Productivity and Prosperity
生产力与繁荣
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
前文我提到，我们在 Kraft Heinz 的伙伴如何消除低效，从而提升每工时产出。自 1776 年建国以来，这类改进一直是美国生活水平显著提升的秘诀。不幸的是，用“秘密”来形容再贴切不过：真正理解生产力与繁荣之间关系的美国人太少。为揭示这种联系，让我们先看美国最具代表性的例子——农业——然后再考察伯克希尔旗下的三个具体领域。
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
1900 年，美国劳动力为 2,800 万人，其中有 1,100 万人从事农业，占总劳动力的惊人 40%。当时的主要作物与今天一样是玉米。约 9,000 万英亩土地用于玉米种植，亩产 30 蒲式耳，年产总量 27 亿蒲式耳。
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
随后，拖拉机问世，并接连出现多项创新，彻底改变了播种、收割、灌溉、施肥和种子品质等决定农业生产率的关键环节。如今，我们种植玉米的面积约为 8,500 万英亩，但亩产已提升至 150 蒲式耳以上，年产总量达 130-140 亿蒲式耳。农民在其他作物上也取得了类似的增产成果。
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.
产量的提高只是故事的一半：实物产出的巨大增长伴随着农业劳动力（即“人力投入”）的大幅减少。如今，只有约 300 万人从事农业，仅占 1.58 亿劳动力总数的 2%。因此，改进的耕作方式使数以千万计的现代劳动者能将时间和才能投入其他事业，这种人力资源再配置让今天的美国人得以享用大量原本无缘的非农产品和服务。
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
回顾这 115 年历程，不难认识到农业创新带来了多么巨大的福祉——不仅惠及农民，更造福整个社会。若当初遏制了这些生产率提升，我们今天的美国将无法与现在相提并论。（幸好马儿不会投票。）然而，在日常生活中，对于那些被效率更高的机器取代的农场工人而言，“更大利益”的说法听来必定空洞刺耳。我们将在本节后文探讨生产率提高的这一负面效应。
For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.
不过，现在让我们来看看三个提高效率的案例，它们对伯克希尔的子公司产生了重大影响。这类转变在美国商业界屡见不鲜。
‹ In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
‹ 1947 年，二战结束不久，美国劳动力总数为 4,400 万人，其中约 135 万人在铁路行业工作。当年一级铁路运输的货运收入吨英里总量为 6550 亿。
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about \$90 billion annually in current dollars.
到 2014 年，一级铁路的货运吨英里已增至 1.85 万亿，同比增长 182%，而雇员仅剩 18.7 万人，较 1947 年减少 86%。(其中一部分变化涉及客运相关员工，但大多数人员减少发生在货运领域。) 由于生产率的惊人提升，按通胀调整后的单位吨英里运费自 1947 年以来下降了 55%，按当前美元计每年为托运人节省约 900 亿美元。
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.) Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.
还有一个惊人的数据：如果现在运输同样数量的货物仍需 1947 年那样多的人员，我们将需要 300 多万铁路工人来处理当前的货运量。(当然，如此高的用工水平会大幅推高运费，因此现实中不可能达到今天的运量。) 我们的 BNSF 由 Burlington Northern 与 Santa Fe 于 1995 年合并而成。1996 年，即合并后首个完整运营年度，公司以 4.5 万名员工运输了 4.11 亿吨英里货物。去年，相应数据为 7.02 亿吨英里(增 71%)和 4.7 万名员工(仅增 4%)。生产率的大幅提升让股东与托运人双双受益。BNSF 的安全状况也得到改善：可报告伤害事故率由 1996 年的每 20 万工时 2.04 起降至目前的 0.95，降幅超过 50%。
‹ A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.
‹ 一百多年前，汽车发明问世，并催生了为汽车及其驾驶员提供保障的保险行业。最初，这一业务通过传统保险代理机构承保——与办理火险业务的机构相同。这种以代理为核心的模式手续费和其他承保费用高昂，大约占到保费收入的 40 美分。当地实力雄厚的代理掌握主导权，因为它们代表多家保险公司，可以在佣金谈判时让保险公司相互竞争。当时呈现类似卡特尔的定价局面，相关各方都过得不错——除了消费者。
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
随后，美国人的创造力开始发挥作用：伊利诺伊州 Merna 的农民 G. J. Mecherle 想出了建立专属销售队伍的主意，只销售同一家公司的保险产品。他的“孩子”被命名为 State Farm Mutual。该公司削减佣金和费用——从而得以降低价格——很快便成为行业巨头。数十年来，State Farm 一直稳坐汽车险和住宅险的销量冠军宝座。同样采用直接销售模式的 Allstate 长期位居第二。State Farm 和 Allstate 的承保费用率均约为 25%。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
20 世纪 30 年代初，另一个竞争者——类似互助公司的美国军人汽车协会（USAA）——开始直接面向客户为军官承保汽车保险。这一营销创新源于军人群体的需求，他们需要一种保险，无论调往何处都能随行生效。而这类业务对当地保险代理机构兴趣不大，因为他们更青睐长期定居者带来的稳定续保。
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with \$100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
事实证明，USAA 的直接销售模式成本低于 State Farm 和 Allstate，由此为客户提供了更大的价格优惠。这促使 USAA 员工 Leo 与 Lillian Goodwin 萌生念头，想把这种直销模式的目标市场扩展至军官之外。1936 年，他们以 10 万美元资本创立了 Government Employees Insurance Co.（后来简化为 GEICO）。
Their fledgling did \$238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did \$22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
这家新公司在 1937 年第一个完整经营年度实现了 23.8 万美元的汽车保险业务。去年，GEICO 的业务量达到 226 亿美元，超过 USAA 的两倍。（早起的鸟儿有虫吃，第二只老鼠却能吃到奶酪。）2015 年，GEICO 的承保费用率为保费的 14.7%，仅有 USAA 的比例更低。（GEICO 的运营效率与 USAA 不相上下，但为了促进增长在广告上花费更多。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
凭借低成本带来的价格优势，GEICO 几年前从 Allstate 手中夺得了汽车保险业的第二名也就不足为奇了。GEICO 也正在缩小与 State Farm 的差距，尽管后者的业务规模仍遥遥领先。我计划在 2030 年 8 月 30 日——我 100 岁生日那天——宣布 GEICO 登顶第一。请把这一天记在日历上。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO 现有约 34,000 名员工，为 1,400 万名保单持有人提供服务。我只能猜想，若采用代理系统，要服务相同数量的保单持有人需多少人手。我认为至少需要 60,000 名员工，既包括保险公司直接雇用的人员，也包括代理机构的人手。
‹ In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
‹ 在电力业务方面，我们的 Berkshire Hathaway Energy（“BHE”）正处于经济模式变革之中。过去，当地电力公司的生存并不取决于效率。事实上，即便运营“粗放”，财务上也能过得去。
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
原因在于，公用事业通常是必需品的唯一供应者，被允许将价格设定在可保证其投入资本获得规定收益的水平。业内曾流传一句笑话：公用事业是唯一能通过重新装修老板办公室就自动赚更多钱的行业。有些首席执行官确实按这种思路来经营。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
这一切都在改变。如今，社会已经认定由联邦补贴的风能与太阳能发电符合美国的长期利益。联邦税收抵免被用来实施这一政策，在某些地区使可再生能源具备价格竞争力。这些税收抵免或其他政府对可再生能源的强制性扶持，最终可能侵蚀现有电力公司的经济效益，尤其是那些高成本运营者。BHE 长期以来对效率的重视——即便当年公司并不需要依靠效率来获得核准收益——使我们在当今市场上尤具竞争力（更重要的是，在未来市场上亦然）。
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
BHE 于 1999 年收购了其在爱荷华州的公用事业公司。此前一年，该公司雇用 3,700 名员工，发电量为 1,900 万兆瓦时。如今，我们仅雇用 3,500 名员工，却能生产 2,900 万兆瓦时电力。效率的大幅提升让我们在 16 年间未曾涨价，而行业电价在此期间上涨了 44%。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
我们在爱荷华州的公用事业公司的安全纪录同样出色。2015 年每一百名员工的可报告伤害仅为 0.79 起，而在我们收购前一年，前任业主的这一数字为 7.0 起。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006 年，BHE 收购了主要在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的 PacifiCorp。收购前一年，PacifiCorp 员工 6,750 人，发电量 5,260 万兆瓦时。去年，这两个数字分别为 5,700 名员工和 5,630 万兆瓦时。安全表现同样显著改善，每百名员工事故率已从 2005 年的 3.4 起降至 2015 年的 0.85 起。在安全方面，BHE 现位居行业前 10%。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)
这些杰出表现解释了为何当 BHE 提出收购某辖区的电力公司时，会受到监管机构的欢迎。监管者知道，BHE 将以高效、安全、可靠的方式运营，并带来充足资金支持一切有意义的项目。（自我们接手以来，BHE 从未向伯克希尔分红。美国没有任何一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司能与 BHE 对再投资的热情相提并论。）
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The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我刚才阐述的那些生产率提升——以及美国取得的无数其他进步——为社会带来了非凡的福祉。这正是全国人民整体上已享受并将继续享受大量商品和服务增益的根本原因。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
然而，这一观点也有其负面影响。首先，近年来实现的生产率提升在很大程度上惠及了富裕阶层。其次，生产率的提高常常带来剧烈震荡：当创新或新效率颠覆既有格局时，资本和劳动力都可能为此付出惨痛代价。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
对于资本家（无论是私人业主还是数量庞大的公众股东），我们无需为其流泪。照顾好自己本就是他们的职责。当正确决策能为投资者带来巨额回报时，他们也不该被错误选择造成的损失所豁免。此外，那些广泛分散投资并坚持长期持有的投资者必将繁荣：在美国，成功投资的收益始终远超失败资产的损失。（在整个 20 世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数——某种形式的指数基金——从 66 点飙升至 11,497 点，而其成份公司同时持续提高分红。）
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
长期受雇的工人面临的却是另一番景象。当创新与市场体系相互作用并提升效率时，许多工人可能变得多余，其技能被淘汰。有些人可以在别处找到体面的工作；但对另一些人来说，这并非可行之路。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
当低成本竞争将制鞋业推向亚洲时，我们昔日繁荣的 Dexter 工厂关门，缅因州一座小镇的 1,600 名员工因此失业。许多人已过再学习其他行业的年龄。我们损失了全部投资，这笔损失我们承担得起，但许多工人却失去了无法替代的生计。同样的情形在我们最初的新英格兰纺织厂上演——在苦撑 20 年后最终关停。举一个令人心酸的例子，我们位于新贝德福德的工厂有许多年长工人只会说葡萄牙语，几乎不会英语，他们根本没有第二条出路。
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
面对这种冲击，解决之道并不是限制或禁止提升生产率的举措。如果我们当年强令 1100 万人永远从事农业，美国人的生活水平绝不可能达到今日的高度。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
真正的解决方案应是多种安全网，旨在为那些愿意工作却因市场力量而被低估其特定技能的人提供体面的生活。（我个人支持改革并扩大“劳动所得抵税额”，以确保美国对愿意工作的群体发挥作用。）让绝大多数美国人不断繁荣的代价，不应是让不幸者陷入贫困。