Transcript: (disclaimer: may contain unintentionally confusing, inaccurate and/or amusing transcription errors)
David: What were you listening to before we hopped on to your walkout music?
David：在我们开始你的出场音乐之前，你在听什么？
Ben: The new Beyonce.
Ben：碧昂丝的新歌。
David: The new Beyonce, I haven't heard it yet. How is it?
David：碧昂丝的新歌，我还没听呢。感觉怎么样？
Ben: I really like it.
Ben：我很喜欢。
David: Nice.
David：不错。
Ben: I think it is reductionist to call it country.
Ben：我觉得把它称作乡村音乐太过简化了。
David: I was appropriately enough listening to Start Me Up through the ages.
David：很巧，我一直在听《Start Me Up》各个年代的版本。
Ben: Of course you were. But I feel like a David Rosenthal move is that you might have been listening to Start Me Up whether we were doing Microsoft or not. That's a very squarely in your genre song.
Ben：这果然像你。可我觉得，很大卫·罗森塔尔的做法是，不管我们是否聊微软，你都会听《Start Me Up》。那首歌完全符合你的曲风。
David: The Stones though, man, it's crazy. They're in their 70s–80s.
David：不过滚石乐队啊，哥们儿，太疯狂了。他们都七八十岁了。
Ben: Amazing.
Ben：不可思议。
David: Man, I hope we're in our 70s and 80s dancing on stage.
David：哥们儿，希望我们七八十岁时还能在台上跳舞。
Ben: Season 126.
Ben：第126季。
David: Yeah.
David：是啊。
Ben: All right, let's do it.
Ben：好吧，开始吧。
David: Let's do it.
David：开始吧。
Ben: Welcome to season 14, episode 4 of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert.
Ben：欢迎收听《Acquired》第14季第4集，这是一档讲述伟大公司以及背后的故事和战略的播客。我是本·吉尔伯特。
David: I'm David Rosenthal.
David：我是大卫·罗森塔尔。
Ben: And we are your hosts. We often remark that selling software is the best business model of all time. Today, finally, we tell the story of the company that created that business, Microsoft.
Ben：我们是你们的主持人。我们常说，出售软件是史上最好的商业模式。今天，我们终于来讲创造这一模式的公司——微软的故事。
David: Finally, we're 10 years into Acquired. We're finally doing it.
David：终于啦，《Acquired》做到第10年，我们终于要讲它了。
Ben: It's been daunting. We wanted to do it for a while, but it takes some chutzpah to tackle Microsoft.
Ben：这一直让人望而生畏。我们早就想讲，但要谈微软确实需要点胆识。
David: I'm so fired up. We're ready. It's time.
David：我超激动。我们准备好了。现在就是时候。
Ben: Listeners, Microsoft today is sprawling and massive. It is the world's most valuable company worth over \$3 trillion. They have 49 years of history making software for consumers and enterprises, making hardware, gaming systems, gaming studios, Windows apps, iPad apps, Mac apps, operating systems, mobile operating systems, MP3 players, search engines, cloud computing, services on cloud computing, programming languages, development environments, and the list goes on. But it did not start out that way.
Ben：各位听众，如今的微软庞大无比。它是全球市值最高的公司，市值超过3万亿美元。公司已有49年的历史，为消费者和企业开发软件，制造硬件、游戏主机、游戏工作室、Windows 应用、iPad 应用、Mac 应用、操作系统、移动操作系统、MP3 播放器、搜索引擎、云计算、云计算服务、编程语言、开发环境等，项目不胜枚举。但最初并非如此。
Today, we will tell the story of the desktop software company. Before the enterprise, before IT, before the Internet, before being a trusted partner to governments around the free world, and really, before people even knew what to do with personal computers, this is the story of a bunch of ragtag geniuses in their 20s pushing what was possible. Welcome to Microsoft, the PC era.
今天，我们将讲述这家桌面软件公司的故事。在企业、IT、互联网，以及成为自由世界各国政府信赖的合作伙伴之前，甚至在个人电脑的用途尚未被大众所理解之前，这是一群二十多岁的天才不断突破可能性的故事。欢迎来到微软的 PC 时代。
Listeners, if you want to know every time an episode drops, you can get hints at the next topic and follow up. You can sign up at acquired.fm/email. Come talk about this episode with the community at acquired.fm/slack. If you want more from David and I, you should check out our second show, ACQ2, where we interview founders, investors, and experts often as a deeper dive into topics we cover on the main show.
各位听众，如果你想在每期节目上线时第一时间获悉，并获取下一期主题的提示与后续内容，请访问 acquired.fm/email 进行订阅。欢迎加入 acquired.fm/slack，与社群讨论本期节目。如果你想听到更多由 David 和我带来的内容，请关注我们的第二档节目 ACQ2，在那里我们采访创始人、投资人和专家，对主节目话题进行更深入的探讨。
Ben: With that, this show is not investment advice. David and I may have investments in the companies we discuss and likely all of you if you hold any index funds, and the show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. David, where on earth do we start the Microsoft story?
Ben：在此声明，本节目不构成投资建议。David 和我可能在节目中讨论的公司中持有投资，你们当中如果持有指数基金也同样如此。本节目仅供信息与娱乐之用。David，我们从何处开始讲微软的故事？
David: We're right down the middle on this one. We're going to start in 1955 in Seattle, Washington with the birth of Bill Gates III or Trey as he's known growing up. It's so confusing because his dad is the second, but he goes by Senior, and Bill is Junior/III/Trey. Bill is born in 1955 as the second of three children to Bill and Mary Gates. Bill Gates Sr. (his father), is from Bremerton, the Navy town just across the sound from Seattle, where he grows up in a family that owns and runs a furniture store there, a long way from the software king of the world here.
David：这次我们要从正中切入——1955年，在华盛顿州西雅图，比尔·盖茨三世（小时候被叫作 Trey）的出生说起。名字有些混乱：他父亲是“二世”，但人们称其为 Senior，而比尔既是 Junior 又是三世/Trey。1955年，比尔作为盖茨夫妇的三个孩子中的老二出生。比尔的父亲比尔·盖茨二世来自布雷默顿，那是隔着普吉特湾与西雅图相望的海军小镇，他在那里的家族家具店中长大，离后来成为全球软件之王的道路还相当遥远。
Bill Gates Sr./II, after high school, he joins the Army during World War II, serves during World War II, and then he goes, I presume on the GI Bill to the University of Washington, where he's the first member of his family to go to college. There he gets an undergrad and a law degree in four years, and then decides to stay in Seattle with his new family and become a practicing attorney.
比尔·盖茨二世在高中毕业后参军，参加了第二次世界大战并服役。战后，他大概利用《退伍军人权利法案》(GI Bill) 进入华盛顿大学，成为家族中第一个大学生。在那里，他四年内获得了本科和法学学位，随后决定留在西雅图，与新建立的家庭一起生活，并成为一名执业律师。
I say family because at the U-Dub, he meets and marries one Mary Maxwell. Mary, I don't know how to put it other than that she is a force. Mary's family had founded National City Bank, and her father was a senior executive at First Interstate Bank, which later became a big part of Wells Fargo. Mary, despite being the daughter of a successful business family in that day and age, was not cast aside like so many other daughters we've talked about on the show.
之所以说“家庭”，是因为在华盛顿大学期间，他遇到了并娶了玛丽·麦克斯韦。我找不到更贴切的词来形容玛丽，她就是一股力量。玛丽的家族创立了 National City Bank，她父亲则是 First Interstate Bank 的高管，该行后来成为富国银行的重要组成部分。尽管在那个年代，商业世家的女儿往往被边缘化，但玛丽并未如我们节目里提到的其他许多女儿那样被忽视。
Ben: New York Times, Hermes, where it was passed to the son-in-law to continue to run the business. That was not the case with Mary Maxwell.
Ben：像《纽约时报》或爱马仕那样把事业交给女婿经营的情况，在玛丽·麦克斯韦这里并不存在。
David: No. After she graduates from the U-Dub, she becomes first the president of the Seattle Junior League. She starts joining nonprofit boards in Seattle as a very young woman. She joins the Seattle Symphony Board, the Chamber of Commerce, the Children's Hospital, the King County United Way. She's such a force on these boards that she starts getting asked by her fellow board members to join their company's boards too. The corporate boards were so impressed with her.
David：并非如此。玛丽从华盛顿大学毕业后，首先成为西雅图青年联盟主席。作为一位年轻女性，她开始加入西雅图的各类非营利组织董事会，包括西雅图交响乐团董事会、商会、儿童医院、金县公益联合会等。她在这些董事会中表现极为出色，以至于其他董事会成员纷纷邀请她加入各自公司的董事会。企业董事们对她的能力印象深刻。
First, she joins the board of First Interstate Bank, the bank that her family's a part of. Then she joins the board of Cairo Television in Seattle. She even ends up joining the Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Board.
首先，她进入了家族所在的 First Interstate Bank 董事会；随后，她加入了西雅图 Cairo 电视台董事会；最终，她还进入了 Pacific Northwest Bell 电话公司的董事会。
Ben: That's right, part of the AT\&T breakup.
Ben：没错，那是 AT\&T 拆分的一部分。
David: Yeah. Eventually, she joins the Board of Regents of the University of Washington and the entire national United Way board. She never works full-time in a corporate setting, but it is not an overstatement at all to say that Mary Gates became one of the most powerful business people in the Pacific Northwest, period.
David：是的。最终，她加入了华盛顿大学校董会以及全美公益联合会董事会。她从未在企业担任全职职位，但毫不夸张地说，玛丽·盖茨成为了太平洋西北地区最具影响力的商界人士之一。
Ben: Absolutely, and Bill Gates Sr. was the prominent attorney in the region, so it's quite the power couple.
Ben：完全正确，而比尔·盖茨二世则是该地区的知名律师，所以两人堪称权势夫妻。
David: Ben, it's like you're reading my script here. Yes. We don't want to give Bill Sr. the short shrift here either. He becomes a superstar lawyer, and he becomes a co-founding partner of the firm Preston, Gates, and Ellis, which today, I didn't even realize until I dug in the research, that is K\&L Gates today, one of the largest law firms in the world.
David：Ben，你简直像在读我的稿子。是的。我们也不想忽视比尔二世的成就。他成为一名明星律师，并共同创建了 Preston、Gates & Ellis 律师事务所。直到我深入研究时才意识到，这家公司就是如今的 K&L Gates——全球最大的律师事务所之一。
David: Another fun fact that you probably know about Bill Gates Sr., but we got to, this being Acquired, talk about. Do you know what corporate board he joined later in life?
David：还有一个有趣的事实，你可能已经知道比尔·盖茨二世的相关信息，但既然这是《Acquired》，我们必须提到。你知道他后来加入了哪家公司的董事会吗？
Ben: I do not.
Ben：我不知道。
David: Costco.
David：Costco。
Ben: Of course, Bill Gates Sr., we should say too, basically galvanized the entrepreneurial community in Seattle. He started the tech alliance. He was a huge angel investor. He really did organize angel investors, people who want to put high risk capital to work into startups. His heart was there, obviously, through his law practice, long before Bill Gates III became the prodigy he became.
Ben：当然，我们还要说，比尔·盖茨二世可谓激活了西雅图的创业生态。他发起了科技联盟，是一位重量级天使投资人。他真正把那些愿意承担高风险、投资初创公司的天使投资者组织起来。显然，通过他的法律执业，他一直专注于此，远在比尔·盖茨三世成为天才之前。
David: Totally, and that's the point we want to land here. For young Bill, Trey growing up here, he is growing up in a pretty unique household. He would later talk about being 9 or 10 years old. Most nights at dinner at his house, there would be a CEO, a senator, a governor, or somebody who's just over for dinner, and Bill would sit there and absorb the business conversation. It's like the Hermes family, the Dumas family that we talked about in that episode. This whole thing makes me think of Paul, the main character in the Dune movies in the book. He's bred from birth to be this incredible business mind.
David：没错，这正是我们想强调的一点。年轻的比尔·盖茨（Trey）在一个相当独特的家庭环境中长大。他后来回忆道，在他九、十岁时，家里晚餐桌旁常常坐着一位 CEO、参议员或州长等来宾，比尔就在一旁吸收这些商业对话。这就像我们节目中提到的爱马仕家族、杜马家族。这一切让我联想到《沙丘》中的主角保罗——他从出生起就被培养成卓越的商业头脑。
Ben: At age 13, with his best friend, who we will talk about very soon, he brought up the idea, I wonder what company I will be the CEO of when I grow up. What industry will I go after? What problems will I tackle? It wasn't a question of if, but which.
Ben：13 岁时，他和我们很快就要提到的挚友一起曾提出这样的问题：长大后我会成为哪家公司的 CEO？我将进入哪个行业？要解决哪些问题？问题不是“是否”，而是“哪一个”。
David: Yes. It just turned out that He would be the CEO and founder of the biggest company in the biggest industry ever to exist. The other thing that we got to say about Bill growing up, he is insanely competitive. He did not and does not like to lose at anything. That is putting it mildly, whether it's sports, swimming, computers, school, or the classroom.
David：没错。事实证明，他后来成为了史上最大产业中最大公司的创始人兼 CEO。还得补充一点，比尔从小就极度好胜。他过去不喜欢输，现在也一样。无论是体育、游泳、电脑、学业还是课堂，他都不肯服输，这已经是说得很委婉了。
There's a quote in one of the books we read from a childhood friend of his who says, "Everything Bill did, he did competitively and never simply to relax." I think this used to be more than today. There's this image of Bill Gates that he was a computer nerd, that he was this shy little skinny kid. The way he looks doesn't help this, but that is not the case at all. This guy had a competitive fire in him, I'm sure he still does like none other.
我们读过的一本书中，他的一位童年好友说：“比尔做任何事情都带着竞争心，从不只是为了放松。” 我认为过去这点更为明显。人们常把比尔·盖茨视作电脑书呆子，觉得他是个害羞瘦弱的小男孩，他的外表也加深了这种印象，但事实绝非如此。他体内燃烧着强烈的竞争之火，我敢说至今依然如故。
Ben: Both things can be true. He was the number one math student in the State of Washington. He was a nerdy kid, a brilliant kid, and also fiercely competitive. His childhood friend and co-founder of Microsoft, Paul Allen, would say about him, “You could tell three things about Bill Gates pretty quickly. He was really smart, he was really competitive, and he wanted to show you how smart he was. And he was really, really persistent.”
Ben：两件事都是真的。他曾是华盛顿州数学第一的学生。他既是一个书呆子、天才少年，又极具竞争心。他的童年好友、微软联合创始人保罗·艾伦曾这样评价他：“很快你就能看出比尔·盖茨的三件事：他非常聪明，他非常好胜，他想让你知道他有多聪明。而且他异常坚持不懈。”
David: That sounds about right. Famously, speaking of Paul and where Bill and Paul meet, when Bill is in seventh grade, his parents enroll him at the Lakeside School, which now I think is internationally famous because of Bill. It is a super rigorous college prep school, middle school, and high school. Bill ends up writing the scheduling software for class scheduling that he puts himself in the classes with all the girls. Funny.
David：听起来完全正确。众所周知，说到保罗以及他和比尔相识的地方，七年级时，比尔的父母把他送进了莱克赛德学校——如今因比尔而享誉全球的学校。这是一所极其严格的大学预科中学兼高中。比尔后来编写了排课软件，把自己排进了所有女孩所在的班级，十分滑稽。
This Bill, 13 years old, seventh grade, Lakeside, this is when it starts. Obviously, Microsoft doesn't start. But during that year, Bill is 13 years old, the Lakeside Mothers Club raises money to buy the school a teletype, connect it up, and rent computer time from a DEC PDP 10 that is located in downtown Seattle and owned by the branch office there of General Electric.
当时的比尔，13 岁，七年级，莱克赛德，一切由此开始。当然，微软尚未诞生。但就在那一年，莱克赛德母亲俱乐部筹钱为学校购买了一台电传打字机，将其接入，并向位于西雅图市中心、隶属通用电气分部的 DEC PDP-10 租用计算机时间。
Probably a bunch of you are like, I have no idea what any of those words mean, so we got to set some context. This is 1968, the Beatles, Vietnam, the Summer of Love. This is not the computer age.
可能很多人听到这些名词会一头雾水，因此我们需要补充背景。那是 1968 年——甲壳虫、越战、“爱之夏”的时代——远不是计算机时代。
Ben: 2001, A Space Odyssey had just come out.
Ben：电影《2001 太空漫游》刚上映。
David: Nolan Bushnell has not founded Atari yet. Bob Noyce and Gordon Moore are only just leaving Fairchild Semiconductor to start Intel. Silicon Valley is still dominated by Lockheed. There is no such thing as a microprocessor.
David：诺兰·布什内尔还未创办雅达利；罗伯特·诺伊斯和戈登·摩尔才刚离开仙童半导体准备创立英特尔；当时的硅谷仍由洛克希德主导，根本没有“微处理器”这种东西。
Ben: The United States would land on the moon one year later.
Ben：再过一年，美国才会登上月球。
David: Totally. The way computing worked back then, it was basically still the ENIAC days. A computer meant two things. It either meant a massive room-sized machine that had about the computing power of a calculator, or it meant a human. People talked about computers as humans. Have you ever seen the movie Hidden Figures about the Black women who did the calculations?
David：完全正确。那时的计算方式基本仍停留在 ENIAC 时代。“计算机”有两种含义：要么是一台占满整间房、算力仅相当于计算器的庞然大物；要么就是人本人。人们把做运算的人称为“computers”。你看过讲述黑人女计算员的电影《隐藏人物》吗？
Ben: Yes. Those women were the computers.
Ben：看过。那些女性就是“计算机”。
David: They were called the computers, yes.
David：没错，人们称她们为“计算机”。
Ben: Because they would sit there and compute.
Ben：因为她们坐在那里进行计算。
David: This was a totally different era. The idea that a 13-year-old kid in this high school, this middle school would get access to share computer time, I can't imagine there are many other secondary schools in the country that were doing this.
David：那是一个截然不同的时代。一个 13 岁的中学生能够获得共享计算机时间的机会，我想当时全美几乎没有其他中学能做到这一点。
Ben: This is a very early place to make the point. Microsoft is the result of tremendous intelligence, brilliant strategy, fierce competition, and an unbelievable amount of luck. Bill Gates was born in 1955, the same year as Steve Jobs, to come into adulthood just as the personal computer wave is starting.
Ben：在此必须提前指出，微软的成功源于卓越的智慧、出色的战略、激烈的竞争，以及难以置信的运气。比尔·盖茨生于 1955 年，与史蒂夫·乔布斯同岁，成年时正逢个人计算机浪潮兴起。
The fact that he was at a middle school and had this much privilege, where he could get access to a PDP-10 at this point in his life to help him understand how important computers would become, there are dozens of people in America who are as well-situated as Bill is, and that might be overly generous.
在中学阶段就享有如此优渥条件，能接触到 PDP-10，从而理解计算机的重要性——放眼全美，条件能与比尔相提并论的人可能只有几十个，这个估计都算慷慨。
David: He and Paul got a sneak peek into the future there at Lakeside. It's funny, you said the personal computer era. We are so far away from the personal computer here. We got us at the stage. What is computing? I mentioned ENIAC and these room-sized things.
David：他和保罗在莱克赛德提前窥见了未来。你提到个人电脑时代很有意思。我们现在离个人电脑还早得很。先来铺垫一下：什么是计算？我提到了 ENIAC 和那些房间大小的机器。
Computers did not have screens. You didn't have cursors, you didn't have lights, you didn't have pixels. Everything was done on a teletype that looked like typewriters, and they were wired up remotely either in the same facility or what Lakeside is doing. You could be remote. It's almost the cloud today.
计算机没有屏幕，没有光标，没有灯，没有像素。所有操作都在一台看起来像打字机的电传机上完成，这些电传机通过有线方式连接到同一设施内的主机，或者像莱克赛德那样远程连接。你可以远程操作，它几乎就像今天的云。
Ben: And it called over a phone line. That was the teletype.
Ben：而且是通过电话线呼叫连接，这就是电传机。
David: Exactly. Got wired over the phone line, hooked up to these mainframes. You typed commands into this teletype, and then the response came back over the phone line or over whatever cable from the mainframe. It got printed out on a spool of tape on the teletype. But this is power that normal 13-year-olds don't come anywhere near accessing.
David：没错。它通过电话线接入这些大型主机。你把命令输入电传机，然后回应会通过电话线或其他主机电缆返回，在电传机的纸带上打印出来。但这可是一份普通 13 岁孩子根本接触不到的强大力量。
What is the computing market at this time? It is pretty much—we'll come back to the pretty much in a minute—100% dominated by IBM. IBM, Big Blue, Big Iron is what it was referred to, the products that they would produce, were the industry.
当时的计算市场是什么样的？几乎——稍后再说“几乎”——100% 被 IBM 垄断。IBM，人称 Big Blue、Big Iron，他们生产的产品就是整个行业。
Ben: Ben Thompson has a fantastic quote on this. He has an article called, What is a Tech Company? And here's his comment. "Fifty years ago, what is a tech company was an easy question to answer. IBM was the tech company, and everybody else was IBM's customers. That may be a slight exaggeration, but not by much. IBM built the hardware, at that time the System 360, They wrote the software, including the operating system and the application, and provided services including training, ongoing maintenance, and custom line of business software.”
Ben：Ben Thompson 对此有个绝妙的引述。他写过一篇文章《What is a Tech Company?》，评论如下：“五十年前，什么是科技公司这个问题很容易回答。IBM 就是科技公司，其他所有人都是 IBM 的客户。这或许略显夸张，但差不多。IBM 制造硬件（当时的 System 360），编写软件，包括操作系统和应用程序，并提供培训、持续维护以及定制的业务软件等服务。”
David: Yeah, System 360 was a line of solutions, I would say, offered by IBM. It consisted of the room-sized thing, the mainframe, the software, which was system 360, and the consulting and the implementation. You couldn't just call up UPS and forklift one of these things into a company and expect it to work. No, you got to operate this thing too.
David：是的，System 360 可说是一整套 IBM 提供的解决方案。它包含那台房间大小的设备——主机——以及系统 360 软件、咨询与实施。你不能只叫 UPS 把这玩意儿运到公司就指望它能用。不行，你还得会操作它。
Ben: Totally, it's like ASML machines. You don't just ship them off to TSMC and say, good luck making semiconductors. It's a full solution, full service thing. But an important thing that was also happening this year, 1968, was that IBM was undergoing some antitrust scrutiny over that huge bundle that I just told you about.
Ben：完全没错，就像 ASML 的机器。你不能把它们直接运给 TSMC 然后说“祝你造芯片好运”。这是一套完整的方案、全方位的服务。但同样重要的是，1968 年这一年，IBM 因这种庞大的打包业务开始受到反垄断审查。
Doesn't it smell antitrust? They do everything from the hardware to the software to the operating system, the service, the support. They are the whole market. They're starting to get concerned. Proactively, they unbundled hardware, software, and services. They started selling those separately for the first time, which was not a problem at first. What it did was it cracked the door for customers to say, oh, I can buy hardware from IBM and software from someone else? Other people were not exploiting this, but it was possible.
是不是有点反垄断的味道？他们从硬件到软件再到操作系统、服务、支持包揽一切，占据整个市场。他们开始感到担忧，于是主动将硬件、软件和服务拆分销售，首次分别定价。起初这没什么问题，但它给客户开了扇门——哦，我可以从 IBM 买硬件，然后从别人买软件？当时没人利用这一点，但已经成为可能。
David: Yeah, interesting. It cracks the door for Microsoft 15–20 years later.
David：是啊，有意思。这为 15–20 年后的微软打开了机会之门。
Ben: Yes, but this is where the seeds are sown of what is the exploitable opportunity when Bill Gates is ready to do something.
Ben：没错，这就是当比尔·盖茨准备行动时，可被利用机会的种子所在。
David: Interesting. Back to the timing thing for Bill, Paul, and Microsoft. I mentioned when we were setting this up that there's something else to talk about here. IBM was facing a disruptive force at this moment, I think, probably for the first time in its history, certainly in the computing era of IBM's history, and that was the Digital Equipment Corporation or DEC. Noticed when we said earlier that Lakeside is renting computer time from the General Electric computer in downtown Seattle, I said it's a deck PDP-10. It's not an IBM product.
David：有意思。回到比尔、保罗和微软的时机问题。我在开场时就提到还有件事要聊。当时 IBM 正面临一股颠覆性势力——我认为这可能是其历史上，至少在计算机时代首次遭遇的挑战——那就是 Digital Equipment Corporation（DEC）。还记得我们之前说莱克赛德从西雅图市中心的通用电气计算机租用机时，我提到的是 DEC PDP-10，而非 IBM 的产品。
What's DEC? They're the "mini" computer company. Mini meaning it was the size of a closet, not the size of a room. It's all relative. DEC had been started by this guy, Ken Olson from MIT.
什么是 DEC？他们是一家“迷你”计算机公司。所谓迷你，是指机器只有衣柜大小，而不是占满整间房——一切相对而言。DEC 由 MIT 的 Ken Olson 创立。
What they did, he had this brilliant insight that would play out over and over and over again in technology that I'm not going to go compete with IBM head on, I'm not going to make any act. I'm not going to make mainframes.
他们之所以成功，源于 Ken Olson 的一个绝妙洞见——这一洞见在科技界反复上演——那就是：我不会与 IBM 正面硬碰硬，不会去造 ENIAC，不会制造大型主机。
But computing has advanced enough that there's an opportunity to make something smaller, less powerful, more toy-like, and there's enough demand out there that I think they can find some new markets for people who will buy those types of computers and it’s smaller businesses. But in particular, it's branch offices of the big company.
但计算技术已足够成熟，可以做出体积更小、性能更低、更像玩具的计算机，而市场需求也已出现。我认为他们能够在新市场找到买家，比如小型企业，尤其是大公司的分支机构。
I am sure General Electric bought lots and lots and lots of IBM mainframes and products at their headquarters, but the GE field office in Seattle is not going to truck in a mainframe.
我敢肯定通用电气在总部买了大量 IBM 大型机和相关产品，但位于西雅图的 GE 外地办事处可不会把一台大型机运过来。
Ben: And in 1968, Seattle is a provincial little town. I'm standing here right now. It's a major city and a huge economy in the United States. But at the time, a podunk, forgotten, sleepy, faraway place.
Ben：而在 1968 年，西雅图只是个偏僻小镇。我现在站在这里，它已是美国的重要城市和庞大经济体，但当时却是一个不被关注、昏昏欲睡的远方小城。
David: Totally. Microsoft would go a long way to changing that over time.
David：没错。微软后来在很大程度上改变了这一切。
Ben: We should say this is the classic low-end disruption playbook. This is what Clayton Christensen was talking about. Going from mainframe to mini computers, I'm going to make something that's worse for most things, but better for some new things that new customers and new markets are going to care a lot about. IBM's going to look at it and go, that can't do any of the things that are important to our customers. And that's exactly why it works.
Ben：这正是经典的低端颠覆策略——克莱顿·克里斯坦森所阐述的路线。从大型机到迷你机，我要造一台在大多数方面更差、但在某些新需求上更好的机器，而新客户和新市场会格外看重这些需求。IBM 会说，这东西做不了我们客户需要的任何事——这恰恰是它行之有效的原因。
David: Specifically, why are they not going to care about it? I don't know exactly what an IBM mainframe system, System 360, 370, whatever cost. I'm imagining tens of millions of dollars all in total cost, maybe hundreds of millions of total dollars to run a system like that and buy it.
David：具体来说，他们为什么不在意？我不清楚 IBM 的大型机系统（System 360、370 等）到底多少钱，但我猜想总成本得上千万美元，甚至可能需要数亿美元才能买下并运行这样一套系统。
The first DEC machine, when it comes out, the PDP-1, a few years before this time, was priced at \$120,000, so an order of magnitude, maybe two below a system that you would buy from IBM. Obviously still a long, long, long way from the personal computer. People are not buying these things for their houses, but GE will buy one for the field office in Seattle, or universities will buy them for research, for their students, for their professors.
DEC 的第一台机器 PDP-1 在早几年推出时，售价 12 万美元，比从 IBM 购买的系统低一个甚至两个数量级。当然，这离个人电脑时代仍遥不可及。人们不会把它买回家，但 GE 会为西雅图分支办事处买一台，大学也会为研究、学生和教授购买。
DEC creates a new market for computing. Bill, he's so studied in business history, the founder, Ken Olson is Bill's hero. He totally looks up to DEC and what DEC's done. The DEC and minicomputer UI is still the same as the mainframe. You're still using a teletype. There's no innovation in terms of what computing is or how you use it. It's just cheaper and more people have access to it.
DEC 为计算开辟了一个新市场。比尔研读商业历史时，创始人 Ken Olson 成了他的偶像，他完全崇敬 DEC 及其作为。DEC 迷你机的使用界面与大型机无异——仍旧用电传机——在计算本质或使用方式上没有创新，只是更便宜，让更多人能接触到。
Back to Lakeside and the Mother's Club raising money for this access here for the school, Bill, remember, he's just started. He's in seventh grade, and Lakeside is a middle school in a high school. The high school is actually in a separate building. The computer room that gets installed with the teletypes was over in the high school, but Bill doesn't care. He gets exposed to it in a math class one day and he's like, oh, I'm hooked.
回到莱克赛德和母亲俱乐部为学校筹资获得计算机使用权的故事。别忘了，比尔才刚起步，他当时七年级。莱克赛德有初中部和高中部，高中部在另一栋楼。安装电传机的计算机室在高中楼，但比尔毫不在意。有一天在数学课上接触到后，他立刻被迷住了。
He goes over. He's hanging out with the high schoolers, teaches himself how to program, and pretty quickly he becomes known as one of the very best programmers there. He and three other kids form what they call themselves the Lakeside Programmers Group. One of his buddies who he forms it with is of course the high schooler or I think the 10th grader at the time, Paul Allen.
于是他跑去那边，和高中生混在一起，自学编程，很快就被公认为那里最出色的程序员之一。他和另外三个孩子成立了自称“莱克赛德程序员小组”的组织。其中一位伙伴正是当时高二的保罗·艾伦。
Ben: There is a fantastic photo, listeners, that we will tweet of Bill and Paul sitting in the computer room at Lakeside. Bill, I think he's 13–14. He looks like he's about eight. I think on the wall, there's this almost printed out magazine thing that says the bug slayer that they've hung up over the wall. It's amazing.
Ben：各位听众，有一张绝妙的照片，我们会在推特上发出来，照片里比尔和保罗坐在莱克赛德的计算机房里。我想比尔当时十三四岁，但看上去只有八岁左右。我记得墙上贴着一张像是杂志印刷品的东西，上面写着“Bug Slayer”（除虫高手），他们把它挂在墙上，非常有趣。
David: These high school kids, they start the Lakeside Programmers Group. They call it the programmers group because they are programmers. This is another super important thing to learn. To use a computer at this time meant to be a programmer. There was no package software that you bought. The software that IBM was selling was the operating system to make the machines actually function, and it was the programming languages that you could then program on but you weren't clicking around and using Excel or pulling up apps. Everybody who used a computer wrote their own software.
David：这些高中生成立了“莱克赛德程序员小组”。他们之所以这么叫，是因为他们就是程序员。这件事极其重要：在那个时代，使用计算机就意味着自己要编程。根本没有现成的软件包可买。IBM 卖的软件是操作系统，让机器能够运转，以及供你编程的语言；你不会像现在那样点几下就用 Excel 或打开应用。那时所有使用计算机的人都得自己写软件。
Ben: Right. There was not this multi-sided network of you've got developers making applications, and then you've got users of those applications. No, everybody who used a computer was a programmer.
Ben：没错，当时没有那种由开发者编写应用、用户使用应用的多边网络。所有使用计算机的人本身就是程序员。
David: The goal of the Lakeside Programmers Group, remember Bill is this business prodigy, is to use their very valuable and very rare skills as programmers at this time to make money, do a business.
David：“莱克赛德程序员小组”的目标——别忘了比尔是个商业神童——就是利用他们在当时极其稀缺且宝贵的编程技能赚钱、做生意。
It turns out at the same time—the coincidences here are just crazy—there is a local startup coming out of the University of Washington called the Computer Center Corporation or C-Cubed. The business plan behind C-Cubed was that they were going to get a bunch of DECs, a bunch of PDP-8s, PDP-10s, PDP-11s, whatever, and they were going to be AWS. They were going to just be a computer time-sharing company.
与此同时——这巧合简直离奇——华盛顿大学孵化出一家名为 Computer Center Corporation（简称 C-Cubed）的本地初创公司。C-Cubed 的商业计划是购入一堆 DEC 机器，什么 PDP-8、PDP-10、PDP-11 等等，做成 AWS 一样的存在，纯粹提供计算机分时租赁服务。
C-Cubed hires the Lakeside Programmers Group, these kids, to come in and find and document bugs in the system. They're going to pay them directly in computer time. When they come into C-Cubed, they learn Fortran, they learn Lisp, they learn machine language for the PDPs. Back at Lakeside, they were just using BASIC, the programming language.
C-Cubed 雇用“莱克赛德程序员小组”这些孩子来查找并记录系统中的漏洞，并直接以计算机使用时间支付报酬。他们在 C-Cubed 学习了 Fortran、Lisp，以及 PDP 机器的机器语言。而在莱克赛德时，他们只用过编程语言 BASIC。
Ben: Which is reasonably high level in terms of how abstract it is. You're not writing machine language. You don't have to know how to address memory, registers, and all that. It reads English, it knows how to add numbers together. It's not an elegant language, and it's a very verbose language. But if you look at it with your eyes as a person who speaks English and knows basic math, you're like, I understand what this program does. There's a meaningful amount of translation done by a BASIC interpreter that takes you from the BASIC code you have to write to what is actually running on the machine.
Ben：从抽象层级来看，BASIC 算是比较高级的语言；你不用写机器码，也不必了解如何寻址内存、寄存器等。它读起来像英语，还能做加法。它并不优雅，而且非常啰嗦，但如果你懂英语、会基本数学，读它就能明白程序在做什么。BASIC 解释器会做大量翻译，把你写的 BASIC 代码转成机器实际运行的指令。
David: Yes, but BASIC, we don't want to give the impression that it is just basic or just for kids.
David：是的，但我们不能让人觉得 BASIC 只是“基础”或者只给孩子用的。
Ben: No, it's widely used.
Ben：当然不是，它被广泛使用。
David: It's going to become hugely, hugely important. It is both the gateway programming language for everybody, but it's a real programming language, and a lot of stuff is done in it.
David：它后来变得极其重要。它既是所有人的入门语言，也是一门真正的编程语言，很多实际工作都用它完成。
Ben: It's the Python of its day. I think the way Python is now where you joke that Python is so flexible, you can accidentally write a program by writing English, it can forgive a lot of mistakes, and it reads English, it's a reasonable parallel to draw it way back when with BASIC where you say, look, you can understand it as a layman, but also it's used in a broad set of business applications.
Ben：它就是那个时代的 Python。如今我们常开玩笑说 Python 灵活到像写英语一样，随手就能写出程序，容错率高，可读性强。当年 BASIC 的地位与之类似——外行也看得懂，同时又被广泛用于各类商业应用。
David: Totally. When Bill, Paul, and their buddies come into C-Cubed, they're now getting access to learn real hardcore systems programming languages, including machine code for the PDP-10. They're becoming pretty prolific engineers here.
David：没错。当比尔、保罗和他们的伙伴进入 C-Cubed 时，他们开始接触真正硬核的系统编程语言，包括 PDP-10 的机器码。他们在这里迅速成长为多产的工程师。
Ben: They're handwriting assembly code.
Ben：他们在手写汇编代码。
David: And they're getting mentored. One of the executives at C-Cubed is a guy named Steve Russell. Did you find this, Ben? Do you know about this?
David：而且他们还得到了指导。C-Cubed 的一位高管叫史蒂夫·拉塞尔。Ben，你发现了吗？你知道这件事吗？
Ben: No.
Ben：没有。
David: This is amazing. You're going to die. Steve Russell was the guy who wrote Spacewar when he was at MIT on the first PDP, the PDP-1. He's a computer science legend.
David：太厉害了，你会惊掉下巴。史蒂夫·拉塞尔正是在 MIT 使用第一台 PDP-1 编写《Spacewar》的那位，他是计算机科学的传奇人物。
乔布斯没有这样的机会，凭借更好的天赋取得同样的成绩。
Ben: Nolan Bushnell told us about that.
Ben：诺兰·布什内尔跟我们提过这事。
David: Yes. Spacewar was the first video game, first computer game ever written. It was written as a fun side project by some MIT engineers in the early days of DEC, and then that became Nolan Bushnell's inspiration for starting Atari and Pong. Steve Russell, that guy, he mentored Bill Gates.
David：没错。《Spacewar》是史上第一款电子游戏，也是第一款计算机游戏。它是 DEC 早期，几位 MIT 工程师的趣味副项目，后来成为诺兰·布什内尔创办 Atari 和《Pong》的灵感来源。而史蒂夫·拉塞尔正是指导比尔·盖茨的人。
Ben: Wow, and he was here at the University of Washington?
Ben：哇，他当时居然在华盛顿大学？
David: He had come out to the University of Washington, and then left and was part of one of the execs starting this company.
David：他曾来到华盛顿大学，之后离开并成为这家公司创始高管之一。
Ben: C-Cubed, wow. That's a mile from my house.
Ben：C-Cubed，哇，就在离我家一英里的地方。
David: Right? Crazy.
David：是吧？太不可思议了。
Ben: Wow.
Ben：哇。
David: After a little while at C-Cubed, all of this real expertise that these kids are getting leads to another opportunity at another timeshare computing company based down in Portland. They ask the kids to write a real piece of software, to write a payroll billing program for all their clients that are using the timeshare system.
David：在 C-Cubed 工作一段时间后，这些孩子积累的真本事为他们带来了另一份机会——在波特兰一家分时计算公司。他们请这群孩子编写真正的软件，为所有使用该分时系统的客户制作一套工资计费程序。
Bill now, who's the de facto leader of this group, negotiates a deal with the help of his dad, Bill Gates Sr. prolific corporate attorney in Seattle. Rather than just being paid hourly for their time, they're going to get a royalty on the revenue that their client makes off the software. I can't believe it. These kids are teenagers. They're figuring out the whole software business model here.
此时作为小组事实领袖的比尔，在身为西雅图知名企业律师的父亲比尔·盖茨二世帮助下，谈成了一笔协议：他们不按工时收费，而是按客户使用该软件获得的收入抽取版税。难以置信，这些孩子还是十几岁的少年，就已经摸索出了完整的软件商业模式。
They end up making at least \$10,000 from these royalties, which the average household income in the US at the time was below \$10,000. These kids are rolling in money. The next year, Paul graduates from Lakeside and goes off to college at Washington State. He and Bill decide to team up on a new venture that they're going to do together called Traf-O-Data.
最终，他们靠这些版税赚了至少 1 万美元，而当时美国的平均家庭年收入还不到 1 万美元。这些孩子已经赚得盆满钵满。第二年，保罗从莱克赛德毕业，进入华盛顿州立大学。他和比尔决定携手开展一个名为 Traf-O-Data 的新项目。
Ben: They've identified a market opportunity, and that opportunity is reducing traffic.
Ben：他们发现了一个市场机会，而那个机会就是缓解交通拥堵。
David: Yes. The business plan is that municipalities count cars that go through intersections, use that to make decisions about how they're going to do city planning. Bill and Paul are like, we can take this new thing that's coming out of Intel, a microprocessor, which is promising to be a full computer on one chip. We can use that. We can build a machine that is going to be a computer, and it'll process and analyze that data, and then we can sell it to governments. Great, big market.
大卫：没错。商业计划是各市政府统计通过路口的车辆数量，并据此决定城市规划方案。比尔和保罗认为，可以利用英特尔推出的新玩意——微处理器，它有望把整台计算机装进一块芯片。我们可以用它造出一台真正的计算机来处理并分析这些数据，然后把机器卖给政府。市场巨大。
Ben: Listeners, are you sensing what's happening here? Mainframe, mini computer, microprocessor. We have to keep using smaller and smaller words to represent the fact that the computer is getting smaller and smaller here.
本：各位听众，你们感觉到正在发生什么吗？大型机、迷你计算机、微处理器——我们得用越来越短的词来说明计算机正在变得越来越小。
David: It wasn't until we started doing research for this episode that I finally realized, oh, microcomputers, which is the original term for the personal computer for the PC. It was called microcomputers before PC caught on. They're called microcomputers because they're based on the microprocessor.
大卫：直到我们为本期节目做研究时我才恍然大悟，原来“微型计算机”——也就是个人电脑最初的称呼——之所以这样叫，是因为它基于微处理器。在“PC”普及之前，人们都叫它 microcomputer。
Ben: Yes, absolutely.
本：没错，完全正确。
David: It's not just that micro is smaller than mini.
大卫：原因不仅仅是“micro”比“mini”更小。
Ben: It is funny that it stopped there. The computers that are sitting on all of our desks are microcomputers.
本：有趣的是，这个叫法就停在那里了。如今摆在我们桌面的电脑其实都是微型计算机。
David: Right. While they're waiting for the AD08, this new first microprocessor from Intel, to come out, or at least for them to get access to it, they want to get a head start on programming their traffic data machine and programming this microprocessor. Paul's like, I got this. I can find a way to make this happen.
大卫：没错。在他们等待英特尔首款微处理器 AD08 发布或至少拿到样片期间，他们想抢先为交通数据机器和这颗微处理器编程。保罗说：“包在我身上，我能搞定。”
He takes the PDP-10 at Washington State and he writes a whole emulator program to mimic the instruction set for the AD08 from the manual. They get a full emulator up and running, and they can code even without the microprocessor actually being there. It's just NVIDIA. When Jensen was like, no, we got to build an emulator and simulate this, and then we're going to ship it sight unseen, they're doing the same thing.
他在华盛顿州立大学用 PDP-10 写了一个完整的模拟器，依照手册仿真 AD08 的指令集，把模拟器跑了起来，即使没有真正的微处理器也能编程。这就像英伟达：黄仁勋说“先做模拟器仿真，然后盲发芯片”，他们干的也是这套操作。
Ben: It's funny. In many ways, at this point in history, getting a manual was actually much more valuable than getting the processor itself because the processor would arrive. Unless there was documentation, you would have no idea how to interact with it to take advantage of its power.
本：有意思的是，在那个时代，拿到一份手册往往比拿到处理器更有价值。因为处理器到了手，如果没有文档，你根本不知道如何与之交互，发挥它的威力。
If you had a manual, sure, you couldn't actually test the stuff you wrote for it on the hardware. But if you wrote an emulator on a bigger, more powerful computer that could mimic the computer that you're actually targeting, you could go years before actually ever running the software on the target device and just work off of what the manual says as long as the manual is correct and matches how it actually works.
如果你有手册，当然无法在硬件上真实测试代码。但若在更大、更强的计算机上写一个模拟器，去模拟目标计算机，你可以在真正把软件跑到目标设备之前，甚至几年之久，只按手册编程——只要手册准确、与硬件一致即可。
David: And this is going to become very important to Microsoft in just a second. Traffic data is not a huge success. I think I read a few places, they make about \$20,000 in revenue from it. Again, great money for high school and college kids, but not world-changing stuff here. This is not what Bill aspires to for the company he's going to start.
大卫：而这一点马上就会对微软变得至关重要。Traf-O-Data 并不算大成功，我看到有资料说他们只赚了约两万美元。对于高中生、大学生来说已是一笔巨款，但称不上改变世界。这并不是比尔创办公司所追求的。
Bill and Paul are getting experience with the microprocessor. Bill actually has the idea for Microsoft when they're working with it. He's like, oh, this is a computer, why don't I go off and write an interpreter for BASIC here, and we can sell the BASIC interpreter for the microprocessor and build a big business? The AD08 just wasn't powerful enough yet to do that.
比尔和保罗借此积累了微处理器经验。比尔正是在处理器项目中萌生了微软的创意——他想：这毕竟是一台计算机，为什么我不去给它写一个 BASIC 解释器，然后把解释器卖给使用微处理器的人，做成大生意？只是 AD08 的性能当时还不足以支撑这一点。
Ben: But spoiler alert, that totally becomes Microsoft. The seeds of Microsoft are selling language interpreters for new processors, new hardware, new computers that enable you to write familiar programming languages on that new hardware.
Ben：剧透一下，这最终就成了微软的模式。微软的种子业务是为新的处理器、新的硬件、新的计算机销售语言解释器，让你能在新硬件上使用熟悉的编程语言。
David: Yup. Bill and Paul are not the only ones having this insight here, too. Another Seattle guy named Gary Kildall who they had intersected with, who they knew from C-Cubed and the University of Washington, had the same idea here. We're going to bring up Gary and his company, Digital Research, a little bit later.
David：没错。而且有这种洞见的不止比尔和保罗。另一位西雅图人 Gary Kildall——他们在 C-Cubed 和华盛顿大学就认识——也有同样的想法。稍后我们会谈到他和他的公司 Digital Research。
Ben: Yeah, he cared a little bit less about programming languages and a little bit more about operating systems. That's how they diverged for the few years here.
Ben：是的，他对编程语言的兴趣稍少一些，对操作系统更上心。这就是他们此后几年分道扬镳的原因。
David: Bill and Paul absolutely see the vision for what this can grow into and become. Bill has a great quote. "Paul and I had talked about the microprocessor, and it was really his insight that because of semiconductor improvements, things would just keep getting better. I said to him, oh, exponential phenomena are pretty rare, pretty dramatic. Are you serious about this? Because this means, in effect, that we can think of computing as free. It was a gross exaggeration, but it was probably the easiest way to understand what it means to cut costs like that. And Paul was quite convinced of it."
David：比尔和保罗完全看到了这种模式的发展前景。比尔有段精彩的引述：“我和保罗谈过微处理器，真正的洞见来自他——由于半导体的改进，一切都会不断变好。我对他说，指数级现象非常罕见、非常剧烈，你确定吗？因为这实际上意味着我们可以把计算视为免费。这当然非常夸张，但大概是理解这种成本削减含义的最简单方式。而保罗对此深信不疑。”
Ben: Is this in the Smithsonian interview?
Ben：这是在史密森学会的访谈里吗？
David: Yes, so good.
David：对，太精彩了。
Ben: It's so good. This quote is incredible because basically, Paul Allen brings up Moore's Law to Bill Gates; they don't use that language there. But in 1971, that is what's happening. For Paul, this is just an observation of hey, there's an exponential thing happening here, it seems like it's going to keep happening, it's been happening.
Ben：确实精彩。这段话了不起，因为保罗·艾伦向比尔·盖茨提出了摩尔定律——虽然他们没用这个词。可在 1971 年，这正是正在发生的事。对保罗来说，这只是个观察：嘿，这里出现了指数级的变化，而且看样子会持续下去，也一直在持续。
Bill's shaking and he's like, what? Exponential phenomena don't just happen. That's incredibly, incredibly rare and immediately gets Bill's wheels turning on. What does this mean for the world? If that's actually true, we need to act and do something profoundly different than anyone's ever done before because this enables new things that no one ever thought could be possible.
比尔震惊地想：什么？指数级现象可不是随便发生的，那极其罕见。这立刻让比尔开始思考：这对世界意味着什么？如果这是真的，我们就应该采取行动，做前所未有的事，因为这将使许多从未被认为可能的事情成为现实。
David: This moment is the genesis of the vision for Microsoft. Even though Bill doesn't say the words in this quote, the vision of a computer on every desk in every home, that's the famous part that got left off later when the DOJ started sniffing around was running Microsoft software.
David：这一刻奠定了微软愿景的起点。尽管比尔在这段引述里没明确说出那句话，但“让每张办公桌、每个家庭都拥有一台计算机，并运行微软软件”的愿景正源于此——后来因司法部调查才省略了“运行微软软件”这半句。
早期的很多软件缺少差异化，市场可以提供反复横跳的选择，云计算、SaaS是一种升级后的模式，跟用户深度绑定。
But that is the vision here, and it is crazy at the time. A computer on every desk and in every home, Bill sees that this is what this exponential phenomenon, what Moore's law means, that that is going to happen. We're still in the era of teletypes. Nobody else sees this.
然而这就是他们的愿景，在当时听来简直疯狂。让每张桌子、每个家庭都拥有计算机——比尔看出这正是指数定律、摩尔定律的含义：它终将实现。那时我们仍处于电传机时代，没人看得到这一点。
Ben: And it's also the reason why Microsoft is going to form into such a different type of company that's ever come before it, why they can break all the rules, why they can sell just software, even though that's never been a thing before, why their business model can be so much different than everyone else's business model.
Ben：这也解释了为什么微软会成为一种前所未有的公司，能打破所有规则，只卖软件——即便此前从没人这么做——以及为什么他们的商业模式与其他公司截然不同。
In preparing for this episode, we got to talk with Pete Higgins, who ran Excel and was an executive overseeing Office for a long time in the early days. He had this great quote to us, which was, "Computer on every desk was wackadoo stuff. People laughed at it. It was absolutely wild. People thought, I don't know, maybe 1 in 10 people in their finance group or something will have one at some point. This is the profoundness of an exponential decrease in price or increase in power of computing. It's going to become universal."
在准备本期节目时，我们采访了早年负责 Excel 并长期主管 Office 的高管彼得·希金斯。他对我们说过一句精彩的话：“‘每张办公桌上都有一台电脑’听上去疯疯癫癫，大家都笑它，简直太狂了。人们当时想，也许财务部十个人里有一个人某天会用上电脑吧。这就是计算能力指数级提升、价格指数级下降的深远意义——它终将普及。”
David: All that said, even Bill and Paul know the AD08. It's not there yet. It's not powerful enough to really be a general-purpose computer on a chip, but they know it's coming. In the fall of 1973, Bill goes off to college at Harvard famously. It's funny, at Harvard, like Jim Simons that we talked about at MIT on the RenTech episode. Bill thinks he's going to be a world-class mathematician and set the world on fire.
David：尽管如此，比尔和保罗都知道 AD08 还差点火候，它还不足以成为真正的通用单芯片计算机，但他们明白那一天终将到来。1973 年秋，比尔如人所知去了哈佛上大学。有趣的是，就像我们在 RenTech 那期节目里谈到的 MIT 的吉姆·西蒙斯一样，比尔当时认为自己会成为世界级的数学家，轰动一时。
Ben: It's literally a quote from Paul Allen. Bill was the number one math student in the state of Washington. He gets there, and he does this theoretical math class, math 55 and gets a B. Paul says, when it came to higher mathematics, he might've been one in a hundred thousand or better, but there were people who were one in a million or one in 10 million. And some of them wound up at Harvard. Bill would never be the smartest guy in the room, and I think that hurt his motivation. He eventually switched his major to applied math.
Ben：这完全是保罗·艾伦的原话。比尔曾是华盛顿州数学第一名，结果到了哈佛，上了理论数学课 Math 55，只拿了个 B。保罗说，在高等数学领域，比尔也许是一十万分之一的天才，但还有百万分之一、千万分之一的天才，而他们中的一些人就在哈佛。所以比尔再也不是房间里最聪明的人了，我想这打击了他的动力，最终他把专业改成了应用数学。
David: Yes. While Bill's at Harvard, he's also doing a bunch of the typical college kid stuff. He's playing poker, he's cutting classes, he's making friends. One of the friends he makes there is a kid down the hall from him named Steve Ballmer. Everybody knows Ballmer. He's everything that Bill is not. He's super social, he's super outgoing. He's in a final club, which is a big thing in the social scene at Harvard.
David：是的。比尔在哈佛时，也干着典型大学生的事——打扑克、逃课、交朋友。其中一个住在走廊尽头的朋友叫史蒂夫·鲍尔默。众所周知，鲍尔默与比尔截然不同，他极其外向、社交能力超强，还加入了哈佛社交圈里分量很重的“终极俱乐部”。
Ben: He's gregarious. Anyone who's ever met Steve or seen a video of Steve, you are well aware that this man has a presence. But the thing that people don't know about him is he is so unbelievably analytical. Steve is the guy that outscored Bill Gates on the Putnam exam.
Ben：他非常合群。任何见过或看过鲍尔默视频的人都知道他气场十足。但很多人不知道，他的分析能力也极其惊人。鲍尔默在普特南数学竞赛中的分数甚至超过了比尔·盖茨。
David: Which is the annual math competition for college students.
David：那是面向大学生的年度数学竞赛。
Ben: Yeah, Steve isn't a programmer, but he is every bit the mathematician that Bill Gates is. That is one of these things where I think when people try to set it up as well, you've got the brilliant programmer genius and the marketing guy, it's just like those are the roles they took. But I think when you're getting a sense of who the original crew was at Microsoft, they were all brainiacs, and they were all wildly analytical.
Ben：没错，鲍尔默不是程序员，但他的数学造诣丝毫不亚于比尔·盖茨。我觉得人们常常把他们刻画成“天才程序员”和“市场高手”这对搭档，但那只是他们后来的分工。要了解微软最初的团队，就会发现他们都是超级聪明且极富分析力的人。
David: Totally. In the spring of 1974, Bill's freshman year, Electronics Magazine publishes big news about a new Intel chip, the next generation, the next turn of the crank on Moore's Law, the 8080. In Bill's words here, all at once, we were looking at the heart of a real computer, and the price was under \$200. We attacked the manual. I told Paul, DEC can't sell any more PDP-8s now. It seemed obvious to us that if a tiny chip could get so much more powerful, the end of big unwieldy machines was coming.
David：完全正确。1974 年春，比尔大一时，《Electronics Magazine》发布重大新闻：英特尔推出新芯片 8080，这是摩尔定律的又一次飞跃。用比尔的话说，“突然间，我们看到了一台真正计算机的核心，而价格不到 200 美元。我们立即钻研手册。我告诉保罗，DEC 的 PDP-8 以后卖不动了。一个小小芯片就能变得如此强大，笨重庞大的机器快到头了。”
Ben: Yup. This is really where Bill Gates commits to computers to be his life's work. I think what's often lost in the story is Bill, even though he was good at computers and spent tons of time programming computers, never fancied himself a computer guy until this moment in history. He went to Harvard because he felt, hey, if I ever want to be a lawyer or something else, they've got a lot of great programs there. This was the moment where I think it really clicked for him that I'm just in the middle of the right place at the right time with the right skill set, and this is my way of having the most impact on the world.
Ben：没错，这一刻真正促使比尔·盖茨决定把计算机当作终身事业。故事里常被忽略的一点是，尽管比尔擅长并沉迷编程，但在此之前他并不认为自己是“电脑人”。他上哈佛，是想着将来如果想当律师或做别的，也有好专业可选。而正是在这一刻，他意识到：自己拥有合适的技能，刚好在正确的时间、合适的地点，这就是对世界产生最大影响的途径。
David: They think, okay, what's clearly going to happen here is all the big computer companies, IBM, DEC, the big Japanese computing companies, they see this. They're going to get into this business, they're going to make machines, and they're going to make microcomputers. Surely, they will jump on this opportunity, right?
David：他们想，很明显，IBM、DEC 以及日本的大型计算机公司都会注意到这一点，势必进入这个领域，制造微型计算机。毫无疑问，他们会抓住这个机会，对吧？
Ben: If it didn't destroy their existing business model, sure they would.
Ben：如果这不会颠覆他们现有的商业模式，那他们当然会。
David: Exactly. Bill and Paul are sitting around waiting through 1974 and 1975 being like, hey, when are the 8080 computers going to come out? Where are they? It's just crickets. Paul is so convinced that the revolution is coming that he actually drops out of Washington State, moves to Boston to be close to Bill so that they can be ready when it happens. That summer, they both get summer jobs at Honeywell as programmers. Paul stays on into the next school year when Bill goes back to school. He's just waiting, waiting, waiting.
David：没错。1974 到 1975 年间，比尔和保罗一直在等待，纳闷 8080 计算机什么时候上市，怎么一点动静都没有。保罗深信革命即将来临，于是退学离开华盛顿州立大学，搬到波士顿，离比尔更近，以便随时行动。那个夏天，两人都在霍尼韦尔做程序员实习。比尔返校后，保罗继续留下工作。他就是不停地等，等，等。
In December 1974, Paul is walking across Harvard Square, and he sees in a newsstand the January issue of Popular Electronics, on whose cover is the Altair 8800, the world's first real honest-to-God commercially available for sale microcomputer. The legend has it that Paul grabs the magazine, runs over to Bill's dorm, throws open the door, throws the magazine on the desk, and is like, it's here. Bill's just says, oh, my God, it's happening without us. We need to get on this right now.
1974 年 12 月，保罗穿过哈佛广场时，在报摊看到《Popular Electronics》1 月刊，封面上是 Altair 8800——世界上第一台真正面向大众销售的微型计算机。传说中，保罗抓起杂志就冲到比尔宿舍，推门进来把杂志往桌上一拍，说：“它来了！”比尔则惊呼：“天哪，事情在没有我们的情况下发生了，我们得马上行动！”
Ben: It's so funny he thinks they're already behind because clearly they're not. History would show. I think Bill Gates even says, we might've actually started a year or two too early. The market actually hadn't materialized yet. The funniest thing is, the starting gun went off, Bill and Paul ran, and everyone else is still standing around.
Ben：真有意思，他觉得自己已经落后了，但显然并没有——历史证明了这一点。我记得比尔·盖茨甚至说过，他们可能还早跑了一两年，因为市场并未真正形成。最有趣的是，发令枪响后，比尔和保罗冲出了起跑线，而其他人还站在原地。
David: This is it. This is the moment. The revolution is here. Microsoft is about to be founded.
David：就是这个时刻，革命来临，微软即将诞生。
Ben: David, they're like, it's happening without us. What do they do?
Ben：David，他们觉得事情在没有他们的情况下发生了。他们怎么办？
David: They do the natural thing that two super excited, ambitious, high octane college kids would do. They call up the main phone number of Altair's manufacturer, a company called MITS and ask for the president, a man named Ed Roberts. Bill and Paul get them on the phone and they say, we have a BASIC interpreter, ready to go, ready to ship, for the 8080 Intel chip, and we want to provide it for you, for your machine.
David：他们做了两位兴奋且雄心勃勃的大学生最自然会做的事：直接拨通 Altair 制造商 MITS 的总机，找总裁埃德·罗伯茨。比尔和保罗在电话里告诉他：“我们已经开发好一款可立即交付的 8080 芯片 BASIC 解释器，想为你们的机器提供。”
Ben: Of course they don't.
Ben：当然他们并没有。
David: They don't have a single letter of code written. They don't have anything.
David：他们连一行代码都还没写，什么都没有。
Ben: It's a market test. They want to know what's the response if this were true.
Ben：这只是一次市场测试，他们想看看如果真有此事对方会如何回应。
David: Exactly. Ed's a bit of a character himself. He says, okay, well, guys, a lot of other people are calling me and saying the same thing. What I'm telling them, and I'm going to tell you too, is that anybody who can come here to my office in Albuquerque, New Mexico and demonstrate a working version of BASIC on my Altair will get a contract with us to distribute it when they go on sale. Bill and Paul say, okay, great, we'll see you soon, and hang up. By ‘see you soon,’ they mean, ‘let's go get to work.’
David：没错。埃德本人也挺有意思，他说：“好吧，小伙子们，很多人都打电话来说同样的话。我告诉他们，也告诉你们：谁能来新墨西哥州阿尔伯克基的办公室，在我的 Altair 上演示可运行的 BASIC，就能与我们签合同，在机器上市时随机发行。”比尔和保罗回答：“太好了，我们很快见。”挂断电话后，他们的意思是“马上动手”。
Ben: This is a big deal for MITS too if this works, because right now they've just announced a machine for which you can't really do anything on it. The hardware is powerful, but they're not going to have a lot of customers unless there's stuff you can do on the machine. A BASIC interpreter running on it, it's quite valuable to then make the claim you can program BASIC on our computer. They're very excited about this, even though they're playing coy.
Ben：如果这事成了，对 MITS 也意义重大。因为他们刚发布的机器目前基本没法做任何事。硬件虽强，但若无法在上面运行程序，就吸引不了多少客户。有了 BASIC 解释器，就可以号称“我们的电脑能用 BASIC 编程”。他们对此非常兴奋，尽管表面上还在试探。
David: I was going to talk about this in a minute, but let's talk about what the Altair is. What did they just announce in the magazine here? The Altair is the first mass market commercially available personal computer.
David：我本打算稍后介绍，但我们先说说 Altair。杂志上刚发布的到底是什么？Altair 是首款面向大众市场、可商业购买的个人计算机。
Ben: Again, no screen or anything.
Ben：再说一次，没有屏幕，也没有其他东西。
David: Yeah. Does not have a screen, does not have a keyboard, doesn't have a display of any kind. What it does have is it has a set of 16 lights on the front of the machine, Christmas lights and 16 switches. You can flip the switches to flip bits, and then the machine will respond by lighting up different patterns of lights. It doesn't come with any software. There's nothing. That's all it is, 16 lights, 16 switches.
David：对。没有屏幕，没有键盘，没有任何显示设备。它只有机器前面的一排 16 个灯泡，就像圣诞彩灯，以及 16 个拨动开关。你拨动开关就能改变位值，机器随后以不同的灯光组合作为反馈。它自带软件？没有，什么都没有。整台机器就是 16 个灯、16 个开关。
Ben: In order to use it, you got to hook up your own teletype, you got to get the manual, you got to hope that the manual is right, and you got to code to the machine instructions, literally the assembly language for the chip inside for the Intel 8080.
Ben：要想用它，你得自己接一台电传打字机，拿到说明书，还得祈祷说明书没错，然后按照芯片的机器指令——也就是 Intel 8080 的汇编语言——亲手写代码。
David: Back to the Traf-O-Data days and Paul writing the emulator for the 8008 at Washington State, Paul's like, we got this. I'll just write an emulator on the Harvard PDP-10 for the 8080 instruction set.
David：回到 Traf-O-Data 时期，保罗在华盛顿州立大学为 8008 写过模拟器，他说没问题。我就在哈佛的 PDP-10 上写一个 8080 指令集的模拟器。
Ben: He does the same thing again. They get the manual, they have an emulator, and they write it against an emulator.
Ben：他再次如法炮制：拿到手册，写好模拟器，然后对着模拟器开发程序。
David: Yup. Bill writes the BASIC interpreter. In a couple of weeks, they've got it working. Ed's like, okay, come on out to Albuquerque. Bill and Paul—remember, Bill still looks he's 12 at this point in time—decide that just Paul should go.
David：没错。比尔负责编写 BASIC 解释器，几周后就跑通了。埃德说，好，来阿尔伯克基吧。比尔和保罗——别忘了比尔那时看着像 12 岁——决定只让保罗去。
Ben: Does Paul have a rocking beard at this point yet?
Ben：这时候保罗已经留着酷炫的大胡子了吗？
David: Paul is super 70s. He is into it. As we'll see, he's going to fit right in at Albuquerque and MITS. Paul gets on a plane, flies from Boston to Albuquerque. In a total epic legend moment, they didn't have a bootloader written for the BASIC interpreter.
David：保罗一副 70 年代范儿，很投入。你会看到，他在阿尔伯克基和 MITS 完全能融入。保罗登机，从波士顿飞往阿尔伯克基。传说级的一幕是，他们根本没给 BASIC 解释器写引导加载程序。
They had the BASIC, it was all written, they'd done it on the emulator, and Paul's flying out with the computer tape with the code of the BASIC interpreter on it. He's like, oh, shoot, we can't just feed that right into the machine. There's got to be a bootloader to load up this thing. He writes the bootloader on the plane.
他们的 BASIC 已经写好，在模拟器上跑过。保罗带着存有解释器代码的磁带飞往目的地，心想：糟糕，不能直接把磁带塞进机器，还得先有个引导加载程序。于是他在飞机上把引导程序写了出来。
Ben: On paper, by hand, he is hand coding octal, not even assembly language instructions. He's hand coding in pure octal the instructions to load their BASIC interpreter program into memory.
Ben：用纸笔、全手写八进制代码，连汇编都不是，纯粹写八进制指令，把 BASIC 解释器装进内存。
David: Yup. He lands in Albuquerque, drives out to MITS. They load the bootloader onto the prototype Altair there that loads up the BASIC interpreter, and it fails. It doesn't work. Paul's like, oh, shoot, let's try it again. Let's try it again. They try it again. This is how early computing is. It works the second. Who knows what the bug was the first time. They didn't change anything, it just didn't work the first time, and it worked the second time.
David：没错。他落地后开车去 MITS，把引导程序载入 Altair 原型机，再加载 BASIC 解释器——失败了。保罗说：糟了，再来一次，再来一次。他们又试了一次，这就是早期计算的写照：第二次就成功了。没人知道第一次的 bug 是啥，什么都没改，第一次不行，第二次就成了。
It loads up, Paul writes in the instructions, print two plus two. It spits out four—by spits out, I mean the lights light up and say four. Both he and Ed, their jaws are on the floor. Paul's like, oh, my God, the BASIC works. Ed's like, oh, my God, the Altair works. Neither of them believed this was actually going to work.
程序跑起来后，保罗输入指令：print 2 + 2。机器“吐”出一个 4——也就是灯亮出的图案显示 4。保罗和埃德都惊呆了。保罗喊：“天啊，BASIC 真的能跑！”埃德喊：“天啊，Altair 真的能跑！”两个人原本都不敢相信这事能成。
Ben: Ed actually has more eggs in this basket than he let on because when Bill and Paul call and say, hey, can you give us the teletype instructions, he reveals they're actually the only ones who called about that. Everyone else who said they were writing a BASIC never got far enough to ask, how do we actually interact with your computer?
Ben：事实上，埃德把宝都押在这上面。比尔和保罗打电话要电传机接口说明时，他透露，他们是唯一提出这个问题的人。其他声称在写 BASIC 的人根本没走到需要询问“怎么跟你的电脑交互”这一步。
真正认真做的人极少，大部分都是不知道自己在做什么的噪音。
David: Yes. Now is the time to say a few words about Ed and MITS. What is this company? Bill and Paul originally thought that it was going to be the IBMs, the DECs, the Japanese companies who are going to make the first microcomputers. MITS is about as far away from IBM as you can possibly imagine. MITS basically was a model rocket company.
David：没错。现在该说说埃德和 MITS 了。这家公司到底是什么？比尔和保罗原先以为第一批微型计算机会由 IBM、DEC 或日本公司制造，可 MITS 与 IBM 的距离简直天壤之别——MITS 本质上是一家模型火箭公司。
Ben: Which, Albuquerque is a great place to do that.
Ben：没错，阿尔伯克基确实是做这个的好地方。
David: Ed Roberts, the founder, had been in the Air Force and stationed in Albuquerque. That's how he got involved in model rocketry. The reason that they're introducing the Altair and they made this big Splash in the magazine was this is a last ditch gambit to try and save the company. You got a bankrupt model rocketry company.
David：创始人埃德·罗伯茨曾在空军服役并驻扎在阿尔伯克基，因此他才接触到模型火箭。他们推出 Altair 并在杂志上大张旗鼓宣传，是为了孤注一掷挽救公司；毕竟这家公司做模型火箭已经濒临破产。
Ben: Their little gambit worked and got a couple of college kids to pounce.
Ben：他们的这步小棋却奏效了，还吸引了几个大学生立即行动。
David: Totally. Why did it work? They had two things going for them that really, Ed, I think probably personally made happen. (1) They got this splashy popular electronics magazine cover that was through a relationship that Ed had. (2) The sticker price was \$397, which is about \$2300 in 2024 dollars. Yes, that's a lot of money, but the next cheapest computer that anybody could buy at this point in time was a DEC, a \$120,000 mini computer. The idea that somebody could buy a computer for \$400, I don't care who's selling that thing, I want that.
David：完全正确。为什么能成功？有两大因素，而这两点都离不开埃德本人。第一，他们凭埃德的人脉拿到了《Popular Electronics》的醒目封面。第二，定价仅 397 美元，按 2024 年的价值约合 2300 美元。虽说不便宜，但当时市面上能买到的下一档最便宜的电脑是 DEC 的迷你机，要价 12 万美元。有人只花 400 美元就能买电脑？无论谁卖我都想要。
Ben: What did they get, some sweet deal from Intel?
Ben：他们这是从英特尔拿到了什么甜蜜交易吗？
David: Yes. This is all Ed's doing. The list price from Intel for the 8080 chip was \$360. I think this is part of what was deterring the market of how would anybody sell a kit that was affordably priced when so much of the cost of goods would go to Intel with the processor deal. He managed to negotiate a volume deal with Intel to get 8080 chips at \$75 a pop. That was the key unlock.
David：没错，全靠埃德操作。8080 芯片的英特尔标价是 360 美元，这本来让市场望而却步——谁能在成本大头都给了英特尔的情况下卖得起廉价套件？埃德却与英特尔谈成了批量价，每颗只要 75 美元，这才是关键突破。
Ben: That's a 5X price reduction.
Ben：这可是 5 倍的降价。
David: Totally. I wasn't able to find how that negotiation went down or why Ed Roberts in Albuquerque, New Mexico got this sweetheart deal from Intel.
David：完全如此。我没能查到谈判细节，也不清楚为什么英特尔会给新墨西哥阿尔伯克基的埃德·罗伯茨这样一份肥约。
Ben: Either the list price is wildly wrong, or they were cutting deals all over the place. One thing it could have been is just that, and I'm totally speculating, but chips are the ultimate high fixed cost investment, low marginal costs next to software.
Ben：要么标价本身就水分很大，要么他们四处在给折扣。我纯属推测，但芯片毕竟是典型的“高固定成本、低边际成本”行业，仅次于软件。
You could imagine maybe Intel had already put all the money into the fixed costs of spinning up the fabs and was expecting a certain amount of market demand, and they weren't seeing it. They were like, crap, we've got to recoup our investment. I don't know, lower the price, let them just sell. Maybe we'll make it up in volume.
可以想象，英特尔或许已经为晶圆厂投入巨额固定成本，预计会有一定市场需求，却迟迟没见苗头，只能想办法回本——那就降价、放量卖，也许靠走量能把钱挣回来。
David: I like that. I have no idea, but that's a totally viable train of thought here. Either way, he gets the sweetheart deal. Not only does it make computer history and enable and create Microsoft, it saves the company of MITS.
David：这个推断不错，具体原因我也不清楚，但绝对说得通。不管怎样，他确实拿到了这份肥约。这不仅改写了计算机史、促成了微软的诞生，还挽救了 MITS 本身。
They were on the edge of bankruptcy. After the popular electronics article comes out, they get 4000 pre-orders in the first month or two, which is \$1.5 million in revenue, cash paid upfront. That is pure cash hitting the bank account.
当时公司濒临破产。《Popular Electronics》的文章刊出后，头一两个月就收获 4000 台预订，相当于 150 万美元预收收入，现金直接打进账户。
Ben: That will save a company.
Ben：这足以救活一家公司。
David: And also just proves 4000 people just paid cash sight unseen for 16 lights and switches. There's a lot of demand for a home computer here.
David：这也证明了：有 4000 个人没见过实物就掏钱买 16 个灯和 16 个开关，可见家用电脑的需求巨大。
Ben: At decent margins too, if they're getting the processor for \$72, and they're selling it for what did you say?
Ben：而且毛利率还不错，如果他们的处理器拿货价是 72 美元，卖价是多少来着？
David: \$397.
David：397 美元。
Ben: Everything else in there is much cheaper than the processor, so I don't know. Depending on how much they have to give to the sales channel they're selling through, if it's retail or distributors.
Ben：机器里其他部件成本都比处理器低得多。所以我想看他们卖给零售还是分销渠道，要让出多少利润。
David: I think they're selling direct. I think people are just sending money orders.
David：我觉得他们是直销，买家直接寄汇票过来。
Ben: It's a decent margin business. Unlike what the PC business would become over time, they managed to have nice margins.
Ben：那毛利就相当可观了。和后来 PC 行业越做越薄不同，他们当时还能保持不错的利润。
David: Paul and Ed hit it off. Paul decides to move out to Albuquerque to be close to the action here. He actually joins MITS as their vice president of Software. He's vice president of a software department of one. He is the software department here.
David：保罗和埃德一拍即合。保罗决定搬到阿尔伯克基就近参与，他甚至加入 MITS 当软件副总裁——整个软件部门就他一个人，他就是全部软件部门。
Ben: Yeah, software department of one, but he's got his buddy Bill Gates who is not employed, but Bill's definitely working on software for the Altair as well.
Ben：对，名义上的“部门”只有他，但他的好伙伴比尔·盖茨虽未受雇，实际上也在为 Altair 写软件。
David: Yes. Bill stays at Harvard, but keeps cranking on enhancing the BASIC interpreter and adding more functions and functionality to the version of BASIC that they had just written for the Altair. Once the school year is over, he comes out to Albuquerque for the summer.
David：没错。比尔留在哈佛，不断改进 BASIC 解释器，为他们写给 Altair 的 BASIC 版本增添功能。学年一结束，他就到阿尔伯克基度暑假。
The Altair is getting ready to ship with the Microsoft BASIC included in it. Bill and Paul need to set up a company, but Paul is an employee of MITS at this point, so what did they do? They set up a partnership. The founding of Microsoft, at this point Micro-Soft, is a two-person partnership between Bill and Paul.
Altair 计划出货，并预装 Microsoft BASIC。比尔和保罗得成立公司，可此时保罗是 MITS 员工，于是他们设立了合伙企业。微软——当时拼作 Micro-Soft——由比尔和保罗两人合伙创立。
Ben: As we record this, that was 49 years and one day ago. We are sitting here on April 5th recording. That was April 4th, 1975. It is very funny to look back at some of the original signatures when Bill writes on letters. It's Bill Gates, the general partner of Micro-Soft, which is great. I think it's actually a Paul Allen name where he wants to put together microcomputer and software. Bill's like, that's perfect, we're immediately just going to run with it. As it was a partnership, originally, they were going to call it something like Allen and Gates, and then they ultimately are like, no, Micro-Soft is perfect.
Ben：就在我们录音的此刻，那已经是 49 年零一天前的事了。今天是 4 月 5 日，当年的日期是 1975 年 4 月 4 日。回头看比尔当年签署的信件特别有趣——“Micro-Soft 普通合伙人比尔·盖茨”。据说“Micro-Soft”是保罗·艾伦想出的名字，把 microcomputer 和 software 组合起来。比尔觉得完美，立刻采用。原本作为合伙企业，他们可能叫 Allen and Gates，最后还是定了 Micro-Soft。
David: Microsoft has become Kleenex. Microsoft means microprocessor software.
David：如今 Microsoft 已成了“克林克斯”式的通用名词——Microsoft 就意味着微处理器软件。
Ben: I will say it's a nice clarifying North Star because it really draws the line in the sand and says, we're in the software business. Gates makes this really clear to Paul Allen, who is often tempted to do hardware stuff. Bill is very hardcore about saying, no, what we're uniquely good at in the world is software and we should stick to that.
Ben：我觉得这个名字就像一颗指路北极星，明确划清界限：我们做软件。盖茨反复向常常想搞硬件的保罗强调：不行，我们在这个世界独一无二的优势就是软件，必须专注于此。
I also suspect Bill is starting to realize that there's an amazing business model here if we can pull it off, where we don't have to make the hardware, and we can charge for every copy of the software sold. But that insight, I would say, has not yet fully materialized.
我也猜想，比尔已开始意识到：如果操作得当，这里有一个绝妙的商业模式——不用造硬件，却能按每份软件收费。不过，这一洞见当时还未完全成形。
David: Let's talk about business model here in one sec. First though on the partnership. Again, we've been saying all along that Bill is clearly the leader here. They set up the partnership. Initially, it's 60/40 ownership, Bill is 60%, Paul is 40%. Later, it gets changed to Bill is 64% and Paul is 36%. Yup, Bill is the leader here.
David：我们先稍后再谈商业模式，先讲合伙关系。我们之前一直说，比尔显然是领导者。他们成立合伙企业时，最初的持股比例是 60/40，比尔 60%，保罗 40%。后来改成比尔 64%，保罗 36%。没错，比尔主导一切。
Ben: Bill's case that he makes on that to Paul is, hey, you took a job and you were doing this on the side, I was all in. Paul's an agreeable guy, and 36% is still a nice percent, so he says, sure.
Ben：比尔对此对保罗的解释是：“嘿，你当时另有工作，只是兼职做这个，我可是全身投入。”保罗性格随和，而 36% 的股份也相当可观，于是他就同意了。
David: In the long run here, everybody gets nuts. It's all a rounding error, but to that point back to the business model. Once the partnership is set up, they sign an exclusive licensing arrangement with MITS. This is super important. This is a big lesson that young Bill and Paul are going to learn here.
David：长远来看，这些股权细节都无关紧要，差别只是四舍五入。但说回商业模式：合伙成立后，他们与 MITS 签订了独家授权协议。这一点极其重要，年轻的比尔和保罗在这里会上到一堂深刻的课。
MITS gets exclusive license to the BASIC interpreter to the BASIC as they call it for the 8080. MITS is the one that can then decide whether to sublicense the BASIC out to other companies or not.
MITS 获得了 8080 版 BASIC 解释器（他们称之为 BASIC）的独家授权。是否再把 BASIC 转授给其他公司，全由 MITS 说了算。
Essentially, this is a distribution deal with MITS, where MITS becomes the exclusive seller and distributor of Microsoft's BASIC. Microsoft doesn't have any direct sales control here, and it's going to become a big, big, big issue. The terms of the deal are Microsoft is to get \$30 for each copy of BASIC that MITS sells plus 50% of the revenue that comes from the sublicensing deals that MITS may or may not do with other companies who want to use the BASIC.
本质上，这是一份与 MITS 的分销协议，MITS 成为 Microsoft BASIC 的唯一销售和分销方。微软对销售毫无直接控制权，这之后会成大问题。协议条款是：每售出一份 BASIC，微软可得 30 美元；若 MITS 将 BASIC 再授权给其他公司，微软还可分得 50% 的再授权收入。
Ben: Why would they ever do any sublicensing deals? Why would you give it to your competitors?
Ben：他们怎么可能再授权？谁会把东西给竞争对手？
David: That is a really good question, Ben.
David：好问题，Ben。
Ben: Let's just round that part of the revenue to zero.
Ben：那就把那部分收入直接按零算吧。
David: Yeah. This is a big, big, big divergence of interest between Microsoft and MITS. The kicker on this contract is that the total amount of lifetime revenue that Microsoft can make from the BASIC from MITS is capped at \$180,000. Ed admits really has the upper hand in this deal.
David：的确。这在微软与 MITS 之间造成了巨大的利益冲突。合同里最要命的一条是：微软通过 MITS 销售 BASIC 的终身收入上限为 18 万美元。埃德·罗伯茨在这笔交易中明显占了上风。
Ben: Or phrased another way, we will give you \$180,000 for you to hand over exclusive rights to all that cool BASIC stuff you just wrote to us. But if we sell fewer than X machines, we're actually going to pay it out to you on a prorated basis at \$30 a pop rather than giving you the full \$180,000.
Ben：换句话说，就是“我们最多给你 18 万美元，换你把那套很酷的 BASIC 独家权利交给我们；但如果机器销量不到某个数，我们就按 30 美元一份、按销量给钱，而不是一次性付满 18 万”。
David: That is another way to frame it. Definitely, a great deal for MITS. On the other hand, what are Bill and Paul going to do here?
David：确实可以这么理解。对 MITS 来说肯定是好买卖。而对比尔和保罗而言，他们还能怎样？
Ben: Right, a great deal for them too given the position they're in.
Ben：没错，以他们当时的处境来说，这对他们其实也算不错。
David: Right, MITS is the industry. There is one very, very important clause in the contract though, protecting Microsoft's interests. That clause is that MITS must use its best efforts to license, promote, and commercialize the BASIC broadly in the marketplace. Any failure to do so by MITS would be grounds for termination of the contract by Microsoft.
David：是的，MITS 当时就是整个行业。不过合同里有一条对微软非常关键的保护条款：MITS 必须尽最大努力在市场上授权、推广并商业化 BASIC；若 MITS 未能做到，微软有权解除合同。
Ben: Thank God, Bill's dad is a lawyer.
Ben：谢天谢地，比尔的父亲是一位律师。
David: Indeed. The Altair comes out for sale later in 1975. Microsoft does \$16,000 in revenue that year from their \$30 a pop, the BASICs that are getting sold with the Altair, which is great, especially the first year that they're starting.
David：确实如此。Altair 于 1975 年晚些时候上市销售。当年微软凭借每份 30 美元随 Altair 捆绑销售的 BASIC 语言实现了 1.6 万美元的收入，这对创业第一年来说已经相当不错。
The next year in 1976, everybody's so excited about this new market, the vision that's happening, the demand, the Altair, the sales that Paul Allen resigns from MITS to join Microsoft full-time. Bill drops out of Harvard officially. He moves to Albuquerque. They're all in on this. But for the year in 1976, Microsoft's revenue is still only \$22,000. It was \$16,000 the year before, \$22,000 in 1976.
到了 1976 年，每个人都对这个新兴市场、正在实现的愿景以及旺盛的需求感到无比兴奋。Altair 的销量促使保罗·艾伦从 MITS 辞职，全职加入微软；比尔也正式从哈佛退学，搬到阿尔伯克基，全身心投入。然而 1976 年微软全年收入仍只有 2.2 万美元——前年是 1.6 万美元，1976 年是 2.2 万美元。
Ben: Not a high growth company.
Ben：这公司增长率可不算高。
David: This is less than they were making in high school. What is going on here? (1) MITS is the one at the controls of sales, not Microsoft. (2) MITS is selling a thousand computers a month. This is taking off. This is creating a new industry. Despite MITS selling thousands of computers a month, only a few hundred copies of BASIC are selling per month. What's going on? People are pirating the software. This is the discovery of software piracy.
David：这甚至还不如他们高中时赚的钱多。到底怎么回事？（1）掌控销售的是 MITS，而不是微软；（2）MITS 每月能卖出一千台计算机，市场正在起飞、行业正在形成。尽管 MITS 每月卖出数千台电脑，但每月只有几百份 BASIC 售出。原因是什么？人们在盗版软件。这就是软件盗版的首次被发现。
Ben: This is a pretty interesting time to pause and say, are they pirating software?
Ben：此时停下来问一句，他们真的在盗版软件吗？
David: That's a good question.
David：好问题。
Ben: This is 1975. Piracy implies that you are running afoul of some particular legal protection for the good. You might say, well, with today's legal frameworks in hindsight, you would say, of course, if they're copying the software and not paying the money for it, it's piracy. That was actually not established yet. This is the craziest thing. Bill basically has an opinion that it's piracy, and he writes letters to the computer community.
Ben：时间是 1975 年。盗版意味着你违反了某种法律保护。用今天的法律框架回看，你会说：当然，如果复制软件却不付费，就是盗版。但当时这一点并未确立。这才是最疯狂之处：比尔坚信这就是盗版，并给计算机社群写了信。
David: He writes an open letter to hobbyists.
David：他给业余爱好者写了一封公开信。
Ben: Yes, and tries to basically guilt trip people. He tries to use that as a recruiting method and say, if you're so excited about pirating our software, maybe you should just come work with us. Nothing would make me happier than making the best software in the world, and please join us on this mission. But ultimately, the legal standing that he has to say, hey, what you're doing is illegal, is not fully established.
Ben：是的，他试图用道德谴责的方式，甚至把这当作招聘：如果你对盗用我们的软件这么热衷，干脆加入我们吧！没什么比打造世界最佳软件更让我高兴，请加入我们的使命。但归根结底，他说“你们这是非法”的法律依据尚未完全确立。
It would actually take a couple of years for the courts to look at software and say, what about this is protectable? If you think about it, it is a little bit weird. You've got source code that looks like English, BASIC, it's letters and numbers. It gets translated to machine code. That machine code ends up running, and it's basically electrons. It's voltages that are flipped up and down. What about that are we trying to protect?
实际上，法院花了几年时间才开始审视软件、决定其中哪些内容可以受到保护。想想看，这确实有点奇怪：源代码看起来像英语——BASIC，用字母和数字写成；它被翻译成机器码，而机器码运行时本质上只是电子电压的翻转。我们究竟要保护哪一部分？
Ultimately, the way it gets litigated through some case law from court cases is that the source code is a copyrightable, creative work that is expressed through some tangible medium. That's the important thing about copyright law. It's a creative work expressed through a tangible medium. A book, the creative work is the words and the tangible medium is printed on paper.
最终，若干判例法确立：源代码是一种可受版权保护的创作作品，并通过有形媒介表达。这是版权法的要义：创作作品需通过有形媒介表达。对书籍而言，创作作品是文字，有形媒介是印在纸上的纸张。
With software, it actually took until 1980. Congress changed the law. We'll put a link in the show notes to the literal congressional change that happened. It is in Title 17, Copyrights Chapter 1, Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright. In 1980, they include a defined term, which is a "computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” Once you have that passed by Congress codified into law, you now have the standing legal framework that all the whole computer industry used going forward, in particular, the software industry, a computer program is copyrightable work.
软件方面直到 1980 年国会才修改法律。我们会在节目笔记中放上相关法案的链接。该修订载于《美国法典》第 17 篇《版权》第一章《版权的客体与范围》。1980 年新增定义：“计算机程序是为直接或间接在计算机中使用以实现特定结果的一组语句或指令。” 一旦国会通过并写入法律，就为整个计算机行业——尤其是软件行业——提供了长期有效的法律框架：计算机程序属于可受版权保护的作品。
David: Wow, I didn't know all, that's awesome.
David：哇，我之前完全不知道这些，太棒了。
Ben: It's totally crazy how recent that is. But when you think about it, why would that have any legal…? Software is such an abstract idea. Before, the whole business model of computers was good luck just replicating an IBM PC and everything that comes with it. You don't need any legal standing. But if you're going to pursue this software only business model, what's the protection around your abstract product?
Ben：这件事发生得这么晚，真让人难以置信。不过仔细想想，软件本身非常抽象，为什么要有法律保护呢？过去，计算机商业模式基本就是尽量复制 IBM PC 及其配套内容，不需要法律依据。但如果你要走纯软件商业模式，该如何保护你的抽象产品？
David: That's exactly what I was going to say here. This is the other element of what's going on. This is the first time software has ever been sold. Other than the IBM accounting machinations to protect themselves from antitrust, which was just accounting, nobody had ever sold software before. This is the first time.
David：我正想说这一点。这是问题的另一面：这是首次有人真正出售软件。除去 IBM 为了避免反垄断而做的财务处理（那只是账面操作），此前从未有人把软件当商品出售，这是第一次。
Ben: Certainly to build a legitimate business around it. The other thing that's useful to know is when you're selling an IBM PC, you're literally selling a PC to a customer the same way that when I'm selling you this glass. From crate and barrel, I am selling you the glass, and the glass is now yours. I've transferred property to you.
Ben：当然，若想围绕软件建立合法商业模式，你就得明白卖 IBM PC 时，你实实在在地把一台电脑卖给客户，就像我把这只杯子卖给你一样。装箱发货后，杯子归你所有，所有权已经转移。
Software is not that, so the whole world of software is built on a license agreement. The source code that computer program the actual right of that is retained by the creator, and you license the copyright to your customer to be able to use that on their machine.
软件却不是这样，因此整个软件世界都建立在许可协议之上。程序的源代码及其权利仍由创作者保留，你只是将版权许可给客户，让他们能在自己的机器上使用。
There's this dual idea that computer software is copyrightable, and you can grant a license under certain conditions for customers to use it. That is the legal framework for which the next 50 years of technology at large would operate under.
核心观念有二：软件可受版权保护，并且可在特定条件下将使用许可授予客户。随后 50 年的整个科技行业，尤其软件业，正是在这一法律框架下运作。
David: For the moment though...
David：但眼下……
Ben: They have a piracy problem.
Ben：他们面临盗版问题。
David: Right. The law isn't going to change until 1980. Microsoft would be dead if they didn't figure out a solution to this before 1980. This is when Bill ultimately realizes, shoot, we did the wrong business deal with MITS here. MITS has to sell, and customers have to make the decision buy our BASIC. It's a key critical part of the value of the computer. It's the whole thing.
David：没错。法律要到 1980 年才会改变。如果在那之前解决不了盗版问题，微软可能就活不下去。正是在这时，比尔意识到：糟糕，我们和 MITS 的商业协议做错了。MITS 负责销售，但是否购买 BASIC 还得客户决定，而 BASIC 是电脑价值的关键所在——简直就是全部价值。
Ben: It makes that machine useful.
Ben：正是 BASIC 让电脑变得有用。
David: Without it, it is not useful. It's totally setting up the wrong incentives and value equation that customers should be buying this themselves. It should be included by the hardware OEM in the machine that they are selling and in the total purchase price. If that happens, We no longer have a piracy problem because we're just getting paid as part of the purchase of the machine.
David：没有它，电脑毫无用处。让顾客单独购买 BASIC 完全是错误的激励与价值分配。正确做法是让硬件厂商把 BASIC 预装进电脑，并计入整机售价。那样一来，我们随机器销售获得收入，盗版问题自然消失。
Ben: Right, it should be a royalty.
Ben：对的，它应当按版税方式收费。
David: Right. The problem is that is not the deal that they had with MITS.
David：没错，可问题在于他们与 MITS 的协议并非如此。
Ben: Right, or framed differently. Instead of saying, hey, consumer, do you want to buy something else too and make a new purchase decision, they should be saying, hey computer manufacturer, we make your thing actually useful, so pay us for it.
Ben：对，换个说法：与其问消费者“要不要再买一件东西”，不如对电脑制造商说“我们让你的产品真正有用，所以请为此付费”。
David: Yes. During 1975 and 1976, MITS pretty much had this new microcomputer market all to themselves. There were a couple of other competitors who sprung up, but nothing made. The Altair and MITS was the microcomputer company.
David：是的。1975 年和 1976 年，MITS 几乎独占了这个崭新的微型计算机市场。虽然也冒出过几家竞争对手，但都没掀起什么水花；Altair 与 MITS 就是微型计算机行业本身。
All that changes, though, in a big way in 1977, when what Byte Magazine calls the 1977 Trinity hits the market. That is three machines, the Tandy/RadioShack TRS-80, the Commodore Personal Electronic Transactor, or the acronym PET, and the Apple II. All three of which machines were like the Altair, low cost, mass market.
然而 1977 年情况发生了巨大变化，《Byte》杂志称之为“1977 三驾马车”——Tandy/RadioShack 的 TRS-80、Commodore 的 Personal Electronic Transactor（简称 PET）以及 Apple II。它们与 Altair 一样价格低廉、面向大众市场。
Unlike the Altair, they were not kits. They were fully assembled, fully functional, right out of the box, and they each had their own major distribution advantages. In Bill's words, these three machines, the 1977 Trinity, ignite volume in the market. Bill loves these really dramatic verbs like we attacked the manual, they ignite the volume in the market.
与 Altair 不同，它们不是套件，而是开箱即用、功能完整的整机，而且各自拥有强大的分销渠道。用比尔的话说，这“三驾马车”点燃了市场销量。比尔喜欢用戏剧化的动词，比如“我们猛攻手册”“它们点燃了市场”。
Ben: The press just latches on to him. Whenever Bill has a leaked memo or something where he talks about all this war terminology, those all become headlines.
Ben：媒体对他的话抓得紧。每当比尔的内部备忘录泄露，里面充满战争术语，立刻就能上头条。
David: It's so great. Earlier, during 1976, Microsoft had started getting approached by a few of the bigger computing companies NCR (National Cash Register), GE, Control Data Systems. I want to license Microsoft BASIC for the 8080 microprocessor here so that we can experiment with these things. Each of these deals would have been revenue to Microsoft of \$100,000-ish.
David：这太有趣了。早在 1976 年，微软就开始接到几家大型计算公司——NCR、GE、Control Data Systems——的洽询，想为 8080 微处理器授权 Microsoft BASIC 来做试验。这些交易每笔都能给微软带来约 10 万美元的收入。
Ed and MITS, they keep dragging their feet on negotiating these. They've got the exclusive license. Everything's got to go through MITS. Most of them are turning down because Ben, you said, they don't want anybody to come in and compete with them.
但埃德和 MITS 在谈判上一直拖延。独家授权在他们手里，一切都得经过 MITS。他们大多拒绝这些请求，因为正如你说的，Ben，他们不想引来竞争者。
Ben: Yup, there's the misaligned incentive.
Ben：没错，激励彻底错位。
David: There's the misaligned incentive. There is the clause that Bill and Microsoft, and I presume Bill Sr. put in the original agreement—is MITS is using its best efforts to license, promote, and commercialize the BASIC broadly in the marketplace? You can make a pretty strong argument that they're not.
David：激励确实错位。比尔和微软（我想还有比尔的父亲）在合同里加了一条：MITS 必须尽最大努力在市场上广泛授权、推广并商业化 BASIC。显然，他们并没有做到。
Ed, though, unbeknownst to Bill and Paul, has another reason that he's dragging his feet on these deals, which is that he's about to sell the company. In May of 1977, MITS gets acquired by the tape drive manufacturer, Pertec, for \$6.5 million. Ed rides off into the sunset.
然而埃德拖延还有另一层原因，是比尔和保罗当时并不知道的——他准备把公司卖掉。1977 年 5 月，MITS 以 650 万美元被磁带机制造商 Pertec 收购，埃德功成身退。
Pertec knows about this dispute with Microsoft, and they come in and they figure, who is this Bill Gates? He's a 21-year-old kid, a college dropout, we're a big company, we can deal with this. Robert says an amazing quote later. He says, "Pertec kept telling me they could deal with this kid. It was a little Roosevelt telling Churchill that he could deal with Stalin."
Pertec 了解与微软的纠纷后，心想：比尔·盖茨是谁？不过是个 21 岁的辍学生；我们大公司还怕他？罗伯茨后来有句惊人的评价：“Pertec 总说能摆平那孩子，这就像小罗斯福对丘吉尔说他能搞定斯大林。”
Ben: Oh, my God.
Ben：天哪。
David: I also don't think they realized that this kid's dad is one of the best corporate attorneys in the country.
David：他们大概也没意识到，这孩子的父亲是全美顶尖的公司律师之一。
Ben: Bill Gates was just constantly underestimated, which worked to his advantage in those early days.
Ben：比尔·盖茨一直被低估，这在早期反而成了他的优势。
David: Totally.
David：确实如此。
Ben: This is the thing about Microsoft. People forget how insanely young Bill was. He was just 20. To put that in context, he's only 7 years older than Jensen Huang, but they feel an entire generation apart since Microsoft was started almost 20 years before NVIDIA. When you start bending your mind around like, oh, Bill Gates is still pretty young, considering what an institution Microsoft has become in the world.
Ben：谈到微软，人们常忘记比尔当时有多年轻——他才 20 岁。比较一下，他只比黄仁勋大 7 岁，但两人似乎隔了一代人，因为微软比英伟达早将近 20 年创立。想到微软已成世界级巨头，而比尔其实依旧相当年轻，这真让人惊叹。
David: Right. Microsoft next year is going to have its 50th anniversary. I believe that'll also be the same year that Bill turns 70. That's wild.
David：没错。明年微软将迎来 50 周年，我记得那年比尔也将满 70 岁。真是不可思议。
Ben: Yeah.
Ben：是啊。
David: That fall in 1977. The dispute between MITS/Pertec and Microsoft goes to arbitration in Albuquerque. The interim months while this arbitration is happening are the only moment in Microsoft's history where cash gets tight. They're running out of money because they can't really make any sales here.
David：回到 1977 年的那个秋天，MITS/Pertec 与微软的纠纷进入阿尔伯克基仲裁。在仲裁期间这几个月里，微软的现金首次也是唯一一次变得紧张，因为他们几乎无法展开销售。
Ben: They don't control their destiny.
Ben：他们无法掌控自己的命运。
David: People aren't paying MITS for the BASIC. They're "pirating" the software. They can't do deals with all the other computer companies that want to come licensed directly, so things get a little tight. Microsoft ends up winning the arbitration, I believe, in maybe November 1977, meaning they are now totally free to license BASIC to anybody who wants to buy it on any terms that they want.
David：用户没有向 MITS 支付 BASIC 费用，而是在“盗版”软件。微软也无法与那些想直接授权 BASIC 的计算机公司达成交易，所以资金有点吃紧。我记得 1977 年 11 月左右，微软在仲裁中获胜，这意味着他们可以自由地以任何条件向任何想购买的人授权 BASIC。
They turn around. They immediately license it to Trinity, Apple, Commodore, Radio Shack, and Tandy. They license it to all the big companies, the GEs, the NCRs, who want to experiment with microcomputers.
随后他们迅速将 BASIC 授权给“三驾马车”——Apple、Commodore、Radio Shack/Tandy——以及那些希望试水微型计算机的大公司，如 GE、NCR。
There's a really funny story with Apple that apparently, Woz had more or less written 95% of their own BASIC. But it didn't have floating point numbers, it only had integer numbers. Jobs is totally writing Woz. He's like, the BASIC is really important. Can you just finish it? Can you do floating point? Woz just doesn't do it, so Jobs has to go license Microsoft's BASIC. Amazing.
关于 Apple 有个有趣的故事：据说沃兹几乎写好了自家 95% 的 BASIC，但它不支持浮点数，只能处理整数。乔布斯一直催沃兹：“BASIC 很重要，你能把它完善吗？能加上浮点数吗？”沃兹就是不动手，结果乔布斯只好去授权微软的 BASIC，令人咋舌。
Ben: That's the first deal that happens between the companies. There's so many deals done, both directions, commercial deals, equity deals, legal disputes in both directions. This is the very first time that they do something together.
Ben：那是两家公司之间的第一笔交易。此后双方有过无数往来，包括商业合作、股权合作以及各类法律纠纷。这是他们首次携手。
David: Yup. Bill, Paul, and Microsoft, do all these deals. They do them all as cash upfront, fixed cost, all you companies, you're going to pay us. You include the BASIC in the machines that you're selling, and we're going to get all the money up front. Super presciently, though, Bill does not value maximize on these deals.
David：没错。比尔、保罗和微软把所有交易都做成预付现金、一次性买断：各位厂商，你们把 BASIC 预装进机器里，先把钱一次付给我们。但极具前瞻性的比尔并没有追求这些交易的最大化收益。
The Apple deal is \$31,000 for eight years of access for Apple for the Apple II Microsoft's BASIC. They're not price gouging here because Bill sees, he's like, the play here is we want to make it a no brainer for everybody who's selling a microcomputer to have Microsoft's BASIC on it, because we want to set the standard.
与 Apple 的协议是 3.1 万美元，Apple 获得 8 年期许可，在 Apple II 上使用微软 BASIC。比尔没有哄抬价格，因为他看得很清楚：关键是要让所有卖微型计算机的人都不假思索地选择微软 BASIC，我们要制定行业标准。
If we are the standard programming environment that anybody who's using these computers—and again, anybody who is using these computers is programming them, they're used to the Microsoft version of BASIC—we're going to have so much power that it'll become a self-fulfilling prophecy. All of our competitors will just wither away. Nobody will want them because it's not going to be compatible with the language everybody knows. Once people start trading and then ultimately developing and selling software that they've written, it's only going to run on our BASIC interpreter, not anybody else's.
只要使用这些计算机的人（再次强调：当时每位使用者都需要编程），都习惯使用微软版 BASIC，我们就能掌握巨大话语权，并形成自我实现的预言：所有竞争对手都会逐渐枯萎，因为他们的产品与大家熟悉的语言不兼容。一旦用户开始交流、乃至开发并销售基于我们解释器的软件，那些程序只会在我们的 BASIC 上运行，而不是别人家的。
Ben: Fascinating. I actually didn't know that it started this early. One correction there, you don't know for a fact it's only going to run on Microsoft's BASIC interpreter, but you do know for a fact that it will run on Microsoft's BASIC interpreter. If it's cheap enough, why would you take the chance on a clone that might have one or two things wrong with it?
Ben：太有趣了。我其实不知道事情这么早就开始了。有一点要纠正：你并不能确定它只能在微软的 BASIC 解释器上运行，但你可以确定它一定能在微软的 BASIC 解释器上运行。如果价格够低，为什么还要冒险去用可能有一两处问题的克隆版本呢？
David: Yes. Basically, his vision is, I want to remove any oxygen from any argument anyone could have about not using Microsoft's BASIC on a microcomputer. He thinks about this concept as a positive spiral that he really in his mind is the reason for Microsoft's success.
David：没错。基本上，他的愿景是要彻底堵死任何人拒绝在微型计算机上使用微软 BASIC 的借口。在他看来，这是一种正向螺旋，也是微软得以成功的根本原因。
He says, “Success reinforces success. In a growing market, one way of doing something gets a slight advantage over its competitors, this is most likely to happen with high technology products that can be made in great volume for a very little increase in cost.” If you get that slight advantage, it'll compound, and this is what he's playing for here.
他说：“成功会强化成功。在一个增长中的市场里，只要某种做法比竞争对手略胜一筹，这在高科技产品上尤为常见，因为它们可以以极低的增量成本进行大规模生产。”只要获得那一点优势，它就会不断复利，这正是他追求的。
现在的chatGPT，用户懒的更去尝试其他的AI，验证比OpenAI更好是需要时间和精力的。
Ben: It's interesting. In the earliest days, what was stopping someone else from writing a BASIC interpreter and licensing it to Apple or RadioShack? Nothing. There were other smart people out there. It was just a very good business decision to say, we got to close that door. We just got to make this a no-brainer for people to buy from us, because if we're value maximizing and it's starting to feel expensive, they're going to turn elsewhere until we get a lead.
Ben：很有意思。最初的时候，是什么阻止别人写一个 BASIC 解释器然后授权给 Apple 或 RadioShack 呢？没有任何阻力。外面还有很多聪明人。所以必须把那扇门关上，让大家毫不犹豫地向我们购买。因为如果我们一味追求高价，客户感觉贵了就会转投他处，直到我们再次领先。
David: The Apple story is the perfect example. The Woz thing is cute, it makes for a good story, and oh, he didn't finish the BASIC. But when Microsoft sold them the BASIC, which was already getting established as the standard for \$31,000...
David：Apple 的故事就是完美例子。沃兹那事儿很有趣，也很有戏剧性——他没把 BASIC 做完。但微软把已经成为业界标准的 BASIC 卖给他们，只要 31 000 美元……
NVIDIA留下的缺口很大，竞争对手都在打造自己的芯片。
Ben: Sure. Why not?
Ben：当然，为什么不呢？
David: No brainer. Apple could have gone out and hired another programmer to finish the BASIC. They're like, wait, we could do that, or I could just get the standard one for \$31,000. I'm going to do that.
David：毫无悬念。Apple 完全可以再雇个程序员把 BASIC 写完，但他们想：等等，我们可以这么做，或者只花 31 000 美元就能买到标准版。那还是买吧。
Ben: Just because it's important to establish there are trade offs for everything, if you're running a startup right now, you might think to yourself, oh, great. I'll just run that exact strategy. The important thing here is (a) Most of the work was already done for the original BASIC. (b) Bill was doing it himself, Bill and Paul, so the importance of technical co-founders. Their overhead was crazy low.
Ben：必须说明任何策略都有取舍。如果你正在创业，可能会想：“太好了，我就照搬这套策略。”关键在于：(a) 原版 BASIC 的大部分工作已完成；(b) 这些都是比尔亲自做的——比尔和保罗——技术合伙人的重要性，他们的固定成本极低。
They could do these deals where they don't make very much money. I think at the end of 1977, there were five employees. Their overhead was just so unbelievably low that they could take a really long lens.
他们可以做利润不高的交易。我记得 1977 年底公司只有 5 名员工，开销低得惊人，因此他们能放眼长远。
David: Even though it takes until the very end of 1977 when the MITS dispute gets resolved and Microsoft can actually make money again, they end 1977 with \$381,000 in revenue, despite zero for the first 11 months of the year. They're just rolling in cash. This is when Bill famously goes out and buys a green Porsche 911 and is motoring around Albuquerque, getting all sorts of speeding tickets and hilarious stuff.
David：尽管直到 1977 年底与 MITS 的纠纷解决后微软才能重新挣钱，他们仍以 381 000 美元的收入结束了 1977 年——前 11 个月几乎是零收入，随后现金滚滚。这时候，比尔出名地买了一辆绿色保时捷 911，在阿尔伯克基到处飙车，收了一堆超速罚单，趣事不断。
Ben: This is when he got his mugshot, right?
Ben：这是他拍警局照的时候，对吧？
David: Yeah, I think that's right.
David：对，我想是的。
Ben: This is the classic Bill Gates holding up the...
Ben：就是那张经典的比尔·盖茨举着……
David: Yes. Amazing.
David：没错，太精彩了。
Ben: He got, I think, three speeding tickets in one day, two of which were from the same police officer.
Ben：据说他一天就收了三张超速罚单，其中两张还是同一个警官开的。
David: Yeah, and there are funny stories of the Albuquerque police thought, how is a kid driving a Porsche 911? He must be a drug dealer or something.
David：是啊，还有个有趣的传闻，说阿尔伯克基的警察曾想，怎么会有小孩开着保时捷 911？他肯定是贩毒的之类的。
Ben: Even when he was 20–21, he looked 17.
Ben：他二十来岁时，看上去也就不到十八。
David: Right. It's like, do you even have a driver's license?
David：对啊，感觉像在质疑：你确定你有驾照吗？
Ben: Wild.
Ben：太疯狂了。
David: Back to what you're saying, it's a really, really important point. To make this dynamic work, you need to be able to afford the investment in the fixed cost for the software, for the technology to make it that little bit superior, like Bill's talking about, the slight advantage over the competitors. At this moment in time, the industry is completely brand new. The software industry is brand new.
David：回到你刚才的观点，那真的是至关重要。要让这种正循环奏效，你得能负担软件和技术上的固定成本投入，好让产品略微优于竞争对手——就像比尔说的那样，占得一点点优势。而在当时，这个行业是全新的，软件行业更是刚刚起步。
The amount that that fixed costs takes, the cost is quite low. Really, it's just Bill and Paul's time and dedication to this industry that nobody else is making that investment. You can't run this playbook today because in any market, even a brand new market, even a speculative market, the minimum viable fixed cost is billions of dollars.
当时所需的固定成本其实非常低，本质上就是比尔和保罗投入的时间与热情，别人并未做出同样的投资。放到今天，你无法再复制这套剧本，因为无论哪个市场——哪怕是全新的或投机性的——最低可行的固定成本都得以十亿美元计。
Ben: Right. Yeah, that's interesting. I also think this moment galvanized something important, which is Bill and Paul could look around and see that there is going to be so much value created by microcomputers and by software. They really found religion around software is magic. The things that people can create now that we've done this BASIC interpreter and these machines are cheap and plentiful. The magic will take care of itself as long as we ensure this industry can just exist and do its thing.
Ben：没错，很有意思。我觉得这也催生了一个重要转变：比尔和保罗环顾四周，意识到微型计算机和软件将创造巨大的价值，他们由此对“软件的魔力”深信不疑。有了 BASIC 解释器，机器又便宜又多，未来人们能创造的东西将不受限制。只要我们确保这个行业得以存在并自然发展，魔力就会自行显现。
They flipped from this mode of we need to bite and scratch and claw, and make sure that we win in deals to, huh, how can we enable software as a thing to thrive? I'm sure we can position ourselves well to capture some or a lot of that. I think they became almost stewards of the software industry and evangelists from this point forward.
他们的思维从“必须拼命争抢、确保每笔交易都赢”转变为“我们如何让软件蓬勃发展？只要行业繁荣，我们自会分得可观的一杯羹”。从此，他们几乎成了软件行业的守护者与布道者。
David: Yes. They also do another really prescient thing the next year in 1978, which is they go global.
David：是的。接下来的一年——1978 年——他们又做了件远见卓识的事：走向全球。
Ben: Yes.
Ben：没错。
David: Nobody else is going global yet, and the way that this happens is so fun. Bill gets a call one day.
David：那时还没有其他公司走向全球，这个过程也十分有趣。有一天比尔接到一个电话。
Ben: Also, how crazy is it? You've got five people, you're operating out of Albuquerque, you just finally expanded from having one customer, and you're like, you know what we should do this year? Let's open in Japan and become an international company.
Ben：想想多疯狂——公司只有五个人，总部在阿尔伯克基，好不容易客户从一家增至多家，却说：“我们今年干脆去日本开分公司，做跨国企业吧。”
David: Yes. The way this happens is one day, Bill gets a call from a guy named Kazuhiko Nishi, or Kay Nishi, who's a computer enthusiast in Japan, has gotten a hold of Microsoft BASIC, and totally shares the same vision as Bill and Paul. He doesn't have a Paul nor is he technical himself.
David：没错。事情是这样的：一天，比尔接到日本电脑爱好者西和彦（Kay Nishi）的电话。他拿到了 Microsoft BASIC，与比尔、保罗的愿景完全一致，但他既没有“保罗”这样的搭档，也不具备技术背景。
He's like, I'm going to bring you guys to Japan. I'm going to bring you to all the big computer companies. They agree that Kay will become Microsoft's exclusive distribution partner in Japan. By the next year in 1979, half of Microsoft's revenue is coming from Japan, which is wild.
他说：“我要把你们带到日本，介绍给所有大型计算机公司。”最终双方同意由 Kay 担任微软在日本的独家分销伙伴。结果到了下一年，也就是 1979 年，微软一半的收入居然来自日本，简直疯狂。
Ben: It's unbelievable, and it stayed at that very high run rate of an international being a huge chunk, close to half always basically forever. This is a huge cornerstone of Microsoft's success that they were an international company from year three of their existence.
Ben：不可思议，而且之后国际收入占比始终居高不下，长期维持在接近一半。这是微软成功的基石之一——成立仅三年就成了跨国公司。
David: Totally. Revenue in 1977, that last month of revenue was almost \$400,000. 1978 revenue is \$1.3 million.
David：没错。1977 年的最后一个月，微软收入接近 40 万美元；1978 年全年收入达到 130 万美元。
Ben: They have 13 employees at this point.
Ben：此时他们共有 13 名员工。
David: In 1979, revenue is \$2.4 million. At the end of that year, they're like, all right, we got to get out of Albuquerque.
David：1979 年，收入增至 240 万美元。那年末，他们决定：必须离开阿尔伯克基。
Ben: They've got 25 employees, I believe, at that point.
Ben：那时候，他们的员工数涨到大约 25 人。
David: Yeah, something like that. This is when they moved to Seattle. It's interesting to hear Bill talk about this. He actually really liked Albuquerque. Specifically, there weren't any distractions there.
David：差不多就是这个数。于是他们搬到西雅图。比尔谈起这段往事时，说他其实很喜欢阿尔伯克基，主要是那儿几乎没有外界干扰。
Ben: No distractions, weather was great.
Ben：没有干扰，天气也好。
David: Everybody was happy there, but the big problem was recruiting. He's like, if we're going to build this into the opportunity that I see, the vision that I see and that Paul shares with me, there's no way we're going to do that in Albuquerque. We got to move to a hub.
David：大家在那儿都过得不错，但最大问题是招聘。比尔认为，如果要把公司做成他和保罗所构想的样子，就不可能在阿尔伯克基实现，必须搬到人才汇聚的中心城市。
Ben: He's got three reasons for why Seattle in particular. By the way, it worked. Every single person except for his secretary did make the move. (1) He grew up in Seattle. He's like, I just want to go home. He justifies it in two other ways, which I found pretty fascinating. This is from an interview in the early 90s that he did.
Ben：他之所以选西雅图有三大理由。顺便说一句，除了秘书外，所有员工都随公司搬迁。(1) 他在西雅图长大，想回家。他还给出了另外两个理由，我觉得很有意思，这是他 90 年代初在采访里说的。
He said it basically came down to Seattle or Silicon Valley. In Silicon Valley, it's hard to keep secrets because there's a rumor mill. In Seattle, we can be a little bit more removed, and we can announce things when we want to announce them.
他表示，备选城市只有西雅图或硅谷。硅谷流言四起，难以保密；而在西雅图，他们可以适当保持距离，想公布消息时再公布。
(2) In Silicon Valley, people switch around companies. I don't want that. I want people to just work at Microsoft. There was a disadvantage to not being able to recruit from your competitors, but for a while, they were really the only game in town in Seattle.
(2) 在硅谷，跳槽频繁；他不想这样，只希望员工长期留在微软。虽然不能轻易从竞争对手挖人是劣势，但在西雅图，微软曾一度“独一家”。
David: But not really, though, because pretty quickly, Microsoft is such an important part of the industry. They recruit from Silicon Valley, too. We're going to talk about some of the people who come up. You're totally right, people stay at Microsoft. They don't leave. This continues right through to this day.
David：不过事实上也不尽然。很快微软就成了行业核心，也会去硅谷招人。稍后我们会提到一些案例。你说得对，微软的员工流失率极低，这一点一直延续到今天。
The other thing that I think is really important to say that makes it work for Seattle in a way that I don't know that this could have worked in too many other places in the country is the University of Washington. The computer science department there was really good. There were great people. Steve Russell had come out there. There was real talent, and they were churning out graduates out of the U-Dub that would go on to populate Microsoft for decades to come.
David：还有一点对西雅图至关重要——全美少有城市能具备——就是华盛顿大学。该校的计算机系实力强劲，人才济济，连 Steve Russell 这样的大牛也在那儿任教。UW 不断输送毕业生，几十年来源源不断加入微软。
Ben: Bill, of course, reinvested in that flywheel, donating tons of money to the university. There are buildings, there are whole new schools.
Ben：比尔当然也回馈这条飞轮，为华大捐了巨额资金，盖教学楼，成立新学院。
David: Yes, absolutely. They played right into it.
David：没错，这形成了良性循环。
Ben: Today, it's always a top 10, if not top 5 computer science program in the country. But unlike other top computer science programs, it's a state school, so it just has huge volumes. I think more students come out of the University of Washington and go to big tech than any other program in the country. That has stayed this amazing advantage.
Ben：如今，华大计算机系常年位列全美前十、甚至前五。与其他顶尖 CS 项目不同，它是州立大学，招生规模庞大。我认为，每年进入大型科技公司的毕业生数量，华大高于全美任何一所院校，这始终是西雅图的巨大优势。
David: Yeah. I think the only thing even close to it is Berkeley in the Bay Area with a lot of the same dynamics. But there's Stanford there too, so it's a dual university system in the Bay Area. You cannot overstate how important the University of Washington was to this decision and an ultimate success of coming to Seattle.
David：是的。我认为唯一能与之相比的大概只有湾区的伯克利，它具备许多相似的条件。但湾区同时还有斯坦福，形成了双大学体系。华盛顿大学对微软迁往西雅图这一决策的影响以及最终成功的重要性，怎么强调都不为过。
This brings us to 1980 in the beginning of the year when they move to Seattle, just in time for, I think you can make a very strong argument, the single most important deal ever done in the history of technology. It's crazy to even say it now, the Microsoft-IBM PC partnership.
这就来到了 1980 年初，他们搬到西雅图——恰逢科技史上或许最重要的一笔交易即将达成，说出来都令人难以置信：微软与 IBM 的 PC 合作。
Ben: It's crazy. You have this absolute behemoth partnering with someone that's not really relevant. If you're standing here today, it sounds like I'm talking about Microsoft partnering with IBM. At the time, it was IBM partnering with Microsoft. It was the only computer company that mattered in the entire world, got themselves into a particular situation where they came to Microsoft looking for help. It's the craziest set of events that made this possible, and I can't wait to dive into it.
Ben：太疯狂了。一家巨无霸要与一个当时并不起眼的公司合作。若站在今天看，好像是微软与 IBM 合作；可在当年，却是全球唯一重要的计算机公司 IBM 找微软求助。一连串匪夷所思的事件让这一切成为可能，我迫不及待想深入探讨。
David: Me too.
David：我也是。
The IBM PC. Why is IBM getting into the personal computer here in 1980? A fun quote we heard in our research was that IBM was the sun, the moon, the stars of the computing industry. That meant the hardcore enterprise mainframe computing industry.
IBM PC。为什么 1980 年 IBM 要涉足个人电脑？我们调研时听到一句有趣的说法：IBM 是计算行业的太阳、月亮和星辰——指的是企业级大型机领域。
Ben: David, are you going to attribute that quote or are you going to leave listeners just hanging?
Ben：David，你打算给这句话注明出处吗，还是让听众一头雾水？
David: All right, I think it's time. We talked to probably 10 early Microsoft people in research and preparation. One of those folks was Steve Ballmer himself. He used those words in describing IBM.
David：好吧，是时候揭晓了。我们在调研中采访了大约十位微软早期人物，其中之一正是史蒂夫·鲍尔默。他用这句话来形容 IBM。
Ben: And it's hard to imagine a better person to get their perspective on what IBM meant to the world at this point in time, because 1980 was also the year that Steve joined Microsoft. Literally at the same time in 1980, you've got the management team coming together with Steve, Bill, and Paul Allen, and you've got the IBM thing going on, and you've got them moving to Seattle. We haven't even talked about Charles Simonyi yet, but this was the year he joined.
Ben：想了解当时 IBM 对世界意味着什么，再没有比他更合适的视角了，因为 1980 年也是史蒂夫加入微软的年份。同一年，史蒂夫、比尔和保罗·艾伦组成管理团队；IBM 合作在进行；公司也搬到西雅图。我们还没提到查尔斯·西蒙尼——他也是这一年加入的。
David: This is the year. Every year for Microsoft until this point is the year, but 1980 is big.
David：这一年意义非凡。此前微软的每一年都很重要，但 1980 尤为关键。
Ben: Okay, so why is IBM the sun, the moon, and the stars of computing? Why are they getting into this PC? It's way cheaper than anything else they sell. It seems to be a totally different business strategy, a different customer set. What's going on?
Ben：那么，IBM 为何是计算行业的日月星辰？他们为什么要做 PC？这东西比他们卖的其他产品便宜得多，似乎是完全不同的商业策略、不同的客户群。这是怎么回事？
David: All the early microcomputers we were just talking about, the Altair, the Apple II, the TRS-80, are all 8-bit machines. They're running the Intel 8080 processor or a competitor making a similar 8-bit processor. The problem with an 8-bit processor is that the maximum data size for a given instruction cycle in the processor—this is called a data word in computer science terminology—is 256, 2⁸. You can't represent any number greater than 256 in any given CPU clock cycle in an 8-bit machine.
David：我们刚提到的早期微型计算机——Altair、Apple II、TRS-80——全都是 8 位机，使用 Intel 8080 或其它 8 位处理器。同 8 位处理器的问题在于：每个指令周期可处理的数据字（data word）最大只有 256，即 2 的 8 次方。在 8 位机的一个 CPU 时钟周期里，你无法表示超过 256 的数值。
Ben: It's effectively a bandwidth limitation, where if you're in a single clock cycle trying to do some particular instruction, it's a very, very small amount of data that you can move through the arithmetic logic unit or that you can move through the processor in that clock cycle.
Ben：这本质上是带宽限制：在单个时钟周期内执行指令，算术逻辑单元或处理器能处理的数据极其有限。
David: Totally. You could think of it as an hourglass or something. There's all the data sitting there in memory at the top of the hourglass, and then there's this small little funnel that it goes through. That's the processor, and then it comes out.
David：完全正确。你可以把它想象成沙漏：所有数据都在沙漏上半部的内存里，然后要通过下方狭窄的漏斗——那就是处理器——再流出。
Ben: That's a good analogy. It's going to take forever.
Ben：这个比喻很好。那样可就慢得要命了。
David: Yeah, into the application of the software that the user sees. You just are not really going to process it that fast.
David：是的，用户看到的软件应用就会很慢，处理速度根本上不去。
Ben: Very primitive machines.
Ben：非常原始的机器。
David: Yes. For a company IBM, they eclipsed the 8-bit computing cycle a long, long, long time ago. Mainframes, even minicomputers with DEC, all these machines are at least 16-bit, if not 32-bit computing machines. 8-bit is just not interesting.
David：没错。对 IBM 这种公司来说，8 位计算早就被他们甩在身后；无论是大型机还是 DEC 的迷你机，至少都是 16 位，甚至 32 位。8 位机对他们毫无吸引力。
Ben: Which is why they only cost $375 or whatever for an Altair.
Ben：这也解释了为什么 Altair 只卖 375 美元左右。
David: Right. In late 1979, Intel announces that they're coming out with the 8086 processor, which is a 16-bit microprocessor. With 16 bits, you can really start to do some damage here in terms of the applications that you could put on this thing to eat into business software use cases.
David：没错。1979 年末，英特尔宣布推出 8086 处理器，这是一款 16 位微处理器。拥有 16 位，就能在商业软件应用方面大显身手。
Ben: In 16 bits, you can represent numbers up to 65,536, so that's two to the 16th. You can do interesting things passing 16 bits around at once.
Ben：在 16 位里，你可以表示最高 65 536（2 的 16 次方），一次传递 16 位数据，就能做很多有趣的事情。
David: There are some really, really fun aspects to this. If you look at pictures of these processors, what did the 8080, the 8-bit processor, look like? And then you look at what the 8086, the 16-bit processor, looked like? You can see this.
David：这其中有些非常有趣的细节。如果你看这些处理器的照片——8 位的 8080 长什么样？然后看看 16 位的 8086——你能直观看到区别。
In the 8008 processor that's only eight bits, you see only nine pins coming off of the little chip. There's the eight pins for the data bits, and then I think there's one more control pin. If you look at the 8086 processor, it's a much longer rectangle with 16, 17, maybe 20 pins coming off of it. You see this physically represented in the chip.
在 8 位的 8008 上，你只能看到 9 个引脚——8 个数据脚，加一个控制脚。而 8086 是更长的矩形，大约有 16、17 甚至 20 个引脚，芯片的物理结构直接反映了位宽的提升。
Ben: The further we get in the computing world, the more abstract stuff becomes. It's always fun to go back in history when these concepts were so grounded in our physical reality that's easily observable since everything was so much bigger too.
Ben：计算技术越发展，层次就越抽象。回到历史中看这些概念与实体紧密对应，并且体积都很大、肉眼可见，总是很有趣。
David: Yeah. Back in 1980, the 8086 has been announced, 16-bit microprocessor is coming. IBM has already lived through missing a computing expansion era once with DEC and the minicomputer. They just let DEC take that market. Of course, that didn't really hurt IBM, but man, it would have been nice to also have that market too.
David：是的。1980 年，8086 的问世意味着 16 位微处理器时代来临。IBM 曾在 DEC 的迷你机时代错过一次计算范式扩张，任由 DEC 占领市场。当然，这并未真正伤到 IBM，但如果当时也能吃下那块市场就更好了。
Ben: The thing that they're observing about the microcomputer market is it's exploding. People in our industry know about DEC, people in the broader world never knew about DEC. But I think it's a very different rate of adoption and rate of demand with microcomputers where IBM started to look at and go, oh, this might be a really big computer market for people.
Ben：他们看到微型计算机市场正在爆发。业内人知道 DEC，但普通大众几乎不知道。微型计算机的采用速度和需求增长与迷你机完全不同，这让 IBM 开始意识到，这或许会成为面向大众的巨大市场。
David: They're finally observing the same thing that Bill and Paul did all the way back in the Traf-O-Data days of this is an exponential cycle. Moore's law, this is exponential, and exponential gets real big very quickly once you get a few years in.
David：他们终于看到比尔和保罗早在 Traf-O-Data 时期就洞察到的东西：这是指数级循环。摩尔定律意味着指数级增长，而指数级增长只需几年就能变得非常庞大。
Ben: Yup.
Ben：没错。
David: The mini computer cycle never was that. It's hard to remember today, but just to underscore this again, in 1980, IBM was the most valuable company in the entire world, the highest market cap company, bigger than all the oil companies in 1980.
David：迷你机从未达到那种增速。如今很难想象，但必须再次强调：1980 年，IBM 是全球市值最高的公司，甚至超过当时所有石油巨头。
Ben: The sun, the moon, and the stars.
Ben：真是计算行业的日月星辰。
David: Yes. Do you know what their market capital was?
David：是的。你知道他们的市值是多少吗？
Ben: In 1980, \$150 billion?
Ben：1980 年，1500 亿美元？
David: You are almost an order of magnitude off \$34 billion. That was the most valuable company. It is wild what a different world we live in today.
David：你差了几乎一个数量级——真正的数字是 340 亿美元。那可是当时全球市值最高的公司。今天的世界变化真是天翻地覆。
Ben: Yeah, even inflation adjusted, it's interesting that the rate of growth of the most valuable companies in the world in terms of market cap has far outpaced inflation.
Ben：是啊，即便考虑通胀，全球市值最高公司的增长速度也远远快于通胀，本身就很有意思。
David: That company, the most valuable in the world, they're going to tiny little Microsoft that's just moved to Seattle for this partnership. What's going on here? This is just so amazing. They deserve so much credit here. They got the Clay Christensen disrupt yourself, disruptive technology thing intuitively decades before Clay writes any of this stuff.
David：那家全球最有价值的公司，竟然要与刚搬到西雅图、微不足道的小微软合作。这是怎么回事？真是太令人惊叹了。他们理应获得满满的赞誉。几十年前他们就直觉式地领悟了克莱·克里斯滕森“自我颠覆、颠覆性技术”的理念，远在克莱写下这些理论之前。
The way that they decide to compete is all the things that Clay wrote about are working against us here. What we need to do is we need to create essentially a skunk works division, just our Lockheed episode. We need to do something outside the company, completely removed from the politics, sure, but the business incentives not to disrupt ourselves, and create a new division they called the entry level systems division. Actually, it may have existed before, but they repurpose it.
他们决定竞争的方式恰恰是克莱写到的那些因素此刻对我们不利。我们需要做的，是创建一个本质上的“臭鼬工厂”部门，就像我们的洛克希德那一集一样。我们得在公司之外搞点事情，完全脱离内部政治——当然还要避免现有业务激励阻挠自我颠覆——并建立一个新部门，称为“入门级系统部”。说不定以前就有，但他们赋予了它新使命。
Ben: This is in Boca Raton?
Ben：这是在博卡拉顿？
David: In Boca Raton, Florida. Very nice place. We were just there a couple of months ago, but not a technology hotbed in the world. They create a secret project called Project Chess, secret from the rest of the company, the whole world. The goal is to develop the IBM microcomputer or the personal computer, as people are starting to refer to microcomputers.
David：在佛罗里达的博卡拉顿。好地方。几个月前我们刚去过，但那里并不是全球的科技中心。他们秘密启动了一个名为“Project Chess”的项目，对公司其它部门乃至全世界都保密。目标是研发 IBM 微型计算机，也就是人们开始称之为个人计算机的东西。
This is wild. They're going to do it in secret with a small team with no other IBM resources. That means this small team, the only way they can do it is to use all off-the-shelf components from technology providers, basically play on the same level playing field as all the other microcomputer manufacturers out there.
这太疯狂了。他们要在保密状态下，仅凭一个小团队、没有任何其他 IBM 资源来完成。也就是说，这支小团队只能使用技术供应商的现成组件，基本上要和其他所有微机制造商站在同一条起跑线上竞争。
One more thing, IBM leadership tells this team in Boca, they have to ship the PC to customers within one year.
还有一点，IBM 总部告诉博卡的这个团队，他们必须在一年内把 PC 交付给客户。
Ben: It's a crazy constraint.
Ben：这真是个疯狂的限制条件。
David: It is a total crazy constraint. A couple of quotes on this. Don Estridge, who is one of the leaders of Project Chess, would later say that the company realized that if you're going to compete against people who started in a garage, obviously a reference to Apple here, you have to start in a garage yourself. Lou Gerstner, who later would take over IBM, would describe this whole Boca project as, "The way you get an elephant to tap dance."
David：这绝对是个疯狂到极点的限制。我引用两句话。Project Chess 的领军人物之一 Don Estridge 后来说，公司意识到如果要跟那些从车库起家的竞争对手（显然暗指苹果）拼搏，就得自己也从车库起步。后来执掌 IBM 的 Lou Gerstner 则把整个博卡项目形容为“让大象跳探戈的办法”。
Ben: The question is, are they playing from behind and thus have to adopt a flawed strategy, or is this strategy of assembling with all off-the-shelf components actually a good strategy if it works?
Ben：问题在于，他们是因为落后才被迫采取这种有缺陷的策略，还是说如果奏效的话，用全套现成组件组装其实本身就是一种好策略？
David: Let's tell the story and then come back to it.
David：先把故事讲完，待会儿再回头讨论。
Ben: Great.
Ben：好的。
David: Okay. What do they do? The hardware aspect of this is trivial, basically. Ed Roberts could put together the hardware to sell a microcomputer and do this deal with Intel. I think IBM can do a deal with Intel, not necessarily trickier but the more important part is the software. Thanks to Bill's genius strategy about be the volume player, don't optimize on per unit price, set the standards out there.
David：好吧，那他们怎么做？硬件其实没什么难度。Ed Roberts 能拼出一台微机并与英特尔合作，IBM 当然也能和英特尔签协议，这并不更复杂，但更关键的是软件。多亏比尔的天才策略——做规模玩家，不在单价上斤斤计较，而是把标准推向市场。
Ben: They were the world's leading provider of programming language interpreters, right?
Ben：他们当时是全球最大的编程语言解释器供应商，对吧？
David: 100%. There is one game in town and one game in town only, and that is Microsoft in Bellevue, Washington at this point in time.
David：完全正确。当时市面上只有一家玩家、唯一的选择——位于华盛顿州贝尔维尤的微软。
Ben: Now, interpreters are notably different from operating systems, but Microsoft definitely has raised the flag. Everyone could see, if I want to go buy software for my computers, broadly, they're an interesting group to talk to.
Ben：当然，解释器与操作系统毕竟不同，但微软已经高举大旗。大家都看得出来：如果我要给计算机买软件，微软肯定是值得洽谈的对象。
David: Yeah. Obviously, operating systems are going to become really, really big here in just a sec. Again, the 8-bit generation operating systems weren't that important because people were writing their own software. The standardized software, packaged application software doesn't happen until the 16-bit era and doesn't really, really happen until the 16-bit era and the IBM PC. That's why BASIC the interpreter is so important.
David：没错。很快，操作系统的重要性就会爆炸式提升。再次强调，在 8 位时代，操作系统意义不大，因为大家都自己写程序。标准化软件、成品应用软件要到 16 位时代，特别是 IBM PC 出现后才真正兴起。这也是为什么 BASIC 解释器当时至关重要。
What happens? IBM calls up Bill Gates. By August, 1980, the two companies are in serious talks to partner and work together on the IBM PC. We referenced Steve Ballmer a minute ago. The timing is just crazy. Steve had just joined the company in June of 1980.
接下来发生了什么？IBM 拨通了比尔·盖茨的电话。到 1980 年 8 月，两家公司已经在就 IBM PC 的合作展开深入谈判。我们刚才提到史蒂夫·鲍尔默，时机真是巧得离谱——他在 1980 年 6 月才刚刚加入微软。
Ben: He's employee number 30.
Ben：他是第 30 号员工。
David: The Microsoft team of 30, which the whole company of Microsoft pivots to work on the IBM PC partnership, is bigger than the Project Chess team in Boca.
David：微软这 30 人小队——实际上整个公司都转向 IBM PC 合作项目——人数已经比博卡的 Project Chess 团队还多了。
Ben: It's amazing.
Ben：太不可思议了。
David: Wow. Okay, Bill has just convinced Steve to drop out of business school at Stanford and come help him and Paul run the company. Microsoft at this point in time is still a partnership. Steve is the first person besides Bill and Paul to get equity in the company when he joins. It's 8.5% and it's a handshake deal at this point.
David：哇。好吧，比尔刚刚说服史蒂夫从斯坦福商学院退学，来和他以及保罗一起管理公司。这时的微软仍然是合伙制。史蒂夫是除比尔和保罗之外首位拿到公司股份的人，占比 8.5%，而且只是口头握手协议。
Ben: Bill really, really wanted to bring Steve on. He knew him from the Harvard days, knew what an asset he could be.
Ben：比尔非常非常想把史蒂夫招进来。他在哈佛时期就认识他，知道他能成为多大的资产。
David: He is the Yin of Bill's Yang.
David：他是比尔的“阴”，与比尔的“阳”相得益彰。
Ben: Yes. Frankly, 8.5%, it's a big grant. Who's out there running a 30-person company, and you're giving away 8.5% slugs? That just doesn't happen. Those are founder shares. This is really a reflection that the way that Bill thought about Steve was as a founder.
Ben：是的。坦白说，8.5% 是一笔很大的授予。谁会在经营一家只有 30 人的公司时就让出 8.5% 的股份？这几乎不可能发生。这是创始人份额。这充分反映了比尔视史蒂夫为创始人的心态。
In fact, it created some tension with Paul Allen, where Bill asked Paul, if they could go to 5%, Paul said, sure. And then Bill actually offered him 8.5%. Paul got upset and Bill said, I'll eat the 3.5%. It can come out of my share because I want him that bad.
事实上，这还引发了与保罗·艾伦的紧张。当比尔先问保罗能否给 5% 时，保罗同意了；结果比尔却实际给了他 8.5%。保罗很不高兴，比尔说，那额外的 3.5% 由我承担，从我的股份里扣，因为我太想要他加入。
David: He's the perfect person for this point in time. Bill was the only salesperson doing these OEM deals. Now they're dealing with IBM. They're entering the enterprise world. This needs to be a real business.
David：他正是当下最理想的人选。比尔此前是唯一负责这些 OEM 交易的销售人员。现在他们要跟 IBM 打交道，正踏入企业级世界，必须把公司变成一家真正的生意。
Back to the IBM negotiations, obviously Microsoft is very interested. IBM is not just very interested in working with Microsoft. They have to work with Microsoft. They're the only game in town.
回到与 IBM 的谈判上来，显然微软极其感兴趣。而 IBM 不仅想与微软合作，他们必须与微软合作——市面上只有微软这一家选择。
Ben: Specifically, they asked Microsoft for programming languages. They're like, we're making this great PC, we're going to need a BASIC. We think you guys are working on a COBOL. We'd like some COBOL.
Ben：具体来说，他们向微软要编程语言。他们说，我们要做一台很棒的 PC，需要一款 BASIC；我们听说你们在开发 COBOL，也想要 COBOL。
David: Yeah, Fortran. Give us the whole thing. There's some debate on whether it was the Microsoft side or the IBM side that really saw the vision of, hey, the 16-bit generation is going to enable real business software use cases on the personal computer, but it doesn't matter. That's the plan here, and that is absolutely what happens.
David：对，还要 Fortran，通通给我们。至于是微软还是 IBM 首先洞察到 16 位时代将在个人电脑上实现真正的商业软件应用，这点存有争议，但没关系，这就是他们的计划，也是后来确实发生的事情。
These initial discussions are for the programming language. Microsoft doesn't make an operating system at this point, because in the 8-bit generation, the operating system, I think, was a glorified bootloader to just get into the programming environment so that you could either write or load up the BASIC programs that Microsoft was going to interpret and then run.
这些最初的讨论只针对编程语言。此时微软还不做操作系统，因为在 8 位时代，操作系统基本只是一个华丽的引导加载程序，用来进入编程环境，好让你编写或加载 BASIC 程序，由微软的解释器来执行。
In the 8-bit generation, most, if not all hardware providers of microcomputers just wrote their own operating systems. It just wasn't a big deal. Now, there was one off-the-shelf operating system out there from a company called Digital Research, which was run by Gary Kildall, who, I think as we talked about earlier, Bill and Paul had actually intersected with back in Seattle.
在 8 位时代，大多数、如果不是全部的话，微机硬件厂商都会自己写操作系统，这根本算不上大事。不过市面上确实有一家名为 Digital Research 的公司提供现成的操作系统，由 Gary Kildall 领导，正如我们之前所说，比尔和保罗当年在西雅图就与他有所交集。
Ben: Yup. I think they were reasonably friendly.
Ben：没错。我觉得他们算是相当友好。
David: Yeah, I think they were quite friendly because they partnered. You needed the operating system to get into the programming environment. It wasn't that big of a deal. Whenever anybody needed one off-the-shelf, Bill and Microsoft would just refer people over to Digital to get it.
David：是的，我认为关系不错，因为他们合作过。要进入编程环境就需要操作系统，但这不算什么大事。任何人需要现成系统时，比尔和微软都会把他们介绍去 Digital 那里。
Ben: Yup. CP/M, right?
Ben：对，CP/M，对吧？
David: Exactly. CP/M, which I think is maybe Control Program for Microprocessors, I think, is the abbreviation there.
David：没错，就是 CP/M，我想是 Control Program for Microprocessors 的缩写吧。
Ben: God, they were so bad. Every single thing that's been named to this point, except for the company Microsoft, was a horrible name. The processor is 8008, and now it's 8080, but the machine is 8800, that the processor is inside. Give me a break, everyone. It's horrible naming.
Ben：天啊，他们的名字都太糟糕了。到目前为止，除了“微软”这家公司以外，所有被命名的东西名字都很难听。处理器叫 8008，现在是 8080，但装着这颗处理器的机器却叫 8800。拜托各位吧，这些名字起得太差了。
David: Bill and I'm sure Paul too, but Bill is the only person in this industry that has the vision for what this can become, even Intel. Bill talks about this. He doesn't think that Intel even realizes what's happening here. They're just like, oh, we're just making more chips, and people use them for stuff.
David：比尔——我相信保罗也是——但在这个行业里只有比尔真正看到了这件事可能发展成什么样，连英特尔都没有这种视野。比尔提到过，他认为英特尔甚至没有意识到正在发生什么，他们只是想：哦，我们就是多做点芯片，人们会拿去用。
巴菲特从一开始就看不上Intel，可能有很多原因，洞察力很可能是其中重要的原因，在后来的历史中，巴菲特宁愿选择IBM也没有碰Intel，事实是现在的IBM还有2600亿的市值，Intel快倒闭了。
Ben: It does seem like very few people are thinking about their products as something they really need to build a brand around with consumers, hence the naming schemes.
Ben：的确，似乎很少有人把自己的产品当作真正需要在消费者心中打造品牌的对象，这也就导致了如今这种命名方式。
David: The IBM, Microsoft discussions are going along. IBM's like, oh, hey, yeah, we need an operating system. Bill, I think from everything we've read and folks we've talked to, in good faith just does the standard thing he's always done in these situations. He's like, oh yeah, go talk to Gary, go talk to Digital Research. He can probably do that.
David：IBM 和微软的讨论持续进行中。IBM 说，嗨，是啊，我们需要一款操作系统。根据我们读到和听到的一切，比尔完全是出于好意，照他以往在这种情况下的惯例去做：哦，去找加里，去找 Digital Research，他们大概能搞定。
Ben: Right. We don't have an operating system, this guy does.
Ben：对，我们手头没有操作系统，而那家伙有。
David: What happens next is unclear. But what is clear is however it goes down, this is one of, if not the biggest business blunder in history. IBM, that team from Project Chess, flies down, I think, directly from Seattle and talking with Bill and Steve to Monterey, California, where Digital Research is based at this point, to meet with Gary and his wife, Dorothy, who run the business together. Bill's called them. He's like, hey, I got a big OEM client coming down, needs an operating system.
David：接下来发生的情况有些含糊，但可以肯定的是，无论细节如何，这都是商业史上最大——如果不是最大——的失误之一。IBM 那支 Project Chess 团队从西雅图（他们刚与比尔、史蒂夫谈过）直接飞到加州蒙特雷，那时 Digital Research 位于那里，与加里及其妻子多萝西会面，他们共同经营公司。比尔已打电话告诉他们：“嘿，有个重要的 OEM 客户要来，需要一款操作系统。”
Ben: He signed hefty, hefty NDAs. He cannot say who it is, but he's like, you really should take this seriously.
Ben：他签了厚厚一叠保密协议，不能透露客户是谁，但他告诉他们：你们可得当回事。
David: Right. The team comes down. Obviously, they show up there from IBM. There's a big snafu where Gary does not attend the meeting. There are conflicting reports about what happened.
David：没错。那支团队抵达后，显而易见他们来自 IBM。但随即出现大问题：加里没有出席会议。关于原因有多种说法，彼此矛盾。
Ben: Was it one of them that he's out flying an airplane?
Ben：其中一种说法是他去开飞机了吗？
David: Yeah. I'm pretty sure he was flying his personal airplane while this happens. Some reports are he was just out joyriding and missed it. Some reports are no, he was on a business trip, knew it was happening, but he had another important business meeting. He didn't know that this was IBM that was coming. Regardless, it doesn't really matter because IBM just wants the operating system.
David：对，我几乎可以肯定他当时正在驾驶私人飞机。有报道称他只是出去兜风错过了会议；也有报道称他在出差，知道会议要开，但另有一个重要商务约见。他并不知道来的是 IBM。无论哪种说法，其实都无关紧要，因为 IBM 只想要操作系统。
Dorothy does meet with them. She's unwilling to sign their NDA. There's a lawyer from Digital Research who gets involved, and he doesn't really understand what's going on.
多萝西倒是见了他们，但她不愿意签 IBM 的保密协议。Digital Research 派出的律师也介入了，可他根本没弄清楚状况。
The punchline is that IBM leaves this interaction with the belief that Gary and Digital Research aren't up for working with them and aren't capable of producing here. Producing is important because it's not like the existing CP/M OS that they made would work here. They would have to write a new version, a 16-bit version, and they hadn't done that yet.
结果是 IBM 带着这样的印象离开了：加里和 Digital Research 不愿意与他们合作，也没有能力交付成果。交付这一点很重要，因为他们现有的 CP/M 系统根本不能直接用；必须重新写一个 16 位版本，而他们尚未完成。
Ben: In particular, they would have to do some customizing. But part of what IBM wants is a customized version of an operating system for the IBM PC. They don't want this to be fully off-the-shelf.
Ben：尤其是，他们得做一些定制。而 IBM 想要的是一款为 IBM PC 定制的操作系统，不希望完全拿现成货来用。
Just to add one more stir the pot of history here, there is another version of this story where Gary does actually have a conversation with IBM, and it blows up over licensing terms. What Gary really wants is a significant royalty of every IBM PC sold, and IBM walks over that. Whether that happened or whether it's just an NDA issue, either way, I think we all know the IBM PC did not end up running the CP/M operating system.
再给历史添一把火，还有另一种说法是加里确实与 IBM 谈过，但因授权条款谈崩了。加里真正想要的是从每一台 IBM PC 的销量中抽取可观版税，IBM 因此掉头就走。无论最终是因为这个还是仅仅因为保密协议问题，反正结果大家都知道——IBM PC 最终并没有运行 CP/M 操作系统。
David: That's amazing. I didn't know that. We'll talk about that when we get to the business terms of the Microsoft IBM deal in a minute. But for the moment, there's no deal yet because an operating system needs to be provided here.
David：太惊人了，我之前不知道。等我们马上谈到微软与 IBM 协议的商务条款时再讨论这件事。不过目前还没有达成协议，因为这里需要先提供一款操作系统。
IBM goes back to Microsoft and they're like, hey, this guy you referred us to ain't going to work. The way that I read some quotes from the IBM people here were like, we just threw the problem back in Microsoft's lap of you guys deal with this, you source an operating system.
IBM 又找回微软，说：嗨，你给我们推荐的那个人不行。从我看到的一些 IBM 内部说法来看，他们把问题直接丢回微软：你们来解决，自己去找一套操作系统。
I'd like to say that Bill, Steve, and Microsoft, you don't need to give them an opportunity twice. In this case, you did need to give them an opportunity twice because they almost flubbed it and sent IBM down to see Gary. This time they don't flub it. They're like, okay, we'll get you an operating system.
我得说，比尔、史蒂夫以及微软，通常不需要给他们第二次机会。但这一次确实给了他们第二次机会，因为他们差点搞砸，把 IBM 送去找加里。这回他们没失手，而是说：好，我们会搞定一款操作系统给你们。
Ben: Enter Seattle Computer Products.
Ben：这时，Seattle Computer Products 登场。
David: Yes. It just so happens that right down the road from Microsoft in the Seattle area—I think despite being named Seattle Computer Products, I think this company was actually based in Tukwila, Washington—a programmer named Tim Patterson had just written a 16-bit operating system for the 8086 that Intel had just announced, and he was calling it the Quick and Dirty 16-bit Operating System or QDOS for short, and had it ready to go.
David：没错。恰好在微软附近的西雅图地区——尽管公司名叫 Seattle Computer Products，但我记得它实际上位于华盛顿的 Tukwila——一位名叫 Tim Patterson 的程序员刚为英特尔新发布的 8086 写了一套 16 位操作系统，他把它称作“Quick and Dirty 16-bit Operating System”，简称 QDOS，而且已经可以使用。
Why had he written this? What was this company, Seattle Computer Products? Why did they have an operating system? They were a component provider to microcomputer manufacturers. They essentially made motherboards. When Intel now has announced this new 16-bit processor generation that they're coming out with, Seattle Computer Products want to sell motherboards and have them ready for 16-bit.
他为什么要写这个？Seattle Computer Products 究竟是家什么公司？他们为什么会有操作系统？他们是给微型计算机制造商提供组件的厂商，主要做主板。英特尔宣布了新的 16 位处理器之后，Seattle Computer Products 想卖出能支持 16 位的主板并提前做好准备。
They need to test and play around with these things, and their customers are asking for it. They had been going to Kildall and Digital Research too and badgering them to like, hey, write the 16-bit version of CP/M. Gary just didn't, so Tim's like, fine, I'll do a quick and dirty version myself, and thus DOS is born.
他们需要测试这些东西，客户也在催。他们曾多次找过 Kildall 和 Digital Research，缠着他们写一套 16 位版的 CP/M。加里一直没动手，于是 Tim 就想：行，那我自己做个简易版，DOS 就这样诞生了。
Ben: Incredible, which of course later, they would drop the Q and call it DOS, the Disk Operating System. Something about dirty didn't have a ring to it when you're selling it to IBM.
Ben：不可思议。后来他们当然去掉了 Q，只叫 DOS——磁盘操作系统。毕竟当你要卖给 IBM 的时候，“Dirty” 这个词听起来不太合适。
David: No. Bill, Paul, and Microsoft have learned about this. They know Seattle Computer Products, they know Rod Brock, the guy who owns the company. They get in touch with him and they say, hey, can we license QDOS from you and Tim? We've got a big OEM customer that wants a 16-bit operating system. They work out a deal whereby Microsoft pays Seattle Computer Products \$25,000 for the rights to adapt and sell QDOS to the one unnamed original equipment manufacturer who they're working with.
David：对。比尔、保罗以及微软得知了此事。他们认识 Seattle Computer Products，也认识公司老板 Rod Brock。他们联系他，说：嘿，我们能向你和 Tim 许可 QDOS 吗？我们有个大型 OEM 客户需要 16 位操作系统。双方达成协议：微软支付 Seattle Computer Products 2.5 万美元，获得修改并向那家未具名 OEM 厂商销售 QDOS 的权利。
Tim, actually, is jazzed about this. He ends up leaving SCP computer products and joining Microsoft. With the rest of the team, he's part of building DOS, taking his initial work and turning it into real DOS. Later on, before this all gets announced and the PC ships, Microsoft would pay Seattle computer products another \$50,000 for full rights to own 86 QDOS, sell and license it to anybody else indefinitely. I believe the total amount of dollars that changed hands here is \$75,000.
Tim 对此其实非常兴奋，他最终离开 SCP，加入微软，与团队一起把自己的初始作品打磨成真正的 DOS。随后，在一切公开并且 PC 出货之前，微软又向 Seattle Computer Products 支付 5 万美元，买下 86-QDOS 的完整所有权，可无限期向任何人出售和授权。换算下来，这笔交易的总金额是 7.5 万美元。
Ben: Unbelievable.
Ben：难以置信。
David: This is DOS. One programmer wrote a "quick and dirty" operating system, and Microsoft bought the license to that and adapted it into DOS. Tim, when he was at Seattle computer products, definitely did not write DOS as DOS. It's not like Microsoft bought all of DOS for \$75,000. They did a lot of work on it, but this is how it all goes down.
David：这就是 DOS。一个程序员写了一个“快速又简陋”的操作系统，微软买下其许可并将其改造成 DOS。Tim 在 Seattle Computer Products 工作时并不是直接写出了完整的 DOS。微软并不是花 7.5 万美元就买到了全部 DOS，他们后续投入了大量工作，但事情的来龙去脉就是如此。
Ben: Microsoft would eventually generate billions of dollars on DOS-based products. You're exactly right in the same way that Instagram today is a much different code base than Instagram and much larger code base than Instagram when it was purchased, but my God, \$75,000 to buy DOS to get this whole thing started. Until Windows 95, all of the Windows operating systems were DOS-based.
Ben：微软最终凭借基于 DOS 的产品赚取了数十亿美元。你说得完全正确，就像今天的 Instagram 代码库与被收购时相比已经大得多、不同得多一样。但天哪，只花 7.5 万美元就买下 DOS 启动了这一切！在 Windows 95 之前，所有 Windows 操作系统都建立在 DOS 之上。
David: It's just crazy. It really illustrates how fast things were moving, how much all this was getting invented and discovered in real time that even to this point, Bill Gates isn't thinking that operating systems are that important. This is just a shortcut to get the deal done with IBM to make it happen.
David：这太疯狂了。这充分说明了事态发展之快，许多东西都是实时被发明和发现的；甚至到此刻，比尔·盖茨还没把操作系统看得那么重要。这只是为了迅速敲定与 IBM 的交易而采取的捷径。
Ben: Also, David, I got to say, I just looked it up. The address of Seattle Computer Products, on the original business card for Seattle Computer Products where I presume QDOS was written, the space is available, so I know where our next studio needs to be.
Ben：另外，David，我得说，我刚查了一下。Seattle Computer Products 的地址——我猜 QDOS 就是在那里的原始名片上写出来的——目前那个场地还空着，所以我知道我们下一间工作室该设在哪儿了。
David: It's in Tequila?
David：在 Tequila？
Ben: It's in Tequila.
Ben：在 Tequila。
David: All right. The rent can't be that expensive then, so let's do it.
David：好吧，那里的租金应该不会太贵，那就干吧。
Ben: Correct.
Ben：没错。
David: Hell, yeah. We've been joking for years about making the Acquired Museum. We might have a location.
David：太好了。我们多年来一直开玩笑说要建 Acquired 博物馆，也许现在找到地点了。
Okay. Now they've got the operating system, they've got QDOS or DOS in place to license the IBM. The only thing that is left to formalize the partnership is the business terms.
现在他们已经拥有了操作系统，已经准备好将 QDOS 或 DOS 授权给 IBM。要正式确立合作关系，唯一剩下的就是敲定商务条款。
Ben, if what you said is right about the Gary Kildall IBM negotiations, this is just a master stroke from Bill here in the licensing with IBM, because there are two really, really big levers that it looks like Bill is giving big time on one of them, but he is winning big time on the other one.
Ben，如果你说的 Gary Kildall 与 IBM 的谈判属实，那么比尔在与 IBM 的授权中简直神来之笔：这里有两个极其关键的杠杆，看起来比尔在其中一个上大幅让步，但在另一个上却大获全胜。
Ben: What are they?
Ben：是哪两个？
David: The one that it looks like he's giving on is he does another fixed cost OEM deal with IBM.
David：表面上看，他让步的那一点是再次与 IBM 签署了固定费用的 OEM 合同。
Ben: This is in Paul Allen's memoir. IBM paid Microsoft \$75,000 for testing and consultation, \$45,000 for DOS, and \$310,000 for an array of 16-bit language interpreters and compilers. All told, bundled together, that is \$430,000 fixed that IBM paid Microsoft with no ongoing obligation.
Ben：保罗·艾伦在回忆录中写道，IBM 向微软支付了 7.5 万美元用于测试和咨询，4.5 万美元用于 DOS，31 万美元用于一系列 16 位语言解释器和编译器。合在一起，总计 43 万美元的固定费用，IBM 付给微软后不再有任何后续义务。
David: Yes. No per copy royalties. Every copy of DOS that IBM sells is either included as part of systems that they're selling, or they're free to charge independently for DOS, whatever amount they want, Microsoft gets \$0. If it's true that this is where things fell apart with Gary Kildall, crazy that Bill is willing to do this.
David：没错，没有按份收取版税。IBM 销售的每一份 DOS，要么作为所售系统的一部分附带，要么 IBM 可以自由单独定价销售 DOS，而微软分文不取。如果真的是在 Gary Kildall 那里谈崩，那么比尔竟愿意这样做，简直令人难以置信。
Ben: You might say, what? Didn't Bill learn his lesson? Why would he ever agree to this?
Ben：你可能会问，什么？比尔不是已经吸取教训了吗？他为什么还要同意这种条件？
David: On the one hand, this is what he was doing with Apple and others. He was doing these fixed cost deals. He would think, man, IBM, this is the time. People aren't going to pirate IBM software. Now's the time to really grab the money bags.
David：一方面，他以前和苹果等公司做的就是这种固定费用交易。他会想，天哪，IBM 这回时机到了，人们不会去盗版 IBM 的软件，现在正是大捞一笔的时候。
Ben: But Bill saw something that no one else did.
Ben：但比尔看到了别人没有看到的东西。
David: I don't know if it was directly in exchange in the negotiations, but the other lever that he saw, that he pulled was Microsoft retained the rights to own DOS and to own their languages and license it and them to anyone else they wanted at any price on any terms.
David：我不确定这是不是谈判中直接互换的条件，但他拉动的另一个杠杆是微软保留了对 DOS 以及自家语言的所有权，并且可以以任何价格、任何条款向任何人授权。
Ben: It's so interesting, because what ended up happening that Bill Gates masterminded was once we distribute our operating system through IBM's PC, that's going to become the thing everyone buys. Now, in the 16-bit generation, when there are people building programs for computers, not just developers, once those application developers who are writing programs are targeting an operating system, then that is the operating system that every other OEM, every other computer maker is also going to want and really need, and we're going to be the ones that they have to come to to buy it.
Ben：这太有意思了，因为比尔·盖茨策划的一切导致，一旦我们通过 IBM 的 PC 分发我们的操作系统，它就会变成人人购买的产品。到了 16 位时代，当有人（不仅仅是开发者）开始为电脑编写程序时，一旦这些应用开发者将目标对准某个操作系统，那么其他所有 OEM、所有电脑制造商也都会想要并且确实需要那个操作系统，而他们必须来找我们购买。
I can't figure out, did IBM miss this fact? Or did they know it? Basically, what IBM did was they were the one place where every business needed to go for their computer needs. What they did in this negotiation was they actually handed that over to Microsoft. They said, we are going to become a commodity, just like every other hardware manufacturer, and you are going to be the point of integration for the whole ecosystem. You're going to be the linchpin that everyone has to target for their applications.
我搞不清楚，IBM 是忽略了这一点，还是他们其实知道？基本上，IBM 曾是每家企业满足计算需求的唯一去处，而他们在这次谈判中却把这一地位交给了微软。他们等于是说：我们会变成和其他硬件制造商一样的商品化企业，而你们将成为整个生态系统的整合点，成为所有人开发应用必须针对的核心。
David: I think there are two things going on here, one small and one big. The small thing is actually related all the way back to the beginning of the episode, what you said, Ben, about the antitrust concerns within IBM. To hear them say it, they actually didn't want ownership of the software. They wanted it to be separate because it would look better.
David：我觉得这里有两件事，一小一大。小的那件事要回到本期节目开头你提到的，IBM 内部的反垄断顾虑。照他们的说法，他们其实不想拥有软件的所有权，他们想把软件分离出来，这样看上去会更好。
Ben: Because then they have the plausible deniability of, how could we possibly have a monopoly? We're buying off-the-shelf...
Ben：因为这样他们就可以合理否认垄断：我们怎么可能垄断？我们买的都是现成货……
David: Part of an ecosystem, blah-blah-blah. Yeah.
David：生态系统的一部分，诸如此类。对。
Ben: Yeah. From a vendor who can sell to anybody else. We have no lock in.
Ben：对，供应商也能卖给别人，我们没有锁定客户。
David: That may well be true. I think the bigger thing that just wasn't in their consideration or mindset was they (I think) assumed that once they entered the PC market, IBM was going to be the dominant player, so it didn't matter. Once IBM is selling PCs, who's going to buy a PC from anybody else? IBM is going to win this market.
David：这也许没错。我认为更大的问题是他们根本没有考虑到，或者没有这种心态——他们（我想）假设只要进入 PC 市场，IBM 就会成为主导者，所以这些都无所谓。一旦 IBM 在卖 PC，谁还会买别家的？IBM 一定会赢得这个市场。
Ben: Just like they have in every other line of business they've been in.
Ben：就像他们进入的每条业务线里做的一样。
David: What Bill saw was he really made a bet that the same dynamics that played out with the Altair were also going to play out with the IBM PC. There would be a million hardware manufacturers, flowers blooming here.
David：而比尔看到的是，他真正打赌的是 Altair 上演过的同样动态也会在 IBM PC 上重演——会有百万硬件制造商百花齐放。
Ben: Building to the same spec.
Ben：都遵循同样的规范。
David: Building to the same spec.
David：都遵循同样的规范。
Ben: Using the same processor.
Ben：使用同样的处理器。
David: Which of course, they could because it was all off-the-shelf components. IBM either didn't see or didn't believe that that would actually happen.
David：当然他们可以，因为全都是现成组件。IBM 要么没看到，要么不相信这真的会发生。
Ben: IBM failed to see the value of software, and they certainly failed to understand what a software platform business model would be.
Ben：IBM 没能认识到软件的价值，也完全没有理解什么是软件平台的商业模式。
David: Which makes sense. Why would they? They are the computing company.
David：这也说得过去。他们为什么要懂？毕竟他们自认为是“计算机公司”。
Ben: Yes. Their experience in selling mainframes with everything bundled in was the wrong experience to go off of in understanding the way the future would unfold. Bill's very modest experience watching the Altair and all these Altair clone type machines, or even if they're not Altair clones, just more microcomputers that need more software, actually was the useful experience to pattern match off of of what does the world of microcomputers look like, and how is that fundamentally different than the world of mainframes.
Ben：没错。他们过去出售大型机并将所有内容打包销售的经验，用来判断未来的发展方向，是完全错误的参考。相比之下，比尔对 Altair 以及那些 Altair 克隆机（或说更多需要软件支持的微型计算机）的有限观察，反而成了有价值的样本，让他能类比判断微型计算机世界将呈现怎样的面貌，以及它与大型机世界在本质上的差异。
David: Totally. In a way that the mini computer generation, like we've been saying, it was like a half generation. It wasn't actually fundamentally that different other than DEC gained a foothold.
David：完全正确。就像我们说的，“小型机时代”更像是半代过渡，除了 DEC 抢到了一席之地外，本质上并没有什么根本性不同。
Ben: The deal that Bill Gates made with IBM for the IBM PC is the greatest deal in at least computer industry history, if not all business history, full stop.
Ben：比尔·盖茨为 IBM PC 与 IBM 达成的那份协议，至少在计算机行业史上堪称最伟大的交易，甚至可以说是商业史上最伟大的交易，毋庸置疑。
David: Let's say a little bit about why. It's obvious, but here now is IBM, most valuable company in the world. They're going to come out with the PC platform. They are going to build the market. Microsoft is going to own the linchpin, in Hamilton Helmer terms, where the power is in the market, and they're going to be free to license it at whatever terms they want to any other player who wants to enter.
David：先简单说说原因。显而易见——IBM 当时是全球市值最高的公司，他们要推出 PC 平台，亲手打造市场。而按 Hamilton Helmer 的说法，微软掌握了这个市场的“支点”，并能以任意条款向所有想进入市场的玩家授权。
They signed this agreement in November 1980. The IBM PC ships in August 1981. Just incredible, almost exactly a little more than a year from the time Project Chess starts to when they actually ship the PC.
他们在 1980 年 11 月签署协议。IBM PC 于 1981 年 8 月出货。令人难以置信——从 Project Chess 启动到真正将 PC 推向市场，仅仅一年多一点点。
Ben: Truly incredible, they pulled it off.
Ben：的确不可思议，他们真的做到了。
David: Truly incredible. It changes the world. That's such a trite thing to say, but everything that everybody's imagining happens.
David：确实惊人。这改变了世界——虽然这句话听起来老生常谈，但人们想象的一切都随之实现。
Ben: IBM was right that it was by far in a way the most successful personal computer on the market as soon as they released it.
Ben：IBM 的判断没错——一发布就立刻成为市场上最成功的个人计算机，遥遥领先。
David: Totally. They sell 13,500 IBM PCs within the first couple of months after they announce it. Over the next two years, they sell half a million of them, makes them unquestionably the largest personal microcomputer manufacturer/market leader. Everybody at IBM is celebrating. The clones haven't arrived yet, and maybe they won't. It'll play out like they think. Not exactly.
David：确实如此。发布后仅两个月，他们就卖出了 13,500 台 IBM PC。随后两年又卖出 50 万台，无可争议地成为个人微型计算机市场的最大厂商和领导者。IBM 上下都在庆祝——克隆机尚未出现，也许永远不会出现，一切似乎正按他们设想的剧本推进… 事实并非如此。
Before we talk about the clones, this is really just a footnote because of course all the incentives are aligned for IBM to push DOS as the operating system for the PC. They've done this whole deal with Microsoft. They have a royalty-free deal with them.
在谈论克隆机之前，先插一句脚注：IBM 有充分动力把 DOS 推成 PC 的操作系统——他们已与微软签好协议，还免付版税。
When they launch the PC, customers actually have a choice of which operating system they want on their IBM PC. They don't have to go with DOS. Consumers can choose between DOS, 16-bit CP/M. By this point in time, Gary and Digital Research have gotten their act together. They've written a 16-bit version of the CPM operating system. Or another 16-bit operating system called Pascal that came out of the University of California at San Diego.
PC 上市时，客户实际上可以给 IBM PC 选择操作系统，不一定非用 DOS。消费者可在 DOS、16 位 CP/M（二者此时 Gary 与 Digital Research 已开发完毕）以及加州大学圣迭戈分校推出的另一款 16 位系统 Pascal 之间选择。
The price sheet for the operating system option is Pascal is an extra \$450 with your IBM PC. CP/M is an extra \$175 with your IBM PC, and DOS, which was developed specifically for the PC is the best way to run it is only \$60. IBM is making \$60 of full 100% margin on top of their hardware for the PC by selling DOS because they don't have to pay Microsoft any of that, and they've set up the incentives that obviously everybody's going to choose DOS.
系统选配价目表显示：Pascal 需额外付 \$450，CP/M 需 \$175，而专为 PC 开发、运行效果最佳的 DOS 仅需 \$60。出售 DOS 能让 IBM 在硬件之外再赚 \$60 的纯利润，因为他们无需向微软支付任何费用。如此明摆的激励，显然所有人都会选择 DOS。
不是自己的东西又需要微软不断更新DOS，脑残的想法。
Ben: It's fascinating. And you know what? To give them a little bit more credit too, they did try to enforce that there's some amount of lock-in to the IBM PC. They did that in two ways. One is we're simplifying calling it DOS. It was PC-DOS, which is different than MS-DOS, which would get licensed to other computer makers. I don't know exactly what happened, but it basically seems like it just wasn't different enough to be meaningful to application developers. That's one piece of it.
Ben：这太有意思了。你知道吗？为了再给他们一点肯定，他们确实试图让 IBM PC 具有某种锁定效应。他们用了两种方式。第一，我们这里简化称为 DOS，其实是 PC-DOS，这与后来授权给其他电脑制造商的 MS-DOS 不同。我不太清楚具体细节，但看起来两者的差异对应用开发者来说并不足够显著，这就是其中之一。
The second is IBM did actually have proprietary BIOS. That was another part where they thought that that might provide them some protection, where they could stay a linchpin in the ecosystem. It wasn't just all off-the-shelf. They actually did have something that was theirs that was proprietary.
其次，IBM 当时确实拥有专有 BIOS。他们认为这能给予自身一定保护，使其仍可在生态系统中保持关键地位。并非所有组件都是现成货，他们确实握有属于自己的专有技术。
David: It just turned out that the effort required to reverse engineer the IBM BIOS was trivial, basically.
David：结果证明，要逆向工程 IBM BIOS 几乎不费吹灰之力。
Ben: Do you know the story of the Compaq BIOS?
Ben：你知道 Compaq BIOS 的故事吗？
David: I know the Compaq story, but I don't know the story of the BIOS specifically. Enlighten us.
David：我知道 Compaq 的故事，但对 BIOS 本身的细节不清楚，给我们讲讲吧。
Ben: It is basically why Compaq worked is what it comes down to. Compaq was formed basically to clone the IBM PC. They saw the market opportunity, and they realized they could buy from all the same equipment vendors. Let's go eat their margin is basically the plan.
Ben：这基本上就是 Compaq 能成功的关键。Compaq 成立的目的就是克隆 IBM PC。他们看准了市场机会，意识到可以向同样的设备供应商采购组件，计划很简单——去蚕食 IBM 的利润率。
However, the one thing that was not off-the-shelf is the BIOS (Basic Input/Output System), which is effectively the thing that decides to load the operating system when you turn the machine on. There's some proprietary magic that happens to call upon the operating system to do its thing. Compaq reverse engineered the BIOS. The way that they did it was very similar to Trip Hawkins and the story that he told us about his reverse engineering at Electronic Arts.
然而唯一不是现成货的部分是 BIOS（基本输入/输出系统），它在开机时决定加载哪个操作系统，并通过一些专有魔法调用操作系统运作。Compaq 对 BIOS 进行了逆向工程；其方法与 Trip Hawkins 在 Electronic Arts 进行逆向工程的经历非常相似。
David: Of the Psychogenesis.
David：你是说 Psychogenesis 那件事。
Ben: Yes. Compaq had two engineers. One engineer went in and fully dissected the code for the IBM PC BIOS, basically saw all the proprietary calls that it made, and documented each of those calls without writing the implementation steps. Then he handed, hey, here's what the BIOS needs to interface with, over to the other engineer. The other engineer, on their own, just went through and thought of an implementation.
Ben：对。Compaq 有两名工程师。一位工程师深入剖析 IBM PC BIOS 代码，查看其所有专有调用，并逐一记录这些调用而不写实现细节；然后他把“BIOS 需要对接的接口”交给另一位工程师。另一位工程师独立思考并编写实现代码。
They have no idea if it's the same implementation, so it's not breaking any infringement. They're basically saying, I'm just seeing the requirements for this product, and I'm coming up with my own implementation of that product. They basically figured out how to exactly clone the IBM PC and buy the very same operating system.
他们并不知道自己的实现是否与原实现相同，因此不存在侵权风险。他们的逻辑是：我只看到这个产品的需求，然后写出自己的实现。他们就这样找到了精准克隆 IBM PC 并采购同款操作系统的方法。
To go back to quoting Ben Thompson because this is from his great piece again, "The result was a company that came to dominate the market. Compaq was the fastest startup to ever hit \$100 million in revenue, then the youngest firm to break into the Fortune 500, then the fastest company to hit \$1 billion in revenue, and by 1994, Compaq was the largest PC maker in the world."
再引用 Ben Thompson 在那篇精彩文章中的话：“结果是这家公司最终主宰了市场。Compaq 成为史上最快达到 1 亿美元营收的初创公司，随后成为最年轻进入《财富》500 强的公司，又成为最快突破 10 亿美元营收的公司，到 1994 年时，Compaq 已是全球最大的 PC 制造商。”
David: The Compaq story is amazing. The three people who start Compaq in 1982 are actually Texas Instruments engineers who left, and they wanted to start a company. I believe as the legend goes, they were trying to decide what to start. They were considering a restaurant chain and a bunch of different business ideas. The IBM PC comes out at the end of 1981 and they're like, oh, we can clone this and do everything, the story you just told. It's wild. They start the company in 1982. Within the first year, they do \$111 million of revenue of selling IBM PC clone hardware.
David：Compaq 的故事令人惊叹。1982 年创办 Compaq 的三位创始人，其实都是离开德州仪器的工程师，他们想创业。据传当时他们在犹豫做什么——甚至考虑过开餐饮连锁等各种生意。到 1981 年底 IBM PC 问世，他们就想：哦，我们可以克隆它并做你刚才讲的那些事。太疯狂了！他们 1982 年成立公司，第一年就靠销售 IBM PC 克隆机硬件做到 1.11 亿美元营收。
Ben: And is it just cheaper? Basically this is the IBM PC, but for less money?
Ben：那它就是更便宜吗？基本上这就是 IBM PC，只是价格更低？
David: Yes, exactly. Same thing, cheaper.
David：对，完全正确。同样的东西，更便宜。
Ben: So begins the race to the bottom of PC hardware. Completely undifferentiated, all the value accrues to the software layer.
Ben：于是 PC 硬件的价格大战就此开始。硬件毫无差异化，所有价值都流向软件层。
David: Totally. Compaq went public the very next year, in 1983 well before Microsoft, which is funny. Compaq, all these other clone companies that get started. Microsoft licenses DOS to all of them importantly, critically, on a per-machine-sold basis. This is when they grab the money. The operating system is so deeply embedded and needs to get shipped with the computer itself.
David：没错。Compaq 在第二年，也就是 1983 年就上市了，比微软早得多，这很有意思。Compaq 以及随后诞生的所有克隆厂商，微软都按“每台电脑销售”向他们授权 DOS。这才是真正捞钱的时候。操作系统与电脑深度绑定，必须随机器一起出厂。
Consumers can go buy operating systems to upgrade and whatnot, but no hardware manufacturer is going to ship a 16-bit PC without an operating system. Piracy is not an issue here. Microsoft can now do a per-copy-sold, per-machine-sold license with all these clones. My God, it's just a geyser of money.
消费者当然可以单独购买操作系统来升级等，不过没有任何硬件厂商会在没有操作系统的情况下出货一台 16 位 PC。盗版在这里不是问题。于是微软就可以对所有这些克隆厂商按每份、每台收取授权费。天哪，这简直是喷涌而出的现金流。
Ben: Microsoft used IBM to generate demand for their software, and then they used every other PC manufacturer to capture the value that all that demand created.
Ben：微软先利用 IBM 为自己的软件创造需求，然后再利用其他所有 PC 制造商去攫取这些需求产生的价值。
David: Yeah. I think I have these numbers and timeframes right. I believe that for calendar year 1982, Microsoft's revenue was \$25 million. I think this must have been when they switched to fiscal year end and June 30th. Microsoft's fiscal year end starting then and up through now is June 30th.
David：是的。我想这些数字和时间点应该没错。1982 自然年，微软的收入约为 2500 万美元。我想那时他们把财政年度结束日改成了 6 月 30 日。从那之后直到现在，微软的财年结束都是 6 月 30 日。
They're fiscal 1984. The year ended June 30th, 1984, so 1983 midpoint to 1984 midpoint. Microsoft does \$98 million. In an 18-month period from the end of 1982, they go from \$25–\$98 million. It's all on the back of the clones. Unlike Compaq that they did \$111 million of revenue their first year, they're selling hardware which has serious cogs associated with it. Microsoft, 100% essentially, gross margin, software revenue, more than doubling year on year. It's the best business of all time.
到 1984 财年，截止 1984 年 6 月 30 日，也就是从 1983 年中到 1984 年中，微软的收入达到 9800 万美元。在 18 个月里，他们的营收从 2500 万跃升到 9800 万，全靠那些克隆机。与第一年就做到 1.11 亿美元营收但要承担高昂硬件成本的 Compaq 不同，微软的软件收入几乎是 100% 毛利，年增长翻倍。这简直是史上最棒的生意。
Ben: Yes, and they combined two magical principles together. This infinite replicability, zero marginal costs of software, and becoming the linchpin of the ecosystem. They are now the software that everyone needs to target, which gives them pricing power. That pricing power raises your top line, and you have no costs. It's unbelievable.
Ben：没错，他们把两条魔法原则结合在一起：软件的无限可复制、零边际成本，以及成为生态系统的关键枢纽。他们成了所有人都必须适配的软件，由此获得定价权。这种定价权抬高了收入，而成本几乎没有，难以置信。
David: Meanwhile, in the computing industry background, while all this is going on with the launch of the IBM PC and then the clones, Apple had gone public at the end of 1980 in I think, the biggest and most successful IPO of all time at that point. Remember we talked about Genentech on the Novo Nordisk episode. They went public right before Apple, and then Apple was bigger. They're valued at \$1.8 billion at IPO. Steve Jobs is this multi hundred millionaire, media darling, all this stuff.
David：与此同时，在计算机行业的背景中，当 IBM PC 及其克隆机陆续推出时，苹果已经在 1980 年底完成了当时规模最大、最成功的一次 IPO。记得我们在诺和诺德那期节目里谈过 Genentech——它在苹果之前上市，但苹果规模更大，IPO 估值 18 亿美元。史蒂夫·乔布斯一跃成为数亿美元身家的公众宠儿，一切风光无限。
The next year in 1981, Microsoft reorganizes from the partnership between Bill and Paul with the handshake deal that Steve's going to be cut in on the partnership into a stock company, a C-corporation. As part of doing that, the venture firm, Technology Venture Investors (TVI) invest \$1 million, I believe, for 5% of the company. This is crazy. That's a \$20 million post money valuation.
下一年，也就是 1981 年，微软将比尔和保罗的合伙企业（并按口头协议让史蒂夫持股）改组为一家股份公司——C 类公司。作为改组的一部分，风险投资公司 Technology Venture Investors（TVI）投资 100 万美元，获得公司 5% 股份。这太疯狂了，投后估值仅 2000 万美元。
Ben: It's a 1-on-20 post when Microsoft is doing how much in revenue?
Ben：投后 2000 万？那会儿微软的营收是多少？
David: That year, they did \$17 million in revenue, and they're about to do the IBM deal. This is absolutely absurd.
David：那一年他们的收入是 1700 万美元，而且马上就要签下 IBM 的大单。这真是荒唐至极。
Ben: It says a lot about this period of time that you could do a 1X revenue deal in a high-margin software company. I actually don't think this shows a weakness in Microsoft. Oh, they didn't have leverage or something that. That wasn't it at all, it was just the deals sucked.
Ben：这充分说明了那个时代的情况——竟然能以 1 倍营收的估值投资一家高利润率的软件公司。我并不认为这表明微软有什么弱点，好像他们缺乏谈判筹码之类。根本不是这样，只是那个投资交易本身太差劲。
David: Venture capital sucked back then. There's no other way to put it.
David：那时候的风险投资简直糟透了，没有别的形容。
Ben: It's only 5%, so good on Microsoft. Spoiler alert, this is the only dilution that they would ever take. That's also extremely different than today, but a \$20 million valuation at this stage is frankly ludicrous.
Ben：微软只稀释了 5%，这对他们来说真是好事。剧透一下，这是他们唯一一次稀释股份。这和今天的情况完全不同，不过在当时阶段给出 2000 万美元估值实在荒谬。
David: Even among people who should be in the know, the beauty of the software business model still is something people don't understand.
David：即便是在那些理应懂行的人当中，软件商业模式的魅力依旧难以被理解。
Ben: That's exactly right.
Ben：完全正确。
David: The hotness is the hardware. It's like Apple just IPO'd. Apple's worth \$1.8 billion. Like, ooh, that's the industry, ooh, it's IBM, et cetera. When Microsoft itself would go public a few years later in 1986, they actually go public the same week that they moved to the big campus in Redmond, where they are to this day. Their market cap at IPO is only \$750 million despite having done \$200 million of very high margin software revenue in the trailing 12 months up to that, growing 100% year over year. It's insane.
David：当时热门的是硬件。比如苹果刚刚上市，市值 18 亿美元。人们觉得这才是行业的焦点，是 IBM 等公司。而几年前，即 1986 年，当微软自己上市时，他们恰好在同一周搬进现在仍在使用的雷德蒙德大园区。彼时微软过去 12 个月高利润率软件收入已达 2 亿美元，并实现 100% 的同比增长，但 IPO 市值只有 7.5 亿美元，简直疯狂。
Ben: Hey, that's 4X multiple expansion off the last time they raised money.
Ben：嘿，这相当于他们上次融资估值的 4 倍扩张。
David: Right? It's just crazy that people don't yet appreciate the power.
David：没错？让人难以置信的是，大家仍然没有认识到这种力量。
Ben: Bill Gates and Warren Buffett did a conversation at the University of Washington in 1998. This is as late as 1998. This thing that we're talking about, the magic of the software business model and how it should be reflected in a company's valuation especially when it's a high-growth company was still not understood even by Bill Gates himself.
Ben：比尔·盖茨和沃伦·巴菲特在 1998 年于华盛顿大学进行过一次对话。直到 1998 年之晚，我们谈论的软件商业模式的魔力，以及在高速成长型公司估值中应有的体现，连比尔·盖茨本人都依旧未完全理解。
Here's the quote. Bill Gates says, "I think the multiples of technology stocks should be quite a bit lower than the multiples of stocks like Coke and Gillette because we are subject to complete changes in the rules. I know very well that in the next 10 years, if Microsoft is still a leader, we will have had to weather at least three crises." Bill Gates is essentially making an argument. Granted, this is in the middle of all the antitrust stuff, so he's very prime for this.
引述如下：比尔·盖茨说：“我认为科技股的市盈率应当比可口可乐、吉列这类股票低得多，因为我们面临规则的彻底变化。我很清楚，如果微软在未来 10 年仍是领军者，那我们至少要经受三次危机。”比尔·盖茨基本上在阐述这个观点。当然，当时正值反垄断旋涡，他对此格外敏感。
David: And the Internet.
David：还有互联网的冲击。
Ben: And the Internet. He's basically making the argument that disruptive forces come at you so fast in the technology industry that even though you can grow extremely fast, it's this extremely scalable thing, distributing software at zero distribution costs, and even though the margins are unbelievable because you have zero marginal costs, they still shouldn't be valued as highly as a CPG company, which is so different than the way that people think about it today.
Ben：没错，还有互联网。他的论点是技术行业的颠覆力量来得太快，即便你能高速增长、拥有极高的可扩展性，软件分发成本为零，利润率惊人（因为边际成本为零），但公司估值仍不应像消费品公司那样高——这与今人的看法截然不同。
David: It's funny. I've thought about this a lot, and I actually watched that interview years ago. It's so good. There are elements of truth to this too. I think it's that for most technology companies, that is totally true. For a few technology companies that have true power and true scale, the exact opposite is true. Microsoft is still the most valuable company in the world today.
David：很有意思。我对此思考了很多，也在多年前看过那场访谈，非常精彩。这种说法也包含部分真理——对大多数科技公司而言完全适用。但对少数真正拥有强大实力和规模的科技公司而言，恰恰相反。微软今天仍是全球市值最高的公司。
Ben: Companies that are less susceptible to disruption, more predictable in terms of high growth, high margin revenue deserve a premium. But Gates is basically arguing, everyone else doesn't.
Ben：更不易被颠覆、拥有高增长且高利润率且更可预测的公司理应获得溢价。但盖茨基本在说，其余公司不该如此。
Let's flash all the way back to 1981 and talk about this venture capital investment, this 1-on-20 that TVI does.
让我们回到 1981 年，谈谈这笔风险投资，也就是 TVI 那次“1 投 20”的投资。
David: Good work if you can get a man.
David：如果你真能请来这样的人，真是好本事。
Ben: How does this come to be? Even a whole year before in the fall of 1980, Dave Marquardt, one of the partners and the founders at TVI, flies up to Seattle not to meet Bill Gates, but to meet Steve Ballmer.
Ben：事情是怎么发展的？早在 1980 年秋天，也就是整整一年前，TVI 的合伙人兼创始人之一戴夫·马夸特就飞到西雅图，不是去见比尔·盖茨，而是去见史蒂夫·鲍尔默。
David: Because they were classmates at GSB, right?
David：因为他们在斯坦福商学院同班，对吧？
Ben: They weren't quite classmates, but because I think they were two years apart, so they didn't overlap, but they had some of the same social circles. Steve was effectively the screener for anyone who wanted to come and talk to Bill and try and invest in the business.
Ben：严格来说并不是同班，我记得他们相差两届，所以并未在校期间重叠，但社交圈部分交叉。史蒂夫实际上负责筛选所有想见比尔、想投资公司的人。
TA Associates had been up, Sutter Hill had been up, Hambrick and Quist had been up, Xerox Ventures, and all of them only ever got to meet with Steve Ballmer and never got passed on to Bill Gates. Steve would basically just bounce them off. I know all this because there's a great oral history from the Computer History Museum, where this whole thing's in a transcript with an interview with Dave Marquardt recalling the whole thing.
TA Associates、Sutter Hill、Hambrick and Quist 以及 Xerox Ventures 都来拜访过，但他们都只能见到史蒂夫·鲍尔默，没机会见比尔·盖茨；史蒂夫基本把他们都挡在外面。我之所以知道这些，是因为计算机历史博物馆有一篇精彩的口述史，记录了戴夫·马夸特的访谈，详细回忆了整件事。
Dave flies up to meet with Steve. Steve says, you're asking really interesting questions. You're thinking about our strategy the right way. You don't just want to do a transactional deal. You really think this is something special. Why don't you meet with Bill? Bill, of course, doesn't have any extra time in his schedule. He says, but I am going to the U-Dub Arizona football game at Husky stadium. Why don't you come and talk to me there?
戴夫飞去见史蒂夫，史蒂夫说：“你提的问题很有意思，也正确理解了我们的战略。你不只是想做一笔交易，你真心觉得这家公司与众不同。要不你去见见比尔？”比尔当然排满了日程，他说：“不过我正要去哈士奇体育场看华大对亚利桑那的橄榄球赛，你来那里跟我聊吧。”
Of course they go, Bill doesn't pay attention to the game at all. He's just laying out the strategy, grilling Dave, and talking about software the whole time. This is fall of 1980. That's a whole year before the deal gets done. Dave's remarking at this point in 1980, they're doing \$5 million in revenue, \$2–\$3 million in profit. They don't need VC money, and yet he was able to get in.
他们当然去了，可比尔对比赛完全不感兴趣，整场都在阐述战略、盘问戴夫，并谈论软件。当时是 1980 年秋，比正式融资还早整整一年。戴夫回忆说那时公司收入约 500 万美元，利润 200–300 万美元，根本不缺风投的钱，但他还是成功介入了。
Here's the quote. "I was just helping them out with the business. In the venture business, you're buying and you're selling at the same time. You're trying to figure out, are these guys crazy? Are they ever going to do anything really interesting? If so, how do I get myself positioned to be able to help them do it? So I spent a lot of time up there helping recruit people. I helped to recruit Charles Simonyi, who was an early key guy." Charles Simonyi would go on, this is an aside, to write Microsoft Word. Charles was at Xerox PARC inventing the GUI.
以下是他的原话：“我只是帮他们把业务做大。在风险投资里，你既是买家也是卖家，你得判断这些人是不是疯子，他们是否真能做成有意思的事？如果能，我怎样才能站在能帮助他们的位置？所以我花了很多时间在那边帮他们招人。我帮忙招来了早期关键人物查尔斯·西蒙尼。”顺便提一下，查尔斯后来编写了 Microsoft Word，当时他在施乐 PARC 发明 GUI。
David: We're going to talk about Charles in just a sec.
David：我们待会儿就会谈到查尔斯。
Ben: Yes. He says, “And I was working with Steve on business strategy. They had these OEM customers, the PC manufacturers, and they had started to engage with IBM on this operating system. Are we just going to become a low-cost contract programming shop for IBM, an outsourced sweatshop? Or is there some way we can build a business out of this?
Ben：对。他说：“我当时和史蒂夫一起研究商业战略。他们有这些 OEM 客户——PC 制造商，而且已开始跟 IBM 洽谈操作系统。难道我们要沦为 IBM 的低成本外包编程作坊吗？还是说我们能把这事做成真正的生意？”
Which led to the fixed fee to IBM, the retention of the code, which then we could sell to other people. That's what created the PC industry basically.” That is his recollection of the whole thing, that he was very helpful in this transformative time for the company. At the same time, you have to look at everyone else's incentives.
“于是就有了向 IBM 收取一次性费用、同时保留代码所有权并转售给其他人的方案。这基本上创造了 PC 行业。”——这是他对整个事件的回忆，他认为自己在公司转型关键期提供了重要帮助。与此同时，你也得考虑其他所有人的激励因素。
David: How can I be helpful, Ben?
David：Ben，我怎么才能帮到你？
Ben: Dave is only 29 years old, but everyone else is 23. He actually is adult supervision. At the same time, the partnership was still just a partnership, and there was a handshake deal for the equity. If you're Steve Ballmer at this point in history, it would be nice to have a forcing function to actually turn this into a corporation so that we can get some shares granted here. There's a little bit of incentive to say, hey, if we take on an outside investor, we're going to have to restructure.
Ben：Dave只有29岁，而其他人都只有23岁。他实际上在充当“成年监督”。与此同时，公司还只是一个合伙制，股权只是个口头协定。如果你此刻是Steve Ballmer，你就会希望有个外部驱动力把它真正转成股份公司，这样我们才能在这里授予股份。引入外部投资者也成了一点激励——嘿，如果要引进外部投资者，我们就得重组。
David: That's what I had always read about the TVI investment. Obviously, Microsoft didn't need the money. They like Dave, but also a big part of it was this was a catalyzing function to do the conversion into a C-corp.
David：我一直读到的关于TVI投资的说法就是这样。显然，微软并不缺钱。他们很欣赏Dave，但这笔投资更大的意义是作为催化剂，推动公司改制为C类公司（C-corp）。
Ben: Yes. This would create a little bit of board and governance, so it's not just Bill all the time. Bill, of course, I think is still the controlling shareholder just by the amount of stock that he owns. But there's a board. It's Bill, it's Dave, and it's Kay Nishi. It's a three-person board.
Ben：是的。这样一来就会有一些董事会和治理结构，不再总是Bill一个人说了算。当然，Bill凭借持股量仍是控股股东。但现在有了董事会成员——Bill、Dave和Kay Nishi——一个三人董事会。
David: Yeah, we should say-to-vis a vis Paul, tragically, and I believe it was 1982-1983, he's diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. He ends up taking a leave and then fully leaving the company. I think he did go on and off the board at various points in time.
David：是的，我们也得提到Paul。很遗憾，大约在1982到1983年，他被诊断出患有霍奇金淋巴瘤。他先是请假，随后彻底离开了公司。我记得他在不同时间几度进出董事会。
Ben: That's true.
Ben：没错。
David: But he's no longer a full-time member of the company after his diagnosis.
David：但在被诊断之后，他就不再是公司的全职成员了。
Ben: Yup. On this venture investment, it's pretty fascinating. None of these are terribly compelling reasons other than, I guess, it would be nice to have a little bit of capital associated with us formalizing the corporation, but they don't need money at all. They're printing cash. They've been printing cash ever since that one tight period in Albuquerque. Dave charmed them. I think that's the answer.
Ben：没错。关于这笔风险投资，这事儿挺有意思的。除了“把公司正规化顺便带来点资金”这个理由外，没有哪个理由真正令人信服，但他们根本不缺钱。他们在“印钞票”。自从阿尔伯克基那段紧日子后，他们一直在大把赚钱。Dave 把他们迷住了。我想这就是答案。
David: I've always heard wonderful, wonderful things about Dave, and I think everybody really did love him and see his value. But man, to be a venture capitalist in the 1980s and 1990s, oh, man, you couldn't lose.
David：我一直听到关于 Dave 的各种赞誉，我觉得所有人都真心喜欢他、认可他的价值。但说实话，80、90 年代做风险投资人，天哪，简直稳赚不赔。
Ben: It's pretty crazy. I think part of it too had to do with the fact that Microsoft was up in Seattle. The VCs just weren't traveling. Dave was young and he was single.
Ben：确实疯狂。我认为这在某种程度上也和微软在西雅图有关。那些风投可不愿意舟车劳顿。Dave 年轻，而且是单身。
David: Don Valentine famously had the rule. They didn't invest in any company that you couldn't bicycle to from Sand Hill Road.
David：Don Valentine 有句名言：他们只投从 Sand Hill Road 骑自行车能到的公司。
Ben: It's crazy. Dave Marquardt, I think most weekends, is flying up to Seattle to hang out with Bill and Steve. It was a real sell. He says, I was young, I was single, I had nothing better to do, and it was really fun and intellectually interesting, so I did it. That resulted in, depending how long TVI held, one of, if not the best venture capital return in history.
Ben：太夸张了。我记得 Dave Marquardt 大多数周末都会飞到西雅图跟 Bill 和 Steve 厮混。这是一场真正的推销。他说：我年轻、单身、没什么更好的事情做，而且这既有趣又激发思考，于是我就干了。结果就是——视 TVI 持股时间而定——这成了史上最好、如果不是最好的话，也几乎是最好的风险投资回报之一。
David: Hard to argue with that one. Okay, back to the story. There are a couple more really, really key things that happened in the PC era. Particularly now, once we're into the IBM PC era and the clones, the 16-bit era. Let's start with applications.
David：这没啥可反驳的。好，回到故事本身。PC 时代还发生了另外几个关键事件。尤其是当我们进入 IBM PC 以及克隆机的 16 位时代后。让我们先谈应用软件。
Like we've been saying all along, the 8-bit era, applications, package software aren't really a thing. In 1979, at the tail end of the 8-bit era, two programs come out for the Apple II, VisiCalc and WordStar. VisiCalc is the first software spreadsheet application, and WordStar is a word processor. These applications by today's standards are super simple, stone age–type stuff, but they're the first of their kind, particularly VisiCalc and the spreadsheet. They established the potential for business applications on personal computers.
就像我们一直说的那样，在 8 位时代，应用程序、套装软件基本不存在。1979 年，也就是 8 位时代末尾，两款为 Apple II 推出的程序问世：VisiCalc 和 WordStar。VisiCalc 是第一款电子表格软件，而 WordStar 是文字处理器。以今天的标准看，这些程序极其简单，堪称石器时代的东西，但它们是同类中的首创，尤其是 VisiCalc 及其表格功能。它们奠定了个人电脑上商业应用的潜力。
There's a joke at one point in the industry that the Apple II was a "VisiCalc" accessory for small businesses. I think that is part of what IBM is seeing and why they're deciding to now get into the industry with the personal computer. Around this time, Microsoft starts the "Consumer Products Division" to compete and make application software themselves.
业内曾经打趣说，Apple II 就是小企业的“VisiCalc 附件”。我认为这正是 IBM 看到的机会，也是他们决定进入个人电脑行业的原因之一。大约在同一时期，微软成立了“Consumer Products Division（消费产品部）”来竞争并自行开发应用软件。
Ben: It's quite telling it's called the Consumer Products Division to make applications. Even though they're competing to make these applications that today we would view as business tools, spreadsheets, and word processing, that is not how they referred to it.
Ben：有意思的是，它被称作 Consumer Products Division 来做应用软件。虽说他们要开发这些在今天看来属于商业工具的应用——电子表格和文字处理——但当时他们并不这么称呼。
David: Right. One of the first people that they hire into this new division to get it going is an engineer, Ben, who you referenced just a minute ago, named Charles Simonyi. They poach Charles, perhaps with Dave Marquardt's help, away from the legendary Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (Xerox PARC). I think this is one of the great misconceptions in technology history. Hopefully we can set the record straight a little bit here.
David：没错。他们为这个新部门招的第一批人里，有一位工程师，Ben，你刚才提到的 Charles Simonyi。他们把 Charles 从传奇的 Xerox Palo Alto Research Center（Xerox PARC）挖了过来，也许 Dave Marquardt 也帮了忙。我认为这是科技史上最大的误解之一，希望我们能稍微澄清一下。
Ben: Yes. If you ask anybody in our ecosystem, save for the 1% of people who actually know this, what happened at Xerox PARC? They will tell you they invented the mouse, they invented the graphical user interface, and then Steve Jobs walked in, he saw it all, and he said, oh, my God, we have to have it. He went off and he made the Lisa, which had a graphical user interface and a mouse. That failed, but what succeeded was the Macintosh, and it's a wholesale ripoff of Xerox PARC that lives on today in Apple. That is the story that you will hear from basically everyone.
Ben：是的。如果你问我们行业里的人——除了那 1% 真正知道内幕的——Xerox PARC 发生了什么？他们会告诉你：那儿发明了鼠标，发明了图形用户界面，然后 Steve Jobs 走进去，看到了这一切，说“天哪，我们必须拥有它”。他回去做了 Lisa，带有 GUI 和鼠标。那失败了，但成功的是 Macintosh，它完全照搬了 Xerox PARC，如今在 Apple 仍然存续。基本上所有人都会给你讲这样的故事。
David: I've heard it characterized as something like Xerox hosted a picnic in Silicon Valley, and Steve Jobs attended and dined lavishly at the feast.
David：我听过一种说法，大意是施乐在硅谷举办了一场野餐，史蒂夫·乔布斯出席并大快朵颐。
Ben: All of this is true.
Ben：这一切都是真的。
David: Which is true. That is true. All of that is true.
David：没错，这是真的，全部都是真的。
Ben: But it's half the story.
Ben：但这只是故事的一半。
David: He was not the only person who dined lavishly at the feast. Microsoft did just as much directly from Xerox, and Charles was one of the main vectors by which this happened.
David：在那场盛宴上大快朵颐的不止他一个。微软同样直接从施乐那里受益匪浅，而 Charles 就是其中最主要的渠道之一。
Here is the list of things that were invented or basically invented at Xerox PARC. The graphical user interface, the desktop, the mouse, object-oriented programming, ethernet, laser printing, along with a whole host of other things. This is everything about modern computing, invented there.
以下是在 Xerox PARC 发明或基本上是在那里发明的技术清单：图形用户界面、桌面、鼠标、面向对象编程、以太网、激光打印，以及其他一大堆东西。现代计算的几乎一切，都诞生在那里。
Who are the people who were at Xerox PARC? There was Alan Kay, there was Bob Metcalfe, who would go on to found 3Com. He invented ethernet, Metcalfe's Law.
那么，当时在 Xerox PARC 的都有谁？有 Alan Kay，有日后创办 3Com 的 Bob Metcalfe。他发明了以太网和“Metcalfe 定律”。
Ben: Yeah, the value of a network scaling proportionally to the square of the number of inputs.
Ben：是的，网络价值与节点数量的平方成正比。
David: Yeah. Bob Metcalf, Xerox PARC, Larry Tesler, who would join Apple, John Warnock, who started Adobe, Eric Schmidt worked at Xerox PARC. Everybody was there. It was a lavish picnic.
David：对。Bob Metcalfe、Xerox PARC 的 Larry Tesler（后来加入苹果）、创办 Adobe 的 John Warnock、Eric Schmidt 都曾在 Xerox PARC 工作。大家都在那里——那真是一场丰盛的野餐。
约等于现在的Google，目标分散了再要取得商业上的成功很难。
Ben: And Charles Simonyi.
Ben：还有 Charles Simonyi。
David: And Charles Simonyi. The thing about PARC and the computer that they built there to instantiate all these concepts, which was named the Alto, is it really was a research center. The Alto, go look it up on Wikipedia, go look at pictures. It's the Mac. The Alto is the Mac.
David：对，还有 Charles Simonyi。关于 PARC 以及他们在那里为实现这些概念而造出的那台电脑——Alto——最重要的一点是，它确实只是一个研究中心。去维基百科查查 Alto、看看照片，它就是 Mac。Alto 就是 Mac。
Ben: It's the Mac with the monitor turned on its side.
Ben：那是把显示器横过来的 Mac。
David: Yes, it's a vertical Mac.
David：没错，它是一台竖屏的 Mac。
Ben: It's a 3x4 display, not a 4x3 display.
Ben：它的显示比例是 3×4，而不是 4×3。
David: They start making it in 1973. You might be like, wait a minute, what's going on here? The Mac doesn't come out till 1984.
David：他们从 1973 年就开始制造它了。你可能会想，等等，这怎么回事？Mac 直到 1984 年才发布啊。
Ben: 11 years earlier.
Ben：早了整整 11 年。
David: How on earth is Xerox making the Mac in the pre 8-bit era, the pre-microprocessor era? It's not a microprocessor. The Alto is not a microprocessor architecture. It's a mini computer. What you see when you look at photos of the Alto is you see the Mac. What you don't see is under the table or behind it is a mini computer.
David：在前 8 位、前微处理器时代，施乐究竟是怎么造出了 Mac？它并不是用微处理器的。Alto 不是微处理器架构，而是一台小型计算机。当你看 Alto 的照片时，你看到的是 Mac，但你看不到的是桌子下面或后面那台小型计算机。
Ben: I never realized that.
Ben：我从来没有意识到这一点。
David: It is not a personal computer architecture at all. It is a 16-bit, essentially mini computer, that costs tens of thousands of dollars to make each one of them. It's a science project.
David：这根本就不是个人电脑的架构。它实际上是一台 16 位的小型计算机，每台造价高达数万美元。这更像是一项科学实验。
Ben: You should have a little bit more generosity for the East Coast management at Xerox for failing to commercialize this.
Ben：你应该对施乐东海岸的管理层多一点宽容，他们未能将这项技术商业化。
David: Totally. The time was not right. It was not possible. It wasn't even conceived of in the microprocessor architecture, because the microprocessor basically didn't exist when they made it.
David：完全正确。时机不成熟，根本做不到。当时甚至还没有微处理器的概念，因为他们造这东西时，微处理器基本不存在。
Ben: Interesting.
Ben：有意思。
David: In 1980, again, this year for Microsoft, same year Microsoft joins, same year they signed the IBM partnership, Charles Simonyi comes up from Xerox PARC. He's of course bringing all this same knowledge, all this same experience that Steve Jobs is bringing into Apple. He's bringing all that right into Microsoft too.
David：1980 年同样是微软的大年，他们在这一年签下了与 IBM 的合作协议；就在这一年，Charles Simonyi 从 Xerox PARC 来到微软。当然，他把 Steve Jobs 带到苹果的那套知识和经验原封不动地带到了微软。
The first thing that he gets tasked with is working with this new consumer products division to build application software to compete with VisiCalc and WordStar to compete with spreadsheets and to compete in word processing. He leads the teams that create Word and MultiPlan, Microsoft's first spreadsheet. Remember, we're still at the end of the 8-bit era. The graphical user interface doesn't exist yet other than on the Alto in Xerox PARC.
他接到的第一项任务是与这个新的消费产品部合作，开发应用软件，在电子表格和文字处理领域与 VisiCalc 和 WordStar 竞争。他领导团队创建了 Word 和微软的第一款电子表格 MultiPlan。记住，我们仍处于 8 位时代末期，除了 Xerox PARC 的 Alto 之外，图形用户界面尚未出现。
Ben: No, these are DOS applications. It's all character mode.
Ben：不，这些都是 DOS 应用，全都是字符界面。
David: Yes, it is command line interface. The vector that they think they're going to compete, at least in spreadsheets with VisiCalc, is that they're going to be on every platform out there. VisiCalc, I believe, was more or less basically only on the Apple II. That doesn't end up working too well.
David：对，都是命令行界面。他们认为，至少在电子表格领域，要与 VisiCalc 竞争的策略是登陆所有平台。我记得 VisiCalc 基本只在 Apple II 上运行。但事实证明，这并不是一个好策略。
The next generation, the IBM PC era, they make the same mistake. The application business stays focused on being on lots of machines, making software that's compatible with everything. A new company pops up called Lotus. Lotus makes the radical decision that they are going to make a spreadsheet only for the IBM PC.
到了下一代，也就是 IBM PC 时代，他们犯了同样的错误——应用软件业务仍然聚焦于兼容各种机器，为所有系统编写软件。这时一家新公司 Lotus 出现，并做出了一个激进决定：他们只为 IBM PC 开发电子表格。
This was genius. This is the 1-2-3 spreadsheet. It goes on to become, at that point in time, the most successful software ever. This is wild. I can't even believe I'm about to say this, and it blew my mind when I found it in research. There are a couple of years in the late eighties, where Lotus has more revenue than Microsoft and is valued higher.
这是天才之举，这就是 1-2-3 电子表格。它后来成为当时最成功的软件。令人难以置信的是，在我查资料时发现，八十年代后期有几年 Lotus 的营收超过微软，市值也更高，这让我大吃一惊。
Ben: Yup. In fact, the year that Microsoft went public, Lotus had more revenue than Microsoft at the IPO.
Ben：没错。事实上，微软上市那一年，Lotus 的营收在 IPO 时就已经超过微软。
David: Yes. Wild.
David：是的，太疯狂了。
Ben: it's crazy. Lotus 1-2-3 had some graphics, but it was still in character mode. It was a powerful spreadsheet that could start to do some graphics, even though there wasn't actually a GUI operating system yet, which is interesting. Lotus 1-2-3 was faster, it had bigger spreadsheets, and it was just more powerful. Microsoft Multiplan was still targeting the older 8-bit.
Ben：确实疯狂。Lotus 1-2-3 虽然有一些图形功能，但仍然是字符模式；它是一款强大的电子表格，甚至在还没有图形操作系统的情况下就能呈现一些图形。Lotus 1-2-3 运行更快，可处理更大的表格，而且功能更强大；而微软的 MultiPlan 仍然聚焦于较旧的 8 位平台。
Multiplan, despite Microsoft's best efforts, is completely left in the dust. Microsoft's trying to figure out, what should we learn from this? In talking with Pete Higgins and Mike Slade, who were both early leaders in the development and the marketing of the applications division, actually, Mike Slade went on to work directly for Steve Jobs at NeXT and Apple for many years.
尽管微软付出了最大努力，MultiPlan 还是被彻底甩在了后面。微软在思考：我们应该从中学到什么？在与 Pete Higgins 和 Mike Slade（他们都是应用软件部门的早期开发和市场领导者；实际上，Mike Slade 之后多年直接为 Steve Jobs 在 NeXT 和 Apple 工作）交谈时，微软得出结论：
In chatting with both of them, what basically became apparent Microsoft learned, with our applications, we should not be targeting the current platforms at all. The lesson to learn is never leave yourself open to the next generation of technology. They're learning the Moore's Law lesson again.
通过与他们的交流，微软基本认识到：我们的应用软件绝不能只瞄准当前的平台。要吸取的教训是，绝不要让自己在下一代技术面前暴露出空档。他们再次学到了“摩尔定律的教训”。
David: Yes, and how it applies to applications. Yes. You always got to target the next platform.
David：是的，而且这同样适用于应用软件。没错，你必须始终瞄准下一代平台。
Ben: Right, even if that platform is not the one you own. That's the interesting thing about when they're evaluating Multiplan and they say, how do we not get Lotus 1-2-3 again, basically, the applications team gets the freedom to look around and say, okay, no matter what our overall company strategy is right now, or no matter what the systems division is doing, what is the most cutting-edge platform that is going to be so interesting to people that we can develop the most envelope-pushing technology for it? That becomes the mandate for applications.
Ben：没错，即便那个平台并不是自己掌控的。这也是他们评估 Multiplan 时最有趣的地方：如何避免再次被 Lotus 1-2-3 打败？于是应用团队被赋予了自由去思考：不管公司当前的大策略是什么，也不管系统部门在做什么，哪个最前沿的平台会让用户眼前一亮，从而让我们能为其开发最具突破性的技术？这就成了应用团队的使命。
David: This is the dawn of horizontal software. You can have a whole company or a whole division of a company, in Microsoft's case, that makes this tool. That tool will be so much better than anything that even the largest companies can have their own software developers write. General Electric isn't going to write a better spreadsheet than 1-2-3. I think that the technology complement to this law is the killer app.
David：这是通用软件（横向软件）的黎明。一个企业，或如微软那样的一个部门，就能专注打造这种工具。这样的工具将远胜于哪怕是最大的公司自己开发的软件。通用电气也写不出比 1-2-3 更好的电子表格。我认为与这条规律相辅相成的技术要素就是“杀手级应用”。
Ben: You have to counter position. If 1-2-3 is the best spreadsheet out there for the current technology generation, you just can't compete with them. You need to wait for the next big leap forward in order to find a new competitive vector.
Ben：你必须反向定位。如果在当前技术代际里 1-2-3 是最好的电子表格，你根本无法与之竞争。你必须等待下一次重大技术飞跃，才能找到新的竞争向量。
David: You need to be the killer app on the next platform, and that's what Lotus 1-2-3 did with the spreadsheet on the IBM PC and IBM compatible PC. That's what Microsoft decides, hey, we got to do this in the graphical interface.
David：你必须成为下一代平台上的杀手级应用，这正是 Lotus 1-2-3 在 IBM PC 及其兼容机上所做的。微软于是决定：嘿，我们得在图形界面上做同样的事。
Ben: Who's about to come out with the very best instantiation of a graphical user interface? Apple computer.
Ben：那么，谁即将推出最出色的图形用户界面实现？苹果电脑。
David: That would be Steve Jobs.
David：那就是史蒂夫·乔布斯。
Ben: Yes. The next chapter of our Microsoft story is the Macintosh in 1984.
Ben：没错。我们讲微软故事的下一章便是 1984 年的 Macintosh。
David: It's so fun.
David：这太有趣了。
Ben: All right, David, why are we talking about the Mac?
Ben：好吧，David，我们为什么要讨论 Mac？
David: Because I think it's fair to say that the Mac made Microsoft Office, and Microsoft Office made the Mac. I don't think that it's actually a controversial statement, although it probably sounds crazy to many of you listening.
David：因为可以毫不夸张地说，是 Mac 成就了 Microsoft Office，而 Microsoft Office 也成就了 Mac。我不认为这是什么有争议的说法，尽管听众中的许多人可能觉得这听起来很疯狂。
Ben: Totally. Far and away the first thing to point out is the first version of Microsoft Excel was for the Mac. It's especially crazy for all the finance people today who are like, oh, Mac Excel isn't real Excel. Excel has to happen on Windows.
Ben：完全正确。首要指出的一点是：第一版 Microsoft Excel 是为 Mac 推出的。对今天那些说“Mac 版 Excel 不是真正的 Excel，Excel 必须运行在 Windows 上”的金融从业者而言，这简直太颠覆了。
David: No, Excel was on the Mac. That was it.
David：不，Excel 最初就在 Mac 上，就是这么回事。
Ben: Yes. The logic basically was Microsoft was really coming around to the idea that the next big thing in computing was the graphical user interface. The reason they were coming around to this was because they knew from Xerox PARC just as well as Apple did, and they were rapidly trying to figure out how to get All of that Xerox PARC-iness into their product line, too. That's the other half of this untold Xerox PARC story.
Ben：没错。其逻辑基本是：微软逐渐认识到计算领域的下一个大趋势是图形用户界面。他们之所以这么认为，是因为他们和苹果一样深知 Xerox PARC 的成果，并且迅速思考如何把那些“PARC 要素”也引入自己的产品线。这就是那段未被充分讲述的 Xerox PARC 故事的另一半。
One of the first ways that they see to bring the graphical user interface to their products is launching Excel for the Mac because they basically see, the way that we got destroyed with Lotus 1-2-3, we can't compete with lotus on the IBM PC, so we're going to shelf Multiplan start over, and Excel is going to come out in the graphical user interface. We're going to try to be first and best on the GUI.
他们认为将图形界面引入自家产品的首批方式之一，就是为 Mac 推出 Excel——因为他们看到了自己被 Lotus 1-2-3 打败的教训：在 IBM PC 上无法与 Lotus 竞争，那就搁置 Multiplan，重新开始，让 Excel 以图形界面的形式面世，争取在 GUI 上做到首创并做到最好。
现在正在进行的AI革命，一些老牌的大型科技企业弄不好就完了。
David: One thing just to underscore here, Excel is the world's first graphical spreadsheet program. That's why it wins, and that's why it's so important. Imagine trying to use Excel in the command line interface. That's what VisiCalc was, that's what even 1-2-3 was. Yeah, useful, better than nothing, but graphical charts, cells, visual relationships, this is so important. Excel is where it all starts.
David：这里必须强调一点：Excel 是全球首款图形化电子表格软件。这正是它能获胜并至关重要的原因。想象一下在命令行界面里使用 Excel——VisiCalc 是那样，甚至 1-2-3 也是那样。没错，那样也能用，总比没有强，但图形化的图表、单元格、可视化的关联，这些都极其重要。而这，一切都始于 Excel。
Ben: Yup. Of course, Apple loves this. The Macintosh came out in 1984, and everybody remembers the great intro video and the hello script. I've watched that Steve Jobs keynote because of course, I have, and it's this magical moment in computing history where finally something that's insanely great comes out. It's the beginning of Steve Jobs' unbelievable presentation prowess. It's so fun to watch it. It's, of course, a product that eventually people really loved. But at first...
Ben：没错。当然，苹果对此喜出望外。Macintosh 于 1984 年面世，人人都记得那段精彩的开场视频和 “hello” 手写脚本。我看过那场 Steve Jobs 的发布会——毫无疑问——那是计算史上一个神奇时刻，终于出现了“疯狂伟大”的产品，也标志着 Steve Jobs 惊人演示天赋的开端。观看过程妙趣横生。这款产品后来确实赢得了用户热爱，但最初……
David: It doesn't have the killer app.
David：它并没有杀手级应用。
Ben: No, it's a product that was supposed to ship in 1982. It didn't, it shipped in 1984. At the time, what they were targeting for 1982 was a pretty great set of technologies. By 1984, it's an aging set of technologies. It debuts with 128K of memory, which basically isn't enough to create any interesting applications. Developers are ignoring it as an interesting platform to develop on. Within 12 months, they figure it out and come out with a better version that's 512K. That's the version that people now really think about.
Ben：没错，本来计划 1982 年出货，但拖到 1984 年。原先为 1982 年瞄准的技术配置在 1984 年已显老旧。首发机只有 128K 内存，根本不足以支撑有趣的应用开发，开发者也不把它当作值得投入的平台。不到 12 个月，他们意识到问题，推出了内存 512K 的改进版——这才是人们如今谈论的版本。
David: That gets re-christened as like, that's the original Mac. The original original is the Mac 128 or something that.
David：后来大家把它重新命名，说那才是最初的 Mac。真正的“初代”其实是 Mac 128 之类的型号。
Ben: Exactly. But in the meantime, Microsoft, the applications group is working their ass off to make something really great for the Macintosh, and they come up with Excel. What ends up happening is Apple's really trying to promote the sales of this machine. They view Excel and PageMaker as the killer apps, as reasons that people should buy this thing, because once you run through a lot of the demo apps and the stuff that Apple built, you're like, okay, what else is here? It's crickets.
Ben：没错。与此同时，微软的应用软件团队拼命为 Macintosh 打造真正出色的软件，最终拿出了 Excel。苹果力推这款电脑销售，把 Excel 和 PageMaker 视为杀手级应用，是用户购买机器的理由。因为演示完苹果自带的那些小程序后，你会问：接下来还能做什么？现场一片寂静。
David: Right. Writing hello in script is cool, but like a lot of VR stuff, you're like, oh, that's a cool demo, but you're going to do that every day? No.
David：没错，用脚本写个 “hello” 很酷，可就像很多 VR 演示——你会觉得“哇，演示挺炫”，但你会天天这么玩吗？显然不会。
Ben: I'm not sure this has ever been publicly disclosed before, but Apple spent just as much marketing Excel as Microsoft did. They matched Microsoft's marketing spend with their own campaign for it and split the bill.
Ben：这可能从未公开透露过：苹果为 Excel 的市场推广投入的资金与微软完全相当，双方各自做宣传，平摊费用。
David: That's amazing.
David：太不可思议了。
Ben: You've got a couple of concurrent things going on in applications land. You've got Excel coming out for Mac to take advantage of the GUI. This strategy is just all over the place, I think that's an interesting thing to underscore about Microsoft in this era. They're trying a ton of stuff because they're paranoid. They don't want to miss the next wave. Meanwhile, also in the applications group, Charles Simonyi has written Word. This is about a year before in 1983. Microsoft Word comes out for DOS.
Ben：当时应用领域并行发生着几件事：Excel 在 Mac 上发布，充分利用 GUI。这种策略四面开花，很能体现微软当年的特质——极度警惕，什么都尝试，唯恐错过下一波浪潮。与此同时，应用团队中的 Charles Simonyi 早在 1983 年就写好了 Word，微软随后在 DOS 平台发布了 Word。
David: Right, and they ship it with a mouse.
David：对，而且还随软件附送鼠标。
Ben: Yes. This is like, okay, we see the Xerox PARC stuff coming out in the Mac. Great, Excel will be for that. We want to develop Word. We're going to do that for DOS. But I can imagine how useful the mouse is going to be in a word processing environment. They actually ship a mouse tied to the application that's not a part of DOS. This is how early we were in figuring out what the split between applications and platforms were at this point in history. Microsoft thought maybe a mouse makes sense just for this one application, even though it doesn't do anything else for the rest of the command line interface.
Ben：没错。他们的思路是：Mac 上已有 Xerox PARC 的 GUI 元素，那就让 Excel 服务于此；而 Word 则要在 DOS 上开发。可想而知，在文字处理环境里鼠标会有多好用。于是他们干脆把鼠标与应用捆绑销售，而鼠标并不是 DOS 的组成部分。这说明当时人们还在摸索应用与平台的分工。微软当时想，也许鼠标只为这一个应用服务就足够了，即便它在命令行界面下的其他场景毫无用武之地。
David: It was all being figured out. I think it is also really fair to say that Microsoft was right there with Apple in the Mac development phase. Obviously, they're working on Excel, working on other what would become the Office Suite applications together for Mac.
David：一切都在逐渐厘清。我认为说微软在 Mac 的开发阶段与苹果并肩作战也很公平。显而易见，他们正在为 Mac 开发 Excel，以及其他后来演变为 Office 套件的应用程序。
Steve Jobs shows Bill Gates the Mac project in 1981, three years before it ships. Microsoft and Apple signed an agreement to work together on applications for it in 1982. They were very deeply embedded on this, which is going to make the lawsuit and what comes up in a minute here all the more funny.
乔布斯在 1981 年向比尔·盖茨展示了 Mac 项目，比其正式上市早了三年。微软和苹果在 1982 年签署协议，共同为其开发应用程序。他们深度参与其中，这也让稍后我们将提到的诉讼增添了几分戏剧性。
Ben: The decision for the Excel team is to focus on GUI. The whole marketing message is Excel on a Mac is better than Lotus 1-2-3 on a PC. You're starting to see truly divergent cultures at Microsoft between the systems group, which is currently making DOS.
Ben：Excel 团队的决定是聚焦于图形用户界面。整个市场宣传都是“Mac 版 Excel 优于 PC 上的 Lotus 1-2-3”。你开始看到微软内部系统组（目前负责开发 DOS）和其他部门之间真正的文化分化。
We'll soon make Windows, soon partner with IBM, or soon do something else that we're getting into here in the next chapter of the story, and the applications group, which is also currently a bunch of disparate applications and teams targeting disparate platforms, but is also about to become unified in their next chapter. Within the applications group, that next chapter is Microsoft Office.
接下来我们很快会开发 Windows，很快会与 IBM 合作，或者在故事的下一章做些其他事情；与此同时，应用组目前仍由面向不同平台的多个独立应用和团队组成，但即将迎来整合——那就是 Microsoft Office 的诞生。
In 1985, in January, the bundle is released. It was originally called the Business Pack for Microsoft. It started on the Mac.
1985 年 1 月，这个捆绑包发布，最初被称为 Microsoft Business Pack，首先登陆 Mac 平台。
David: It really rolls off the tongue.
David：名字真是朗朗上口。
Ben: Totally does. They haven't acquired PowerPoint yet or forethought as we talked about eight years ago on Acquired way back in history. There's no PowerPoint, it's not part of the bundle. What you've got here on the Mac and the first version of Office is Word, which they've developed in house, File, Chart, and Multiplan. This first notion of a suite, so today we're very familiar with suite—Creative Suite over at Adobe. Software is sold this way. This was the first time.
Ben：确实如此。当时他们还没有收购 PowerPoint 或其前身 Forethought（我们在八年前的 Acquired 节目中讨论过）。捆绑包里没有 PowerPoint。Mac 上的首个 Office 版本包含他们自研的 Word、File、Chart 和 Multiplan。这是“套件”概念的第一次亮相——如今我们都熟悉诸如 Adobe Creative Suite 之类的套装软件，而当时这是首开先河。
What was actually happening is all of the bundling was happening in pricing, in marketing, and in manufacturing. You had a single box that they would ship with the different applications by 1988 or 1989. It was Word, Excel, PowerPoint. They're very different things, but they're getting bundled together in a way to be sold to customers, but there's no product integration.
实际上，所谓“捆绑”仅体现在定价、营销和生产层面。到 1988 或 1989 年，他们会把多个应用装进同一个包装盒中发货——Word、Excel、PowerPoint。它们性质迥异，却以打包方式出售给客户，但产品本身并未整合。
You don't have the ability to do this very nice copy-paste from an Excel table and just paste that into Word. That whole idea is pretty far away. In this earliest Microsoft Office, it was just, how can we bundle something for a cheaper price if you buy all three and make marketing easier for us to have this unified message?
当时你无法将 Excel 表格漂亮地复制粘贴到 Word 中，这个概念还很遥远。最早的 Microsoft Office 只是为了：如果你一次性购买这三款软件，我们能以更低价格捆绑销售，并在营销上形成统一口径。
David: Soon to come—and we'll get into Windows here in a second—one of the big killer app for productivity in particular for business productivity with a graphical user interface like Windows and true multitasking, you can get copy-paste from Excel into PowerPoint. Lotus and the world back in the command line interface where you've got these programs running on top of DOS, that is a completely foreign concept.
David：很快——我们马上会谈到 Windows——在带有图形界面并实现真正多任务的 Windows 上，面向商业生产力的一大杀手级应用就是可以将 Excel 数据复制并粘贴到 PowerPoint 中。对于仍在 DOS 命令行界面上运行程序的 Lotus 等软件世界来说，这完全是天方夜谭。
Ben: Right, none of those verbs exist.
Ben：对，那些操作在当时根本不存在。
David: Exactly. We've now set the stage of Microsoft's doing a lot of stuff. They're hedging a lot of bets, they're not totally sure which strategy is going to win out, they're not sure which platform is going to win out. They're not sure if they're more of a systems company or an application company, but what they are unified on is we make great software for personal computers. I think anything that fell into that purview, they were willing to explore.
David：没错。现在微软的舞台已经搭好，他们在做很多事，也在同时下注，并不确定哪种策略、哪个平台会胜出，也不确定自己是系统公司还是应用公司。但他们达成共识的一点是：我们为个人电脑开发出色的软件。只要属于这一范畴的，他们都愿意尝试。
They didn't really have hard boundaries between, we'll do anything to make our operating systems great, or we'll do anything to advantage our applications. Even we think we're an enterprise company, we think we're a consumer company. They just didn't have well formed opinions yet. It was just we make software for personal computers.
他们并未在“为了让操作系统更出色我们什么都做”还是“为了让应用程序占优势我们什么都做”之间划下明确界限。甚至在“我们是企业公司”还是“我们是消费级公司”之间也没有定论。他们的理念尚未成型，只有一句话：我们为个人电脑开发软件。
David: At this point in time, the actual boundary between an operating system and an application is very fluid.
David：在这个阶段，操作系统与应用程序之间的实际界限非常模糊。
Ben: You've got a mouse that works for one program.
Ben：你有一只只能在单个程序里用的鼠标。
David: Totally. Lotus would really go down a dead end evolutionary path with Notes later in its life and its final chapter, where the application was going to be the operating system.
David：没错。Lotus 后期在 Notes 上沿着一条注定死胡同的演化路径走到终章——让应用程序充当操作系统。
Ben: Right. Lotus Notes was crazy. It was a word processor, an email service, and it was a platform on which you could write other applications.
Ben：对。Lotus Notes 简直疯狂：既是文字处理器，也是电子邮件服务，还是一个可在其上编写其他应用的平台。
David: Yes, and it itself was an application.
David：是的，而它本身也是一个应用程序。
Ben: It's crazy.
Ben：太疯狂了。
David: Not an operating system. It was all dynamic. Speaking of though, Microsoft here is in bed with Apple, working on the Mac. Bill and the company are big believers in the future of the graphical user interface. Starting in 1983, they're like, we got to do our own graphical operating system or at least user interface. This is the origins of the Windows product. They actually announced it in November, 1983, before the Mac ends up shipping, which their partner, Apple, is of course not happy about.
David：它并不是操作系统，一切都是动态的。话说回来，微软当时正与苹果紧密合作开发 Mac。Bill 和公司坚信图形用户界面的未来。从 1983 年起，他们就认为必须研发自己的图形操作系统，或至少图形界面，这就是 Windows 产品的起源。他们甚至在 1983 年 11 月就宣布了 Windows，比 Mac 上市还早，这当然令合作伙伴苹果颇为不满。
Just development of the Mac was rocky, development of Windows was super freaking rocky within Microsoft, too. This is around that same time when Paul Allen gets Hodgkin's disease and leaves the company. His presence as great technical leader is very much missed, but they bring in someone from Xerox to manage the development of Windows.
Mac 的开发已经磕磕绊绊，而 Windows 在微软内部的开发更是坎坷。同一时期，Paul Allen 被诊断出霍奇金淋巴瘤并离开公司，这位卓越技术领袖的缺席令人惋惜。微软于是从施乐请来一位负责人管理 Windows 的开发工作。
That person ends up not working out, he gets fired. Steve Ballmer gets drafted to come in and be the dev manager for the final push to release Windows 1.0, which is hilarious. You can find amazing YouTube videos from the launch and all joking about how non-technical Steve coming in to Save the day and dev manage windows to launch.
结果那位负责人并未成功，最终被解雇。Steve Ballmer 被临时召入，担任开发经理，带队完成 Windows 1.0 的最后冲刺，可谓喜剧感满满。你可以在 YouTube 上找到当年发布会的精彩视频，大家调侃非技术出身的 Steve 如何力挽狂澜、推动 Windows 上线。
Ben: Which is so funny. I don't think at this point in history, the lines were clearly formed among the executives yet. Steve wasn't running the global sales force, and Microsoft wasn't an enterprise company.
Ben：这太有趣了。当时高管层的分工界限尚未成形。Steve 还没掌管全球销售团队，微软也还算不上企业级公司。
David: No, we're going to get to that later.
David：没错，我们之后会谈到这点。
Ben: Steve was one of the smart executives, they were a software company, and someone had to manage getting the software out the door. Windows 1.0 comes out. It's bad.
Ben：Steve 是公司里颇为聪明的高管之一，微软毕竟是家软件公司，总得有人把软件发布出去。Windows 1.0 终于问世，但表现糟糕。
David: It's bad. November 1985, Windows 1.0 is a very, very different thing than you imagine a graphical user interface is today or what you know of as Windows. It was tiled. It was not overlapping Windows that you can drag around and have one over the other. When you opened a program in Windows 1.0, the system created a literal window of it on your screen, and then it dynamically resized the windows as you open other applications. Nothing could ever be on top of each other. As you open more and more stuff, the windows get smaller and smaller and smaller. It's very bizarre.
David：确实糟糕。1985 年 11 月发布的 Windows 1.0 与今日人们心中的图形界面或 Windows 大相径庭：它采用平铺窗口，无法拖动重叠。当你在 Windows 1.0 中打开程序时，系统会在屏幕上创建一个实际窗口，并在你打开更多应用时动态缩放。窗口之间永不重叠，打开的应用越多，窗口就越小、越小、越小，场面十分怪异。
Ben: Yeah. The idea of windows overlapping on top of each other, that was a uniquely Mac thing and a thing that smart engineers at Apple figured out how to do that in a performant way that offers good user experience. I would classify Windows 1.0 as a half step between command line and an actual graphical user interface.
Ben：是的，窗口可以层叠在彼此之上是 Mac 独有的特色，是苹果的聪明工程师想出的一种既高效又能提供良好用户体验的实现方式。我会把 Windows 1.0 归类为介于命令行和真正图形界面之间的半步产品。
David: Yes, 100%. I believe Microsoft and Apple actually did a licensing agreement while they were working together during this time that said, hey, Microsoft can use a lot of the stuff that's being developed for Mac for Windows 1.0.
David：完全正确。我记得微软和苹果在合作期间确实签过一份授权协议，允许微软将 Mac 上开发的许多技术用于 Windows 1.0。
Ben: Yes, that's right. Apple does do a deal to license a lot of "their intellectual property" which of course came from Xerox, to Microsoft. Apple, I think, was under the impression that it was just for Windows 1.0, but the actual terms of the agreement are this and all future versions of Windows, which comes back to haunt Apple later. But yes, they totally get the license.
Ben：没错。苹果确实把大量“他们的知识产权”（当然最初源自 Xerox）授权给了微软。苹果原以为授权仅限于 Windows 1.0，但协议条款实际上覆盖了此后所有版本的 Windows，这后来让苹果十分后悔。不过，授权确实给了微软。
David: Also, by the time that this agreement actually happens, I think Steve Jobs has been ousted, so it's Scully who does this agreement. People in Apple would look back on this for years and be like, this was a huge error.
David：此外，等到协议真正签署时，Steve Jobs 已被赶出公司，所以是 Scully 负责的。多年后，苹果内部常把这件事当作一个巨大错误来反省。
The other important thing about Windows during this awkward teenage phase is it's not an operating system. It's just a graphical interface on top of DOS.
Windows 在这段“青少年”时期还有一件重要特点：它并不是操作系统，而只是运行在 DOS 之上的图形界面。
Ben: Yes.
Ben：没错。
David: The original name for Windows was Interface Manager.
David：Windows 的最初名称叫“Interface Manager（界面管理器）”。
Ben: Isn't it crazy? In all of their early marketing, they referred to it as Windows, a graphical operating environment that runs on the Microsoft MS-DOS operating system. Actually, it was not until Windows 95 that Windows was its own operating system. It was in Windows 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 3.1, and Windows for Workgroups. It was a graphical operating environment.
Ben：是不是很疯狂？在最初的营销中，他们把它称作“Windows——运行在 MS-DOS 上的图形操作环境”。直到 Windows 95，Windows 才真正成为独立操作系统；在 Windows 1.0、2.0、3.0、3.1 以及 Windows for Workgroups 时代，它都只是图形操作环境。
Here's the question. Why is Microsoft doing Windows? Obviously here, Microsoft knows they need to evolve DOS. They need to figure something out for the graphical world. David, are you telling me that Windows is the widely agreed upon future of the company and that's just a straight line?
问题来了：微软为什么要做 Windows？显然，微软知道必须让 DOS 进化，必须为图形化世界找到方案。David，你是在说 Windows 已被公司一致认定是未来、而这条路将一帆风顺吗？
David: Obviously that's a setup there. Here's the other thing that's happening in the company at this time, and it's the bigger thing. It's the next phase of the IBM relationship. Windows, the Mac, all of this, are hedges for the company. Microsoft and Bill, in particular, were masters of hedging their bets in an uncertain technology future.
David：显然你在埋梗。公司当时还有另一件更大的事——与 IBM 合作进入下一阶段。Windows、Mac 这些项目都是微软的对冲手段。尤其是 Bill，很擅长在未来技术不确定时押注多条路线。
He was so great. The company was so great at making sure that whichever way the apple fell from the tree, as Jetson Huang put it to us in our interview, Microsoft was going to be positioned to catch it. A lot of people, including Bill and Microsoft themselves, believe that the way that apple was going to fall from the tree here was IBM and OS/2.
正如 Jetson Huang 在采访中所说，比尔及其团队擅长确保“无论苹果落向何方，微软都能接住它”。当时很多人——包括比尔和微软内部——都认为“苹果”会落向 IBM 与 OS/2。
Ben: The IBM PC was such a big deal last time around. You would think that whatever IBM wants to do next is a pretty good way to ally yourself.
Ben：上一次 IBM PC 席卷市场，你会自然想到，紧跟 IBM 的下一步动作或许是最佳结盟之道。
David: What's going on here? IBM, obviously the PC was a huge success, but losing dominance of the ecosystem to the clones, this was bad. IBM wants to find a way to evolve the PC ecosystem back to being more IBM proprietary. They're going to make Microsoft come along for the ride here.
David：这是怎么回事？IBM 的 PC 虽然大获成功，但因克隆机而失去对生态系统的主导权，这很糟糕。IBM 想找回对 PC 生态的控制权，使之更具 IBM 专属性，并打算拉上微软一同前行。
The way that they're going to do this is with the next generation of the PC ecosystem, they are going to make a whole new modern operating system. They're going to get rid of DOS. They're going to make this operating system in partnership with Microsoft, and it's going to be called, fittingly, OS/2. They are going to lock Microsoft up so that they can't license it to anybody else. OS/2 is going to be proprietary to IBM hardware, just like the Mac operating system is proprietary to Apple hardware.
他们的做法是：在下一代 PC 生态中打造全新的现代操作系统，淘汰 DOS，与微软合作开发，并命名为 OS/2。IBM 将限制微软不得向其他厂商授权，OS/2 只能运行在 IBM 自家硬件上，就像苹果的操作系统专属其硬件一样。
As powerful as Microsoft's become here, they're still the little brother to IBM. This is not great news for Microsoft. On the other hand, it's much better for them to be on the inside here with IBM working in bed with them than it would be to be on the outside looking in if IBM's vision comes true and they recapture control of the PC ecosystem.
尽管微软此时已颇具实力，但在 IBM 面前仍是小老弟。对微软而言，这消息并不友好。然而，与其被排除在外、眼看 IBM 若真重新掌控 PC 生态，不如先搭上 IBM 这趟顺风车，起码能身处局内。
Bill, Microsoft, the company, and Steve too as the manager of the account with IBM, commit themselves to Microsoft is all in on this vision of the future of OS/2, and IBM is our horse in the race.
比尔本人、微软公司以及作为 IBM 客户经理的 Steve 都承诺：微软将全力投入 OS/2 的未来愿景，IBM 是他们押注的赛马。
Ben: This is such a crazy part of the story to me, because we just talked about how Microsoft discovered this amazing business model. With everyone needing to license DOS from them, they're taking over the world, and they're becoming the standard development platform. Why on earth, if all that is true, are they going to develop some software that's going to be locked to IBM computers?
Ben：这一段剧情太疯狂了。我们才刚说过，微软凭借 DOS 授权建立了惊人的商业模式，全球厂商都得向他们授权 DOS，他们正席卷世界，成为标准开发平台。既然如此，为什么他们还要开发只能锁定在 IBM 电脑上的软件？
David: This is a recentralization attempt. Ballmer has this great, great, great quote about it. He says, "This,” the IBM partnership at this time, “was what we used to call riding the bear. You just had to try to stay on the bear's back and the bear would twist, turn, and try to throw you off. But we were going to stay on the bear because the bear was the biggest, the most important. You just had to be with the bear. Otherwise, you would be under the bear." That was IBM at this point in time.
David：这是一次“重新集中化”尝试。Ballmer 对此有句名言：“当时和 IBM 合作就像‘骑熊’。你得拼命待在熊背上，熊会扭动、翻滚、想把你甩下去。但我们必须留在熊背上，因为这头熊最大、最重要。你只能跟熊站一边，否则就会被熊踩在脚下。” 当时的 IBM 就是那头熊。
Really, I think it was IBM essentially putting a gun to Microsoft's head and being like, well, you can be in bed with us on this future that we're going to re-centralize everything, or you can be everybody else and not be, and you'll lose.
说白了，IBM 相当于用枪口对准微软：要么和我们站在一起，共同实现重新集中化的未来；要么像其他人一样被排除在外，最终失败。
Ben: Even though Microsoft's doing all these little hedges, Windows, this tiny little team that's 30 people or something, it's not the most prestigious place at the company. The people in the applications division may as well be on another planet by this point from the systems division. They're trying all kinds of crazy stuff. The company motto at this point is the next big thing is OS/2 and IBM, and we are the software vendor for that.
Ben：尽管微软搞了不少对冲项目，比如 Windows——那只是一个 30 人左右的小团队，并非公司里最体面的岗位；应用部门与系统部门此时仿佛身处不同星球，各自折腾各种疯狂点子。但公司口号已明确：下一件大事就是 OS/2 与 IBM，我们就是那套系统的软件提供商。
David: Certainly Bill and I think Steve, too, they needed to tow the party line politically of expressing that, nope, OS/2 is the future. What we're doing with Windows and with the Mac is those are small things within the company. It's a super bizarre period in history, but IBM had also made a bit of a power play too with the later generations of the 16-bit era product they called the PC/AT. They used the Intel 286 chip instead of the Intel 386 chip. The 286 chip—this was an intentional decision on IBM's part—was good, but it wasn't great.
David：比尔和 Steve 当然得在政治上保持一致，宣称“OS/2 才是未来，Windows 和 Mac 不过是公司里的小项目”。这是历史上的极度诡异时期。与此同时，IBM 还在 16 位时代的后续产品 PC/AT 上下了一盘棋——他们选择 Intel 286 而非 386 处理器，这是 IBM 刻意为之。286 芯片虽说不错，但绝称不上卓越。
Ben: You say it was good, but not great. Bill Gates said it was brain dead.
Ben：你说它“不错但不卓越”，而比尔·盖茨直接称它“脑死亡”。
David: Yes. Bill Gates called it a brain-dead chip.
David：是的。比尔·盖茨称它是一颗“脑死亡”的芯片。
Ben: I think you might be being charitable.
Ben：我觉得你这说法还算客气了。
David: I think it certainly was more powerful than the 8086, 8088, but it was nowhere near what the 386 could do. There's a bunch of technical aspects to this, but the most important takeaway is that the 286 was not really powerful enough to do a graphical user interface or to power true multitasking in a way that the 386 and then later the 486 would be.
David：我认为它当然比 8086、8088 更强，但远远达不到 386 的水平。这里有很多技术细节，但最关键的是，286 的性能不足以支撑图形用户界面，也无法像 386 乃至后来的 486 那样真正实现多任务。
A big part of actually the Compaq story about how Compaq and the clones leap ahead of IBM is they're not deterred from coming out with 386 machines, which are way more powerful, can run Windows, can do all this stuff. That's how they start to separate from IBM.
实际上，Compaq 及其克隆机后来之所以能超越 IBM，一个重要原因就是他们毫不犹豫地推出了性能更强的 386 机器，这些电脑能运行 Windows，完成各种任务，从而开始与 IBM 拉开差距。
Ben: That's right. That was a bet that company move where Microsoft was like, hey, Compaq, go make 386 stuff because we're going to make a really great 386 software. We need someone to be all in on that because IBM's not.
Ben：没错。那是一场公司层面的押注——微软对 Compaq 说：“去做 386 机器吧，我们会开发非常优秀的 386 软件，需要有人全力投入，因为 IBM 不会这么做。”
David: This is the thing. Bill, Steve, and the company, they're having to tow the party line of expressing commitment to IBM, but really they're like, no, Compaq, go do the 386, we're going to do Windows.
David：事实就是这样。比尔、Steve 和公司表面上必须坚持对 IBM 的承诺，但实际上在想：“不，Compaq，去做 386，我们要做 Windows。”
Ben: Right, they're riling up the rebels.
Ben：对，他们在煽动“叛军”。
David: Exactly. They are the rebels versus the empire here. Anyway, IBM, of course, sees all this. They made the decision not to go to 386 and to discourage it in the marketplace because they didn't want PCs to start creeping into the core enterprise mainframe IBM workloads, their core business. If that was going to happen, they wanted it to be IBM proprietary closed system. I think that was a big part of the impetus for this OS/2 initiative.
David：正是如此。他们是叛军，而 IBM 是帝国。当然，IBM 看在眼里。他们决定不采用 386，并在市场上加以遏制，因为不希望 PC 逐渐侵蚀 IBM 主机的核心企业工作负载——那是他们的核心业务。如果真要出现这种情况，他们希望它是 IBM 的封闭专有系统。我认为这正是推动 OS/2 计划的重要动因。
Ben: I see.
Ben：我明白了。
David: This is the empire strikes back here.
David：这是“帝国反击”。
Ben: They're basically trying to coop the PC movement back into IBM proprietary land.
Ben：他们基本想把 PC 运动重新拉回 IBM 的专属地盘。
David: Exactly. When OS/2 finally does come out in December 1987, predictably, as you can imagine here, it's not very good. The market does not like it. Thank God for Microsoft. Again, this probably was Bill's strategy all along that they hedged with Windows, with the Mac. That's clearly the future. The market is not going to accept OS/2 and a recentralization on IBM. Microsoft's just crushing it on the revenue side, even though OS/2 is a failure.
David：没错。OS/2 最终在 1987 年 12 月发布，可想而知，它表现并不理想，市场并不买账。感谢微软。很可能这一直是比尔的策略——用 Windows 和 Mac 来对冲。这显然才是未来。市场不会接受 OS/2 及 IBM 的再集中化。尽管 OS/2 失败了，微软在营收方面依旧势如破竹。
Ben: DOS and the applications were both great businesses by 1987.
Ben：到 1987 年，DOS 和各类应用都已经成为极其赚钱的业务。
David: Yes. Fiscal 1987, Microsoft does \$350 million in revenue. Fiscal 1988, they do \$600 million in revenue. Basically, none of this is from OS/2 and the IBM world. Towards the end of 1988 is when the wind starts really blowing away from IBM here.
David：是的。1987 财年，微软实现了 3.5 亿美元收入；1988 财年达到 6 亿美元。基本上，这些收入都不是来自 OS/2 和 IBM 生态。到了 1988 年末，市场风向开始明显远离 IBM。
In June of 1988, Microsoft hires Mike Maples, who is IBM's director of software strategy away from IBM to come head Microsoft's application software. What is Microsoft's application software strategy right now? It's the graphical user interface. It's everything that IBM isn't. The writing is starting to be on the wall here that divorce is coming between IBM and Microsoft.
1988 年 6 月，微软从 IBM 挖来软件战略总监 Mike Maples 掌管微软应用软件业务。微软此刻的应用软件战略是什么？图形用户界面——也就是 IBM 缺失的一切。种种迹象表明，IBM 与微软的分手已迫在眉睫。
Finally, a year-and-a-half later in 1990, Windows 3.0 comes out. This is when they get it right. This is when there's enough installed base of 386 and 486 machines out there in the open PC ecosystem that you can have a really good, true multitasking, good UI, graphical user interface running on top of DOS.
一年半后的 1990 年，Windows 3.0 发布。这一次他们做对了。开放 PC 生态中已有足够多的 386 与 486 机器，使得在 DOS 之上运行真正多任务、体验良好的图形用户界面成为可能。
Windows 1.0 and Windows 2.0 only ever achieved 5% penetration of the DOS installed base. Windows 3.0 doubles that in the first six months. PC Computing magazine writes about Windows 3.0. May 22nd, 1990 will mark the first day of the second era of IBM compatible PCs. Microsoft released Windows 3.0.
Windows 1.0 与 2.0 在 DOS 装机基数中的渗透率始终只有 5%；而 Windows 3.0 在前六个月就把这一比例翻了一番。《PC Computing》杂志写道：1990 年 5 月 22 日将成为 IBM 兼容机第二时代的第一天，因为微软发布了 Windows 3.0。
On that day, the IBM compatible PC, a machine hobbled by an outmoded character-based operating system and 70s style programs, was transformed into a computer that could soar in a decade of multitasking graphical operating environments, aka everything OS/2 is not. Windows 3.0 gets right what its predecessors got wrong. It drives adequate performance, it accommodates existing DOS applications, and it makes you believe that it belongs on a PC.
那一天，这台曾被过时的字符操作系统和 70 年代风格程序束缚的 IBM 兼容机，摇身一变成为能在多任务图形操作环境里驰骋的电脑——亦即 OS/2 所不具备的一切。Windows 3.0 修正了前辈的缺陷：性能够用、兼容现有 DOS 应用，并让人相信它理应属于 PC。
Ben: That's awesome.
Ben：太棒了。
David: That's what the press thought. Ben, I know you talked to a really important person in the Windows ecosystem and Microsoft internally at this time. What do you have for us?
David：媒体也这么认为。Ben，我知道你跟当时 Windows 生态和微软内部的关键人物聊过。你能给我们带来什么？
Ben: We have to thank Brad Silverberg for helping us with this section. Brad led the Windows 3.1 team. He came in right after the 3.0 release and would eventually go on to lead the Windows 95 effort as the VP of the Personal Systems Division.
Ben：我们得感谢 Brad Silverberg 协助完成这一部分。Brad 领导了 Windows 3.1 团队，3.0 发布后不久加入，后来以个人系统部副总裁身份领衔 Windows 95 项目。
Brad comes in, Windows 3.0 has just shipped. The first thing that is super, super obvious is as Brad observed everything going on with OS/2 land and everything going on with the core Microsoft culture, it was a complete clash. It was impossible for the pace of Microsoft. This is a super young group, all in their 20s. Some people in their 30s, but mostly 20s who just want to push the cutting edge, ship stuff.
Brad 入职时，Windows 3.0 刚刚发布。他最直观的观察是：OS/2 阵营的一切与微软核心文化完全冲突，微软的节奏根本无法适应。Windows 团队极其年轻，成员几乎都是二十多岁，只想冲击前沿、快速发布产品。
Think about Google in the early 2000s, just hire all the smartest people you can, set them loose, have creativity, and bump up against the edge of what's possible, both in terms of pushing the hardware, but also pushing even laws as we would later see. Let's just do what users love and see what happens. Let's just do what technology enables us to do and see what happens. That's the opposite of IBM's culture at this point. There's this huge cultural rift between what IBM needs and who Microsoft is at this point.
想想 2000 年代初的 Google——招募最聪明的人，放手让他们发挥创造力，挑战硬件极限，甚至触碰法规边界，让技术与用户热爱引领方向。这与当时 IBM 的文化截然相反，IBM 的需求与微软的本色之间存在巨大文化鸿沟。
What ended up happening with 3.0, it was unexpectedly loved. Microsoft was not really prepared for how much people were going to love the GUI, and with 3.1 it got really good. There was a small off site of the executives, and Bill and Steve basically decided that it was time to bet on Windows. That was the new strategy. Windows had always been plan B, and now suddenly it was plan A.
Windows 3.0 的结局是出乎意料地受欢迎。微软完全没料到用户会如此热爱 GUI，而 3.1 更是大放异彩。在一次高管小型外出会上，比尔和史蒂夫基本决定该押注 Windows 了——这就是新的战略。Windows 一直是 B 计划，如今却突然成了 A 计划。
When I say plan B, I don't mean thought they had a prayer of being plan A. It was 65 people that shipped windows 3.1. These were the misfits. It was not prestigious. The prestigious thing to work on at Microsoft was OS/2 and eventually Windows NT. But the Windows team in the Windows 3.0 era is almost the Mac team over at Apple. They were flying the rebel flag, they valued creativity over bureaucracy, even if it meant they weren't working on the prestigious thing.
所谓 B 计划，并不是说它有成为 A 计划的一丝希望。当时只有 65 个人发布了 Windows 3.1，他们是“异类”，并不光鲜。微软内部最体面的项目是 OS/2，以及后来更体面的 Windows NT。Windows 3.0 时代的团队几乎就像苹果的 Mac 团队，他们高举叛逆旗帜，把创造力置于官僚之上，即便这意味着无法参与最光鲜的项目。
Suddenly, there's this huge strategic opportunity to become the standard independent of IBM if the platform is good enough, and then boom. The early reception to Windows is so good, it gives this glimmer of, that may seem really ambitious, but that opportunity is actually ours if we want to go seize it. Everyone took a big gulp and said, the GUI's the next big thing, users love this, let's take the ragtag group and promote them.
突然间，只要平台足够优秀，就有巨大战略机会摆脱 IBM 而成为行业标准。接着——轰——Windows 的早期反响异常火爆，让人看到：这听似雄心勃勃，但如果我们想抓住，这机会确实属于我们。所有人都深吸一口气，说：GUI 是下一件大事，用户喜欢它，把这支乌合之众扶上马吧。
David: This was, I think, the moment when Microsoft started to believe in themselves, really. If you look at the facts as we told the story, it was like, Bill did this great business deal with IBM, anticipated the rise of the clones in the first PC, won, and then Microsoft now was the thing, and IBM was the old thing. It wasn't until this. In this whole OS/2 thing, I think you can see, they felt like they were still little brother. They had to go along with what IBM dictated. Now they're like, whoa.
David：我想这正是微软真正开始相信自己的那一刻。如果回顾我们讲述的事实，比尔先是与 IBM 做成一桩绝妙的生意，预见到首批 PC 克隆机的兴起并取得胜利，于是微软成为新时代的焦点，而 IBM 成了旧时代的象征。直到这次 OS/2 事件之前，他们仍觉得自己是“弟弟”，必须听从 IBM 的指令行事。现在他们却惊呼：“哇——”。
Ben: Why do we again?
Ben：那我们为什么还要这么做？
David: Yeah, we're in control.
David：没错，现在由我们掌控。
Ben: The press is making a big deal out of Bill Gates. Boy Wonder, he's the youngest ever billionaire at age 31. By the way, when Bill Gates became a billionaire, there were not lots of billionaires, there were 50 billionaires. All this lore around the company, it's like they can do no wrong. But inside the company, I think they're like, we don't know the future of technology. Any wave could break against us at any moment, and this is all tenuous. I think that chasm kept getting wider and wider and wider of internally feeling like they're screwed and externally it's seeming this is the next great thing.
Ben：媒体把比尔·盖茨炒成了大新闻——“神童”，31 岁就成了史上最年轻的亿万富翁。顺便说一句，盖茨成为亿万富翁时，全球亿万富翁还不到 50 位。公司周围的传奇都在说他们百战百胜，但公司内部却觉得：我们并不知道技术的未来，任何浪潮都可能随时拍向我们，一切都岌岌可危。我想这种“内部焦虑与外部赞誉”的裂缝不断扩大——内部总觉得自己可能完蛋，外界却认为他们是下一个伟大事物。
David: Totally. I've got some fun stats on money and revenue around all this. In fiscal 1990, the year that Windows 3.0 shipped, Microsoft does \$1.2 billion in revenue, making them the first software company ever to pass a billion dollars in revenue. Fiscal 1991, they do \$1.8 billion. Fiscal 1992, they finally win the Apple copyright lawsuit around the GUI.
David：完全正确。我这里有些有趣的财务数据。1990 财年（Windows 3.0 发布当年），微软营收 12 亿美元，成为历史上首家营收突破 10 亿美元的软件公司；1991 财年营收 18 亿美元；1992 财年他们终于赢得了与苹果关于 GUI 的版权诉讼。
Ben: By the way, the way that they won that, a judge basically looked at the paper and said, Apple, you totally said in all the future versions of Windows, they can use your UI paradigms. For most of the counts, they're covered. For these other things that you're trying to ask them about, those are not actually defensible. It's just widely accepted that these are UI paradigms now, and you can't enforce any ownership over those. It basically got thrown out. Apple tried to appeal all the way up to the Supreme Court, who said no.
Ben：顺带一提，他们之所以获胜，是因为法官看了文件后说：“苹果，你们确实在所有未来的 Windows 版本中允许他们使用你们的 UI 范式。大部分指控都被这一点涵盖了；至于你们另外提出的内容，也缺乏可辩护性。这些 UI 范式如今已被广泛接受，你们无法再主张所有权。” 案件基本被驳回。苹果一路上诉到最高法院，但被驳回。
David: That's right. Like we've been saying too, they both stole from Xerox.
David：没错，正如我们一直所说，两家公司都从施乐“借鉴”了技术。
Ben: Yes.
Ben：是的。
David: Fiscal 1992 though, this is when Microsoft just blows the doors off. They do \$2.8 billion in revenue in fiscal 1992, up from \$1.8 the year before. That year, 1992 in October is when Gates finally passes John Kluge—Acquired OG fans, back to the LVMH episode—Gates passes John Kluge of Metromedia fame, media mogul to become the wealthiest person in America. Everything you're talking about, all the press comes around that.
David：然而 1992 财年，微软真正火力全开，营收达到 28 亿美元，比前一年的 18 亿大幅增长。同年 10 月，盖茨的财富终于超过传媒大亨、Metromedia 创始人 John Kluge——老听众可回顾我们 LVMH 那期——成为全美首富。你提到的那些媒体报道都是围绕这件事。
In January 1993, the crowning moment happens. Microsoft passes IBM in market cap. They have inherited the earth. They have inherited computing. Supposedly. I don't know if this is 100% true. This is written in one of the books I read. I read this. The folks involved will have to confirm or deny.
1993 年 1 月，最具象征性的时刻到来：微软的市值超越 IBM。他们似乎继承了整个世界，也继承了计算领域的王座——姑且如此说。我不确定这是否百分百属实，我在一本书里读到的，相关人士还需自行确认或否认。
Supposedly, the next month after Microsoft passes IBM in market cap—we're now in February 1993—the IBM board is in disarray. The empire is going down. They fired the CEO. Tom Murphy of Capital Cities fame who is on the IBM board, supposedly comes out to Redmond to sit down with Bill and personally ask him to come and be the next CEO of IBM.
据说微软市值超越 IBM 的下个月——也就是 1993 年 2 月——IBM 董事会一片混乱，帝国正走向衰落，他们解雇了 CEO。据传，出身 Capital Cities 的著名传媒人 Tom Murphy（时任 IBM 董事）亲赴雷德蒙，与比尔会面，邀请他出任 IBM 下一任 CEO。
Ben: No way.
Ben：不可能。
David: Yes. This is what I read. I don't know if this actually happened, but this is what I read.
David：是的。我是这么读到的。我不确定这是否真的发生过，但这是我看到的内容。
Ben: Is that in Hard Drive?
Ben：那是在《Hard Drive》里写的吗？
David: That's in Hard Drive, yeah.
David：没错，写在《Hard Drive》里。
Ben: Wow. Listeners, there are some unauthorized biographies that we tried to corroborate as many of the facts as we can. But the ones where David's saying he doesn't know a source, it's these unauthorized ones.
Ben：哇。各位听众，有些未经授权的传记里的内容我们尽量去核实。但当 David 说他找不到出处时，指的就是这些未经授权的书。
David: Yes. Gates obviously declines that. Whether or not that actually happened, spiritually, you could believe that happened. Bill and Microsoft are the new emperor here. This carries through to this day. We're going to tell in the next episode here, the antitrust, the fall, and all that, but not really. Microsoft's still the most valuable company in the world. They inherited the throne from IBM. It happens right here.
David：没错。盖茨显然拒绝了。不管这事是否真的发生，从精神层面来说，你也能相信它发生过。比尔和微软成了新的“帝王”，这种地位延续至今。我们下期会讲反垄断、衰落等等——其实也谈不上真正衰落，因为微软仍是全球市值最高的公司。他们在这里从 IBM 手中接过了王座。
Ben: It's nuts. Suddenly, Microsoft feels the full weight of everything that you have to do to build a platform and be a steward of an ecosystem. Suddenly, this huge effort began to try and make developers successful. That's how Windows would be successful if it was a great platform for application developers to thrive on.
Ben：太疯狂了。微软一下子感受到了构建平台、维护生态所要承担的全部重担，于是开始大力投入，让开发者取得成功——只有成为应用开发者蓬勃发展的优秀平台，Windows 才能成功。
Cameron Myhrvold led the developer relations group basically to try and figure out, what do people want out of a platform, and how do we provide the APIs for them, the support, and everything in order to do that, all the documentation, all the help, everything? At the same time, Microsoft basically knew establishing a platform is brutal and requires bootstrapping a multi sided network of developers, users, and PC manufacturers.
Cameron Myhrvold 领导开发者关系团队，试图弄清人们需要平台提供什么，以及怎样用 API、技术支持、文档和各种帮助来满足这些需求。微软也深知，打造平台十分艰难，必须同时启动开发者、用户和 PC 制造商组成的多边网络。
So 3.1 had users excited, but it was still very early. They could have lost that throne. Developers were not really yet targeting Windows. Microsoft had to show, we make great applications for Windows, too. The applications group really had to start doing Windows 3.1.
3.1 虽然让用户兴奋，但仍处于非常早期的阶段，王座随时可能失守。开发者并未真正转向 Windows。微软必须证明：我们也能为 Windows 打造出色应用。应用部门确实得开始支持 Windows 3.1。
David: Right, because developers were targeting DOS at this point. They were probably preparing for OS/2. Some of them were targeting the Mac, Microsoft itself, but nobody was targeting Windows.
David：没错，因为当时开发者主要面向 DOS，也可能在为 OS/2 做准备；部分开发者包括微软自己在瞄准 Mac，但几乎没人面向 Windows。
Ben: Exactly. You've got this big developer relations group effort that spins up. Meanwhile, there's a huge push with OEMs to get them to install Windows. At this point, they were still installing DOS or some people were actually installing nothing and requiring users to put operating systems on. There's a conceded push to get the OEMs to install 3.1.
Ben：完全正确。庞大的开发者关系团队开始运作。与此同时，微软大力推动 OEM 预装 Windows；当时 OEM 仍在预装 DOS，甚至有厂商干脆不装系统，让用户自己安装。微软积极游说 OEM 预装 Windows 3.1。
David: Yeah, and there are some people installing nothing. We should mention here, around this same time, this era, they move a lot of their OEM deals to a per processor licensing fee arrangement, which gets them in a lot of hot water with antitrust a few years later.
David：没错，还有厂商什么都不装。同一时期，微软把大量 OEM 协议改成按处理器数量收费的授权模式，这在几年后令他们陷入严重的反垄断麻烦。
Ben: Okay, this happened from 1988 to 1994. David, explain the per processor licensing agreement.
Ben：好的，这件事发生在 1988 到 1994 年之间。David，请解释一下按处理器计费的授权协议。
David: Here's how Microsoft (I think) would position it to their OEM partners. You could pay us a license fee for every machine you ship with DOS installed on it, or DOS and Windows. You can offer other OSes too. But rather than that arrangement, we'll give you a cheaper per unit deal because you're going to ship DOS on everything. DOS is the standard, and we want Windows to be the standard, and Windows is going to be the standard.
David：我想微软会这样向他们的 OEM 合作伙伴推介这项方案：你们可以为每台预装 DOS（或 DOS 加 Windows）的电脑向我们支付授权费，也可以预装其他操作系统。但与其按那种方式收费，我们愿意给你们更低的单机价格，因为你们所有机器都会装 DOS。DOS 已经是标准，我们也希望 Windows 成为标准，而且 Windows 终将成为标准。
We'll make it more economically attractive to you, give you a lower per unit rate. If we just change the terms and say, instead of every unit you ship with, DOS or with Windows, every machine you ship, period, every microprocessor based machine that you ship, no matter what operating system is installed on us, just pay us a per processor rate. If you do that, you'll be paying us for every machine, whether you ship DOS or Windows on it or not, but you're going to ship DOS and Windows anyway.
我们会让这对你们的经济账更合算，提供更低的单机费率。只要我们把条款改成：无论机器预装的是 DOS 还是 Windows，甚至不管装什么系统——只要是你们出货的每台微处理器计算机，都按处理器数量向我们付费。如果这样做，你们将为所有机器付费——不论是否装 DOS 或 Windows——反正你们最终都会装 DOS 和 Windows。
Ben: You may as well take the cheaper rate.
Ben：那你干脆选更便宜的费率好了。
David: You may as well take the cheaper option. Obviously, what effect does this have on competition? There's now a very, very, very strong incentive never to ship any other operating system.
David：你当然会选择较低的价格。显然，这对竞争意味着什么？它极大、极大地激励厂商永远不要预装任何其他操作系统。
Ben: Yeah. Basically, you're going to pay for two different operating systems, even though you're only putting one on if you ever load a different operating system on. Yes, it very strongly incentivizes you to never ever ever ship any other operating systems on your computers as a company.
Ben：没错。本质上，如果你偶尔装别的系统，就等于要为两套操作系统付钱，尽管你只真正安装了其中一套。这确实强烈地促使公司永远不要在电脑上预装任何其他操作系统。
This is of course the way that regulators would look at it in 1994. That would get Microsoft in some hot water, and they had to agree to stop doing this practice. The way Microsoft would look at it is, we're just helping our customers. Do you really think that these companies want to keep a whole separate ledger of what machines they shipped DOS on or Windows on versus what machines they shipped period? Wouldn't it just be easier if once a month or once a quarter, they could just report to us their total shipments like they have to report to their investors anyway, and then we'll just send them an invoice for all their machines?
1994 年的监管机构正是这样看待这件事的。这让微软陷入反垄断麻烦，不得不答应停止这种做法。微软的看法则是：我们只是在帮客户。难道你真的认为这些公司愿意分别记录哪些机器装了 DOS、哪些装了 Windows、哪些只是出货？如果他们每月或每季向投资者报告总出货量时，顺便把这个数字报给我们，然后我们给他们开张总账单，不是更省事吗？
David: Totally. While antitrust and the government would seize onto this as a smoking gun, I think the reality is this was irrelevant in terms of the forces that made DOS and Windows the winners. They were already the winners by the time they started doing this.
David：完全正确。虽然反垄断部门把这当成“铁证”，但事实上，这与 DOS 和 Windows 成为赢家的根本动因无关。在他们实行这套做法时，DOS 和 Windows 已经赢了。
Ben: If this had happened earlier, you could see how this would be more of a compelling way to get market share. But by the time they started doing it, they were already running away with the market.
Ben：如果更早推行，你也许能把它看成抢占市场份额的有力手段。但等他们开始实行时，他们已在市场上遥遥领先。
David: Yes. Speaking of this new customer-friendly, buyer-friendly business practice from Microsoft, which I think is how they thought about it...
David：没错。说到微软这套自认为“对客户友好、对买家友好”的新商业做法……
Ben: Totally. They wanted to make the stuff that people wanted to use the most, and that's how they would win. Their goal was make the very best products, the best software we possibly can in the ways that people want to use and buy software, and then we'll make a bunch of money.
Ben：没错。他们想做的是用户最想用的东西，这就是他们的制胜之道。他们的目标是：以用户想要的使用和购买方式，打造最顶尖的产品、最优秀的软件，然后赚大钱。
David: Yup. As this changing of the guard is happening from IBM to Microsoft, I think part of this new self confidence from Microsoft is, wait a minute, why can't we go win the enterprise too and take that from IBM? We don't have to get in bed with them to sell to the enterprise. We should sell to the enterprise.
David：是的。随着权力交接从 IBM 转到微软，微软的新自信部分体现在：等等，为什么我们不能也在企业市场获胜，把这块从 IBM 手中夺过来？我们没必要与 IBM 继续捆绑销售给企业客户，我们完全可以自己卖给企业。
Ben: The thing they were realizing is, well, we have made software that people like to use, so they're using it in businesses. They always wanted that to be the goal, but now it was happening. People are doing their work in Excel. People are bringing PCs to the office.
Ben：他们意识到的一点是：我们做出了人们喜欢用的软件，所以他们在企业里使用这些软件。他们一直想达到这种目标，而现在最终实现了。人们在 Excel 里完成工作，人们把个人电脑带到办公室。
Maybe businesses are buying their PCs, but people are actually buying them themselves and using them in the office. It just made them that much more efficient. Microsoft really had to figure out how to sell to businesses, but we actually have no idea how to do that. It sounds crazy today. The Microsoft you know today, as late as the mid-90s, really had no idea how to sell or build software for businesses.
也许企业确实会为员工采购电脑，但事实上很多人自己购买电脑然后在办公室使用，使工作效率大大提高。微软必须弄清楚如何向企业销售软件，但我们当时真的不知道怎么做。今天听起来很不可思议——你所熟悉的微软，直到 90 年代中期其实还不会向企业销售或为企业开发软件。
David: Totally. This is the first half of the original Microsoft vision statement coming true, a PC on every desk and in every home. Desk means work, means enterprise. In this era, everybody we talk to, gives 100% of the credit to Steve Ballmer.
David：完全正确。这实现了微软最初愿景的一半——“让每张办公桌和每个家庭都拥有一台 PC”。“办公桌”意味着工作、意味着企业。在那个时代，我们访谈的所有人都把全部功劳归于 Steve Ballmer。
Steve took it on his shoulders at this point in time when Microsoft is passing IBM to say, I am going to build, and we are going to learn as a company how to sell to enterprises. Ben, like you're saying, it's impossible to imagine now Microsoft not like this, but there's so much that they needed to do that they didn't have.
当微软市值超越 IBM 的时候，Steve 担起重任，说：“我要来建立体系，让整个公司学会如何向企业销售。” Ben，就像你说的，如今很难想象微软会不是这样子，但当时他们缺少的东西还有很多。
Ben: In part because prior to this, personal computers were not used by enterprises. It was just not an enterprise tool. Now that it was happening, Microsoft had to figure out how to be the ones that would benefit from it.
Ben：部分原因在于，此前个人电脑并未被企业使用，它根本不是企业级工具。如今情况改变，微软必须弄清楚如何从中受益。
David: That meant selling to the C-suite at global Fortune 500 companies, most of whom did not use computers.
David：这意味着要向全球 500 强企业的 C 级高管销售，而他们中的大多数当时并不使用电脑。
Ben: Correct. Certainly, it didn't want to buy operating systems one at a time.
Ben：没错，他们当然不想一台一台地买操作系统。
David: Right. To the extent, members of the C-suite like CIOs or proto IT organizations used computers or were the computing centers in the company, they hated the PC. It made their life hard. This was when employees would bring a PC to work, plop it down on their desk, and start mucking around with stuff. It made things hard.
David：是的。即便是 CIO 这类 C 级高管，或尚处萌芽阶段的 IT 组织使用电脑、担当公司计算中心的角色，他们也讨厌 PC。PC 让他们的工作更棘手——员工会自带电脑放到办公桌上，随意折腾，令管理复杂化。
Ben: And there really isn't yet a business server that couples nicely with the PC on the desk. You have this weird thing where there's a mainframe that is where the company's real enterprise applications run, but people are bringing PCs. Those PCs don't actually communicate well with anything else yet. They just are there for the employee to do their own work on a spreadsheet or something, print it out because finally 3.1 had printer drivers, and then deliver that. But it wasn't a system that operated with other systems in your enterprise.
Ben：而且当时还没有与桌面 PC 配合良好的商务服务器。情况很尴尬：企业真正的应用跑在大型机上，可员工却带来了 PC。这些 PC 与其他系统几乎无法互通，只能让员工自己在电子表格上做做工作，然后因为 3.1 终于有了打印机驱动，就打印出来交付。但它并不是与企业其他系统协同运作的平台。
David: There's no email. This really was a business transformation task for the global Fortune 500.
David：当时还没有电子邮件。这对全球 500 强来说是真正的业务转型难题。
Ben: It wasn't like, hey, let's sell something to businesses that they want to buy. It's, hey, let's convince businesses that PCs are a good idea for their workforce to adopt.
Ben：这并不是“卖给企业他们想买的东西”，而是“说服企业：让员工使用 PC 是个好主意”。
David: This was partnering with the consulting firms. This was building a direct sales force within Microsoft. This is building an indirect sales force within Microsoft to partner with distribution partners, with channel partners, with independent software vendors. This is building a customer service organization. This is building the executive briefing center on the Microsoft campus, and bringing CEOs and other C-suite folks there to Microsoft. It's building solutions for them, it's becoming a partner. It's everything that Steve is frankly just born to do.
David：这意味着要与咨询公司合作；在微软内部建立直销团队；同时也要建立间接销售团队，与分销商、渠道伙伴、独立软件供应商合作；要建设客户服务体系；要在微软园区建立高管简报中心，把各家 CEO 和其他 C 级高管请来；为他们打造解决方案，成为他们的合作伙伴。坦白说，这一切都是 Steve 天生擅长的工作。
Ben: All of this stuff is pretty out of scope for this episode, including all the software systems you would need to build for the enterprise like Windows NT server, Exchange, SQL server, and Active Directory, the classic mid-2000s Microsoft stuff that they got known for. That is what this would all evolve into, and it really just started with everyone looking at Steve and saying, can you figure this out?
Ben：所有这些内容实际上都超出了本集的范围，其中包括面向企业所需构建的所有软件系统，例如 Windows NT Server、Exchange、SQL Server 和 Active Directory——这些都是 2000 年代中期微软最知名的经典产品线。最终，故事会演变到这一切，而最初不过是大家都看着 Steve 说：你能把这事搞定吗？
We've all to date basically just been either running dev teams, running marketing, or running product groups, and been selling through retail or distributors in the application side or mostly through OEMs on the systems and operating system side. But can you go figure out how to sell everything we make in a completely different way to a completely different buyer profile and keep us posted on how that needs to change all the products we make in order to do that? That's a pretty crazy change.
到目前为止，我们基本都只是领导开发团队、市场团队或产品组；在应用端通过零售或经销商销售，在系统和操作系统端则主要通过 OEM 渠道。但你是否能够找出一种完全不同的销售方式，把我们所有产品卖给完全不同类型的买家，并及时反馈为了实现这一目标我们所有产品需要如何改变？这可是一个相当疯狂的转变。
David: Yup. How it actually goes down, and we heard this from Steve and you heard it from other people, is so fitting. By the end of 1990, the Microsoft-IBM divorce is official. IBM takes full control of OS/2 development back from Microsoft. Microsoft ceases involvement. The breakup is official. This now gives Microsoft and Steve hunting license in the enterprise to go compete against IBM, but they have a secret weapon that is going to enable them to come take the enterprise from IBM. Ben, tell us what it is.
David：没错。事情的实际进展——我们从 Steve 以及其他人那里了解到——非常符合情理。到 1990 年末，微软与 IBM 的“分手”正式宣布：IBM 完全收回 OS/2 的开发控制权，微软不再参与，分手尘埃落定。如此一来，微软与 Steve 便拥有了向企业市场进军、挑战 IBM 的“狩猎许可”，而他们拥有一件秘密武器，足以帮助他们从 IBM 手中夺取企业客户。Ben，请告诉大家那是什么。
Ben: It's painfully obvious. It's Microsoft Office, and it's the fact that the whole workforce is already using Microsoft Office. Everyone loves to talk about product-led growth and how it's this new thing in the late 2010s, how Slack, Atlassian, Trello, and everyone figured out PLG. This bottoms-up workforce-adopted way, rather than selling to procurement, IT, or the central administrator. And it's just not new.
Ben：答案显而易见——就是 Microsoft Office，以及整个职场人群已经在使用 Office 这一事实。人人都喜欢谈论“产品主导增长”（PLG），说这在 2010 年代后期是个新概念，Slack、Atlassian、Trello 等公司都摸索出了 PLG——即自下而上、让员工先用，而不是直接卖给采购、IT 或中央管理员。可这根本不是新鲜事。
David: No. This has always been the case, and Microsoft invented it.
David：没错，这一直如此，而这一模式正是微软首创。
Ben: All the employees wanted to use Excel and Word. They were doing it anyway. At some point Microsoft needed to figure out how to take advantage of selling it centrally and how you do business with other businesses, rather than selling a zillion retail copies of people who are using it illegally for their work.
Ben：所有员工都想用 Excel 和 Word，他们无论如何都会用。微软迟早得想办法利用这一点，把软件集中售卖给企业，而不是卖出无数零售版拷贝，结果人们在工作中“盗用”它们。
David: There's so many things that are beautiful about this. It's the legacy of this bet on the Mac, bet on Excel, and bet on Windows shortly thereafter, that enables Microsoft to go into the enterprise because even though they've just broken up with IBM and OS/2 isn't going anywhere, it's not like Steve can just go knock on the door of some banking CEO or C suite and be like, I'm Microsoft, come talk to me about how you're going to use Microsoft products in your organization. But rather it's like, hey, thousands of people in your organization are already using Excel. Let's have a conversation about how we can make that work better for your organization, and what else Microsoft can do for you.
David：其中蕴含着许多美妙之处。这一切都源于微软当初押注 Mac、押注 Excel、随后又押注 Windows 的遗产——正是因此，微软得以进军企业市场。尽管他们刚与 IBM 分手，OS/2 也无以为继，Steve 并不能直接敲开某家银行 CEO 或其他高管的办公室门，说“我是微软，来聊聊你们怎么用微软产品”。而是要说：“嘿，你们公司已有数千人在用 Excel。让我们谈谈如何让它更好地服务于你们组织，以及微软还能为你们做些什么。”
Ben: Absolutely. Next episode is going to be all about the enormous success of becoming an enterprise company, the enterprise agreement, cloud, and everything that came after that. But we have two chapters left in this episode, and they happen concurrently within the systems group by two very, very different teams, and that is Windows 95 and Windows NT.
Ben：绝对如此。在下一期节目里，我们将专门讨论微软如何成功转型为一家企业级公司——包括企业协议、云，以及随之而来的所有成果。但本期还剩下两个章节，它们在系统团队内部由截然不同的两支团队同时展开：Windows 95 和 Windows NT。
David, let's start with NT, and then our little cherry on top can be 95 to close us out. How did Windows NT happen?
David，我们先从 NT 讲起，最后再以 95 作为点睛之笔收尾。Windows NT 是如何诞生的？
David: Perfect, and it's intertwined with the beginning of all this enterprisification of Microsoft. Okay, Windows NT. Remember, IBM's whole goal with OS/2 was that they saw the trajectory of the PC was going to eat into traditional mainframe type applications in the enterprise. They wanted to recentralize and own the PC enterprisification of workloads. NT is, after the divorce, Microsoft being like, screw that we're going to do the same thing and eat your lunch.
David：好极了，而且这与微软企业化征程的起点紧密相连。说到 Windows NT，别忘了，IBM 推出 OS/2 的核心目标是预见到 PC 的发展轨迹必将侵蚀传统大型机在企业中的应用，他们想重新集中控制、将 PC 企业化的工作负载收归己有。而 NT 则是在“分手”后，微软的回应：去你的，我们也要做同样的事，把你的饭碗砸了。
The initial work starts out of the work they had been doing on OS/2 with IBM. But then in October 1988, as they're heading towards divorce, Microsoft hires Dave Cutler away from DEC. Dave is an absolute beast and legend. He's still writing code at Microsoft today, which is amazing.
最初的研发基于他们与 IBM 合作开发 OS/2 时的成果。但 1988 年 10 月，也就是双方走向分手之际，微软从 DEC 挖来了 Dave Cutler。Dave 是个真正的传奇猛人——令人惊叹的是，他至今仍在微软编写代码。
Ben: Isn't that crazy? He's in his 80s.
Ben：太不可思议了吧？他已经八十多岁了。
David: Amazing. Dave at DEC wrote the whole operating system that DEC ran on VAX. Poaching him away to come work at Microsoft, he's the guy that's going to build an enterprise-ready, take share away from the way traditional enterprise computing is done onto the PC. He's got the chops to do this, he's also got the credibility to do this.
David：真是了不起。在 DEC 时期，Dave 编写了 VAX 运行所用的整套操作系统。把他挖到微软来，就是要让他打造一款面向企业的系统，把传统企业计算从大型机迁移到 PC，他既有能力，也有资历。
Ben: He's written a widely-deployed enterprise operating system.
Ben：他曾经编写过被广泛部署的企业级操作系统。
David: Yes. Him coming to Microsoft, him leading and building this effort, gives Steve and the sales force so much legitimacy when they're going in and talking to the C-suites, the CIOs, the IT departments, and enterprises.
David：没错。他加入微软并领导这一项目，使得 Steve 和销售团队在面对各大企业的高管、CIO、IT 部门时更具公信力。
Ben: Even though they don't yet have an enterprise product to sell, they've got DOS and early Windows, which is essentially consumer-targeted, but now they've got this guy, Dave.
Ben：尽管他们还没有真正的企业级产品可卖，手里只有面向消费者的 DOS 和早期 Windows，但现在他们有了 Dave。
David: Yes, now they've got Dave.
David：对，现在他们有了 Dave。
Ben: We should say, this is really the first time they brought in someone who had real industry experience. In 1988, Microsoft was 13 years old, so Bill Gates would have been 33. Everyone is in their late 20s and early 30s, and Dave's mid-40s. He's like, you know I've seen a few things.
Ben：得说明一下，这真的是他们第一次引进具备深厚业内经验的人才。1988 年时，微软成立 13 年，比尔·盖茨 33 岁，员工多是二十来岁或三十出头，而 Dave 已是四十多岁，他可见过不少世面。
David: I think it was Dave and also Mike Maples coming from IBM too. Mike obviously wasn't a technical leader but on the business and strategy side, too. NT, we'll talk a lot more about it on the next episode. But spoiler alert, it is the vision of what IBM wanted OS/2 to be, but it's Microsoft's version of it.
David：我觉得还有 Dave，以及从 IBM 过来的 Mike Maples。Mike 虽然不是技术领袖，但在业务和战略层面也发挥了作用。关于 NT，我们下一期会详细讨论。提前透露一下——NT 其实实现了 IBM 当初希望 OS/2 达到的愿景，不过这是微软的版本。
Ben: It enables all of your desktop computers at the company to join and network together in a compliant way. It enables an internal server that everything communicates with. It enables a directory of all the devices on the network and all the people in your organization.
Ben：NT 让公司里的所有桌面电脑能够以合规方式加入并联网；它支持内部服务器，让一切设备互联；还提供网络中所有设备和组织内所有人员的目录服务。
David: Soon with the Internet coming, it'll enable servers that face externally from your company. The punchline here is that NT becomes the seeds of Windows Server, the business line, which become the seeds of Azure today.
David：随着互联网的到来，它很快还能支持面向外部的服务器。关键在于，NT 成为了 Windows Server 产品线的种子，也正是今日 Azure 的源头。
Ben: The other important takeaway on NT is it was going to take a long time to build. It was going to take a long time to test. It was going to take a long time to sell and deploy, and it was going to have really strict requirements for what it could work on because it's a power hungry operating system built for enterprise IT administrators. That is not your short-term product strategy. That is a long-term bet that a team is going to work on concurrently while you're figuring out what to do after Windows 3.1.
Ben：另一个要点是，NT 的开发、测试、销售和部署都需要很长时间，而且它对运行环境要求严格，因为它是一款为企业 IT 管理员打造、资源需求巨大的操作系统。这不是短期产品策略，而是一项长期赌注——在思考 Windows 3.1 之后的方向时，必须有一支团队并行推进它。
In 1991, Bill Gates sums this up in a memo where he says, “Our strategy is Windows. One evolving architecture, a couple of implementations, and an immense number of great applications from Microsoft and others.” Every word in that sentence does a bunch of heavy lifting.
1991 年，比尔·盖茨在一份备忘录中总结道：“我们的战略就是 Windows：一个不断演进的架构、几种实现方式，以及微软和其他公司无数优秀的应用。” 这句话里的每个词都大有含义。
You got one architecture. Okay. I think what that basically ends up meaning a few years later is one application programming interface (API) that developers can target so that when they want to write a Windows app, it works on both NT and whatever the evolution of 3.1 is. That's one architecture, but it says one evolving architecture. That buys Microsoft a little bit more fluidity in the one architecture that's being targeted.
所谓“一个架构”，几年后基本体现在：只有一套开发者可针对的应用编程接口（API），写出的 Windows 应用既能在 NT 上运行，也能在 3.1 的后续版本上运行。这就是“一个架构”，但措辞中强调“不断演进的架构”，为微软在单一架构目标下保留了些许灵活性。
Then you hear a couple of implementations. This basically says, even though developers are targeting what became the Win32 API, the one way that we write applications, there are two different implementations. For many years, they would display very differently on NT systems versus—spoiler alert—Windows 95, the successor to Windows 3.1.
接着提到“几种实现方式”，意思是：尽管开发者面向同一套后来称为 Win32 API 的接口写应用，底层却存在两种不同的实现方式。多年来，同一程序在 NT 系统和——剧透一下——Windows 95（即 Windows 3.1 的继任者）上的呈现将截然不同。
David: By Windows 95, you mean Windows 4 that was supposed to ship in 1993?
David：你说的 Windows 95，是指原定于 1993 年发布的 Windows 4 吗？
Ben: Yes, I do, but it's so much sexier to say Windows 95 and name it after the year that it actually ships. Yes, an immense number of great applications from Microsoft and others sheds light on the DRG (Developer Relations Group) strategy. We got to go out and be massive evangelists, and everyone in the systems group is looking over at the apps group going, did you see that? Bill Gates just said our strategy is Windows. We're now the Windows company, and that includes great applications from Microsoft and others.
Ben：是的，但把它叫作 Windows 95、用实际出货年份命名听起来要迷人得多。没错，来自微软及其他公司的海量优秀应用阐明了 DRG（开发者关系组）的策略：我们必须大力做布道。而系统组的所有人都在看应用组，好像在说：看到了吗？比尔·盖茨刚刚宣布我们的战略就是 Windows。我们现在是一家“Windows 公司”，这其中当然包括微软和其他公司提供的大量优秀应用。
What does that mean, applications group? Let's go first and best on Windows, get to it. I just think that sentence says it all for what we're looking at 1991 through call it 2000 or so.
那么应用组意味着什么？那就是要在 Windows 平台上做第一个、做到最好，行动起来。我觉得这句话完全概括了我们对 1991 年直到大约 2000 年这段时期的展望。
David: Yup. We just spent a bunch of time talking about the enterprisification and all the amazing enterprise stuff that the seeds get sewn from Microsoft at this point in time. This era is also the heyday of the consumer PC. In 1993, Jensen starts NVIDIA, graphics cards are becoming a thing. PC gaming is becoming an industry. You can even look at Minesweeper as being a seminal moment in terms of the consumerization, these devices, these personal computers becoming companions to people's lives like the phone is today. You've got CD-ROM technology, multimedia, Encarta. The heyday of the consumer PC is here in this era.
David：没错。我们刚刚花了很多时间讨论微软播下的企业化种子以及那些了不起的企业级成果。但这一时期也是消费级 PC 的全盛时代。1993 年，黄仁勋创办 NVIDIA，显卡开始崭露头角；PC 游戏正在成为一门产业。甚至可以把《扫雷》视为消费化的一个标志性时刻——这些个人电脑正如今日的手机一般，成为人们生活的伙伴。还有 CD-ROM、多媒体、Encarta 百科……消费级 PC 的黄金年代正是在这一时期到来。
Ben: Totally. Even before Windows 95 shipped, they had 75 million Windows users. This is even before you get plug-and-play, multimedia, or networking. This is on Windows 3.1. Crazy.
Ben：完全正确。甚至在 Windows 95 发布之前，Windows 的用户就已达 7,500 万人。那时候还没有即插即用、多媒体或网络功能——都是在 Windows 3.1 上实现的。太疯狂了。
We've been leading up to what we've been building hype, Windows 95, or should I say Chicago? The Chicago name, for those of you out there who were paying attention when this was under development, and you were all excited about what Windows 95 would become—and it's probably 1% of our audience or something who knows the Chicago code name—they wanted to create an OS for the everyman, one that was easy to get to, a nice quality of life when you're there, it was affordable. Chicago is the perfect name in every way. It is also a contrast to what was going on in a different part of Microsoft, where there was the codename of Cairo for a very ambitious next generation operating system.
我们一直在铺垫、在造势的 Windows 95——或者说“Chicago”？对于那些在开发阶段就留意此事、对 Windows 95 充满期待的听众来说（可能也就占 1% 吧），Chicago 这个代号再合适不过：他们想打造一款面向大众的操作系统，易于获取、使用体验良好且价格亲民。Chicago 无论从哪个角度看都是完美的名字；它也与微软另一部门正在进行的代号 “Cairo”——一个雄心勃勃的下一代操作系统——形成鲜明对比。
Mind you, NT had already come out in 1993. Cairo is this general bucket of maybe it's post-NT, maybe it's part of NT, but this is a really sophisticated, crazy set of technologies that we're going to eventually bake into an operating system. It doesn't really have a release date. No one really believes in any of the release dates that are proposed.
别忘了，NT 已于 1993 年推出。Cairo 是个统称，也许是 NT 的后继，也许是 NT 的一部分，总之是将来要整合进操作系统的一揽子复杂而疯狂的技术集合。它并没有真正的发布日期，也没人相信任何提出来的发布日期。
The Windows 95 team, the Windows 4 team, the Chicago team, loved contrasting this idea of a far flung land that's really ambitious. Who knows what it'll actually be like? Chicago is something we know quite well. You get on I-90 from Seattle, you drive for three days, and you're there. That is the goal. That's the spiritual thing about Windows 95.
Windows 95（Windows 4、Chicago）团队喜欢把自己与那个遥不可及、雄心勃勃的“远方”做对比——谁知道 Cairo 最终会是什么样？而 Chicago 是我们非常熟悉的地方：从西雅图上 I-90 高速，开车三天就到了。这就是目标，也是 Windows 95 的精神所在。
David: Pizza, the Bears, the Cubs.
David：披萨、橄榄球队 Bears、棒球队 Cubs。
Ben: 100%. We should say, Cairo never shipped, so there's a lesson in that.
Ben：太对了。还有一点必须提——Cairo 从未发布，这里面自有教训。
David: Might as well been called Oz.
David：倒不如把它叫“奥兹国”算了。
Ben: Or Longhorn.
Ben：或者“Longhorn”（长角牛）。
David: Right. Okay, all right, we're getting ahead of ourselves.
David：好吧，好吧，我们有点跑题了。
Ben: We are getting ahead of ourselves. Windows 95, let's start with the launch event itself. It was a huge, ridiculous, insane day in Redmond, Washington. They set up tents all over Microsoft's campus. They flew in journalists, beta testers. There was a movement around Windows 95 in a way that you would not believe. It was an operating system launch, and Jay Leno launched it. It wasn't like Jay Leno did some stand up, it was Jay Leno for 90 minutes in a tightly scripted environment, co-hosted with Bill Gates all of the fanfare and festivities.
Ben：我们有点跑题了。Windows 95——先从发布会说起吧。那是发生在华盛顿州雷德蒙德的一天，场面宏大、疯狂、难以置信。他们在微软园区搭起了满地帐篷，邀来媒体记者、测试者齐聚一堂。围绕 Windows 95 的热潮简直超乎想象。这是一场操作系统发布会，由杰·雷诺主持登场——而且不是简简单单做段脱口秀，而是在精心编排的流程中，与比尔·盖茨搭档足足主持了 90 分钟的盛大庆典。
David: There is no other word to describe the Windows 95 launch besides glorious. I am so glad that this stuff is preserved on the Internet and on YouTube, and that we could experience it ourselves over the past month.
David：用“辉煌”这个词来形容 Windows 95 的发布再合适不过。我非常庆幸这些影像资料被保存在互联网上、存放在 YouTube 上，让我们在过去的一个月里得以一睹当年的盛况。
Ben: It might be the peak moment of pure joy to celebrate technology before a lot of the skepticism came in and the tech haters.
Ben：那可能是科技界在质疑与唱衰声大规模出现之前，对技术所爆发出的最纯粹的欢乐巅峰时刻。
David: The DOJ.
David：以及后来的美国司法部。
Ben: Totally. It was unabashed celebration of software is probably the best way to put it. Microsoft license Start Me Up famously from the Rolling Stones.
Ben：没错。那是一场毫不掩饰的软件狂欢，也许这是最贴切的说法。微软斥资从滚石乐队买下了《Start Me Up》的使用权，作为主题曲。
David: It's amazing, a software company licensed Start Me Up by the Rolling Stones as the official theme song of an operating system. The idea that this would be happening, certainly back in 1975 when they were moving to Albuquerque, but even just a couple of years earlier, this is breaking new ground.
David：太令人惊叹了——一家软件公司把滚石乐队的《Start Me Up》作为操作系统的官方主题曲。在 1975 年他们搬去阿尔伯克基的时候，乃至仅仅几年前，人们都难以想象会发生这样的事情，这真的开创了先河。
Ben: Totally. The other thing that's happening in 1995 is the Internet hype is starting to build, but we will table that for next episode. Right at this point in history, only 14% of Americans had internet access. It was still very early, so there was no guarantee that any story posted online would actually reach the masses. Microsoft had really relied on traditional broadcast coverage of this event, and brought in all these journalists, all these print magazines, and all these newspapers to build the hype.
Ben：确实如此。1995 年的另一件大事是互联网炒作开始升温，但我们下一期再聊。当时全美只有 14% 的人能上网，仍属早期阶段，网上发布的消息并不一定能触达大众。因此微软主要依赖传统电视广播来报道此次发布会，还邀请大量记者、平面杂志和报纸到场，营造声势。
I watched the whole keynote yesterday. At the end, they ripped down the back of the tent behind the stage. There's the entire development team in the red, yellow, green, and blue squares of the Windows logo sitting outside on the big sports field on Redmond's campus. There's only 360 people that built Windows 95, so it's still a small team, but they're all there. They're fired up. They're part of the moment. That's the launch event in Redmond, at least.
我昨天把整场主旨演讲看完了。最后，他们掀开舞台后方帐篷的帘子，只见整个开发团队身着红黄绿蓝四色的 Windows 徽标方块衫，坐在雷德蒙德园区的大操场上。参与 Windows 95 开发的人员只有 360 人，团队并不大，但全员到齐、热情高涨，共同见证这一历史时刻——这就是雷德蒙德现场的发布会。
Around the world, people are lined up around the block to buy an operating system. There's a lot of news coverage of that. It was basically the iPhone launch of its day. They lit up the CN Tower, the Tower of London. This date, August 24th, 1995, they basically treated an operating system launch the way that you would launch a movie or a new Madonna album. It was a marketing case study, so much so that the folks from Coca-Cola actually reached out to Microsoft to ask them, how do you do marketing this well in the new age?
全球各地，人们排起长队只为购买一款操作系统，这一景象被媒体广泛报道——那简直就是当年版的 iPhone 发布。当天晚上，加拿大国家电视塔、伦敦塔等地标都被点亮。1995 年 8 月 24 日，他们把操作系统的发布当成电影或麦当娜新专辑那样大张旗鼓地推广，堪称营销教科书。甚至连可口可乐的人都向微软取经：在新时代里，怎么做营销才能做到这种程度？
David: To the Bill Gates quote with the Warren Buffett talk at U-Dub.
David：正应了比尔·盖茨在华盛顿大学与沃伦·巴菲特对谈时说过的那句话。
Ben: Yes. This is a company that freaking invented Santa Claus to sell us all sugar water, and they're calling Microsoft asking, how do you market in this new era? It was that successful. They launched concurrently worldwide in eight languages. This thread that Microsoft had of early international continued all the way through to this moment. They invested heavily in doing all of the localization and help stuff so that the whole world really could adopt something all at one time. It really was the perfect product at the right time, the Internet, games, all of that.
Ben：没错——一家曾经为了推销“糖水”而“发明”圣诞老人的公司，如今致电微软取经：在这个新时代该怎么做营销？由此可见 Windows 95 的成功。它同步以 8 种语言在全球发布，延续了微软自早期就坚持的国际化路线。他们在本地化和帮助文档上投入巨大，让全球用户得以同时采用同一款产品。互联网、游戏等大趋势也在此时汇聚，Windows 95 可谓在恰当的时机推出的完美产品。
David: There's so much about Windows 95 too that I'm sure you're going to get into, but the start menu. It was so perfect because this was the peak of the PC going fully mainstream. Nobody had ever treated software like this before.
David：关于 Windows 95 的精彩之处还有很多，你肯定还会谈到，但要先说开始菜单。当时个人电脑全面进入主流，这个设计恰到好处。此前从未有人这样对待软件。
Ben: That's the takeaway. They thought about software in a completely different way. Yes, the start menu, while it got cluttered, complicated, and messed up over time, the idea of a button that you click to start using your computer was very appealing to people.
Ben：这正是要点所在。他们以一种全然不同的方式看待软件。没错，开始菜单后来虽然变得杂乱复杂，但“点击一个按钮就能开始使用电脑”这一理念极具吸引力。
David: Totally. The Mac obviously shared a lot of these elements, but it was at so much a smaller scale.
David：的确。Mac 当然也有不少类似元素，但影响力要小得多。
Ben: The Mac just never had any real PC penetration. From the IBM PC forward, it never had big market share.
Ben：Mac 在 PC 市场上从未真正普及。从 IBM PC 时代开始，它的市场份额就一直不大。
David: This was your grandmother coming into the digital world.
David：这标志着连你奶奶都踏入了数字世界。
Ben: That is how they tried to market it. They market it as people on job sites using Windows. They marketed it as people doing crafts. There's someone who's modeling something for an F1 car. It's just fun watching all these old videos and seeing all the different personas.
Ben：他们的营销正是如此：工地上的工人用 Windows，做手工的人用 Windows，甚至有人用它为 F1 赛车建模。重温那些旧宣传片，看到各种角色，非常有趣。
David: Computer companies love F1 cars for demos. It's the ultimate aspirational demo.
David：电脑公司都爱用 F1 赛车做演示，这是终极“梦想”展示。
Ben: I must say this all pains me deeply as someone who never owned a PC, grew up using a Mac, loved every bit of my Mac. I was even an apologist in the OS-9 era of this isn't very good, but I'm still going to say it's good. I was on the OS-10 public beta. I only clicked a start menu when I was fixing a teacher's computer at school. Even though the takeaway here is everyone thought this was a great operating system and it won the market, I always looked at it like, well, it's not a Mac.
Ben：说实话，这让我这个从未拥有 PC、从小就用 Mac、深爱每一台 Mac 的人倍感痛楚。我甚至在 OS-9 时代为它“辩护”——明知不好，却仍说它好。我还参加了 OS-10 公开测试。我只在学校帮老师修电脑时点过开始菜单。虽然结论是大家都觉得 Windows 95 很棒、并且赢得了市场，但在我眼里，它终归不是 Mac。
David: That's how Mac users always look at Windows.
David：Mac 用户看 Windows 一向如此。
Ben: The way that Apple products became mainstream always felt odd to me as someone who was using them when they weren't, but it's been interesting gaining a new appreciation for Microsoft through studying their history that I absolutely did not have as a user during this era.
Ben：作为在苹果产品尚未流行时就使用它们的人，我一直觉得它们“走红”的方式很奇特。不过，通过研究微软的历史，我对微软有了全新的敬意——这是当年作为用户时绝对没有的。
David: Having this discussion now makes me think, Windows 95, they did what Apple tried to do in bringing Scully in. Scully came from Pepsi. Obviously, that didn't work, but Microsoft, they're the ones who did it. They're the ones who mass-marketified the computing vision.
David：回头看，Windows 95 实现了苹果当初引入 Scully（来自百事可乐）想做却没做到的事——微软才是真正把个人计算的大愿景推向大众市场的公司。
Ben: It was the wrong strategy for Apple, and it was the right strategy for Microsoft. Apple has always, at least in my opinion, created a better computing experience by being completely integrated. It's the Alan Kay quote, "Anyone who cares about making great software needs to build their own hardware." The complete integrated package that Apple offers, I have always found to be the best computing experience. And it doesn't scale.
Ben：对苹果而言，那是错误策略；对微软而言，却是正确之选。至少在我看来，苹果凭借软硬件一体化始终能带来更佳体验。正如 Alan Kay 所言：“真正关心软件的人必须自造硬件。” 苹果提供的完整一体化方案一直是我心目中最佳体验，但它无法大规模扩张。
David: It didn't in that era for sure.
David：在那个时代确实如此。
Ben: In that era, yeah. The way to scale is Make the software that is going to get distributed on the most PCs, and then that is the most interesting to software developers. It is the most interesting to consumers who want the software and IT buyers who want to buy the standard thing. Apple's strategy versus Microsoft strategy in this era, Apple was always going to be a bit player rather than the scale winner.
Ben：在当时，要想扩张，就得开发能装在最多 PC 上的软件，这才对开发者最有吸引力，也最能满足想要软件的消费者和希望采购标准化产品的 IT 买家。那个时代，苹果和微软的战略对比注定是：苹果扮演小众角色，微软赢得规模胜利。
Ben: The trade off is lots of PCs had blue screens of death, Apple never had blue screens of death. Where do blue screens come from? It's driver problems. It's that the printer is not speaking the same language as your particular computer and what the operating system knows about your computer, and are the device drivers right for your particular version of whatever's on your motherboard? Apple never had those issues, but they also had very few units shipped and much more expensive product.
Ben：代价是大量 PC 会出现蓝屏死机，而苹果从未有蓝屏。蓝屏源自驱动问题：打印机与电脑、操作系统之间“语言”不通，或驱动程序不匹配主板版本。苹果没有这些麻烦，但它的出货量也极少，价格更昂贵。
David: Sidebar. That Alan Kay quote about if you really care about software, you do your own hardware, makes so much more sense to me now having done this episode, because he's coming from having made the Alto and the graphical interface there. The only way that he could have made the GUI on the Alto was basically building a mini computer.
David：旁注。在做完这期节目之后，我终于彻底明白艾伦·凯那句“如果你真的在乎软件，就得自己做硬件”的话是什么意思，因为他当年做过 Alto 及其图形界面。要在 Alto 上实现图形界面，他唯一能做的就是亲自打造一台迷你计算机。
Ben: Isn't that crazy?
Ben：是不是很疯狂？
David: It makes so much more sense now.
David：现在可就说得通多了。
Ben: A little bit more on Windows 95 before we finish the story here, it is remarkable to reflect that it took 5–6 years to go from Windows' plan B to Microsoft being extremely right that that was the franchise, that was the bet to bet the entire company on.
Ben：在结束这个故事前再补充点关于 Windows 95 的内容。回过头看，从 Windows 的 Plan B 到微软认定这就是公司的王牌、值得押上全部身家的赌注，仅仅用了 5 到 6 年，简直令人惊叹。
As Brad Silverberg put it this way to me, he said, Windows 95 cemented Windows as the franchise product for Microsoft, which interestingly it was not yet. David, this is crazy. It would remain the franchise product for the next 20 years, perhaps 5 or 10 years too long, but we'll save that story.
正如布拉德·西尔弗伯格对我所说的那样，Windows 95 将 Windows 确立为微软的核心产品——有趣的是，在此之前它还算不上。David，这太夸张了。此后 20 年里（也许还多拖了 5 到 10 年），Windows 一直是公司的王牌，不过这就是另一段故事了。
David: Yeah. Just to put some numbers on this, August 24th, 1995 is the launch event, the glorious day. Windows 95 comes out. It sells a million copies in the first week, seven million copies in the first month.
David：是的。给大家一些数字：1995 年 8 月 24 日发布，也就是那辉煌的一天。Windows 95 上市，首周售出 100 万份，首月售出 700 万份。
Fiscal 1995—this is the 12 months ending in June before Windows 95 comes out—Microsoft did \$5.9 billion in revenue. Fiscal 1996, they did \$8.7 billion. Fiscal 1997 when Windows 95 is really going, they do \$12 billion in revenue. First software company to pass \$10 billion in revenue, already the most valuable company in the world. They are a monster. There is no other way to put it.
1995 财年——也就是 Windows 95 发布前截至 6 月的 12 个月——微软营收 59 亿美元；1996 财年增至 87 亿美元；到 Windows 95 全面发力的 1997 财年，营收达 120 亿美元，成为首家营收突破 100 亿美元的软件公司，并已是全球市值最高的企业。只能说，他们就是庞然大物。
Ben: It's crazy. From a product perspective, there was just so much really got smoothed here. This was a user experience where they finally had time to think, what actually do users want to do with an operating system? What features should be part of the OS, and what should we delegate to applications? What are modern networking technologies that we should bring in?
Ben：太疯狂了。从产品角度看，这里有太多东西被打磨得十分流畅。他们终于有时间认真思考：用户真正想用操作系统来做什么？哪些功能应该内建于操作系统，哪些应该交由应用？我们要引入哪些现代化的网络技术？
I don't want to foreshadow too much, but how should the Internet be in a modern operating system? That was a huge thing. The multimedia, the video stuff. An operating system really showed up and said, we thought about this experience for you. You're looking for where to start, you're looking for cool stuff to do, and you're looking for it to not break on you. We now finally have a complete story around all of that.
我不想过多剧透，但一个现代操作系统里互联网应该如何呈现？这是一个大课题。再加上多媒体、视频等等。操作系统向用户表明：我们已经为你考虑过整个体验——告诉你从哪里开始，提供有趣的功能，而且保证系统不崩溃。现在，这一切终于都有了完整答案。
A couple of interesting technical notes, it was basically all new technology. If you try to look this up, it will tell you, Windows 95 was DOS-based. It still used DOS in fallback situations for older DOS applications or drivers. But for most of the time, it was no longer true that Windows was just an operating environment on top of the DOS operating system.
再说两点有趣的技术细节：Windows 95 几乎是全新的技术栈。如果你去查资料，会说它基于 DOS；确实，在需要兼容旧 DOS 应用或驱动时，它仍会回退到 DOS。但在大多数情况下，Windows 已不再是架在 DOS 之上的“操作环境”。
Windows had now become a true 32-bit operating system of its own. Windows did all the heavy lifting. It had its own file system. It accomplished a lot of the user experience magic and speed that it was praised for by rewriting a lot of this from scratch. This was the beginning of Windows as its own OS. You can see that actually change in the marketing messages that change from operating environment to operating system.
Windows 此时已经成为真正的 32 位独立操作系统。系统本身承担所有底层工作，拥有自己的文件系统，并通过从零重写诸多组件，实现了备受赞誉的流畅体验和速度。这标志着 Windows 作为独立操作系统的起点；你也能从当时的营销宣传中看到措辞变化——从“操作环境”转而称之为“操作系统”。
David, that brings us to the end of our chapter one. We've got plenty of analysis here to do, but my God, what a first 20 years for the company.
David，我们的第一章就此告一段落。接下来还有大量分析要做，但天哪，这家公司前 20 年的历程实在惊人。
David: We knew this was going to happen. This is why we waited 10 years into Acquired's life to cover Microsoft. It's the most important company in the world still today.
David：我们早就料到会这样。这就是为什么我们要等到《Acquired》做了 10 年才去讲微软。它依然是当今世界上最重要的公司。
It was so fun researching, going back and doing all this because there are so many different perspectives, and so much has been written. I don't know if we've gotten it right here, but I feel like every other major attempted storytelling at this has not gotten it right. Getting to go talk to all the people who were part of this...
回头去做这些研究真的太有趣了，因为视角实在太多，书写的内容也太丰富。我不知道我们这次有没有讲对，但我觉得其他所有大型讲述都没讲对。能去与那些亲历者对话……
Ben: Yeah, living in Seattle is quite helpful.
Ben：是啊，住在西雅图非常有帮助。
David: Yeah. We really got that sense of like, there's still a story to be told here. It's never been more relevant again than today. All that to say, I'm glad we waited 10 years.
David：没错。我们真切地感受到，这里仍有故事可讲，而且比以往任何时候都更具现实意义。总之，我很庆幸我们等了 10 年。
Ben: And there's all this stuff we miss. I didn't mention Microsoft Research. Microsoft Research was a lot of people and a lot of money.
Ben：还有很多内容我们没提到。我都没说微软研究院。微软研究院可投入了很多人和很多钱。
David: Microsoft tried to buy Intuit too along the way. That got canned.
David：微软途中还想收购 Intuit，但最后被叫停了。
Ben: Actually, the start of research is interesting. I'll say this real quick. In 1991, Nathan Myhrvold started Microsoft Research, and the logic is fascinating. Basically, everything Microsoft had done until that point was taking things from mainframes and mini computers, and adapting those tasks, those jobs to be done for personal computers.
Ben：其实，研究院的诞生很有意思。我简单说一下。1991 年，内森·梅尔沃德创办了微软研究院，背后的逻辑非常吸引人。基本上，在那之前微软所做的一切都是把主机和小型机上的任务迁移到个人电脑上。
At some point, they looked around and said, all right, well, we did it. All the personal and business applications can now be run on personal computers, so we have to come up with uses for future technologies in order to continue to drive the ecosystem forward. There's no more low hanging fruit. I thought that was an interesting thesis of why to spin up a research division at that point in history.
某个时刻，他们环顾四周说，好吧，我们完成了。所有个人和商业应用现在都能在个人电脑上运行了，所以我们必须为未来技术想出新用途，以继续推动生态系统向前发展，再也没有低垂的果实了。我觉得，这正是那段历史中创立研究部门的有趣命题。
David: Yes. Let's move into analysis.
David：是的。我们进入分析环节吧。
Ben: Okay, great. Playbook. The big interesting one that I want to start with, and it actually involves a chapter from the story that we just glossed over, is capital efficiency allows founders to control their own destinies in a way that you just don't get when you're selling off huge chunks of the company in order to accomplish your mission.
Ben：好，太棒了。第一条有意思的经验，我想先从这个开始，它实际上涉及我们刚才略过的一个篇章：资本效率让创始人能够掌握自己的命运，而如果为了实现目标把公司大块股权卖出去，你就得不到这种掌控力。
David: Yes, I love this.
David：我喜欢这一点。
Ben: Let's just talk through the cap table over time and how the company went public. We talked about the partnership being 64% Gates, 36% Paul Allen. In 1980, Steve Ballmer comes in and gets 8.5%, 8.75%, or something that percent of the company, so dilutes Gates and Allen down.
Ben：那我们来看看公司股权结构随时间的变化，以及公司是怎么上市的。我们之前说过，合伙企业结构是盖茨 64%，保罗·艾伦 36%。1980 年，史蒂夫·鲍尔默加入，拿到了公司 8.5%、8.75% 左右的股份，稀释了盖茨和艾伦的持股。
In 1981, just a year later, they take the VC investment for 5% of the company from TVI. This also, I'm guessing around 5% trying to reverse engineer some of the numbers. They also created an option pool, where they were then creating opportunity for basically rewarding management, which is how there were 10,000 millionaires created in the Seattle area from Microsoft.
1981 年，也就是仅过了一年，他们引入 TVI 的风险投资，出让了公司 5% 的股份。我猜也是大约 5%，我在反推一些数字。他们还创建了一个期权池，用来奖励管理层，这也是为什么微软在西雅图造就了 1 万名百万富翁。
David: That's the amazing thing. The option pool doesn't get created until late in Microsoft's life. All those Microsoft millionaires only came from whatever size that was, 5% of the company or whatever.
David：惊人之处就在于，直到微软生命周期的后期才设立期权池，而所有那些微软百万富翁都只是从那大约 5% 的公司股份中诞生的。
Ben: At IPO, even with all this dilution, you've got the Ballmer dilution, the VC dilution, and the option pool dilution, Bill Gates still owned 49% of the company. That's pretty unprecedented. He wasn't the only one with a big chunk. Paul Allen owned 28% of the company. Steve had 7.5% of the company.
Ben：即便经历了鲍尔默稀释、风投稀释和期权池稀释，微软 IPO 时比尔·盖茨仍持有公司 49% 的股份，这几乎前所未有。而且他并非唯一的大股东，保罗·艾伦持有 28%，史蒂夫则持有 7.5%。
This company was basically owned by the three more or less co-founders. A little tiny option pool, and then a VC who ended up with 6.1%. I think Dave got some more shares from being on the board. You just don't see companies that look this anymore.
这家公司基本上由那三位准共同创始人掌控。再加上一小块期权池，以及最终持股 6.1% 的风投。我想 Dave 作为董事也拿到了一些股份。如今几乎再难见到这种股权结构的公司了。
David: This is Bill's company. This is their company in a way that no other company is these days. No venture-backed company going through the modern era is like that. By the time you get to be public, you may still be the largest shareholder as a founder or CEO, but it's not your company, far from it.
David：这就是比尔的公司，是他们真正拥有的公司，如今已无公司能比。任何一家当代的风投支持企业在上市时，创始人或 CEO 或许仍是最大股东，但那家公司早已不完全属于你。
Ben: Absolutely. I'm trying to figure out why they were able to be so capital efficient. Is it just that software was such an unbelievably good business model compared to everything else that existed? They didn't need a lot of working capital, everything was high margin, they could grow really fast. Or it was just an era before much competition. They didn't need to out-raise their competitors. Once they got a little bit ahead, there was really no way for anybody else to close the gap, assuming that they executed well.
Ben：完全同意。我在思考他们为何能做到这么高的资本效率。只是因为软件相较于其他行业拥有难以置信的优越商业模式吗？它不需要大量营运资金，毛利极高，增长极快。还是说那是竞争尚未激烈的时代，无需筹集巨额资金去超越对手？只要稍微领先一步，并能良好执行，其他人就很难弥补差距。
David: I totally think it's the latter. I think it's that the minimum fixed cost threshold to be that, in Bill's words, slightly better than your competitors and get the positive spiral going, was low enough that it could be paid for just in Bill and Paul's time and effort. There was that unique moment at the beginning of the software industry where that was true, and that would never be true again.
David：我完全认为是后者。在比尔的话里，只需“略胜竞争对手一筹”就能启动正向飞轮，而达到这一点的最低固定成本门槛低到盖茨和保罗凭时间与精力就能负担。这是软件产业初期的独特窗口期，此后再难重现。
Ben: That's so, so, so insane. There was no one else really with the knowledge either. Even if someone else came in with a big \$1 million check and gave it to a competitor, in 1975, how many people could really write these language interpreters?
Ben：这实在太疯狂了。当时几乎没人具备相关知识。即便有人拿着 100 万美元大支票投资给竞争对手，在 1975 年又有多少人真能写出这种语言解释器？
David: You couldn't buy the experience having written emulation software for microprocessors that Paul had.
David：你买不到保罗那种编写微处理器模拟软件的经验。
Ben: They had an obsession and an obscure skill that turned out to be one of the most valuable in the world in an area where there was a freak law of nature in play with Moore's Law that was so unintuitive, that you had to think from real first principles to understand the impacts of it.
Ben：他们对一项冷门技能痴迷不已，后来证明这竟是全球最有价值的技能之一。而这领域受摩尔定律这条近乎反直觉的“自然法则”驱动，只有回到第一性原理才能理解其影响。
David: I think there are two freak laws of nature's one. (1) There was Moore's law that they were benefiting from. (2) There was the zero marginal cost of software.
David：我认为这里有两条“反常自然法则”。（1）他们受益于摩尔定律；（2）软件的边际成本趋近于零。
Ben: That's true. It's this complete perfect storm that enabled them to build a highly defensible business without really any investment ever. This is the largest company in the world, the most valuable company in the world that was entirely bootstrapped.
Ben：没错。正是这场完美风暴，让他们几乎无需外部投资就能打造出高度护城河的业务。这是一家完全靠自筹资金成长为全球最大、最有价值的公司。
David: Even though they raised money, not a single dollar of investment actually happened at this company.
David：即使他们曾融资，实际上公司一美元投资也没花。
Ben: No, and in 1986, when they actually did go public, they raised \$45 million. They never spent that because they generated much more free cash flow than that that year.
Ben：对，而且 1986 年真正上市时，他们募资 4,500 万美元，但从未动用，因为当年自由现金流就远超这个数。
David: It was just a means to an end of getting public.
David：融资只是为了完成上市这一目标的手段而已。
Ben: And they needed to for the reason that they had been granting so many stock options from that little option pool to employees that they were going to blow the SEC's 500 shareholder cap. They projected 1987, so they wanted to go public on their own terms in 1986, not when they had to buy SEC rules.
Ben：他们之所以必须这么做，是因为从那小小的期权池中授予员工的大量期权即将突破 SEC 规定的 500 名股东上限。他们预测会在 1987 年触顶，所以希望在 1986 年按自己的节奏上市，而不是被 SEC 规则逼着上市。
David: Also, Microsoft needed to be a public company. If you're going to be an important company in the world at this scale, if you're going to first ride the bear with IBM but then inherit the earth from IBM, you got to be a public company. You can't be a private partnership. You're not going to go have conversations with C-suites and CEOs of Fortune 500 companies if you are a private partnership in this era especially.
David：此外，微软必须成为一家上市公司。若要在如此规模上成为全球重要企业，先与 IBM 共舞、再从 IBM 接管天下，就必须上市。你不能还是一家私人合伙企业；尤其在那个时代，你若是私营合伙制，就没法和《财富》500 强公司的高管与 CEO 坐下来谈。
Ben: Maybe. I don't know. I'd agree with you if you had a bunch of short-term capital interests that owned your company, but if it's all founder-owned, there are great, large private companies in the world.
Ben：也许吧，我不确定。如果你的公司被一群短期资本所掌控，我会同意你的说法；但如果完全由创始人持有，世界上也有很多伟大的大型私营企业。
David: Yeah, fair, true.
David：是的，公平，没错。
Ben: Coke Industries is a trusted company by a whole bunch of their customers. Cargill is even bigger than that. There's a bunch of European industrial and shipping companies. Rolex. There are privately-held, big, important companies in the world.
Ben：科氏工业就是许多客户信赖的公司；嘉吉甚至更大。欧洲还有不少工业和航运巨头，劳力士也是。世界上确实存在私有的大型重要企业。
David: For sure, but none of those companies are Microsoft.
David：当然，但它们都不是微软。
Ben: That's true. That's very fair. Especially getting to the stage that they eventually got to being the trusted partner to governments around the free world, that requires being a public company.
Ben：确实，很公平。尤其当微软后来成为自由世界各国政府的可信赖伙伴时，这就必须是一家上市公司。
David: It's funny. This playbook theme, this was a moment in time and a set of factors where this worked. I guess the lesson is find an industry in its infancy, be capital-efficient, and run the table.
David：有趣的是，这种成功模式只在特定时间点、特定因素下奏效。我要得出的教训是：找到一个行业的萌芽期，高效利用资本，然后全面制胜。
Ben: That has unique economic conditions that have never existed before to create these magical businesses you could never fathom before this new technology thing existed? It's an impossible thing to wish for. It may never happen again. We may never get another Google either.
Ben：这需要前所未有的特殊经济条件，才能催生在新技术出现前根本无法想象的神奇企业？这种愿望几乎不可能实现，可能再也不会发生，我们也许再没有下一个谷歌。
David: That's what I was going to say, it did happen again, it happened with Google.
David：我正想说，这种事确实又发生过一次，那就是谷歌。
Ben: But how many things can you collapse to zero? I think that's the question. With Microsoft, they were able to collapse their marginal cost to zero, but they still had distribution costs, and then Google collapsed distribution costs to zero with the Internet. What's a big cost that a company has now? Maybe AI will collapse. You no longer need 50,000 employees, you can have five employees. Maybe it can collapse that to zero.
Ben：但究竟有多少成本能被压缩到零？这才是关键。微软把边际成本压到零，但仍有分销成本；随后谷歌利用互联网将分销成本压到零。现在企业的最大成本是什么？也许是人工智能——再也不需要 5 万名员工，只需 5 个人，或许能把这项成本也压到零。
You need something of that scale, which is, where does a company spend most of its money that suddenly it can spend no money on? I suppose actually it is on the human capital. You just look at big successful companies and look at what they spend money on. Those are the candidates.
你需要这种量级的变化：公司最大支出突然归零。其实最大的支出往往就是人力资本。看看那些大型成功企业的费用结构，就能找出候选项。
David: Good point. Still unlikely we'll ever find another Microsoft opportunity.
David：说得好。不过再遇到另一个微软机会的可能性依然很小。
Ben: Yup. Other fun things on the IPO, do you know who IPO'd the day before Microsoft did?
Ben：是啊。说到 IPO 的趣事——你知道微软上市前一天是哪家公司 IPO 吗？
David: No.
David：不知道。
Ben: Oracle. Oracle had a nice pop, which actually helped Microsoft price a little bit higher in their IPO. That is another episode we have to do.
Ben：甲骨文。甲骨文上市后股价表现不错，这实际上让微软在 IPO 定价时得以稍微抬高区间。这又是我们日后要做的一期节目。
Another thing adds yet another layer to the insanity of everything that we've been talking about of why they were able to build such a successful company on such little capital, I don't think there has ever been a tailwind in history like the one that Microsoft had with the secular growth of the personal computer wave. The only thing I can think of that is comparable is Amazon with the growth of the Internet, powering their early growth.
再说一点，也给我们讨论的“微软如何凭借极少资本就打造出如此成功的公司”再添一层疯狂：我认为历史上从未出现过像个人电脑浪潮那样强劲的顺风，而微软正是受益者。唯一可以相比的大概就是亚马逊借助互联网爆发式增长推动其早期腾飞。
Here's the stat. From 1975 to 1986, 11 years prior to their IPO, so founding to IPO, PCs grew at a compound annual growth rate of 98%. It grew from 4000 units per year to 9 million units per year shipped. You can almost not mess up when you have a tailwind that.
来看一组数据：1975 年至 1986 年，也就是从创立到上市的 11 年间，个人电脑年出货量的复合增长率高达 98%，从每年 4000 台跃升到每年 900 万台。有这种顺风，你几乎难以犯错。
David: Especially when you are the linchpin player.
David：尤其当你是行业的关键枢纽玩家时。
Ben: They managed to make themselves the point of integration for the whole industry. Oftentimes, I find myself when we're looking at these companies that are among the most successful in the world or like Microsoft, the most successful in the world, it's basically a multidimensional multiplication problem.
Ben：他们成功把自己变成了整个行业的集成枢纽。我常常发现，当我们研究那些世界上最成功的企业、或者说像微软这种最成功的企业时，其实就是一个多维乘法问题。
They had this unbelievable one in a zillion thing going for them, which you can multiply by this other one in a zillion multi thing. It's the zero marginal cost, zero distribution cost, unbelievable secular growth of the PC, Moore's law happening. They're the single choke point for the whole industry. It's just crazy how many things you multiply together, and of course it should end up in a number over three trillion.
他们拥有亿万分之一的不可思议优势，再乘以另一个亿万分之一的多重优势：边际成本为零、分销成本为零、个人电脑的惊人长期增长、摩尔定律的推动……他们是整个行业的单点咽喉。把这么多因素相乘，结论当然会是超过 3 万亿美元的市值。
David: Yup. I'll jump in with a playbook theme that we referenced a little bit in the episode, but we really got a highlight here. Bill, Steve, Paul, and everybody at Microsoft, were incredibly talented, incredibly smart. They saw the future in a way nobody else did, but they also were willing to hedge their bets.
David：没错。我来补充一个我们在节目里提到但需要突出强调的经验：比尔、史蒂夫、保罗以及微软的所有人都极其聪明、才华横溢，他们以别人无法企及的方式洞见未来，但同时也愿意对冲风险。
It's not like they just got everything right. They were going to get things wrong with OS/2, but they hedged the bets with Windows. I think that is such a key lesson of when you're in a really dynamic market like this, in our ecosystem right now in tech, venture capital, startups, whatnot, people put so much value on conviction. I have conviction. This is what the future is going to be like. I think the Microsoft story is the opposite of that. They had conviction that software was going to be big.
他们并非事事正确；在 OS/2 上就走过弯路，但用 Windows 对冲了风险。我认为，这对身处高度动态市场（当下的科技、风投、初创生态）的人来说是关键教训。许多人极度看重“信念”——我有信念，这就是未来。但微软的故事恰恰相反：他们只坚信软件会很重要。
Ben: And personal computers. Creating software for desktop computers was a really good idea, and they wanted to be the best at it.
Ben：以及个人电脑。为台式机开发软件是个极佳主意，他们要做这方面的佼佼者。
David: Yeah, but the exact path of how that was going to play out, they had very little conviction and were willing to be very flexible.
David：没错，但具体路径会怎样，他们几乎没有定见，并且愿意保持极大的灵活性。
Ben: You're right. It's both the hedging, but also then the ability to read the world and quickly, entirely change your strategy if you need to, and having your hedge be far enough along that you can jump quickly to it and shift your whole organization to get on board with it. That's a hard leadership thing to do.
Ben：说得对。这既是对冲，也是洞察世界并在必要时迅速、彻底调整策略的能力；而且你的对冲项目要推进得足够远，以便能迅速转向并让整个组织跟上。这对领导力要求极高。
David: Totally. I can't wait in the next episode to talk about the Internet tidal wave memo. That's related to your playbook theme too. You can't really do that if you don't own 49% of the company, if it's not your company.
David：完全同意。我迫不及待想在下一期节目里聊“互联网浪潮”备忘录。这也与你的经验法则相关：若你并不拥有公司 49% 的股份，若这家公司不真正属于你，你根本无法做到那种转向。
Ben: Which I think you're seeing play out with most CEOs today. There's a big difference between a founder-CEO and the stuff that they can do. Zuckerberg with the metaverse or Jensen with betting the whole company and going all in again on AI versus Tim Cook or Sundar Pichai, certainly a very different type of CEO. Satya is interesting. Despite the fact that he doesn't own half the company, he's got a lot of founder-like control, which I think is pretty interesting.
Ben：我认为你今天在大多数 CEO 身上都能看到这种现象。创始人兼 CEO 与普通 CEO 在能做的事情上差别巨大——扎克伯格押注元宇宙、黄仁勋再次孤注一掷全面进军 AI，与蒂姆·库克或桑达尔·皮查伊截然不同。萨蒂亚很有趣，虽然他并未持有公司一半股份，却拥有许多类似创始人的控制权，这点相当引人注目。
David: All right, don't get ahead of ourselves.
David：好的，先别跑得太快。
Ben: Moving along. Other playbook themes, a big one that jumps out to me is that new generations of technologies enable market dislocations. Unless you are in a transformational moment in terms of a new technology came out that enables something that wasn't possible before that's going to rearrange the whole value chain and open up new markets, it's pretty hard to go challenge an incumbent. No one was going to challenge IBM really until the microcomputer, even the minicomputer people. Did DEC really challenge IBM? Not really. It never made a dent.
Ben：继续说。另一个显而易见的经验是，新一代技术会带来市场错位。只有当出现能够实现此前不可能之事、重塑整个价值链并开辟新市场的颠覆性技术时，挑战现有巨头才有可能。在微型计算机出现之前，几乎没人能真正挑战 IBM，连小型机厂商也不行。DEC 真正威胁过 IBM 吗？并没有，连个水花都没激起。
David: It wasn't a full platform shift in the same way.
David：那并不是同等级别的完整平台转移。
Ben: And there are these little blips of it. The GUI I think meaningfully reshuffled the DECs. Those are the moments where you can have meaningful new entrants. Otherwise, you have to bide your time and just build your hedges and see.
Ben：当然也会出现一些小规模的机遇。图形用户界面就曾实质性地重新洗牌 DEC 等公司。只有在这种时刻，才会有有意义的新进入者。否则，你只能等待时机，同时做好对冲并静观其变。
Related, even if you are the incumbent being disrupted, it is possible to have a very, very large and durable revenue stream that can go on for a very long time. What I'm referring to in this particular example is despite all of the dethroning that we just talked about, Microsoft would not eclipse IBM in revenue. You mentioned market cap, David, but in revenue until the year 2015. Isn't that nuts?
另一方面，即便你作为 incumbents 被颠覆，也完全可能继续拥有规模庞大且持久的收入流，这种收入可持续很久。我要说的是，尽管我们刚讨论了 IBM 宝座被撼动，但微软的收入直到 2015 年才超过 IBM。David，你提到了市值，可在收入层面直到 2015 年才超越，是不是很疯狂？
David: I intentionally didn't look up revenue because it made the story muddier, but wow, there you go.
David：我刻意没去查收入数据，因为那会让故事更复杂，但哇，结果就是如此。
Ben: I think that's the point. Microsoft's perception by the market, I'm sure they were growing faster, I'm sure they had better gross margins. I'm sure there was a better story there, so there's a multiple that comes out of the story. I'm sure there are lots of good reasons why Microsoft became more valuable than IBM very early, but IBM's revenue did not peak until 2012. What?
Ben：我想这就是关键所在。市场对微软的看法——他们增长更快、毛利率更高、故事更好，于是给出的估值倍数也更高。微软早早就比 IBM 更具价值，肯定有很多理由，但 IBM 的收入直到 2012 年才达到峰值。什么情况？
Long after public perception moves on, customers still get value from something created by incumbents for a very long time. I think that's something we often forget about in the buzzy Twitterverse of like, oh that thing's over. It might still grow for another 20 years before it's over.
在公众认知早已转移之后，客户仍会长期从 incumbents 的产品中获得价值。我觉得在喧嚣的推特世界里我们常常忘了这一点——“哦，那东西已经完了。”可它也许还会再增长 20 年才真正结束。
David: That also just speaks to the nature of the enterprise business, too.
David：这也道出了企业业务的本质。
Ben: That's a good point.
Ben：说得好。
David: IBM was the enterprise business. Today, Microsoft is the enterprise business.
David：IBM 过去就是企业业务的代名词，如今，微软是企业业务的代名词。
Ben: That's true. Peloton revenue can dry up a lot faster than contracts for mainframes. What do you got?
Ben：确实如此。Peloton 的营收枯竭速度可远比大型机合同快得多。你有什么要说的？
David: A playbook theme that I want to highlight that really, really came out in our conversations is Microsoft was not just a talent magnet, the talent magnet during the PC era. If you were an ambitious young person, this is where you wanted to be.
David：我想强调的一条经验，在我们的对话中体现得淋漓尽致——微软不仅是人才吸铁石，而是 PC 时代最强的人才磁场。若你是雄心勃勃的年轻人，这就是你渴望去的地方。
It was on every dimension. If you were an ambitious young technical person, that's where you wanted to be. If you were an ambitious young salesperson, if you're an ambitious young marketing person, that's where you wanted to be.
方方面面都是如此。若你是有抱负的年轻技术人员，你就想去那里；若你是有抱负的年轻销售或市场人员，你同样想去那里。
They just had this culture there, which is so funny. We'll talk in the next episode of how that culture really fell apart for a while there. I asked a lot of these early people that we talked to, what was it being there? You guys worked yourselves half to death. Were you mad about that? Did you resent it? Were you just making Bill rich? They're all like, no. Yeah, we neglected every other part of our life, but that was the good old days. This was the magic, we were making it happen.
他们那里就是这种文化，很有意思。我们下一期会聊到这文化如何曾一度瓦解。我问了许多早期员工：在那里工作是什么感觉？你们拼命工作到半死，会生气吗？会怨恨吗？觉得只是替比尔赚钱吗？他们都说，没有。是的，我们忽视了生活的其他部分，但那是美好的旧时光。那是魔力，我们在创造奇迹。
Ben: That totally comes through. I asked Brad, why did Windows 95 work? There's lots of structural reasons, but he said, we basically did two things. (1) We laid out principles for product and then pushed responsibility down. Developers were often their own PMs. There's this idea of once you got the principles, we don't need to write a zillion specs, design something three times, and pass it through three functions. You know the principles, make great software that follows the principles. (2) He said that everyone felt personally responsible for the product, and it really showed.
Ben：这一点完全体现出来了。我问布拉德，为什么 Windows 95 能成功？有很多结构性原因，但他说基本做了两件事：(1) 先制定产品原则，然后把责任下放。开发者常常兼任自己的产品经理。原则确定后，就无需写成千上万的规格，不用三次设计、三道流程；你知道原则，就去做遵循原则的优秀软件。(2) 每个人都对产品负有个人责任，而且效果显而易见。
David: Anybody you talked to from this era of Microsoft, this was their life's work. No doubt about it.
David：你跟那个时代的任何微软人聊，他们都会说这是他们的毕生事业，毫无疑问。
Ben: Something we touched on a little bit is the benefit of scaling with OEMs. This was the contrast against Apple, where I said Apple was always going to be a niche player by the way they designed, built, and packaged everything themselves. Apple is in many ways like the AmEx, where Microsoft is the Visa.
Ben：我们稍微谈到的一点是与 OEM 合作实现规模化的好处。这与苹果形成对比——我说过，苹果通过自己设计、制造和封装一切，注定要做小众玩家。某种程度上，苹果像运通，微软则像 Visa。
On our Visa episode, it just became so clear that Visa could quickly take over the world at MasterCard by being an open network, where they didn't have to do all the work to scale themselves. They could distribute to a bank, partner with a bank, and then boom, each of the banks that was on their network could independently scale at their own rate, which created obviously compounding effects for how fast Visa and MasterCard could scale. The same can be said of Windows.
在我们的 Visa 那一期节目中就很清楚地看到，Visa 作为一个开放网络，能迅速超越万事达，原因是它无需自己承担全部扩张工作。它可以把网络分发给银行，与银行合作，然后——砰——网络上的每家银行都能按自己的速度独立扩张，这显然对 Visa 和万事达的扩张速度产生了复合效应。Windows 亦是如此。
David: Totally, the OEMs. Yeah.
David：完全正确，就是 OEM。
Ben: I think the Microsoft OEM team for Windows was 20 people or something. Before the enterprise, in this era that we're talking about, the group of people responsible for go-to market for Windows was really small. They sold some retail, but the team was just about, hey, make sure HP and...
Ben：我记得微软负责 Windows OEM 的团队大概只有 20 人左右。在我们讨论的这一时期、企业业务之前，负责 Windows 市场推广的人数非常少。他们做一点零售，但团队的重心只是确保惠普和……
David: Compaq, Dell, and Gateway.
David：康柏、戴尔和 Gateway。
Ben: Exactly. That was their go-to market, and it makes your scaling unbelievably efficient.
Ben：没错，这就是他们的市场策略，使得规模扩张效率惊人。
David: Dude, you're getting a Dell.
David：兄弟，你要买台戴尔了。
Ben: Dude, you are getting a Dell. Similarly, I think the fact that they went international early was this very powerful constraint. It meant that every time they shipped software, they had to make it globally ready quickly. That meant that if there was any network effects to your software, anything becoming a standard, Microsoft was just way better positioned to become the standard than anyone else was.
Ben：兄弟，你就是要买台戴尔。同样，我认为他们很早就全球化是一个非常强大的约束。这意味着每次发布软件，都必须迅速做好全球就绪。如果软件存在任何网络效应、任何标准化的可能，微软都比其他任何公司更有机会成为标准。
On top of there being network effects, there's also scale economies. A word processor is a word processor. The extent that you have customers in every country who can buy your one piece of software, you can amortize the development costs over a huge user base so much more quickly.
除了网络效应之外，还存在规模经济。文字处理器就是文字处理器；当你在全球各国都有客户购买同一款软件时，你可以将开发成本在庞大的用户基础上更快摊销。
David: 100%.
David：百分之百。
Ben: The fact that they forced themselves to be international early meant that every product after that also had to figure out how to do all the localization, training, and all of that to get all those effects too.
Ben：他们早早逼自己走向国际化，这就意味着此后推出的每一个产品都必须弄清楚如何完成本地化、培训等全部工作，才能获得同样的成效。
David: No matter how much time, money, and resources you have to spend to localize Microsoft word into kanji, it's a lot less time and resources and money than developing Microsoft word.
David：无论将 Microsoft Word 本地化成日文汉字版要花多少时间、金钱和资源，都远比重新开发一款 Microsoft Word 来得省时省力省钱。
Ben: Exactly. They just realized that so early. They also realized that most people who were doing some localization would do a shoddy job. They would think about it as lesser than the US market. They just did a good job at localization. They just cared. They thought of it as this is a strategic pillar that in every country, everyone experiences our software to the same quality because it's our brand everywhere. I don't know. I just think that is not how the rest of the industry thought about it.
Ben：完全正确，他们很早就意识到了这一点。他们也认识到，大多数做本地化的人往往敷衍了事，把海外市场看成次于美国市场。而他们却把本地化做到极致，真正在乎质量，把它视为战略支柱：在任何国家，每个人都应以同样的品质体验我们的软件，因为那代表着我们的全球品牌。我觉得行业里其他公司并没有这么想。
David: Definitely not.
David：绝对不是。
Ben: On top of all of this, the way that they executed it through subsidiaries was pretty genius. Redmond did not control international. They spun up country managers and subsidiaries in each of these countries in a ton of countries.
Ben：除此之外，他们通过子公司来执行这一策略堪称天才做法。雷德蒙总部并不直接管国际业务，而是在众多国家设立了当地经理和子公司。
While Redmond did the product development and then did the engineering work to do localization to all the strings files and everything for those countries, the actual marketing messaging, the sales strategy, and the sales structure, happened in country that was owned by a person who lived there so they actually could think through, what is the best way for people to receive this software here?
雷德蒙负责产品开发，并完成所有国家的字符串文件等本地化工程工作；而真正的营销信息、销售策略和销售体系，则由当地负责人在本国制定，他们能深入思考“这里的人如何最容易接受这款软件”。
Again, that's just going to yield way better results than if you're sitting there armchair quarterbacking at Redmond thinking about how a person in Chile is going to receive your marketing message.
相较于你坐在雷德蒙隔空指点、揣测智利用户如何接收你的营销信息，这种做法显然能带来更好的结果。
One other that I have is this one that we didn't really talk about, but Microsoft famously was not first to market with basically any of their applications. They aren't even really today in most cases. You think about the strategy that they had early on spreadsheets, word processing, all these were copycats at their outset.
还有一点我们之前没怎么谈：微软几乎没有哪款应用是首发上市的，直到今天大多数也不是。早期的电子表格、文字处理等产品都是“借鉴”现有软件起步的。
Sometimes they would do an acquisition, but most of the time they just look at a product and say, huh, our software should do the same thing, and they would copy it. They had no shame in doing that. They had their eyes everywhere looking for good ideas, they had reverence for the good ones, and then they would just incorporate them.
有时他们会通过收购获取技术，但更多时候只是看到一款产品就想：“我们的软件也该做到这一点。”然后直接复制。他们对此毫不羞愧，眼观四方寻找好点子，对优秀创意心怀敬意，并迅速将其纳入自家产品。
On top of that, they wanted to make the software very easy to switch to. A lot of the keyboard shortcuts in Excel to this day are there because they were originally the Lotus 1-2-3 shortcuts. They wanted people to have the same muscle memory that just worked.
此外，他们致力于让用户轻松切换到自家软件。直到今天，Excel 中的许多快捷键沿用 Lotus 1-2-3 的设计，就是为了让用户沿用原有的肌肉记忆即可上手。
Fundamentally, what this does for you as a business is it just leads to better risk adjusted returns. You already know what's going to work before you ship it. You don't really take market risk. You're not going to be the first to the market with early adopters, but most of the time, you actually don't need to be to win.
从商业角度看，这意味着更佳的风险调整后回报——在发布前你就知道产品能奏效，不必承担市场风险。你不会成为早期采用者市场里的第一家，但多数情况下赢并不需要第一个。
I think Microsoft own that idea. Most of the time people are sheepish about it. Steve Jobs famously said, Microsoft has no taste. I think that's another way to put it that it's copycatting.
我认为微软完全接受了这种理念；而大多数人对此讳莫如深。史蒂夫·乔布斯曾讥讽“微软没有品位”，换言之就是在说他们爱模仿。
David: I do agree with the premise, with all of this. I think doing this episode though has made me think there's a little more nuance to it. Yes. In broad strokes, you can say that's what Microsoft strategy was with applications over the years, but the Microsoft versions never actually won until there was a platform shift that they could take advantage of to beat the incumbent.
David：我同意这个前提，也同意上面的全部观点。不过做完这期节目后，我觉得事情还有点微妙。的确，宽泛地说，多年来微软在应用层面的策略就是如此，但微软的版本其实从未真正取胜，直到出现了平台转换，他们才能借机击败现有霸主。
Microsoft wasn't going to beat Lotus 1-2-3 until the graphical paradigm came along, and then Excel being graphical was just obviously so much better. They tried with Multiplan, they failed. Multiplan was fine, but 1-2-3 was the winner.
在图形界面范式出现之前，微软不可能打败 Lotus 1-2-3；随后 Excel 具备图形界面，明显更胜一筹。他们试过用 Multiplan，但失败了。Multiplan 表现尚可，可赢家仍是 1-2-3。
The nuance to me is yes, but it's more like with the resources of Microsoft and the timeframe that Microsoft can afford to have, they can afford to start building the application, start building the product, getting into market, start learning, be positioned that then when the paradigm shift comes, leap ahead.
在我看来，细微之处在于：凭借微软的资源与可承受的时间，他们完全可以先着手构建应用、打造产品、推向市场、开始学习并占据位置，然后当范式转换来临时就能实现飞跃。
Ben: That's a good point. It's also different. The Lotus 1-2-3–Multiplan thing, in that era, Microsoft just didn't have great distribution yet. Lotus 1-2-3 just got pretty far ahead of them, and Microsoft had no way to catch up. A few years after that, that would basically never be true again.
Ben：说得好，但情况也有所不同。在那个年代的 Lotus 1-2-3 与 Multiplan 之争中，微软的分销渠道并不强大，Lotus 1-2-3 已经大幅领先，微软根本追不上。再过几年，微软就再也不会遇到这种情形了。
David: That could be true too.
David：这也有可能是真的。
Ben: I will say, you touched on something that's an interesting corollary to this. Their first versions of software famously are not good. You look at Windows 1.0 and 2.0. They know that it's part of the strategy, and they were world class at learning from customers and integrating customer feedback into subsequent versions.
Ben：我想补充一点，你刚才提到的有个有趣的推论——微软的初版软件出了名地不好用。看看 Windows 1.0 和 2.0 就知道。他们深知这符合策略，而且擅长向客户学习，把用户反馈融入后续版本。
There's always this saying of Microsoft doesn't have a very good first or second version, but the third version of something is typically pretty good. I think that fact pattern definitely follows.
一直都有句话：微软的第一、二版通常不行，但第三版往往相当出色。我认为这种规律确实存在。
David: I'm curious your thoughts on this. I'm so surprised. One thing that you have not brought up yet on this episode is you were a PM at Microsoft for several years.
David：我想知道你对此的看法。我很惊讶，你在本期节目里还没提到，你曾在微软做了几年产品经理。
Ben: I was, but it was such a different era in that 2012–2014 era. I guess 2011 is when I started as an intern. I'll have a lot of thoughts on it next episode.
Ben：是的，但那是 2012–2014 那个完全不同的时代。我 2011 年先做实习生。下一期我会有很多想法要聊。
David: Okay, great. I've got one more playbook theme before we move on to power. Microsoft figured out software before anybody else, and they figured out so many aspects of what it means to be a software business before anybody else, but they figured out that software is never done.
David：好，太好了。进入“护城河”环节前我还有一条经验要说——微软比任何人都更早搞懂了软件，也最先搞清楚软件企业意味着什么，更早明白软件永远没有完成之时。
I do think a lot of their competitors, we didn't obviously didn't study Lotus to the same degree that we studied Microsoft here, we didn't study WordPerfect, et cetera, but I think there was a mindset that a lot of other folks are like, you ship software, and then the software was done.
我认为许多竞争对手——我们显然没像研究微软那样去研究 Lotus、WordPerfect 等公司——在观念上觉得软件一旦发布就算完事。
That was not the culture at Microsoft. This is related to what you were just saying. Shipping software is the beginning. You are always working on that software. You're working on next versions and stuff, but even before the next version, the work of software is never done.
这绝非微软的文化。正如你刚才所说，发布只是起点；你要持续打磨软件，开发下一版本等等，甚至在下一版本之前，软件的工作永远没有终点。
Ben: Of course, if you own the hardware, you definitely think of it more of like, well, we ship them, the big cabinet of things, we install it, and we fix it if it's broken, but we've sold them hardware. The software is required to run it, but the thing we sold them is the hardware. If you're a pure software company, you think about the world differently.
Ben：当然，如果你拥有硬件，你会更倾向于认为：我们把那台大柜子运过去，安装好，坏了再修理；我们卖给他们的是硬件，软件只是运行硬件所需。而若你是纯软件公司，你看待世界的角度就不同了。
You're like, well, I can always ship you another CD, another floppy disk, over the Internet. It's obviously very different. But because there weren't really software companies before them, of course people didn't come from that mindset.
你会想，我随时可以再寄给你一张光盘、软盘，或者通过互联网推送新版本——这完全不同。而在他们之前几乎没有纯软件公司，人们自然不会有这种心态。
David: I think you still see the legacy of this right to this day in Apple versus Microsoft. Apple still is on a yearly software release cadence, which is ridiculous. Whereas Microsoft is on the cloud, it's all constant. It's all constantly shipping. Look at AI, look at OpenAI. The software is never done so deeply in the software business model.
David：我认为直到今天，在苹果与微软的对比中仍能看到这种传承。苹果依旧采用一年一次的软件发布节奏，这太荒谬；而微软依托云端，持续迭代、不断上线。看看 AI、看看 OpenAI——在软件商业模式中，软件永远都不会“完成”。
Ben: That's true.
Ben：没错。
David: All right, should we move on to power?
David：好，那么我们进入“护城河”部分？
Ben: Yes. Listeners who are new to the show, we do this section based on Hamilton Helmer's seven powers framework. The question is, what is it that enables a business to achieve persistent differential returns, or to put in another way, to be more profitable than your closest competitor and do so sustainably?
Ben：好的。给新听众解释一下，我们这一部分采用汉密尔顿·赫尔默的“七种护城河”框架。核心问题是：是什么让一家企业能够持续获得超额回报？换句话说，如何在长期内保持比最接近的竞争对手更高的盈利能力？
The seven are counter positioning, scale economies, switching costs, network economies, process power, branding, and cornered resource. David, I am pretty sure I could make a case somewhere between 1975 and 1995 at Microsoft for all seven of these.
这七种护城河分别是：反向定位、规模经济、转换成本、网络效应、流程能力、品牌力和稀缺资源。David，我完全可以用 1975 到 1995 年之间的微软来一一对应这七条。
David: Totally.
David：完全同意。
Ben: It's one of the most defensible businesses they built in history, so of course they would have all seven of the powers.
Ben：这是历史上防御性最强的企业之一，所以它理所当然兼具七种护城河。
David: All right, let's run through each of them and do a quick 45 seconds on each.
David：好的，我们快速过一遍，每项用 45 秒。
Ben: Great. Counter positioning. I think the biggest example of this comes through where Microsoft is basically willing to jump on the microcomputer revolution before the incumbents were. IBM did not want microcomputers to happen. When they started to happen, IBM tried to figure out how to slow it down and reintegrate it into their old business model.
Ben：好，先说反向定位。我认为最典型的案例就是微软敢于在 incumbents 之前投入微型计算机革命。IBM 并不希望微型计算机兴起；当这股潮流出现时，IBM 设法放缓其发展，并把它重新纳入旧有商业模式。
Microsoft basically had no baggage. This is classic innovator’s dilemma stuff. They could say, well, we don't need to make any money on hardware. We don't need to even make hardware. We are free to become the whole point of integration for the entire ecosystem just by shipping bits. And that is crazy.
而微软毫无包袱，这正是“创新者的窘境”的经典场景。他们可以说：我们不必靠硬件赚钱，甚至不用生产硬件；只需交付比特流，就能成为整个生态的集成枢纽——这简直疯狂。
David: Actually, related to that—I can't believe we haven't talked about this in the episode until now—Microsoft could enable other companies to be successful. You talk to Microsoft people, they always talk about themselves as a platform, like we're a platform. Other companies grow on the back of Microsoft. That was not true for IBM. Totally not true.
David：事实上，与此相关——我都不敢相信我们到现在才提到——微软还能让其他公司成功。微软人常说自己是平台，其他企业在微软背上成长。这在 IBM 时代可不是这样，完全不是。
Microsoft could make Compaq successful. Microsoft could make Lotus successful. Microsoft could make Intuit successful. Microsoft could make Netscape successful.
微软可以成就康柏，可以成就 Lotus，可以成就 Intuit，也可以成就 Netscape。
Ben: We keep talking about Microsoft as the point of integration, choke point, dependency, or standard for the whole ecosystem. Given that, it is quite remarkable how much value they created on top of the platform versus just captured for themselves. There's that famous Bill Gates line, you want your ecosystem around you to be generating more revenue than you are taking for yourself. They did a ton of that. It's the OEMs, and it's the application developers.
Ben：我们总说微软是整个生态的集成枢纽、卡点、依赖或标准。考虑到这一点，他们在平台上创造的价值之多令人震惊，而不仅仅是自我攫取。比尔·盖茨那句名言说，你希望生态伙伴的收入总和超过你自己，这一点他们做得很多——无论是 OEM 伙伴，还是应用开发者。
David: That's major counter positioning. Okay, that's one.
David：这就是典型的反向定位。好，第一个说完了。
Ben: Scale economies.
Ben：规模经济。
David: That's everything we just talked about in Playbook.
David：这正是我们在“攻略”环节刚讨论的一切。
Ben: It's unbelievable. When Microsoft has an install base of 100 million people using Excel—in this episode, let's just say 10 million people who are using Excel—and suddenly some up and coming spreadsheet comes out with a cool feature like auto sum, fill down, draw borders around the cells, or whatever, suddenly, Microsoft does a tiny bit of dev work. They can reap tons and tons and tons of value for doing that that the tiny company cannot do.
Ben：太不可思议了。当微软拥有一亿 Excel 用户——在本期节目里我们就说有一千万 Excel 用户吧——若有某个新兴电子表格软件推出自动求和、向下填充、给单元格加边框等炫酷功能，微软只需做一点点开发工作，就能获得那家小公司根本无法企及的大量价值。
David: Yup, great.
David：没错，太棒了。
Ben: Fixed amount of dev work amortized across a large customer base.
Ben：固定的一点开发工作成本，摊薄到庞大的客户群中。
David: I don't think we need to say any more on this. The whole episode's about scale economies.
David：我觉得这一点无需再多说，本期节目谈的就是规模经济。
Ben: Yes. Switching costs. The funny thing about monopoly is there's nothing to switch to.
Ben：对。转换成本。垄断有意思的地方在于：根本没东西可换。
David: That's a good one. This one's pretty related to network economies for me with this one of, okay, sure, you can switch to another operating system. Good luck getting other applications that you know and love to run on that.
David：说得好。我觉得这与网络经济密切相关。好吧，你当然可以换另一个操作系统，但想让你熟悉喜爱的其他应用跑在上面——祝你好运。
Ben: Yeah, that's the answer.
Ben：对，就是这个答案。
David: Speaking of network economies, developers, applications, OEMs.
David：说到网络经济——开发者、应用、OEM。
Ben: There's not a classic network, Facebook, or AT\&T style network here, in terms of one user can contact every other user, but more users being on Windows incentivizes more developers to make great applications for Windows, which enables Microsoft to sell more copies to more users, et cetera.
Ben：这里并没有 Facebook 或 AT\&T 那种经典网络，用户之间不能直接互联。但当 Windows 用户越多，就越能激励更多开发者为 Windows 编写优秀应用，这又让微软能卖出更多拷贝，形成循环。
David: Although, actually, I think once they start getting into the enterprise workplaces in general, organizations in general, there is the user network effect, like I want this Microsoft Word document that I just worked on for you to be able to open it and use it too.
David：不过实际上，一旦进入企业办公场景、组织普遍使用后，就会出现用户网络效应——我希望自己刚做好的 Word 文档，你也能打开使用。
Ben: You're right. I didn't even think about that. The document formats are a huge network effect thing, even before the Internet. Even before organizations were networked and computers were networked outside of an organization, file formats. You're right, there are huge network economies to file formats.
Ben：你说得对，我都没想到这点。文件格式本身就是巨大的网络效应——早在互联网之前也是如此。即便在组织外部计算机尚未互联时，文件格式也很关键。没错，文件格式具有巨大的网络经济效应。
David: Yeah, and it's inter-organizational too. If I'm a law firm, I want my clients to be able to open my Word docs.
David：是的，而且这是跨组织的。如果我是律师事务所，我希望我的客户也能打开我的 Word 文件。
Ben: Right.
Ben：没错。
David: Okay, next.
David：好，下一个。
Ben: Process power. This might be the weakest.
Ben：流程能力。这可能是最弱的一项。
David: As it so often is.
David：通常都是如此。
Ben: It's elusive. This is a little bit later in history, but I did always think it was absolutely incredible when I was at Microsoft, and we would ship a version of Office every three years. I worked on Office 15. The entire 6000 person organization had a process in place, where we could release to manufacturing (RTM) on a date that we planned three years in advance and actually hit it.
Ben：这很难捉摸。这是稍晚一些的历史，但我在微软时一直觉得不可思议——我们每三年就发布一个 Office 版本。我当时负责 Office 15。整个拥有 6000 名员工的组织建立了一整套流程，能在提前三年确定的日期实现 RTM（发布到制造），并且真正做到了。
The process of the ads cuts meetings, the zero bug bounce, the testing schedule, and the triage when you had things that people wanted to introduce late in the schedule. It was a remarkable product, especially with all these teams that needed all their code to interoperate.
关于广告冻结会议、零缺陷回弹、测试计划，以及当有人想在后期插入新功能时的缺陷分级处理，这整套流程都非常出色，尤其考虑到需要众多团队的代码相互兼容运行。
I worked on a shared experiences team that would check things and that would be a dependency. Word, Excel, PowerPoint, all of them took on the shared code. We knew our ship date three years in advance and would hit it. It's crazy.
我曾在共享体验团队工作，负责检查依赖项。Word、Excel、PowerPoint 等都接入这段共享代码。我们提前三年就知道出货日期并且如期完成，简直疯狂。
David: Totally. This exists. Especially by the time you get to the Windows 95 era at the end of this episode, it's like RenTech. The amount of stuff and process within Microsoft, the device drivers, the middleware, the programming languages, the dev tools, the machine there to make all this computing work, there was a miracle that this stuff worked. You couldn't just recreate that.
David：完全如此。这样的体系确实存在。尤其到本集结尾提到的 Windows 95 时代，这几乎像“技术炼金”。微软内部拥有海量流程和组件——设备驱动、中间件、编程语言、开发工具，整套让计算运转的机器——这些系统能协同运转本身就是奇迹，根本无法凭空复制。
Ben: It's funny. The process power, I would say, is stronger in Office than Windows. Now my colors are showing. Windows always notoriously miss their ship dates. I'm actually less sure that process power existed in that early days. I think they were a bunch of smart people, but I'm not sure that they had a unique way of creating software.
Ben：有趣的是，我认为 Office 的流程能力比 Windows 更强——暴露一下我的立场。Windows 总是臭名昭著地错过交付日期。我其实不太确定早期是否真的存在流程能力。我觉得他们只是一群聪明人，但未必拥有独特的软件开发方法。
David: I think that got built over time.
David：我认为那是随着时间逐步建立起来的。
Ben: Agree.
Ben：同意。
David: Okay, branding, for sure.
David：好了，品牌力当然也是。
Ben: For sure.
Ben：当然。
David: Don't get fired for buying Microsoft.
David：买微软不会被炒鱿鱼。
Ben: That's true. Windows 95 built a consumer brand. The idea of a consumer brand of operating systems was there was Apple, but they were tiny, and that was more around the hardware.
Ben：没错。Windows 95 打造了消费级品牌。操作系统面向消费者的品牌概念当时只有苹果，但体量很小，而且主要依托硬件。
David: It's both fronts. It's their brand in the enterprise that is an amazing story that they built. They were branding consumer. The easiest to point to instantiation is the Rolling Stones and Jay Leno, but they had a software brand. Nobody had that.
David：这体现在双重层面。一方面，他们在企业市场构建的品牌故事令人惊叹；另一方面，他们也打造了消费品牌。最直观的例子就是滚石乐队和杰·雷诺，但他们真正建立的是软件品牌，这是别人没有的。
Ben: But branding is probably the thing that they rely on the least interestingly enough. There are other structural reasons that they're entrenched, where even if Microsoft had a crappy brand in this era, they probably still would have won. The magic of getting the whole deal with the IBM PC and then getting to sell licenses to all the other OEMs.
Ben：不过有意思的是，品牌或许是他们最不倚重的一环。还有其他结构性因素让他们根深蒂固，即使在那个时代微软的品牌很糟，他们可能依旧会赢。IBM PC 的整套合作以及随后向所有 OEM 销售授权的魔力才是关键。
David: That brings us to the last one, which I think is a super strong one at least in this era, cornered resource. DOS, full stop.
David：这把我们带到最后一条，我认为至少在那个年代这是一条非常强大的护城河——被垄断的资源。DOS，没别的。
Ben: Yup. It didn't start as a cornered resource, but as soon as IBM started shipping it on the IBM PCs, it was over. I'll say it again, IBM's distribution created demand for DOS, and then Microsoft just got to capture value from everyone else who wanted it.
Ben：对。它一开始并不是垄断资源，但 IBM 在 PC 上预装之后，一切就尘埃落定了。我再说一次，IBM 的渠道创造了对 DOS 的需求，然后微软就能从所有想要它的人那里攫取价值。
All right, we would do bear and bull, listeners, but we know what happened after this. The bull case is that the party continues, and Microsoft continues shipping amazing operating systems after amazing operating systems. That stays the important thing in the world. The bear case is something else becomes an important thing in the world. Just having this super locked-in operating system is not actually the way to bet your whole company for the future.
好了，按惯例我们会讨论多空观点，但听众们都知道后来的故事。多头论点是狂欢继续，微软持续推出一代又一代出色的操作系统，仍是全球关键；空头论点是世界出现新的核心事物，单靠一个超级锁定的操作系统并非押注公司未来的最佳方式。
David: The dramatic tension for you all to come back for our next episode on Microsoft here is not because you want to find out what happens.
David：吸引大家继续回来收听我们下一期微软节目的戏剧张力，并不是为了让你们知道接下来会发生什么。
Ben: That's true.
Ben：没错。
David: Okay, take away, splinter. We've spent the last probably six weeks deep in this. We've talked to everybody. What are you thinking about in the middle of the night?
David：好，收尾、拆解。过去大约六周里我们深入研究了这一切，采访了所有人。深夜里你在想什么？
Ben: The IBM deal. I can't unsee it. Microsoft figured out a way to take someone else's dominance and wholesale transfer that into their dominance for the next generation. The fact that IBM called the Project Chess is so deeply ironic because Bill Gates was playing chess and they played checkers.
Ben：那笔与 IBM 的交易。我无法忽视它。微软找到了把别人的主导权整盘转化为自己下一代主导权的方法。IBM 把项目称作“Project Chess”简直讽刺至极，因为比尔·盖茨下的是国际象棋，而他们下的只是跳棋。
David: Maybe Bill was playing 3D chess. This is the thing about it, though. We got to give IBM so much credit for Project Chess and the PC, that they even did what they did was huge, that a big entrenched corporation that could ship a skunkworks project in a year, revolutionized the industry. They just didn't end up capturing any value out of it.
David：也许比尔下的是三维棋局。不过有一点必须给 IBM 高度评价：他们启动 Project Chess，推出 PC，本身就是巨大的成就——一家根深蒂固的大公司能在一年内完成一项秘密项目并彻底改变行业。但他们最终却没能从中捕获任何价值。
Ben: If I could make a less cheeky comment on it, I would say it's that a new technology generation, when something becomes possible and opens up a new market, it enables a shift in the point of integration and a value chain.
Ben：如果少点调侃，我会说：当新一代技术让某些事情成为可能、并打开新市场时，就会促使集成节点和价值链转移。
The old value chain of IBM, if you shipped the mainframe, you had all the power. But in this new world of PCs, if you controlled the operating system that all the users were familiar with and all the developers wanted to target, you had all the power. I think that is not necessarily obvious unless you went through it and have the hindsight of history to be able to articulate it.
在 IBM 的旧价值链里，只要你交付大型机，你就拥有全部话语权。但在 PC 的新世界里，若你掌握了所有用户熟悉、所有开发者都想要针对的操作系统，你就拥有全部话语权。我认为，若非亲历其境并事后反观，未必能看出这一点。
David: I think you might be right. I think this might be the single best business deal negotiation of all time.
David：我觉得你可能说得对。这或许是史上最成功的一桩商业谈判。
Ben: It arguably created \$3 trillion of value.
Ben：它可以说创造了 3 万亿美元的价值。
David: No, a lot more than that because this is the point about Microsoft being a platform. Microsoft is worth \$3 trillion, but how much value has been created on top of Microsoft? No matter what you think, good, bad, or ugly of Microsoft, you can't deny that.
David：不，远不止这些——关键在于微软是一大平台。微软自身市值 3 万亿美元，但在微软之上又创造了多少价值？无论你对微软褒贬如何，这一点不可否认。
Ben: Absolutely.
Ben：确实如此。
David: At least twice as much, probably much, much more.
David：至少是两倍，甚至远不止于此。
Ben: You watch every early interview with Bill, and you read a lot of his writing, he's a great writer. It's awesome that so many of his memos leaked whether intentionally or unintentionally over time.
Ben：你看比尔早期的每一次采访，读他的大量文字——他写作极佳。许多备忘录无论是有意还是无意公开，真是太棒了。
David: So many of his memos were issued for publication.
David：他的许多备忘录后来都公开发表了。
Ben: He really did view himself as a steward of the software ecosystem, and had this steadfast belief that software was magic and was going to change the world. Over the next 20 years, from 1975 to 1995, software did change the world, and Microsoft enabled it to happen.
Ben：他确实把自己视作软件生态系统的守护者，并始终坚信软件拥有魔力，将会改变世界。从 1975 年到 1995 年的 20 年里，软件的确改变了世界，而微软让这一切成为可能。
Again, good, bad, or ugly, whatever you think of the company, they were sincere. I think the ugly part is, a lot of people want to hate on the value capture, because god did they capture value, but they were sincere in their desire and ability to create too.
不论你怎么看待这家公司，是善是恶，是美是丑，他们都是真诚的。我觉得人们讨厌的丑陋之处在于，他们确实攫取了巨额价值，但他们同样真诚且有能力去创造。
David: Totally. That's super related to my takeaway here. The moment for me in the research and then when we're telling the story along the way is when they start to believe in themselves that they don't need IBM. Just the audacity, and I mean that in a pure good way of these kids. These kids changed the world. That's so trite to say.
David：完全同意。这正呼应了我的收获。在研究和讲述过程中，让我印象最深的一刻是他们开始相信自己不再需要 IBM 的时候。那份胆识——我指的是纯粹正面的大胆——这些年轻人改变了世界，说来似乎陈词滥调。
My book we read my daughter at bedtime and somebody gave us, it's like the most Silicon Valley trophy thing ever. It's like, what do you do with an idea? The punchline at the end of it is you change the world. It's become such a trope, but these kids in the 70s did it. They believed in themselves in the beginning and then more and more and more over time.
有人送我们一本书，睡前我会给女儿读，简直是最符合硅谷气质的“奖杯书”。主题是“你拿到一个想法怎么办？”结尾的答案是“去改变世界”。这听起来已经成了套话，但 70 年代的这些年轻人真的做到了。他们一开始就相信自己，并且越来越坚定。
There's just this moment that I think, where they started to really, truly believe that they were going to change the world. Again, good, bad and ugly come out of that. Mostly good, I think, but just the level of ambition and audacity of these people is staggering.
我认为有那么一刻，他们真正相信自己要去改变世界。由此带来善恶丑各色结果，但总体还是好的一面居多。他们的雄心与大胆程度令人震撼。
Ben: Is that your splinter in your mind?
Ben：这就是扎在你脑海里的那根“刺”吗？
David: That's my splinter, yeah.
David：没错，那就是我的“刺”。
Ben: Listeners who are new to the show, we've been iterating on how we end episodes. We decided on this recently of, how should we land the plane? It's to talk about the thing that we can't stop thinking about.
Ben：各位新听众，我们一直在迭代节目结尾的方式。最近我们的决定是：该怎么“降落飞机”呢？就是聊聊我们挥之不去的那件事。
David: This company's 49 years old, and it's still the most valuable company in the world.
David：这家公司已经 49 岁了，依旧是全球市值最高的企业。
Ben: Crazy. All right, David, I have some trivia for you.
Ben：太疯狂了。好吧，David，我有个冷知识问你。
David: I love it. Trivia before carve outs.
David：太棒了，先来冷知识再做推荐。
Ben: Do you know where Dave Marquardt from TVI first encountered Bill Gates?
Ben：你知道 TVI 的 Dave Marquardt 第一次在哪儿遇到比尔·盖茨吗？
David: No, I just assumed it was through Steve.
David：不知道，我以为是通过 Steve。
Ben: Dave had watched Bill present many years earlier at none other than the Homebrew Computer Club at Stanford, the very place that is part of the Apple lore with Jobs and Woz showing off the early Apple computer. Apparently, Bill also went and made a presentation there and would hang out there, and that is where Dave first came across him.
Ben：多年前，Dave 就在斯坦福的 Homebrew Computer Club——正是乔布斯和沃兹展示早期苹果电脑、载入苹果史册的地方——看过比尔的演示。显然，比尔也去那里做过演讲并常去逛，Dave 就是在那里第一次见到他的。
David: Amazing. When we were talking about the letter that Bill writes to the hobbyist community decrying piracy and software, he's basically writing it to the Homebrew Computer Club. He believed that those were the people who were ripping off his software.
David：了不起。我们之前谈到比尔写给业余电脑爱好者社区、谴责软件盗版的那封信时，他实际上写的就是 Homebrew Computer Club 的成员。他认为正是那群人在盗用他的软件。
Ben: It's amazing. All right, carveouts?
Ben：太棒了。好，推荐环节？
David: All right, carveouts. For new listeners, at the end of every episode, Ben and I just chat about one or two things that we've been enjoying personally lately that usually have nothing to do with the episode.
David：好的，推荐时间。给新听众说明一下，每期节目结尾，Ben 和我都会随意聊一两件最近私下里很喜欢、通常与本期主题无关的东西。
In my case, I have two. The first one has a lot to do with the episode. I have discovered/rediscovered the LGR YouTube channel. Are you into this Ben?
对我来说今天有两个推荐。第一个和本期节目关系很大——我最近发现/重新发现了 LGR 这个 YouTube 频道。Ben，你知道吗？
Ben: No.
Ben：不知道。
David: Clint and LGR, and it stands for Lazy Game Reviews, which I think is how it started, but then it became so much more, and now it's just LGR. Clint is this awesome dude, and I think he lives in North Carolina. He is dedicated to basking in the glory, restoring, reliving, and preserving computer history, hardware and software from this era. The YouTube channel is all unboxing a Compaq PC from 1992 or restoring a Windows 3.1 machine.
David：频道主叫 Clint，全名是 “Lazy Game Reviews”，起初是这样，后来内容远超游戏评测，如今简称 LGR。Clint 是个超酷的家伙，好像住在北卡罗来纳州。他专注于展示、修复和保存这一时代的计算机历史、软硬件。频道内容包括开箱 1992 年的康柏电脑或修复 Windows 3.1 机器等。
Ben: That's awesome.
Ben：太酷了。
David: It's so good. He's got the best, most soothing voice in the world. He just seems like such a nice dude. He's dedicated to preserving the era of computing that we are talking about on this episode. It's so fun.
David：真的很棒。他的声音超级温和悦耳，人也非常友好。他致力于保存我们这期节目谈到的那段计算机年代，特别有趣。
Ben: That's cool. It's really hard because all hardware fails eventually. At some point, there will be zero computers out there that can run Windows 3.1 that will boot. The only way to experience any of these things is through an emulator. I don't know. To be able to capture high-res footage and stuff of those machines while they still work, it's cool.
Ben：这很酷。但确实很难，因为所有硬件最终都会坏。总有一天世上再也找不到能启动 Windows 3.1 的电脑。那时体验这些东西只能靠模拟器。趁这些机器还能运转时录下高分辨率画面，真的很赞。
David: Yup, super cool. My other carve out is Andre 3000 from Outkast. Do you know what Andre 3000 is up to these days?
David：对，超级酷。我的另一个推荐是 Outkast 的 Andre 3000。你知道他最近在忙什么吗？
Ben: Not at all. No.
Ben：完全不知道。
David: Oh, my God. Okay. GQ just did a big interview with Andre 3000 because he just released a new album. This is not what you think. Andre, a lot of people say, consensus top five rappers of all time. Big Boi, his counterpart in Outkast, also great too, but they basically went out on top.
David：天哪。GQ 刚刚对 Andre 3000 做了一个大型专访，因为他刚出了一张新专辑。和你想的不一样。很多人认为 Andre 是史上公认的五大说唱歌手之一。Outkast 的另一位成员 Big Boi 也很棒，而他们当年几乎是功成名就后淡出。
They did Speakerboxxx/The Love Below, which was their double album. I think it came out 2004 maybe. I was a freshman in college.
他们当时出了双碟专辑《Speakerboxxx/The Love Below》，大概是 2004 年发行？那会儿我还是大一新生。
Ben: Hey Ya was on that, right?
Ben：那首 “Hey Ya” 就在那张专辑里，对吧？
David: Hey Ya, yeah, everything was on that. They did one more album, and then they stopped. Andre would be featured on some other rappers tracks over the years, but didn't put out another album for close to 20 years. He just put out an album, and he just did this big video interview with GQ.
David：对，“Hey Ya” 就在那张专辑。他们后来又出了一张专辑就停了。Andre 这些年偶尔客串别的歌手的歌曲，但差不多 20 年没发专辑。现在他刚出了一张新专辑，还接受了 GQ 的大型视频采访。
The album is a flute album. He got really into woodwind instruments. This has been his life. He reveals in the interview that he has put out other songs and other albums over the years under pseudonyms. This interview is so great. It's so unexpected because the interviewer keeps asking, you're Andre 3000, why'd you stop rapping? I don't have anything to say. Am I going to rap about getting a colonoscopy? This is where my life is right now. I never wanted to put out any work that wasn't both authentic and great. I didn't have anything to say anymore.
这张专辑是长笛专辑。他迷上了木管乐器，这成了他的生活重心。他在采访中透露，自己过去曾以化名发布过其他歌曲和专辑。采访非常精彩且出乎意料，记者不断追问：你是 Andre 3000，为何停止说唱？他说：我没什么好说的，难道要唱做结肠镜检查？这是我现在的生活。我不想发布任何不真诚、不够好的作品。我没什么可说的了。
Ben: Yup, I love that. If you ever heard the phrase, go out when the top row at the back of the auditorium is empty?
Ben：是的，我很喜欢那句话。你有没有听过这句话：“当礼堂最后一排座位空出来时就该离场”？
David: Yeah, and that's what they did. Idlewild which was the album that came out after Speakerboxxx/The Love Below, was great, but it wasn't that, and yet that's exactly what he did.
David：对，他们就是这么做的。《Idlewild》是《Speakerboxxx/The Love Below》之后出的专辑，虽然很好，但不及前作，可他依旧选择了功成身退。
Ben: I think it's a Seinfeld quote. I might misattribute it. Drop a note in the Slack if I did, but I think it's a Seinfeld quote. "You let one row be empty, but you don't want to wait too long."
Ben：我记得这是塞恩菲尔德的名言，也许记错了，如果错了请在 Slack 里提醒我，大意是：“你可以让最后一排空出来，但别等太久。”
David: Yeah, it's the same thing as what Seinfeld did.
David：没错，这正是塞恩菲尔德做过的事。
Ben: Fascinating.
Ben：真有意思。
David: Super fun. We'll link to it in the show notes.
David：非常有趣，我们会在节目笔记里放链接。
Ben: All right. I have three and they're all different. We've had a tradition on the recent episodes of doing multiple carveouts, and all of them are different genres. My product that I've really been loving, my physical product is the Meta Ray-Bans.
Ben：我有三个推荐，类型各不相同。最近几期我们都推荐多样内容。我最近超喜欢的一件实物产品是 Meta Ray-Ban 智能眼镜。
David: Yes. I was talking with the team at Meta about them. They're doing great.
David：没错。我之前和 Meta 的团队聊过，他们的表现很棒。
Ben: I bet. It's a pretty delightful product. I bought them because I was in Hawaii and with my four month old son. We were in the pool and stuff. My iPhone's waterproof, but I want a different angle, and I don't necessarily want to be holding my phone. It's very cool to be able to take pictures and record video of what I actually see to be able to relive that moment.
Ben：我想也是。这款产品体验很赞。我是在夏威夷带着四个月大的儿子时买的，我们下泳池什么的。iPhone 虽然防水，但我想换个视角，也不想一直拿着手机。用它能拍摄我所见的画面、录像留念，非常酷。
I did a bunch of photos and video. We were on vacation that way, and then I discovered a thing that they're actually just awesome for. I think even better than AirPods is phone calls. The speakers are great. I wouldn't say necessarily they're the best for listening to music. The bass is obviously not as good as headphone bass. They project the sound down toward your ears. Unless you're standing really close to me, you can't really hear, or unless I have the volume all the way up.
我用它拍了很多照片和视频，度假就靠它。后来我发现它还有个惊艳功能——通话体验甚至比 AirPods 还好。扬声器效果很棒，虽然听音乐时低音不如耳机，但声音是向下投向耳朵，除非离我很近或我把音量调到最大，否则别人听不到。
The microphones are great too. I was on a long walk on the beach with the wind whipping by on a call with my mom. I was like, does this sound really bad and distorted to you? She's like, not at all. I was really impressed and we'll definitely be using them for more calls. I think that style of headphone over the ear, there are many things that it's not good for.
麦克风也很出色。我在海滩上迎着大风散步，一边给妈妈打电话。我问她声音是不是很糟？她说完全没问题。我很惊喜，决定以后多用它打电话。那种挂耳式扬声器在很多场景下其实比入耳式舒服。
When you're on an airplane or something, you want to plug your ears, or if you're in a super loud environment. But unless you're in one of those environments, it's a nice break for your ears versus having AirPods jammed in. It's a great call experience. So they're great.
坐飞机或在特别嘈杂的环境下你还是想塞住耳朵，但除非在那种场景，相比一直塞着 AirPods，让耳朵放松一下挺好。通话体验很棒，总之这眼镜很赞。
The battery's great. It's a four-hour battery, so it's a low key, more subtle, augmented reality experience. There's no heads up display. You don't see anything, but when you get a text message, it'll read it to you.
电池也不错，续航约四小时。这是一种低调、轻量的增强现实体验，没有抬头显示，你看不到界面，但收到短信时它会读给你听。
David: There's more than just the camera system.
David：它的功能可不止摄像头那么简单。
Ben: Totally. It basically is you have AirPods in, but you don't actually have AirPods in, and you have a pretty good photo video camera on your face.
Ben：完全正确。它本质上就像你戴着 AirPods，但事实上并没有耳机，而且你的脸上还装着一台相当不错的拍照和摄像机。
David: Does it have an indication when you're taking photo or recording video?
David：拍照或录像时它会有提示吗？
Ben: Yes. It's not super bright. I'm not sure everybody really knows when you are, but if you know what to look for, you know if it's on or off.
Ben：有，但不是特别显眼。我不确定所有人都能看出来，不过如果你知道要留意什么，就能判断它是否在工作。
David: Cool.
David：很酷。
Ben: I've been loving it. I think it's a great product. I intend to wear them a lot this summer.
Ben：我很喜欢它，觉得这是款出色的产品。今年夏天我打算经常戴它。
My second one is a thank-you to a very, very good designer, Julia Rundberg, who worked with David and I on a recent project for some design work, some of which is actually featured as we speak on Apple Podcasts. She did a bunch of other stuff with us, too, and she's really excellent.
我的第二个推荐是对一位非常优秀的设计师 Julia Rundberg 的感谢。最近一个项目中她与我和 David 合作做了设计，其中一些作品此刻已在 Apple Podcasts 上展示。她还为我们做了很多其他设计，真的很出色。
If you're looking for someone who's good at visual identity, branding, slide decks, websites, I've worked with her on a few projects before and she's just awesome, so I wanted to recommend her.
如果你正在寻找擅长视觉形象、品牌设计、演示文稿或网站的人选，我之前和她合作过几个项目，她非常棒，所以想推荐给大家。
My third is this community spotlight to go all the way back to nine years ago Acquired. It was a listener who runs a company called Summer Health reached out and said, I heard you say that you have a baby. I've got this great company that is for new parents, and here's some info on it. I am now a paying member. It is an on-demand texting relationship with a pediatrician.
我的第三个推荐是一个社区亮点，要追溯到九年前的 Acquired。那时有位听众经营一家公司叫 Summer Health，他联系我说听到我提到有了宝宝。他的公司专为新手父母服务，并介绍了相关信息。我现在已成为付费会员。它提供随时通过短信与儿科医生沟通的服务。
David: Wow. This is crack for new parents.
David：哇，这对新手父母简直是“神药”。
Ben: It is crack for parents. It's crazy. You can hook up multiple phones, so my wife and I both have a direct line to like, something weird is going on, will you help me through it? We had a 2:00 AM wake-up the other night. Everything ended up being fine, but as I'm sure any other new parents can relate to, you really want to make sure in the middle of the night, if you're not sure if everything's fine, you would like to figure out the right steps to make sure everything's fine. Having a virtual doctor on demand is totally amazing. Summer Health, if you are a new parent, we've been loving it.
Ben：对父母而言确实是“神药”，太疯狂了。你可以绑定多部手机，所以我和妻子都能直接联系医生：出现奇怪情况时，请帮我们处理。前几天凌晨两点我们被孩子吵醒，最后一切都好，但相信所有新手父母都懂，那种半夜不确定是否正常却想搞清楚正确做法的心情。有随时待命的线上医生简直太棒了。如果你是新手父母，强烈推荐 Summer Health，我们非常喜欢。
David: Amazing. I'm going to have to subscribe. We've referred to this before. I think this will probably be the last episode that comes out while I'm still the parent of just one child. Number two coming soon. If it may take a little longer than usual for the next Microsoft episode to come out, our next six-hour opus on Microsoft, don't get too mad, that is the reason why.
David：太棒了，我得去订阅一下。之前我们提到过这件事。我想这很可能是我仍只有一个孩子时发布的最后一期节目。二宝快来了。如果下一期关于微软的六小时巨作发布得比平时晚些，别太生气，原因就在这里。
Ben: We have a lot of thank-yous on this one, as you can imagine. People were really generous with their time, pointing us to different resources, explaining their recollection of history as it happened. Being in Seattle, active in the venture community here, both through PSL and David, you're in my shared history at Madrona, me working at Microsoft, a lot of good opportunities to learn what really happened from folks.
Ben：正如你们可以想象的，这一期我们要感谢很多人。大家非常慷慨地抽时间，引导我们去不同的资料来源，讲述他们亲历的历史。我们身处西雅图，活跃于这里的创投圈——无论是通过 PSL，还是 David 你我在 Madrona 的共同经历，或我在微软的工作，都让我们有很多机会向业内人士了解当年的真实情况。
A huge thank-you to Mike Slade who spent the time with me. Mike spent two different stints at Microsoft and then at NeXT, and Apple in between.
非常感谢 Mike Slade 抽时间与我交流。Mike 在微软有两段经历，后来去了 NeXT，中间还在苹果工作过。
David: Yeah, he worked for Steve at NeXT, right?
David：对，他在 NeXT 给 Steve 做事，对吧？
Ben: Yup. One of the few people in the world who both spent a ton of time with Steve, Bill, and worked closely with both of them. It's so great to get his perspective, especially about the early days of Office and the applications group. Very helpful. Similarly, Pete Higgins worked closely with Mike. Pete, I think, ran Excel for a long time and oversaw a lot of the different stuff in the applications group, and I believe also ran Office.
Ben：没错。他是少数同时与 Steve 和 Bill 深度共事的人之一。能听到他的视角太棒了，尤其是关于 Office 和应用部门早期的故事，非常有帮助。同样，Pete Higgins 也与 Mike 共事多年。Pete 长期负责 Excel，管理应用部门的多项事务，我记得他也主管过 Office。
It's funny how many different people picked up the mantle over time as these things traded around groups. But frankly, I think that's a huge part of the Microsoft story. The company very quickly adapted and changed its structure depending on the current needs of technology, competitors, and et cetera.
有趣的是，随着业务在各团队间转移，有多少人先后接过大旗。但坦率说，这正是微软故事的重要部分——公司总能根据技术、竞争格局等需求迅速调整结构。
Huge thanks to Tren Griffin, who is actually a lifelong Seattleite and close friend to the whole Gates family. Bill Gates Sr. was his mentor. I'm sure you've seen Tren's prolific tweets online about Microsoft history. Actually, Tren I think currently works at Microsoft in a strategy role. Thanks Tren for your help as well. David, I know you've got a bunch.
还要大大感谢 Tren Griffin，他是土生土长的西雅图人，与盖茨家族交情深厚，Bill Gates Sr. 是他的导师。想必你们看过他在推特上关于微软历史的大量帖子。目前 Tren 也在微软做战略工作。谢谢你的帮助。David，你那边也有很多要感谢的。
David: Yes. Also, speaking of former Microsoft folks who are very active and prolific on Twitter, we talked to Steven Sinofsky who had lots and lots of great perspective, and we can't wait to share more of it on the next episode.
David：没错。同样提到活跃在推特上的微软前高管，我们采访了 Steven Sinofsky，他给了我们大量精彩见解，期待在下一期中分享更多。
Ben: I read 20 of Steven's Hardcore Software posts. When David and I were dividing up what belongs in what episode, I realized 19 of them belong in next episode. Steven, thank you for your early prep work for part two.
Ben：我读了 Steven 的 20 篇《Hardcore Software》文章。在我和 David 划分哪些内容放在哪一期时，我发现其中 19 篇都该留到下一集。Steven，谢谢你为第二部分做的早期准备。
David: So much fun internet stuff to talk with that Steven was right there for. I spoke with other people who ran windows, Terry Myerson who's a great friend and a supporter of the show. Terry ran Windows for quite a long time, right?
David：有太多网络趣闻要和 Steven 聊。我还采访了其他 Windows 部门领导，比如 Terry Myerson，他是我们的好朋友和节目的支持者。Terry 曾经长期负责 Windows，对吧？
Ben: Yeah. When I was there, Terry was EVP over Windows and Windows Phone.
Ben：对。我在微软时，Terry 是 Windows 和 Windows Phone 的执行副总裁。
David: Terry was very generous. He was actually the first person that clued us into just how key Steve's role was in building the enterprise for Microsoft.
David：Terry 非常慷慨。他是第一个提醒我们：Steve 在微软企业市场建设中角色多么关键的人。
Ben: And how different the go to market motions were for Windows and Office. I think Terry was the one that gave us the insight of Windows, especially in the early days. It was basically an OEM game, small group doing an OEM thing.
Ben：以及 Windows 与 Office 的市场打法如何截然不同。我想是 Terry 让我们了解到早期 Windows 基本就是 OEM 模式，由一个小团队负责 OEM 业务。
David: There were 10 people selling that.
David：当时只有 10 个人负责销售。
Ben: And it's still I don't think a very big team even today.
Ben：直到今天，这支团队规模似乎也不大。
David: Speaking of strategy, Charles Fitzgerald, who's OG in Microsoft and a great platform strategy guy, prolific angel investor in Seattle now, it's fun chatting with him about the early days.
David：说到战略，还有微软元老级人物 Charles Fitzgerald，他是平台战略高手，现在是西雅图活跃的天使投资人。和他聊微软早期历史非常有趣。
Ben: Obviously, Brad Silverberg who we mentioned a bunch. It was very fun seeing after spending some time talking with Brad and texting a lot with him to see the end of the Windows 95 announcement after Bill and Jay Leno are done for Brad to come out and finish it off. It's fun. It's like watching a time machine, watching that thing is really cool.
Ben：当然，还有我们多次提到的 Brad Silverberg。和 Brad 深聊、互发大量短信后，再去看 Windows 95 发布会末尾，当 Bill 和 Jay Leno 退场后，Brad 上台收尾，特别有趣，宛如坐上时光机。
Soma Somasegar at Madrona is someone that David and I love crossing paths with in the Seattle entrepreneurship ecosystem.
Madrona 的 Soma Somasegar 也是我和 David 在西雅图创业生态圈常遇到的好朋友。
David: Soma's just such a legend at Microsoft and in the industry too. There's so many people who Soma made their careers, plucked them out of school, saw something in them that maybe they didn't even see in themselves, and then they went on to be big executives or venture capitalists at Microsoft or elsewhere.
David：Soma 在微软及整个行业都堪称传奇。许多人正是因他而崭露头角——他把他们从校园中发掘出来，看见他们尚未自知的潜力，之后他们成了微软或其他地方的高管、风险投资人。
Ben: Lastly, huge thank you to Steve Ballmer. To be honest, it was a little bit surreal chatting and hearing about his experience over the whole thing. There's nobody including Bill Gates that bleeds Microsoft more than Steve Ballmer, and his just unabashed pure pride in what they built is infectious.
Ben：最后，衷心感谢 Steve Ballmer。坦白说，能与他交流、聆听他的经历有点不真实。包括比尔·盖茨在内，没有人比 Steve Ballmer 更“微软”，他对所打造一切毫无保留的自豪感极具感染力。
David: Absolutely. It was so fun talking to Steve. He was so gracious with his time. It must have been just super special for you too. He was the CEO when you worked there.
David：完全同意。与 Steve 交谈非常愉快，他慷慨地抽出时间。对你而言这也一定意义非凡——毕竟你在微软时他就是 CEO。
Ben: Totally. To be frank, I had a very opposite strategy in mind, but I was a new hire out of college, individual contributor PM. It was still the Windows company then, and Steve was championing the Windows strategy, and I was a guy working on Office for iPad.
Ben：确实。说实话，当时我的思路完全相反；那时我刚毕业入职，做单兵 PM。彼时微软仍是“Windows 公司”，Steve 全力推动 Windows 战略，而我却负责 iPad 版 Office。
If you like this episode, I was thinking of ones to recommend. It would be pretty funny to go listen to the forethought acquisition, given all of this context. It's a short episode when David and I were not good at this yet, and we did our very best. It is from our early days, and it covers overlapping source material.
如果你喜欢本期节目，我想推荐另一集——关于 Forethought 收购案。结合今天的背景再听会很有趣。那是我们还不太熟练时录的短篇，我们尽了最大努力，属于早期作品，且素材有不少重叠。
David: Forethought was the company that made PowerPoint, Microsoft acquired, the first major acquisition for the company.
David：Forethought 是开发 PowerPoint 的公司，微软收购了它——那是微软的首次重大并购。
Ben: If you are new to the show and looking for great recent episodes that we've done, I highly recommend the Visa one as discussed earlier in the Network of Networks idea, if you haven't heard that, or perhaps the Nintendo or NVIDIA episodes, all of which will be right up your alley if you liked this one.
Ben：如果你是新听众且想找些近期精彩内容，我强烈推荐我们关于 Visa 的那一期，里面谈到“网络中的网络”概念；或者任天堂、NVIDIA 等，也会符合你的口味。
David: If you're not at all interested in technology or software, but have somehow managed to get through all these hours with us, give a listen to our LVMH and Hermes episodes. Even if you do love technology and software, which obviously you do if you're still here, there's so much to learn from that world.
David：如果你对科技软件并无兴趣，却仍陪我们听了这么久，可以去听听我们关于 LVMH 和 Hermès 的节目。即便你热爱科技软件（显然能坚持到现在就说明这一点），奢侈品世界仍有大量值得借鉴之处。
Ben: If you want to know every time an episode drops, get hints at the next episode topic, and get episode corrections and follow up, you can sign up at acquired.fm/email. Come discuss this episode with everyone else who's chatting about it at acquired.fm/slack.
Ben：若想第一时间获知新节目、获取下一期线索以及勘误与跟进，欢迎订阅 acquired.fm/email。想和大家讨论本期内容，加入 acquired.fm/slack。
If you're looking for another episode, go check out our second show, ACQ2, where we will have actually some very awesome tech CEO guests coming out over the next month or so that are absolutely worth listening to, especially if you're interested in semiconductor and tech history. If you want some sweet Acquired merch, go to acquire.fm/store.
如果想再听一档节目，去看看我们的第二档播客 ACQ2。接下来一个月左右我们会请来几位超棒的科技公司 CEO，尤其关注半导体与科技史的朋友别错过。想要精美的 Acquired 周边，可访问 acquire.fm/store。
With that, listeners, we'll see you next time.
说到这里，听众朋友们，我们下次再见。
David: We'll see you next time.
David：下次见。
Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions.
注：Acquired 的主持人与嘉宾可能持有节目中讨论的资产。本播客不构成投资建议，仅供信息与娱乐之用。进行任何金融交易前，请自行研究并独立决策。