2018-02-14 Here’s What 1999 Warren Buffett Might Say About the 2018 Stock Market

Refer To：《Here’s What 1999 Warren Buffett Might Say About the 2018 Stock Market》。

Last week’s big selloff isn’t fazing Wall Street’s bulls. In early February, analysts and market strategists from Wells Fargo, Invesco, and UBS, among several others, declared on CNBC that the stock market will rebound to post gains of 10% or more for 2018.

上周的大幅抛售并未让华尔街的多头动摇。2月上旬，来自Wells Fargo、Invesco和UBS等机构的分析师与市场策略师在CNBC上表示，股市将反弹，并在2018年录得10%或以上的涨幅。

The optimists invariably present a seemingly super-rational explanation: The steep decline is mainly market noise, when what really matters is the strong outlook for America’s economy. In their view, the economy’s excellent metrics are the “fundamentals,” the essential forces, bound to keep propelling equities.

乐观派总会给出一个看似“超理性”的解释：这次急跌主要是市场噪音，真正重要的是美国经济的强劲前景。在他们看来，亮眼的经济指标才是“基本面”，是必将持续推动股市上行的根本力量。

In reality, the bulls are confusing two kinds of “fundamentals.” The economic fundamentals are indeed strong. The stock market’s fundamentals are lousy.

事实是，多头把两类“基本面”混为一谈。经济层面的基本面确实强劲；而股市层面的基本面却很糟糕。

To understand why, the best guide is a 1999 article that distilled Warren Buffett’s views on the factors that drive stock prices, and why they spelled danger at the time. The story (“Mr. Buffett and the Market,” Fortune 11/22/1999) was adapted by the great Fortune writer Carol Loomis from two informal talks that Buffett delivered that year.

要理解为何如此，最好的参照是一篇发表于1999年的文章，它提炼了Warren Buffett对推动股价因素的看法，并解释了当时为何已显露风险。这篇文章（“Mr. Buffett and the Market,” Fortune 1999年11月22日）由《Fortune》的资深记者Carol Loomis依据Buffett当年两次非正式演讲改写而成。

In that evergreen piece, Buffett explains that at any point in time, two variables are most influential in predicting future returns: The level of interest rates, and the ratio of corporate profits to national income. For Buffett, those are the fundamentals, the twin pistons that power stocks. If rates are extremely low, and profits extremely high, at the start of any period, it’s likely that returns over the next decade or more will most likely be poor. Since those are precisely today’s conditions, investors should pay close attention to Buffett’s analysis.

在那篇常读常新的文章中，Buffett指出，在任何时点，用于预测未来回报、影响力最大的两个变量是：利率水平，以及企业利润占GDP的比例。对Buffett而言，这两者才是基本面，是驱动股市的“双活塞”。若某一时期伊始利率极低而利润极高，那么接下来十年乃至更长时间的回报大概率会很差。鉴于这正是当下的环境，投资者应高度重视Buffett的分析。

What earnings and rates tell us

收益与利率告诉了我们什么

According to Buffett’s analysis, the principal fundamental that guides Wall Street, the prospect of strong economic growth, is actually relatively unimportant in forecasting the performance of equities. For example, Buffett shows that if profits are already extremely elevated today, they’re likely to lag in the future, even if the economy expands at a brisker-than-average pace.

依照Buffett的分析，引导华尔街叙事的核心——强劲经济增长的前景——对预测股市表现其实并不那么重要。比如，Buffett指出，如果当下利润已处于极高水平，即便经济以快于平均的速度扩张，未来利润也很可能落后。

胡扯，每个白痴都只看到自己想看到的内容，GDP的增速显然影响企业利润的增速。

Today’s boosters keep talking about the “disconnect” between a sunny climate for business and the sudden drop in equity prices, and claim that it makes no sense. They predict that stocks and the economy will soon advance shoulder-to-shoulder. Buffett is warning about a different disconnect: Super-high prices and rampant optimism, versus fundamental factors signaling lean times ahead.

当下的鼓吹者不断谈论商业环境的“晴空万里”与股价突跌之间的“背离”，并称其不合常理。他们预测股市与经济将很快齐头并进。Buffett警示的却是另一种背离：超高的价格与泛滥的乐观，正与基本因素所发出的“前路清淡”的信号相冲突。

Buffett compares how these fundamentals at the start of each period shaped the market’s performance over two, seventeen-year spans. The first ran from the end of 1964 through 1981. In that entire interval, stock prices registered zero gains. The big hammer was an astounding jump in interest rates.

Buffett比较了两个17年区间起点处这些基本面如何塑造后续市场表现。第一个区间从1964年末至1981年。在这整段时期，股价几乎毫无涨幅。致命打击来自利率的惊人飙升。

As Buffett states in the article, “The higher the rate, the greater the downward pull. That’s because the rates of return that investors need from any kind of investment are directly tied to the risk-free rate that they can earn from government securities.” The period dawned with the 10-year treasury yielding 4%, well below its historic average of 5%-plus. By late 1981, that number had more than tripled to 15%. Corporate profits also performed poorly, sagging from 6.9% of GDP–the high end of their normal range of 4% to 6.5%–to 3.5%.

正如Buffett在文中所言：“利率越高，下拉的力量越大。因为投资者对任何资产所要求的回报率，都直接系于他们从政府债券可获得的无风险利率。”该时期伊始，10年期国债收益率为4%，显著低于其超过5%的历史均值；到1981年末，这一数字已翻逾两倍至15%。企业利润表现也很差，从占GDP的6.9%（位于其4%至6.5%常态区间的高端）下滑至3.5%。

Although Buffett doesn’t specify what caused the spike, that particular jump in yields came from two sources. The first is the trend that automatically lowers the prices of all other assets, a rise in the “real” rate, measured by 10-year Treasury yield adjusted for inflation. In good times, the “real” rate increases when demand for capital swells, typically when companies eye lots of profitable opportunities in a thriving economy.

尽管Buffett并未详述利率飙升的成因，但这波收益率跃升主要源于两方面。其一是“实际利率”的上升（以经通胀调整的10年期国债收益率衡量），它会自动压低其他资产的估值。在景气期，当资本需求膨胀、企业在繁荣经济中看到大量可获利机会时，“实际利率”往往上行。

But it can also jump when the economic outlook is highly uncertain, so that nervous creditors demand a big cushion as insurance against tough times ahead, and when heavy the government to borrowing competes for America’s savings, inflating the cost of credit for the private sector. Both of those forces were at work in the late 1970s through the end of our time frame, 1981: The economy was wrestling with crushing oil prices, and huge deficits swelled federal borrowing. In 1981, the real rate hit almost 6%, still the highest level in more than four decades.

但在经济前景高度不确定时，实际利率也会跳升：紧张的债权人会要求更大的“缓冲”以对冲潜在逆风；同时政府的大规模借款与私人部门争夺美国的储蓄，抬高社会信贷成本。上述两股力量在20世纪70年代末至我们区间终点1981年期间同时发力：经济饱受高企油价之苦，巨额赤字推高联邦借款。到1981年，实际利率逼近6%，依然是四十多年里的最高水平。

But another bogeyman haunted equities: rampant inflation, ignited by OPEC’s tripling of oil prices. A climate of exploding, unpredictable prices shrouds investors in a thick fog. They lose confidence in the nation’s economic leadership, and fret that companies can’t raise prices as fast as costs. All told, high inflation makes stocks look a lot riskier, and hence investors demand steep discounts to compensate for a potentially treacherous times ahead.

但困扰股市的另一个“妖魔”是肆虐的通胀，其导火索是OPEC把油价提高了三倍。价格爆炸且难以预期的环境令投资者如坠浓雾：他们对国家经济治理失去信心，担心企业提价无法跟上成本上涨。总而言之，高通胀让股票显得风险陡增，因而投资者会要求更大的折价来补偿潜在的凶险前景。

The second period runs from the start of 1982 until the end of 1998. This time, the starting point was incredibly high rates, and extraordinarily low profits. For Buffett, that was the best of all places to launch, because a mere return to normal in both categories guaranteed super results. And super they were. The reason wasn’t an explosion in GDP, confirming Buffett’s view that overall growth isn’t a critical factor in equity returns. In fact, national income increased a lot less than it had in the previous period. Once again, it was an historic drop in rates, engineered by Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, that brought the biggest benefits. By late 1998, the 10-year yield had dropped by ten points, to 5%. Profits also rebounded strongly, gaining 1.8 points to reach 5.3% of national income. Profits thrived not because GDP growth was great, but simply because they reclaimed a normal share of national income.

第二个阶段从1982年初持续到1998年末。此次的起点是极其高企的利率与异常低迷的利润。对Warren Buffett而言，这是最理想的出发点，因为只要这两项回到常态，就几乎锁定了出色的结果。事实也确实如此。驱动力并非GDP的爆发式增长，这印证了Buffett的观点：总体增长并不是股市回报的关键因素。实际上，国民收入的增速远低于前一阶段。再次成为决定性因素的是在美联储主席Paul Volcker主导下出现的历史性降息。到1998年末，10年期收益率下行了10个百分点至5%。利润也强劲反弹，上升1.8个百分点，达到国民收入的5.3%。利润之所以改善，不是因为GDP增长有多好，而是它们重新夺回了在国民收入中的正常份额。

事后证明这一时间的繁荣的最重要原因是估值。

A glum prediction comes true

一个阴郁的预言成真

The point of Buffett’s analysis was to assess the outlook in 1999, at the end of that fabulous run. Just as the gargantuan yields and sub-par earnings in 1982 heralded great returns to come, he predicted, below-average rates and excellent profits in 1999 foreshadowed mediocre times ahead. Buffett stated that investors who expected double-digit returns would be sorely disappointed. “Investors in stocks these days are expecting far too much,” Buffett said, forecasting that folks would reap total returns, including dividends, of a maximum of 6.5% a year.

Buffett这番分析的目的是在那段辉煌行情结束后的1999年评估前景。正如1982年的超高收益率与偏低利润预示了未来的优异回报一样，他预言，1999年的低于均值的利率与出色利润预示着前方只是平庸的年代。Buffett表示，期待两位数回报的投资者会大失所望。“如今投资股票的人期待过高，”Buffett说，他预测包括股息在内的年化总回报最多为6.5%。

Buffett predicted that the neither of the two big drivers was likely to improve from their current levels, because they’d already registered such favorable moves in the previous period. In effect, he said, the two big fundamentals had run out of room. In that sense, he was wrong: the 10-year Treasury yield fell from 4.6% to 2.2% by the end of 2015, and profits as a share of GDP rose from 5.2% to 8.8%. But a two headwinds blunted those forces. First, the economy, hammered by the financial crisis, grew at a pokey average of just 2% a year. So while profits took a bigger share of national income, it was largely because earnings grew at decent rates while GDP lagged.

Buffett预测，这两大驱动因素都不太可能在当时水平上进一步改善，因为它们在上一个时期已经取得了极为有利的变化。换言之，这两项基本面已“无路可走”。从这个意义上看，他错了：到2015年末，10年期美债收益率从4.6%降至2.2%，而企业利润占GDP的比重从5.2%升至8.8%。但两股逆风削弱了这些有利因素。其一，受金融危机打击，经济年均增速仅约2%，步履蹒跚。因而，虽然利润在国民收入中占比提高，很大程度上是因为企业盈利维持了尚可的增速，而GDP却落后。

But the markets suffered a counter-punch that Buffett warned about–a big contraction in valuations. Buffett observed that stocks were extremely pricey in 1999. The multiple investors award earnings, the amount they’re willing to pay for each dollar in profits, stood at a towering 33. Buffett noted that investors might not be willing to pay such rich prices for long. And they weren’t. From 1999 to 2015, the S&P 500’s P/E fell from 33 to 23.5, a decline of almost 30%. And even though the last seven years of that span (2009-15) included a roaring bull market, all told, stocks performed even worse than Buffett predicted. The S&P gained a mere 3% a year. So adding the 1.5% starting dividend yield, the total return came to just 4.5%.

但市场遭遇了Buffett所警示的反击——估值的大幅收缩。Buffett指出，1999年的股票价格极其昂贵。投资者给予盈利的倍数——也就是每1美元利润愿意支付的价格——高达惊人的33倍。Buffett提醒说，投资者不太可能长期愿意支付如此高昂的价格。事实亦然：1999年至2015年，标普500的市盈率从33倍降至23.5倍，跌幅接近30%。尽管该区间的后七年（2009—2015）伴随了一轮澎湃的牛市，但总体表现仍弱于Buffett的预测。标普500年均仅上涨约3%。加上期初1.5%的股息率，总回报也只有4.5%。

Warning signals

警示信号

So what does Buffett’s methodology tell us about the current period? The basics signaling low future returns either remain just as extreme as in 2015, or have only become more so. The 10-year yield has risen sharply in the last year, but still sits at 2.84%, putting the “real” rate at less than just 1%. Profits have kept claiming larger and larger shares of national income. The ratio of earnings to national income is now 9.4%, or 50% higher than its long-term average.

那么，按照 Buffett 的方法论，当前时期意味着什么？那些预示未来回报低迷的基本指标要么仍与 2015 年一样极端，要么更加恶化。过去一年里 10 年期国债收益率大幅上升，但仍停留在 2.84%，将“实际”利率压至不足 1%。企业利润持续占据国民收入的更大份额，如今利润占国民收入的比例达到 9.4%，比长期均值高出 50%。

Listen to Buffett in 1999: “If an investor is to achieve juicy profits in the market over the next ten years or 17 or 20, one or more of three things must happen: (1) Interest rates must fall further. (2) Corporate profitability in relation to GDP must rise.”

请听 1999 年的 Buffett 所言：“如果投资者想在未来十年、十七年或二十年里在市场上获得丰厚回报，必须满足三件事中的一件或多件：(1) 利率必须进一步下降。(2) 企业盈利相对于 GDP 的占比必须上升。”

Today, Buffett’s two main fundamentals are much more stretched than in 1999, when he wrongly believed that they’d reached the danger point. Rates are already rising, and more Fed rate hikes are on the way. With unemployment at near-record lows, companies are finally raising wages to attract workers. As a result, labor will get a bigger share of national income in the years to come, putting the squeeze on profits. That reversal means that earnings-per-share will likely lag GDP.

如今，Buffett 所强调的两大基本面比 1999 年更为紧绷，而他当时已认为它们达到了危险点。利率正在上升，而且更多的美联储加息即将到来。随着失业率接近历史低位，企业终于提高工资以吸引员工。因此，未来几年劳动将占据更大的国民收入份额，从而压缩利润空间。这种逆转意味着每股收益可能落后于 GDP 增长。

But the third factor Buffett mentioned further darkens the outlook. That when momentum takes charge. “Once a bull market gets underway,” he warns, “and once you reach the point where everybody has made money no matter what the system he or she followed, a crowd is attracted into the game that is responding not to interest rates and profits but simply to the fact that it seems a mistake to be out of stocks. In effect, people superimpose an I-can’t-miss-the-party factor on top of the fundamental factors that drive the market.”

但巴菲特提到的第三个因素进一步让前景黯淡。那就是一旦动量主导。“一旦牛市开始，”他警告说，“一旦达到人人都赚钱、不论他们遵循何种体系的地步，就会有一群人被吸引进来，他们并不是根据利率和利润作出反应，而仅仅因为看起来不参与股票是个错误。实际上，人们在驱动市场的基本因素之上叠加了‘我不能错过这个派对’的因素。”

Too much momentum

动能过剩

Today, it sure looks like momentum is swamping the fundamentals. The P/E, based on trailing GAAP earnings over the past four quarters, stands at a still lofty 25. Even that number greatly understates how expensive equities really are, since earnings are hovering at historic, probably unsustainable, highs.

如今看来，动能行情显然正淹没基本面。按过去四个季度的 GAAP 追溯盈利计算，市盈率仍高达 25 倍。即便如此，这个数字仍大大低估了股票真正的昂贵程度，因为当前盈利正徘徊在历史、且大概率难以持续的高位。

The 1999 article marked one of the few times that Buffett discussed the general level of stock prices. In recent interviews, he’s declined to take a stance on whether stocks are excessively expensive. So in no way does this article purport to reflect current Buffett’s thinking.

那篇 1999 年的文章是 Buffett 少数几次讨论整体股价水平的作品之一。近年的访谈中，他已不愿再就股价是否过高表态。因此，本文并未试图代表 Buffett 当前的观点。

相比于2018年，2015-16年的基本面更差，基准利率接近于零，企业税后利润占GDP处于9-10%的高位，巴菲特在这个时期买入不少的企业，包括AAPL。

But Buffett’s 1999 primer provides the tools for assessing what’s ahead. It appears that the legendary investor never imagined that his fundamentals could keep testing new limits. Now, that they’ve gone beyond the probable limits he outlined 19 years ago, it’s hard to imagine that rates and profits can go anywhere but in the wrong direction.

然而，Buffett 1999 年的“入门指南”依旧提供评估未来的工具。看上去，这位传奇投资者当年并未料到，他所强调的那些基本面竟能持续刷新极限。如今，它们已越过他 19 年前所描绘的“可能上限”，很难想象利率与利润接下来会朝着有利方向发展。

就像农业在整个经济中的比重越来越低，实物类的工业在整个经济中的比重也会越来越低，GOOG/MSFT/AMZN/META，这些企业做的都是软件和体验类的经济，利润率远远超过传统企业。

Buffett was predicting mediocre returns in 1999, when the fundamentals weren’t nearly this stretched. Now, a shift to normal would mean a future that’s worse than mediocre, a lot worse. The careening market is the first sign that the journey may have begun.

在 1999 年，基本面远未如此紧绷时，Buffett 就预计回报将趋于平庸。如今若回归正常水平，未来恐怕不止“平庸”，而是远逊于平庸。当前摇摇欲坠的市场，也许正是这场旅程已经启程的首个信号。

2018-02-14 Here’s What 1999 Warren Buffett Might Say About the 2018 Stock Market

2018-02-14 Here’s What 1999 Warren Buffett Might Say About the 2018 Stock Market

What earnings and rates tell us

A glum prediction comes true

Warning signals

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