2018-04-02 Ben Thompson.The End of Windows

Refer To：《The End of Windows》。

The story of Windows’ decline is relatively straightforward and a classic case of disruption:

Windows 衰落的故事相对直白，是一个典型的“颠覆”案例：

1、The Internet dramatically reduced application lock-in

互联网显著降低了应用程序的锁定效应

2、PCs became “good enough”, elongating the upgrade cycle

PC 变得“足够好”，从而拉长了升级周期

3、Smartphones first addressed needs the PC couldn’t, then over time started taking over PC functionality directly

智能手机先满足了 PC 无法覆盖的需求，随后逐步直接接管了 PC 的功能

What is more interesting, though, is the story of Windows’ decline in Redmond, culminating with last week’s reorganization that, for the first time since 1980, left the company without a division devoted to personal computer operating systems (Windows was split, with the core engineering group placed under Azure, and the rest of the organization effectively under Office 365; there will still be Windows releases, but it is no longer a standalone business). Such a move didn’t seem possible a mere five years ago, when, in the context of another reorganization, former-CEO Steve Ballmer wrote a memo insisting that Windows was the future (emphasis mine):

不过，更有意思的是 Windows 在 Redmond 衰落的过程，并在上周的重组中达到高潮——自 1980 年以来公司首次不再拥有一个专门负责个人计算机操作系统的事业部（Windows 被拆分：核心工程团队归入 Azure，其余组织实际上归入 Office 365；Windows 仍会发布新版本，但它不再是一个独立的业务）。仅仅五年前，这样的举动还看似不可能；当时在另一轮重组的背景下，前 CEO Steve Ballmer 写了一份备忘录，坚称 Windows 才是未来（强调为我所加）：

In the critical choice today of digital ecosystems, Microsoft has an unmatched advantage in work and productivity experiences, and has a unique ability to drive unified services for everything from tasks and documents to entertainment, games and communications. I am convinced that by deploying our smart-cloud assets across a range of devices, we can make Windows devices once again the devices to own. Other companies provide strong experiences, but in their own way they are each fragmented and limited. Microsoft is best positioned to take advantage of the power of one, and bring it to our over 1 billion users.

在当下对数字生态系统的关键抉择中，Microsoft 在工作与生产力体验上拥有无可匹敌的优势，并且具备独一无二的能力，能够为从任务、文档到娱乐、游戏与通信的一切提供统一的服务。我深信，只要把我们的智能云（smart-cloud）资产部署到各种设备之上，我们就能让 Windows 设备再次成为人们“必须拥有”的设备。其他公司也能提供强大的体验，但各走各路，因此各有割裂与局限。Microsoft 处在最有利的位置，可以利用“一体化”的力量，并把它带给我们超过 10 亿的用户。

That memo prompted me to write a post entitled Services, Not Devices that argued that Ballmer’s strategic priorities were exactly backwards: Microsoft’s services should be businesses in their own right, not Windows’ differentiators. Ballmer, though, followed-through on his memo by buying Nokia; it speaks to Microsoft’s dysfunction that he was allowed to spend billions on a deal that allegedly played a large role in his ouster.

那份备忘录促使我写了一篇题为 Services, Not Devices 的文章，主张 Ballmer 的战略轻重完全本末倒置：Microsoft 的服务本应是独立的生意，而不是 Windows 的差异化点。不过，Ballmer 依旧按备忘录行事，收购了 Nokia；他被允许花数十亿美元完成一笔据称在其被迫离职中扮演重要角色的交易，这恰好说明了 Microsoft 的失灵。

似是而非的东西。

That dysfunction was The Curse of Culture:

这种失灵正是“文化的诅咒”（The Curse of Culture）：

Culture is not something that begets success, rather, it is a product of it. All companies start with the espoused beliefs and values of their founder(s), but until those beliefs and values are proven correct and successful they are open to debate and change. If, though, they lead to real sustained success, then those values and beliefs slip from the conscious to the unconscious, and it is this transformation that allows companies to maintain the “secret sauce” that drove their initial success even as they scale. The founder no longer needs to espouse his or her beliefs and values to the 10,000th employee; every single person already in the company will do just that, in every decision they make, big or small.

文化并不是成功的起因，反而是成功的产物。所有公司都从创始人所宣示的信念与价值观出发，但在这些信念与价值观被证明是正确并带来成功之前，它们都可以被讨论、被改变。然而，如果它们带来了真正持续的成功，那么这些信念与价值观就会从有意识层面滑向无意识层面。正是这种转变，使企业在规模扩张的同时，仍能保持推动其最初成功的“秘方”。创始人不再需要向第 10,000 名员工反复阐述他的信念与价值观；公司里的每一个人都会在自己大小决策中去做同样的事。

As with most such things, culture is one of a company’s most powerful assets right until it isn’t: the same underlying assumptions that permit an organization to scale massively constrain the ability of that same organization to change direction. More distressingly, culture prevents organizations from even knowing they need to do so.

和多数此类事物一样，文化是公司最强大的资产之一——直到它不再是为止：那些让组织得以大规模扩张的底层假设，恰恰也极大限制了该组织转向的能力。更糟的是，文化甚至会让组织连“需要转向”这件事都无从觉察。

Thus my assertion at the top, that the story of how Microsoft came to accept the reality of Windows’ decline is more interesting than the fact of Windows’ decline; this is how CEO Satya Nadella convinced the company to accept the obvious.

因此，我在开头的判断是，Microsoft 如何接受 Windows 衰落这一现实的过程，比“Windows 的确在衰落”这一事实本身更有意思；CEO Satya Nadella 正是这样让公司接受显而易见的事实的。

跟文化有个屁的关系，是基础性质的服务很难提价并且容易触及社会共识中比较敏感的地方，生活中的水、电、移动宽带的服务都是垄断的但都不能随意提价并赚取超额收益。

The Easy Win: Office on iPad

轻松得分：iPad 版 Office

A month after taking over as CEO, Nadella introduced Office for iPad. Quite obviously, given the timing, the work had been done under Ballmer; some reports suggest the initiative in fact started years previously. Ballmer, though, wouldn’t release it until there was a touch version for Windows 8; some wonder if he would have ever released it at all.

在接任 CEO 一个月后，Nadella 发布了 iPad 版 Office。很明显，从时间点看，这项工作是在 Ballmer 任内完成的；一些报道甚至称该计划早在数年前就已启动。不过，Ballmer 坚持要等到有 Windows 8 的触控版本才肯发布；甚至有人怀疑他是否会真的放行。

It’s all a bit of a moot point; in the end Ballmer’s delay gave Nadella an easy win that symbolized the exact shift in mindset Microsoft needed: non-Windows platforms would be targets for Microsoft services, not competitors for Windows.

这在某种意义上已无关紧要；最终，Ballmer 的拖延让 Nadella 轻松赢下一局，而这正象征着 Microsoft 所需的心态转变：非 Windows 平台将成为 Microsoft 服务的目标，而不是 Windows 的竞争对手。

That wasn’t the only news that week: Microsoft also renamed its cloud service from Windows Azure to Microsoft Azure. The name change was an obvious one — by then customers could already run a whole host of non-Windows related software, including Linux — but the symbolism tied in perfectly with the Office on iPad announcement: Windows wouldn’t be forced onto Microsoft’s future.

那一周的消息不止如此：Microsoft 还把其云服务从 Windows Azure 更名为 Microsoft Azure。这个更名显而易见——当时客户已经能够运行大量与 Windows 无关的软件，包括 Linux——但其象征意义与 iPad 版 Office 的发布完全呼应：Windows 不会被强行塞入 Microsoft 的未来。

The Demotion: Nadella’s First Strategy Memo

降位：Nadella 的第一封战略备忘录

It was another three months before Nadella wrote his first company-wide strategy memo explicitly departing from his predecessor:

又过了三个月，Nadella 才写下第一封面向全公司的战略备忘录，明确背离其前任的路径：

More recently, we have described ourselves as a “devices and services” company. While the devices and services description was helpful in starting our transformation, we now need to hone in on our unique strategy. At our core, Microsoft is the productivity and platform company for the mobile-first and cloud-first world. We will reinvent productivity to empower every person and every organization on the planet to do more and achieve more.

近来，我们把自己描述为一家“设备与服务”公司。虽然“设备与服务”的表述有助于开启我们的转型，但现在我们需要聚焦于独特的战略。从核心看，Microsoft 是一家面向“移动为先、云为先”世界的生产力与平台公司。我们将重塑生产力，使地球上每个人和每个组织能够做得更多、成就更多。

What is striking about this articulation of “productivity and platforms” is that it is exactly how Nadella reorganized the company last week; the “Experiences & Devices” team is focused on end-user productivity, while the “Cloud + AI” team is all about building the platform of the future. The reason it took so long is the point of this article — Nadella had a Windows problem.

这段对“生产力与平台”的表述之所以引人注意，是因为它正是 Nadella 上周重组公司的方式；“Experiences & Devices” 团队聚焦终端用户的生产力，而 “Cloud + AI” 团队则致力于构建未来的平台。之所以花了这么久，正是本文的要点——Nadella 面临一个 Windows 问题。

To that end, the most important aspect of Nadella’s memo was not what he said about Windows, but where he said it. I wrote in a Daily Update breaking down the memo:

为此，Nadella 这份备忘录中最重要的并非他对 Windows 说了什么，而是他在“哪里”说的。我在一篇 Daily Update 中这样解析这份备忘录：

Trust me when I say demoting Windows all the way to this point in the letter is a dramatic shift. Remember, it wasn’t that long ago that Steve Ballmer said “Nothing is More Important at Microsoft than Windows”; Nadella not even mentioning the OS for the first 2,000 words sends a very different message. Similarly, spending nothing more than a sentence on Surface and Nokia — in the entire email, the word “Surface” appears twice and “Nokia” once — makes it as clear as can be that neither is the future.

请相信我，把 Windows 在这封信里一路降格到这个位置，是一个巨大的转变。要知道，不久之前 Steve Ballmer 还说过“在 Microsoft，没有什么比 Windows 更重要”；而 Nadella 在前 2,000 个词里甚至没有提到这个操作系统，传达的信息截然不同。同样地，对 Surface 和 Nokia 只字略带一句——整封邮件里，“Surface”只出现了两次，“Nokia”只出现了一次——已经清清楚楚地表明，它们都不是未来。

This was the next step after the initial symbolism of Office on iPad and the Azure name change: actually articulating a future where Windows didn’t matter.

这就是在 iPad 版 Office 与 Azure 更名带来的初步象征之后的下一步：真正勾勒一个 Windows 不再关键的未来。

Nadella做对一些事情看着只是承认了现实，而不是真正理解了本质。

The Retreat: Love Windows

撤退：Love Windows

Nadella, though, had a short-term problem: Microsoft’s most important customers — enterprises — hated Windows 8. The operating system may not have been Microsoft’s future, but it was still a massive cash cow, and the linchpin for all of Microsoft’s legacy products. To that end the company needed Windows 10 to get out the door sooner-rather-than-later.

不过，Nadella 面临一个短期问题：Microsoft 最重要的客户——企业用户——讨厌 Windows 8。这个操作系统或许不是 Microsoft 的未来，但它仍是一头巨大的“现金奶牛”，并且是所有微软传统产品的关键枢纽。为此，公司需要尽快把 Windows 10 推向市场，越早越好。

This, I think, is the context for Nadella’s presentation at a January, 2015 event about Windows 10; Nadella said:

我认为，这就是 2015 年 1 月 Nadella 在一场有关 Windows 10 活动上演讲的背景；Nadella 说：

We absolutely believe that Windows is home for the very best of Microsoft experiences. There’s nothing subtle about this strategy. It’s a practical approach which is customer first. We want to give ourselves the best opportunity to serve our customers everywhere and give ourselves the best chance to help customers find Windows as their home. That’s what we plan to do…We need to move from people needing Windows to choosing Windows to loving Windows…We want to make Windows 10 the most loved release of Windows.

我们坚信，Windows 是承载 Microsoft 最佳体验的“家”。这项战略毫不含糊。它是一种以客户为先、务实的路径。我们希望给自己创造最佳机会，在任何地方服务客户，并尽可能帮助客户把 Windows 视为他们的“家”。这就是我们的计划……我们需要把人们对 Windows 的关系，从“需要 Windows”，过渡到“选择 Windows”，再到“热爱 Windows”……我们要让 Windows 10 成为最受喜爱的 Windows 版本。

At the time I was very disappointed; suggesting that Microsoft experiences needed to be “best” on Windows suggested that Windows was dictating the direction of Microsoft services. A few months later, though, once Windows 10 shipped, Nadella made clear this was only a temporary retreat.

当时我非常失望；声称 Microsoft 的体验必须在 Windows 上“最佳”，意味着 Windows 正在支配 Microsoft 服务的方向。不过，在几个月后 Windows 10 发货之后，Nadella 明确表示这只是一次暂时的撤退。

The Quarantine: Nadella’s First Reorganization

隔离：Nadella 的第一次重组

That summer Nadella undertook his first reorganization, separating the company into three divisions: Cloud and Enterprise, Applications and Services, and Windows and Devices. I wrote in a Daily Update:

那年夏天，Nadella 进行首次重组，将公司拆分为三个部门：Cloud and Enterprise、Applications and Services，以及 Windows and Devices。我在一篇 Daily Update 中写道：

This explicitly undoes Ballmer’s ill-considered reorganization from a divisional company to an allegedly functional organization. At the time Ballmer wrote:

这明确推翻了 Ballmer 欠考虑的重组——把一家事业部制公司改造成所谓的职能型组织。当时 Ballmer 写道：

We are rallying behind a single strategy as one company — not a collection of divisional strategies…

我们作为一家统一的公司围绕一项单一战略集结——而不是一堆事业部战略的拼盘……

This was exactly wrong: by that point Microsoft had already lost the devices war and needed to focus on services that worked on iOS and Android. A “One Microsoft” strategy, on the other hand, kept all of those services subservient to Windows. However, with this new reorganization, Windows is off in the corner where it belongs, leaving the Cloud and Enterprise team and Applications and Services Group free to focus on building their businesses on top of all platforms.

这恰恰是错误的：到那时 Microsoft 已经输掉了设备之战，需要把精力转向能在 iOS 和 Android 上运行的服务。而所谓“One Microsoft”的战略反过来让所有这些服务都从属于 Windows。不过，随着这次新重组，Windows 被放到了它应在的角落里，让 Cloud and Enterprise 团队与 Applications and Services 团队得以自由地在所有平台之上打造各自的业务。

I believe this reorganization was the turning point: not only were the two teams Nadella announced last week basically formed at this time, but more importantly, Windows was left to fend for itself.

我认为这次重组是转折点：Nadella 上周宣布的那两个团队基本上在这时就已成形，更重要的是，Windows 被留在一旁自谋生路。

承认现实，利用企业客户对MSFT特别是对Office还有忠诚做好当下可以做的事。

The Inception: The Death of Windows Phone

肇始：Windows Phone 的终结

Nadella’s most impressive bit of jujitsu was how he killed Windows Phone; while the platform had obviously been dead in the water for years, Nadella didn’t imperiously axe the program. Instead, by isolating Windows, he let the division’s leadership come to that conclusion on their own.

Nadella 最令人印象深刻的“借力打力”是他如何终结 Windows Phone；尽管这个平台显然多年来已毫无生机，Nadella 并没有专断地一刀砍掉项目。相反，他通过“隔离”Windows，让该事业部的领导层自己得出这个结论。

Naturally, departing Windows-head Terry Myerson blamed the rest of the company, stating, “When I look back on our journey in mobility, we’ve done hard work and had great ideas, but have not always had the alignment needed across the company to make an impact.” I wrote at the time:

自然地，离任的 Windows 负责人 Terry Myerson 把责任推给公司其他部分称：“回顾我们的移动业务历程，我们付出了艰苦努力，也有过很好的想法，但我们并不总是能在全公司范围内达成实现影响所需的一致。”我当时写道：

This is such an utterly clueless explanation of why Windows Phone failed that it’s kind of stunning. Until, of course, you remember the culture-induced myopia I described yesterday: Myerson still has the Ballmer-esque presumption that Microsoft controlled its own destiny and could have leveraged its assets (like Office) to win the smartphone market, ignoring that by virtue of being late Windows Phone was a product competing against ecosystems, which meant no consumer demand, which meant no developers, topped off by the arrogance to dictate to OEMs and carriers what they could and could not do to the phone, destroying any chance at leveraging distribution to get critical mass…

这种对 Windows Phone 失败原因的解释全然不着边际，几乎令人目瞪口呆。除非，你还记得我昨天所说的“文化导致的近视”：Myerson 依然抱持 Ballmer 式的预设，认为 Microsoft 掌控自己的命运，可以借助自身资产（如 Office）赢得智能手机市场，而忽略了“来得太晚”使 Windows Phone 成为与“生态系统”竞争的产品——这意味着没有消费者需求，也就没有开发者；再加上对 OEM 与运营商颐指气使，规定他们的手机能做什么、不能做什么，从而毁掉了借助渠道达到临界规模的任何机会……

Interestingly, though, Myerson’s ridiculous assertion in a roundabout way shows how you change culture…In this case, Nadella effectively shunted Windows to its own division with all of the company’s other non-strategic assets, leaving Myerson and team to come to yesterday’s decision on their own. Remember, Nadella opposed the Nokia acquisition, but instead of simply dropping the axe on day one, thus wasting precious political capital, he hung the Windows team out to dry let Windows give it their best shot and come to that conclusion on their own.

不过有趣的是，Myerson 的荒唐断言以一种迂回方式展示了如何改变文化……在这个案例中，Nadella 实际上把 Windows 与公司其他非战略性资产一起分流到一个独立事业部，让 Myerson 和团队自己得出昨天那个决定。要知道，Nadella 曾反对收购 Nokia，但他并未在第一天就直接“挥刀”，以免浪费宝贵的政治资本；他选择让 Windows 团队“自生自灭”，让 Windows 尽其所能，最终自行得出那个结论。

Nadella did the same thing with Windows proper: when Windows 10 launched Myerson claimed that the operating system would be on 1 billion devices by mid-2018; the company had to walk that back a year later, not because Nadella said so, but because the market did.

在 Windows 本体上，Nadella 也采取了同样做法：Windows 10 发布时，Myerson 声称该操作系统将在 2018 年年中部署到 10 亿台设备上；一年后公司不得不收回这个说法，并不是因为 Nadella 的指示，而是因为市场给出了答案。

The Division: The End of Windows

分拆：Windows 的终局

And so we reach last week’s announcements: the Windows division is no more. It is an incredibly meaningful milestone, yet anticlimactic at the same time, thanks to Nadella’s careful management. It is worth noting, though, that Nadella had one critical ally in this journey: Wall Street.

于是我们来到了上周的公告：Windows 事业部不复存在。借助 Nadella 的审慎操盘，这既是一个极具意义的里程碑，同时也显得波澜不惊。值得注意的是，在这段旅程中，Nadella 有一个关键盟友：华尔街。

If culture flows from success, then it follows that an attempt to change culture is far easier to accomplish when the most obvious indicator of success — one that has a direct impact on employee pocket-books — is moving up-and-to-the-right. What is fascinating to consider, though, is that Microsoft’s stock is up not only because the company has a vision that it is delivering on quarter-after-quarter, but also because the stock was depressed in the first place.

如果文化源自成功，那么当最显而易见的成功指标——而且直接影响员工钱袋子的那个指标——正一路向右上时，试图改变文化就更容易达成。有趣的是，Microsoft 的股价之所以上涨，不仅因为公司有一个愿景并且季度接季度地兑现，还因为最初股价本就处于被压抑的状态。

To put it another way, Nadella’s shift to a post-Windows Microsoft is the right one; to have done the same a decade sooner would have been better. It also, though, may have been impossible, simply because Windows was still the biggest part of the business, and it’s not clear the markets would have tolerated an explicit shift before it was painfully obvious it was necessary; without a rising stock price, Nadella’s mission would have been much more challenging if not impossible.

换句话说，Nadella 将 Microsoft 转向“后 Windows”的决策是正确的；若能提前十年这么做会更好。但这也可能根本不可能，因为当时 Windows 仍是业务中最大的一块，而且市场是否会在“痛感显而易见”之前容忍一次公开的转向并不确定；如果没有上涨的股价，Nadella 的使命会困难得多，甚至不可能完成。

The Future: Why Microsoft?

未来：为什么是 Microsoft？

It’s important to note that Windows persisted as the linchpin of Microsoft’s strategy for over three decades for a very good reason: it made everything the company did possible. Windows had the ecosystem and the lock-in, and provided the foundation for Office and Windows Server, both of which were built with the assumption of Windows at the center.

需要注意的是，Windows 作为 Microsoft 战略的关键枢纽延续了三十多年，是有充分理由的：它让公司所做的一切成为可能。Windows 拥有生态与锁定效应，并为 Office 和 Windows Server 提供了基础，这两者都建立在以 Windows 为中心的假设之上。

Office 365 and Azure are comparatively weaker strategically: Office 365 has document lock-in, but the exact same forces that weakened Windows in the first place weaken the idea of documents as well. It’s not clear why new companies in particular would even care. Azure, meanwhile, is chasing AWS, with a huge amount of business coming from Linux VMs that could run anywhere.

就战略层面而言，Office 365 和 Azure 相对要弱一些：Office 365 具备文档层面的锁定，但最初削弱 Windows 的那些力量，同样也在削弱“文档”这一观念本身。尤其对新创公司而言，他们为何要在意，并不明确。与此同时，Azure 在追赶 AWS，而且有大量业务来自可在任何地方运行的 Linux VMs。

Unsurprisingly, both are still benefiting from Windows: Office 365 really does, as Nadella noted in his retreat, work better on Windows, and vice versa; it is seamless for organizations that have been using Office for years to move to Office 365. Azure’s biggest advantage, meanwhile, is that it allows for hybrid deployments, where workloads are split between legacy on-premise Windows servers and Azure’s public cloud; that legacy was built on Windows.

不出所料，这两者仍在受益于 Windows：正如 Nadella 在那次“撤退”中所说，Office 365 在 Windows 上的确运行得更好，反之亦然；多年使用 Office 的组织迁移到 Office 365 几乎是无缝的。与此同时，Azure 最大的优势在于支持混合部署，让工作负载在遗留的本地 Windows 服务器与 Azure 公有云之间分配；而这些遗留基础正是建立在 Windows 之上。

This, then, is Nadella’s next challenge: to understand that Windows is not and will not drive future growth is one thing; identifying future drivers of said growth is another. Even in its division Windows remains the best thing Microsoft has going — it had such a powerful hold on Microsoft’s culture precisely because it was so successful.

因此，这就是 Nadella 的下一个挑战：认识到 Windows 不是、也不会成为未来增长的驱动力是一回事；找出未来增长的真正驱动因素又是另一回事。即便在它自己的事业部中，Windows 仍是 Microsoft 手中最强的“王牌”——正因为它如此成功，才会对 Microsoft 的文化产生如此强大的牵引。

2018-04-02 Ben Thompson.The End of Windows

2018-04-02 Ben Thompson.The End of Windows

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