2017-05-31 Revisiting Buffett’s 1999 Warning: Interest Rates, Orgies, and Value
Dear Fellow Investors,
We thought it would be very helpful to review Warren Buffett’s argument in 19991, the last time there was very high expectations attached to technology stocks and to the overall level of common stock prices. We will reference Buffett’s quotes by the year he said them. The sections labeled 2017 offer our current observations on the markets and thoughts from respected experts.
我们认为回顾 Warren Buffett 在 19991 年的论点会非常有帮助——那是上一次科技股与整体普通股价格水平被寄予非常高期望的时候。我们将按 Buffett 发表这些言论的年份进行引用。标注为 2017 的部分则是我们对当时市场的观察以及来自受尊敬专家的观点。
Buffett in 1999 “Investors in stocks these days are expecting far too much, and I'm going to explain why. That will inevitably set me to talking about the general stock market, a subject I'm usually unwilling to discuss. But I want to make one thing clear going in: Though I will be talking about the level of the market, I will not be predicting its next moves. At Berkshire (BRK.B), we focus almost exclusively on the valuations of individual companies. The fact is that markets behave in ways, sometimes for a very long stretch, that are not linked to value. Sooner or later, though, value counts.”
Buffett 在 1999 年：“如今股票投资者的预期过高，而我将解释原因。这不可避免地会让我谈到总体股市——一个我通常不愿讨论的话题。但我想先把一件事讲清楚：尽管我将谈论市场的水平，我不会预测它接下来的走势。在 Berkshire（BRK.B），我们几乎把注意力完全放在个别公司的估值上。事实是，市场的行为方式有时会在很长一段时期内与价值无关。不过迟早，价值会起作用。”
2017 Like Buffett, we recognize that we have no ability to predict market swings and we stick to our “circle of competence.” Buffett recently emphasized on CNBC that if interest rates stay low, investors aren't expecting enough from stocks. Dan Fuss, a 57-year veteran of the bond market and manager of the Loomis Sayles Bond Fund says, "We are keeping our maturities short for the coming normalizing of interest rates." We find it interesting that Buffett has talked more about one side of the interest rate movement coin rather than the more dangerous rising interest rate side.
2017 和 Buffett 一样，我们承认自己没有能力预测市场波动，并坚持我们的“能力圈”。Buffett 最近在 CNBC 强调，如果利率保持低位，投资者对股票的回报预期反而不够。债券市场 57 年老将、Loomis Sayles Bond Fund 的经理 Dan Fuss 说：“我们正在缩短久期，以应对即将到来的利率正常化。”我们注意到一个有趣之处：Buffett 更频繁地谈到利率变动这枚硬币的一面，而较少谈及更具危险性的利率上升一面。
Buffett in 1999 “Let's start by defining "investing." The definition is simple but often forgotten: Investing is laying out money now to get more money back in the future--more money in real terms, after taking inflation into account.
Buffett 在 1999 年：“让我们先来定义一下‘投资’。定义很简单但常被遗忘：投资就是现在投入资金，以便将来收回更多的钱——在考虑通胀后的实际购买力意义上的更多。”
Now, to get some historical perspective, let's look back at the 34 years before this one--and here we are going to see an almost Biblical kind of symmetry, in the sense of lean years and fat years--to observe what happened in the stock market. Take, to begin with, the first 17 years of the period, from the end of 1964 through 1981. Here's what took place in that interval:
现在，为了获得一些历史视角，我们回顾此前的 34 年——在“丰年与荒年”的意义上，几乎呈现一种《圣经》式的对称——看看股市发生了什么。先看这段时期的前 17 年，从 1964 年底到 1981 年。期间发生了如下变化：
DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE Dec. 31, 1964: 874.12 Dec. 31, 1981: 875.00
道琼斯工业平均指数 1964 年 12 月 31 日：874.12；1981 年 12 月 31 日：875.00
Now I'm known as a long-term investor and a patient guy, but that is not my idea of a big move.
我一向被视为长期投资者、很有耐心的人，但这可称不上什么“大涨大落”。
To understand why that happened, we need first to look at one of the two important variables that affect investment results: interest rates. These act on financial valuations the way gravity acts on matter: The higher the rate, the greater the downward pull. That's because the rates of return that investors need from any kind of investment are directly tied to the risk-free rate that they can earn from government securities. So, if the government rate rises, the prices of all other investments must adjust downward, to a level that brings their expected rates in line.
要理解为什么会这样，我们首先需要看影响投资结果的两个重要变量之一：利率。利率对金融估值的作用就像重力对物体：利率越高，下拉力越强。这是因为投资者对任何资产要求的回报率，都直接与他们从政府证券可获得的无风险利率挂钩。因此，一旦政府利率上升，其他一切投资的价格都必须下调，以使其预期回报率与之匹配。
The increase in equity values since 1981 beats anything you can find in history. This increase even surpasses what you would have realized if you'd bought stocks in 1932, at their Depression bottom--on its lowest day, July 8, 1932, the Dow closed at 41.22--and held them for 17 years.”
自 1981 年以来股票价值的上涨，胜过历史上你能找到的任何时期。这样的涨幅甚至超过了你在 1932 年（大萧条底部）买入股票并持有 17 年所能获得的回报——在 1932 年 7 月 8 日的最低点，道指收于 41.22。”
2017 We look at ten-year Treasury Bonds with a 2.23% interest rate and stocks trading at high historical levels in relation to earnings, book value and gross domestic product (GDP) wondering if the same case can be made for the next 17 years.
2017 我们看到十年期美国国债利率为 2.23%，而股票相对于盈利、账面价值与国内生产总值（GDP）都处于历史高位，不禁要问：未来 17 年还能复制同样的情形吗？
Buffett in 1999 “The second thing bearing on stock prices during this 17 years was after-tax corporate profits, which this chart [we have updated below2] displays as a percentage of GDP. In effect, what this chart tells you is what portion of the GDP ended up every year with the shareholders of American business.
Buffett 在 1999 年：“在这 17 年里影响股价的第二个因素是税后企业利润，下图（我们在下文2中已更新）将其展示为占 GDP 的百分比。实际上，这张图告诉你，每年有多少 GDP 份额最终落到了美国企业股东手中。”
Corporate profits as a percentage of GDP peaked in 1929, and then they tanked…But from 1951 on, the percentage settled down pretty much to a 4% to 6.5% range.
以 GDP 占比计的企业利润在 1929 年达到峰值，随后大幅下滑……但自 1951 年起，该占比基本稳定在 4% 至 6.5% 的区间内。
By 1981, though, the trend was headed toward the bottom of that band, and in 1982 profits tumbled to 3.5%. So, at that point investors were looking at two strong negatives: Profits were sub-par and interest rates were sky-high.
不过到 1981 年，这一趋势已逼近区间下沿，1982 年利润更是骤降至 3.5%。因此，当时投资者面对两大利空：利润低迷、利率高企。
And as is so typical, investors projected out into the future what they were seeing. That's their unshakable habit: looking into the rear-view mirror instead of through the windshield.”
而且，典型如常，投资者把眼前所见外推到未来。这是他们根深蒂固的习惯：看“后视镜”，不看“挡风玻璃”。”
2017 Corporate profits have gone through the roof (see chart above). The chart shows that profits were nearly 10% at the last secular low for interest rates in 1952. It also appears to us that technology companies which dominate a particular sector of modern life (social media, search, online commerce) are allowed to leverage their dominance in their main business to attack industries and companies without the same proprietary information or clout. More importantly they have caught the investing public’s imagination.
2017 企业利润已飙升（见上图）。该图显示，在 1952 年上一次利率长期低点时，利润占比接近 10%。在我们看来，主宰现代生活某些领域（社交媒体、搜索、线上商务）的科技公司，似乎被允许利用其主营业务的主导地位，进攻那些缺乏同等专有信息或话语权的行业与公司。更重要的是，它们牢牢抓住了公众投资者的想象力。
Technology companies are drastically reducing the need for labor in many industries and are causing capital to win at labor’s expense. It looks to us like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Anti-Trust Enforcement division of the US Department of Justice have taken an eight-year sabbatical on most cases associated with tech stock darlings. Teddy Roosevelt is rolling in his grave as Alphabet (GOOGL) becomes Standard Oil, Facebook (FB) becomes AT&T (T) and Amazon (AMZN) becomes the railroads with an overwhelming control over life and business in the US.
科技公司正大幅降低许多行业对劳动力的需求，使资本以牺牲劳动为代价获胜。在我们看来，美国联邦贸易委员会（FTC）与司法部反垄断执法部门在大多数与科技股宠儿相关的案件上仿佛“休了八年长假”。当 Alphabet (GOOGL) 有如 Standard Oil、Facebook (FB) 有如 AT&T (T)、而 Amazon (AMZN) 有如铁路体系般对美国的生活与商业拥有压倒性控制力时，Teddy Roosevelt 在九泉之下也难以安息。
白痴，阻止这些科技企业、不让他们做业务就有用了？
Buffett in 1999 “Today (1999), if an investor is to achieve juicy profits in the market over ten years or 17 or 20, one or more of three things must happen. I'll delay talking about the last of them for a bit, but here are the first two:
Buffett 在 1999 年：“如今（1999 年），若投资者想在十年、十七年或二十年的时间里在市场上获得可观收益，三件事中至少要发生一件。我稍后再谈第三件，先说前两件：
(1) Interest rates must fall further. If government interest rates, now at a level of about 6%, were to fall to 3%, that factor alone would come close to doubling the value of common stocks. Incidentally, if you think interest rates are going to do that--or fall to the 1% that Japan has experienced--you should head for where you can really make a bundle: bond options.”
（1）利率必须进一步下降。如果政府利率（目前约为 6%）降至 3%，仅此一项因素就几乎会使普通股的价值翻倍。顺带说一句，如果你认为利率会那样下行——甚至降到日本经历过的 1%——你就该去能真正大赚的地方：债券期权。”
2017 Buffett was correct and the move to 2% on Treasury bond rates did come close to doubling the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Are we going to 1% long-term interest rates over the next 17 years or is this as good as it gets?
2017 Buffett 的判断正确：国债利率降至 2% 的走势的确使道琼斯工业平均指数几近翻倍。接下来的 17 年，我们会走向 1% 的长期利率，还是说眼下已经是“最好就这样了”？
Buffett in 1999 (2) “Corporate profitability in relation to GDP must rise. You know, someone once told me that New York has more lawyers than people. I think that's the same fellow who thinks profits will become larger than GDP. When you begin to expect the growth of a component factor to forever outpace that of the aggregate, you get into certain mathematical problems. In my opinion, you have to be wildly optimistic to believe that corporate profits as a percent of GDP can, for any sustained period, hold much above 6%. One thing keeping the percentage down will be competition, which is alive and well.”
巴菲特在 1999 年（2） “企业利润相对于 GDP 必须上升。你知道，有人曾告诉我纽约的律师比人还多。我想那人也是认为利润会超过 GDP 的人。当你开始期望一个组成因素的增长永远超过总体的增长时，你就会遇到某些数学问题。在我看来，要相信企业利润占 GDP 的比例在任何持续时期内能长期远高于 6%，你必须极度乐观。压低这个比例的一个因素将是竞争，而竞争是存在且健康的。”
2017 Corporate profits rose substantially since 1999 and rewarded long-duration common stock owners in concert with lower interest rates (quite a rearview mirror). Wise investors like Jeremy Grantham have had to wrestle recently with thoughts that a “permanently higher level” of corporate profitability in relation to the overall GDP might exist (It’s different this time).
2017 自 1999 年以来，企业利润大幅上升，并与较低利率一道回馈了长期持有普通股的投资者（这确实是典型的“后视镜”）。像 Jeremy Grantham 这样的睿智投资者，近来不得不思考一个问题：相对于整体 GDP，企业盈利能力可能存在一个“永久性更高的水平”（也就是“这一次不一样”）。
Buffett mentioned that competition would keep profits down in 1999, but he had no idea that companies the likes of Facebook, Google and Amazon would be allowed to gain national importance the way Standard Oil, AT&T and the railroads did in 1900. Imagine if his Mid-American Energy business was not regulated.
Buffett 在 1999 年提到竞争会压低利润，但他当时未曾预料到，Facebook、Google 和 Amazon 这类公司会被允许像 1900 年的 Standard Oil、AT&T 和铁路那样取得全国性的举足轻重地位。设想一下，如果他的 Mid-American Energy 业务不受监管，会发生什么。
Buffett in 1999 “So where do some reasonable assumptions lead us? Let's say that GDP grows at an average 5% a year--3% real growth, which is pretty darn good, plus 2% inflation. If GDP grows at 5%, and you don't have some help from interest rates, the aggregate value of equities is not going to grow a whole lot more. Nor can investors expect to score because companies are busy boosting their per-share earnings by buying in their stock. The offset here is that the companies are just about as busy issuing new stock, both through primary offerings and those ever-present stock options.”
Buffett 在 1999 年：“那么，一些合理的假设会把我们带向何处？假设 GDP 年均增长 5%——其中 3% 的实际增长（这已经相当不错），再加上 2% 的通胀。如果 GDP 以 5% 增长，但利率没有给你帮忙，那么股票总体的价值增幅就不会大得多。投资者也别指望通过企业回购来轻松得分，因为公司忙着通过回购提升每股收益的同时，也同样忙着发行新股——既包括公开增发，也包括无处不在的股票期权。”
2017 To us, Buffett's warning is as valid or more valid today than in 1999 before the tech crash! The dilution of existing shareholders at major companies by issuance of stock options and restricted shares should have the same impact on today’s glam tech companies that it did on Microsoft (MSFT), Intel (INTC) and Cisco (CSCO) in the late 1990’s. It took 16 years for MSFT to get even with its 2000 high share price, while Intel and Cisco are still far below where they traded in early 2000. Back in 1999, there seemed to be no limit to what the most popular tech companies could accomplish and today, it is safe to say there are no limits being put on the FANG stocks.3
2017 在我们看来，Buffett 的警示在今天与 1999 年科网泡沫破裂前一样有效，甚至更有效！大型公司通过发放股票期权与限制性股票而造成对现有股东的稀释，对当今那些光鲜的科技公司，应当会产生与 1990 年代末对 Microsoft（MSFT）、Intel（INTC）和 Cisco（CSCO）相似的影响。MSFT 花了 16 年才回到其 2000 年的高点，而 Intel 和 Cisco 迄今仍远低于 2000 年初的交易水平。早在 1999 年，最受欢迎的科技公司似乎无所不能；而今天，可以说对 FANG 股票3也几乎没有设限。
Buffett in 1999 “Bear in mind--this is a critical fact often ignored--that investors as a whole cannot get anything out of their businesses except what the businesses earn. Sure, you and I can sell each other stocks at higher and higher prices. You personally might outsmart the next fellow by buying low and selling high. The absolute most that the owners of a business, in aggregate, can get out of it in the end--between now and Judgment Day--is what that business earns over time.”
Buffett 在 1999 年：“请牢记——这是一条经常被忽视的关键事实——整体而言，投资者从企业中得到的，不能超过企业本身赚到的。你我当然可以把股票以越来越高的价格相互交易。你个人也许能靠低买高卖比别人聪明。但整体而言，从现在到世界末日，企业所有者们最终能够从企业中得到的极限——就是这家企业随时间所赚到的利润。”
2017 Buffett has been spending a great deal of time praising Jeff Bezos and Amazon who have created astounding returns in the stock market while losing money selling millions of items. It appears that Amazon has become rich by "outsmarting the other fellows." The sum of all reported profits of Amazon in 20 years might add up to $5 billion. Would Buffett pay around $1,000 per share (as of May 30, 2017) for Amazon to start with an $8 per share profit in calendar 2017 (Value Line estimate)?
2017 近来 Buffett 花了大量时间赞美 Jeff Bezos 和 Amazon——他们在亏损出售数以百万计商品的同时，却在股市上创造了惊人的回报。看起来 Amazon 是通过“胜过其他人”的方式致富的。Amazon 20 年来所有报告利润的总和可能也就约 50 亿美元。若以 2017 年 5 月 30 日约每股 1,000 美元的价格，去购买一家在 2017 年日历年以每股 8 美元盈利起步的公司（Value Line 估计），Buffett 会出手吗？
看不见Jeff Bezos身上有的罕见的聪明劲。
In his book, A Short History of Financial Euphoria, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote the following, “A further rule is that when a mood of excitement pervades a market or surrounds an investment prospect, when there is a claim of unique opportunity based on special foresight, all sensible people should circle the wagons; it is time for caution.”
John Kenneth Galbraith 在其著作《A Short History of Financial Euphoria》中写道：“还有一条规则：当一种兴奋情绪弥漫市场或围绕某个投资前景之时，当有人声称凭借特殊的先见之明把握到独一无二的机会时，所有理性的人都应当拉起防线；那正是需要谨慎的时候。”
Seattle Uber drivers and Joe Kennedy's shoeshine boy are on the same page!
Seattle 的 Uber 司机与 Joe Kennedy 的擦鞋童看法一致！
Buffett in 1999 “Let me summarize what I've been saying about the stock market: I think it's very hard to come up with a persuasive case that equities will over the next 17 years perform anything like--anything like--they've performed in the past 17. If I had to pick the most probable return, from appreciation and dividends combined, that investors in aggregate--repeat, aggregate--would earn in a world of constant interest rates, 2% inflation, and those ever-hurtful frictional costs, it would be 6%. If you strip out the inflation component from this nominal return (which you would need to do however inflation fluctuates), that's 4% in real terms. And if 4% is wrong, I believe that the percentage is just as likely to be less as more.”
Buffett 在 1999 年：“让我总结一下我对股市的看法：我认为，很难提出一个令人信服的论据，证明未来 17 年的股票表现会像——哪怕接近——过去 17 年那样出色。如果非要让我在利率恒定、通胀 2%、且始终存在损人的摩擦成本的世界里，选出投资者整体（注意，是整体）从股价上涨与股息合计中最可能获得的回报，那就是 6%。如果把这一下的名义回报中的通胀因素剔除掉（无论通胀如何波动你都需要这么做），实际回报就是 4%。而如果 4% 不对，我相信更有同等概率是更低，而不是更高。”
2017 The argument is better for low returns today because the dividend rate is lower, interest rates are lower, the corporate profits margins are higher and the S&P 500 is over-weighted again in high price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio stocks. Also, expensive stocks are the most disconnected to the average stock as they've been since 1999.
2017 现在支持低回报的论据更充分：股息率更低、利率更低、企业利润率更高，而且 S&P 500 再次对高市盈率（P/E）股票超配。此外，昂贵股票与平均股票之间的背离达到了自 1999 年以来的极致。
Expensive stocks extremely expensive
昂贵股票极其昂贵
Buffett in 1999 “And there's still another major qualification to be considered. If you and I were trading pieces of our business in this room, we could escape transactional costs because there would be no brokers around to take a bite out of every trade we made. But in the real-world investors have a habit of wanting to change chairs, or of at least getting advice as to whether they should, and that costs money--big money.
1999 年的 Buffett：“还有一个重要的限定条件需要考虑。如果你我在这个房间里互相交易我们生意的一部分，我们可以免于交易成本，因为没有经纪人在每一笔交易中抽成。但在现实世界里，投资者总喜欢‘换座位’，或者至少要为是否该换座位去寻求建议，而这需要花钱——大笔花钱。”
And what do they come to? My estimate is that investors in American stocks pay out well over $100 billion a year--say, $130 billion--to move around on those chairs or to buy advice as to whether they should!”
那这些钱到底有多少？我估计，美国股市的投资者每年为此要付出远超 1000 亿美元——大约 1300 亿美元——用来‘挪座位’或购买是否该挪座位的建议！”
2017 At Smead Capital Management, we seek to hold companies for a long time, significantly reducing the frictional costs Buffett is referring to. Now that stocks are at elevated levels compared to history (as they were in 1999) and tech stocks make up nearly 25% of the index if you include Amazon and Netflix as tech stocks. Buffett is solving the expense problem by heaping praise on the S&P 500 Index and its wholesaler in chief, Jack Bogle. In case you are wondering, index funds were already up and running in 1999.
2017 在 Smead Capital Management，我们力求长期持有公司，从而大幅降低 Buffett 所说的摩擦性成本。如今，相比历史水平（就像 1999 年那样），股市处在高位；如果把 Amazon 和 Netflix 也算作科技股，科技股在指数中的权重接近 25%。Buffett 正通过大力称赞 S&P 500 指数及其“总批发商”Jack Bogle 来解决费用问题。若你想知道，1999 年指数基金就已在运行。
Together, Bogle and Buffett have created a virtuous circle in tech stocks. Buffett now praises tech stocks, apologizes for not owning them and they go up. The S&P 500 goes up because tech stocks are outperforming. Money pours into the S&P 500 which has the effect of driving up tech stocks in a new virtuous circle. Ironically, long-term historical data shows that the companies with the fastest earnings growth underperform the companies with the worst results over one-year time periods!
Bogle 和 Buffett 共同在科技股上形成了一个良性循环。Buffett 现在称赞科技股、为自己没持有而道歉，结果它们继续上涨。由于科技股表现更强，S&P 500 上涨；资金涌入 S&P 500，又反过来推高科技股，形成新的良性循环。讽刺的是，长期历史数据显示，在一年期的比较中，盈利增长最快的公司往往跑输业绩最差的公司！
Buffett in 1999 “I won't dwell on other glamorous businesses that dramatically changed our lives but concurrently failed to deliver rewards to US investors: the manufacture of radios and televisions, for example. But I will draw a lesson from these businesses: The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.”
1999 年的 Buffett：“我不会细说那些极大改变了我们生活、却未能同时给美国投资者带来回报的光鲜行业：比如收音机和电视的制造业。但我会从这些行业中得出一个教训：投资的关键不在于评估某个行业将对社会产生多大影响，或它会增长到多大规模，而在于判断某家特定公司的竞争优势，以及最重要的——这种优势的持久性。”
2017 Standard Oil, AT&T and the railroads had very wide moats before they were broken up or regulated. It is not just us that seem to recognize the risks to the US economy and to the share prices of the most popular technology stocks. Many of the leading business news organizations have recently written about either breaking up or regulating one or more of the FANG stocks. Our favorite writer on the subject is Farhad Manjoo from The New York Times who has dubbed the FANG stocks the “frightful five”. Our question is, are Senator Elizabeth Warren and Senator Chuck Schumer listening?
2017 在被拆分或纳管之前，Standard Oil、AT&T 和铁路都有极宽的护城河。认识到这对美国经济和最受欢迎科技股股价的风险的，不止我们。许多主流商业媒体近期都在讨论拆分或监管一个或多个 FANG 股票。我们最喜欢的相关作者是《The New York Times》的 Farhad Manjoo，他把 FANG 股票称为“frightful five”。我们的问题是：参议员 Elizabeth Warren 和参议员 Chuck Schumer 在听吗？
这样的傻子居然从事投资？
Buffett in 2006 “Once a price history develops, and people hear that their neighbor made a lot of money on something, that impulse takes over, and we're seeing that in commodities and housing...Orgies tend to be wildest toward the end. It's like being Cinderella at the ball. You know that at midnight everything's going to turn back to pumpkins & mice.”4
2006 年的 Buffett：“一旦价格历史形成，人们听说邻居靠某物赚了大钱，这种冲动就会占上风；我们在大宗商品和房地产上都看到了这种现象……狂欢往往在尾声最为放纵。这就像灰姑娘的舞会。你知道午夜一到，一切都会变回南瓜和老鼠。”4
2017 At Smead Capital Management, we are very grateful for the wisdom and kind education Buffett has extended to us and other investors. However, even Buffett makes mistakes occasionally. Buffett called Coke and Gillette the "Inevitables" in the late 1990's when he should have sold his holdings. He amassed a position in ConocoPhillips between February of 2006 and the summer of 2008 near the 20-year high in oil prices. He travelled to China in September of 2010 at the height of the China, emerging market and commodity hype. He and Munger heaped praise on the guy running BYD when they should have been selling every share. Now, he has entered the FANG-stock orgy, a lot closer to midnight than to 4 o’clock pm, while the S&P 500 Index is at a juncture with lower interest rates and higher profit margins than his warning speech in 1999.
2017 在 Smead Capital Management，我们非常感谢 Buffett 给予我们和其他投资者的智慧与教诲。然而，即便是 Buffett 也偶有失误。20 世纪 90 年代末，他称 Coke 和 Gillette 为“必然赢家”，当时他其实应该卖出持仓。2006 年 2 月至 2008 年夏天，他在油价接近 20 年高位时大量买入 ConocoPhillips。2010 年 9 月，他在中国、 新兴市场与大宗商品最火热之际前往中国。他和 Munger 对 BYD 的掌舵者大加称赞，而他们本应卖掉每一股。现在，他加入了 FANG 股的狂欢，离“午夜”更近，而非“下午四点”；与此同时，S&P 500 指数所处的利率更低、利润率更高的节点，比他 1999 年的警示时点更为极端。
We have already “rounded up the wagons” concerning the rabid mania in glamour tech stocks. As contrarians, we relish expecting higher interest rates and a better economy, which moves the economic spoils away from technology stocks toward household formation, child bearing and more useful endeavors which come with them! Someday in the future, when the great tech companies have stumbled and the crowd is long gone, we will go shopping among those which survive and prosper.
对于炙手可热的“光鲜科技股”狂热，我们已经“围起了马车”。作为逆向投资者，我们乐于预期更高的利率与更健康的经济，这将把经济收益从科技股转向家庭形成、生育以及随之而来的更有用的事业！将来的某一天，当伟大的科技公司遭遇挫折、人群早已散去时，我们会在那些幸存并繁荣的公司中“淘宝”。
脑残，如果真的有自己关注的点，怎么会这么关注宏观的股票市场？这跟个股有多大的关系？
Warm Regards, William Smead
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