2011-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Refer To：《2011-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.*

在 2010 年，我们的 Class A 和 Class B 股票每股账面价值均增长了 13%。在过去 46 年里（也就是自现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从 19 美元增至 95,453 美元，按年复合计算的增长率为 20.2%*。

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.

本报告中使用的每股数据均适用于伯克希尔的 A 类股票。B 类股票的数据为所示 A 类股票数据的 1/1500。

The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.

2010 年的亮点是我们收购了伯灵顿北方圣塔菲铁路，这笔收购的效果甚至比我预期的还要好。现在看来，拥有这条铁路将使伯克希尔的“正常”盈利能力在税前增加近 40%，税后则增加远超过 30%。这次收购使我们的股份数量增加了 6%，并使用了 220 亿美元的现金。由于我们很快补充了现金，这笔交易的经济效益证明非常好。

A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.

当然，“一个正常的年度”并不是我本人或我的合伙人、伯克希尔副董事长 Charlie Munger 能够精确界定的概念。但在估算我们当前盈利能力的目的下，我们所设想的“正常年度”，是指保险业务没有发生特大灾难、整体商业环境略优于 2010 年、但又弱于 2005 年或 2006 年的那种年份。基于这些假设，以及我将在“Investment”部分说明的若干其他假设，我估计我们目前所拥有资产的正常盈利能力约为税前 170 亿美元、税后 120 亿美元，这还不包括任何资本利得或损失。Charlie 和我每天都在思考如何在这一基础上继续扩展和提升。

Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

我们两人都对 BNSF 的未来充满热情，因为铁路在成本和环境方面相较于它的主要竞争对手——卡车运输，具有重大的优势。去年，BNSF 每运输一吨货物所消耗的柴油能够使其在单次加注下行驶创纪录的 500 英里。这比卡车的燃油效率高出三倍，这意味着我们的铁路在经营成本上拥有一项重要优势。同时，我们的国家也因此受益，因为温室气体排放减少，对进口石油的需求大大降低。当货运改由铁路运输时，社会将受益。

（1）必需品；（2）结构性的成本优势，前面的例子是GEICO、Costco。

Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.

随着时间推移，美国的货运量将增加，BNSF 应当获得其全部增长份额。为实现这一增长，铁路公司将需要大规模投资，但没有谁比伯克希尔更有条件提供所需资金。无论经济多么缓慢，或市场多么混乱，我们的支票都会兑现。

Last year – in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy – we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion – or 90% of the total – was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending – $8 billion – and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.

去年——在外界普遍对美国经济持悲观态度的情况下——我们通过在 Berkshire 投入 60 亿美元用于固定资产和设备，展示了自己对资本投资的热情。其中 54 亿美元——也就是总额的 90%——都投入在美国国内。毫无疑问，我们的业务未来会在海外扩张，但其未来投资的绝大部分仍将留在本土。到了 2011 年，我们将把资本支出提高到创纪录的 80 亿美元，而新增的 20 亿美元也将全部花在美国。

Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.

资金总是会流向机会之处，而美国境内蕴藏着大量这样的机会。今天的评论者经常谈论所谓的“巨大不确定性”。但不妨回想一下，例如 1941 年 12 月 6 日、1987 年 10 月 18 日以及 2001 年 9 月 10 日——无论今天看上去多么风平浪静，明天始终充满未知。

Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.

别让这种现实吓到你。在我一生中，政客和评论家们不断抱怨美国面临可怕的问题。然而我们的公民现在的生活水平惊人地是我出生时的六倍。那些厄运的预言家们忽视了一个至关重要且确定无疑的因素：人的潜能远未耗尽，而能够释放这种潜能的美国体制——一个尽管偶有衰退期甚至内战打断，但两百多年来屡次创造奇迹的体制——依然存在并且有效。

We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.

我们天生并不比建国之初的人更聪明，也并没有比他们更勤奋。但环顾四周，你会看到一个远远超出任何殖民时代居民想象的世界。如今，就像 1776 年、1861 年、1932 年和 1941 年那样，美国最好的日子仍在前方。

Performance

业绩

Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.

Charlie 和我认为，凡是受托管理他人资金的人，都应该在一开始就设定清晰的业绩目标。如果缺乏这样的标准，管理层就很容易先随便射出一箭，然后再在箭落之处画上靶心，把结果说成是原本的目标。

1962年的股东信里有一段专门内容：“A Word About Par”。

In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.

就 Berkshire 而言，我们早就告诉过你们，我们的工作就是让每股内在价值的增长率，长期跑赢标普 500 指数（包括股息）的增幅。有的年份我们做到了，有的年份我们做不到。但如果从长期来看，我们无法实现这一目标，那就说明我们根本没有为投资人做成什么事——因为他们自己去买一只指数基金，就可以获得相同甚至更好的结果。

The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.

当然，难点在于如何计算内在价值。如果把这个任务分别交给 Charlie 和我去算，你会得到两个不同的数字。精确到小数点后的那种精度，在这件事上根本不可能。

To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.

为了减少主观性，我们在衡量自己业绩时，就用一个偏保守的内在价值替代指标——账面价值。可以肯定的是，我们有些业务的实际价值远远高于它们在账面上的记录值（在本报告后面，我们会举一个具体例子）。但由于这种“溢价”一般不会在年与年之间剧烈波动，账面价值就可以作为一个合理的工具，用来跟踪我们到底做得怎么样。

The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.

本报告第 2 页的表格展示了我们与标普指数对比的 46 年业绩记录：早期表现相当出色，而现在则只能算是尚可。我们要强调的是，那些“丰收的年代”不会再来了。我们目前管理的资本规模过于庞大，这几乎排除了再取得异常亮丽业绩的可能性。不过，我们仍会努力争取取得“好于平均”的结果，也认为你们用这个标准来要求我们，是完全合理的。

Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.

需要说明的是，年度数据既不能被忽视，也不应被视为一切的全部。地球绕太阳公转的节奏，并不必然与投资构想或经营决策结出果实所需的时间同步。以 GEICO 为例，我们去年非常积极地投入了 9 亿美元用于广告，只是为了争取那些短期内并不能带给我们任何利润的保单持有人。如果我们能把两倍的金额同样高效地花出去，尽管这会让我们的短期业绩受到进一步拖累，我们也会心甘情愿地去做。我们在铁路和公用事业业务上的许多大额投资，同样是着眼于很久以后的回报。

To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.

为了让你从更长期的角度看待业绩，我们在相邻页面把第 2 页上的年度数据重新整理成了一系列连续的五年期区间。总体来看，一共有 42 个这样的时期，而它们共同讲述了一个颇有意思的故事。从相对表现来看，我们最好的年份在上世纪 80 年代初就已经结束了；而市场的黄金时期则出现在随后那 17 年，在这段时间里，即便我们的相对优势有所收窄，Berkshire 在绝对回报上仍然有着非常耀眼的表现。

After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.

1999 年之后，市场基本停滞不前（或者说，这一点你早就注意到了？）。因此，自那以后，尽管 Berkshire 相对于标普指数的表现依然令人满意，但在绝对回报上却只能说是中规中矩。

Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.

展望未来，我们希望平均每年能够比标普指数高出几个百分点——当然，这样的结果绝谈不上有任何保证。如果我们真的能达成这一目标，那么在股市表现不佳的年份，我们几乎可以肯定会取得更好的相对业绩；而在市场非常强劲的年份，我们的表现则很可能会相对逊色一些。

这一段是对《2001-12-10 Mr. Buffett on the stock market》的回顾。

Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow

内在价值——今天与明天

Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.

尽管 Berkshire 的内在价值无法被精确计算，但它的三大支柱中有两项是可以量化的。Charlie 和我在估算 Berkshire 价值时，严重依赖这些可测量的指标。

The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.

价值的第一部分来自我们的投资：股票、债券以及现金等价物。按市值计算，这部分投资在年末合计为 1,580 亿美元。

Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金——也就是我们在保险业务中暂时持有、但并不真正属于我们的那部分资金——为我们的投资提供了 660 亿美元的资金来源。只要保险承保能够做到不亏不赚，这部分浮存金对我们来说就是“免费的”，也就是说，我们收到的保费与我们承担的赔付及费用大致相当。当然，承保结果本身是波动的，时而盈利、时而亏损，在两者之间来回摆动。但从我们整个历史来看，承保业务整体是相当赚钱的，而且我也预期未来我们至少可以做到平均持平或略有盈利。如果能做到这一点，那么我们所有的投资——无论是由浮存金还是由留存收益所资助的——都可以视为 Berkshire 股东所拥有的价值要素。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.

Berkshire 价值的第二部分来自那些非投资和非保险承保来源的收益。这部分收益由我们的 68 家非保险子公司贡献，具体名单列在本报告第 106 页。在 Berkshire 的早期，我们的重心主要放在投资端；然而在过去 20 年里，我们越来越重视从非保险业务中发展盈利能力，而这种做法在未来也会持续下去。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.

下面的表格展示了这种变化。在第一张表中，我们给出了自 1970 年起、按十年为间隔计算的每股投资数额——那一年距我们进入保险业已有三年。我们在其中剔除了属于少数股东权益部分所对应的那部分投资。

Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.

在这 40 年期间，我们每股投资的年复合增长率达到 19.9%，这一表现相当可观。但随着我们越来越多地将资金用于收购经营性企业，这一增长率已经明显放缓。

The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

这种战略转变带来的回报体现在后面的表格中，该表展示了我们的非保险业务利润是如何增长的，同样是按每股口径计算，并已扣除相关的少数股东权益。

For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

在这 40 年里，我们每股非保险业务税前收益的年复合增长率为 21.0%。同期，Berkshire 的股价按年复合计算上涨了 22.1%。从长期来看，你可以预期我们的股价大致会与 Berkshire 的投资与盈利表现同步前行。市场价格与内在价值往往会走出非常不同的轨迹——有时候这种背离甚至会持续相当长的时间——但最终两者总会在某个时点汇合。

There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.

在估算内在价值时，还有第三个更加主观的因素，它可以是正面的，也可以是负面的：那就是未来对留存收益的运用效率。在未来十年里，我们以及许多其他企业，很可能会留存一笔相当于、甚至超过当前所使用资本规模的利润。有些公司会把这些留存下来的每一美元“变成”价值只有 0.5 美元的东西，而另一些公司则能把同样的一美元“变成”价值 2 美元的资产。

This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.

要对一家公司的内在价值做出合理估计，我们——或者任何人——都必须同时评估两个方面：“现在我们拥有什么”和“未来他们打算怎样使用这些钱”。这是因为，当管理层替股东把公司赚到的利润再投资时，外部投资者实际上只能在一旁干着急，却插不上手。如果可以合理预期一位 CEO 能很好地完成这项再投资的工作，那么这些再投资的前景就会为公司当前的价值加分；如果这位 CEO 的能力或动机令人怀疑，那么今天的价值就必须打折。两种结果之间的差别可能巨大。上世纪 60 年代末，落在 Sears Roebuck 或 Montgomery Ward 两家公司的 CEO 手中的每一美元，其未来命运，与同一时期交到 Sam Walton 手中的那一美元，可谓天差地别。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.

Charlie 和我希望我们的非保险业务每股盈利能够以一个不错的速度持续增长。但随着基数越来越大，这项工作也变得愈发困难。我们既需要现有业务保持良好表现，也需要继续完成更多重要的收购。对此我们已经做好准备，我们的 “elephant gun（大象枪）” 已经重新装填完毕，而我的扳机手指也已经开始发痒了。

Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.

在一定程度上抵消我们庞大体量这一“锚”的，是我们所拥有的几项重要优势。首先，我们拥有一批真正出色的管理者，他们对自己所管理的业务以及对 Berkshire 都有着非同寻常的投入与承诺。我们的许多 CEO 本身已经财务自由，他们之所以工作，只是因为热爱自己所做的事情。他们更像志愿者，而不是雇佣兵。由于没有人能够给他们提供一份更让他们享受的工作，他们也就很难被挖走。

硅谷也是这个说法。

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

在 Berkshire，管理者可以专心经营自己的业务：他们不用被总部的各种会议折腾，不用为融资操心，也不用应付华尔街的纠缠。他们每两年只会收到我写的一封信（全文重印在本报告第 104–105 页），需要时再主动给我打电话。而且，每个人的风格也不一样：过去一年里，有些经理我一次都没通话，但也有一位几乎是天天和我交流。我们的信任建立在人身上，而不是建立在流程上。“严选人才，宽松管理” 的准则对他们和我都非常合适。

Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

Berkshire 的 CEO 形形色色，有的拿着 MBA 文凭，有的却连大学都没念完；有的人习惯做预算、按章行事，有的人则更多凭经验和直觉行事。我们的团队就像一支由全明星组成的棒球队，球员们击球姿势千差万别，但整体战斗力却极强，而我们几乎很少需要调整阵容。

Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.

我们的第二个优势与我们如何分配各业务赚来的资金有关。在满足这些业务本身的资金需求之后，我们仍然会有相当可观的剩余资金。大多数公司只会在自己所在的行业内进行再投资，这往往把它们的资本配置“宇宙”限制在一个既狭小又远逊于整个外部世界机会集合的范围内。对于那少数可投的机会，竞争自然变得异常激烈。卖方于是掌握绝对优势，就像一个派对上只有一位女生、而到场却有一大群男生那样——这种严重失衡的局面，对那个女生当然好得很，但对那群男生而言就糟糕透了。

局部泛化的缺点。

At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.

在 Berkshire，资本的投向不受任何“体制性限制”。Charlie 和我唯一的约束，是我们是否有能力看懂某个潜在标的的未来前景。如果我们能跨过这道门槛——而很多情况下我们做不到——那接下来，我们就可以把这个机会与成千上万个其他机会逐一比较。

When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.

1965 年我接手 Berkshire 时，并没有好好利用这一优势。那时 Berkshire 只做纺织，而在此前的十年里纺织业务已经亏了很多钱。我能做的最愚蠢的事情，就是继续追逐那些看似能改善和扩张现有纺织业务的“机会”——结果多年间我干的正是这件蠢事。最后，在一次“灵光乍现”的高峰操作中，我居然还去收购了另一家纺织公司。Aaaaaaargh！（惨叫）直到后来我才幡然醒悟，先把方向转向保险，然后再进入其他行业。

There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.

在这种“世界都是我们可选珍珠”的优势之外，其实还有一个额外加成：除了把一个业务与众多其他业务进行比较之外，我们还会把这些业务机会拿来和可交易证券（股票、债券等）的机会相比较——而大多数管理层并不会这样做。很多时候，企业的估值在可预期的股票或债券投资回报面前，显得荒唐地偏高。在这种时候，我们就会选择去买证券，然后耐心等待更好的机会出现。

Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.

在资本配置上的灵活性，是我们迄今取得进展的主要原因之一。举例来说，我们可以把 See’s Candies 或 Business Wire 赚到的钱（这两家都是我们管理最出色的企业之一，但可再投资机会有限），拿出来作为收购 BNSF 所需股权资金的一部分。

Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.

我们的最后一项优势，是渗透在 Berkshire 全公司的、极难复制的企业文化。而在商业世界里，文化至关重要。

To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.

首先，代表你们的董事们，在思考方式和行为上都像真正的所有者。他们拿到的只是象征性报酬：没有期权，没有限制性股票，而且几乎也拿不到什么现金。我们也不给他们提供在其他大型上市公司几乎标配的董事及高管责任险。如果他们在使用你们资金的过程中犯了错，他们自己也要一起承担损失。撇开我个人的持股不谈，董事及其家人所持有的 Berkshire 股票价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事会会以极大的兴趣和真正所有者的眼光，来审视 Berkshire 的一举一动及其经营结果。你和我都非常幸运，能有他们充当我们的受托人。

This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.

这种“所有者导向”同样在我们的经理人当中普遍存在。在许多案例里，这些人主动找到 Berkshire，希望我们收购他们及其家族长期持有的企业。他们带着所有者的心态来到我们这里，而我们则提供一种环境，鼓励他们一直保持这种心态。拥有一批真正热爱自己业务的经理人，是一项非同小可的优势。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

文化会自我繁衍。Winston Churchill 曾说过：“是你塑造了你的房子，然后房子又反过来塑造你。”这句话对企业同样适用。官僚程序会催生更多官僚主义，奢华的公司宫殿则会养出一套颐指气使的作风。（正如有人打趣说的：“当你坐进车子的后座，它却没有自动开动时，你就知道自己已经不再是 CEO 了。”）在 Berkshire 的“全球总部”，我们的全年租金支出是 270,212 美元。此外，总部在家具、艺术品、可乐机、餐厅、高科技设备——等等一切项目上的投资，加起来也只不过是 301,363 美元。只要 Charlie 和我始终把你们的钱当作我们自己的钱来对待，Berkshire 的经理人也就很可能同样谨慎地使用这些资金。

Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.

我们的薪酬制度、年度股东大会，乃至年度报告，全部都围绕着一个目标来设计：强化 Berkshire 的企业文化，并让这种文化自动排斥乃至“排除”那些价值观不同的经理人。这样的文化每年都在不断增强，即使在 Charlie 和我离开舞台很久之后，它依然会保持完整。

We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.

要想取得尚可的成绩，我们需要用上刚才所说的全部优势。我们的经理人一定会交出答卷，这一点你可以放心。但 Charlie 和我在资本配置方面能否不拖后腿，在某种程度上还要取决于收购领域的竞争环境。无论如何，你们都会得到我们的最大努力。

GEICO

Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.

现在让我讲一个故事，来帮助你理解一家企业的内在价值如何可以远远超过它的账面价值。讲这个故事也让我有机会再次回味一些非常美好的记忆。

Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.

六十年前的上个月，GEICO 走进了我的人生，而且注定以一种巨大的方式改变它。当时我还是 Columbia 的一名 20 岁研究生，之所以选择去那里，是因为我心目中的英雄 Ben Graham 每周会在那儿上一次课。

One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.

有一天在图书馆里，我翻看了《Who’s Who in America》中关于 Ben 的条目，发现他是 Government Employees Insurance Co.（现在叫 GEICO）的董事长。我对保险一无所知，也从未听说过这家公司。不过，馆员把我引向一本保险公司大全，我在上面读完关于 GEICO 的那一页后，决定亲自去拜访这家公司。接下来的那个星期六，我一早就坐上火车前往 Washington。

Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.

然而，当我抵达公司总部时，大楼关门没人上班。于是我有点慌乱地开始用力敲门，最后终于有一位清洁工出现。我问他办公室里有没有我可以聊聊的人，他把我带到当时唯一在场的人那里，那就是 Lorimer Davidson。

That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)

那一刻是我人生中的幸运时刻。接下来的四个小时里，“Davy” 给我上了一堂关于保险和 GEICO 的系统课程，也由此开启了一段非常美好的友谊。不久之后，我从 Columbia 毕业，回到 Omaha 做股票推销员。当然，GEICO 是我首要推荐的股票，这让我一开始就和几十位客户建立了良好的关系。GEICO 也大大推动了我的个人资产，因为在认识 Davy 后不久，我就把这只股票做到占我 9,800 美元投资组合的 75%。（即便如此，我当时仍然觉得自己“过于分散”。）

Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened – with the stock falling by more than 95% – Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)

后来，Davy 成为 GEICO 的 CEO，把公司带到了当初几乎难以想象的高度，直到 1970 年代中期他退休几年后公司出了问题。那时股价从高点跌去了 95% 以上，Berkshire 便在市场上买入了大约三分之一的股份，之后由于 GEICO 回购本公司股票，我们的持股比例逐步升至 50%。Berkshire 拿下这半家公司所付出的成本是 4,600 万美元。（尽管持股比例如此之高，我们对公司的经营并没有行使任何控制权。）

We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)

之后，我们在 1996 年年初又把剩余的 50% GEICO 股权全部买下。这促使当时已经 95 岁的 Davy 录了一盘录像带，说他有多高兴看到自己心爱的 GEICO 永久“安家”于 Berkshire。（他还打趣地补了一句：“下次，Warren，记得先预约。”）

A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.

过去 60 年里，GEICO 发生了很多变化，但它的核心目标一直未变——帮助美国人在购买汽车保险时节省大量费用。（欢迎拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com。）换句话说，是要凭实力赢得保单持有人的生意。围绕这一目标，公司一路发展成为美国第三大汽车保险公司，市占率达到8.8%。

When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.

当 GEICO 现任 CEO Tony Nicely 在 1993 年接手时，这一市场份额只有 2.0%，而且已经在这个水平徘徊了十多年。接手之后，在 Tony 的带领下，GEICO 变成了一家完全不同的公司，在保持严格承保纪律和低成本的同时，找到了持续增长的路径。

Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.

让我用数字来说明 Tony 的成就。1996 年，我们买下当时尚未持有的那 50% GEICO 股权，为此支付了约 23 亿美元。这一价格隐含着整家公司 100% 的估值为 46 亿美元。当时 GEICO 的有形净资产为 19 亿美元。

The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.

隐含价值超过有形净资产的那 27 亿美元，就是我们当时对 GEICO “goodwill”（商誉）价值的估计。这部分商誉代表的是那些当时正在与 GEICO 做生意的保单持有人的经济价值。1995 年，这些客户共向公司支付了 28 亿美元保费。因此，我们给 GEICO 客户的估值，约等于他们每年支付给公司的保费金额的 97%（2.7/2.8）。以行业标准来看，这是一个非常高的价格。但 GEICO 并不是一家普通的保险公司：得益于公司极低的成本，保单持有人整体上长期盈利，而且异常忠诚。

Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.

如今，GEICO 的保费规模已经达到 143 亿美元，而且还在持续增长。即便如此，我们账面上记录的 GEICO 商誉只有 14 亿美元，并且无论 GEICO 的真实价值如何上升，这一数字在账面上都不会改变。（按照会计规则，如果商誉的经济价值下降，就要减记其账面价值；但如果经济价值上升，则账面值保持不变。）如果继续用我们在 1996 年收购时采用的“保费规模 97%”这一估值标尺来衡量，那么现在 GEICO 经济商誉的真实价值大约是 140 亿美元。而在未来十年、二十年里，这一数字很可能会高得多。GEICO——在 2011 年已经有了一个强劲的开局——是一份会不断馈赠的礼物。

One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personallines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.

还有一条并不算小的补充：在 Tony 的领导下，GEICO 建立了全国最大的个人险保险代理机构之一，主要向我们的 GEICO 汽车保险客户销售房屋保险。在这项业务中，我们代表的是一批与我们并无股权关系的保险公司。他们承担风险，而我们只是负责签下客户。去年，这个代理业务共销售了 769,898 份新保单，比前一年增长了 34%。这项业务对我们的直接帮助，是带来了手续费收入；同样重要的是，它进一步增强了我们与保单持有人的关系，有助于提高客户留存率。

Progressive正在努力发展的业务，GEICO的数字化能力不如Progressive。

I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).

我欠 Tony 和 Davy 一份极其巨大的恩情（细想之下，也包括当年那位清洁工）。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们来看看 Berkshire 的四大业务板块。每一块在资产负债表结构和损益特征上都与其他板块有着巨大的差异。如果把它们简单揉在一起，只会妨碍分析。因此，我们会把它们当作四家独立的企业来呈现——这也正是 Charlie 和我看待它们的方式。

We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.

我们先从保险业务讲起，因为这是 Berkshire 的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的发动机。

Insurance

保险

Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:

财产与意外险（“P/C”）保险公司先收保费、后付赔款。在极端情况下，比如某些工伤赔偿事故，赔付可以持续几十年。这个“先收钱、后付钱”的模式，使得我们在相当长时间里握有一大笔资金——我们称之为“float（浮存金）”——虽然这些钱最终要付给别人。但在此期间，我们可以将这笔浮存金用于投资，从而造福 Berkshire。尽管单张保单和单笔赔案此消彼长，但与保费规模相比，我们所持有的浮存金总额却表现出惊人的稳定。因此，随着业务规模的增长，我们的浮存金也随之水涨船高。至于我们增长得有多快，只要看一看后面的那张表就知道了：

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.

如果我们的保费超过了我们的总支出和最终损失，我们就会记录一笔承保利润，这会增加我们的浮存金所产生的投资收入。当出现这样的利润时，我们可以使用免费的资金——更好的是，还能因持有这些资金而获得报酬。可惜，所有保险公司都希望实现这一美好结果，这导致竞争异常激烈，大多数年份都如此激烈，以致整个财产与意外伤害保险行业总体上出现了重大的承保亏损。事实上，这种亏损就是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。例如，全国最大的保险公司、管理良好的 State Farm 在过去十年中有七年出现了承保亏损。在此期间，其累计承保亏损超过 200 亿美元。

At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.

在 Berkshire，我们已经连续八年实现了承保盈利，这一期间累计承保利润达到了 170 亿美元。我认为，在未来的大多数年份（当然不可能是所有年份）我们很有可能继续保持承保盈利。如果我们能做到这一点，那么我们的浮存金就不仅仅是“无成本”资金，而是“负成本”资金了——其效果就好比有一方把 660 亿美元存放在我们这里，还另外付给我们保管费，并允许我们将这笔资金完全按自己的意愿进行投资。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.

我再强调一次，对于财产/意外险行业整体而言，“零成本浮存金”并非可期的结果：在大多数年份里，行业保费不足以覆盖赔付和费用。因此，多十年来该行业整体的有形股本回报率远远低于美国产业的平均回报率，这是一项悲哀的表现，几乎可以肯定将继续下去。伯克希尔卓越的经济表现仅仅因为我们有一些出色的管理者在经营一些与众不同的业务。我们已经向你们介绍过 GEICO，但我们还有另外两项非常大的业务，以及一群较小的业务，每一项在其领域都是明星。

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First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.

首先是由阿吉特·贾因（Ajit Jain）负责的伯克希尔哈撒韦再保险集团。阿吉特承保那些其他人既无意愿也无资本承担的风险。他的运营以一种在保险业独一无二的方式结合了承保能力、速度、果断性，以及最重要的智慧。然而，他从未让伯克希尔承担与我们资源不相称的不当风险。实际上，在这方面我们比大多数大型保险公司要保守得多。在过去一年里，阿吉特大幅扩大了他的人寿再保险业务，发展了约 20 亿美元的年度保费规模，这种规模将在未来几十年持续重复。

From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.

自 1985 年从零起步以来，Ajit 打造出一家拥有 300 亿美元浮存金并且实现了可观承保利润的保险业务，这一成就至今没有任何其他保险公司 CEO 能够接近匹敌。凭借这些成绩，他为 Berkshire 增加了数百亿美元的价值。甚至连 kryptonite（氪石）都奈何不了 Ajit。

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We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.

我们在 General Re 也拥有另一家保险业的“巨无霸”，由 Tad Montross 负责管理。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

归根到底，一家健康稳健的保险公司必须严格遵守四条纪律：（1）充分理解所有可能导致保单发生赔损的风险敞口；（2）以保守的态度评估这些风险敞口实际引发损失的可能性，以及一旦发生损失时的可能成本；（3）设定一个在平均意义上可以保证盈利的保费水平，也就是说，在覆盖预期赔付成本和运营费用之后仍能留有利润；（4）当无法获得足够的保费时，有毅力、有意愿直接放弃这笔业务。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.

许多保险公司在前三条纪律上都能勉强过关，却在第四条上彻底不及格。华尔街的鼓噪、代理人和经纪团队的压力，或者只是某些“荷尔蒙爆棚”的 CEO 不愿意接受业务量下滑的现实，这些因素共同推动了太多保险公司在保费严重不足的情况下仍然硬着头皮承保业务。“别人都这么干，所以我们也得这么干”——这种心态在任何行业都会带来麻烦，而在保险业则尤为致命。

人性假设的一个例子，但凡出问题的都是因为情绪。

Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.

Tad遵守了四条保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得以体现。在他的领导下，General Re 的庞大浮存金表现优于无成本状态，我们预计平均而言这种状况将会继续。

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Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最后，我们还拥有一组规模较小的公司，其中大多数都专注于保险世界里一些相对冷门、细分的领域。整体来看，它们的经营结果长期保持盈利，而且正如下表所示，它们为我们提供的浮存金规模相当可观。Charlie 和我非常珍视这些公司以及管理它们的经理人。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

下面是我们四大财产险与人寿保险业务板块的整体业绩记录：

Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.

在所有大型保险集团当中，Berkshire 的表现在我看来可以说是全世界最出色的。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

制造、服务与零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

在 Berkshire 的这一板块中，我们的业务范围可谓包罗万象、涉猎广泛。不过，我们不妨先来看一下该板块整体的资产负债表和利润表摘要。

This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.

这一组公司所销售的产品，从棒棒糖一直到喷气式飞机一应俱全。其中有些业务的经济特性极为优越，以未加杠杆的有形净资产税后收益率来衡量，区间大约在 25% 到 100% 以上。也有一些业务能带来 12%–20% 区间的不错回报。不幸的是，还有少数业务的回报非常糟糕，那是我在资本配置工作中犯下几次严重错误的结果。这些错误，要么源于我误判了所收购企业的竞争实力，要么源于我看错了其所处行业未来的经济状况。做收购决策时，我总是尽量把眼光放到十年、二十年之后，但有时候，我的“远视力”确实不够好。

Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.

本部分的大多数公司在去年都实现了盈利增长，其中有四家公司创下了历史新高。我们先从这些刷新纪录的公司说起。

• TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI’s exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.

TTI 是我们的电子元件分销商，其销售额比上一轮高点（2008 年）高出 21%，税前利润则比此前的纪录高出 58%。它的销售增长横跨三大洲：北美增长 16%，欧洲增长 26%，亚洲增长 50%。TTI 分销的上千种产品本身都很普通，很多单价还不到一美元。支撑 TTI 取得如此非凡表现的“魔力”，来自 CEO Paul Andrews 以及他的团队。

• Forest River, our RV and boat manufacturer, had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There’s no need; Pete Liegl, the company’s CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.

Forest River 是我们生产房车和船只的制造公司，去年销售额接近 20 亿美元，创下历史纪录，盈利同样创下新高。Forest River 拥有 82 家工厂，而我到现在一个都没去看过（包括总部）。这完全没有必要，因为公司 CEO Pete Liegl 把业务经营得非常出色。欢迎你在年度股东大会上来看看他的产品，更好的做法是——直接买一台。

• CTB, our farm-equipment company, again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company’s CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid $140 million for CTB in 2002. It has since paid us dividends of $160 million and eliminated $40 million of debt. Last year it earned $106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were $189,365; now they are $405,878.

CTB 是我们的农用设备公司，再次创下盈利纪录。我在 2008 年的年度报告里跟你们提到过这家公司的 CEO Vic Mancinelli，他这些年只会变得越来越出色。Berkshire 在 2002 年以 1.4 亿美元收购了 CTB。此后，这家公司已经向我们支付了 1.6 亿美元股息，并偿还了 4,000 万美元债务。去年，它实现了 1.06 亿美元的税前利润。其中很大一部分增长来自生产率的提升。我们当年收购 CTB 时，人均销售额是 189,365 美元；现在这一数字已经达到 405,878 美元。

• Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.

你能想到是鞋子吗？H. H. Brown 由 Jim Issler 负责经营，以其 Born 品牌最为人熟知，去年在销售和盈利上都创下新纪录（其中也得益于在我们年度股东大会上卖出了 1,110 双鞋）。Jim 在应对行业重大变革方面表现得非常出色。我还要补充一句，他的工作由 89 岁的 Frank Rooney 监督，他是一位极其优秀的商人，在高尔夫球场上依然是个下注时要小心应对的对手。

A huge story in this sector’s year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can’t overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol’s achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.

在这一板块年度表现的改善中，真正的大故事发生在 NetJets。作为喷气式飞机分权所有制服务的领先提供商，我怎么强调 Dave Sokol 在这家公司取得的成就都不为过。NetJets 很久以来在运营上一直非常成功，2010 年的市场份额是排名第二竞争对手的五倍。我们之所以拥有压倒性的领先优势，源于一支由飞行员、机务维护人员和服务人员组成的优秀团队。2010 年，这支队伍再次出色地完成了任务，根据我们定期做的客户满意度调查，各项指标都创下了新高。

Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire’s credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater.

尽管 NetJets 在客户中一直是当之无愧的大赢家，但自我们在 1998 年收购以来，这家公司的财务表现却称得上失败。在截至 2009 年的 11 年里，公司累计报告的税前亏损为 1.57 亿美元，而这个数字其实严重低估了真实亏损，因为 NetJets 的借款成本被其免费使用 Berkshire 信用这一事实大幅补贴了。如果 NetJets 是以完全独立的身份运营，那么这些年累计的实际亏损将会多出数亿美元。

前10年都是亏损的，这样的业务需要一个足够坚定的假设：（1）被渴望；（2）在客户心中没有接近的替代品；（3）不受价格管制。

We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire’s guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to $38 million in 2010), NetJets earned $207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave’s quick restructuring of management and the company’s rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire’s only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.

现在，我们开始就 Berkshire 提供的担保向 NetJets 收取一笔合理费用。尽管有这项费用（2010 年金额为 3,800 万美元），NetJets 在 2010 年仍实现了 2.07 亿美元的税前利润，相比 2009 年实现了 9.18 亿美元的巨大转变。Dave 对管理层的快速重组，以及公司在采购和支出政策上的理顺，终结了现金的大量流失，把 Berkshire 唯一的一个重大业务问题，变成了一项稳健盈利的业务。

Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets’ industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that’s equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.

与此同时，Dave 也维持住了 NetJets 在安全和服务方面领先全行业的声誉。在许多重要方面，我们的培训和运营标准都明显高于 FAA 的要求。坚持最高水准的标准，本身就是正确之举，但我支持这项政策还有一点私心：我和家人在 NetJets 上累计飞行时间已经超过 5,000 小时（相当于连续 24 小时在空中飞行七个月），今后还会再飞上几千个小时。我们没有受到任何特殊待遇，使用过的机队是至少 100 架飞机、300 个机组的随机组合。无论是哪一架飞机、哪一个机组，我们始终知道自己飞行在私人航空领域训练最好的飞行员手中。

The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon, a collection of 130 businesses. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.

在我们的制造、服务和零售板块中，盈利规模最大的一家公司是 Marmon，它由大约 130 家业务组成。不久之后，我们将按照既定安排，从 Pritzker 家族手中再购买 17% 的股份，把在这家公司的持股比例提高到 80%，成本大约为 15 亿美元。随后，我们会在 2013 年或 2014 年（由该家族选择具体年份）买下 Pritzker 家族剩余的全部持股。Frank Ptak 把 Marmon 经营得非常出色，我们也期待最终实现 100% 持股。

Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier’s McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company’s dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.

紧随 Marmon 之后，这一板块中盈利规模最大的两家公司是 Iscar 和 McLane。它们在去年都取得了非常出色的成绩。2010 年，由 Grady Rosier 负责的 McLane 进入了葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务，以补充其作为食品、烟草、糖果和杂货分销商、年营收 320 亿美元的既有业务。通过收购在 Georgia 和 North Carolina 经营的 Empire Distributors，我们与这家充满活力的 CEO David Kahn 携手合作。David 正在带领我们推动业务在地域上的扩张。到年底，他已经完成了第一笔并购——位于 Tennessee 的 Horizon Wine and Spirits。

At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar’s main competitors.

在 Iscar，2010 年的利润同比增长了 159%，我们很有可能在 2011 年超过经济衰退前的盈利水平。公司的销售在全球范围内都在改善，尤其是在亚洲市场。Iscar 能取得远远优于主要竞争对手的卓越表现，功劳应归于 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman。

All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned $362 million pre-tax in 2010 compared to $1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.

上述情况全都是好消息。不过，我们与住宅建筑相关的业务仍然举步维艰。Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw 和 Acme Brick 虽然都守住了各自的竞争地位，但它们的利润水平远低于几年前。整体来看，这几项业务在 2010 年合计实现 3.62 亿美元税前利润，而 2006 年这一数字为 13 亿美元，同时其员工总数减少了大约 9,400 人。

A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently: (1) At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months; (2) At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for $50 million; (3) Johns Manville is building a $55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year; and (4) Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America. These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.

住宅市场的复苏很可能会在一年左右启动。无论如何，可以肯定的是，这一复苏迟早会到来。因此：（1）在 MiTek，我们在过去 11 个月里已经完成或承诺完成 5 笔补强式并购；（2）在 Acme，我们刚刚以 5,000 万美元收购了 Alabama 领先的砖块制造企业；（3）Johns Manville 正在 Ohio 建设一座投资 5,500 万美元的屋面防水卷材工厂，预计明年完工；（4）Shaw 计划在 2011 年投入 2 亿美元用于厂房和设备，这些投资全部发生在美国。这些业务在进入衰退时就很强大，走出衰退时会变得更加强大。对 Berkshire 来说，我们的时间视角是“永远”。

2014年股东信里的一个假设：一个世纪之后，。。。住宅和汽车仍将是大多数家庭生活的核心。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

受监管、资本密集型业务

We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.

我们有两家体量非常庞大的企业——BNSF 和 MidAmerican Energy，它们具有一些重要的共同特征，把它们与我们旗下众多其他业务明显区分开来。因此，在这封股东信中，我们单独把它们划成一个板块；在我们的 GAAP 资产负债表和利润表中，也把它们的财务数据单独列示出来。

A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF’s car loadings far off peak levels, the company’s interest coverage was 6:1.

这两家公司的一个关键特征是：它们在寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入了巨额资本，而这些资产主要依赖大量长期债务融资，而且这些债务都没有 Berkshire 的担保。我们并不需要提供信用背书，因为即便在非常不利的经营环境下，这两家企业的盈利能力也足以覆盖其利息支出。举例来说，在经济衰退的 2010 年，尽管 BNSF 的运量远低于高峰水平，但其利息保障倍数依然达到 6:1。

Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.

这两家公司都处于高度监管之下，并且在未来都将持续不断地为厂房和设备投入巨额资本。同时，它们必须向客户提供高效且令人满意的服务，才能赢得所在社区和监管机构的尊重。作为回报，它们也必须能得到一个合理的预期：未来新增资本投入能够获得公平、合理的收益。

Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country’s future. Rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.

前面我已经解释过铁路对美国未来有多重要。以吨英里计算，铁路承担了美国 42% 的城际货运，而 BNSF 的运量超过美国任何一家铁路公司——大约占整个行业总量的 28%。稍微算一算就会发现，美国所有城际货运吨英里中，有超过 11% 是由 BNSF 承运的。考虑到美国人口正持续向西部迁移，我们的份额未来很可能还会略有提高。

All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy’s circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society’s needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I’m confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.

所有这些加总起来，意味着一份巨大的责任。我们是美国经济“循环系统”中的核心和不可或缺的一部分，必须持续不断地维护和改善我们约 23,000 英里的铁路线，以及沿线的大量桥梁、隧道、机车和车厢。在履行这项职责时，我们必须预判社会未来的需求，而不能被动地事后响应。为了履行这样的社会责任，我们的资本支出将长期远高于折旧额，仅 2011 年这一“超额部分”就将达到 20 亿美元。我有信心，我们能在这些巨大增量投资上获得合理的回报。明智的监管与明智的投资，本来就是同一枚硬币的两面。

At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up everincreasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.

在 MidAmerican，我们参与的是一份类似的“社会契约”。社会与监管的期待，是我们要不断投入越来越多的资金，以满足未来客户的用电与用能需求。只要我们在此期间做到运行可靠、高效，我们就知道可以在这些投资上获得合理的回报。

MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.

MidAmerican 在美国为 240 万客户提供电力服务，是 Iowa、Wyoming 和 Utah 的最大电力供应商，同时也在其他一些州扮演着重要供电角色。我们运营的管道输送了全美国 8% 的天然气——显然，每天都有数以百万计的美国人依赖着我们。

MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire’s interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.

MidAmerican 多年来为其所有者（Berkshire 持股 89.8%）和客户都交出了非常出色的成绩。2002 年 MidAmerican 收购 Northern Natural Gas 管道公司后不久，这家公司在业内权威机构的评级中，管道运营绩效排名 43 家里的倒数第一。然而在最新一期报告中，Northern Natural 已经升至第二名，而第一名是我们另一条管道 Kern River。

In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.

在电力业务方面，MidAmerican 也有类似的优秀记录。自从我们在 1999 年收购其在 Iowa 的电力业务以来，当地电价至今没有上涨过；而同期该州另一家大型电力公司却把电价提高了 70% 以上，如今其收费水平远高于我们。在某些两家公司同时供电的都会区，我们客户的电费账单明显低于身边邻居。我听说，在这些城市里，如果一栋房子位于我们的供电区域，往往可以卖出更高的价格。

MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.

到 2011 年年底，MidAmerican 投运的风电装机容量将达到 2,909 兆瓦，高于美国任何一家受监管电力公司。MidAmerican 已经在风电项目上投入或承诺投入的总金额高达 54 亿美元。我们之所以能进行这种规模的投入，是因为 MidAmerican 会把自己赚到的利润全部留存下来，而不像大多数公用事业公司那样，把大部分利润以股息形式分配出去。

As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:

相信你已经看出来了，我对 BNSF 的 Matt Rose 以及 MidAmerican 的 David Sokol 和 Greg Abel 为社会所做的贡献感到非常自豪。同样，我也为他们为 Berkshire 股东创造的价值感到由衷自豪并深表感谢。下面是一些相关的数据。

Finance and Financial Products

金融与金融产品

This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.

这是我们最小的一个业务板块，其中包括两家租赁公司：XTRA（挂车）和 CORT（家具），以及 Clayton Homes——全美领先的装配式住房制造商和融资方。

Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to $35 million from $17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of $3 million in 2009 to $18 million of profit in 2010.

我们的两家租赁业务去年业绩都有所改善，尽管是从一个非常低的基数起步。XTRA 的设备利用率从 2009 年的 63% 提高到 2010 年的 75%，税前利润也从 2009 年的 1,700 万美元提升到 3,500 万美元。CORT 随着年度推进业务有所回暖，同时显著收紧并优化了运营管理，两者叠加的结果，是其税前业绩从 2009 年亏损 300 万美元，转为 2010 年盈利 1,800 万美元。

At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry’s total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.

在 Clayton，我们生产了 23,343 套住房，占全行业 50,046 套总产量的 47%。对比之下，在 1998 年的高峰期，全行业生产了 372,843 套（当时我们只有 8% 的市场份额）。无论在什么情形下，去年装配式住房的销售都会非常惨淡，而我在 2009 年年报中提到的融资难题，则进一步加剧了这种困境。具体来说：政府的住房贷款政策（反映在 FHA、Freddie Mac 和 Fannie Mae 所认可的贷款类型上），倾向于支持传统现浇/砖混的现场建造住房，从而在实质上削弱了装配式住房在价格上的优势。

We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country’s home-loan practices. Let’s take a look.

我们为装配式住房买家提供的融资规模，超过任何其他公司。因此，我们在这一领域的实际经验，对那些准备重构美国住房贷款体系的人来说，应该具有重要的参考价值。下面我们就来具体看一看。

Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.

Clayton 自行发放并持有 200,804 笔按揭贷款（此外还持有一些从他处购入的贷款组合）。在这些贷款签约时，我们客户的平均 FICO 信用评分为 648，其中有 47% 的借款人分数在 640 或以下。你的银行家会告诉你，这样的信用评分通常会被视为“存疑”客户。

Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here’s our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:

尽管如此，我们的贷款组合在压力环境下整体表现良好。下面是过去五年里，这些自营贷款的实际损失情况：

Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.

我们的借款人在失业、生病、离婚等情况下就会陷入困境。经济衰退对他们打击很大。但他们普遍都想留在自己的房子里，而且总体上，他们的借款金额与自身收入相比是比较审慎的。除此之外，我们会把自己发放的按揭贷款留在自有账上，也就是说，我们并不会把这些贷款打包证券化或转手卖给别人。如果我们在放贷时做了蠢事，亏损就得我们自己吞下——这种安排会迫使你保持头脑清醒、格外谨慎。

If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.

如果全国的购房者都像我们的客户那样行事，美国就不会遭遇后来那场房贷危机。我们的做法其实很简单：要求买家支付一笔“有意义的首付”，并把固定月供控制在一个相对于收入合理的比例之内。这样的政策既保证了 Clayton 自身的稳健，也帮助借款人守住了他们自己的房子。

Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.

自有住房对于绝大多数美国人来说是有道理的，尤其是在当前房价较低、利率极具吸引力的环境下。综合考虑一切因素，我这辈子做过的第三好投资，就是买下现在这套自住房——尽管如果当年选择租房、而把买房的钱拿去买股票，我在金钱上会赚得更多。（排在前两位的投资，是结婚戒指。）我为这套花了 31,500 美元买下的房子，与家人一起收获了 52 年的美好回忆，而且未来还会继续增加。

But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.

但如果买房人的“眼睛大于钱包”，再加上放贷机构（往往还享有政府担保）迎合甚至放大了这种幻想，那么房子就会从梦想变成噩梦。一个国家在住房上的社会目标，不应该是“让每个家庭住进他们梦想中的房子”，而应该是“让每个家庭住进他们负担得起的房子”。

（1）电路、能源；（2）住宅、汽车；（3）保险，现在开始配置AAPL和GOOG。

Investments

投资

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.

下面我们列出了在年末按市值计算超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资组合。

In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience – and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century – undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.

在我们报告的收益中，只反映了投资组合公司支付给我们的股息。然而，这些被投资企业未分配给我们的那部分留存收益，在去年超过了 20 亿美元。这些留存收益非常重要：根据我们的经验——事实上也是过去一个世纪投资者的普遍经验——企业没有分配的利润，最终往往会在股价上涨中得到匹配，甚至被超额反映，尽管这种反映的节奏非常不规则。（有时候相关性甚至会“反向”表现。就像有位投资者在 2009 年说的那样：“这比离婚还惨。我失去了自己一半的净资产——但我老婆还在。”）展望未来，我们预计自己在股市上的长期资本利得，至少会与这些被投资企业留存的利润大致相当。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).

在我们之前对 Berkshire “正常盈利能力”的估算中，我们做了三项与未来投资收益相关的调整（但没有把刚才提到的“未分配收益”因素算进去）。

The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these – our Swiss Re note – was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others – our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks – are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.

第一项调整显然是负面的。去年，我们讨论了五笔规模较大的固定收益投资，这些投资为我们报告的收益贡献了可观金额。其中一笔——我们持有的 Swiss Re 债券——已在 2011 年年初被提前赎回；另外两笔——我们在 Goldman Sachs 和 General Electric 所持的优先股——也很可能会在年末之前全部被赎回。General Electric 有权在今年十月赎回我们手中的优先股，并且已经表示了会行使这一权利的意向。Goldman Sachs 则可以在提前 30 天通知后赎回我们的优先股，只是迄今一直被 Federal Reserve（感谢它！）按下了暂停键；不过，可惜的是，美联储很可能在不久的将来为 Goldman 放行。

All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so – in aggregate about $1.4 billion – but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That’s the bad news.

这三家公司在赎回我们的证券时，都必须向我们支付一定的溢价补偿——合计大约 14 亿美元——但即便如此，我们仍然并不欢迎这些赎回。因为在它们全部赎回之后，我们的盈利能力将会受到显著削弱。这就是“坏消息”的部分。

There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held $38 billion of cash equivalents that have been earning a pittance throughout 2010. At some point, however, better rates will return. They will add at least $500 million – and perhaps much more – to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of “normal” earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.

好消息是，存在两项很可能起到对冲作用的因素。年末时，我们持有 380 亿美元的现金和现金等价物，而这些资金在 2010 年几乎拿不到什么像样的收益。不过，总有一天，更好的利率环境会回归，届时这些资金至少可以为我们的投资收益每年增添 5 亿美元，甚至可能远不止于此。货币市场利率出现这种幅度的提升，短期内大概率不会发生，但在估算“正常”盈利能力时，把更合理的利率水平纳入假设之中是合适的。更进一步说，即便在利率尚未回升之前，我们也可能有机会找到一些能让这笔巨额现金获得不错回报的投资标的。对我个人来说，这一天当然是越早到来越好——借用一下伊索寓言的结构来更新一句话：现在的我看来，“敞篷车上的一个姑娘，胜过电话簿里的五个。”

In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don’t fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)

除此之外，我们当前持有的普通股投资，其股息几乎可以肯定会明显提升。其中增幅最大的一笔，很可能来自 Wells Fargo。过去两年，美联储对所有大型银行——不论强弱——的股息水平都实施了冻结，而 Wells Fargo 虽然在整个经济衰退最糟糕的阶段仍持续保持良好盈利能力，目前也拥有极其雄厚的财务实力和盈利能力，却依然被迫维持一个明显偏低的派息水平。（我们对此并不苛责美联储：在当时的危机以及后续时期，出于多方面原因，对全体银行实施统一的股息冻结，是有其合理性的。）

At some point, probably soon, the Fed’s restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

在某个时间点——很可能就在不远的将来——美联储的这些限制将会解除。到那时，Wells Fargo 就可以恢复一套与自身实力相匹配的理性股息政策，而这是它的股东应得的。届时，我们仅从这一家证券上每年收到的股息，就有望增加数亿美元。

Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us $88 million in 1995, the year after we finished purchasing the stock. Every year since, Coke has increased its dividend. In 2011, we will almost certainly receive $376 million from Coke, up $24 million from last year. Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.

我们持有的其他公司，也很可能相继提高股息。以 Coca-Cola 为例，在我们完成建仓后的第一年——1995 年——它支付给我们的股息是 8,800 万美元。此后，Coke 每年都在提高股息。2011 年，我们几乎可以确定会从 Coke 那里收到 3.76 亿美元股息，比上一年增加 2,400 万美元。我预计，在十年之内，这 3.76 亿美元还会再翻一番。等到那个时候，我一点也不会惊讶地看到：我们从 Coke 每年分得的盈利，超过当初为这笔投资所支付金额的 100%。对一家真正优秀的企业而言，时间永远是它的朋友。

Overall, I believe our “normal” investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.

综合来看，我相信我们的“正常”投资收益至少会达到 2010 年的水平，尽管前面提到的赎回行为会在 2011 年，甚至可能延续到 2012 年，阶段性压低我们的收益。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 – an age Charlie and I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire – his call was a surprise.

去年夏天，Lou Simpson 告诉我他打算退休。鉴于 Lou 才 74 岁——在 Charlie 和我看来，这个年纪在 Berkshire 也就只适合作为“培训生”——他的这个决定着实让我感到意外。

Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?

Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.

Lou 在 1979 年加入 GEICO，担任投资经理，他为这家公司所做的贡献是无可估量的。我在 2004 年年度报告中详细列出了他在股票投资方面的成绩，此后之所以不再更新，只是因为他的业绩会把我自己的业绩衬托得很难看——谁需要这种“对比”呢？

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren’t around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.

四年前，我对你们说过，我们必须增添一位或多位更年轻的投资经理，以便在 Charlie、Lou 和我都不在的时候继续接力。那时候，我们已经有好几位非常出色的候选人，可以随时接替我的 CEO 职位（现在也一样），但在投资管理这个环节，我们还没有“替补”。

It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.

要在市场上找到近期业绩出色的投资经理并不难。但在评估未来表现时，历史业绩虽然重要，却远远不够。关键在于：这些成绩是如何取得的？同样重要的，是经理人对风险的理解和敏感度（风险绝不应该用 beta 来衡量，可惜太多学者都钟情于这个指标）。在风险这条标准上，我们一直在寻找一种极难评估的能力：预判那些从未出现过的宏观经济情景可能带来的影响。最后，我们希望找到的人，是把在 Berkshire 工作看得远不止是一份“工作”的那种人。

When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.

当 Charlie 和我见到 Todd Combs 时，我们就知道他符合我们的全部要求。Todd 的薪酬安排会像当年的 Lou 一样：固定工资加一部分与标普指数相对表现挂钩的浮动报酬。我们也设计了递延和结转机制，避免出现“业绩忽上忽下、奖励照发不误”的情况。对冲基金行业里曾出现过不少很糟糕的现象：普通合伙人在好年景拿到巨额分成，一旦业绩转坏，就拍拍屁股、带着财富走人，让有限合伙人把之前赚到的钱再亏回去。有时候，这些普通合伙人很快又重开新基金，如此一来，他们可以立即参与未来利润分配，而不必先填补过去的亏损。把钱交给这种经理人打理的投资者，更像是“冤大头”，而不是“合伙人”。

As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire’s holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as “long-short,” “macro,” “international equities.” At Berkshire our only style box is “smart.”)

只要我还是 CEO，我就会继续管理 Berkshire 绝大部分的资产持仓——无论是债券还是股票。Todd 起初将管理 10 亿到 30 亿美元规模的资金，这个额度他可以按年调整。他的主要精力会放在股票上，但并不被限制只能做这一类资产。（基金顾问往往喜欢给经理人划“风格框”：什么“多空”、“宏观”、“海外股票”等等，而在 Berkshire，我们唯一认可的“风格框”就一个词：smart。）

Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.

随着时间推移，如果我们遇到合适的人选，可能还会再增添一到两位投资经理。如果真那样做，我们很可能会把每位经理业绩报酬中的 80%，与他/她自己管理的投资组合挂钩，剩余 20% 与其他经理的组合表现挂钩。我们希望建立的，是一种对个人成功给予高回报、同时又能鼓励合作而不是相互竞争的激励体系。

When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted – but not to have a vote – on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.

当 Charlie 和我都不在时，我们的投资经理将对整个投资组合负责，其职责边界由当时的 CEO 和董事会来设定。由于优秀投资人往往能为收购决策带来独特而有价值的视角，我们预期他们在潜在收购项目上会被征询意见——但没有表决权。最终，对任何重大收购做出决策的，当然还是董事会。

One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd’s joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was “little-known” and expressed puzzlement that we didn’t seek a “big-name.” I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Ajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops – that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)

最后再补一句：当我们发布 Todd 加入 Berkshire 的新闻稿时，一些评论人士指出他是个“名不见经传”的人，并质疑我们为何不去找一个“响当当的大牌”。我倒想知道，这些人当中有多少在 1979 年时听说过 Lou，在 1985 年时听说过 Ajit，或者在 1959 年时听说过 Charlie。我们的目标，是找到一匹 2 岁的 Secretariat，而不是一匹 10 岁的 Seabiscuit。（哎，这可能不是一个 80 岁 CEO 最聪明的比喻选择。）

Derivatives

衍生品

Two years ago, in the 2008 Annual Report, I told you that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operations at our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the few left over at Gen Re). Today, the comparable number is 203, a figure reflecting both a few additions to our portfolio and the unwinding or expiration of some contracts.

两年前的 2008 年年度报告里，我告诉过你们，Berkshire 参与了 251 份衍生品合约（不包括子公司正常经营中使用的那部分，例如 MidAmerican，以及 Gen Re 里残留的那少数几份）。到了今天，对应的数量是 203 份，这一数字既反映了我们在组合中新增了少量合约，也反映了一些原有合约已经到期或提前平仓。

Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging us in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks that others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk. That’s important.

我们目前持有的衍生品头寸——全部由我个人负责——大体可以分成两大类。在我们看来，这两类交易本质上都是类似保险的业务：我们收取“保费”，去承担别人不愿意继续持有的风险。事实上，我们在这些衍生品交易上的思考方式，与在保险业务中的思路完全一致。还有一点也很重要：进入这些合约时，我们是预先一次性收款的，因此不存在对手方信用风险。这一点非常关键。

Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.

第一类衍生品，是在 2004–2008 年间签下的一批合约：如果某些高收益债券指数中的公司发生债务违约，我们就需要按约定支付赔款。除去个别例外，每份合约的风险敞口期限约为五年，每份合约名义上覆盖 100 家公司。

In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float.

总体来看，我们从这些合约中一共收取了 34 亿美元的“保费”。我在 2007 年年度报告里第一次向你们介绍这类合约时曾经说过，我预计这些合约会为我们带来“承保利润”——也就是说，最终发生的赔付总额会小于我们收取的保费。另外，我当时还提到，我们还会从这批交易中获得一笔可供运用的“浮存金”。

Subsequently, as you know too well, we encountered both a financial panic and a severe recession. A number of the companies in the high-yield indices failed, which required us to pay losses of $2.5 billion. Today, however, our exposure is largely behind us because most of our higher-risk contracts have expired. Consequently, it appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago.

之后的事你们都太清楚了：我们先是经历了一场金融恐慌，随后又遭遇了一次严重的经济衰退。高收益债券指数中的相当一部分公司破产倒闭，迫使我们累计支付了 25 亿美元的赔付。不过，到现在为止，我们在这类风险上的敞口基本已成“过去时”，因为大部分风险最高的那批合约已经到期。因此，目前几乎可以肯定，我们最终会像当初预计的那样，在这批交易中获得承保利润。此外，在这些合约存续期内，我们平均持有了约 20 亿美元的无息浮存金。简单说，我们当初定价定得很合理，这在三年前商业环境急转直下时，给了我们很好的保护。

Our other large derivatives position – whose contracts go by the name of “equity puts” – involves insurance we wrote for parties wishing to protect themselves against a possible decline in equity prices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts are tied to various equity indices, such as the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the FTSE 100 in the U.K. In the 2004-2008 period, we received $4.8 billion of premiums for 47 of these contracts, most of which ran for 15 years. On these contracts, only the price of the indices on the termination date counts: No payments can be required before then.

我们的另一大类衍生品头寸——这批合约通常被称为“equity puts”（股权看跌期权）——本质上是我们为一些机构提供的“股市保险”：它们希望对冲未来在美国、英国、欧洲和日本股市可能出现的大幅下跌风险。这些合约与一篮子股权指数挂钩，比如美国的 S&P 500、英国的 FTSE 100 等。在 2004–2008 年间，我们为这类合约一共签了 47 份，合计收取 48 亿美元保费，大多数合约期限为 15 年。在这些合约中，只有到期日的指数点位才会被用来结算：在此之前，我们无须也不可能支付任何款项。

As a first step in updating you about these contracts, I can report that late in 2010, at the instigation of our counterparty, we unwound eight contracts, all of them due between 2021 and 2028. We had originally received $647 million in premiums for these contracts, and the unwinding required us to pay $425 million. Consequently, we realized a gain of $222 million and also had the interest-free and unrestricted use of that $647 million for about three years.

作为关于这批合约的最新进展，先汇报一件事：在 2010 年年底，应对手方的要求，我们提前对八份合约进行了平仓，这些合约原本的到期时间在 2021 至 2028 年之间。我们当初从这八份合约里收取了 6.47 亿美元保费，而此次平仓则需要支付 4.25 亿美元，因此我们实现了 2.22 亿美元的收益，而且在这三年里，我们一直无息、无任何限制地使用着这 6.47 亿美元。

Those 2010 transactions left us with 39 equity put contracts remaining on our books at yearend. On these, at their initiation, we received premiums of $4.2 billion.

这些 2010 年的交易之后，我们账面上还剩下 39 份 equity put 合约。在这些剩余合约刚签订时，我们一共从中收取了 42 亿美元的保费。

The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 – and foreign exchange rates are unchanged – we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount “settlement value.”

这些合约未来会怎么走，当然是存在很大不确定性的。不过我们可以从一个角度来理解它们：如果在各份合约到期日时，相关指数的点位与 2010 年 12 月 31 日时完全相同，且各主要货币汇率也保持不变，那么在 2018 至 2026 年这段时间里，合约到期时我们总共需要支付 38 亿美元。你可以把这个数字称为这批合约的“结算价值”。

On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at $6.7 billion. In other words, if the prices of the relevant indices remain unchanged from that date, we will record a $2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of $6.7 billion and the settlement value of $3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that, of course, is far from a sure thing.

不过，在我们年末资产负债表上，对这 39 份剩余 equity put 合约所计提的负债却是 67 亿美元。换句话说，如果未来相关指数的点位一直停留在 2010 年 12 月 31 日的水平不变，我们将在未来若干年内确认一笔高达 29 亿美元的收益——这正是目前账面负债 67 亿与结算价值 38 亿之间的差额。我个人认为，股价从现在到合约到期之间很大概率会有所上涨，相应的，我们就有机会在此期间看到这项负债显著减少。如果真是那样，从现在这一刻算起，我们最终获得的收益将会比 29 亿更大。当然，这一切都远谈不上“板上钉钉”。

What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.

可以确定的一点是，我们还能在平均大约未来 10 年里，继续使用这 42 亿美元的剩余“浮存金”。（无论这部分浮存金，还是前面高收益债合约所形成的浮存金，都没有计入 660 亿美元保险浮存金的统计口径中。）既然资金本身是可以互换的，你不妨把其中一部分视作当初我们用于收购 BNSF 的资金来源。

As I have told you before, almost all of our derivatives contracts are free of any obligation to post collateral – a fact that cut the premiums we could otherwise have charged. But that fact also left us feeling comfortable during the financial crisis, allowing us in those days to commit to some advantageous purchases. Foregoing some additional derivatives premiums proved to be well worth it.

正如我之前跟你们说过的，我们几乎所有衍生品合约都不要求我们提供任何形式的抵押品——这一事实，客观上压低了我们本可以多收的一部分保费。但这一安排也让我们在金融危机期间感到非常从容，使我们能够在那段日子里出手做成几笔很划算的收购或投资。事实证明，少赚一点衍生品保费，换来那种安全感和灵活性，是非常值得的。

On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don’t

关于“披露”和“误导披露”：哪些数字重要，哪些数字不重要

Earlier in this letter, I pointed out some numbers that Charlie and I find useful in valuing Berkshire and measuring its progress.

在本信前面，我已经提到过一些数字，是 Charlie 和我在给 Berkshire 估值、以及衡量它的进展时真正有用的指标。

Let’s focus here on a number we omitted, but which many in the media feature above all others: net income. Important though that number may be at most companies, it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire. Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could – quite legally – cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.

现在我们来关注一个我们刻意没提，但媒体常常当作“头号指标”反复报道的数字：净利润（net income）。在大多数公司，净利润当然是一个重要数字；但在 Berkshire，这个数字几乎总是没什么意义。不管我们的业务实际经营情况如何，Charlie 和我完全可以——而且是“合法地”——在任何一个报告期里，把净利润变成几乎我们想要的任何数。

We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a $10 billion increase in unrealized gains in a given year and concurrently had $1 billion of realized losses. Our net income – which would count only the loss – would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved.

我们之所以拥有这种“调节空间”，是因为：投资的已实现盈亏会计入净利润，而未实现的盈亏（多数情况下尤其是未实现损失）则不会进净利润。例如，假设 Berkshire 在某一年里未实现收益增加了 100 亿美元，同时实现了 10 亿美元的损失，那么我们对外披露的“净利润”——只会计算那 10 亿损失——看上去还会低于我们的经营利润。如果我们前一年刚好实现了可观盈余，各大媒体的标题很可能会写成“伯克希尔盈利同比大幅下滑 X%”，而事实上我们的业务可能比前一年好了很多。

If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for “game playing” with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.

如果我们真的认为“净利润”很重要，那完全可以定期去“收割”一部分已实现收益，只要动用我们账面上那一大堆未实现盈余就行了。不过你大可放心，Charlie 和我从来不会为了即将披露的净利润好看一点，而去卖掉一只证券。我们对玩数字游戏这类事情有着发自内心的厌恶感——在上世纪 90 年代，这种玩法曾经在美国企业界泛滥成灾，现在虽然少了一些、隐蔽了一些，但并没有彻底消失。

Operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing. Ignore our net income figure, however. Regulations require that we report it to you. But if you find reporters focusing on it, that will speak more to their performance than ours.

“经营收益”（operating earnings）虽然也有若干缺点，但总体而言，是衡量我们业务表现的一个相对合理的指标。相反，“净利润”这个数字你基本可以无视。法规要求我们必须向你们报这个数字，但如果你看到有记者对它大书特书，那反映的更多是他们的业务水平，而不是我们的经营水平。

Both realized and unrealized gains and losses are fully reflected in the calculation of our book value. Pay attention to the changes in that metric and to the course of our operating earnings, and you will be on the right track.

已实现和未实现的全部盈亏，会在我们的“账面价值”（book value）计算中得到完整、真实的反映。只要你盯住账面价值变化的轨迹，以及我们经营收益的走势，你就抓住了真正重要的方向。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As a p.s., I can’t resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had a termination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay $6.4 billion to our counterparties at that date. Security prices then generally rose in the next quarter, a move that brought the corresponding figure down to $5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from $8.9 billion to $9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.

作为补充说明，我忍不住想再强调一下所谓“报告净利润”是多么善变。如果我们的 equity puts 合约到期日是 2010 年 6 月 30 日，那么那天我们必须向对手方支付 64 亿美元。接下来的一个季度里，证券价格普遍上涨，使得这一对应数字在 9 月 30 日时降到 58 亿美元。然而，我们用来对这些合约估值的 Black-Scholes 公式，却要求我们在这段期间把资产负债表上记载的相关负债从 89 亿美元提高到 96 亿美元。扣除税费计提的影响，这一变化使得我们当季的净利润减少了 4.55 亿美元。

Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.

Charlie 和我都认为，当 Black-Scholes 被用于长期期权估值时，会得出极不恰当的结果。两年前，我们就在股东信中举过一个荒谬的例子。更为“实在”的证据是，我们用真金白银通过签订这些 equity put 合约来表达自己的观点——这么做等于是直接宣称，对手方或其客户所采用的 Black-Scholes 计算结果是有问题的。

We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation – almost all leading business schools teach it – and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use BlackScholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.

尽管如此，在编制财务报表时我们仍然继续使用这套公式。Black-Scholes 是目前被广泛接受的期权定价标准——几乎所有一流商学院都在教授它——如果我们偏离这一做法，就会被指责“不按规范会计”。更麻烦的是，如果我们这么干，还会给审计师制造一个根本无解的问题：他们的一些客户正好是我们的对手方，并且他们在对同样的合约估值时也是用 Black-Scholes。如果我们的估值方法和这些对手方大相径庭，审计师就不可能同时为双方的数字“背书”。

Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure – anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.

Black-Scholes 之所以对审计师和监管者很有吸引力，很大一部分原因在于，它给出了一个“精确的数字”。而这一点，是 Charlie 和我做不到的。我们相信，这些合约的真实负债远低于 Black-Scholes 计算出来的数字，但我们没法给出一个精确数值——就像我们也没法给出 GEICO、BNSF 或 Berkshire Hathaway 自身的“精确价值”一样。我们对自己算不出一个精确数字并不感到困扰：我们宁可“大致正确”，也不要“精确错误”。

John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it “anomalies.” (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)

John Kenneth Galbraith 曾经带着几分讽刺地说过，经济学家在“节约点子”方面是最节俭的：他们把研究生阶段学到的那些理论，用一辈子。大学里的金融系在行为上往往也很类似。你可以回想一下：几乎所有人是多么顽固地在 1970 年代和 1980 年代牢牢抱住“有效市场理论”，把那些有力反驳事实轻描淡写地称作“异常值”。（我向来很喜欢这样的说法方式：地平学会（Flat Earth Society）大概会把一艘船环绕地球一圈这件事，看成一个烦人但无足轻重的“异常现象”。）

Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.

学界目前把 Black-Scholes 当成某种“真理启示”来教学的做法，确实需要重新检讨。同样需要重新审视的，还有学界对“如何给期权估值”这一话题的过度着迷。你完全可以在投资上取得巨大成功，却丝毫不懂如何给一个期权定价。学生真正应该学会的，是如何给一家公司估值——投资的本质就在这里。

Life and Debt

人生和负债

The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.

赛车比赛的基本原则是：想要第一个冲线，你必须先保证自己能完赛。这条原则同样适用于商业，也始终指导着我们在 Berkshire 的一切行动。

Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade – and some relearned in 2008 – any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.

毫无疑问，有些人确实通过举债变得非常富有。但同样明显的是，用借来的钱也可以把人变得一无所有。当杠杆顺风时，它会放大你的收益，你的配偶会觉得你很聪明，你的邻居会开始羡慕你。但杠杆具有成瘾性，一旦尝到它的“甜头”，很少有人愿意退回到更保守的做法。而且，正如我们在三年级算术课上学到的——也是在 2008 年重新补上的一课——任何一串再漂亮的正数，只要乘上一个零，就会化为乌有。历史告诉我们，杠杆“制造零”的频率实在太高，即便操盘的人是非常聪明的人也不例外。

Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.

当然，杠杆对企业同样可能是致命的。负债沉重的公司，往往习惯性地假设：等债务到期时，总能顺利再融资。这个假设在大多数时候是成立的。但偶尔会有例外：要么因为公司自身出了问题，要么因为全球性信用紧缩，结果就是债务到期时真的需要“掏现金”还本付息，而那一刻，只有真金白银才能解决问题。

Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.

到那时，借款人就会明白：信用就像氧气。只要两者供给充足，人们甚至察觉不到它们的存在；一旦任何一项缺失，所有人的注意力就只剩下这一件事。即便只是短暂的信用中断，也足以让一家公司立刻跪下。事实上，在 2008 年 9 月，信贷几乎一夜之间在许多经济领域消失，这种局面已经非常接近于让整个美国经济跪倒在地。

Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s wellbeing. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.

Charlie 和我对任何哪怕可能给 Berkshire 的长期健康带来一点点威胁的行为都毫无兴趣。（以我们加起来 167 岁的年纪来说，“从头再来”显然不在我们的心愿清单上。）我们始终清楚：你们这些合伙人，在很多情况下把自己相当大一部分积蓄托付给了我们；同时，还有重要的慈善承诺依赖于我们的稳健行事；最后，许多因我们承保客户而蒙受事故、致残的受害者，也指望我们在未来几十年按时支付赔款。如果为了多赚几个百分点的回报而拿这些群体的利益冒险，那对我们来说就是极其不负责任的行为。

A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.

一点个人历史，或许可以部分解释我们为什么对金融上的“冒险主义”有如此强烈的厌恶。我直到 Charlie 35 岁才第一次见到他，尽管他从小在离我现在住了 52 年的地方不到 100 码的地方长大，而且也就读于 Omaha 市中心那所公立中学——我的父亲、妻子、孩子和两个孙辈都从那里毕业。不过，小时候我们都曾在我外祖父的杂货店打过工，只是两人的打工时间相隔大约五年。我的外祖父叫 Ernest，可以说“earnest”（认真、诚挚）这个名字配得上他本人。没有人能在他店里干活——哪怕只是当个理货小工——而不被那段经历深刻地塑造性格。

On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found – along with $1,000 of cash – when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.

在本页对面，你可以看到一封 1939 年 Ernest 写给他小儿子（也就是我叔叔 Fred）的信。类似的信，他也分别写给了另外四个孩子。我至今仍保存着寄给我姑妈 Alice 的那一封——1970 年，我以遗产执行人身份打开她的保险箱时，在里面同时发现了那封信和 1,000 美元现金。

Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.

Ernest 从没上过商学院——事实上，他连高中都没念完——但他非常明白一件事：充足的流动性，是企业能否活下来的基本前提。在 Berkshire，我们把他那“1,000 美元方案”又向前推进了一大步，并郑重承诺：在不计入受监管的公用事业和铁路业务持有现金的前提下，我们自己始终至少持有 100 亿美元的现金。正因为有这一承诺，我们在实际操作中通常会将手头现金维持在至少 200 亿美元的水平，这样我们既能扛住史无前例的巨额保险赔付（迄今为止最大的一次是来自 Katrina 的约 30 亿美元——那也是整个保险业史上代价最高的一场灾难），又能在金融动荡时期迅速抓住合适的收购或投资机会。

We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.

我们主要把现金放在美国国债（U.S. Treasury bills）上，而避免去买那些虽然多给几个基点收益、但本质上是短期信用工具的其他证券。早在 2008 年 9 月商业票据和货币市场基金的脆弱性暴露之前很久，我们就一直坚持这一政策。我们认同投资作家 Ray DeVoe 的那句名言：“因为追逐收益而亏掉的钱，比在枪口下亏掉的还多。”在 Berkshire，我们不依赖银行授信，也不会签订那种需要我们不断追加抵押品的合约，除非所需抵押金额与我们的流动资产相比微不足道。

Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.

另外，在过去 40 年里，Berkshire 一分钱现金都没有因为派发股息或回购股票而流出公司。相反，我们把全部盈利都留存在公司，用来加强业务实力，而这一“强化过程”现在大约以每月 10 亿美元的速度在进行。正因为这样，在过去这四十年中，我们的账面净资产从 4,800 万美元增长到了 1,570 亿美元，而内在价值的增幅远远超过这个数字。没有任何一家美国公司，能以这样“从不松懈”的方式，把自己的财务实力堆积到类似的高度。

By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.

在杠杆问题上保持如此谨慎，确实在一定程度上让我们的投资回报少了那么一小块“上浮空间”。但换来的，是我们拥有一大堆流动性，可以安稳睡觉。更重要的是，当经济中不时爆发金融动荡时，我们在财务上和心理上都能保持“进攻姿态”，而不是像别人那样忙于“保命逃生”。正是这种状态，让我们在 2008 年 Lehman 破产后的 25 天恐慌期里，能够投入 156 亿美元大举买入。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东大会

The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.

年度股东大会将于 4 月 30 日（星期六）举行。来自总部的 Carrie Kizer 将担任“总指挥”，今年的主题是“Planes, Trains and Automobiles（飞机、火车与汽车）”，这给了 NetJets、BNSF 和 BYD 一个好好展示自己的机会。

As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

一如既往，Qwest Center 会在早上 7 点开门，8:30 播放全新的 Berkshire 短片。9:30 我们将直接进入问答环节（中间在 Qwest 的卖品部安排午餐休息），一直持续到 3:30。稍作休息后，Charlie 和我将在 3:45 正式召开年度股东大会。如果你在白天的问答过程中想离场，请尽量选择在 Charlie 发言的时候走。（动作要快，他说话向来简短。）

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,053 pairs of Justin boots, 12,416 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Dairy Queen Blizzards® and 8,800 Quikut knives (that’s 16 knives per minute). But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t learned where to shop.

当然，离场最好的理由，就是去购物。我们会“全力支持”你这么做——把会场旁边那块 194,300 平方英尺的大厅挤满来自 Berkshire 各家子公司的产品。去年，你们也确实不负所托，多数摊位都创下了历史销售纪录。在短短 9 小时内，我们卖出了 1,053 双 Justin 靴子、12,416 磅 See’s 糖果、8,000 份 Dairy Queen Blizzards®，以及 8,800 把 Quikut 刀（平均每分钟 16 把）。但我相信你们完全可以做得更好。记住：任何说“钱买不来幸福”的人，只是还没学会该去哪里花钱。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.

GEICO 会在会场设立一个展台，由来自全美各地的一批顶级业务顾问值守，随时为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO 能够给股东提供折扣（通常为 8%）。这一特别优惠在我们经营所在的 51 个司法辖区中，有 44 个是被允许的。（再补充一点：如果你已经符合其他折扣条件，比如某些群体折扣，这个股东折扣并不能与之叠加。）请带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们能不能帮你省下一笔钱——对于你们当中至少一半的人，我相信答案是“可以的”。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can’t read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.

一定要去 Bookworm 看一看。那里会有 60 多种书籍和 DVD 销售，其中包括《Poor Charlie’s Almanack》的中文版——那本关于我合伙人、一直广受欢迎的书。就算你看不懂中文也没关系，买一本随身带着走，看上去就会很有“文化人”的气质。如果你需要把买的书寄回去，附近还会有提供寄送服务的摊位。

If you are a big spender – or merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.

如果你是“大手笔消费者”——或者哪怕只是去“长长见识”——周六中午到下午 5 点之间，可以去 Omaha 机场东侧的 Elliott Aviation 看看。那里会停着一整队 NetJets 的飞机，保证能让你的心跳加速。建议你“坐大巴来，乘专机走”。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

本报告所附的委托书材料中，有一份附件会详细说明你如何获取参加股东大会及其他活动所需的出席证。至于机票、酒店和租车预订，我们今年再次请 American Express（800-799-6634）来为你提供专项帮助。负责这些事务的 Carol Pedersen 每年都帮我们干得非常出色，在此我要向她表示感谢。大会期间酒店房间常常十分紧张，但只要和 Carol 合作，你就能订到房。

Airlines have often jacked up prices – sometimes dramatically so – for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 21⁄2 hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.

航空公司在 Berkshire 周末期间，经常会大幅提高票价，有时候涨幅非常夸张。如果你是从比较远的地方过来，建议比较一下飞 Kansas City 和飞 Omaha 的总成本。两地开车大约是两个半小时车程，如果你本来就打算在 Omaha 租车，那很可能这样安排能帮你省下一大笔钱。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that – as far as I know – exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anyplace. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.

在 Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM），也就是位于 72nd Street 上 Dodge 和 Pacific 之间、占地 77 英亩的那家店，我们今年会再次推出 “Berkshire Weekend” 折扣价。去年，这家店在年度股东大会期间的促销周里做成了 3,330 万美元的销售额——据我所知，这一周度销售额超过了世界上任何一家零售店在任何一周的记录。要享受 Berkshire 股东折扣，你必须在 4 月 26 日（周二）到 5 月 2 日（周一）之间完成购买，并同时出示你的大会出席证。在这段时间内，特别折扣甚至会适用于一些通常有“铁律禁打折”的大牌厂商的产品，但他们为了配合我们的股东周，专门为你破例一次，我们对此表示感谢。NFM 的营业时间是：周一到周六早上 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日早上 10 点到下午 6 点。今年的周六，NFM 会在下午 5:30 到 8 点举办一次野餐派对，所有人都欢迎参加。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st , from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men’s shirts at J.C. Penney’s 63 years ago. I’ve told Susan Jacques, Borsheims’ CEO, that I’m still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.

在 Borsheims，我们同样会安排两场只对股东开放的特别活动。第一场是 4 月 29 日（周五）晚上 6 点到 9 点的鸡尾酒会；第二场是 5 月 1 日（周日）上午 9 点到下午 4 点的主场庆典。周六我们会营业到晚上 6 点。周日大约下午 1 点，我会带着笑容、擦亮的皮鞋出现在 Borsheims 卖珠宝，就像 63 年前我在 J.C. Penney’s 卖男式衬衫那样。我已经跟 Borsheims 的 CEO Susan Jacques 说过，我现在依然是个“销售高手”，不过我看得出她眼里有点怀疑。所以，放开一点，从我这里给你的太太或爱人（理论上应该是同一个人）买点东西吧，让我在她面前长点脸。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire shareholder.

整个周末，Borsheims 都会人山人海。为方便你购物，股东优惠价格将从 4 月 25 日（周一）一直持续到 5 月 7 日（周六）。在这段期间，请出示你的大会出席证，或者能证明你持有 Berkshire 股票的券商对账单，以便表明你是股东。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，在 Borsheims 外面的商场区域，美国两届象棋冠军 Patrick Wolff 会蒙着眼睛迎战所有挑战者——而对手们都是“睁大眼睛”上阵——每组六人同时对弈。附近，来自 Dallas 的魔术大师 Norman Beck 会用他的表演让围观者眼花缭乱。另外，两位世界顶级桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg 将在周日下午与我们的股东一起打桥牌。

Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and – still being a growing boy – I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.

Gorat’s 和 Piccolo’s 这两家餐厅将在 5 月 1 日（周日）再一次只对 Berkshire 股东开放。两家都会营业到晚上 10 点，其中 Gorat’s 下午 1 点开门，Piccolo’s 下午 4 点开门。这两家餐厅都是我的最爱，而且——我自认还是个“正在长身体的男孩”——周日晚上我会在这两家都吃上一顿。记住：预订 Gorat’s 请在 4 月 1 日当天（不要提前）拨打 402-551-3733，预订 Piccolo’s 则拨打 402-342-9038。

We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我们今年依然会由同样三位财经记者主持问答环节，由他们转问 Charlie 和我那些股东通过电子邮件提交的问题。三位记者及其邮箱地址分别是：Fortune 的 Carol Loomis，邮箱 cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，邮箱 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；以及 The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，邮箱 arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

在所有提交的问题中，每位记者会各自挑选大约十几个他们认为最有趣、最重要的问题。这几位记者告诉我，如果你想提高自己问题被选中的概率，最好做到：言简意赅、不要拖到最后一刻再发、内容与 Berkshire 相关，而且每封邮件中最多只提两个问题。（在邮件中，请注明：如果你的问题被选中，是否希望记者在现场提问时报出你的名字。）

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it.

Charlie 和我事先不会得到哪怕一点点关于问题内容的“剧透”。我们知道他们一定会选出一些很“辣手”的问题，而这正是我们所乐见的。

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.

周六早上 8:15，我们会在会场布置的 13 个麦克风位置各自进行一次抽签，供那些希望亲自提问的股东参与。大会上，我会在记者提问和中签股东提问之间轮流切换。我们希望至少能回答 60 个问题，对我们来说，问题越多越好。无论是通过这些年度股东信，还是通过大会现场的讨论，我们的目标都是让你对自己所持有的这家企业有更深入的理解。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).

理由充分的情况下，我经常赞扬我们各业务子公司经理们取得的成就。不过，同样重要的，还有在总部和我一起共事的那 20 位同事（男士和女士），他们都挤在同一层楼里办公——而我们就打算一直这么保持下去！

This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.

这一小组同事高效应对大量来自 SEC 以及其他监管机构的要求，为我们申报一份长达 14,097 页的联邦所得税申报表以及各州和海外的报税文件，回复无数股东和媒体的来信与询问，负责年度报告的制作与寄送，筹备全美规模最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会的各项事务——清单还可以一直往下写。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.

他们把所有这些业务工作都处理得又愉快又高效，让我的生活变得既轻松又愉悦。他们所做的事情早已超出了 Berkshire 本身的范畴：他们要负责和 48 所大学对接（这 48 所是从 200 所申报学校里选出来的），这些学校会在本学年组织学生来 Omaha 和我共度一天；他们也要处理我收到的各种各样的请求，安排我的行程，甚至负责给我买汉堡当午餐。没有哪位 CEO 比我更幸福。

This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30th and tell them so.

总部这一支团队，得到了我最真挚的感谢，也同样值得你向他们致谢。4 月 30 日来参加我们的“资本家的伍德斯托克”（Woodstock for Capitalism）时，记得当面告诉他们这一点。

February 26, 2011

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

Memo

To: Berkshire Hathaway Managers (“The All-Stars”)

cc: Berkshire Directors

From: Warren E. Buffett

Date: July 26, 2010

This is my biennial letter to reemphasize Berkshire’s top priority and to get your help on succession planning (yours, not mine!).

这是我每两年写一次的信，目的是再次强调 Berkshire 的头号优先事项，并请你们帮忙做接班人规划（是你们的，不是我的！）。

The priority is that all of us continue to zealously guard Berkshire’s reputation. We can’t be perfect but we can try to be. As I’ve said in these memos for more than 25 years: “We can afford to lose money – even a lot of money. But we can’t afford to lose reputation – even a shred of reputation.” We must continue to measure every act against not only what is legal but also what we would be happy to have written about on the front page of a national newspaper in an article written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter.

我们的首要任务，是所有人都要持续、严谨、近乎偏执地维护 Berkshire 的声誉。我们不可能做到完美，但可以尽量接近完美。正如 25 年来我在这些备忘录里反复说的那句话：“我们可以承受亏钱——哪怕亏很多钱；但我们承受不起丢掉声誉——哪怕只是一点点。”我们必须继续用这样的标准来衡量每一个行为：不仅问它是否合法，更要问，如果一位不友善但很聪明的记者，把这件事写成一篇登在全美性报纸头版的报道，我们是否也会感到坦然。

Sometimes your associates will say “Everybody else is doing it.” This rationale is almost always a bad one if it is the main justification for a business action. It is totally unacceptable when evaluating a moral decision. Whenever somebody offers that phrase as a rationale, in effect they are saying that they can’t come up with a good reason. If anyone gives this explanation, tell them to try using it with a reporter or a judge and see how far it gets them.

有时候，你的同事会说：“大家都这么干。”如果这是某个经营决策的主要理由，那几乎总是一个糟糕的理由；如果放到道德判断里，这种理由则是完全不可接受的。每当有人拿这句话当理由，本质上就是在说：他们想不出一个真正站得住脚的原因。如果有人这样解释，你就让他想象一下，把这句话拿去对记者或法官说一遍，看能走多远。

脑子里只是习惯性的复制别人的想法，有这种惯性的很难再改回去。

If you see anything whose propriety or legality causes you to hesitate, be sure to give me a call. However, it’s very likely that if a given course of action evokes such hesitation, it’s too close to the line and should be abandoned. There’s plenty of money to be made in the center of the court. If it’s questionable whether some action is close to the line, just assume it is outside and forget it.

如果你看到什么事情，在“合不合适”或者“合不合法”上，让你哪怕犹豫了一下，请一定给我打电话。不过，很可能只要某个行动会让你产生这种犹豫，它就已经离红线太近，应该直接放弃。球场中间有大把可以赚钱的位置，不必靠着边线铤而走险。如果你在犹豫某个行为是不是靠近边线，那就直接假定它已经越界，然后把它忘掉。

As a corollary, let me know promptly if there’s any significant bad news. I can handle bad news but I don’t like to deal with it after it has festered for awhile. A reluctance to face up immediately to bad news is what turned a problem at Salomon from one that could have easily been disposed of into one that almost caused the demise of a firm with 8,000 employees.

顺带一提，如果有任何重大的坏消息，请第一时间告诉我。我可以处理坏消息，但我不喜欢接手那些已经拖了一阵子、开始“发酵”的坏消息。当年 Salomon 的事件，本来是一个可以轻松解决的小问题，之所以演变成几乎让一家拥有 8,000 名员工的公司走到崩溃边缘，就是因为当初有人不愿立刻面对坏消息。

Somebody is doing something today at Berkshire that you and I would be unhappy about if we knew of it. That’s inevitable: We now employ more than 250,000 people and the chances of that number getting through the day without any bad behavior occurring is nil. But we can have a huge effect in minimizing such activities by jumping on anything immediately when there is the slightest odor of impropriety. Your attitude on such matters, expressed by behavior as well as words, will be the most important factor in how the culture of your business develops. Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.

在 Berkshire 今天，一定有人正在做一些事情——如果你和我知道了，会感到很不高兴。这是不可避免的：我们现在雇佣了超过 250,000 名员工，指望这么多人在一天之内没有任何不当行为发生，概率基本为零。但我们可以在第一时间对任何“有一点不对劲的味道”的行为做出反应，从而大幅减少这类事情的发生。你在这类问题上的态度——不仅通过言语，更通过实际行为——会成为决定你所在业务单元文化走向的最关键因素。文化，比制度手册，更能决定一个组织会如何行事。

In other respects, talk to me about what is going on as little or as much as you wish. Each of you does a first-class job of running your operation with your own individual style and you don’t need me to help. The only items you need to clear with me are any changes in post-retirement benefits and any unusually large capital expenditures or acquisitions.

在其他方面，你愿意多和我聊聊公司里发生的事也好，愿意少聊也好，完全随你。你们每个人都用各自独特的风格，把各自负责的业务经营得一流，并不需要我来帮忙。唯一需要事先和我沟通、取得同意的事项有两类：一是关于退休后福利的任何变动，二是任何异常巨大的资本支出或收购。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I need your help in respect to the question of succession. I’m not looking for any of you to retire and I hope you all live to 100. (In Charlie’s case, 110.) But just in case you don’t, please send me a letter (at home if you wish) giving your recommendation as who should take over tomorrow if you should become incapacitated overnight. These letters will be seen by no one but me unless I’m no longer CEO, in which case my successor will need the information. Please summarize the strengths and weaknesses of your primary candidate as well as any possible alternates you may wish to include. Most of you have participated in this exercise in the past and others have offered your ideas verbally. However, it’s important to me to get a periodic update, and now that we have added so many businesses, I need to have your thoughts in writing rather than trying to carry them around in my memory. Of course, there are a few operations that are run by two or more of you – such as the Blumkins, the Merschmans, the pair at Applied Underwriters, etc. – and in these cases, just forget about this item. Your note can be short, informal, handwritten, etc. Just mark it “Personal for Warren.”

我在接班人问题上需要你的帮助。我并不是希望你们谁现在退休，也真心希望你们都能活到 100 岁（对 Charlie 来说是 110 岁）。但以防万一，如果你哪天在一夜之间丧失工作能力，请给我写一封信（如果你愿意，可以寄到我家里），提出你认为“明天应该由谁来接管你的工作”的推荐意见。这些信件除了我之外不会给任何人看，除非我已经不再担任 CEO，那时候我的继任者就需要这些信息。请简要说明你首选接班人的优势和劣势，同时，如果你愿意，也可以附上若干备选人选及他们的优缺点。你们当中的大多数人过去已经参加过这个“练习”，其他一些人也曾经口头表达过自己的想法。不过，对我来说，定期更新这方面的信息非常重要；而且，既然我们现在又新增了这么多业务，我更需要把你们的想法写在纸面上，而不是试图全靠记忆把它们装在脑子里。当然，有少数业务是由你们两位或多人共同负责的——比如 Blumkins、Merschmans、Applied Underwriters 的那对搭档等等——在这些情况下，就不必理会这一条要求。你的便条可以很短、很随意、手写都没问题，只要在上面标注“Personal for Warren”即可。

Thanks for your help on all of this. And thanks for the way you run your businesses. You make my job easy.

感谢你在这一切上的帮助，也感谢你经营好自己业务的方式。你们让我的工作变得轻松许多。

WEB/db

P.S. Another minor request: Please turn down all proposals for me to speak, make contributions, intercede with the Gates Foundation, etc. Sometimes these requests for you to act as intermediary will be accompanied by “It can’t hurt to ask.” It will be easier for both of us if you just say “no.” As an added favor, don’t suggest that they instead write or call me. Multiply 76 businesses by the periodic “I think he’ll be interested in this one” and you can understand why it is better to say no firmly and immediately.

P.S. 还有一个小小的请求：请你一律婉拒所有邀请我去演讲、请求我捐款、希望我替他们在 Gates Foundation 面前说情之类的提议。有时候，对方在请你充当“中间人”时，会附上一句“问一问总不会有坏处吧”。如果你直接替我说“不”，对你我双方都更省事。另外，拜托不要建议他们去给我写信或打电话。76 家公司乘上“他（Buffett）可能会对这个感兴趣”这种周期性念头，你就能明白，为什么更好的办法是干脆利落、立刻说“不”。

2011-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

2011-02-26 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders

Performance

Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow

GEICO

Insurance

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

Finance and Financial Products

Investments

Derivatives

On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don’t

Life and Debt

The Annual Meeting

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