2012-02-25 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 4.6% in 2011. Over the last 47 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $99,860, a rate of 19.8% compounded annually.*
2011年，我们的A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均增长了4.6%。在过去47年（即自现任管理层接手以来），账面价值从19美元增长到99,860美元，年复合增长率为19.8%*。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
本报告中的所有每股数据均对应伯克希尔A股。B股数据为A股数据的1/1500。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I feel good about the company’s progress during 2011. Here are the highlights:
伯克希尔副董事长兼我合伙人的Charlie Munger与我，对公司在2011年的进展感到满意。要点如下：
• The primary job of a Board of Directors is to see that the right people are running the business and to be sure that the next generation of leaders is identified and ready to take over tomorrow. I have been on 19 corporate boards, and Berkshire’s directors are at the top of the list in the time and diligence they have devoted to succession planning. What’s more, their efforts have paid off.
董事会的首要职责，是确保合适的人在经营企业，并确保下一代领导者已经被识别且随时可以接班。我曾在19家公司的董事会任职，伯克希尔董事们在继任规划上投入的时间与勤勉位居前列。更重要的是，他们的努力已经见效。
As 2011 started, Todd Combs joined us as an investment manager, and shortly after yearend Ted Weschler came aboard. Both of these men have outstanding investment skills and a deep commitment to Berkshire. Each will be handling a few billion dollars in 2012, but they have the brains, judgment and character to manage our entire portfolio when Charlie and I are no longer running Berkshire.
2011年伊始，Todd Combs加入我们担任投资经理；年末后不久，Ted Weschler也加入。两位都具备出色的投资能力并对伯克希尔高度投入。2012年他们各自将管理数十亿美元，但在Charlie和我不再执掌伯克希尔时，他们具备管理我们整个投资组合的才智、判断与品格。
Your Board is equally enthusiastic about my successor as CEO, an individual to whom they have had a great deal of exposure and whose managerial and human qualities they admire. (We have two superb back-up candidates as well.) When a transfer of responsibility is required, it will be seamless, and Berkshire’s prospects will remain bright. More than 98% of my net worth is in Berkshire stock, all of which will go to various philanthropies. Being so heavily concentrated in one stock defies conventional wisdom. But I’m fine with this arrangement, knowing both the quality and diversity of the businesses we own and the caliber of the people who manage them. With these assets, my successor will enjoy a running start. Do not, however, infer from this discussion that Charlie and I are going anywhere; we continue to be in excellent health, and we love what we do.
董事会对我作为CEO的继任者同样充满信心——他们与这位人选有充分接触，并认可其管理与人文素养。（我们也有两位极佳的候补人选。）当需要交接职责时，将毫无缝隙，伯克希尔的前景依然光明。我的净资产有超过98%是伯克希尔的股票，这些将全部捐赠给不同的慈善机构。如此高度集中于一只股票有悖“常识”，但鉴于我们所拥有业务的质量与多元以及经营这些业务团队的水平，我对此安排心里有数。凭借这些资产，我的继任者将一上来就能全速前进。不过，不要从上述话里推断Charlie和我准备离开；我们依然身体健康，并热爱我们的工作。
• On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004, with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many opportunities for “bolt-on” acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we’ve already agreed to three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager to expand his managerial domain.
9月16日，我们收购了Lubrizol，这是一家全球性的添加剂及其他特种化学品生产商。自2004年James Hambrick出任CEO以来，公司业绩斐然，税前利润由1.47亿美元增长至10.85亿美元。Lubrizol在特化领域拥有大量“bolt-on”收购机会。事实上，我们已同意了三笔，总计4.93亿美元。James既是有纪律的买家，也是卓越的经营者。Charlie和我希望扩大他的管理版图。
Water the flowers and skip over the weeds.
• Our major businesses did well last year. In fact, each of our five largest non-insurance companies – BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – delivered record operating earnings. In aggregate these businesses earned more than $9 billion pre-tax in 2011. Contrast that to seven years ago, when we owned only one of the five, MidAmerican, whose pre-tax earnings were $393 million. Unless the economy weakens in 2012, each of our fabulous five should again set a record, with aggregate earnings comfortably topping $10 billion.
我们的主要业务去年表现良好。事实上，我们五家最大的非保险子公司——BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、Marmon Group和MidAmerican Energy——均创下经营利润新高。2011年，这些业务合计实现超过90亿美元的税前利润。相比之下，七年前我们只持有其中一家MidAmerican，税前利润为3.93亿美元。除非2012年经济转弱，这“精彩五强”应当再创纪录，合计利润轻松突破100亿美元。
• In total, our entire string of operating companies spent $8.2 billion for property, plant and equipment in 2011, smashing our previous record by more than $2 billion. About 95% of these outlays were made in the U.S., a fact that may surprise those who believe our country lacks investment opportunities. We welcome projects abroad, but expect the overwhelming majority of Berkshire’s future capital commitments to be in America. In 2012, these expenditures will again set a record.
2011年，我们所有经营性子公司在固定资产上的资本开支总计82亿美元，较此前纪录高出逾20亿美元。其中约95%投在美国——这可能令那些认为美国缺乏投资机会的人感到意外。我们欢迎海外项目，但预计伯克希尔未来绝大多数资本投入仍将留在美国。2012年，这些支出将再创新高。
• Our insurance operations continued their delivery of costless capital that funds a myriad of other opportunities. This business produces “float” – money that doesn’t belong to us, but that we get to invest for Berkshire’s benefit. And if we pay out less in losses and expenses than we receive in premiums, we additionally earn an underwriting profit, meaning the float costs us less than nothing. Though we are sure to have underwriting losses from time to time, we’ve now had nine consecutive years of underwriting profits, totaling about $17 billion. Over the same nine years our float increased from $41 billion to its current record of $70 billion. Insurance has been good to us.
我们的保险业务继续提供“无成本资本”，为众多机会提供资金来源。保险业务产生“float”（浮存金）——这笔钱并不属于我们，但我们可以为伯克希尔的利益进行投资；如果我们在赔付与费用上的支出低于所收保费，我们还会获得承保利润，意味着浮存金的成本不但不是正的，甚至是负的。尽管我们时而会出现承保亏损，但我们已经连续九年实现承保盈利，累计约170亿美元。同一时期，浮存金从410亿美元增至当下创纪录的700亿美元。保险业务对我们贡献良多。
• Finally, we made two major investments in marketable securities: (1) a $5 billion 6% preferred stock of Bank of America that came with warrants allowing us to buy 700 million common shares at $7.14 per share any time before September 2, 2021; and (2) 63.9 million shares of IBM that cost us $10.9 billion. Counting IBM, we now have large ownership interests in four exceptional companies: 13.0% of American Express, 8.8% of Coca-Cola, 5.5% of IBM and 7.6% of Wells Fargo. (We also, of course, have many smaller, but important, positions.)
最后，我们在可流通证券上做了两笔重大投资：（1）以50亿美元购买Bank of America年息6%的优先股，并附带认股权证，可在2021年9月2日之前任何时候以每股7.14美元购买7亿股普通股；（2）以109亿美元买入IBM 6,390万股。连同IBM，我们目前在四家卓越企业持有重要股权：American Express 13.0%、Coca-Cola 8.8%、IBM 5.5%、Wells Fargo 7.6%。（当然，我们也持有许多较小但重要的仓位。）
尝试着适应新的时代。
We view these holdings as partnership interests in wonderful businesses, not as marketable securities to be bought or sold based on their near-term prospects. Our share of their earnings, however, are far from fully reflected in our earnings; only the dividends we receive from these businesses show up in our financial reports. Over time, though, the undistributed earnings of these companies that are attributable to our ownership are of huge importance to us. That’s because they will be used in a variety of ways to increase future earnings and dividends of the investee. They may also be devoted to stock repurchases, which will increase our share of the company’s future earnings.
我们把这些持股视为对优秀企业的“合伙权益”，而非根据短期前景买卖的“可交易证券”。不过，我们应占的收益远未充分体现在我们的账面利润中；财报里能体现的只有这些企业支付给我们的股息。长期来看，这些公司留存、归属于我们持股比例的未分配利润对我们至关重要，因为它们将通过多种方式提升被投企业未来的盈利与分红，也可能用于回购股票，从而提高我们对其未来收益的持股占比。
Had we owned our present positions throughout last year, our dividends from the “Big Four” would have been $862 million. That’s all that would have been reported in Berkshire’s income statement. Our share of this quartet’s earnings, however, would have been far greater: $3.3 billion. Charlie and I believe that the $2.4 billion that goes unreported on our books creates at least that amount of value for Berkshire as it fuels earnings gains in future years. We expect the combined earnings of the four – and their dividends as well – to increase in 2012 and, for that matter, almost every year for a long time to come. A decade from now, our current holdings of the four companies might well account for earnings of $7 billion, of which $2 billion in dividends would come to us.
如果我们去年全年都持有现在这些头寸，我们从这“四大金刚”取得的股息将达到8.62亿美元——也只有这部分会在伯克希尔的利润表里体现。而我们应占这四家公司的盈利将远大于此：达到33亿美元。Charlie和我相信，那未在账面体现的24亿美元，将至少以相当规模为伯克希尔创造价值，因为它们会推动未来多年的盈利增长。我们预计这四家公司的合计利润与分红将在2012年增长，并且未来很长一段时间几乎每年都会增长。十年之后，我们目前在这四家公司的持股可能对应70亿美元的盈利，其中20亿美元将以股息的形式流向我们。
10年时间，从33亿增长到70亿美元，年化复利7.81%，事实上10年后2022年，上述四家企业合计的透视利润只有28.95亿美元，不单没有增长反而下降了，其中最糟糕的是IBM和Wells Fargo，未来很难预测，参考：《2025-05-03 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting》。
You never reach a final answer in this business – you reach a point of action that you take.
在这门生意里，你永远得不到最终答案——你只能到达一个“采取行动的节点”。
I’ve run out of good news. Here are some developments that hurt us during 2011:
我已经说完了好消息。以下是2011年对我们造成伤害的一些情况：
• A few years back, I spent about $2 billion buying several bond issues of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility operation serving portions of Texas. That was a mistake – a big mistake. In large measure, the company’s prospects were tied to the price of natural gas, which tanked shortly after our purchase and remains depressed. Though we have annually received interest payments of about $102 million since our purchase, the company’s ability to pay will soon be exhausted unless gas prices rise substantially. We wrote down our investment by $1 billion in 2010 and by an additional $390 million last year.
几年前，我花了大约20亿美元购买了Energy Future Holdings发行的多期债券，这家公司是一家为Texas部分地区提供服务的电力公用事业企业。这是一个错误——一个大错误。很大程度上，该公司的前景与天然气价格挂钩，而在我们买入后不久天然气价格便大幅下跌并一直低迷。尽管自我们买入以来每年都收到约1.02亿美元的利息，但除非天然气价格大幅上涨，否则公司很快将无力支付。我们在2010年将这项投资减记了10亿美元，去年又追加减记3.9亿美元。
At yearend, we carried the bonds at their market value of $878 million. If gas prices remain at present levels, we will likely face a further loss, perhaps in an amount that will virtually wipe out our current carrying value. Conversely, a substantial increase in gas prices might allow us to recoup some, or even all, of our write-down. However things turn out, I totally miscalculated the gain/loss probabilities when I purchased the bonds. In tennis parlance, this was a major unforced error by your chairman.
到年末，我们按8.78亿美元的市值持有这些债券。如果天然气价格维持在当前水平，我们很可能将面临进一步亏损，幅度甚至可能几乎抹去我们目前的账面价值。相反，若天然气价格大幅上升，我们可能收回部分、甚至全部的减记。无论结果如何，我在购买这些债券时完全误判了盈亏概率。用网球术语来说，这是你们董事长的一次重大“非受迫性失误”。
• Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in 2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That’s a lot of income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.
2011年，有三笔规模大且非常有吸引力的固定收益投资被发行方赎回。Swiss Re、Goldman Sachs和General Electric合计向我们支付了128亿美元赎回这些证券，而这些证券此前每年为Berkshire带来约12亿美元的税前收益。要替代这部分收入并不容易，尽管我们收购Lubrizol在很大程度上抵消了影响。
经济开始好转。
• Last year, I told you that “a housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so.” I was dead wrong. We have five businesses whose results are significantly influenced by housing activity. The connection is direct at Clayton Homes, which is the largest producer of homes in the country, accounting for about 7% of those constructed during 2011.
去年，我对你们说过“房地产复苏可能在一年左右开始”。我完全错了。我们有五项业务的业绩受住房活动显著影响。对于Clayton Homes，这种关联最为直接——它是全美最大的住房生产商，2011年约占新建住房的7%。
Additionally, Acme Brick, Shaw (carpet), Johns Manville (insulation) and MiTek (building products, primarily connector plates used in roofing) are all materially affected by construction activity. In aggregate, our five housing-related companies had pre-tax profits of $513 million in 2011. That’s similar to 2010 but down from $1.8 billion in 2006.
此外，Acme Brick、Shaw（地毯）、Johns Manville（保温材料）和MiTek（建材产品，主要是用于屋顶的连接板）都受到建筑活动的实质影响。合计来看，我们这五家与住房相关的公司在2011年的税前利润为5.13亿美元，与2010年相近，但较2006年的18亿美元大幅下降。
Housing will come back – you can be sure of that. Over time, the number of housing units necessarily matches the number of households (after allowing for a normal level of vacancies). For a period of years prior to 2008, however, America added more housing units than households. Inevitably, we ended up with far too many units and the bubble popped with a violence that shook the entire economy. That created still another problem for housing: Early in a recession, household formations slow, and in 2009 the decrease was dramatic.
住房市场会复苏——这一点你可以确定。长期来看，住房存量必然会与家庭数量相匹配（在考虑正常空置水平后）。然而在2008年之前的数年里，美国新增住房数量超过了新增家庭数量。结果不可避免：住房过剩，泡沫以剧烈方式破裂并冲击整个经济。这也为住房带来另一重问题：在衰退初期，新家庭的形成放缓，而2009年的下降尤为显著。
That devastating supply/demand equation is now reversed: Every day we are creating more households than housing units. People may postpone hitching up during uncertain times, but eventually hormones take over. And while “doubling-up” may be the initial reaction of some during a recession, living with in-laws can quickly lose its allure.
这种可怕的供需关系如今已反转：每天新增的家庭数多于新增的住房数。人在不确定时期可能推迟成家，但归根到底生理与情感因素会占上风。而在衰退中，有些人最初选择“合住”，但与亲家或长辈同住的吸引力很快就会消退。
At our current annual pace of 600,000 housing starts – considerably less than the number of new households being formed – buyers and renters are sopping up what’s left of the old oversupply. (This process will run its course at different rates around the country; the supply-demand situation varies widely by locale.) While this healing takes place, however, our housing-related companies sputter, employing only 43,315 people compared to 58,769 in 2006. This hugely important sector of the economy, which includes not only construction but everything that feeds off of it, remains in a depression of its own. I believe this is the major reason a recovery in employment has so severely lagged the steady and substantial comeback we have seen in almost all other sectors of our economy.
以我们当前每年约60万套的开工速度——显著低于新形成家庭的数量——买家与租客正在逐步消化旧有过剩。（这一过程在全美不同地区推进速度各异；供需状况也高度区域化。）但在这种复原过程中，我们与住房相关的公司仍在艰难运转，员工人数仅为43,315人，而2006年为58,769人。这个极其重要的经济板块，不仅包括建筑业，还包括所有与其相连的产业，如今仍处于自身的萧条中。我认为，这正是就业复苏显著落后于我们在经济其他大多数领域已见到的稳健且可观复苏的主要原因。
Wise monetary and fiscal policies play an important role in tempering recessions, but these tools don’t create households nor eliminate excess housing units. Fortunately, demographics and our market system will restore the needed balance – probably before long. When that day comes, we will again build one million or more residential units annually. I believe pundits will be surprised at how far unemployment drops once that happens. They will then reawake to what has been true since 1776: America’s best days lie ahead.
明智的货币与财政政策在缓和经济衰退方面发挥重要作用，但这些工具既不能创造新家庭，也不能消除过剩住房。幸运的是，人口结构与我们的市场体系将恢复所需的平衡——且很可能不会太久。一旦那一天到来，我们每年将再次建造一百万套甚至更多住房。我相信，一旦如此，失业率的下降幅度会令专家们惊讶。届时，人们会再次觉醒，认识到自1776年以来始终成立的一点：America的最好日子仍在前方。
Intrinsic Business Value
内在业务价值
Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn’t, we are overpaid at any price.
Charlie和我以Berkshire每股内在业务价值的增长率来衡量我们的绩效。如果长期表现优于S&P 500，我们就配得上薪酬；若不然，无论薪酬多少都拿多了。
We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value. This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That’s because the amount by which Berkshire’s intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.
我们无法精确定位内在价值。但我们确有一个有用的、尽管明显低估的替代指标：每股账面价值。对大多数公司而言，这个标尺毫无意义。然而在Berkshire，账面价值大致能跟随业务价值。这是因为Berkshire内在价值相对账面价值的超额并不会逐年剧烈波动，尽管多数年份在上升。随着时间推移，二者的绝对差距可能会越来越大；但由于业务价值/账面价值这个比率的分子与分母都在增长，按百分比衡量会相对稳定。
We’ve regularly emphasized that our book-value performance is almost certain to outpace the S&P 500 in a bad year for the stock market and just as certainly will fall short in a strong up-year. The test is how we do over time. Last year’s annual report included a table laying out results for the 42 five-year periods since we took over at Berkshire in 1965 (i.e., 1965-69, 1966-70, etc.). All showed our book value beating the S&P, and our string held for 2007-11. It will almost certainly snap, though, if the S&P 500 should put together a five-year winning streak (which it may well be on its way to doing as I write this).
我们一再强调，在股市不佳的年份，我们的账面价值表现几乎肯定会超过S&P 500；而在强劲上涨的年份，我们几乎肯定会落后。检验标准在于长期表现。去年的年报列出了自1965年我们接管Berkshire以来的42个五年期（即1965–69、1966–70等）的结果。所有区间中我们的账面价值都战胜了S&P，而这一纪录在2007–11年间仍得以保持。不过，如果S&P 500连赢五年（在我写下这些话时，它很可能正走在这条路上），我们的纪录几乎肯定会被打破。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I also included two tables last year that set forth the key quantitative ingredients that will help you estimate our per-share intrinsic value. I won’t repeat the full discussion here; you can find it reproduced on pages 99-100. To update the tables shown there, our per-share investments in 2011 increased 4% to $98,366, and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 18% to $6,990 per share.
去年我还附上了两张表格，列出了有助于你估算我们每股内在价值的关键定量要素。这里我不再重复完整讨论；你可以在第99–100页看到重印内容。根据那里表格的更新，2011年我们的每股投资增长了4%至$98,366，而除保险与投资之外业务的每股税前收益增长了18%至$6,990。
Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our primary focus is on building operating earnings. Over time, the businesses we currently own should increase their aggregate earnings, and we hope also to purchase some large operations that will give us a further boost. We now have eight subsidiaries that would each be included in the Fortune 500 were they stand-alone companies. That leaves only 492 to go. My task is clear, and I’m on the prowl.
Charlie和我希望这两个领域都能增长，但我们的首要关注是提升经营性收益。随着时间推移，我们目前拥有的业务应当提升其合计盈利，我们也希望收购一些大型企业以进一步助力。目前我们有八家子公司，如果它们是独立公司，都将跻身《Fortune 500》。这意味着还剩492家要追赶。我的任务很明确，而我也正在积极寻觅。
Share Repurchases
股票回购
Last September, we announced that Berkshire would repurchase its shares at a price of up to 110% of book value. We were in the market for only a few days – buying $67 million of stock – before the price advanced beyond our limit. Nonetheless, the general importance of share repurchases suggests I should focus for a bit on the subject.
去年9月，我们宣布Berkshire将在价格不超过账面价值110%的情况下回购本公司股票。我们只在市场上买了几天——共买入$6700万——价格便超过了我们的上限。尽管如此，鉴于股票回购具有普遍重要性，我还是应当就此话题多讲几句。
Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met: first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.
当同时满足两项条件时，Charlie和我赞成回购：第一，公司拥有充足资金以满足业务的运营与流动性需求；第二，按保守口径计算，公司股票的交易价格相对于其内在业务价值存在显著折价。
We have witnessed many bouts of repurchasing that failed our second test. Sometimes, of course, infractions – even serious ones – are innocent; many CEOs never stop believing their stock is cheap. In other instances, a less benign conclusion seems warranted. It doesn’t suffice to say that repurchases are being made to offset the dilution from stock issuances or simply because a company has excess cash. Continuing shareholders are hurt unless shares are purchased below intrinsic value. The first law of capital allocation – whether the money is slated for acquisitions or share repurchases – is that what is smart at one price is dumb at another. (One CEO who always stresses the price/value factor in repurchase decisions is Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan; I recommend that you read his annual letter.)
我们见过许多未通过第二项测试的回购。有时，当然，违规——即便是严重的——也未必出于恶意；许多CEO从不停止相信自家股票便宜。另一些情况下，则很难做出如此善意的判断。仅仅声称回购是为了对冲股票发行带来的摊薄，或因为公司现金过剩，这是不够的。除非以低于内在价值的价格回购，否则持续持股的股东会受损。资本配置的第一定律——无论资金用于并购还是回购——是在某一价格聪明的事，在另一价格就是愚蠢。（在回购决策中始终强调价格/价值因素的一位CEO是J.P. Morgan的Jamie Dimon；我建议你阅读他的年度信。）
Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) Nevertheless, we don’t enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling.
当Berkshire的股价远低于内在价值时，Charlie和我的心情是复杂的。我们乐于为持续持股的股东赚钱，而最稳妥的方式莫过于以低于其价值的价格——以0.9x、0.8x，甚至更低的价格——回购我们明确至少值x的资产——也就是自家股票。（正如我们一位董事所说，这就像“在桶里的鱼被放干了水、也不再乱跳之后再去射击”。）尽管如此，我们并不乐于以折价价格让合伙人套现，尽管这可能相比我们不出手时，能让卖出股东拿到略高的价格。因此，当我们回购时，我们希望离场的合伙人对他们所出售资产的价值有充分认知。
At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.
在我们设定的账面价值110%的上限价格下，回购显然会提升Berkshire的每股内在价值。而且买得越多、价格越低，持续持股股东的收益越大。因此，如果有机会，我们很可能会在这一价格上限或更低价位积极回购。不过你需要知道，我们无意“托市”，在市场尤其疲弱时我们的买单会退潮；同时，如果我们的现金等价物持有低于$200亿，我们也不会回购。在Berkshire，无可置疑的财务稳健性优先于一切。
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This discussion of repurchases offers me the chance to address the irrational reaction of many investors to changes in stock prices. When Berkshire buys stock in a company that is repurchasing shares, we hope for two events: First, we have the normal hope that earnings of the business will increase at a good clip for a long time to come; and second, we also hope that the stock underperforms in the market for a long time as well. A corollary to this second point: “Talking our book” about a stock we own – were that to be effective – would actually be harmful to Berkshire, not helpful as commentators customarily assume.
关于回购的讨论，也让我有机会谈谈许多投资者对股价变动的非理性反应。当Berkshire买入一家正在回购股份的公司的股票时，我们希望发生两件事：第一，我们通常会希望该企业的盈利在很长一段时间里以良好的速度增长；第二，我们也希望该股票在相当长的一段时间里在市场上的表现不佳。第二点的推论是：就我们持有的一只股票“发声”（Talking our book）——如果真有用——实际上会伤害Berkshire，而非如评论者通常所假定的那样对我们有利。
Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisano did a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Their operational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.
以IBM为例。众所周知，CEO Lou Gerstner和Sam Palmisano在将IBM从二十年前的濒临破产，带到今天的卓越地位方面功勋卓著。他们在运营上的成就确实非凡。
But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, a skill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, made value-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.
但他们在财务管理方面同样出色，尤其是在近年来公司财务灵活性提升之后。事实上，我想不出还有哪家大型公司在财务管理上做得更好——而这种能力实实在在地提升了IBM股东获得的收益。公司明智地使用负债，几乎全部以现金进行增值型并购，并积极地回购自家股票。
Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%. Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us. Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for the day: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?
如今，IBM的流通股为11.6亿股，我们持有约6,390万股，占5.5%。很自然，未来五年公司盈利的走向对我们至关重要。除此之外，公司在这些年很可能会投入约$50 billion用于回购股份。今天的小测验：像Berkshire这样的长期股东，在这段期间应该为什么而欢呼？
I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.
我不卖关子了。我们应该希望IBM的股价在这五年里表现低迷。
Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire 250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and we would own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-year period, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding after five years, of which we would own 6.5%.
来算一算。如果在此期间IBM股价的平均水平为$200，那么公司将用$50 billion回购2.5亿股，届时流通股将为9.1亿股，我们将持有公司约7%。反之，如果五年期间平均股价为$300，IBM只能回购1.67亿股。五年后流通股约为9.9亿股，而我们的持股比例将为6.5%。
If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100 million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price” repurchase scenario had taken place.
如果在第五年IBM的盈利为$20 billion，那么在“令人失望”的低股价情形下，我们应占的盈利将比高股价情形下多整整$100 million。再往后某个时点，我们的持股价值可能会比“高价回购”情形下高出约$1.5billion。
The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.
逻辑很简单：如果你未来将成为股票的净买入者——无论是直接用你自己的钱，还是间接地（通过你所持有、正在回购股份的公司）——当股价上涨时你会受损，当股价下跌时你会受益。然而情绪常常使问题复杂化：大多数人——包括那些未来会成为净买入者的人——看到股价上涨会感到欣慰。这类股东很像一位通勤者，仅仅因为自己的油箱还存着一天的油，就在油价上涨后感到高兴。
Charlie and I don’t expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking – we’ve observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that – but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. And here a confession is in order: In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.
Charlie和我并不指望让你们中的许多人接受我们的思维方式——我们对人性的观察已足以让我们明白这样做的徒劳——但我们确实希望你了解我们的个人算法。此处也该忏悔一句：在我早年，市场上涨我也会欢呼。后来我读了Ben Graham的《The Intelligent Investor》第八章，那一章讨论投资者应如何看待股价波动。我立刻如拨云见日，低价从此成为我的朋友。拿起那本书，是我一生中最幸运的时刻之一。
In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.
归根结底，我们对IBM投资的成败，主要取决于其未来的盈利。但一个重要的次要因素是，公司会用投入于此的巨额资金回购多少股份。而如果回购最终把IBM的流通股降到6,390万股，我将放弃我一贯的节俭，为Berkshire员工放带薪假一天。
即便是错误的选择，巴菲特地思维框架始终在正确的方向上。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them. Because we may be repurchasing Berkshire shares from some of you, we will offer our thoughts in each section as to how intrinsic value compares to carrying value.
现在，让我们审视公司经营的四大板块。它们彼此在资产负债表与损益特征上迥然不同，把它们混在一起只会妨碍分析。因此我们将把它们作为四个独立的业务来呈现，这也是Charlie和我看待它们的方式。鉴于我们可能会向你们中的一些人回购Berkshire股票，我们将在各部分中给出我们对内在价值与账面价值对比的看法。
Insurance
保险
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
先来看保险，这是Berkshire的核心业务，也是多年来推动我们扩张的引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
财产意外险（“P/C”）公司先收保费、后赔付。在极端情况下，比如某些工伤赔偿事故，赔付款项可能持续数十年。这个“先收后付”的模式使我们手中持有大笔资金——我们称之为“float”（浮存金）——这些钱最终会支付给他人。与此同时，我们可以将这笔浮存金用于Berkshire的投资。尽管单个保单与理赔不断发生与消失，但相对于保费规模，我们持有的浮存金额度依然相当稳定。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也随之增长。以下表格展示了我们的增长情况：
It’s unlikely that our float will grow much – if at all – from its current level. That’s mainly because we already have an outsized amount relative to our premium volume. Were there to be a decline in float, I will add, it would almost certainly be very gradual and therefore impose no unusual demand for funds on us.
我们的浮存金从当前水平继续增长的可能性很小——即便有，也是非常有限。主要原因是相对于我们的保费规模，我们的浮存金已经相当庞大。我还要补充一句，即便未来浮存金出现下降，也几乎可以肯定会非常缓慢，因此不会对我们的资金产生非同寻常的需求压力。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operateatasignificantunderwritingloss.Forexample,StateFarm,byfarthecountry’slargestinsurerandawell-managed company besides, has incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the last eleven years. There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry is resourceful in creating new ones.
如果我们的保费收入超过费用与最终赔付之和，我们就实现了承保利润，这会叠加在浮存金带来的投资收益之上。一旦出现承保盈利，我们等于使用了“免费资金”——更妙的是，还能因持有这笔资金而获得报酬。不幸的是，所有保险公司都渴望达成这一美好结果，从而引发了激烈竞争；多数年份竞争之强，导致整个财产意外险（P/C）行业在承保层面处于显著亏损状态。比如，State Farm——迄今美国规模最大的保险公司，且管理良好——在过去十一年里有八年出现了承保亏损。保险行业有很多种亏钱的方法，而且还不断“推陈出新”。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for nine consecutive years, our gain for the period having totaled $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will profit just as we would if some party deposited $70.6 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.
正如本报告第一部分所述，我们已经连续九年实现承保盈利，期间累计收益达$17 billion。我认为，在未来大多数（当然不是全部）年份，我们大概率仍能保持承保盈利。如果做得到，我们的浮存金将“好于零成本”。这就好像有人把$70.6 billion存放在我们这里，不仅为此支付保管费，还允许我们将这笔资金用于自身利益的投资，而我们因此获利。
So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability.
那么，这么诱人的浮存金如何影响内在价值的计算？在计算Berkshire的账面价值时，我们将浮存金全额作为负债扣除，仿佛我们明天就必须把它全部支付出去且无法补充。可这种看法并不正确；浮存金更应被视为一只可循环使用的资金池。如果浮存金既无成本又能长期稳定存在，那么其真实“负债价值”远低于会计上的负债数字。
Partially offsetting this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” attributable to our insurance companies that is included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. If an insurance business produces large and sustained underwriting losses, any goodwill asset attributable to it should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
部分对冲这一被高估的负债数字的，是并入账面价值、归属于我们保险公司的$15.5 billion“goodwill（商誉）”。实质上，这笔商誉代表我们为保险业务“产出浮存金的能力”所付的价格。然而，商誉的历史成本与其真实价值并无必然关系；如果一家保险业务长期出现重大承保亏损，与其相关的商誉资产不论原始成本多少，都应被视为没有价值。
Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would pay to purchase float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds book value.
幸运的是，Berkshire并非如此。Charlie和我相信，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——也即我们愿为同等质量浮存金支付的价格——远高于其历史账面价值。浮存金的价值，是我们之所以认为Berkshire内在业务价值显著高于账面价值的原因之一——而且是一个非常重要的原因。
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: We don’t think there is much “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
我要再强调一次，“零成本浮存金”并不是整个P/C行业可以指望的常态：在保险世界里，“Berkshire-quality”的浮存金并不多见。多数年份（包括2011年），行业保费都不足以覆盖赔付加费用。因此，行业整体的有形股本回报率几十年来远低于美国企业的平均回报，这种令人遗憾的表现几乎肯定会延续。Berkshire之所以具备出色的经济性，只因为我们有一批卓越经理人经营着一些非凡的保险业务。下面谈谈主要单位。
可能是买入Chubb的原因，如果Chubb能全部并入BRK，其浮存金的价值才能真正发挥作用。
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First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in that respect than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever faced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a moderate profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. Concurrently, all other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, and some would face insolvency.
按浮存金规模排名第一的是Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group，由Ajit Jain负责。Ajit承保那些其他人既无意愿也无资本承接的风险。他的运营在产能、速度、决断力以及最重要的“头脑”上独树一帜。然而，他从不让Berkshire暴露于与我们资源不匹配的风险之中。事实上，在这方面我们远比多数大型保险公司更为保守。举例说，如果行业遭遇某次超大型灾害导致$250 billion的损失——约为以往任何一次的三倍——Berkshire整体仍很可能凭借多元的盈利来源实现当年温和盈利。与此同时，其他所有主要保险与再保险公司将深陷亏损，其中一些甚至会面临资不抵债。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $34 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By these accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Charlie would gladly trade me for a second Ajit. Alas, there is none.
自1985年从零起步以来，Ajit打造出一家拥有$34 billion浮存金并实现显著承保利润的保险业务，这样的成就其他任何保险公司的CEO都难以企及。凭借这些业绩，他为Berkshire增添了数十亿美元的价值。Charlie愿意毫不犹豫地“用我去换来第二个Ajit”。可惜，世上并无“第二个Ajit”。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们还有一家保险劲旅General Re，由Tad Montross管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
归根结底，一家稳健的保险经营需要遵循四条“戒律”。其必须（1）理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险敞口；（2）保守地评估这些敞口实际致损的概率及一旦致损的可能成本；（3）在覆盖预期损失成本与运营费用后，制定能够平均实现盈利的保费；以及（4）在无法获得合适保费时，愿意转身离开。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, “The other guy is doing it so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Indeed, a good underwriter needs an independent mindset akin to that of the senior citizen who received a call from his wife while driving home. “Albert, be careful,” she warned, “I just heard on the radio that there’s a car going the wrong way down the Interstate.” “Mabel, they don’t know the half of it,” replied Albert, “It’s not just one car, there are hundreds of them.”
许多保险公司能通过前三项测试，却倒在第四项上。他们就是无法对竞争对手热衷承保的业务置之不理。那句老话——“别人都在做，所以我们也得做”——在任何行业都会带来麻烦，而在保险业尤甚。事实上，一名优秀的核保人需要一种独立思维，类似这位开车回家的老人收到妻子电话时的心态。“Albert，小心点，”她提醒说，“我刚在广播里听到，高速上有一辆车在逆行。”“Mabel，他们还只知道一半呢，”Albert回答道，“不止一辆，有上百辆呢。”
不能独立思考的也不能正确思考，这是很多人的盲区。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it’s a treasure.
Tad严格遵守了这四条保险“戒律”，其成果不言自明。在他的领导下，General Re庞大的浮存金实现了“优于零成本”的效果，我们预计平均而言这种状况将会延续。我们收购后的最初几年，General Re曾是一个大麻烦；如今，它是一项瑰宝。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 61 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 50 years of service in 2011.
最后是GEICO，这家保险公司是我61年前“入行学艺”的地方。GEICO由Tony Nicely执掌，他18岁加入公司，并在2011年完成了其50年的服务。
GEICO’s much-envied record comes from Tony’s brilliant execution of a superb and almostimpossible-to-replicate business model. During Tony’s 18-year tenure as CEO, our market share has grown from 2.0% to 9.3%. If it had instead remained static – as it had for more than a decade before he took over – our premium volume would now be $3.3 billion rather than the $15.4 billion we attained in 2011. The extra value created by Tony and his associates is a major element in Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value.
GEICO令人艳羡的成绩，源自Tony对一种卓越且几乎不可复制的商业模式的精彩执行。在Tony担任CEO的18年间，我们的市场份额从2.0%提升至9.3%。若是像他上任前十多年那样停滞不前，我们如今的保费规模将只有$3.3 billion，而非2011年达到的$15.4 billion。Tony及其团队创造的额外价值，是Berkshire内在价值大幅超越账面价值的关键组成。
There is still more than 90% of the auto-insurance market left for GEICO to rake in. Don’t bet against Tony acquiring chunks of it year after year in the future. Our low costs permit low prices, and every day more Americans discover that the Gecko is doing them a favor when he urges them to visit GEICO.com for a quote. (Our lizard has another endearing quality: Unlike human spokesmen or spokeswomen who expensively represent other insurance companies, our little fellow has no agent.)
汽车保险市场中，还有超过90%的份额有待GEICO去争取。不要押注Tony在未来的岁月里不能年复一年地拿下其中一大块。我们的低成本使低价格成为可能；每天都有更多美国人意识到，当那只Gecko敦促他们访问GEICO.com获取报价时，它确实是在帮他们省钱。（我们的这只小蜥蜴还有一项可爱的优点：不同于其他保险公司高价聘请的代言人，我们的小家伙没有任何“经纪人”。）
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了三大保险业务之外，我们还拥有一组较小的公司，其中大多数在保险世界的“细分角落”耕耘。总体而言，它们持续盈利，并为我们提供了可观的浮存金。Charlie和我珍视这些公司及其管理者。
At yearend, we acquired Princeton Insurance, a New Jersey writer of medical malpractice policies. This bolt-on transaction expands the managerial domain of Tim Kenesey, the star CEO of Medical Protective, our Indiana-based med-mal insurer. Princeton brings with it more than $600 million of float, an amount that is included in the following table.
在年末，我们收购了Princeton Insurance，这是一家位于New Jersey、专营医疗事故险的公司。这笔“bolt-on”交易扩大了Medical Protective这家总部在Indiana的医疗事故险公司明星CEO——Tim Kenesey——的管理版图。Princeton随之带来了超过$600 million的浮存金，相关数额已纳入下表。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
以下是我们财产意外险与寿险业务四个板块的业绩记录：
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.
在大型保险业务中，Berkshire给我的印象是世界上最好的。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管且资本密集型的业务
We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our many other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own sector in this letter and also split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我们拥有两项非常庞大的业务，BNSF与MidAmerican Energy，它们具有一些重要的共同特征，使其区别于我们的诸多其他业务。因此，在本信中我们将它们单独划为一个板块，并在我们的GAAP资产负债表与损益表中分别列示其合并财务数据。
A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply covers their interest requirements. In a less than robust economy during 2011, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x. At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.
这两家公司的关键特征，是它们在寿命极长、受监管的资产上投入了巨额资本，其中一部分由大量长期债务融资，且这些债务并未由Berkshire提供担保。我们的信用并非必要：即使在糟糕的经营环境下，这两项业务的盈利能力也足以覆盖其利息负担。举例而言，在2011年并不强劲的经济环境中，BNSF的利息保障倍数为9.5倍。与此同时，在MidAmerican，有两项关键因素确保其在任何情况下都能偿债：其一，作为独家提供基础性服务所固有的收益稳定性；其二，多元的收益来源，使其免受任何单一监管机构行动的冲击。
Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.
以吨英里计量，铁路承运了美国城际货运的42%，而BNSF所承运的份额超过任何其他铁路——约占行业总量的37%。稍作计算你就会明白，美国所有城际货运吨英里中约有15%由BNSF承担。把铁路称作我们经济的“循环系统”并不夸张。你们的铁路是其中最大的“动脉”。
All of this places a huge responsibility on us. We must, without fail, maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with 13,000 bridges, 80 tunnels, 6,900 locomotives and 78,600 freight cars. This job requires us to have ample financial resources under all economic scenarios and to have the human talent that can instantly and effectively deal with the vicissitudes of nature, such as the widespread flooding BNSF labored under last summer.
所有这一切都赋予我们巨大的责任。我们必须毫无差池地维护并改进我们2.3万英里的轨道，以及1.3万座桥梁、80条隧道、6,900台机车和78,600节货车。要完成这项工作，我们在各种经济情景下都需要充足的财务资源，还需要具备能够即时且有效应对自然变故的人才，例如BNSF去年夏天所遭遇的大范围洪水。
To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. The three other major U.S. railroads are making similar outlays. Though many people decry our country’s inadequate infrastructure spending, that criticism cannot be levied against the railroad industry. It is pouring money – funds from the private sector – into the investment projects needed to provide better and more extensive service in the future. If railroads were not making these huge expenditures, our country’s publicly-financed highway system would face even greater congestion and maintenance problems than exist today.
为履行其社会责任，BNSF定期进行远超折旧费用的投资，2011年超出部分达到$1.8 billion。美国另外三家主要铁路公司也在进行类似投入。尽管许多人批评我国在基础设施上的支出不足，但这一批评并不适用于铁路行业。铁路正把来自私营部门的资金大量投入到未来提供更好、更广泛服务所需的投资项目中。如果铁路没有进行这些巨额支出，我国以公共资金支持的公路系统将面临比现在更严重的拥堵与养护问题。
首先是私人资本，如果私人资本做不到再用公共资金，而不是相反。
Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits. But I am confident it will do so because of the value it delivers. Many years ago Ben Franklin counseled, “Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee.” Translating this to our regulated businesses, he might today say, “Take care of your customer, and the regulator – your customer’s representative – will take care of you.” Good behavior by each party begets good behavior in return.
如果BNSF无法在其投入的增量资金上获得合适回报，那么进行如此巨额投资无疑是愚蠢的。但我有信心它会做到，因为它所提供的价值足以支撑。多年前，Ben Franklin曾告诫：“Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee.” 将其转译到我们的受监管业务上，今天他或许会说：“照顾好你的客户，而监管者——你客户的代表——也会照顾好你。” 各方的良好行为会相互促成良好行为。
At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.
在MidAmerican，我们参与的是类似的“社会契约”。人们期望我们持续投入不断增长的资金，以满足客户未来的需求。只要我们在此过程中做到可靠、高效运营，我们就有把握在这些投资上获得公平的回报。
MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.
MidAmerican由Berkshire持股89.8%，为美国250万客户供电，是Iowa、Utah与Wyoming最大的供应商，同时也是另外六个州的重要供应商。我们的管道运输全美8%的天然气。显然，数以百万计的美国人每天都在依赖我们。他们并未失望。
When MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.
当MidAmerican在2002年收购Northern Natural Gas管道时，该公司的管道运营表现被业内最权威的机构评为倒数第一，43家中的第43位。在最近的报告中，Northern Natural排名第二。榜首是我们的另一条管道，Kern River。
In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. In the most recent survey of customer satisfaction, MidAmerican’s U.S. utilities ranked second among 60 utility groups surveyed. The story was far different not many years back when MidAmerican acquired these properties.
在电力业务上，MidAmerican也有相当的成绩。在最近一次客户满意度调查中，MidAmerican在美国的公用事业公司中名列60家样本中的第二名。与MidAmerican当年收购这些资产时的情况相比，如今的故事已截然不同。
MidAmerican will have 3,316 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2012, far more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that we have invested or committed to wind is a staggering $6 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn. In addition, late last year we took on two solar projects – one 100%-owned in California and the other 49%-owned in Arizona – that will cost about $3 billion to construct. Many more wind and solar projects will almost certainly follow.
到2012年底，MidAmerican将拥有3,316兆瓦的风电装机在运规模，远超全国其他任何受监管的电力公用事业公司。我们在风电上的既已投入与承诺总额高达$6 billion。之所以能进行这类投资，是因为MidAmerican保留了其全部收益，不同于其他通常将大部分盈利分派出去的公用事业公司。除此之外，在去年年底我们还启动了两个太阳能项目——一个在California，100%持有；另一个在Arizona，持股49%——建设成本约$3 billion。未来几乎可以肯定还会有更多风电与光伏项目跟进。
As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:
至此你可以看出，我为BNSF的Matt Rose与MidAmerican的Greg Abel为社会所做的贡献而感到自豪。我也为他们为Berkshire股东取得的成绩感到既自豪又感激。相关数据如下：
In the book value recorded on our balance sheet, BNSF and MidAmerican carry substantial goodwill components totaling $20 billion. In each instance, however, Charlie and I believe current intrinsic value is far greater than book value.
在我们资产负债表记录的账面价值中，BNSF和MidAmerican包含了合计$20 billion的大额商誉。然而在每一种情况下，Charlie和我都认为当前的内在价值远高于账面价值。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire在这一板块的活动几乎包罗万象。不过，我们先来看一下该集团整体的资产负债表与收益表摘要。
This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor. Charlie’s has been better; he voted no more than “present” on several of my errant purchases.
该集团旗下公司的产品范围从棒棒糖一直到喷气式飞机。有些业务的经济性极佳，以未加杠杆的有形净资产回报来衡量，税后回报率从25%到超过100%不等；也有一些业务能带来12–20%区间的良好回报；但还有少数业务回报很差，这源于我在资本配置岗位上犯下的一些严重错误。这些错误要么是我误判了被收购企业的竞争力，要么是误判了其所处行业的未来经济特性。进行收购时，我努力把目光放到十年或二十年之后，但有时“视力”并不理想。Charlie看得更清楚；对我几笔失误的收购，他的投票不超过“到场”（present）。
Berkshire’s newer shareholders may be puzzled over our decision to hold on to my mistakes. After all, their earnings can never be consequential to Berkshire’s valuation, and problem companies require more managerial time than winners. Any management consultant or Wall Street advisor would look at our laggards and say “dump them.”
Berkshire的新股东可能会困惑于我们为何决定继续持有这些“错误”。毕竟，它们的盈利对Berkshire的估值永远不会产生实质影响，而问题公司消耗的管理时间往往多于优秀公司。任何管理顾问或华尔街顾问看了我们的落后者，都会说“清仓吧”。
That won’t happen. For 29 years, we have regularly laid out Berkshire’s economic principles in these reports (pages 93-98) and Number 11 describes our general reluctance to sell poor performers (which, in most cases, lag because of industry factors rather than managerial shortcomings). Our approach is far from Darwinian, and many of you may disapprove of it. I can understand your position. However, we have made – and continue to make – a commitment to the sellers of businesses we buy that we will retain those businesses through thick and thin. So far, the dollar cost of that commitment has not been substantial and may well be offset by the goodwill it builds among prospective sellers looking for the right permanent home for their treasured business and loyal associates. These owners know that what they get with us can’t be delivered by others and that our commitments will be good for many decades to come.
那不会发生。在过去29年里，我们一直在这些报告中系统阐述Berkshire的经济原则（第93–98页），其中第11条说明了我们通常不愿出售表现欠佳者（多数情况下它们落后源于行业因素，而非管理缺陷）。我们的方法远非达尔文式的，很多人可能不赞同，我理解这种立场。然而，我们已经并将继续向卖给我们业务的所有者作出承诺：无论顺境逆境，我们都会保留这些企业。到目前为止，这一承诺在美元层面的成本并不高，而且很可能被其带来的“商誉”所抵消——来自那些正在为他们珍视的企业与忠诚的同事寻找长期归宿的潜在卖家。这些所有者知道，从我们这里得到的，别人无法提供；而我们的承诺将在未来几十年里始终有效。
Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.
但也请理解，Charlie和我既不是受虐狂，也不是盲目乐观派。如果第11条所述的两种问题之一出现——即该业务在长期内可能持续消耗现金，或劳资冲突已成痼疾——我们会迅速而果断地采取行动。在我们47年的历史中，这种情况只发生过寥寥几次；而我们目前所拥有的业务中，没有一家处于需要我们考虑处置的险境。
不发生癌变的话就继续留着。
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The steady and substantial comeback in the U.S. economy since mid-2009 is clear from the earnings shown at the front of this section. This compilation includes 54 of our companies. But one of these, Marmon, is itself the owner of 140 operations in eleven distinct business sectors. In short, when you look at Berkshire, you are looking across corporate America. So let’s dig a little deeper to gain a greater insight into what has happened in the last few years.
自2009年年中以来，美国经济稳健而显著的复苏，在本节开头披露的收益数据中一目了然。本汇编涵盖了我们旗下的54家公司。但其中的Marmon本身又拥有横跨11个不同业务领域的140项运营。简而言之，当你审视Berkshire时，你看到的是整个美国企业版图。让我们更深入一点，看看过去几年究竟发生了什么。
The four housing-related companies in this section (a group that excludes Clayton, which is carried under Finance and Financial Products) had aggregate pre-tax earnings of $227 million in 2009, $362 million in 2010 and $359 million in 2011. If you subtract these earnings from those in the combined statement, you will see that our multiple and diverse non-housing operations earned $1,831 million in 2009, $3,912 million in 2010 and $4,678 million in 2011. About $291 million of the 2011 earnings came from the Lubrizol acquisition. The profile of the remaining 2011 earnings – $4,387 million – illustrates the comeback of much of America from the devastation wrought by the 2008 financial panic. Though housing-related businesses remain in the emergency room, most other businesses have left the hospital with their health fully restored.
本节中的四家与住房相关的公司（不含归入Finance and Financial Products项下的Clayton）在2009年合计实现2.27亿美元税前利润、2010年为3.62亿美元、2011年为3.59亿美元。如果把这些收益从合并报表中扣除，你会看到我们的多元非住房业务在2009年赚取18.31亿美元、2010年39.12亿美元、2011年46.78亿美元。2011年其中约2.91亿美元来自对Lubrizol的收购。剩余的2011年收益——43.87亿美元——清晰地展现出美国大部分产业从2008年金融恐慌所致重创中的复苏。尽管与住房相关的业务仍在“急诊室”，但大多数其他业务已“出院”，并恢复了健康。
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Almost all of our managers delivered outstanding performances last year, among them those managers who run housing-related businesses and were therefore fighting hurricane-force headwinds. Here are a few examples:
去年，我们几乎所有的经理人都交出了出色的成绩，其中也包括那些负责住房相关业务、因而逆风前行的经理人。以下是一些例子：
• Vic Mancinelli again set a record at CTB, our agricultural equipment operation. We purchased CTB in 2002 for $139 million. It has subsequently distributed $180 million to Berkshire, last year earned $124 million pre-tax and has $109 million in cash. Vic has made a number of bolt-on acquisitions over the years, including a meaningful one he signed up after yearend.
在我们的农业设备公司CTB，Vic Mancinelli再次刷新纪录。我们在2002年以1.39亿美元收购CTB。此后它已向Berkshire分配1.80亿美元，去年实现1.24亿美元税前利润，账上持有1.09亿美元现金。多年来，Vic完成了多笔“bolt-on”并购，其中一笔重要交易是在年末之后签署的。
• TTI, our electric components distributor, increased its sales to a record $2.1 billion, up 12.4% from 2010. Earnings also hit a record, up 127% from 2007, the year in which we purchased the business. In 2011, TTI performed far better than the large publicly-traded companies in its field. That’s no surprise: Paul Andrews and his associates have been besting them for years. Charlie and I are delighted that Paul negotiated a large bolt-on acquisition early in 2012. We hope more follow.
我们的电子元件分销商TTI销售额增至创纪录的21亿美元，较2010年增长12.4%。利润同样创下新高，较我们收购该公司的2007年提升127%。2011年，TTI的表现远胜该领域大型上市公司。这并不意外：Paul Andrews及其团队多年来一直胜过同行。Charlie和我很高兴Paul在2012年初又谈成一笔规模可观的“bolt-on”并购，我们期待更多进展。
• Iscar, our 80%-owned cutting-tools operation, continues to amaze us. Its sales growth and overall performance are unique in its industry. Iscar’s managers – Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman – are brilliant strategists and operators. When the economic world was cratering in November 2008, they stepped up to buy Tungaloy, a leading Japanese cutting-tool manufacturer. Tungaloy suffered significant damage when the tsunami hit north of Tokyo last spring. But you wouldn’t know that now: Tungaloy went on to set a sales record in 2011. I visited the Iwaki plant in November and was inspired by the dedication and enthusiasm of Tungaloy’s management, as well as its staff. They are a wonderful group and deserve your admiration and thanks.
我们持股80%的切削工具公司Iscar依然让人惊叹，其销售增长与整体表现放眼全行业独树一帜。Iscar的管理层——Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz和Danny Goldman——既是卓越的战略家，也是出色的运营者。2008年11月全球经济低迷之际，他们逆势收购了日本领先的切削工具企业Tungaloy。去年春天东京以北遭海啸袭击，Tungaloy受到严重损害。但从2011年的创纪录销售额看，已难见灾后痕迹。我在11月参观了磐城市的工厂，Tungaloy管理层及员工的敬业与热情令我深受鼓舞。他们是一支了不起的团队，值得你们的敬佩与感谢。
• McLane, our huge distribution company that is run by Grady Rosier, added important new customers in 2011 and set a pre-tax earnings record of $370 million. Since its purchase in 2003 for $1.5 billion, the company has had pre-tax earnings of $2.4 billion and also increased its LIFO reserve by $230 million because the prices of the retail products it distributes (candy, gum, cigarettes, etc.) have risen. Grady runs a logistical machine second to none. You can look for bolt-ons at McLane, particularly in our new wine-and-spirits distribution business.
我们的大型分销公司McLane由Grady Rosier掌舵，2011年新增多家重要客户，税前利润创下3.7亿美元纪录。自2003年以15亿美元收购以来，公司累计税前利润达24亿美元；同时因其分销的零售商品（糖果、口香糖、香烟等）价格上涨，LIFO存货准备亦增加了2.3亿美元。Grady运营着业内一流的物流机器。McLane还有“bolt-on”并购机会，尤其在新拓展的酒类分销业务上。
• Jordan Hansell took over at NetJets in April and delivered 2011 pre-tax earnings of $227 million. That is a particularly impressive performance because the sale of new planes was slow during most of the year. In December, however, there was an uptick that was more than seasonally normal. How permanent it will be is uncertain.
Jordan Hansell于4月接任NetJets，2011年实现税前利润2.27亿美元。考虑到全年大部分时间新机销售疲软，这一成绩尤为亮眼。不过12月出现了超越季节性的回升，其可持续性尚未可知。
A few years ago NetJets was my number one worry: Its costs were far out of line with revenues, and cash was hemorrhaging. Without Berkshire’s support, NetJets would have gone broke. These problems are behind us, and Jordan is now delivering steady profits from a well-controlled and smoothly-running operation. NetJets is proceeding on a plan to enter China with some first-class partners, a move that will widen our business “moat.” No other fractional-ownership operator has remotely the size and breadth of the NetJets operation, and none ever will. NetJets’ unrelenting focus on safety and service has paid off in the marketplace.
几年前，NetJets曾是我最大的担忧：成本与收入严重不匹配、现金不断流失。没有Berkshire的支持，NetJets早已撑不住。如今这些问题已成为过去，Jordan正通过受控且高效的运营实现稳定盈利。NetJets正与一流伙伴推进进入中国的计划，这将拓宽我们的业务“护城河”。没有任何分时所有权运营商在规模和广度上能接近NetJets，也不会有。NetJets对安全和服务的不懈坚持，已在市场上得到回报。
• It’s a joy to watch Marmon’s progress under Frank Ptak’s leadership. In addition to achieving internal growth, Frank regularly makes bolt-on acquisitions that, in aggregate, will materially increase Marmon’s earning power. (He did three, costing about $270 million, in the last few months.) Joint ventures around the world are another opportunity for Marmon. At midyear Marmon partnered with the Kundalia family in an Indian crane operation that is already delivering substantial profits. This is Marmon’s second venture with the family, following a successful wire and cable partnership instituted a few years ago.
在Frank Ptak的领导下，Marmon的进步令人欣喜。除了实现内部增长，Frank还定期完成“bolt-on”并购，整体上将显著提升Marmon的盈利能力。（仅在过去几个月就完成了三笔，合计约2.7亿美元。）全球范围的合资亦是Marmon的另一个机遇。年中，Marmon与Kundalia家族在印度起重机业务上的合作已带来可观利润。这是双方继几年前成功的电线电缆合作之后的第二次携手。
Of the eleven major sectors in which Marmon operates, ten delivered gains in earnings last year. You can be confident of higher earnings from Marmon in the years ahead.
Marmon目前运营的11个主要领域中，有10个去年实现了盈利增长。你可以对Marmon未来几年更高的收益充满信心。
• “Buy commodities, sell brands” has long been a formula for business success. It has produced enormous and sustained profits for Coca-Cola since 1886 and Wrigley since 1891. On a smaller scale, we have enjoyed good fortune with this approach at See’s Candy since we purchased it 40 years ago.
• “买大宗、卖品牌”长期以来是商业成功的公式。自1886年以来为Coca-Cola带来巨大且持续的利润，自1891年以来也成就了Wrigley。在更小的体量上，自我们40年前收购See’s Candy以来，这一模式同样为我们带来好运。
Last year See’s had record pre-tax earnings of $83 million, bringing its total since we bought it to $1.65 billion. Contrast that figure with our purchase price of $25 million and our yearend carrying-value (net of cash) of less than zero. (Yes, you read that right; capital employed at See’s fluctuates seasonally, hitting a low after Christmas.) Credit Brad Kinstler for taking the company to new heights since he became CEO in 2006.
去年，See’s实现创纪录的8300万美元税前利润，自我们收购以来累计达到16.5亿美元。请将这个数字与当初2500万美元的收购价及年末账面价值（扣除现金后）低于零作对比。（没错，你没看错；See’s投入资本存在季节性波动，圣诞后会降至低位。）自2006年出任CEO以来，Brad Kinstler将公司带上新台阶，功不可没。
• Nebraska Furniture Mart (80% owned) set an earnings record in 2011, netting more than ten times what it did in 1983, when we acquired our stake.
Nebraska Furniture Mart（我们持股80%）在2011年也创下盈利新高，净利润是我们1983年入股时的十倍以上。
But that’s not the big news. More important was NFM’s acquisition of a 433-acre tract north of Dallas on which we will build what is almost certain to be the highest-volume home-furnishings store in the country. Currently, that title is shared by our two stores in Omaha and Kansas City, each of which had record-setting sales of more than $400 million in 2011. It will be several years before the Texas store is completed, but I look forward to cutting the ribbon at the opening. (At Berkshire, the managers do the work; I take the bows.)
但这不是最大的新闻。更重要的是，NFM收购了Dallas以北一块433英亩的土地，我们将在那里建造几乎可以确定为全美销量最高的家居用品商店。目前，这一头衔由我们在Omaha和Kansas City的两家门店共同拥有，它们在2011年各自都创下了超过4亿美元的销售纪录。Texas店要数年后才能完工，但我期待在开业时剪彩。（在Berkshire，经理们负责干活；我负责上台鞠躬。）
Our new store, which will offer an unequalled variety of merchandise sold at prices that can’t be matched, will bring huge crowds from near and far. This drawing power and our extensive holdings of land at the site should enable us to attract a number of other major stores. (If any high-volume retailers are reading this, contact me.)
我们的新店将以无人能及的丰富商品种类和无法匹敌的价格销售，吸引来自四面八方的大量顾客。凭借这种吸引力以及我们在该址持有的大量土地，我们应当能够吸引多家其他大型门店进驻。（如果有高销量零售商在读到这里，请联系我。）
Our experience with NFM and the Blumkin family that runs it has been a real joy. The business was built by Rose Blumkin (known to all as “Mrs. B”), who started the company in 1937 with $500 and a dream. She sold me our interest when she was 89 and worked until she was 103. (After retiring, she died the next year, a sequence I point out to any other Berkshire manager who even thinks of retiring.)
我们与NFM及其经营者Blumkin家族的合作经历令人愉快。这项事业由Rose Blumkin（大家称她为“Mrs. B”）创立，她在1937年带着500美元和一个梦想开启了公司。她在89岁时把我们所持权益卖给了我，并一直工作到103岁。（退休后一年的次序是：她就去世了——我把这个顺序特别指出给任何动念退休的Berkshire经理。）
Mrs. B’s son, Louie, now 92, helped his mother build the business after he returned from World War II and, along with his wife, Fran, has been my friend for 55 years. In turn, Louie’s sons, Ron and Irv, have taken the company to new heights, first opening the Kansas City store and now gearing up for Texas.
Mrs. B的儿子Louie，现在92岁，二战归来后帮助母亲壮大了这项事业，并与他的妻子Fran一起，成为我55年的朋友。随后，Louie的儿子们Ron和Irv把公司带上了新高度，先是开了Kansas City店，如今正为进军Texas做准备。
The “boys” and I have had many great times together, and I count them among my best friends. The Blumkins are a remarkable family. Never inclined to let an extraordinary gene pool go to waste, I am rejoicing these days because several members of the fourth Blumkin generation have joined NFM.
我和这些“男孩们”一起度过了许多美好时光，我把他们视为我最好的朋友之一。Blumkin家族非同凡响。我从不愿让卓越的“基因池”被浪费，如今我很高兴看到Blumkin第四代中的数位成员已加入NFM。
Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.
总体而言，Berkshire在这一板块所持业务的内在价值显著高于其账面价值。然而，对许多小公司来说并非如此。我在收购小公司上犯过不止一两次错误。Charlie很早就对我说过：“如果一件事根本不值得做，那就不值得把它做好。”我本该更认真地听进去。无论如何，我们的大型收购总体表现良好——在少数案例中表现极为出色——总体上，这一板块对我们而言是赢家。
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Certain shareholders have told me they hunger for more discussions of accounting arcana. So here’s a bit of GAAP-mandated nonsense I hope both of them enjoy.
有些股东告诉我，他们渴望更多关于会计秘辛的讨论。那么这里有一段GAAP强制的“无稽之谈”，希望那两位会喜欢。
Common sense would tell you that our varied subsidiaries should be carried on our books at their cost plus the earnings they have retained since our purchase (unless their economic value has materially decreased, in which case an appropriate write-down must be taken). And that’s essentially the reality at Berkshire – except for the weird situation at Marmon.
常识会告诉你，我们多样化的子公司应当以成本加上自我们买入以来留存的盈利计入账面（除非其经济价值出现重大下降，在那种情况下必须计提适当的减损）。这基本上也是Berkshire的实际做法——除了Marmon的怪异情形。
We purchased 64% of the company in 2008 and put this interest on our books at our cost, $4.8 billion. So far, so good. Then, in early 2011, pursuant to our original contract with the Pritzker family, we purchased an additional 16%, paying $1.5 billion as called for by a formula that reflected Marmon’s increased value. In this instance, however, we were required to immediately write off $614 million of the purchase price retroactive to the end of 2010. (Don’t ask!) Obviously, this write-off had no connection to economic reality. The excess of Marmon’s intrinsic value over its carrying value is widened by this meaningless write-down.
我们在2008年购买了该公司64%的股权，并按成本48亿美元计入账面。到此为止一切正常。随后在2011年初，根据与Pritzker家族的原始合同，我们又购买了额外16%的股权，按反映Marmon价值上升的公式支付了15亿美元。但在这一案例中，我们被要求立即将其中6.14亿美元冲销，并追溯至2010年末。（别问！）显然，这笔冲销与经济现实毫无关联。由于这次毫无意义的减记，Marmon内在价值超过其账面价值的超额被进一步放大。
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
该板块是我们最小的一个，包含两家租赁公司，XTRA（挂车）与CORT（家具），以及Clayton Homes——全美领先的装配式住房生产商与金融服务商。除这些100%持有的子公司外，我们还在此类别中纳入了一揽子金融资产和我们在Berkadia Commercial Mortgage中的50%权益。
It’s instructive to look at what transpired at our three operating businesses after the economy fell off a cliff in late 2008, because their experiences illuminate the fractured recovery that later came along.
回顾2008年末经济从悬崖坠落之后我们这三家运营企业发生的事情颇具启发性，因为它们的经历揭示了随后出现的“断裂式”复苏。
Results at our two leasing companies mirrored the “non-housing” economy. Their combined pre-tax earnings were $13 million in 2009, $53 million in 2010 and $155 million in 2011, an improvement reflecting the steady recovery we have seen in almost all of our non-housing businesses. In contrast, Clayton’s world of manufactured housing (just like site-built housing) has endured a veritable depression, experiencing no recovery to date. Manufactured housing sales in the nation were 49,789 homes in 2009, 50,046 in 2010 and 51,606 in 2011. (When housing was booming in 2005, they were 146,744.)
我们的两家租赁公司的业绩映照了“非住房”经济。它们的合计税前利润在2009年为1,300万美元、2010年为5,300万美元、2011年为1.55亿美元，改善反映了我们几乎所有非住房业务所见到的稳步复苏。相反，Clayton所处的装配式住房世界（与现场建造住房一样）经历了一场真正的萧条，迄今未见复苏。全美装配式住房销量在2009年为49,789套、2010年为50,046套、2011年为51,606套。（而在2005年住房繁荣时，该数字为146,744套。）
Despite these difficult times, Clayton has continued to operate profitably, largely because its mortgage portfolio has performed well under trying circumstances. Because we are the largest lender in the manufactured homes sector and are also normally lending to lower-and-middle-income families, you might expect us to suffer heavy losses during a housing meltdown. But by sticking to old-fashioned loan policies – meaningful down payments and monthly payments with a sensible relationship to regular income – Clayton has kept losses to acceptable levels. It has done so even though many of our borrowers have had negative equity for some time.
尽管形势艰难，Clayton依然保持盈利，主要因为其按揭贷款组合在严峻环境下表现良好。鉴于我们是装配式住房领域最大的放贷方，且通常向中低收入家庭放贷，你可能会预期在住房崩盘期间我们会遭受巨额损失。但凭借坚守“老式”的贷款政策——有意义的首付比例，以及与常规收入形成合理关系的每月供款——Clayton将损失控制在可接受水平。即便我们的许多借款人已长期处于“负资产”状态，它仍做到了这一点。
As is well-known, the U.S. went off the rails in its home-ownership and mortgage-lending policies, and for these mistakes our economy is now paying a huge price. All of us participated in the destructive behavior – government, lenders, borrowers, the media, rating agencies, you name it. At the core of the folly was the almost universal belief that the value of houses was certain to increase over time and that any dips would be inconsequential. The acceptance of this premise justified almost any price and practice in housing transactions. Homeowners everywhere felt richer and rushed to “monetize” the increased value of their homes by refinancings. These massive cash infusions fueled a consumption binge throughout our economy. It all seemed great fun while it lasted. (A largely unnoted fact: Large numbers of people who have “lost” their house through foreclosure have actually realized a profit because they carried out refinancings earlier that gave them cash in excess of their cost. In these cases, the evicted homeowner was the winner, and the victim was the lender.)
众所周知，美国在住房拥有率与按揭放贷政策上脱轨了，而我们的经济如今正为这些错误付出巨大代价。所有人都参与了这种破坏性行为——政府、放贷人、借款人、媒体、评级机构，凡此种种。愚行的核心是一个几乎被普遍接受的信念：房价会随着时间确定性上涨，任何回落都无关紧要。这一前提的被接受，为住房交易中的几乎任何价格与做法提供了“正当性”。各地的房主都觉得自己更富了，纷纷通过再融资把住房增值“变现”。这些巨量现金注入推动了整个经济的消费狂欢。一切在持续期间看起来都其乐无穷。（一个基本未被注意的事实是：大量通过止赎“失去”住房的人实际上赚了钱，因为他们此前做过再融资，拿到的现金超过其成本。在这些案例中，被驱逐的房主是赢家，而受害者是放贷人。）
In 2007, the bubble burst, just as all bubbles must. We are now in the fourth year of a cure that, though long and painful, is sure to succeed. Today, household formations are consistently exceeding housing starts.
在2007年，泡沫破裂了，就像所有泡沫终将破裂一样。如今我们已处在疗愈的第四年，这一过程虽漫长且痛苦，但必将成功。当前，新成立家庭的数量持续超过住房开工量。
Clayton’s earnings should improve materially when the nation’s excess housing inventory is worked off. As I see things today, however, I believe the intrinsic value of the three businesses in this sector does not differ materially from their book value.
当全国过剩的住房库存被消化后，Clayton的盈利应会显著改善。不过就我目前的看法而言，我认为本板块这三家公司的内在价值与其账面价值并无实质差异。
Investments
投资
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面列示的是我们在年末市值超过10亿美元的普通股投资。
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*这是我们的实际买入价格，同时也是我们的税务成本；在少数情况下，GAAP口径下的“成本”因必须进行的增值或减值调整而有所不同。
We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important: our purchases of IBM and Bank of America and the $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.
2011年我们对投资持仓变动不多，但有三笔操作至关重要：买入IBM、Bank of America，以及将我们在Wells Fargo的持仓追加了$10亿。
The banking industry is back on its feet, and Wells Fargo is prospering. Its earnings are strong, its assets solid and its capital at record levels. At Bank of America, some huge mistakes were made by prior management. Brian Moynihan has made excellent progress in cleaning these up, though the completion of that process will take a number of years. Concurrently, he is nurturing a huge and attractive underlying business that will endure long after today’s problems are forgotten. Our warrants to buy 700 million Bank of America shares will likely be of great value before they expire.
银行业已重振旗鼓，Wells Fargo蒸蒸日上：盈利强劲、资产稳健、资本水平创纪录。至于Bank of America，前任管理层犯下过一些重大错误。Brian Moynihan在清理这些问题上进展出色，尽管彻底完成需要若干年。同时，他所培育的庞大且具吸引力的核心业务，将在今天的问题被人遗忘之后长期存在。我们以买入Bank of America 7亿股的权证，在到期前极可能具有巨大价值。
As was the case with Coca-Cola in 1988 and the railroads in 2006, I was late to the IBM party. I have been reading the company’s annual report for more than 50 years, but it wasn’t until a Saturday in March last year that my thinking crystallized. As Thoreau said, “It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.”
就像我们在1988年对Coca-Cola、2006年对铁路行业那样，我加入IBM“派对”的时间也不算早。我阅读该公司的年报已逾50年，但直到去年的一个三月周六，我的想法才彻底成形。正如Thoreau所言：“重要的不是你看了什么，而是你看见了什么。”
Todd Combs built a $1.75 billion portfolio (at cost) last year, and Ted Weschler will soon create one of similar size. Each of them receives 80% of his performance compensation from his own results and 20% from his partner’s. When our quarterly filings report relatively small holdings, these are not likely to be buys I made (though the media often overlook that point) but rather holdings denoting purchases by Todd or Ted.
Todd Combs去年建立了一支按成本计$17.5亿的投资组合，Ted Weschler很快也会建立规模相近的组合。他们各自有80%的业绩报酬取决于本人业绩，20%取决于搭档业绩。当我们的季度披露中出现相对较小的持仓时，这些很可能不是我买的（尽管媒体常忽略这一点），而是Todd或Ted的持仓。
One additional point about these two new arrivals. Both Ted and Todd will be helpful to the next CEO of Berkshire in making acquisitions. They have excellent “business minds” that grasp the economic forces likely to determine the future of a wide variety of businesses. They are aided in their thinking by an understanding of what is predictable and what is unknowable.
关于这两位新加入者还有一点：Ted与Todd在并购方面将能帮助Berkshire的下一任CEO。他们具备卓越的“商业头脑”，能把握将决定众多行业未来走向的经济力量。他们也清楚哪些是可预测的、哪些是不可知的，这种认知有助于他们的思考。
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There is little new to report on our derivatives positions, which we have described in detail in past reports. (Annual reports since 1977 are available at www.berkshirehathaway.com
.) One important industry change, however, must be noted: Though our existing contracts have very minor collateral requirements, the rules have changed for new positions. Consequently, we will not be initiating any major derivatives positions. We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral. The possibility of some sudden and huge posting requirement – arising from an out-of-the-blue event such as a worldwide financial panic or massive terrorist attack – is inconsistent with our primary objectives of redundant liquidity and unquestioned financial strength.
关于我们的衍生品头寸没有太多新内容可报告，此前报告已有详细描述。（自1977年以来的年报可在www.berkshirehathaway.com获取。）不过必须指出一项重要的行业变化：尽管我们现有合约几乎无需抵押品，但针对新建头寸的规则已改变。因此，我们不会再发起任何重大的衍生品头寸。我们回避任何可能要求即时追加抵押的合约。因突发事件（如全球金融恐慌或大规模恐怖袭击）而需要突然、巨额追加抵押的可能性，与我们“冗余流动性与无可置疑的财务稳健性”的首要目标相悖。
Our insurance-like derivatives contracts, whereby we pay if various issues included in high-yield bond indices default, are coming to a close. The contracts that most exposed us to losses have already expired, and the remainder will terminate soon. In 2011, we paid out $86 million on two losses, bringing our total payments to $2.6 billion. We are almost certain to realize a final “underwriting profit” on this portfolio because the premiums we received were $3.4 billion, and our future losses are apt to be minor. In addition, we will have averaged about $2 billion of float over the five-year life of these contracts. This successful result during a time of great credit stress underscores the importance of obtaining a premium that is commensurate with the risk.
我们“类保险”衍生品合约（若高收益债指数所含若干债券违约我们即赔付）接近尾声。对我们敞口最大的合约已到期，剩余合约也将很快终止。2011年我们就两笔损失支付了$8600万，使累计赔付达$26亿。我们几乎可以确定该组合最终将实现“承保利润”，因为我们收取的保费为$34亿，未来损失大概率较小。此外，在这些合约的五年存续期内，我们平均持有约$20亿的“浮存金”。在信用压力极大的时期能取得这样的结果，凸显“与风险相称的保费”的重要性。
Charlie and I continue to believe that our equity-put positions will produce a significant profit, considering both the $4.2 billion of float we will have held for more than fifteen years and the $222 million profit we’ve already realized on contracts that we repurchased. At yearend, Berkshire’s book value reflected a liability of $8.5 billion for the remaining contracts; if they had all come due at that time our payment would have been $6.2 billion.
考虑到我们在超过十五年时间里持有$42亿“浮存金”，以及我们在已回购合约上实现的$2.22亿利润，Charlie和我仍相信我们的股票看跌期权头寸将带来可观收益。年末，Berkshire账面就剩余合约计提了$85亿负债；若当时全部到期，我们应付金额将为$62亿。
The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer
投资者的基本选择以及我们强烈偏好的那一种
Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.
投资常被描述为：现在投入资金，期望未来获得更多资金。在Berkshire，我们提出更严格的定义：投资是现在把购买力转移给他人，并基于理性预期在未来获得更多的购买力——且是在名义收益缴税之后的购买力。更简洁地说，投资就是现在放弃消费，以便在未来具备更高的消费能力。
From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability – the reasoned probability – of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing-power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
由我们的定义可推出一个重要推论：投资的风险性并不以beta（华尔街用于度量风险、涵盖波动性的术语）来衡量，而应以在持有期内该投资导致持有人购买力受损的概率——理性估算的概率——来衡量。只要在持有期内较为确定能带来购买力的提升，资产即便价格大幅波动也未必是高风险；反之，如我们将看到的，价格“不波动”的资产也可能风险满满。
Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.
投资可能性繁多且多样化，但大致可分为三大类，理解每一类的特征至关重要。下面我们逐一梳理。
• Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.” In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.
以某种货币计价的投资包括货币市场基金、债券、按揭贷款、银行存款以及其他工具。大多数这类与货币相关的投资被认为是“安全的”。实际上，它们属于最危险的资产之一。它们的beta或许为零，但风险巨大。
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.
在过去一个世纪中，这些工具在许多国家摧毁了投资者的购买力，即便持有人仍在按时收到利息与本金的支付。而且，这种丑陋的结果将永远反复出现。政府决定货币的最终价值，而体系性的力量有时会使其趋向于导致通胀的政策；这种政策不时会失控。
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”
即使在对货币稳定有强烈诉求的美国，自我在1965年接管Berkshire以来，美元价值已惊人地下跌了86%。如今至少需要7美元才能买到当年1美元能买到的东西。因此，在那段时期里，一个免税机构需要从债券投资中每年获得4.3%的利息，才能仅仅维持其购买力。如果管理者把其中任何一部分利息当作“收益”，那就是自欺欺人。
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.
对于像你我这样需要纳税的投资者，情况要糟糕得多。在同样的47年期间，不断滚动持有美国国库券的年化收益为5.7%。听起来还不错。但如果个人投资者平均按25%的税率缴纳个税，那么这5.7%的回报在实际收入上将一无所获。该投资者可见的所得税会从名义收益中剥走1.4个百分点，而无形的通胀税会吞噬剩下的4.3个百分点。值得注意的是，这种隐含的通胀“税”超过了投资者自以为的主要负担——显性所得税——的三倍。“In God We Trust”或许印在我们的货币上，但推动政府印钞机的手却太过“人性”。
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
当然，高利率可以补偿货币类投资所面临的通胀风险——事实上，20世纪80年代初的利率确实很好地做到了这一点。然而当前的利率远不足以抵消投资者承担的购买力风险。此刻，债券上应该贴上警示标签。
Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
因此，在当今条件下，我不喜欢货币类投资。即便如此，Berkshire仍持有相当数量的此类资产，主要是短期品种。在Berkshire，充裕流动性的需求至关重要，利率再低也不能忽视。为满足这一需求，我们主要持有美国国库券——在最混乱的经济环境中仍可指望其流动性的唯一投资。我们的流动性工作水位是200亿美元；100亿美元是绝对下限。
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we’ve exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: “Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.”
除去流动性与监管对我们的要求，只有当货币相关证券提供了不同寻常的获利可能时我们才会购买——要么是某个信用被错误定价（如周期性垃圾债灾中会出现的情况），要么是利率上升到某一水平，使得在利率回落时可在高评级债券上实现可观的资本利得。虽然我们过去抓住过这两类机会（未来也可能再抓住），但现在我们与这类前景相距“180度”。此刻，华尔街人士Shelby Cullom Davis多年前的一句冷嘲恰如其分：“那些号称提供无风险回报的债券，如今被定价为提供‘无回报的风险’。”
• The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
第二大类投资涉及永远不会产出任何东西的资产，但买家购买它们，是希望未来会有人——也明知这些资产将永远无生产力——愿意出更高的价。17世纪，郁金香曾短暂成为这类买家的最爱。
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.
这类投资需要不断扩大的买家池；而买家之所以被吸引，是因为他们相信买家池还会进一步扩大。持有者的动力并非源自该资产自身能产出什么——它将永远没有生命力——而是源自一种信念：未来会有更多人更热切地渴望它。
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
这一类别中的主要资产是黄金，目前深受几乎惧怕所有其他资产、尤其是纸币（正如前文所述，他们有理由害怕其价值）的投资者青睐。然而，黄金有两大缺陷：既无太多用途，也不具繁殖能力。诚然，黄金在工业与装饰上有些用途，但这些用途的需求有限，无法吸收新增产量。与此同时，如果你永远持有一盎司黄金，到了尽头你仍只有一盎司。
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.
多数黄金购买者的动机，是相信“恐惧者”的队伍会扩大。在过去十年里，这一信念被证明是正确的。除此之外，价格上涨本身也激发了额外的买兴，吸引那些把上涨视为投资论点背书的买家。随着“随大流”的投资者加入任何派对，他们会在一段时间里创造出自己的“真理”。
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”
过去15年里，Internet股票与住房都展示了这样一种极端：当一个起初看似合理的论点与广为传播的上涨价格结合时，会被推向何等过度。在这些泡沫中，最初持怀疑态度的大批投资者屈服于市场给出的“证据”，买家池在一段时间内扩张到足以让“花车游行”继续前行。但泡沫一旦被吹到足够大，必然破裂。随后，那句古老谚语再次得到验证：“智者所为于始，愚者所为于终。”
Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
当今世界的黄金存量约为17万公吨。如果把这些黄金全部熔铸在一起，会形成一个边长约68英尺的立方体。（想象一下，它能轻松放进一座棒球内场。）按我写作时每盎司$1,750的价格计算，其价值为$9.6 trillion。把这个立方体称为A堆。
Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?
现在让我们构建一个成本相同的B堆。为此，我们可以买下全美所有耕地（4亿英亩，每年产出约2000亿美元），再加上16家Exxon Mobil（全球最赚钱的公司，每年盈利超过400亿美元）。完成这些收购后，我们还会剩下大约1万亿美元的“零花钱”（大采购之后也没必要拮据）。你能想象一个拥有9.6万亿美元的投资者会选择A堆而不是B堆吗？
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
除了对既有黄金存量给出的惊人估值外，按当前价格计算，今日黄金的年产量价值约1600亿美元。买家——无论是珠宝和工业用户、受惊的个人，还是投机者——必须持续吸收这部分新增供给，才能仅仅维持现价的均衡。
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.
一个世纪后，这4亿英亩农田将已生产出惊人数量的玉米、小麦、棉花及其他作物——而且无论货币为何物，它仍会继续产出这些宝贵财富。Exxon Mobil大概率已向股东派发了数万亿美元股息，并持有价值更多数万亿美元的资产（别忘了，你拥有的是16家Exxon）。而这17万吨黄金体量不变，仍然无法生产任何东西。你可以抚摸那块立方体，但它不会有任何回应。
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
诚然，当一百年后的世人感到恐惧时，许多人仍可能蜂拥至黄金。然而我确信，A堆按当前估值的9.6万亿美元，在这一个世纪里的复合增速将远远低于B堆所能实现的水平。
• Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
我们的前两类资产在恐惧巅峰时最受欢迎：对经济崩溃的恐惧驱使个人转向与货币相关的资产，尤其是美国债务；而对货币崩溃的恐惧又推动人们投向像黄金这类贫瘠的资产。2008年末，我们听到“cash is king”，恰恰那时现金应该被投入而不是被抱持。同样，20世纪80年代初，我们听到“cash is trash”，而那正是固定美元计价投资在人们记忆中最具吸引力的阶段。在这些时刻，那些需要“同侪支持”来打气的投资者为这种安慰付出了沉重代价。
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
我个人的偏好——你也料到了——是第三类：投资于有生产力的资产，不论是企业、农场还是不动产。理想情况下，这些资产在通胀时期应能提供维持购买力的产出，同时只需极少新增资本投入。农场、不动产，以及许多企业如Coca-Cola、IBM和我们自己的See’s Candy，都符合这“双重考验”。另一些公司——例如我们受监管的公用事业——未能通过，因为通胀会对它们提出沉重的资本要求。要赚更多，所有者就得投更多。即便如此，这类投资依然优于无生产力或货币类资产。
公用事业有稳定的收入来源，稳定能让人做出更理性的决策。
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.
无论一个世纪后的货币是以黄金、贝壳、鲨鱼牙，还是像今天这样一张纸为基础，人们都会愿意用日常劳动的几分钟来换一瓶Coca-Cola或一些See’s的花生酥糖。未来美国人口将比现在搬运更多货物、消费更多食品、需要更多生活空间。人们将永远用自己生产的东西交换他人生产的东西。
Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
我国的企业将继续高效地提供公民所需的商品与服务。打个比方，这些商业的“奶牛”会存活几个世纪，并产出越来越多的“牛奶”。它们的价值不取决于交换媒介，而取决于其产奶能力。出售牛奶的收益会为“牛”的所有者持续复利，就像20世纪道琼斯从66点涨到11,497点（期间还派发了大量股息）那样。Berkshire的目标是提升对一流企业的所有权。我们的首选是100%持有——但我们也会通过持有大量可流通股票来成为所有者。我相信，在任何足够长的时期内，这一类投资都会成为我们所讨论三类中的遥遥领先者。更重要的是，它的安全性也远胜其他。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 5th at the CenturyLink Center (renamed from “Qwest”). Last year, Carrie Kizer debuted as the ringmaster and earned a lifetime assignment. Everyone loved the job she did – especially me.
年度股东大会将于5月5日（周六）在CenturyLink Center（原“Qwest”）举行。去年，Carrie Kizer首次担任“场内主持”，一战成名并“终身聘用”。所有人都喜欢她的表现——尤其是我。
Soon after the 7 a.m. opening of the doors, we will have a new activity: The Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Late last year, Berkshire purchased the Omaha World-Herald and, in my meeting with its shareholder-employees, I told of the folding and throwing skills I developed while delivering 500,000 papers as a teenager.
上午7点开门不久，我们将新增一个活动：Newspaper Tossing Challenge。去年年底，Berkshire收购了Omaha World-Herald，在我与其股东—员工的见面会上，我谈起了自己在少年派送50万份报纸时练就的折叠与投掷技巧。
I immediately saw skepticism in the eyes of the audience. That was no surprise to me. After all, the reporters’ mantra is: “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” So now I have to back up my claim. At the meeting, I will take on all comers in making 35-foot tosses of the World-Herald to a Clayton porch. Any challenger whose paper lands closer to the doorstep than mine will receive a dilly bar. I’ve asked Dairy Queen to supply several for the contest, though I doubt that any will be needed. We will have a large stack of papers. Grab one. Fold it (no rubber bands). Take your best shot. Make my day.
我立刻从听众眼中看到了怀疑。这并不让我意外。毕竟，记者的口头禅是：“就算你妈说她爱你，也要核实。”所以现在我得用行动证明。大会上，我将与所有挑战者比拼——把World-Herald从35英尺外掷到一处Clayton门廊。任何人只要把报纸掷得比我更接近门口，就能获得一根dilly bar。我已请Dairy Queen为比赛备上若干，尽管我怀疑用不上。我们会准备一大摞报纸。拿一份。把它折好（别用皮筋）。尽你所能。让我开心一下。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8:30将播放一部新的Berkshire影片。一小时后进入问答环节（中午在CenturyLink的摊位就餐休息），持续至3:30。短暂休息后，Charlie和我将在3:45召开年度大会。如果你打算在当天的问答环节中途离场，请在Charlie发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,249 pairs of Justin boots, 11,254 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Quikut knives (that’s 15 knives per minute) and 6,126 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, a Marmon product whose very existence was news to me. (The product I focus on is money.) But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.
当然，离席的最佳理由是去购物。为此我们把与会场相连、面积194,300平方英尺的大厅塞满了来自数十家Berkshire子公司的商品。去年你们表现不俗，多数摊位创下了销售纪录。短短九小时，我们卖出1,249双Justin靴、11,254磅See’s糖果、8,000把Quikut刀（相当于每分钟15把），以及6,126双Wells Lamont手套——这款Marmon产品的存在我之前都不知晓。（我关注的“产品”是钱。）但你们还能更好。记住：谁说金钱买不到幸福，显然没来过我们的年会逛一逛。
Among the new exhibitors this year will be Brooks, our running-shoe company. Brooks has been gobbling up market share and in 2011 had a sales gain of 34%, its tenth consecutive year of record volume. Drop by and congratulate Jim Weber, the company’s CEO. And be sure to buy a couple of pairs of limited edition “Berkshire Hathaway Running Shoes.”
今年的新展商之一将是我们的跑鞋公司Brooks。Brooks正大口蚕食市场份额，2011年销售增长34%，连续第十年创下销量新高。欢迎路过向公司CEO Jim Weber道贺。别忘了入手几双限量版“Berkshire Hathaway Running Shoes”。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将设立一个展台，由来自全美的多位顶级顾问驻场，为你提供汽车保险报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO可以为你提供股东折扣（通常为8%）。这一特别优惠在我们经营的51个司法辖区中，有44个允许实行。（补充一点：如果你符合其他折扣（例如某些群体折扣），折扣不叠加。）带上你现有保险的详细信息，看看我们是否能帮你省钱。我相信，至少对你们一半人来说，我们可以。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. I recommend MiTek, an informative history of one of our very successful subsidiaries. You’ll learn how my interest in the company was originally piqued by my receiving in the mail a hunk of ugly metal whose purpose I couldn’t fathom. Since we bought MiTek in 2001, it has made 33 “tuck-in” acquisitions, almost all successful. I think you’ll also like a short book that Peter Bevelin has put together explaining Berkshire’s investment and operating principles. It sums up what Charlie and I have been saying over the years in annual reports and at annual meetings. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
一定要去逛逛Bookworm。那里将提供35种以上的书籍和DVD，其中包括几本新书。我推荐《MiTek》，这是我们一家非常成功的子公司的信息量很大的发展史。你会了解到，我最初对这家公司的兴趣，源自我收到邮寄的一块丑陋金属块——我完全不明白它的用途。自我们2001年收购MiTek以来，它已完成33笔“tuck-in”式收购，几乎都很成功。我想你也会喜欢Peter Bevelin整理的一本小册子，阐释Berkshire的投资与经营原则，归纳了多年来Charlie和我在年报以及股东大会上的观点。如果你需要邮寄所购书籍，附近也提供寄送服务。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. I’ll OK your credit.
如果你是“大手笔”——或者立志成为“大手笔”——周六中午到下午5点之间请到Omaha机场东侧的Elliott Aviation看看。那里会有一队NetJets飞机，足以让你心跳加速。坐公交来；乘私人飞机走。我会为你的信用开绿灯。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2½ hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
本报告所附的代理材料附件说明了如何获取参加大会及其他活动所需的入场证。有时航空公司会在Berkshire周末涨价。如果你从远方来，请比较飞往Kansas City与飞往Omaha的成本。这两座城市之间车程约2个半小时，你可能因此节省一笔不小的费用，尤其是你原本计划在Omaha租车的话。把省下来的钱在我们这里花掉吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $32.7 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that exceeds the yearly sales of most furniture stores. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from10a.m.to9p.m.MondaythroughSaturday,and10a.m.to6p.m.onSunday.OnSaturdaythisyear,from5:30p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
在Nebraska Furniture Mart（位于72街、介于Dodge与Pacific之间，占地77英亩），我们将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”折扣价。去年该店在年会促销期间实现了3,270万美元的销售额，这一体量超过了多数家具店全年的销量。要享受Berkshire折扣，你必须在5月1日（周二）至5月7日（周一）期间购买，并出示你的会议凭证。期间的特价甚至适用于几家通常严格禁止打折的知名厂商的产品——他们为我们的股东周末破例了。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM营业时间为周一至周六10:00—21:00，周日10:00—18:00。今年周六17:30—20:00，NFM将举行一次野餐活动，欢迎各位参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 2 p.m., I will be clerking at Borsheims, desperate to beat my sales figure from last year. So come take advantage of me. Ask me for my “Crazy Warren” price.
在Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月4日（周五）18:00—21:00的鸡尾酒会。第二场主活动为5月6日（周日）9:00—16:00。周六我们营业至18:00。周日约14:00，我将在Borsheims亲自站柜台，力图打破我去年的销售额。快来“占我便宜”。向我索要“Crazy Warren”价。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末Borsheims都会人山人海。为便于大家享受福利，股东价将从4月30日（周一）延续到5月12日（周六）。在此期间，请出示你的会议凭证或显示你为Berkshire股东的券商对账单以证明身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Two non-experts – Charlie and I – will also be at the tables.
周日，在Borsheims外部商场内，两届美国国际象棋冠军Patrick Wolff将蒙眼迎战所有挑战者——对手们睁大眼睛——每组六人。同时，来自Dallas的杰出魔术师Norman Beck将在附近让观众大开眼界。此外，全球顶尖桥牌高手Bob Hamman与Sharon Osberg将于周日下午与我们的股东同桌切磋牌艺。两位“非专家”——Charlie和我——也会坐到牌桌旁。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. (Actuarial tables tell me that I can consume another 12 million calories before my death. I’m terrified at the thought of leaving any of these behind, so will be frontloading on Sunday.) Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s, call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, show some class and order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
Gorat’s和Piccolo’s将在5月6日（周日）再次只对Berkshire股东开放。两家餐厅均营业至22:00，Gorat’s自13:00开门，Piccolo’s自16:00开门。这两家是我的心头好，我周日晚上会两家都去。（精算表告诉我，在离世前我还可以摄入1200万卡路里。想到可能有卡路里“浪费”我就害怕，所以准备周日前置消费一波。）请记住：预订Gorat’s请在4月1日拨打402-551-3733（但不要提前拨打）；预订Piccolo’s请拨打402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s，请有点格调，点一杯巨大的root beer 冰淇淋苏打作甜点。只有“娘炮”才点小杯。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at [cloomis@fortunemail.com](mailto:cloomis@fortunemail.com); Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com](mailto:BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com), and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at [arsorkin@nytimes.com](mailto:arsorkin@nytimes.com).
大会问答环节仍将由同三位财经记者主持，他们将提问股东通过电子邮件提交给他们的问题。三位记者及其邮箱分别是：Fortune的Carol Loomis（[cloomis@fortunemail.com](mailto:cloomis@fortunemail.com)）；CNBC的Becky Quick（[BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com](mailto:BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com)）；以及The New York Times的Andrew Ross Sorkin（[arsorkin@nytimes.com](mailto:arsorkin@nytimes.com)）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
三位记者将从来稿中各自挑选十来个他们认为最有趣、最重要的问题。记者们告诉我：如果你的问题简明扼要、不在最后一刻提交、与Berkshire相关，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题，被选中的概率最高。（在邮件中请注明：若问题入选，你是否希望提及你的姓名。）
This year we are adding a second panel of three financial analysts who follow Berkshire. They are Cliff Gallant of KBW, Jay Gelb of Barclays Capital and Gary Ransom of Dowling and Partners. These analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience.
今年我们新增一个由三位追踪Berkshire的金融分析师组成的小组。他们是KBW的Cliff Gallant、Barclays Capital的Jay Gelb以及Dowling and Partners的Gary Ransom。这些分析师将带来他们各自围绕Berkshire的问题，并与记者及现场观众轮流提问。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our new panel will let analysts ask questions – perhaps even a few technical ones – in a manner that may be helpful to many shareholders.
Charlie和我相信，所有股东都应当同时获得Berkshire的新信息，并且应当有充足时间进行分析，这也是我们尽量在周五收盘后发布财务信息的原因。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一沟通。新的小组将允许分析师提问——甚至可能包括一些技术性问题——以一种有助于众多股东的方式进行。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 13 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
Charlie和我不会提前得到任何有关问题的线索。我们知道记者与分析师会抛出一些很难的问题，而我们也乐于此道。总体而言，我们预计至少会有54个问题，这将允许每位分析师与记者各提六个问题，观众提18个。如果还有时间，我们会从观众那里接更多的问题。观众提问者将通过抽签决定，抽签将于上午8:15在会场与主分会场布置的13个麦克风处进行。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分的理由，我经常称赞我们各业务单元经理的成就。他们真的是“全明星”，像经营自家唯一资产那样经营他们的业务。我相信，在大型上市公司中，很难再找到像他们这样以股东为导向的心态。多数人并非出于财务需要而工作；打出业务“本垒打”的喜悦对他们来说，与薪水同样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
同样重要的，是与我在总部共事的23位同事（都在同一层楼，我们打算一直保持这种状态！）。
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements and files a 17,839-page Federal income tax return – hello, Guinness! – as well as state and foreign returns. Additionally, they respond to countless shareholder and media inquiries, get out the annual report, prepare for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinate the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
这个团队高效地应对无数SEC及其他监管要求，递交了一份17,839页的联邦所得税申报——你好啊，吉尼斯！——并同时处理州与海外的申报。另外，他们还回应无数股东与媒体咨询、制作年报、筹备全美规模最大的年度股东大会、协调董事会事务——等等等等。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.
他们愉快而高效地完成了所有这些工作，让我的生活轻松而愉悦。他们的努力不仅限于与Berkshire直接相关的活动：他们还对接48所大学（自200家申请者中选出），这些学校将在本学年派学生来Omaha与我共度一天；他们也处理我收到的各种请求、安排我的差旅，甚至帮我准备午餐汉堡。没有哪位CEO能比我更幸福。
This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and tell them so.
这个总部团队与我们的一线经营经理一道，值得我最深的感谢，也同样值得你们的感谢。5月5日来Omaha——资本主义的摇篮——亲口对他们说一声吧。
February 25, 2012
Warren E. Buffett
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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