Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.”  If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.
前参议员 Alan Simpson 有句名言：“在华盛顿走高尚之路的人不必担心拥堵。”不过，如果他真想找一条门可罗雀的路，倒该看看美国企业界的会计核算。

An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994.  America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9.  Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity – by unanimous agreement, no less – to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.
关于企业更偏好哪条道路的“公投”发生在 1994 年。美国的 CEO 们刚刚以 88 比 9 的投票，迫使参议院命令 Financial Accounting Standards Board 闭嘴。在这次训斥之前，FASB 竟然——而且是全票通过——鼓起勇气告诉企业领袖：他们所获授的股票期权是一种补偿，其价值应当计入费用。

After the senators voted, the FASB – now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs – decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options.  The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.
参议院投票之后，FASB——如今被参议院那 88 位“隐形 CPA”上了会计原则课——宣布公司可以在两种期权列报方法中择一：优选做法是费用化其价值，但只要期权按市价授予，公司也可以忽略这项费用。

A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight.  During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route.  CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.”  I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.
美国 CEO 们的“真相时刻”随之到来，而他们的反应并不好看。接下来的六年里，标普 500 家公司中只有两家选择了优选路径。其余公司的 CEO 都选择了“低路”，从而忽略一项巨大且显而易见的费用，以便报告更高的“利润”。我确信，他们中的一些人也担心：一旦费用化，董事们未来在批准他们渴望的巨额授予时会三思而行。

It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough.  Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value.  No problem.  To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.
事实证明，对许多 CEO 而言，即便“低路”也不够好。按这套放宽的规则，如果期权行权价低于市价，仍会影响利润。没关系。为规避这条烦人的规定，不少公司偷偷把期权追溯定价，虚假地显示为按当期市价授予，实际上却是远低于市价的价格发放。

Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain – important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense.  It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%.  Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.
关于期权会计的荒唐做法如今大体尘埃落定，但其他会计口径依然存在——其中最重要的之一，就是公司在计提养老金费用时采用的投资回报假设。毫不意外，许多公司仍选择一个能让其报告不那么扎实“利润”的假设。对于标普中拥有养老金计划的 363 家公司，这一假设在 2006 年的平均值为 8%。让我们看看实现它的概率。

The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.
所有养老金组合中债券与现金的平均配置约为 28%，而这部分资产的回报预期不超过 5%。当然，更高收益是可能的，但相应（或更大）的损失风险也会随之而来。

This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments – must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%.  And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.
这意味着其余 72% 的资产——主要是股票，直接持有或通过对冲基金、私募股权等工具持有——必须赚到 9.2%，养老金整体才能实现所设定的 8% 回报。而且，这个回报必须是扣除所有费用之后的净值，而如今费用水平远高于以往。

How realistic is this expectation?  Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497.  This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually.  An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years.  It was a wonderful century.
这个预期到底有多现实？让我们重温我两年前提到的数据：在 20 世纪，道琼斯从 66 点涨到 11,497 点。这一涨幅看似巨大，但年复合仅为 5.3%。一个整世纪持有道指的投资者在其中很长一段时间还能获得可观分红，但到最后几年也只有约 2% 左右。那是一个了不起的世纪。

Think now about this century.  For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099.  We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.
再想想本世纪。若投资者仅仅想匹配那 5.3% 的市值增幅，道指——近期仍低于 13,000 点——到 2099 年 12 月 31 日需要收在约 2,000,000 点。我们已走过本世纪的八年，但在为匹配上世纪 5.3% 所需的 1,988,000 点路程中，仅走了不到 2,000 点。

It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000.  If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years.  While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?
有趣的是，评论员们常常在道指跨越整千整数位（比如 14,000 或 15,000）时激动得“过度换气”。如果他们一直这样反应，那么为了实现本世纪 5.3% 的年增幅，他们在未来 92 年里至少要经历 1,986 次“发作”。虽然一切皆有可能，但真有人相信这最可能吗？

Dividends continue to run about 2%.  Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so.  And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and highpriced managers (“helpers”).
股息仍在约 2% 左右。即便股票能重现上世纪 5.3% 的年均升幅，在考虑 0.5% 费用后，养老金资产中的股票部分也难以产出超过 7% 的回报。而且，考虑到层层顾问与高价经理人（“帮手”）的存在，0.5% 很可能还是低估了成本。
 
Naturally, everyone expects to be above average.  And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief.  But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average.  The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors.  But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs.  Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren.  That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.
自然地，人人都期望自己高于平均水平。而那些“帮手们”——愿上帝保佑他们——一定会鼓励客户坚持这种信念。但作为一个整体，经帮手协助的一群人必然低于平均。原因很简单：1）所有投资者整体上只能获得平均回报，扣除其成本；2）被动与指数型投资者因其不作为，将获得“平均减极低成本”的回报；3）既然那部分人赚到的是平均回报，那么剩下那部分——主动投资者——也只能赚到平均回报。但这群人要承担高额的交易、管理与咨询成本。因此，主动投资者的回报将被削减得远高于“不作为”的同行。这意味着，被动的一群——那些“什么都不懂的人”——必然胜出。

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100.  If your adviser talks to you about doubledigit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him.  Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”  Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.
我还要指出，那些指望本世纪股票年赚 10% 的人——设想其中 2% 来自股息、8% 来自价格上涨——实际上是在隐含预测到 2100 年道琼斯将达到约 24,000,000 点。如果你的顾问向你兜售股票的“两位数回报”，把这笔算术给他讲讲——尽管这未必能让他收敛。许多“帮手”显然是《爱丽丝梦游仙境》里那位女王的直系后代，她说过：“哎呀，有时我在早餐前就能相信六件不可能的事。”当心那些油嘴滑舌的帮手——他一边往你脑子里塞幻想，一边往自己口袋里塞费用。

Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans.  This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well?  I’ve never seen this puzzle explained.  But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.
有些公司既在美国也在欧洲设有养老金计划，而在其会计处理中，几乎都假定美国计划的回报率将高于非美国计划。这一差异令人费解：既然如此，为什么这些公司不让美国经理人也来管理非美国养老金资产，好让他们的“魔法”同样发挥作用？我从未见过对此的解释。但负责审查回报假设的审计师与精算师似乎并不觉得这有什么问题。

What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings.  And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.
但不费解的是，CEO 们为何选择更高的投资假设：这能让他们报告更高的利润。而且即便他们错了——我认为他们确实错了——等到“报应”来临时，往往已是他们退休多年之后。

After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up.  It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”
在为了把当期利润尽可能做高而“试探红线”乃至越界了几十年之后，美国企业界该收敛了。应该听听我搭档 Charlie 的劝告：“如果你已经连续三杆打出左侧界外球，下一杆就向右瞄一点。”

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers.  Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate.  Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed.  Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make.  In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.
无论未来股东在养老金成本上还会遭遇怎样的“惊吓”，纳税人的“震动”都会远远更大。公共养老金的承诺巨大，而在许多情况下资金严重不足。由于这枚“定时炸弹”的导火索很长，政客们往往不愿加税以求解，因为等到问题真正显现时，他们早已卸任。涉及极早退休——有时甚至四十出头——以及慷慨的生活成本调整（COLA）这样的承诺，对他们来说很容易许下。但在一个人们寿命更长且通胀几乎确定的世界里，这些承诺将极其难以兑现。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item.  In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units.  If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong.  So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate.  Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.
既然已经阐述了美国会计“荣誉制度”的失败之处，我必须指出：对于 Berkshire 的一项极其庞大的资产负债表项目，我们采用的正是这种制度。在每一次向你们提交的报告中，我们都必须对保险子公司的赔付准备金进行估算。若我们的估算有误，意味着资产负债表和利润表都会出错。因此，我们当然尽最大努力提高这些估算的准确性。尽管如此，在每一份报告中，我们的估算必然仍会有偏差。

At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value).  We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process.  In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.
截至 2007 年年末，我们在报表上列示了 560 亿美元的保险负债，这代表我们对年末之前发生的所有损失事件最终将支付金额的估计（约有 30 亿美元的准备金已折现至现值除外）。我们已知悉数以千计的事件，并对每起事件给出了一笔美元金额，反映我们认为需要支付的数额，包括在理赔过程中将发生的相关费用（例如律师费）。在某些情况下——比如工伤赔偿中涉及的严重伤害——支付期可能长达 50 年甚至更久。

We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about.  Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred.  (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.)  We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.
我们还为那些在年末之前已经发生、但我们尚未得知的损失计提了大额准备。有时，被保险人本人也并不知道损失已经发生。（想想那些多年未被发现的挪用行为。）我们有时会接到发生在数十年前保单项下的损失通知。

A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability:  A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died.  Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover.  When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000.  He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10.  He paid that, too – and still another $10 charge he received a month later.  When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on.  “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you.  We buried Dad in a rented suit.”
几年前我讲过一个故事，恰好说明了我们在准确估计赔付负债时面临的问题：有个人在欧洲出差，妹妹打电话告诉他父亲去世了。哥哥解释说他无法回来，但嘱咐妹妹葬礼不要省钱，费用由他承担。他回国后，妹妹告诉他葬礼很隆重，并递上一叠账单共 8,000 美元。他付清了。但一个月后，他又收到殡仪馆寄来的一张 10 美元账单。他也付了——一个月后又收到一张 10 美元账单。当第三张 10 美元账单在再下一个月寄来时，这位困惑的男子打电话问妹妹发生了什么事。妹妹答道：“哦，我忘了告诉你了。我们给爸爸穿的是租来的西装。”

At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world.  We try to estimate the bill for them accurately.  In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is.  But even that guess will be subject to surprises.  I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.
在我们的保险公司里，世界各地都埋着数量不详、但几乎可以肯定非常多的“租来的西装”。我们努力把这些账单估得尽可能准确。十年或二十年后，我们甚至能较准确地估计当下估算的误差有多大。但即便如此，这样的估计仍可能遭遇意外。我个人认为我们披露的准备金是充足的，但过去我也曾几次判断失准。

The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd.  As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30.  At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00.  Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15.  If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
今年的大会将在 5 月 3 日（周六）举行。老规矩，Qwest Center 早上 7 点开门，8:30 播放新版 Berkshire 影片。9:30 我们直接进入答问环节（中午在 Qwest 的摊位稍作用餐休息），一直持续到 3:00。随后短暂休息，3:15 我与 Charlie 将正式召开年度股东大会。如果你决定在答问环节中途离场，请选在 Charlie 发言的时候离开。

The best reason to exit, of course is to shop.  We will help you do that by filling the 194,300square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries.  Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales.  But you can do better.  (If necessary, I’ll lock the doors.)
当然，离场的最好理由是去购物。我们会为此提供便利：把邻接会场的一间 194,300 平方英尺的大展厅塞满 Berkshire 子公司的产品。去年到会的 27,000 名参会者出力不小，几乎所有摊位都创下了销售纪录。但你们完全可以做得更好。（必要时，我会把门锁上。）

This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture).  You will find that this 1,550square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value.  And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.
今年我们将再次展示一套 Clayton 的住宅（配有 Acme 砖、Shaw 地毯、Johns Manville 保温材料、MiTek 紧固件、Carefree 遮阳篷以及 NFM 家具）。你会发现，这套 1,550 平方英尺、标价 69,500 美元的住宅，性价比非同一般。买完房子后，不妨再看看旁边展出的 Forest River 房车和浮桥船。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes.  In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%).  This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate.  (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.)  Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.  For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 将设立展台，派驻来自全美各地的顶尖顾问，为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能提供股东专享折扣（通常为 8%）。在我们经营的 50 个司法辖区中，有 45 个允许这一优惠。（补充一点：如果你同时符合其他优惠条件（例如某些团体折扣），折扣不可叠加。）请带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们能否帮你省钱。我相信，至少对你们中的 50% 来说，我们可以。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection.  Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes.  Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.  And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you. 

周六在 Omaha 机场，我们将按惯例陈列 NetJets 机队，供你参观。可先到 Qwest 的 NetJets 展台了解参观安排。你可以坐大巴来 Omaha，坐你的新飞机离开。上机时想带多少发胶和剪刀都行。

Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack.  Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie’s book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies.  For those of you who can’t make the meeting, go to poorcharliesalmanack.com to order a copy.
接着，如果你还有余钱，请去 Bookworm 逛逛，你会找到约 25 种打折的书籍和 DVD——其中领衔的仍是《Poor Charlie’s Almanack》。在没有任何广告或书店陈列的情况下，这本书如今已惊人地卖出了将近 5 万册。无法到会的朋友，可以到 poorcharliesalmanack.com 下单购买。
 
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events.  As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help.  Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it.  Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
本报告所附的委托书材料中包含一份附件，说明了如何获取进入大会及其他活动所需的证件。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们再次委托 American Express（800-799-6634）为你提供特别协助。负责相关事务的 Carol Pedersen 每年都把这项工作做得非常出色，在此致谢。酒店房间可能紧张，但与 Carol 配合，你就能订到。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing.  We initiated this special event at NFM eleven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30.9 million in 2007.  This is more volume than most furniture stores register in a year.
在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（位于 72nd Street 上 Dodge 与 Pacific 之间，占地 77 英亩），我们将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”折扣价。十一年前我们在 NFM 启动这一特别活动，“周末”销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元增长到 2007 年的 3,090 万美元。这一规模超过了大多数家具店一整年的销量。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.  The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you.  We appreciate their cooperation.  NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday.  On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.
要享受 Berkshire 折扣，必须在 5 月 1 日（周四）至 5 月 5 日（周一）期间购买，并出示你的大会证件。期间的特价甚至适用于几家一贯严格禁折扣的知名厂商的产品，但本着股东周末的精神，他们为你们破例。我们对此深表感谢。NFM 营业时间为周一至周六上午 10 点至晚 9 点，周日为上午 10 点至晚 6 点。今年周六 5:30 pm 至 8 pm，NFM 还将举办 Baja Beach Bash，供应牛肉和鸡肉玉米卷。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events.  The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd.  The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.  On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场股东专属活动。第一场为 5 月 2 日（周五）6 pm 至 10 pm 的鸡尾酒会。第二场主活动为 5 月 4 日（周日）上午 9 点至下午 4 点。周六我们营业至下午 6 点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend.  For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th.  During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末 Borsheims 都会人潮涌动。为便于大家购物，股东优惠价将从 4 月 28 日（周一）持续至 5 月 10 日（周六）。期间请出示大会证件或能显示你持有 Berkshire 的券商对账单，以表明股东身份。

On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six.  Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.  Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日，在 Borsheims 外的帐篷里，两届美国国际象棋冠军 Patrick Wolff 将在蒙眼情况下，每组六人，迎战所有挑战者（他们可是睁大着眼睛的）。附近还有来自 Dallas 的杰出魔术师 Norman Beck 为观众带来迷幻表演。此外，周日下午我们还邀请到世界顶尖桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 与 Sharon Osberg，与股东同桌切磋。

Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m.  Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 915 dinners on Shareholder Sunday.  The three-day total was 2,487 including 656 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti.  Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation.  To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
Gorat’s 将在 5 月 4 日（周日）对 Berkshire 股东专场开放，营业时间为下午 4 点至晚 10 点。去年“股东周日”Gorat’s 共 240 个座位，竟供应了 915 份晚餐。三天合计 2,487 份，其中包括 656 份 T-bone 牛排，这是行家们的首选。请记住，当天前往 Gorat’s 必须提前预约。预约请在 4 月 1 日致电 402-551-3733（勿提前拨打）。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America.  Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far.  Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries.  Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
我们将于周六下午 4 点再次为来自北美以外地区的股东举办招待会。每年大会都吸引来自全球各地的朋友，Charlie 和我希望能亲自向远道而来的你们致意。去年我们很高兴与来自数十个国家的 400 多位股东见面。凡来自美国或加拿大以外的股东，都将获得专属证件及参加该活动的指引。

* * * * * * * * * * * * 
At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams.  We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being.  Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates.  Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work.  But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting.  So join us on May 3rd at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists.  We’ll see you there.
在 84 岁与 77 岁的年纪，Charlie 和我依然幸运得超乎想象。我们生于美国；有让我们受良好教育的了不起父母；拥有美满家庭与健康体魄；并且天生带着一枚“商业基因”，使我们所获得的繁荣远超许多对社会福祉贡献同样多、甚至更多的人。此外，我们长期从事自己热爱的工作，得到才华横溢、乐观开朗的同事在无数方面的帮助。每天对我们都充满激情，难怪我们“踢踏着舞步去上班”。而比这更让我们开心的，是在 Berkshire 年会上与股东伙伴相聚。所以，5 月 3 日请到 Qwest 参加我们的资本家“伍德斯托克”。不见不散。
 
 
February 2008

Warren E. Buffett  
Chairman of the Board 
 
 

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