2014-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2013 was $34.2 billion. That gain was after our deducting $1.8 billion of charges – meaningless economically, as I will explain later – that arose from our purchase of the minority interests in Marmon and Iscar. After those charges, the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 18.2%. Over the last 49 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $134,973, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*
2013年，Berkshire的净资产增加了342亿美元。该增幅是在扣除了18亿美元的费用之后得出的——从经济实质看这些费用并无意义，稍后我会解释——这些费用源于我们收购Marmon和Iscar少数股权所产生的会计处理。扣除这些费用后，我们Class A和Class B股票的每股账面价值均增长了18.2%。在过去49年（也就是自现任管理层接手以来），每股账面价值已从19美元增长至134,973美元，年复合增速为19.7%＊。
All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
本报告中的每股数据均适用于Berkshire的A类股。B类股的数据为A类股的1/1500。
On the facing page, we show our long-standing performance measurement: The yearly change in Berkshire’s per-share book value versus the market performance of the S&P 500. What counts, of course, is pershare intrinsic value. But that’s a subjective figure, and book value is useful as a rough tracking indicator. (An extended discussion of intrinsic value is included in our Owner-Related Business Principles on pages 103 - 108. Those principles have been included in our reports for 30 years, and we urge new and prospective shareholders to read them.)
在对页，我们展示了长期沿用的绩效衡量指标：Berkshire每股账面价值的年度变动，与S&P 500的市场表现对照。当然，真正重要的是每股内在价值。但内在价值是主观估计，而账面价值可作为一个粗略的跟踪指标。（关于内在价值的详细讨论见第103—108页的“Owner-Related Business Principles”。这些原则已纳入我们的报告达30年之久，我们敦促新老股东阅读。）
As I’ve long told you, Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That’s why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount. We did not purchase shares during 2013, however, because the stock price did not descend to the 120% level. If it does, we will be aggressive.
正如我长期所说，Berkshire的内在价值远高于其账面价值。此外，近年来二者之间的差距显著扩大。这就是我们在2012年授权按账面价值的120%回购股票之决定合乎情理的原因。在该水平进行回购有利于继续持有的股东，因为每股内在价值明显高于账面价值的这一百分比。然而，2013年我们并未回购，因为股价未曾回落到120%的水平。一旦达到，我们会积极出手。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I believe both Berkshire’s book value and intrinsic value will outperform the S&P in years when the market is down or moderately up. We expect to fall short, though, in years when the market is strong – as we did in 2013. We have underperformed in ten of our 49 years, with all but one of our shortfalls occurring when the S&P gain exceeded 15%.
Berkshire的副董事长、我的合伙人Charlie Munger与我相信，在市场下跌或温和上涨的年份，Berkshire的账面价值和内在价值都会跑赢S&P。但在市场强势的年份——如2013年——我们预计会落后。在我们49年的历史中，有10年表现不及大盘，其中除一年外，其余落后均发生在S&P涨幅超过15%的年份。
Over the stock market cycle between yearends 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.
在从2007年年末到2013年年末的这一轮股市周期中，我们跑赢了S&P。在未来完整的周期里，我们预计会再次做到这一点。若做不到，我们就不配拿薪酬。毕竟，你完全可以持有指数基金，从而确保获得S&P的回报。
The Year at Berkshire
Berkshire这一年
On the operating front, just about everything turned out well for us last year – in certain cases very well. Let me count the ways:
在经营层面，去年对我们几乎事事顺利——有些方面甚至非常出色。让我逐项说明：
+ We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.
我们完成了两笔大型收购，耗资近180亿美元，全资收购NV Energy，并取得H. J. Heinz的重要股权。这两家公司与我们高度契合，百年之后仍将兴旺。
With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates – Bernardo Hees, Heinz’s new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman – are responsible for operations.
更重要的是，通过这笔Heinz收购，我们建立了一套可供Berkshire在未来大型收购中沿用的合作模板。在该交易中，我们与3G Capital的投资者携手，这家公司由我的朋友Jorge Paulo Lemann领导。他才华出众的同事——Heinz新任CEO Bernardo Hees与董事长Alex Behring——负责具体运营。
Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred’s annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.
Berkshire是融资伙伴。在这一角色下，我们购买了80亿美元的Heinz优先股，票面利率为9%，并附带其他条款，预计可将该优先股的年回报提高至约12%。此外，Berkshire与3G各以42.5亿美元购买了Heinz普通股的一半。
Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).
尽管此次Heinz收购与“私募股权”交易有些相似，但有一个关键区别：Berkshire无意卖出公司任何一股。相反，我们希望增持，而这可能发生：某些3G投资者未来或将部分或全部售股，届时我们可能提高持股比例。Berkshire与3G也可能在某个时点认为，将部分优先股按当时合理的权益估值交换为普通股对双方都有利。
Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.
我们的合伙体在6月取得Heinz控制权，迄今运营结果令人鼓舞。不过，本年Berkshire报告中仅反映了来自Heinz的少量利润：收购及随后的业务重组产生的一次性费用合计13亿美元。2014年的利润将会可观。
With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 81⁄2 companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 4911⁄2 to go.
随着Heinz的加入，Berkshire目前拥有8 1⁄2家（若为独立公司即足以进入Fortune 500）的企业。只剩491 1⁄2家了。
NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada’s population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican’s last major acquisition.
NV Energy由我们的公用事业子公司MidAmerican Energy以56亿美元收购，为Nevada约88%的人口供电。该收购与我们现有电力公用事业业务高度契合，并为在可再生能源领域进行大额投资提供了诸多可能。NV Energy不会是MidAmerican的最后一笔重大收购。
+ MidAmerican is one of our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of large non-insurance businesses that, in aggregate, had a record $10.8 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2013, up $758 million from 2012. The other companies in this sainted group are BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol and Marmon.
MidAmerican是我们的“Powerhouse Five”之一——一组大型非保险业务，2013年合计创下108亿美元的税前利润新高，较2012年增加7.58亿美元。这支“神圣小组”的其他成员为BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol和Marmon。
Of the five, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire nine years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and, for the remainder, issued shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $10.4 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the nine-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
在这五家公司中，九年前Berkshire仅持有MidAmerican，当时其税前利润为3.93亿美元。随后我们以全现金方式又收购了其中三家。至于第五家BNSF，我们约70%的对价以现金支付，其余部分通过增发股票完成，使流通股数增加了6.1%。换言之，在过去九年里，这五家公司为Berkshire带来的年利润增量达104亿美元，而相伴的摊薄幅度很小。这符合我们“不是单纯做大，而是提升每股成果”的目标。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2014, we can expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve also – perhaps by $1 billion or so pre-tax.
若2014年美国经济继续改善，我们的Powerhouse Five盈利也有望提升——税前或许增加约10亿美元。
+ Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $4.7 billion pre-tax last year, up from $3.9 billion in 2012. Here, too, we expect further gains in 2014.
我们几十家规模较小的非保险业务去年实现税前利润47亿美元，高于2012年的39亿美元。在这一板块，我们同样预计2014年将进一步增长。
+ Berkshire’s extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 – that makes 11 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
Berkshire庞大的保险业务在2013年再次实现了承保盈利——这已经是连续第11年——并扩大了浮存金。在这11年间，我们的浮存金——这笔不属于我们却能为Berkshire利益进行投资的资金——已从410亿美元增长至770亿美元。同期我们的承保利润累计达220亿美元（税前），其中2013年实现30亿美元。而这一切可追溯至1967年：我们以860万美元收购了National Indemnity。
We now own a wide variety of exceptional insurance operations. Best known is GEICO, the car insurer Berkshire acquired in full at yearend 1995 (having for many years prior owned a partial interest). GEICO in 1996 ranked number seven among U.S. auto insurers. Now, GEICO is number two, having recently passed Allstate. The reasons for this amazing growth are simple: low prices and reliable service. You can do yourself a favor by calling 1-800-847-7536 or checking Geico.com to see if you, too, can cut your insurance costs. Buy some of Berkshire’s other products with the savings.
我们如今拥有多样且卓越的保险业务。其中最知名的是GEICO，这家汽车保险公司在1995年年末被Berkshire全资收购（此前多年我们持有其部分股权）。1996年，GEICO在美国汽车保险公司中排名第七。如今，GEICO已升至第二，最近刚超过Allstate。其惊人增长的原因很简单：价格低、服务可靠。你不妨拨打1-800-847-7536或访问Geico.com，看看自己是否也能降低保险成本。把省下来的钱用来购买Berkshire的其他产品吧。
+ While Charlie and I search for elephants, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year, we contracted for 25 of these, scheduled to cost $3.1 billion in aggregate. These transactions ranged from $1.9 million to $1.1 billion in size.
当Charlie和我仍在寻找“巨象”（大型并购）时，我们的众多子公司也在常态化地进行补强式并购（bolt-on）。去年，我们签订了25笔此类交易，计划总成本31亿美元，单笔规模从190万美元到11亿美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage these deals. They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. The result is no more work for us and more earnings for you. Many more of these bolt-on deals will be made in future years. In aggregate, they will be meaningful.
Charlie和我鼓励这类交易。它们把资本投入与我们现有业务高度契合的活动，并由我们经验老到的经理人团队管理。结果是对我们不增负担，对你们（股东）增收益。未来几年还会有更多此类补强交易。合计起来，它们将十分可观。
+ Last year we invested $3.5 billion in the surest sort of bolt-on: the purchase of additional shares in two wonderful businesses that we already controlled. In one case – Marmon – our purchases brought us to the 100% ownership we had signed up for in 2008. In the other instance – Iscar – the Wertheimer family elected to exercise a put option it held, selling us the 20% of the business it retained when we bought control in 2006.
去年，我们在最可靠的一类补强上投入了35亿美元：在两家我们已控股的优秀企业中增持股份。其中一例——Marmon——我们的增持使我们达到2008年协议中的100%持股。另一例——Iscar——Wertheimer家族选择行使其持有的出售期权，将其在我们2006年取得控制权时保留的20%股权卖给了我们。
These purchases added about $300 million pre-tax to our current earning power and also delivered us $800 million of cash. Meanwhile, the same nonsensical accounting rule that I described in last year’s letter required that we enter these purchases on our books at $1.8 billion less than we paid, a process that reduced Berkshire’s book value. (The charge was made to “capital in excess of par value”; figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion.
这些增持使我们的当期盈利能力（税前）增加了约3亿美元，同时还带来了8亿美元现金。与此同时，正如我在去年信中所述的那条荒诞的会计规则，要求我们以比实际支付金额低18亿美元的数额入账，从而降低了Berkshire的账面价值。（该项冲减记入“capital in excess of par value”；你细品一下。）你应当明白，这种古怪的会计处理会立刻把Berkshire内在价值相对账面价值的超额同幅度地增加18亿美元。
+ Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America.
2013年，我们的各子公司在厂房与设备上的资本开支创下110亿美元纪录，约为折旧额的两倍。其中约89%花在美国。虽然我们也在海外投资，但机会的主矿脉在美国。
+ In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They’ve earned it.
在多数股票经理难以跑赢S&P 500的一年里，Todd Combs和Ted Weschler两人都轻松做到了。两人各自管理的投资组合现已超过70亿美元。他们当之无愧。
I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add “by a lot.”) If such humiliating comparisons continue, I’ll have no choice but to cease talking about them.
我必须再次承认，他们的投资业绩优于我。（Charlie说我应该补上一句：“而且高出不少。”）如果这种让人汗颜的比较继续下去，我只好不再谈他们了。
Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins.
Todd和Ted还在几项与投资组合无关的事务上为你们创造了可观价值。他们的贡献才刚刚开始：两人的血液里都流着Berkshire的血。
+ Berkshire’s yearend employment – counting Heinz – totaled a record 330,745, up 42,283 from last year. The increase, I must admit, included one person at our Omaha home office. (Don’t panic: The headquarters gang still fits comfortably on one floor.)
Berkshire年末雇员总数（计入Heinz）达到创纪录的330,745人，较上年增加42,283人。我得承认，这一增量包括我们奥马哈总部新增的一位同事。（别紧张：总部这帮人依然能舒舒服服地待在一层楼里。）
+ Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (increasing our ownership to 9.2% versus 8.7% at yearend 2012) and IBM (6.3% versus 6.0%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in CocaCola grew from 8.9% to 9.1% and our interest in American Express from 13.7% to 14.2%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our share of their equity raises Berkshire’s share of their annual earnings by $50 million.
去年，Berkshire在其“Big Four”投资——American Express、Coca-Cola、IBM和Wells Fargo——中的持股比例均有所提升。我们增持了Wells Fargo（持股由2012年年末的8.7%升至9.2%）和IBM（由6.0%升至6.3%）。与此同时，Coca-Cola和American Express的股票回购提高了我们的持股比例：我们在CocaCola的权益从8.9%升至9.1%，在American Express的权益从13.7%升至14.2%。如果你认为零点几个百分点无关紧要，不妨算笔账：这四家公司合计中，我们的持股每增加0.1个百分点，Berkshire按比例分享的其年度利润就增加5,000万美元。
The four companies possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business; it’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四家公司拥有卓越的业务，并由既有才能又以股东为导向的管理者经营。对Berkshire而言，我们远比起拥有一家平庸企业的100%股权，更偏好在一家优秀公司中持有非控股但可观的股份；拥有Hope diamond的一部分，胜过把整块人造水钻据为己有。
Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
按我们年末持仓计算，我们在“Big Four”2013年的应占利润为44亿美元。然而，在向你们报告的利润中，我们只计入实际收到的股息——去年约14亿美元。但请别误会：那未计入报表的30亿美元，对我们而言与Berkshire确认的那部分一样有价值。
The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances our share of future earnings – as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, our unrealized capital gains will, too. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.)
这四家公司保留的利润通常用于回购自家股票——这会提升我们未来利润的按股分摊份额——也用于资助通常颇为有利的业务机会。基于这些，我们预计这四家被投企业的每股收益会随时间显著增长。如果果真如此，Berkshire获得的股息将增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本利得也会随之增长。（截至年末，这四家的未实现收益已累计达390亿美元。）
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: “The advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.” Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash.
我们在资本配置上的灵活性——愿意在非控股业务上进行大额的被动投资——使我们相较于那些把自己限制在只能自己经营的收购上的公司具有显著优势。用Woody Allen的话来表达这一普遍道理就是：“双性恋的优势在于，这会让你在周六晚上约会的机会翻倍。” 同样地，我们对经营性业务和被动型投资都来者不拒，这让我们为源源不断的现金洪流找到合理用处的机会也翻了一番。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009年末，在“大衰退”的阴霾之中，我们同意收购BNSF——这笔交易是Berkshire历史上最大的一次。当时，我称其为“对美国经济未来的孤注一掷”。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
这类承诺对我们而言并不新鲜：自从1965年Buffett Partnership Ltd.取得Berkshire控制权以来，我们一直在下类似的注。也确有其理。Charlie和我始终认为，押注美国持续增长的繁荣几乎等同于“稳赢”。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America’s best days lie ahead.
事实上，在过去的237年里，谁靠做空美国而获益？把当今的美国与1776年的美国相比较，你会不禁揉揉眼睛感叹。而我们市场经济所蕴含的活力仍将持续创造奇迹。美国最好的日子仍在前方。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
在这股顺风助力下，Charlie和我希望通过以下方式提升Berkshire的每股内在价值：（1）持续提升众多子公司的基础盈利能力；（2）通过补强式并购进一步提高其盈利；（3）分享被投企业的增长；（4）当Berkshire股价相对内在价值出现有意义的折价时进行回购；（5）择机进行大型并购。我们也将尽量通过很少、甚至基本不发行Berkshire新股来为你们最大化结果。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire.
这些“积木”建立在坚如磐石的基础之上。一个世纪之后，BNSF与MidAmerican Energy仍将扮演经济中的重要角色。保险同样会继续对企业与个人至关重要——而在这一行业上，没有任何一家公司能像Berkshire那样集聚更强的人力与财力资源。
Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
此外，我们将永远保持极高的财务实力：持有至少200亿美元的现金等价物运营，且绝不背负有实质性的短期负债。基于这些以及其他优势，Charlie和我都看好你们这家公司的前景。能被托付管理它，我们感到幸运。
Intrinsic Business Value
内在商业价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109 - 110.
尽管Charlie和我频繁谈及内在商业价值，但我们无法精确给出Berkshire股票（事实上对任何股票亦然）的这个数值。然而，在我们2010年的年度报告中，我们阐述了三大要素——其中之一为定性因素——我们认为这是合理估算Berkshire内在价值的关键。该讨论在第109—110页完整转载。
定性因素：“用钱生钱”的能力，以骗钱为业的有一些，“用钱生钱”的找不到第二家。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9,116 per share.
以下是两项量化因素的更新：2013年，我们的每股投资资产增长13.6%至129,253美元；来自保险与投资之外业务的每股税前收益增长12.8%至9,116美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资资产以19.3%的年复合增速增长，而我们的收益指标则以20.6%的速度提升。Berkshire股价在这43年间的增长率与上述两项价值指标极为接近，并非巧合。Charlie和我希望两个维度都在增长，但我们将最着力于提升经营性收益。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
现在，让我们审视公司运营中的四大板块。它们各自的资产负债表与损益特征差异巨大。因此，我们将把它们视作四家独立的企业来呈现——这也是Charlie和我看待它们的方式（尽管把它们置于同一屋檐下有着重要且持久的优势）。我们的目标，是向你提供这样一套信息：若换作我们是缺席股东、你是汇报经理，我们也会希望得到的那种信息。（不过可别“多想”！）
Insurance
保险
“Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.” — 1967 Annual Report
“我们对保险公司的投资，体现了我们为实现更为多元化的盈利基础而迈出的第一个重要步伐。”——1967 Annual Report
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published.
先谈保险，这是Berkshire的核心业务，也是自那份1967年报告发表以来持续推动我们扩张的引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collectnow, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
财产—意外（“P/C”）保险公司先收保费、后付赔款。在极端情形下，例如某些工伤赔付，支付期可延续数十年。这种“先收、后付”的模式，使P/C公司手中长期持有巨额资金——我们称之为“float（浮存金）”——这些资金最终将归他人所有。与此同时，保险公司能够在此期间将浮存金用于自身利益的投资。尽管单个保单与赔案此起彼伏，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模通常会相对保费规模保持相当稳定。因此，随着我们的业务增长，浮存金也随之增长。我们的增长如何，见下表所示：
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.)
进一步增加float（浮存金）将会很难。从积极的一面看，GEICO的float几乎肯定会增长。然而，在National Indemnity的再保险部门，我们有若干处于run-off（仅结清存量）的合同，其float呈下滑趋势。即便未来某个时候我们的float出现下降，那也会非常渐进——上限是任一年降幅不超过3%。由于我们的保险合同的性质，我们永远不可能面临与现金资源相比数额巨大的即时支付要求。（在这一点上，财产—意外保险与某些类型的人寿保险存在重要差异。）
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过费用与最终赔付的总和，我们就会实现承保利润，而这会叠加在float带来的投资收益之上。当取得这样的利润时，我们相当于在使用免费的资金——更妙的是，还因为持有这笔资金而得到报酬。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry – despite the float income all companies enjoy – will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望达成这种美好结果，这反而导致竞争异常激烈，多数年份里激烈到使整个P/C行业处于显著的承保亏损状态。实质上，这种亏损就是行业为持有其float所支付的“费用”。例如，State Farm——迄今国内规模最大的保险公司且管理良好——在截至2012年的12年中有9年出现了承保亏损（写下这些文字时，这是其财务数据可得的最新年份）。竞争格局几乎可以保证，尽管各家公司都享有float收益，保险业整体相较其他行业仍将延续其低于正常水平的回报这一不佳记录。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
正如本报告第一部分所述，我们已连续11年实现承保盈利，该期间累计税前收益达220亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们在大多数年份仍将保持承保盈利。所有保险管理者每天都专注于此，因为他们明白，尽管float有价值，但糟糕的承保结果足以将其“淹没”。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims – some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
那么，我们的float如何影响内在价值？在计算Berkshire的账面价值时，我们将全部float作为负债予以扣减，仿佛我们必须在明天就把它全部付出去且无法补充一样。但将float严格视为负债是不正确的；它更应被看作一笔“周转基金”。每天，我们支付旧的赔案——2013年向超过500万名索赔人支付了约170亿美元——这会减少float。同样确定的是，我们每天也在签发新业务，从而产生新的赔案，增加float。若我们的这笔周转性的float既无成本又可长期持续——我相信会如此——那么该项负债的真实经济价值远低于其会计上的负债金额。
A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
与这一被高估的负债相对应的，是计入我们账面价值、归属于保险公司的155亿美元“goodwill”（商誉）资产。从很大程度上说，这一商誉代表着我们为保险业务产生float能力所支付的价格。不过，商誉的成本与其真实价值并无必然关系。举例而言，如果一项保险业务长期且大幅承保亏损，那么无论其最初成本如何，账面上所列示的任何商誉都应被视为一文不值。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，这并非Berkshire的写照。Charlie和我认为，我们保险商誉的真实经济价值——也就是我们愿意为获取与现有float质量相当的保险业务所付出的价格——远高于其历史账面价值。我们的float之价值，是我们之所以相信Berkshire的内在商业价值大幅超过其账面价值的一个原因——而且是一个极其重要的原因。
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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
Berkshire之所以拥有出色的保险经济性，唯因我们有一些出类拔萃的管理者在以严格的纪律运营，并且这些业务模式稳健、难以复制。下面我来介绍主要的业务单元。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some megacatastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
按float规模居首的是Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group，由Ajit Jain管理。Ajit承保那些其他人既无意愿也无资本承担的风险。他的业务在产能、速度、决断力，尤其是脑力方面的组合，在保险业独树一帜。然而，他从不让Berkshire暴露于与我们资源不相称的风险之中。事实上，在规避风险方面，我们远比大多数大型保险公司更为保守。举例说，如果保险业遭遇某次特大灾害造成2,500亿美元损失——约为其以往任何损失的三倍——Berkshire整体上仍很可能因多元的收益来源而在该年度录得可观利润。而且我们仍将现金充沛，若灾害引发市场震荡，我们会寻找大型机会。与此同时，其他所有主要保险与再保险公司则会深陷亏损，其中一些甚至面临资不抵债。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit’s mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.
自1985年从零起步以来，Ajit打造出一家拥有370亿美元float并累积了巨大承保利润的保险业务，此等成就迄今无其他保险CEO能望其项背。Ajit的大脑是座“创意工厂”，总在寻找可以纳入现有组合的新增业务线。
One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully.
去年6月，他创立了Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance（“BHSI”）。这一举措使我们进入商业保险领域，我们也立即获得全美主要保险经纪人和企业风险管理者的认可。这些专业人士认识到，没有任何保险公司的财务实力能与Berkshire匹敌，而这确保了即便多年后发生的合法索赔也能得到及时、足额的赔付。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.
BHSI由Peter Eastwood领导，他是一位在保险界广受尊敬的资深核保人。Peter已经组建了一支出色的团队，正与众多Fortune 500公司及较小企业承保大量业务。BHSI将成为Berkshire的一项重要资产，数年内其业务规模将达到数十亿美元。若你在年度股东大会上见到Peter，记得向他致以Berkshire式的问候。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们在General Re还有另一家再保险劲旅，由Tad Montross管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
归根结底，健全的保险经营需要遵循四条纪律：（1）理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险暴露；（2）以保守方式评估任何风险暴露实际导致损失的可能性，以及一旦发生时的可能成本；（3）设定一项平均而言在覆盖预期损失成本与运营费用之后仍能带来利润的保费；（4）若无法获得恰当的保费，必须愿意转身离场。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司通过前三项考验，却在第四项上不及格。他们就是无法对竞争对手热情承保的业务说“不”。那句老话——“别人在做，所以我们也得做”——在任何行业都是祸因，在保险业尤甚。
没有自己的脑子是一个确定性的风险，再好的运气也挡不住确定性的风险。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵循了这四条“戒律”，其业绩已然说明一切。在他的领导下，General Re庞大的float不仅无成本，甚至优于“零成本”，而我们预计平均而言这种状况将持续。我们对General Re的国际寿险再保险业务尤为看好，自1998年我们收购该公司以来，该业务持续、盈利地增长。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
值得回忆的是，在我们收购General Re后不久，公司曾遭遇一系列问题，以至于评论者——包括我本人，也有过短暂动摇——认为我犯了一个大错。那一天早已远去。General Re如今是一颗瑰宝。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.
最后，是GEICO——63年前我在这家保险公司开启了自己的磨砺之路。GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，他18岁加入公司，并于2013年完成了52年服务。Tony在1993年出任CEO，自那以后公司一路腾飞。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.
我在1951年1月首次接触GEICO时，立刻被其相较于行业巨头所具有的巨大成本优势所震撼。这种运营效率延续至今，并且是一项至关重要的资产。没有人喜欢购买车险，但几乎每个人都喜欢开车。对大多数家庭而言，所需的保险是一项重要开支。节省对他们很重要——而只有低成本的运营才能实现这一点。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling.
GEICO的成本优势，是其年复一年吞食市场份额的关键。低成本构筑了一道护城河——而且是持久的——竞争者无法逾越。与此同时，我们那只小gecko仍在向美国人宣讲GEICO如何帮他们节省真金白银。随着我们最新一轮运营成本的降低，这个故事更具说服力了。
In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn’t already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That’s “goodwill,” and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO’s business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.
1995年，我们买下了当时尚未持有的GEICO另一半股权，较所获净有形资产多支付了14亿美元。那就是“goodwill”（商誉），在我们的账簿上其金额将永远保持不变。然而，随着GEICO业务增长，其真实的经济性商誉也在同步增长。我认为这一数值正在接近200亿美元。
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除三大保险业务外，我们还拥有一组规模较小的公司，其中大多数活跃于保险业的细分角落。总体上，这些公司是一项不断增长的业务，并且持续带来承保利润。此外，正如下表所示，它们也为我们提供了可观的float。Charlie和我珍视这些公司及其管理团队。
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Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.
简而言之，保险是在出售承诺。“客户”现在支付金钱；若未来发生特定事件，保险公司承诺支付金钱。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay – even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives – is all-important.
有时，这一承诺数十年都不会受到检验。（想想二十多岁的人购买的寿险。）因此，保险公司的“支付能力与支付意愿”至关重要——即便在需要理赔时外部经济一片混乱也必须兑现。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world’s largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally longlived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however – one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor – would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.
Berkshire的承诺无可匹敌，这一点在近年间已被全球最大、最成熟的保险公司的行动所证明：其中一些希望摆脱巨额且超长期的负债，尤其是与石棉索赔相关的负债。也就是说，这些保险公司希望把负债“分出”（cede）给再保险公司。然而，若选择了错误的再保险方——未来被证明财务吃紧或行为不端——原保险公司就有可能把这些负债“兜回”到自己身上。
Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd’s in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.)
几乎无一例外，寻求援助的最大型保险公司都找到了Berkshire。事实上，在有记录以来规模最大的此类交易中，Lloyd’s于2007年将大量源于1993年前签发保单的已知索赔，以及同一时期必将于未来显现的数量庞大但当时未知的索赔，一并移交给我们。（没错，几十年后我们仍会收到与1993年前事件相关的索赔。）
Berkshire’s ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd’s transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer’s promise would have given Lloyd’s the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd’s claims said it best: “Names [the original insurers at Lloyd’s] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
就Lloyd’s这笔交易而言，Berkshire最终需要支付的金额如今仍不可知。然而可以确定的是，Berkshire将按我们的保单条款，支付所有有效索赔，直至150亿美元的限额。没有任何其他保险公司的承诺能像与Berkshire达成协议那样让Lloyd’s感到安心。彼时负责处理Lloyd’s索赔的实体的CEO对此评价最到位：“Names（Lloyd’s的原始承保人）希望夜里能安枕无忧，而我们认为，我们刚刚为他们买到了全世界最好的床垫。”
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Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
Berkshire卓越的管理者、一流的财务实力，以及多种拥有宽广护城河的业务模式，共同构成了保险业的独特存在。这种组合对Berkshire股东而言是一项巨大的资产，且会随着时间推移愈加珍贵。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受监管且资本密集型的业务
“Though there are many regulatory restraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.” — 1999 Annual Report
“尽管公用事业行业监管束缚众多，我们仍可能在这一领域继续加大投入。若真如此，涉及的金额可能会很大。”——1999 Annual Report
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我们有两项重要业务——BNSF与MidAmerican Energy——它们具有区别于我们其他业务的共同关键特征。因此，在这封信里我们单列一节介绍它们，并在GAAP资产负债表与损益表中将其合并财务数据单独列示。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
两家公司的一个关键特征，是它们在超长期、受监管资产上的巨额投资，其中部分以大量长期债务融资，且这些债务并无Berkshire担保。事实上并不需要我们的信用背书，因为每家公司即便在极差的经济环境下，其盈利能力也远超利息需求。举例而言，去年BNSF的利息保障倍数为9:1。（我们对“保障倍数”的定义是“税前利润/利息”，而非常用但我们认为严重有缺陷的“EBITDA/利息”。）
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies exclusively offering an essential service. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Now, with the acquisition of NV Energy, MidAmerican’s earnings base has further broadened. This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire’s ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.
与此同时，MidAmerican在任何情况下都能偿付债务，得益于两点。其一，是所有公用事业公司的共性：源于提供“必需性服务”而具备的抗衰退收益；其二，是少数公用事业公司才具备的优势：高度多元的收益来源，使我们免受任何单一监管机构的严重冲击。如今，随着收购NV Energy，MidAmerican的收益基础进一步拓宽。此项特质，加之Berkshire的股东背景，使MidAmerican及其公用事业子公司能够显著降低债务成本。这一优势惠及我们与我们的客户。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我们的两家子公司都以重要方式为美国经济“供能”：
+ BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system. Its hold on the number-one position strengthened in 2013.
BNSF承运约15%的城际货运（以吨英里计），无论这些货物最终通过卡车、铁路、水运、航空或管道运输。实际上，我们运送的吨英里数高于任何其他主体，这一事实确立了BNSF作为我国经济循环体系中“最重要动脉”的地位。其第一的位置在2013年进一步巩固。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
与所有铁路一样，BNSF在燃油效率和环境友好性方面极其出色：每加仑柴油可将一吨货物运送约500英里。执行同等任务的卡车大约要消耗四倍的燃油。
+ MidAmerican’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: From a standing start nine years ago, MidAmerican now accounts for 7% of the country’s wind generation capacity, with more on the way. Our share in solar – most of which is still in construction – is even larger.
MidAmerican的公用事业业务为十一州的受监管零售客户提供服务。没有任何公用事业公司的覆盖更广。此外，我们在可再生能源领域居领先地位：自九年前从零起步，MidAmerican如今占全国风电装机容量的7%，且仍在增长中。我们在太阳能领域的占比——其中大多仍在建设——更高。
MidAmerican can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. Here’s a little known fact: Last year MidAmerican retained more dollars of earnings – by far – than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this as an important advantage – one almost certain to exist five, ten and twenty years from now.
MidAmerican之所以能进行这些投资，是因为它保留了全部利润。这里有个鲜为人知的事实：去年，MidAmerican保留的利润金额——遥遥领先——超过任何一家美国电力公用事业公司。我们与监管者都将此视为重要优势——几乎可以肯定在未来五年、十年乃至二十年仍将存在。
When our current projects are completed, MidAmerican’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns. And, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
当我们当前项目完工时，MidAmerican的可再生能源资产组合将耗资150亿美元。只要能带来合理回报，我们乐于作出这样的承诺。而在这方面，我们对未来的监管抱有高度信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is meanwhile in our selfinterest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心来自既往经验，也源于这样一种认知：社会永远需要在交通与能源领域进行大规模投资。政府出于自身利益，应以能确保资金持续流向关键项目的方式对待资本提供者；同样地，从我们的自身利益出发，我们必须以赢得监管者及其所代表公众认可的方式开展运营。
Tangible proof of our dedication to that duty was delivered last year in a poll of customer satisfaction covering 52 holding companies and their 101 operating electric utilities. Our MidAmerican group ranked number one, with 95.3% of respondents giving us a “very satisfied” vote and not a single customer rating us “dissatisfied.” The bottom score in the survey, incidentally, was a dismal 34.5%.
去年，一项涵盖52家控股公司及其101家运营中的电力公用事业的客户满意度调查，为我们履职所作的努力提供了有形证据。我们的MidAmerican集团名列第一，95.3%的受访者给出“非常满意”的评价，且没有一位客户评为“不满意”。顺带一提，该调查的最低分仅为惨淡的34.5%。
All three of our companies were ranked far lower by this measure before they were acquired by MidAmerican. The extraordinary customer satisfaction we have achieved is of great importance as we expand: Regulators in states we hope to enter are glad to see us, knowing we will be responsible operators.
在被MidAmerican收购之前，我们的三家公司在这一指标上的排名都低得多。我们取得的卓越客户满意度对我们的扩张意义重大：我们希望进入的各州的监管者乐于见到我们，因为他们知道我们会成为负责任的运营方。
Our railroad has been diligent as well in anticipating the needs of its customers. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting: BNSF spent $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, double its depreciation charge and a single-year record for any railroad. And, we will spend considerably more in 2014. Like Noah, who foresaw early on the need for dependable transportation, we know it’s our job to plan ahead.
我们的铁路同样在前瞻客户需求方面尽职尽责。无论你听到多少有关本国基础设施日渐崩坏的说法，都不适用于BNSF或整个铁路行业。美国的铁路系统从未像今天这样状况良好，这是行业巨额投资的结果。当然，我们并未止步：BNSF在2013年用于铁路的资本开支为40亿美元，是其折旧额的两倍，且创下任何铁路公司的年度纪录。2014年我们还将大幅增加投入。正如Noah及早洞见到可靠交通之必要，我们深知未雨绸缪是我们的职责。
Leading our two capital-intensive companies are Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, and the team of Matt Rose and Carl Ice at BNSF. The three are extraordinary managers who have my gratitude and deserve yours as well. Here are the key figures for their businesses:
领导我们两家资本密集型公司的，是MidAmerican的Greg Abel，以及BNSF的Matt Rose与Carl Ice团队。这三位都是非凡的管理者，我对此深表感激，你们也应当如此。以下是他们业务的关键数据：
Ron Peltier continues to build HomeServices, MidAmerican’s real estate brokerage subsidiary. Last year his operation made four acquisitions, the most significant being Fox & Roach, a Philadelphia-based company that is the largest single-market realtor in the country.
Ron Peltier 继续壮大 MidAmerican 的房地产经纪子公司 HomeServices。去年，他的团队完成了四起收购，其中最重要的是位于 Philadelphia 的 Fox & Roach，这是一家全美单一市场中规模最大的房地产经纪商。
HomeServices now has 22,114 agents (listed by geography on page 112), up 38% from 2012. HomeServices also owns 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which are in the process of rebranding their franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices. If you haven’t yet, many of you will soon be seeing our name on “for sale” signs.
HomeServices 目前拥有 22,114 名经纪人（按地域列于第 112 页），较 2012 年增长 38%。HomeServices 还持有 Prudential 与 Real Living 特许经营业务的 67% 股权，这两项业务正将其加盟商重塑为 Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices 品牌。即便你现在还没看到，许多人很快会在“for sale”标牌上看到我们的名字。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
制造、服务与零售业务
“See that store,” Warren says, pointing at Nebraska Furniture Mart. “That’s a really good business.” “Why don’t you buy it?” I said.
“看到那家店了吗？”Warren 指着 Nebraska Furniture Mart 说，“那是个非常好的生意。” 我说：“你为什么不把它买下来？”
“It’s privately held,” Warren said.
Warren 说：“它是私人持有的。”
“Oh,” I said.
我说：“哦。”
“I might buy it anyway,” Warren said. “Someday.”
Warren 说：“我也许还是会买下它。”“总有一天。”
— Supermoney by Adam Smith (1972)
——摘自 Supermoney，Adam Smith（1972）
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
Berkshire 在这一板块的活动范围极广。接下来，让我们先看整个集团的资产负债表摘要与利润表摘要。
Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们的收入与费用数据按照 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles（“GAAP”，一般公认会计原则）编制，见第29页。相较之下，上文的经营费用为非GAAP口径，且不包含某些购买法会计项目（主要是某些无形资产的摊销）。我们以这种方式呈现数据，因为Charlie和我认为，相比GAAP数字，这些经调整的数据更能准确反映表内汇总业务的真实经济成本与利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不会逐一解释所有调整——有些既细微又晦涩——但严肃的投资者应理解无形资产性质的差异：有些确会随时间消耗，另一些则并不丧失价值。以软件为例，摊销费用确属真实支出。然而，对其他无形资产（如客户关系）的摊销，源自购买法会计规则，显然并非真实成本。GAAP并不区分这两类费用。换言之，在计算利润时二者均计入费用——尽管从投资者视角看，它们大相径庭。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在第29页所示的GAAP口径数据中，本节所含公司计提的摊销费用为6.48亿美元，作为费用扣减。我们认为其中约20%是“真实”的，其余则不是。由于我们进行了大量并购，这一差异已变得显著；随着我们继续收购更多公司，它几乎肯定还会扩大。
Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and – alas – it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.
当然，等相关资产摊销完毕，这些“非真实”的费用终会消失。但这通常需要15年——可惜——届时在报表利润上获益的将是我的继任者。
Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.
然而，我们报告的每一分钱折旧都是实打实的成本。几乎所有其他公司亦然。当华尔街人士把EBITDA当作估值指引到处兜售时，请捂紧你的钱包。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
当然，我们对外披露的利润仍将遵循GAAP。不过，为贴近现实，请记得把我们报告的大部分摊销加回来。
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The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.
本节这一大群公司所售产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机无所不包。其中一些业务（按未加杠杆净有形资产的收益衡量）具备极佳的经济性，税后回报率从25%到远超100%不等。另一些产生12%到20%的良好回报。还有少数回报很差，这是我在资本配置工作中所犯一些严重错误所致。我并非受人误导：只是对公司或其所处行业的经济机理判断失误。
Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
幸运的是，我的失误通常涉及相对较小的收购。我们的大额并购总体表现良好，少数案例更是出类拔萃。然而，在购买企业或股票上，我犯错尚未“封笔”。并非所有事情都会如计划般发展。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.
作为一个整体，这组公司是一桩极好的生意。2013年它们平均动用了250亿美元净有形资产，在大量超额现金、低杠杆的前提下，实现了16.7%的税后资本回报。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
当然，哪怕经济性出色，若买价过高也会成为糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务相对净有形资产支付了相当可观的溢价，这在我们账上的商誉大数中有所体现。总体而言，我们在该板块投入的资本获得了不错的回报。此外，这些业务的总体内在价值明显高于其账面价值。尽管如此，保险与受监管行业板块中内在价值与账面价值之间的差额要大得多。真正的大赢家在那些板块里。
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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, both current and potential competitors read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if they knew our numbers. So, in some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 80-84.
本组公司太多，无法逐一点评。此外，现有与潜在竞争者都会读这份报告；在我们个别业务上，若他们知晓我们的具体数据，可能令我们处于不利。因此，对那些规模不足以影响对Berkshire整体评估的业务，我们仅披露监管所要求的信息。不过，你仍可在第80—84页找到许多业务的详细情况。
I can’t resist, however, giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart’s expansion into Texas. I’m not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire – it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire’s $225 billion equity base. But I’ve now worked 30 years with the marvelous Blumkin family, and I’m excited about the remarkable store – truly Texas-sized – it is building at The Colony, in the northern part of the Dallas metropolitan area.
不过，我还是忍不住向你更新一下Nebraska Furniture Mart进军Texas的进展。我提及此事并非因为其对Berkshire具有重要经济意义——新增一家店，不足以“拨动”Berkshire 2,250 亿美元的股本基数。但我已与出色的Blumkin家族合作30年，我对他们正在Dallas都会区北部The Colony建设的那家非凡门店（真正的“德州尺寸”）感到兴奋。
When the store is completed next year, NFM will have – under one roof, and on a 433-acre site – 1.8 million square feet of retail and supporting warehouse space. View the project’s progress at www.nfm.com/texas. NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (in Omaha and Kansas City, Kansas), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away. If you live anywhere near Dallas, come check us out.
当该店于明年完工时，NFM将在同一屋檐下、占地433英亩的园区中，拥有180万平方英尺的零售及配套仓储空间。项目进展可见 www.nfm.com/texas。NFM已拥有全美销量最高的两家家居商店（位于Omaha与Kansas City, Kansas），各自年销售额约4.5亿美元。我预测Texas这家店将轻松刷新这些纪录。若你住在Dallas附近，欢迎前来看看。
I think back to August 30, 1983 – my birthday – when I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 1 1⁄4-page purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. (It’s reproduced on pages 114 - 115.) Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company’s financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was what, and her word was good enough for me.
我回想起1983年8月30日——我的生日——我带着自己起草的一份NFM收购提案（长一又四分之一页）去见Mrs. B（Rose Blumkin）。（该提案重印于第114 - 115页。）Mrs. B一字未改地接受了我的报价，我们在没有投行业者或律师参与的情况下完成了交易（这种体验只能用“如登天堂”来形容）。尽管公司的财务报表未经审计，我却毫不担心。Mrs. B直截了当地告诉我情况，而她的一言九鼎对我而言已足够。
Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 – definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM’s financial statements from 1946 on pages 116 - 117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 – no zeros omitted – of cash the company then possessed, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son, Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.
当时Mrs. B已89岁，并一直工作到103岁——绝对是我欣赏的那种人。翻到第116 - 117页看看NFM自1946年以来的财务报表。NFM如今拥有的一切，源自：（a）当年公司账上的72,264美元净值与50美元现金——一个零都没少；以及（b）Mrs. B、她的儿子Louie，以及他两位儿子Ron与Irv的非凡才能。
The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At Mrs. B’s request, the family always sang God Bless America at its gatherings.
这段故事的包袱在于：Mrs. B从未在学校待过一天。此外，她从Russia移民到美国时一句英语也不会。但她热爱她的第二故乡：应Mrs. B的请求，这个家族在聚会时总会合唱God Bless America。
Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B’s incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B’s lessons, they need none from me.
立志从商的管理者应认真体察那些朴素却稀有的品质——正是它们成就了Mrs. B的非凡成功。每年有来自40所大学的学生来访，我让他们一天行程从参观NFM开始。若他们吸收了Mrs. B的“课程”，便不必再听我多言。
Finance and Financial Products
金融与金融产品
“Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.” — 2003 Annual Report
“Clayton的贷款资产组合在不久的将来很可能增长到至少50亿美元；在稳健信贷标准下，应能带来可观盈利。”—— 2003 Annual Report
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
这一板块（我们最小的板块）包括两家租赁公司XTRA（挂车）与CORT（家具），以及Clayton Homes——全美领先的成品住宅制造商与融资方。除这些100%owned子公司外，本类别还包括一组金融资产以及我们在Berkadia Commercial Mortgage的50%权益。
Clayton is placed in this section because it owns and services 326,569 mortgages, totaling $13.6 billion. In recent years, as manufactured home sales plummeted, a high percentage of Clayton’s earnings came from this mortgage business.
将Clayton归入本节，是因为它拥有并服务326,569笔按揭贷款，总额136亿美元。近年来，随着成品住宅销量暴跌，Clayton相当大比例的利润来自这项按揭业务。
信用卡+房产中介+按揭贷款。
In 2013, however, the sale of new homes began to pick up and earnings from both manufacturing and retailing are again becoming significant. Clayton remains America’s number one homebuilder: Its 2013 output of 29,547 homes accounted for about 4.7% of all single-family residences built in the country. Kevin Clayton, Clayton’s CEO, has done a magnificent job of guiding the company through the severe housing depression. Now, his job – definitely more fun these days – includes the prospect of another earnings gain in 2014.
然而在2013年，新房销售开始回升，制造与零售两端的利润再次变得重要。Clayton仍是美国第一大住宅建造商：2013年其产量29,547套，占全美新建独栋住宅约4.7%。Clayton的CEO Kevin Clayton在引领公司跨越严峻住房萧条方面功不可没。如今，他的工作——确实更有趣了——包括在2014年再度实现盈利增长的前景。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. And Jeff Pederson and Bill Franz will keep them on top. We are backing their plans through purchases of equipment that enlarge their rental potential.
CORT与XTRA在各自行业亦属领先。Jeff Pederson与Bill Franz将继续保持其领先地位。我们正通过采购设备以扩大其租赁能力来支持他们的计划。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
以下为该板块的税前利润概览：
Investments
投资
“Our stock portfolio . . . was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value [cost] . . . it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost.”
— 1974 Annual Report
“我们的股票组合……的市值大约比其账面价值[成本]低约 1700 万美元……我们相信，经过数年时间，整体组合将被证明其价值会高于成本。”
— 1974 Annual Report
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
以下列出本公司年末市值最大的十五项普通股投资。
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules.
*这既是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的税基；在少数情况下，GAAP 下的“成本”因其规则要求的增值或减值而有所不同。
**Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.
**不包括由 Berkshire 子公司养老金计划持有的股份。
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.
Berkshire 还有一项未计入该表的重大股权头寸：我们可在 2021 年 9 月之前的任何时候，以 50 亿美元购买 700 百万股 Bank of America。年末这些股份价值 109 亿美元。我们很可能会在期权到期前夕完成购买。在此期间，你需要认识到，Bank of America 实际上已是我们的第五大股权投资，而且我们高度重视这笔投资。
In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we’ve done well in these. But not always.
除股权持仓外，我们也在债券上投入大量资金。通常我们做得不错，但并非总是如此。
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn’t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.
大多数人从未听说过 Energy Future Holdings。你们算走运；我真希望自己也没听说过。该公司于 2007 年成立，目的是对 Texas 的电力公用事业资产实施一宗巨型杠杆收购。股东投入 80 亿美元，同时又借入巨额债务。其中约 20 亿美元的债务由 Berkshire 买入——这是我未经 Charlie 商量所作出的决定。这是一个大错误。
Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I’ll call Charlie.
除非天然气价格飙升，否则 EFH 几乎肯定会在 2014 年申请破产。去年，我们以 2.59 亿美元卖出了持仓。在持有这些债券期间，我们收到了 8.37 亿美元的现金利息。总体而言，我们蒙受了 8.73 亿美元的税前损失。下次我会先给 Charlie 打电话。
A few of our subsidiaries – primarily electric and gas utilities – use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of mediumterm float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.
我们有少数子公司——主要是电力与天然气公用事业——在运营中使用衍生品。除此之外，我们已经多年未签订任何新的衍生品合约，而既有头寸也在持续自然到期。到期的合约带来了可观利润以及数十亿美元的中期浮存金。虽然无法保证，但我们预计账面剩余合约也将产生类似结果。
Some Thoughts About Investing
一些关于投资的思考
Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.
当投资最像经商时，它才是最明智的。
— The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
用 Ben Graham 的名言作为开场恰如其分，因为我在投资方面所知甚多皆承他所赐。稍后我会更多谈谈 Ben，更早我会谈到普通股。但让我先讲两笔我很久以前做过的小型“非股票”投资。它们对我的净资产影响不大，却颇具启示。
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
故事始于 Nebraska。1973 至 1981 年间，中西部农地价格暴涨，导火索是广泛流行的“即将失控通胀”的预期，以及小型乡村银行的放贷政策推波助澜。随后泡沫破裂，价格下跌 50% 甚至更多，重创了加杠杆的农场主及其贷款人。在泡沫后的收拾残局阶段，Iowa 和 Nebraska 倒闭的银行数量，是最近“大衰退”期间的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986 年，我从 FDIC 手中购得一块位于 Omaha 以北 50 英里的 400 英亩农场。购价 28 万美元，远低于几年前某家倒闭银行以该农场作抵押所发放的贷款。我对农业经营一窍不通。但我有个热爱务农的儿子，我从他那儿了解到农场能产多少蒲式耳的玉米与大豆，以及运营成本是多少。基于这些估算，我得出的“正常化回报率”约为 10%。我也认为，随着时间推移，生产率很可能会提升，作物价格也会走高。这两点期待都兑现了。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我无需任何非常识的知识或智力就能判断，这笔投资几乎没有下行风险，却有相当的上行潜力。固然，偶尔会有歉收之年，价格有时也会令人失望。但那又如何？也会有出奇地好的年份，而且我从不面临出售这处地产的压力。如今，28 年过去了，这块农场的收益已增长到三倍，市值至少是我当年买价的五倍。我仍对务农一无所知，最近才第二次去那块农场看看。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993 年，我又做了一笔小投资。Larry Silverstein——我担任 Salomon CEO 期间公司的房东——告诉我，Resolution Trust Corp. 正在出售一处紧邻 NYU 的 New York 零售物业。又一次，泡沫破裂——这回是商业地产——RTC 的职责是处置那些因过度乐观放贷而酿祸的倒闭储贷机构的资产。
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
同样，分析很简单。就像那块农场一样，该物业“未加杠杆的当期收益率”约为 10%。但该物业在 RTC 管理下长期“照看不周”，几处空置店面一旦出租，收入就会增加。更重要的是，最大的租户——占项目面积约 20%——所付租金约为每平方英尺 5 美元，而其他租户平均为 70 美元。九年后这份“低价租约”到期，必然会为收益带来大幅提振。该物业的位置也极佳：NYU 不会搬走的。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
我与一个小团队共同购买了这处不动产，成员包括 Larry 和我的朋友 Fred Rose。Fred 是一位经验丰富、水平很高的房地产投资人，由他与其家人负责管理这处资产。他们确实做到了。随着旧租约陆续到期，收益增长到原来的三倍。现在，年度分派已超过我们初始股本投资的 35%。此外，我们最初的按揭在 1996 年与 1999 年两次再融资，从而促成了若干次特别分派，合计超过我们投资额的 150%。至于我本人，至今还没去看过这处物业。
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
来自农场与 NYU 那处房地产的收入在未来几十年很可能都会提高。尽管增幅不会惊人，这两笔投资将在我有生之年乃至之后对我的子孙而言，都是稳健且令人满意的持有资产。
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我讲这些故事，是为了阐明一些投资的基本原则：
+ You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
你不必是专家也能获得令人满意的投资回报。但如果你不是专家，就必须认清自己的边界，并遵循一条大概率行之有效的路径。保持简单，不要一味追求一击致胜（全垒打）。当有人承诺“快速获利”时，请迅速回答“拒绝”。
+ Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
把注意力放在你所考量资产的“未来产出能力”上。如果你连其未来收益的粗略估算都没把握，那就忘了它，继续向前。没有人有能力评估所有投资机会。但你也不必无所不知；你只需理解自己所要采取的行动。
+ If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
如果你把关注点放在拟购资产的“未来价格变动”上，你就是在投机。投机并非不正当。然而我知道自己无法在投机上长期成功，对那些声称能持续成功投机的人我持怀疑态度。抛硬币的人里，一半会在第一次“赢”。但若继续玩下去，这些“赢家”没有任何可期的利润。某项资产最近涨过，从来不是买入的理由。
+ With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
在我的两项小投资中，我只考虑这些资产会产出什么，从不在意它们的每日估值。比赛是由专注于赛场的人赢得的——不是由只盯记分板的人赢得的。如果你能在周六、周日不看股价也过得很好，不妨在工作日也试试。
+ Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
自己构建宏观观点，或聆听他人的宏观/市场预测，都是浪费时间。实际上，这还很危险，因为它可能模糊你对真正重要事实的把握。（当我听到电视评论员轻描淡写地断言市场下一步怎么走时，我会想起 Mickey Mantle 那句犀利的话：“只有当你坐进播音室，才会觉得这场比赛有多容易。”）
+ My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
我那两笔买入发生在 1986 年与 1993 年。至于之后紧接着的几年——1987 年与 1994 年——经济、利率或股市会如何，与我做出这些投资并无关系。我也记不得当时的头条或名嘴们在说什么。无论噪音如何，Nebraska 的玉米还会继续生长，学生们还会涌向 NYU。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
我的这两项小投资与股票投资有一个重大差别：股票会为你的持仓提供分分秒秒的估值，而我的农场和那处 New York 房地产却从来没有“报价牌”。
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
对股票投资者而言，持仓每天被赋予大幅波动的报价本应是巨大优势——对一些投资者而言确实如此。毕竟，倘若我家农场旁边那位情绪多变的邻居每天都朝我喊价，或要买我的农场，或要把他的农场卖给我——而且这些价格会随着他短期的心情巨幅波动——我怎么可能不从他这种反复无常的行为中获益？如果他每日喊出的价格低得可笑，而我手头又有闲钱，我就买他的农场；如果他喊出的价格高得离谱，我要么卖给他，要么继续种我的地。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
然而，股票持有人却常常让其他持有人的反复无常、甚至非理性行为带动自己也变得非理性。由于有关市场、经济、利率、股价表现等的噪音铺天盖地，一些投资者以为倾听专家评论很重要——更糟的是，还觉得“照着评论行动”也很重要。
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
那些在拥有农场或公寓时可以安静持有数十年的人，一旦暴露在持续不断的股票报价与评论之下（其潜台词是“别坐着不动，赶紧干点啥”），往往会变得焦躁不安。对这类投资者而言，流动性本应是不带任何负面含义的好处，却被扭曲成了一种诅咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
一次“闪崩”或其他极端市场波动，对投资者造成的伤害，不会比那位反复无常、喋喋不休的邻居对我的农场投资造成的伤害更大。事实上，只要在价格远离价值时手上有现金，真正的投资者会从下跌的市场中受益。恐惧的氛围是你投资时的朋友；亢奋的世界则是你的敌人。
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
在 2008 年末那场罕见的金融恐慌期间，尽管严重衰退显而易见，我从未动念卖出我的农场或 New York 的那处不动产。再说，如果我当时 100% 拥有一家基本面稳健、长期前景良好的企业，那么哪怕只是“考虑抛掉它”也是愚蠢的。那么，为什么我要卖出那些仅占少量股权但对应优质企业的股票呢？诚然，单只个股最终可能令我失望，但作为一个组合，它们一定会表现良好。难道真的有人相信，这个星球会把美国所拥有的惊人生产性资产与无限的人类创造力一口吞下去吗？
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When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
当Charlie和我买股票时——我们把它们看作企业的一小部分——我们的分析与收购整家公司时非常相似。我们首先要决定能否对五年甚至更久之后的盈利区间作出合理估计。若答案为是，只要价格相对于我们估计区间的下沿合理，我们就会买入该股票（或企业）。反之，若我们缺乏估计未来盈利的能力——这通常是事实——我们就干脆转向别的机会。在我们合作的54年里，从未因为宏观或政治环境，或他人的观点而放弃有吸引力的买入。事实上，这些话题在我们决策时根本不会出现。
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
然而，识别并坚守我们的“能力圈”边界至关重要。即便如此，我们在股票与企业上仍会犯错。但这些错误不会是那种灾难性的错误——例如，长期上涨的市场诱使人们基于预期价格走势和“身处热闹之地”的欲望去买入所造成的那类错误。
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
当然，多数投资者并未把研究企业前景当作人生要务。明智的话，他们会得出结论：自己对具体企业了解不足，无法预测其未来盈利能力。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
对于这些非职业投资者，我有个好消息：典型的投资者并不需要这项技能。从整体看，美国企业长期表现卓越，未来也会继续如此（尽管肯定会起伏不定）。在20世纪，Dow Jones Industrials指数从66涨至11,497，同时派发不断增长的股息。21世纪还将见证进一步、且几乎可以肯定相当可观的涨幅。非职业投资者的目标不应是挑出赢家——他和他的“帮手”都做不到——而应拥有一篮子整体上注定会表现良好的企业。低成本的S&P 500指数基金能实现这个目标。
That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
以上是非职业投资者“投什么”。“何时投”同样重要。主要风险在于：胆怯或新手投资者会在市场极度亢奋时入场，一旦出现账面亏损就幻灭。（记住已故Barton Biggs的话：“牛市像性爱，在结束前那一刻感觉最好。”）对这种择时失误的解药，是长期分批买入，并且在坏消息频出、股价远离高位时绝不卖出。遵循这些规则，同时分散投资并将成本降至极低的“什么都不懂”的投资者，几乎必然会取得令人满意的结果。事实上，能坦然面对自身短板的朴素型投资者，很可能比那些学识渊博却对自身哪怕一个缺点都视而不见的职业投资者，获得更好的长期回报。
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
如果“投资者”疯狂地相互买卖农田，作物的产量和价格都不会因此提高。唯一的结果，是农场主群体的整体收益下降——因为他们在寻求建议与频繁置换资产时会产生大量成本。
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
尽管如此，个人与机构仍会被那些靠提供建议或撮合交易获利的人不断怂恿去“频繁行动”。由此产生的摩擦成本可能极大，而从整体上看，对投资者毫无益处。所以，忽略噪音，把成本压到最低，把股票当作农场那样去投资。
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.
我还要补充一句：我言行一致。我在此的建议，与我在遗嘱中写下的某些指示本质一致。其一项遗赠条款规定，将现金交由受托人，以惠及我的妻子。（个别遗赠我必须以现金形式，因为我全部的Berkshire股票会在遗产清算后的十年内，全部分配给若干公益机构。）我给受托人的建议再简单不过：10%的现金投短期国债，90%投超低成本的S&P 500指数基金。（我建议Vanguard’s。）我相信，这一策略带来的信托长期结果将优于大多数投资者——无论是养老金、机构还是个人——那些雇佣高收费经理人所取得的结果。
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And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
现在回到Ben Graham。我在本节投资讨论中的大部分思想，来自我1949年购买的Ben的著作《The Intelligent Investor》。那次购买改变了我的财务人生。
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
在读Ben的书之前，我在投资世界里四处游走，凡与之相关的文字都如饥似渴地阅读。很多内容让我着迷：我尝试画图，用市场指标预测股价走势；我坐在券商营业部看行情带滚动，听评论员说法。这一切很有趣，但我总挥之不去：自己并没有真正进步。
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.
相较之下，Ben的思想以逻辑严谨、优雅易懂的文字阐述（没有希腊字母或复杂公式）。对我而言，关键要点体现在后来版本标注的第8章与第20章中。（1949年初版的章节编号不同。）这些要点至今仍指导着我的投资决策。
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
这本书还有两个有趣的侧影：后续版本附录里提到了一笔未点名的投资，给Ben带来了丰厚回报。Ben在1948年撰写初版时完成了那笔买入——准备好——这家神秘公司就是GEICO。若非Ben在GEICO襁褓之时就识别出其特殊之处，我与Berkshire的未来将截然不同。
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
该书1949年版还推荐了一只铁路股，当时股价17美元，每股盈利约10美元。（我敬佩Ben的理由之一，是他敢用当下的例子，哪怕稍有闪失就会被人讥笑。）部分低估值源于当时的一条会计规则：铁路公司在报告利润时必须剔除关联公司大量留存收益。
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
这只被推荐的股票是Northern Pacific，其最重要的关联公司是Chicago, Burlington and Quincy。这些铁路如今都是BNSF（Burlington Northern Santa Fe）的重要组成部分，而BNSF目前由Berkshire全资拥有。我读这本书时，Northern Pacific的市值约为4,000万美元。如今其继任者（当然已增加了大量资产）每四天就赚到这个数。
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
我已记不清第一本《The Intelligent Investor》的购书价。无论价钱几何，它都印证了Ben那句格言的真理：“价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。”在我做过的所有投资中，买Ben的这本书是最好的（除了我买下的两张结婚证）。
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Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.
地方与州级财政问题正在加速恶化，主要原因在于公共部门许下了自己承担不起的养老金承诺。公民与公职人员往往低估了这一“巨型财务绦虫”：当承诺与筹资意愿相冲突时，它便应运而生。遗憾的是，如今的养老金数学对大多数美国人而言仍是谜题。
Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.
投资政策同样在这些问题中扮演重要角色。1975年，我写了一份备忘录给当时的 The Washington Post Company 董事长 Katharine Graham，讨论养老金承诺的陷阱及投资政策的重要性。该备忘录重印于第118—136页。
During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
在未来十年里，你会看到大量关于公共养老金计划的新闻——坏消息。我希望这份备忘录能帮助你理解：在问题存在之处，及时采取补救措施是必要的。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and – yes – saves us money.
年度大会将于5月3日（周六）在 CenturyLink Center 举行。我们才华横溢的“总指挥” Carrie Sova 将负责统筹，总部团队全员协助。我们的团队既能把活儿干得比专业活动策划更好——是的——还更省钱。
CenturyLink’s doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me: I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
CenturyLink 将于早上7点开门，7点30分我们将举行第三届 International Newspaper Tossing Challenge。目标是一个 Clayton Home 的门廊，距离投掷线正好35英尺。青少年时期我大约投过50万份报纸，所以我自认还不错。来挑战我吧：只要谁把报纸投得比我更接近门口，我就请他/她吃一支 Dilly Bar。报纸为36至42页，必须自己折叠（不允许用皮筋）。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8点30分将放映一部全新的 Berkshire 影片。一小时后开始问答环节（中午在 CenturyLink 的摊位短暂停餐），持续至3点30分。短暂休息后，3点45分由我与 Charlie 召集正式年会。如果你决定在当天问答期间离场，请挑 Charlie 发言时离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We’ll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,062 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 32 seconds), 12,792 pounds of See’s candy, 11,162 Quikut knives (21 knives per minute) and 6,344 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie’s picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don’t let me down.
当然，离场的最佳理由是去购物。我们会将与会场相连的194,300平方英尺大厅摆满 Berkshire 数十家子公司的产品，方便各位。去年你们不负所托，多数摊位都创下了销售纪录。9小时里，我们卖出1,062双 Justin 靴子（平均每32秒一双）、12,792磅 See’s 糖果、11,162把 Quikut 刀具（每分钟21把）以及6,344双 Wells Lamont 手套（常年热销）。今年，Charlie 和我将各自推出“竞品”番茄酱瓶。很自然，印着 Charlie 照片的那款会大幅打折。不过，只要你们帮忙，我的销量会超过他的。这很重要，别让我失望。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your tickets for the meeting. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates.
我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 将再次在大会上推出特别纪念款。买上一双，第二天就穿着参加我们的第二届“Berkshire 5K”——早上8点于 CenturyLink 开跑。参赛细则见你随门票收到的 Visitor’s Guide。你会发现自己与众多 Berkshire 的经理、董事与同事并肩奔跑。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 将在购物区设展台，来自全国的顶尖顾问到场服务。欢迎前去询价。多数情况下，GEICO 能为你提供股东折扣（通常为8%）。我们经营所在的51个司法辖区中，有44个允许这一优惠。（补充一点：若你符合其他优惠条件（例如某些群体优惠），折扣不可叠加。）带上你现有保单的详细信息，看看我们能否帮你省钱。我相信，至少一半人可以。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index that I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You’ll enjoy it.
别忘了去 Bookworm。那里将展售约35种书籍与DVD，其中包括几本新书。其一是 Max Olson 汇编的自1965年以来的 Berkshire 来信集。该书附有我尤其看重的索引，按人物、公司与主题列出页码。我也推荐我儿子 Howard 的《Forty Chances》。你会喜欢的。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft sure to set your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果你是“大手笔”——或立志成为“大手笔”——周六中午至下午5点，去 Omaha 机场东侧的 Signature Flight Support 看看。我们将展示一队 NetJets 飞机，保证让你心跳加速。坐公交来；乘私人机走。人生得意须尽兴。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
本报告所附委托书材料中的附件，说明了如何获取参会及参加其他活动所需的凭证。航空公司有时会在 Berkshire 周末抬价。若你从远方而来，不妨比较飞 Kansas City 与飞 Omaha 的成本。两城自驾约需2.5小时，Kansas City 或许能为你省下不少钱，尤其当你原计划在 Omaha 租车时。把省下的钱交给我们花吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did $40.2 million of business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.
在位于72nd Street（介于 Dodge 与 Pacific 之间）、占地77英亩的 Nebraska Furniture Mart（NFM），我们将再次推出“Berkshire Weekend”优惠价。去年大会周，这家店实现4,020万美元销售额，比此前纪录高12%。周六还创下单日820万美元的纪录，仅床垫一项就接近100万美元。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 29th and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
在 NFM 享受 Berkshire 折扣，须于4月29日（周二）至5月5日（周一）期间购买，并出示你的参会凭证。在此期间的特价甚至适用于若干通常“铁定不打折”的知名品牌之产品，他们为了股东周末的氛围特批了例外。我们感谢他们的配合。NFM 营业时间为周一至周六10:00—21:00，周日10:00—18:00。今年周六17:30—20:00，NFM 还将举办野餐，诚邀各位参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在 Borsheims，我们将再次举办两场仅限股东参加的活动。第一场是5月2日（周五）18:00—21:00的鸡尾酒会。第二场主活动在5月4日（周日）9:00—16:00举行。周六门店营业至18:00。近年来，这三天的销量远超整个12月（通常是珠宝商的最佳月份）。
About 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.
周日约13:15，我将在 Borsheims 上柜当“店员”。欢迎就你看中的商品索要我的“Crazy Warren”报价。随着年纪见长，我的报价越来越离谱。来占点我的便宜吧。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末 Borsheims 都会人潮涌动。为方便各位，股东价自4月28日（周一）起至5月10日（周六）有效。在此期间，请出示参会凭证或能证明你持有 Berkshire 的券商对账单，以便识别股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
周日，在 Borsheims 外的商场里，曾两度获得美国国际象棋冠军的 Patrick Wolff 将在蒙眼状态下，以每组六人的形式迎战所有挑战者——而挑战者们会睁大眼睛迎战。附近，来自 Dallas 的非凡魔术师 Norman Beck 将令观众目眩神迷。此外，我们还将邀请世界顶尖桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg，于周日下午与我们的股东切磋桥牌。别和他们打赌钱。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans – and especially me – proud with her performance at the Olympics.
我的朋友 Ariel Hsing 也会在周日现身商场，接受乒乓球挑战。去年，她在奥运会上的表现令美国人——尤其是我——倍感自豪。
I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women’s Champion. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我在她九岁时就见过 Ariel，那时我就连一分都拿不到。如今，她是 Princeton 的大一新生，同时也是美国女子冠军。如果你不介意当众“出丑”，欢迎从下午1点起和她过招。Bill Gates 和我会打头阵，试着先消耗一下她。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and for Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
5月4日（周日），Gorat’s 与 Piccolo’s 将再次仅向 Berkshire 股东开放。两家都会营业至晚10点，Gorat’s 于下午1点开门，Piccolo’s 于下午4点开门。这两家餐厅是我的最爱，周日晚上我会两家都去。记住：预订 Gorat’s 请在4月1日致电 402-551-3733（提前勿扰）；预订 Piccolo’s 请致电 402-342-9038。在 Piccolo’s 请点一杯巨大的 root beer float 作甜点。只有胆小鬼才点小杯。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
大会问答环节仍将由同样三位财经记者主持，他们将代股东向 Charlie 和我提问，问题由股东事先通过电子邮件提交。三位记者及其邮箱为：Fortune 的 Carol Loomis（cloomis@fortunemail.com）；CNBC 的 Becky Quick（BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com）；以及 The New York Times 的 Andrew Ross Sorkin（arsorkin@nytimes.com）。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每位记者将从提交的问题中挑选六个他们认为最有趣且最重要的问题。记者们告诉我，若你希望问题更有机会被选中，请做到：简明扼要、不要在最后一刻才发送、确保与 Berkshire 相关，并且每封邮件不超过两个问题。（在邮件中请注明：若你的问题被选中，是否希望提及你的姓名。）
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb.
我们还将邀请三位长期追踪 Berkshire 的分析师组成小组。今年的保险领域嘉宾为 Barclays 的 Jay Gelb。关于我们非保险业务的问题将由 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 提出。
And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position). The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
此外，我们还将安排一位对 Berkshire 持看空立场、且具备资质的发言人。我们欢迎做空 Berkshire 的申请者（请附上持仓证明）。三位分析师将带来他们各自针对 Berkshire 的问题，并与记者及现场观众交替提问。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial information late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, but rather treat all shareholders the same. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that further educate our owners about their investment.
Charlie 和我认为，所有股东都应同时获得 Berkshire 的新信息，并且应有充足时间加以分析。因此，我们力争在每周五晚或周六早发布财务信息，也因此将年度大会安排在周六。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一沟通，而是平等对待所有股东。我们希望记者与分析师提出的问题，能进一步帮助我们的所有者理解他们的投资。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
Charlie 和我都不会提前获得哪怕一点点问题线索。我们知道记者与分析师会带来一些“刁钻题”，而我们就喜欢这样。总体而言，我们预计至少回答54个问题——每位分析师与记者各6个，观众18个。若时间有余，我们会增加观众提问。观众提问者将通过抽签产生，抽签将在上午8:15于主会场及主溢出厅设置的15个话筒处进行。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分理由，我经常称赞我们运营经理们的成就。他们当之无愧是“全明星”，把所经营的企业当作自家唯一资产一般对待。我相信，在大型上市公司当中，我们经理人的思维方式已经是最以股东为导向的那一类。多数人并不需要为钱而工作；在他们看来，打出商业“本垒打”的喜悦，和薪水一样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 23,000-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
同样重要的，是与我一道在总部办公的24位同事。这个团队高效处理繁多的 SEC 及其他监管要求，申报长达23,000页的联邦所得税申报表以及州与海外申报，回复无数股东与媒体问询，编制年度报告，筹备全国规模最大的年度股东大会，协调董事会事务——等等等等。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他们面带笑容、以难以置信的效率处理这一切事务，让我的工作生活轻松而愉快。他们的付出甚至超越了与 Berkshire 严格相关的活动：去年，他们接待了来自40所大学（从200家申请者中遴选）的学生，来 Omaha 与我进行一整天的问答。他们还处理我收到的各种请求、安排我的行程，甚至负责给我买午餐的汉堡和薯条（当然要浇上番茄酱）。没有哪位 CEO 比我更幸福；我真想每天踢踏着步子去上班。
In closing, I think it’s become appropriate to ignore our “no pictures” policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn’t make it; otherwise you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire’s headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.
最后，我觉得现在有理由破例无视我们的“禁止照片”政策，让你看看我们了不起的总部团队。下面这张是我们圣诞午餐的合照。有两位没能到场；否则你看到的就是 Berkshire 总部的全体成员。他们真是创造奇迹的人。
Next year’s letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
明年的股东信将回顾我们在 Berkshire 的50年，并对未来50年稍作展望。与此同时，请在5月3日来 Omaha，享受我们“资本家的伍德斯托克”。
February 28, 2014
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
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