Michael Batnick:

So nobody has done the Warren and Charlie GPT yet that I'm aware of. Doesn't that seem obvious?

据我所知，目前还没人做出一个“沃伦和查理版”的GPT。这难道不显而易见吗？

Speaker 1:

It does rather, as soon as you mention it.

你这么一说，确实挺明显的。

Michael Batnick:

I'm about to do this. What would Charlie say?

我准备做这个。查理会怎么说？

Speaker 1:

The Ritz-Holz Warren ChatGPT.

“里茨-霍尔兹版”的沃伦ChatGPT。

Michael Batnick:

The problem is if you ask it certain questions, it would say I have nothing to add. And no one's looking for that.

问题是如果你问它某些问题，它可能会回答“我没什么好补充的”。没人想听这样的回答。

Chris Davis:

You'd be lucky if it didn't say Asinine.

如果它没说“愚蠢至极”，你都该庆幸了。

Michael Batnick:

All right. So, John, thank you so much for doing this. And Chris, it's great to see you again. And this should be a lot of fun. There are going to be some sound effects in your ears. So, yeah.

好的，约翰，非常感谢你的参与。克里斯，再次见到你太好了。这应该会很有趣。你们耳机里可能会听到一些音效。所以，就这样了。

Chris Davis:

Do I put these on?

我需要戴上这些吗？

Speaker 1:

Okay.

好的。

Michael Batnick:

So for example, I got it.

比如说，我懂了。

Speaker 1:

I'm going to play those after after my intervention. Yes.

我会在我讲话之后再播放那些音效。对的。

Michael Batnick:

Yes. All right. This is gonna be awesome. I'm so excited to have you guys. How are we looking, everybody? Warren, Charlie, you ready? Yes. All right. John, this used to be a conference room. Right.

是的，好了，这会非常棒。我很高兴你们能来。大家准备得怎么样了？沃伦，查理，准备好了吗？好，约翰，这里以前是个会议室，对吧。

And then in 2021, I said, we may never have an in-person meeting again. What else can we do with this room?

然后在2021年，我说，我们可能再也不会有面对面的会议了。那我们还能用这个房间做点什么呢？

Speaker 1:

True story.

真实的故事。

Michael Batnick:

And Duncan and John transformed it into a full-fledged studio.

邓肯和约翰把这里改造成了一个完整的录音棚。

Speaker 1:

I at one point actually felt the need to make myself a rule that I had to talk to another human being.

有段时间，我甚至觉得有必要给自己制定个规则，要求自己必须去跟另一个人交谈。

Michael Batnick:

In person.

是的，当面交谈。

Speaker 1:

At least once a day. Yeah. And obviously I only did that because if I didn't force myself to do that, I wouldn't get through the day so easily without human contact.

至少一天一次。显然，我这么做完全是因为如果我不强迫自己这样做，每天缺乏人与人的接触，我就很难熬下去。

Michael Batnick:

Yes, increasingly more so these days.

是的，最近这种情况越来越明显了。

Speaker 1:

Not good.

不太好。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah, I agree.

没错，我同意。

Chris Davis:

Although I did like to see Jamie sort of—

不过，我确实挺喜欢看到杰米（戴蒙）有点——

Michael Batnick:

dialing back his rant about in-person being in-person, yeah, and it went sort of viral, and then somebody asked him about it, he said, well, I was emoting a little bit. He said the greatest thing I've heard on the subject. He said, "I work from home on Saturdays and Sundays." That one wasn't very popular. Jamie has more equity than most of the people that landed on. So, are we ready to go? All right.

他收回了一些关于“面对面办公”的激烈言论，对吧？这段还挺火的。后来有人问起这件事，他回应说：“当时我情绪化了一点。” 他讲了我在这方面听过最棒的一句话：“我周六周日在家办公。” 这话不太受欢迎。不过，杰米的地位比大部分受到影响的人高太多了。好了，我们准备好了吗？

Unknown Speaker:

Alright, coming in with three claps.

好的，准备鼓掌三次入场。

Michael Batnick:

Hey John, what episode number is this?

嘿，约翰，这是第几期节目？

Unknown Speaker:

Flush, We Are All In The Company Of Friends, Episode 1 and 2.

《Flush》，我们都是朋友，第一期和第二期。

Michael Batnick:

This episode is sponsored by Apex FinTech Solutions. The time to compete for next-gen clients is now, like now, now. Transforming your business for the future might seem like something that you can push off, but by the time it is a problem, it may be too late. Sure, you could sit this one out and your business will probably be fine tomorrow, but meanwhile, you are letting some new FinTech win a generation of loyal customers around you.

本期节目由Apex金融科技解决方案赞助。现在，就是现在，是争夺下一代客户的时候了。为未来转型业务看似可以推迟，但一旦成为问题，就可能为时已晚。你当然可以观望一下，也许明天生意还能照常进行，但与此同时，你却可能正在让一些新兴的金融科技公司夺走你身边一整代忠诚的客户。

Augmented advice from Apex gives you the power to be what the next generation wants on your terms. It's not a robo. It's a modern on-ramp to tailored advice using your brand, your personal touch and Apex efficiency.

Apex增强建议能帮助你以自己的方式满足下一代客户的需求。这不是机器人理财，而是一个现代化的入口，让你能够结合自己的品牌、个人特色与Apex的高效来提供定制化建议。

Learn more at apexfintechsolutions.com slash augmented advice. 192. My word. Can you believe we've done this 192 times, John? We have. We have. Maybe more. Some would say more.

详情请访问 apexfintechsolutions.com/augmented-advice。192期了，天哪！约翰，你相信我们已经做了192期了吗？我们确实做了，也许还不止呢。有些人觉得还更多呢。

Chris Davis:

Were you working up a list or down a list?

你们这是从头往后数还是从后往前数的？

Michael Batnick:

All right, guys, this is a real treat for me. I'm so excited. Chris Davis is our returning champion. Chris is a chairman and portfolio manager for Davis Advisors, an investment management firm with over \$20 billion in AUM.

好了，各位，这次对我来说真的特别高兴。克里斯·戴维斯是我们的“回归冠军”。克里斯是戴维斯顾问公司的主席兼投资组合经理，这家投资管理公司管理着超过200亿美元的资产。

Chris is a portfolio manager for the Davis Large Cap and Financial Portfolios. Welcome back, my friend.

克里斯是戴维斯大盘股和金融投资组合的经理。欢迎回来，我的朋友。

Chris Davis:

Thank you so much.

非常感谢。

Speaker 3:

Pleasure. Looking good.

很荣幸。你状态不错嘛。

Michael Batnick:

You're getting a Peter O'Toole.

你有点彼得·奥图尔的风范。

Chris Davis:

Well, you know the thing about wearing a sweater vest is my wife said to me, I love seeing you go out to work every day in your sweater vest. And I said, why? And she said—I said, do you like the way it looks? And she said, no, that way I know you're not having an affair.

你知道我为什么穿背心毛衣吗？我太太对我说：“我喜欢看你每天穿着背心毛衣去上班。” 我问她：“为什么？你觉得这穿着很好看？” 她说：“不是，这样我就知道你没出去偷情。”

Michael Batnick:

And here with us for the first time, John Authers. John is a Senior Editor for Markets and for Bloomberg Opinion Columnist.

今天首次与我们一同录制的是约翰·奥瑟斯。约翰是彭博市场高级编辑兼专栏作家。

John is a former Chief Markets Commentator at the Financial Times and he is the author of Welcome to The Fearful Rise of Markets. John, thank you so much for doing this.

约翰曾任《金融时报》的首席市场评论员，他著有《欢迎来到市场恐慌的崛起》一书。约翰，非常感谢你的参与。

Speaker 1:

Thanks for having me.

谢谢邀请我参加。

Michael Batnick:

All right. Can I ask you, when did you move from the FT to Bloomberg Opinion?

好，我能问一下，你是什么时候从《金融时报》跳到彭博专栏的吗？

Speaker 1:

Six and a half years ago now, 2018. Six and a half years.

六年半前，2018年，到现在六年半了。

Michael Batnick:

Okay. Your columns, I think you're every two weeks-ish or every week. How frequently are you publishing?

好的，你的专栏文章，大概是两周一次还是每周一次？你发布频率是多少？

Speaker 1:

Well, I publish every night. The newsletter.

我每晚都会发布，是新闻通讯。

Michael Batnick:

Oh, the newsletter.

哦，是新闻通讯啊。

Speaker 1:

And now I'm doing a weekly column, which is a new thing and I'm going weekly.

现在我还开始写每周一次的专栏，这是新增加的内容，每周一次。

Michael Batnick:

Okay. And you, I mean, you cover the gamut because I read your last 10 columns or so in preparation for this and you hit on it.

好的，我看了你最近大约10篇文章，为这次采访做准备。你真的是涉猎广泛啊。

Speaker 1:

You have my sympathy. Yes, carry on.

你辛苦了。好的，请继续。

Michael Batnick:

But you're a polymath. Is that too far?

不过，说你是“博学多才”，会不会太夸张了？

Speaker 1:

I like to think so.

我倒愿意这样认为。

Michael Batnick:

Okay.

好的。

Speaker 1:

But if you want to boost my ego that way, I'm only too happy for you to do that. And that's what I'm supposed to do. I'm supposed to cover the waterfront. That's the idea.

不过如果你想这样抬高我的自尊，我也非常乐意。这也是我的职责所在，我的任务本来就是广泛地涉猎各种话题。

Michael Batnick:

You certainly do. And I appreciate all the stuff that you write and everything that you've done over the years. Guys, I want to start by playing a very short clip that I think sets the table for what we're going to discuss very nicely.

你确实做到了，我很欣赏你写的这些内容，以及你这些年来做的所有事情。各位，我想先播放一段非常简短的音频片段，我觉得这能很好地引出我们接下来要讨论的话题。

John, if you would.

约翰，麻烦你了。

Speaker 3:

The time has arrived where Greg should become the chief executive officer of the company at year end and I want to spring that on the directors effectively and give that as my recommendation.

时机已经成熟，我认为格雷格应该在年底成为公司的首席执行官。我想正式向董事们提出这个建议，让他们提前有所准备。

Let them have the time to think about what questions or what structures or anything they want and then there's a meeting following that. Which will come in a few months. We'll take action on whatever the view is of the 11 directors.

让董事们有充分时间考虑他们可能提出的各种问题或结构安排，接下来几个月我们会召开另一次会议，根据11位董事的看法采取行动。

I think they'll be unanimously in favor of it. And that would mean that at year end, Greg would be the Chief Executive Officer of Berkshire and I would still hang around and could conceivably be useful in a few cases but then the final word would be what Greg said in operations.

我想他们会一致同意。这意味着到今年年底，格雷格将成为伯克希尔的CEO，而我会继续待在公司，在少数情况下或许还能发挥点作用，不过最终决策权将由格雷格掌控。

Michael Batnick:

OK, now that, of course, was followed by probably ten full minutes, would you say, of standing ovation at the Berkshire annual meeting? It was a pretty major milestone, I would say, for all investors.

好，这段发言之后，伯克希尔年会上出现了大概整整十分钟的起立鼓掌吧？我认为对所有投资者来说，这是一个相当重大的里程碑。

It's kind of feels like the end of an era. Warren Buffett is now 94 and he's been at it since 1965. Is that right?

这似乎标志着一个时代的终结。沃伦·巴菲特现在94岁，他从1965年起就开始执掌公司了，对吧？

Speaker 1:

The Buffett Partnerships might even have been before.

巴菲特合伙企业甚至可能更早。

Chris Davis:

Yeah, the Buffett Partnerships went into the 50s.

是的，巴菲特合伙企业可以追溯到50年代。

Michael Batnick:

I was going to say the tenure at Berkshire though.

不过我指的是他在伯克希尔的任期。

Speaker 1:

Berkshire is 60 years.

在伯克希尔是整整60年。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah. It's a full 60 years. Pretty incredible.

是的，整整60年。真是令人难以置信。

Speaker 1:

All right.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

First of all, I guess what I'd love to hear from you, John, is how that landed on you when you saw it.

首先，我很好奇，约翰，当你看到这个消息时，你有什么感受？

Speaker 1:

As you said, I have known nothing. Berkshire Hathaway or Warren Buffett's position at Berkshire Hathaway is slightly older than I am, let alone in my professional life.

正如你所说，我从未经历过别的。伯克希尔·哈撒韦或沃伦·巴菲特在伯克希尔的任职历史，比我的年龄还要长，更不用说我的职业生涯了。

It's a very strange thought that he isn't going to be there as a constant. The second thought that occurred to me, which I think is one of the many candidates for smartest thing Warren Buffett ever said, is what he's looking for.

想到他不再是那个永远在场的存在，感觉非常奇怪。我的第二个念头——我认为这是巴菲特说过的许多最智慧的话之一——是关于他在寻找什么样的人。

I don't think Warren Buffett is a genius as normally understood, but when it comes to EQ, emotional intelligence, he probably is. And when he was starting to look for people to take over managing the portfolio,

我不觉得沃伦·巴菲特是传统意义上的天才，但就情商（EQ）而言，他很可能是。当他开始寻找接班人来管理投资组合时，

again, Chris can correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that what he was asking for then was emotional intelligence, people who were in control of their own emotions,

当然，如果我记错了，克里斯可以纠正我一下，但我记得他当时强调的是情商，寻找那些能够很好控制自己情绪的人，

who knew their strengths and their weaknesses and who could live with admitting mistakes and so on. And obviously we're still living in the shadow of the tragic era Joe Biden made in not recognizing that it was time for him to hang up.

清楚自己优缺点，能坦然承认错误的人。显然，我们目前还活在乔·拜登那个不承认自己该退休的悲剧阴影下。

Michael Batnick:

I think he was fine. A lot of people forget their wife's name.

我觉得他状态还好吧，很多人都会忘了妻子的名字嘛。

Speaker 1:

But it's difficult to admit that it's time for you to stand down.

不过，承认自己该退下来了，的确是件不容易的事。

It doesn't take a genius, but it does take somebody with fairly special qualities to realize and accept that now is probably the time I better go, that my curveball isn't quite as good as it was. Warren Buffett's case after 60 years seems reasonable enough.

承认自己该退下不需要天才，但需要某种特别的品质，意识到并接受现在或许是该离开的时候了，自己的“曲线球”可能不如从前那么厉害了。巴菲特60年后选择退下来，看起来是足够合理的决定。

Michael Batnick:

I say this to Barry Ritholtz all the time. So all right. But so there's something emblematic, though, of that. He's not a boomer. He's greatest generation, I think. Right. Born in the 30s.

我总是跟巴里·里托兹这么说。好了，不过这件事还有些象征意义。他并不是婴儿潮一代，而是最伟大的一代人（The Greatest Generation），对吗？他是30年代出生的。

Chris Davis:

He was born and conceived, I think, right after the market crash.

他应该是在股市大崩盘后不久出生的。

Michael Batnick:

Yes, he was '29. So, okay. So, he's of that generation, but I do think we are at a moment where the boomer generation, they are, I mean, these are our clients. So, we have these conversations with people.

没错，他是1929年出生的。所以，好，他是属于那个世代。但我认为我们现在正处在一个关键时刻，婴儿潮一代正面临这个问题。我是说，他们就是我们的客户，所以我们会经常跟他们讨论这个话题。

There's a huge number of Americans right now and over the last few years and over the next few years to come that are being faced with that idea of I may not be fully aware of everything that's going on to the extent that I was.

在过去几年、当前以及接下来几年，大量美国人都不得不面对这个现实：也许我不像以前那么清楚周围发生的一切了。

Speaker 1:

Yes.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

If the admission doesn't have to go further than that, it doesn't have to go into a place where, you know, I can't take care of myself or I can't think for myself. It's just I may not be what I was 10 years ago.

承认这一点并不意味着必须进一步承认自己无法照顾自己或无法独立思考。它仅仅意味着“也许我不再是十年前的那个我了”。

And I think that a lot of people are faced with that right now all over the country. So I thought that was somewhat emblematic of this kind of changing of the guard that we're experiencing in the economy.

我想，目前全国各地很多人都正面临这种情况。因此，我觉得这件事也在某种程度上象征着我们经济领域正在经历的这种“权力更替”。

Speaker 1:

Yeah, it's the problem of life insurance. Develop because the problem then was that too many people didn't live long enough. Yeah, now it's all about pensions because the problem is too many people in many ways live too long or live longer than they were ever planning to, right?

没错，就像人寿保险最初出现时解决的是人们寿命太短的问题。如今的重点则变成了养老金，因为许多人活得比预期更长久了，对吧？

And yeah, it's very emblematic that the guy has done as much as he has for boosting the savings of many people also works out that he needs to—works out that this is a good time to leave, right?

而且这很有象征意义：一位为提升很多人储蓄做出巨大贡献的人，也意识到是时候退场了，不是吗？

Michael Batnick:

I think that's apropos. You are, Chris, you are a board director at Berkshire Hathaway. Tell people a little bit about from the inside when that came out because I know it was a surprise. It was like a not-surprise surprise.

我觉得你说得很贴切。克里斯，你是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事。你能不能从内部视角谈谈，当消息宣布时的情况？因为我知道那是个惊喜，但又不完全意外的惊喜。

People understood the succession, but maybe not the timing of the announcement.

人们理解接班人问题，但可能没想到宣布的时机。

Chris Davis:

Well, I'll give you first a big disclaimer. I've been going and attending Berkshire meetings since about 1989 and one of the first stocks I ever bought and definitely a card-carrying member of the cult.

首先，我要做一个重要的免责声明。我从大约1989年就开始参加伯克希尔的股东大会了。这是我最早买的股票之一，我绝对算是一个资深的伯克希尔粉丝。

So everything I say, I should be talking as a longtime investor and owner and deep fan of the company.

因此，我接下来所说的一切都是以长期投资者、股东和公司忠实粉丝的身份来说的。

Michael Batnick:

However, it sounds like there's a however.

不过，听起来你还有个“但是”。

Chris Davis:

Well, I just want to say that, you know, I never want to ever be in a position as if I'm speaking for Berkshire or speaking as a director. So I'll give you that as sort of a caveat.

是的，我只是想强调一下，我并不想代表伯克希尔或者以董事的身份发言。这算是我的一个提醒。

You know, what I'd say is if you went to see, you know, Babe Ruth playing, you know, late in his career and, you know, if he was 44 years old and they'd won the World Series and he announced his retirement, it would be both a surprise and not a surprise.

如果你去看棒球传奇贝比·鲁斯职业生涯后期的比赛，比如他44岁时赢了世界大赛后宣布退休，这个消息可能既是意料之外，也是情理之中。

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

是啊。

Chris Davis:

So, you know, the funny thing is I was sitting next to my dad when he made the announcement. And I was sitting next to my dad at my first Berkshire meeting. And it was shockingly emotional and surprisingly so.

你知道吗，有趣的是，他宣布这个消息时，我正坐在我父亲旁边。当年我第一次参加伯克希尔年会时，也坐在父亲旁边。这次宣布消息竟然让我感到意外的激动，非常出乎意料。

Because in some ways, as I say, it's not a surprise. This has been a transition. I went back to that first meeting and realized that today I'm older today than Warren was at that meeting.

因为从某种程度上来说，就像我说的，这并不意外。这本来就是一个过渡。我回想起第一次开会时，意识到现在的我已经比当时的沃伦还要年长了。

And one of the questions I asked him at that meeting is, what about succession?

而当时我在会上问他的其中一个问题就是：“继任者怎么办？”

Michael Batnick:

We got your answer. You had to wait. You had to wait a minute. You got your answer.

现在你终于等到了答案，虽然你不得不等上一段时间，但你确实得到了你的答案。

Speaker 3:

All right.

确实。

Michael Batnick:

When you say it was emotional in the room, can you describe it?

当你说当时现场很激动人心时，你能具体描述一下吗？

Chris Davis:

Well, I think there was this sense, I mean, in a funny way, it was, you know, when Charlie died, he was 99 and three quarters, right? Who could be surprised to get the phone call and yet he was also eternal, right?

嗯，我想现场有种特殊的感觉。换种奇妙的方式来说吧，比如查理去世时，他已经99岁零9个月了，对吧？接到电话时谁会觉得意外呢？但与此同时，他似乎又永恒不灭。

So there was something, he was so timeless and he had been so much a part of our sort of universe for so long that in that way, it was like a parent being gone. It's natural in the order of things, but your whole existence, they've been there.

他就像一个超越时间存在的人物，他在我们的世界里停留了太久，从这个意义上讲，这种感觉就像失去父母一样。这本是自然规律，但因为他们始终存在于你的世界中，所以一旦离去，就感觉极不自然。

So it feels very unnatural.

所以那种感觉特别奇怪。

Michael Batnick:

It's incredible that he made it to 99 and three quarters. Nobody asked for an autopsy after that one, to your point.

是啊，他竟然能活到99岁零9个月，简直令人难以置信。就像你说的，这种情况下没人会要求验尸的。

Chris Davis:

Although, I did ask him what he wanted for his birthday and he said, oh, I'd like a paternity suit. I want some young, good-looking woman to accuse me of impregnating her in a moment of passion and publicly accuse me.

不过，我曾经问过他想要什么生日礼物。他竟然回答说：“哦，我想要一场亲子诉讼。我希望有个年轻漂亮的女士指控我在激情时刻让她怀孕，并且公开指责我。”

And he said, I would wish for it to be in the LA Times for all my friends to read.

他还补充说，希望这新闻能登上《洛杉矶时报》，让所有朋友们都能看到。

Michael Batnick:

Well, he escaped that one. But people in the room, I thought, I loved, it seemed like very impromptu, like the standing ovation and they stayed up.

好吧，这个愿望他倒是没能实现。但现场的人，我感觉他们的反应非常真诚，像是即兴的起立鼓掌，并且持续了很久。

Speaker 3:

Yeah.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

And I can't read him because I don't know him personally, but he seemed like emotional about it.

我无法准确解读他的情绪，因为我并不真正了解他。但他看起来确实挺动情的。

Chris Davis:

Yeah, it was. I mean, certainly crying, but the sense I felt in the room was this incredible gratitude and the sense of an entire thirty-nine thousand people wanting him to feel that sense of job well done.

是的，确实如此。他明显有落泪的表现。但我在现场感受到的是一种极大的感激之情，三万九千名观众都希望让他感受到那种“功成圆满”的感觉。

You know, there's an old Episcopal hymn, Church of England hymn, Come Labor On. And the last line of the last verse is, you know, at the end of all of this laboring through the morning,

你知道，圣公会（英国国教）有一首老赞美诗叫《Come Labor On》（继续劳作）。这首歌最后一节的结尾是这样的：“当你完成了早晨、正午、午后直至黄昏的劳作，

through the heat of the noon, through the afternoon, into the dusk, at the end of the last verse says, you'll hear your master's voice saying, well done.

你会听到你的主对你说：‘干得好！’”

And I think there was this enormous outpouring from this crowd of wanting that to be conveyed. It was one hell of a run.

我想当时现场的观众都特别想传递这种信息。确实是一段非凡的人生历程。

Michael Batnick:

If the job well done, if the job itself was creating shareholder value and building a company. It would be impossible to envision a scenario where somebody could have done it better.

如果所谓的“干得好”是指创造股东价值、打造一家伟大的公司，那恐怕很难想象还有谁能比他做得更好。

Chris Davis:

Well, but really it's not in a sense that the transition is even that will really eat. Warren would say that would be his legacy. He's built Berkshire to last and you can think of so many iconic CEOs from Jack Welch and Sandy Hank, you know.

不过，实际上这也不是重点。连过渡本身都已经变得顺畅了，沃伦会说这就是他的遗产——他把伯克希尔打造成了一个能长久延续的公司。你可以想想那些标志性的CEO，比如杰克·韦尔奇、桑迪·韦尔等等。

Where that transition was really went out at a high and often left a successor something that was really stressed. And I think the culture at Berkshire is so much the opposite.

I always said, there are very few CEOs that want to make their successors' job easy, that feel a sense of duty to their successor nearly as much as Warren and Charlie Hathaway.

我总是说，很少有CEO会真正希望把接班人的路铺好，像沃伦和查理那样，对接班人怀有那么强的责任感。

Michael Batnick:

John, these days they come back. Like Howard Schultz had to come back. Bob Iger had to come back.

约翰，现在的情况是很多人都还要“回归”。像霍华德·舒尔茨得回来，鲍勃·艾格也得回来。

Speaker 1:

John Pepper a few years ago at Procter & Gamble.

还有几年前宝洁的约翰·佩珀也回来了。

Chris Davis:

United Health has a returning.

Michael Batnick:

Yeah, to Chris's point, that's not easy to do with any type of organization, but something as sprawling and complex as this, it raises the stakes because how does any one person fill the shoes of a Warren Buffett?

是啊，就像克里斯说的，这在任何组织中都不容易，但伯克希尔这么庞大复杂的公司更是难上加难。一个人怎么可能接替沃伦·巴菲特的位置？

Speaker 1:

Well, I suspect they don't. My best guess because this is what happens to conglomerates is that it probably will be split up at some point.

我猜他们也不会。就我看来，像这样的企业集团最终都难免会被拆分，伯克希尔也很可能最终走上这条路。

In our lifetimes, not swiftly, but it's just so difficult to make this thing work and it's hard to think of anybody. I mean, again, Jack Welch, we've just mentioned Jack Welch,

可能不会很快，但在我们有生之年会看到。因为要让这么庞杂的结构持续运转太困难了。而且很难想象有谁能接得上。我们刚才提到的杰克·韦尔奇，

that was an amazing conglomerate that ceased to function as harmoniously as it had been almost as soon as the great architect moved on.

他打造的那个令人惊叹的集团，在他离开后几乎立刻就失去了原本的协同运转能力。

I would imagine that what he's looking for in successors are people who will have the calmness and the judgment to see when it's actually in the best interest of their shareholders to begin to take that empire apart.

我猜沃伦想找的是那种冷静理性、具有判断力的继任者，能在适当的时候意识到：也许为了股东的最大利益，开始拆分这个帝国才是明智之举。

I don't think they should be in a hurry for it. I certainly don't think they should take any less than they can, but there probably will become a point when it's not worth as much.

我不认为他们应该着急做这件事，也绝不应该轻易贱卖资产，但某一天，它的整体价值可能确实不如各部分单独存在时那么高了。

Michael Batnick:

He did go out on top and the stock hit an all-time high in market capitalization the same week that he made this announcement. I also think having, to your point, it's not one person.

他确实是在巅峰时退下的——他宣布消息的那周，伯克希尔的市值创下了历史新高。我也同意你的观点，这不是一个人说了算的结构。

So having Ajit Jain stay on in insurance and having Greg as CEO and then having the investment lieutenants running the portfolio, you don't need one person. And then having his son as the chairman.

阿吉特·贾恩继续掌管保险业务，格雷格担任CEO，再加上负责投资组合的几位“副将”，其实并不需要一个人统领一切。再加上他儿子是董事长，

So you've got the nucleus of something that could continue in its current state.

这就形成了一个可以维持现有架构运转的核心团队。

Chris Davis:

I'd only push back to say I don't think that it's in any way obvious that given the unusual structure of Berkshire that there's a scenario where it should be worth more separately.

我唯一想反驳的是——我并不认为伯克希尔这种特殊结构下，将它拆分能带来更高价值这件事是显而易见的。

There's enormous efficiencies to the structure that they have in the ability to allocate capital across the businesses and Warren's made that case and I think it's unarguable.

他们这种结构能在不同业务之间高效地调配资本，带来了巨大的效率优势。沃伦对此也做过充分论述，我认为这是无可争议的。

I think an interesting thing to think about is one company I like to think about is Exxon. And so let's say Standard Oil. If I was to ask you to name the second or third CEO of Standard Oil, I bet you'd be hard pressed.

我觉得可以思考一个有趣的例子：埃克森。或者说，标准石油。如果我现在让你说出标准石油的第二任或第三任CEO是谁，我敢说你很难答出来。

And yet Standard Oil was among the most valuable companies on earth for 13 decades.

但标准石油曾经是世界上最有价值的公司之一，持续了整整13个十年。

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

是的。

Chris Davis:

And because it was built to last. And what I mean by built to last is you had two factors that the builder genius John D. Rockefeller did that are perfectly analogous. One, he built and put together incredibly long-lived assets.

因为它是为“长存”而建。我所谓的“长存”指的是两个关键因素，是创始天才约翰·D·洛克菲勒所设下的，而这与伯克希尔的情况非常相似。第一，他打造并整合了一批极其长寿的资产。

So think of the executive compensation plan at Exxon, that's 10 years after the retirement of the CEO. That's unique in corporate America. And that ties to the second point about Exxon,

比如埃克森的高管薪酬方案，是在CEO退休十年后才全部兑现的。这在美国企业中极为罕见。而这也引出了第二点：

is it was also built with a very idiosyncratic culture that resisted Wall Street. Remember the old saying at Exxon was governments come and go, but we're Exxon. Yeah, it was a long term engineering rational culture that resisted fads.

它建立起一种非常特殊的企业文化，抗拒华尔街的短期主义。还记得埃克森那句老话吗？“政府来来去去，但我们是埃克森。” 是的，这是一种长远、工程师思维导向的理性文化，它拒绝追逐潮流。

And I would say those two things without any cult of personality after John D. Rockefeller enabled to this very day Exxon to be one of the most valuable companies on earth for whatever it's been.

我认为，正是这两点——而不是对洛克菲勒个人的崇拜——让埃克森至今仍是全球最有价值的公司之一。

Michael Batnick:

It's like a belief system. And I think in the case of Berkshire, there's a pretty strong, you could call it a personality cult in some extent, of course. I mean, obviously.

这就像一种信仰体系。而在伯克希尔的案例中，可以说确实有一定程度上的个人崇拜，这点很明显。

To some extent it is, but I also think it's a cult of ideas and rationality.

某种程度上是，但我更认为这是一种对理念和理性的“信仰”。

Chris Davis:

In other words, the idea is that it resists fad. It's hyper-rational. You talked about emotional intelligence or thoughtfulness. It's very long-term oriented and you have very long-lived assets within that company.

换句话说，它拒绝跟风，追求极度理性。你提到过情商和深思熟虑，这家公司确实非常注重长期视角，并且内部也拥有大量“长寿资产”。

Always think of that as the sort of model that I can imagine.

我一直把这视作理想的企业模型。

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

确实如此。

Michael Batnick:

Wall Street wrote a report. They said they need Greg Abel to be 36% more folksy. They need him tossing newspapers at fake doorways and eating lollipops. So if there's any way he can do that. It'll be interesting to see if and what changes.

华尔街还出了一份报告，说格雷格·阿贝尔需要“再接地气36%”。让他像巴菲特那样往门口扔报纸、吃棒棒糖之类的。如果他真能那样干，那会很有意思。看看有没有什么变化。

And you both kind of sound like you don't expect any big changes anytime soon. I don't either.

听你们俩说的意思，也都不觉得近期会有重大变化。我也是这么看。

Speaker 1:

Well, he's sitting on an awful lot of cash. So if some of the scenarios for a big market break come true, which I can certainly believe they might then, yeah, they might get the chance to make a big deal quite early on.

他现在手里握着大量现金。如果某些大跌情境真的发生，我完全相信他们有机会尽早出手进行一笔大的收购。

Michael Batnick:

They built up \$300 billion worth of cash, which is in absolute terms, a lot of money, but also in relative terms, it's one of the highest cash balances versus the rest of the investment portfolio the company has ever had.

他们囤了3000亿美元现金，绝对金额很大，从相对比例看也是公司历史上现金占投资组合比例最高的时期之一。

So in both relative and absolute terms, a lot of money. And my idea was probably he wants to leave a clean slate for the succession. And yes, of course, there weren't huge opportunities in their mind.

不管从绝对还是相对角度来看，这都是一笔巨额现金。我在想，也许他是想为继任者留下一张“干净的资产负债表”。当然，他们大概也没看到太好的收购机会，

If there were, they probably would have jumped on it. But I also think a lot of the urgency wasn't there. And I want to quote you, John, something from The Wall Street Journal today. And I think this kind of feeds into that idea.

如果真有，他们应该会立刻出手。但我觉得他们也并不急迫。我想引用一下你今天在《华尔街日报》的话，约翰，这也印证了我们刚才讨论的想法。

A Wall Street Journal reporter got Buffett on the phone and asked him, you know, why now? And this is what he said. There was no magic moment. How do you know the day that you become old?

《华尔街日报》的一位记者打电话问巴菲特：“为什么是现在？” 他说：“没有所谓的‘神奇时刻’。你怎么知道自己变老是哪一天开始的？”

I didn't really start getting old for some strange reason until I was about 90. I love him. But when you start getting old, it does become, it's irreversible.

“出于某种奇怪的原因，我直到90岁才开始觉得自己老了。我太喜欢他了。但当你开始变老，那就成了不可逆的过程。”

He began to lose his balance occasionally and sometimes had trouble recalling a person's name. Suddenly, the newspapers he read looked like they were printed with too little ink.

他开始偶尔失去平衡，有时候记不起别人的名字。忽然之间，他觉得报纸上的字都好像印得太淡了。

So why do an elephant gun size deal, I suppose, over the last four years, if that's the way that you've been feeling?

所以，如果他这几年一直有这样的感觉，为什么还要做一桩“象枪级”（超大规模）的交易呢？

Speaker 1:

I mean, it's possible that you continue. I don't think he's lost his emotional intelligence. The fact that he's recognized his own, you know, those elements of his decline shows that. Yes, he probably has a higher bar.

我是说，他还是有可能继续下去的。我不觉得他失去了情商。正是他能意识到自己正在衰退的某些方面，这本身就说明了问题。是的，他现在可能设定了更高的门槛。

He needs to be even more convinced before he presses the button on a deal than he normally would be, which is a wonderful example of what it is to be in control of your emotions and why that's what really matters.

在做交易决定前，他比以往更需要完全确信才会按下“启动键”。这就是一个很棒的例子，说明什么叫控制情绪，以及为什么这才是真正重要的能力。

I knew there was a quote I was trying to think of. The worst succession plan I ever heard was when Sumner Redstone, who I think was late 80s when they asked him this—yeah—asked what his succession plan was.

我刚才想起来一段话。我听过最糟糕的接班人计划是萨姆纳·雷石东说的。我记得当时他已经快90岁了，有人问他：你的接班计划是什么？

His reply was, I don't intend to die. Yes.

他回答说：“我不打算死。”没错。

Michael Batnick:

And how did that go? For the record.

那后来结果怎么样？为了记录在案……

Chris Davis:

Yeah.

是啊。

Michael Batnick:

Not great.

不怎么样。

Speaker 1:

Amazing to relate to. He is the Valedictorian of Boston Latin, but he was mortal. Yes. Yes.

这件事很讽刺。他是波士顿拉丁学校的毕业致辞代表，但他也是凡人。是的，终究是凡人。

Michael Batnick:

Well, I think he spent 20 years fighting in courts with his daughter. And I think at one point his two caretaker nannies or nurses had control of the voting rights of the company.

我记得他花了20年时间在法庭上跟他女儿斗争。有一段时间，他的两位保姆或护士甚至掌控了公司投票权。

He was a living ghost for about five years and the nannies were running the show.

他像个活着的幽灵存在了五年左右，而公司却是由那两个保姆在操控。

Speaker 1:

You might want to follow the Buffett example rather than the Sumner Redstone example.

你可能更应该效仿巴菲特的做法，而不是萨姆纳·雷石东的那一套。

Chris Davis:

I think that is something you could extend to all sorts of aspects of life.

我觉得这个教训可以推广到生活中的方方面面。

Speaker 1:

Yes.

完全同意。

Chris Davis:

Professional life.

尤其是职业生涯。

Michael Batnick:

I like that.

我很喜欢这个说法。

Speaker 1:

All right.

好的。

Michael Batnick:

So now let's now let's look at the dark side of Warren Buffett because John wrote a column that stirred up a lot of emotions. I sort of, I understood the premise of what you're saying and I don't reject the premise out of hand.

那么现在我们来看看沃伦·巴菲特的“阴暗面”，因为约翰写了一篇专栏文章，引发了很多情绪性的反应。我可以说，我理解你想表达的前提，也不打算一开始就否定它。

But I want to ask about the piece and then I want to ask about the reaction to the piece. First, let's start with the title. *Warren Buffett versus American Capitalism.* Is that the editor or is that you?

但我想先问问这篇文章的内容，然后再聊聊外界的反应。首先从标题开始：《沃伦·巴菲特 vs. 美国资本主义》。这个标题是编辑起的，还是你自己起的？

Speaker 1:

I signed off on it. It's the editor, but I'm given a choice.

标题是编辑起的，但我有权选择是否通过，我同意了这个标题。

Michael Batnick:

That's aggressive.

这个标题挺激进的。

Speaker 1:

You have to decide whether you're going to, you've got to get, I mean, with any matter of a headline, you've got to get something that somebody will—well, yes, but I mean, yes, we do actually want people to click on our pieces.

你必须权衡一下。标题这件事嘛，肯定得起个能吸引人点进去的——没错，我们确实是希望有人愿意点开我们写的文章。

Michael Batnick:

The answer is definitely.

毫无疑问。

Speaker 1:

Is this profit bait? Is this revenue bait?

这是“流量诱饵”？“盈利诱饵”？

Michael Batnick:

You know, so anyway, can I tell you a funny story about this?

说到这个，我能跟你讲个有趣的事吗？

Speaker 1:

Yes.

当然。

Michael Batnick:

You wrote it on May 9th, 2025. Was that right before or right after the announcement?

你这篇文章是在2025年5月9日写的，对吧？这是在巴菲特宣布消息之前还是之后？

Speaker 1:

Before the Berkshire weekend, I was just after I was asked to write. I was asked to come up with some—right—to write a piece after it has happened.

是在伯克希尔周末之前写的。我是在宣布之后被邀请写点什么，当时被要求写一篇回应文章。

And basically there were two million pieces stating correctly that Warren Buffett was wonderful.

基本上，当时已经有两百万篇文章在讲同一个事实：沃伦·巴菲特非常了不起。

Michael Batnick:

No, I like that you went that way, but I want to tell you the story.

不，我很喜欢你走的这个角度，但我想讲一下我的经历。

Speaker 1:

What is the point of piling on with yet another? You just need to look at his investment returns to see the man was special. Let's at least see if there's something to discuss.

没必要再多写一篇唱赞歌的文章了。看看他的投资回报就知道这人非同一般。我们至少可以尝试讨论一些其他的角度。

Michael Batnick:

So before we get into the meat of it, the way I get my news, I'm off of Twitter. The way I get my news is Google News. So the algorithm knows me pretty well and it has a "For You" column and it tells me what,

在我们正式讨论文章内容之前，我先说说我是怎么获取新闻的。我现在不用推特了。我主要靠 Google 新闻。它的算法已经很了解我了，会在“For You”栏目里推送一些内容，

you know, it gives me my opinions back to me but in the words of other people. No, it tells me what I'm going to want to read about and all I saw was Bloomberg Opinion and the title, *Warren Buffett versus American Capitalism.*

它会以别人的话，把我本人的观点“反推”给我。总之，它知道我想看什么。然后我看到的就是那篇彭博观点专栏，标题是《沃伦·巴菲特 vs. 美国资本主义》。

And I said, if Barry f\*\*\*ing Ritholtz wrote this article at Bloomberg, I'm literally going to drive to his house and choke him. Thankfully, it was you and not Barry. Shout out to Barry.

我当时就想，如果这篇文章是该死的巴里·里托兹写的，我真的会开车去他家掐死他。幸好，是你写的，不是巴里。顺便给巴里点个赞。

Speaker 1:

All right.

好的。

Michael Batnick:

So I want to read your intro to the article and then tell us what you were thinking. Warren Buffett. In the eyes of JPMorgan Chase's CEO Jamie Dimon represents, quote, everything that is good about American capitalism and America itself,

我想先读一下你文章的开头，然后请你谈谈你的思路。沃伦·巴菲特，在摩根大通首席执行官杰米·戴蒙看来，代表了“美国资本主义以及美国本身所有美好之处”，

investing in the growth of our nation and its businesses with integrity, optimism and common sense. Ninety nine percent of the people who hear that quote would say, yep.

以诚信、乐观和常识投资于国家和企业的成长。听到这句话的99%的人都会说：“没错。”

Speaker 1:

Yes.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

John said, does he really?

但约翰的反应是：“他真的代表这些吗？”

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

All right. Give us the—give us the—give us the story.

好，来告诉我们你的观点、你背后的逻辑。

Speaker 1:

Now, let's be clear that I never at any point questioned the final three or four words of Jamie Dimon's piece—that he did it with humor and integrity and whatever else it was. I think there are two points I wanted to make.

首先我要澄清一点，我从未质疑杰米·戴蒙那段话最后三四个词的内容——说巴菲特是以幽默、正直等方式达成成就的，这我完全同意。但我想表达的有两个核心观点。

The first is I'm not sure he's an exemplar of what is great about American capitalism because the mere fact that Warren Buffett's career happened and that he existed and that he could do what he did,

第一点是：我并不确定他是否真的是“美国资本主义美好典范”。因为仅仅是巴菲特能够存在、他能做到这些事情这件事本身，

shows that there's something fairly inadequate about the way the rest of American capitalism is done from a wealth concentration standpoint. And—well, no, no, there is that. But I wasn't trying to get sociological about it,

就说明了美国资本主义体系中在财富集中方面存在着明显的不足。当然，这确实存在，但我并不打算用社会学的方式来讲这个问题。

but the notion that if you look at the way most money is managed now, it tends to be done in a way that Warren Buffett shows you can do better than—or at least if you're as good as Warren Buffett, you can.

我的意思是，现在大多数的资产管理方式，巴菲特已经证明是可以做得更好的——或者说，哪怕你只是像他一样优秀，也能做得更好。

The amount of money that Wall Street makes offering you quantitative models to take approaches which know for a fact they're not going to beat Warren Buffett—or that only offer you impressive returns by taking the kind of risks that Warren Buffett would never take.

华尔街靠推销各种量化模型赚了很多钱，但他们自己心里也清楚，这些方法无法战胜巴菲特——或者只能靠巴菲特绝不会接受的高风险方式来换取表面上的高回报。

In many ways, I also have great respect for Jamie Dimon. I don't think he is an example of everything that's good about American Capitalism so much as showing up a large swathe of the rest of American Capitalism.

我对杰米·戴蒙其实也很尊重。但我不认为他代表了美国资本主义的“美好”，他更像是一面镜子，反衬出美国资本主义其他部分的缺陷。

Michael Batnick:

So he's very good at playing a game but he's not an exemplar of something that you think overall is great?

所以你是说，他擅长玩这场游戏，但他并不代表你所认同的“优秀体制”的典范？

Speaker 1:

He's an exemplar of something that would be wonderful if all of American Capitalism were like that. He tends to demonstrate that in fact American Capitalism isn't all that wonderful.

他确实是个“范本”，但前提是——如果整个美国资本主义都能像他那样，那当然太好了。可现实是，他恰恰证明了整个体系其实并不那么美好。

The idea of an American Capitalism where every CEO of every company was as good at their job as Warren Buffett is never going to happen. I would like to live in that country.

想象一个美国资本主义的理想世界，每个CEO都像巴菲特那样出色——这永远不会实现。但我愿意生活在那样的国家。

The second point I wanted to make, which is the one that really got people angry, was that Warren Buffett has this very famous concept of the wide economic moat, which is—if there is any one key to his success, arguably that's it.

我想说的第二点——这也是让人不满的焦点——是巴菲特非常著名的“宽护城河”理念。如果非要找一个他成功的关键，那可能就是这个。

What he's most interested in is non-disruptible, difficult to compete with companies.

他最感兴趣的，是那些不可颠覆、竞争门槛极高的企业。

Michael Batnick:

I think most people would agree with that.

我觉得大多数人都会同意这一点。

Speaker 1:

And obviously, it's not easy to find them because everybody can see that it's a good idea to find such companies and Warren Buffett has been better at finding them than anybody else who's ever lived. So I'm not saying it's easy to do that.

显然，找到这样的公司并不容易，因为所有人都知道这是个好主意。而巴菲特在这方面比有史以来任何人都做得更好。所以我并不是说这事儿很容易。

Michael Batnick:

That's the part that you got the most blowback from.

但这就是你被骂得最狠的那部分，对吧？

Speaker 1:

Simply because what that tends to be...

主要是因为这个话题往往……

Michael Batnick:

Besides from Chris, like other people?

除了克里斯之外，还有别人也反对你吗？

Speaker 1:

Oh, no, no. Chris, I mean, I've got one of the rudest ones here, if you'd like me to read it.

哦，不止克里斯。我这儿还有一条最粗鲁的评论，如果你想听，我可以读给你听。

Michael Batnick:

I would.

我很想听。

Speaker 1:

OK. So *Buffett versus American Capitalism* article. This probably sounds better in a British accent. I imagine the guy who wrote it doesn't have a British accent.

好，这是关于《巴菲特 vs. 美国资本主义》那篇文章的评论。用英音可能会更悦耳些，但我猜你写这评论的人应该不是英国人。

Michael Batnick:

It sounds more like me.

听起来倒更像是我说的。

Speaker 1:

"Only the wormy, envious parasites in the MSM find it necessary to write unsophisticated, passively aggressive drivel about Buffett and his incredible success."

“只有主流媒体中那些阴暗、嫉妒的寄生虫，才会觉得有必要写出这种低级、被动攻击性的胡扯来诋毁巴菲特和他不可思议的成功。”

"Your bloviation is even more ironic considering you are a W-2 junkie working for a billionaire who made his own moats by becoming the largest and arguably most watched financial news purveyor. So let's bring Mike Bloomberg into this."

“你这种夸夸其谈更可笑的是，你只不过是个拿W-2工资的打工仔，替一个靠自己打造护城河、成为最大也是最受关注的财经新闻提供者的亿万富翁工作。让我们把迈克·布隆伯格拉进来看看。”

"Who are you? A writer, a craft with so much innovation and positive human impact, to judge businesses that employ hundreds and thousands of people and purchase billions of dollars of inputs are not good for America."

“你是谁？一个写字的？凭什么以‘写作’这种创意满满、影响深远的职业身份，来评判那些雇佣成千上万人、每年采购数十亿美元投入的企业是否对美国有利？”

"In your insular, zero economic value, opinion writer world, you create nothing but hot, subjective air and yet have the hubris and ignorance to denigrate the world's greatest asset manager and ultimately philanthropist,"

“在你这个封闭、毫无经济价值的专栏作家世界里，你除了吹热气和主观臆断什么都没产出，却还敢妄自尊大、无知至极地贬低这个世界上最伟大的资产管理人和慈善家。”

"who has created massive, lasting economic value for millions of people all over the world, including donating his billions to many charities. What a pathetic, insignificant, little parasite you are."

“他为全球数百万人创造了巨大、持久的经济价值，还将自己的数十亿美元捐赠给了各类慈善组织。你真是个可悲、微不足道的小寄生虫。”

Michael Batnick:

All right. Duncan, you want to apologize?

好了，邓肯，你是不是该道个歉？

Speaker 1:

You really need to take a deep breath and tell us what he really thought. Hold on.

他真该深吸一口气，然后告诉我们他到底怎么想的。等一下啊。

Michael Batnick:

Did this guy identify himself?

这家伙有署名吗？

Speaker 1:

Yes.

有的。

Michael Batnick:

Oh, OK.

哦，明白。

Speaker 1:

I'm not going to do that.

但我不会透露他是谁。

Michael Batnick:

No, no, no. It's OK. Is it somebody that works in finance or a professional investor or just like a regular person?

不不不，没关系。他是做金融的、专业投资人，还是就是个普通人？

Speaker 1:

Seems to be just a regular person.

看起来只是个普通人。

Michael Batnick:

OK.

好吧。

Chris Davis:

Have you had management issues?

你是不是还遇到一些管理上的问题？

Speaker 1:

Yeah, well, yeah. I mean, I've had letters which were not obviously as quite as over-the-top outspoken as that, but I've had letters on a similar tenor from people's corporate email addresses and from their Bloomberg addresses.

嗯，是的。我确实收到过类似语气的信件，虽然没那封那么夸张直白，但也差不多，有的还来自公司邮箱或彭博的企业账号。

Michael Batnick:

I've been on TV for 14 years. You should see the shit people send to me. If somebody owns a stock and you say the slightest thing that's not positive about that stock, you're opening up the floodgates. How did you respond to that? How did that land on you?

我上电视已经14年了。你应该看看我收到的那些骂人的东西。如果有人持有一只股票，你哪怕稍微说点负面的，他们就会把洪水都放出来一样。你是怎么回应这些的？你自己感觉如何？

Speaker 1:

To be honest with you, that particular one, I laughed uproariously, shared it with my daughter, my wife, my parents. There comes a point when you can't respond to something like that. Dear Sir, I am not a worthless parasite.

说实话，那封信我当时大笑不止，还拿去给我女儿、我太太、我父母看。这种东西你根本没法回应。你总不能回封信写“尊敬的先生，我并不是个毫无价值的寄生虫”吧。

Chris Davis:

I like what Bill Buckley used to do when people would write an angry letter to him at the *National Review* and they would say, "finally cancel my subscription," and he would send a postcard back that said, "cancel your own damn subscription."

我喜欢比尔·巴克利以前在《国家评论》杂志处理愤怒读者信件的方法。他们会写信说“我要取消订阅了”，他就回张明信片说：“你自己去取消该死的订阅吧。”

Speaker 1:

It was interesting. I should say I got quite a lot of very positive feedback as well. Almost all of it from people in the industry who are just delighted for anybody to say anything negative at all about Warren Buffett.

挺有意思的是，我其实也收到了很多正面的反馈。几乎都是来自行业内部的人，他们对于终于有人愿意对巴菲特说点不同的声音感到非常高兴。

Michael Batnick:

And by the way, you didn't say anything negative personally. You were describing a system in which Buffett has been able to thrive.

顺带说一句，你本身并没有说巴菲特什么坏话。你只是描述了一个让他能够脱颖而出的体系。

Speaker 1:

I was very careful to make clear. I said this at the end. One of the most remarkable—there are so many remarkable things about Warren Buffett—to have made that amount of money over that period of time,

我其实在结尾也特别小心地点明了这一点。巴菲特身上有太多了不起的地方，最令人惊讶的之一就是，他在那么长的时间里赚了那么多钱，

and I could count maybe two or three intimations of impropriety in the whole time he was making that kind of money. It's extraordinary that you can make that kind of money while still…

而在整个过程中，他可能只出现过两三次“涉嫌不当行为”的暗示。能在保持正直的同时赚到那么多钱，这简直令人震惊。

Michael Batnick:

And not even personal impropriety.

而且还不是那种“个人不当行为”。

Speaker 1:

Stayed married to his wife until she passed away.

他一直和妻子婚姻稳定，直到她去世。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah. The guy from Precision Castparts was not great, but Buffett got rid of him. The Salomon Brothers episode, he bought the company.

对。像精密铸件公司的那个高管确实有些问题，但巴菲特最终把他清除了。至于所罗门兄弟那一出戏，是他主动买下来的公司。

Speaker 1:

The American Express salad oil thing very early.

还有很早期那次美国运通“沙拉油事件”。

Michael Batnick:

Right.

对对。

Speaker 1:

This is so minor compared to... Had to get out of that. Agreed. Certainly, if I tried to make it some sort of scapeless attack on the man's character, that would have been seriously.

那事相比之下根本不算什么……他必须脱身，我同意。可以肯定的是，如果我试图把这篇文章搞成对他人格的无端攻击，那确实就过分了。

Michael Batnick:

Here's where I took it.

我来讲讲我是怎么理解你文章的。

Speaker 1:

I didn't.

我不是那样的。

Michael Batnick:

Here's where I took it. I would love to hear what you guys think. It's true that he likes to invest in businesses with wide economic moats, to which I would say, A, who doesn't? And B, let's not act like for every Coke, there's not a Pepsi.

我想听听你们怎么看。确实，他喜欢投资于有宽护城河的企业，但我会说，第一，谁不喜欢这种企业？第二，也别装作这些企业没有竞争者。可口可乐有百事，

For every American Express, there's not a Visa. For every Burlington Northern, there's not a, I don't know the names of the other railroads.

美国运通有Visa。伯灵顿北方铁路也肯定有同行——我只是记不住其他铁路的名字了。

Speaker 1:

In the case of American Express, bear in mind that he also has Visa and MasterCard.

关于美国运通，你要记得他其实也投资了Visa和MasterCard。

Michael Batnick:

Okay, fine.

好吧，那也算。

Speaker 1:

It's only a triopoly, but he does have all three of them.

这其实是个“三头垄断”，而他三家都有。

Michael Batnick:

I do think that there are countries and there are companies in countries, specifically in the emerging world, where there are true economic monopolies. They're government mandated. They don't even try to hide it or pretend it's not that way.

我确实认为，在某些国家，特别是新兴市场，有些公司确实拥有真正的经济垄断地位。这种垄断是由政府授予的，根本不掩饰，也不假装不是这样。

In the case of the Berkshire businesses, if you name one, and I know there are 400 businesses he owns, 300 for give or take. If you name one, I could probably, without a Google search, tell you what their competitor is.

至于伯克希尔持有的那些公司，你随便说一个，虽然他拥有400家左右的企业，但我差不多不用查，就能告诉你它的竞争对手是谁。

Speaker 1:

That's fair enough.

这点说得没错。

Michael Batnick:

Okay.

好。

Speaker 1:

Obviously, the word you can get into. You can get into sort of very nitpicking about the language. A monopoly really does require just the one company. You can refer to monopolistic factors when there's more than one company.

当然，这个词本身也可以展开讨论。要非常严格来说，真正的“垄断”意味着只有一家企业。但当市场只有几家公司时，可以称为“垄断性因素”或“准垄断”。

You can change the word to oligopolistic or you can just continue to say monopolistic. But yes, it's the same. It's only a somewhat watered down version of the same thing. So in terms of where the moats come from,

你也可以换成“寡头垄断”来形容，或者继续用“垄断性”这个说法。这其实是同一种情况，只不过程度稍弱而已。那么说到护城河的来源，

I should also say I'm fascinated by this because I actually covered, when I was at the Financial Times, I was the Mexico bureau chief for four years.

我得说我对这个话题很着迷。因为我曾经在《金融时报》担任驻墨西哥站主任，整整四年。

At the point when Carlos Slim took over as the world's richest man and he basically had the deepest, most impregnable alligator-filled moat you could possibly imagine built for him.

But the thing that was interesting was that he successfully bid for the landline monopoly. He stayed so far ahead of the regulators and the lawyers that he parlayed that into the cell phone monopoly.

He got the money to do that in the first place. He, like Warren Buffett, recognized the importance of cash. He owned more or less every cigarette distributorship in Mexico.

他一开始的资本也是靠现金堆出来的。他像巴菲特一样意识到现金的重要性。他几乎垄断了墨西哥所有香烟经销渠道。

And the way that tax collection for cigarettes works in Mexico is that you, the company, collect the tax when you sell the cigarettes to the punter and you only pay them over to Hacienda, the treasury, once a year.

而在墨西哥，香烟税的征收方式是：公司在卖烟给消费者时代收税款，然后一年才向财政部（Hacienda）统一缴纳。

So you've got an even better version of a carry or float that you can invest than Warren Buffett got.

这其实比巴菲特获得的保险浮存金还要“高级”——你能动用这笔“税收垫款”进行投资，一整年都不用还。

Michael Batnick:

Before you pay your taxes, you can earn money on that money.

在你缴税之前，你可以先用那笔钱去赚钱。

Speaker 1:

I am fascinated by monopolies and how they stay on, but in the case of Slim, he was gifted a monopoly, almost literally gifted.

我一直对垄断及其延续方式很着迷，但像卡洛斯·斯利姆这种情况，他几乎是被“赠予”了一个垄断地位，真的几乎是“白送”的。

He didn't even pay enough for it when they sold it and then stayed ahead of the law to make it a far bigger monopoly in far more areas over 20, 30 years.

当年政府出售时他付的钱甚至都不够合理，然后他在之后的20到30年里始终走在法律之前，把原本的垄断扩大到了更多领域。

For a Buffett-relevant example of something which is not a monopoly in the sense that there's no competitor but where it's behaving in a way that isn't really what we like to think of as capitalism,

说到一个和巴菲特有关的例子，它虽然不算严格意义上的垄断（因为确实有竞争者），但它的行为方式却并不符合我们理想中“资本主义”的样子，

creative destruction, building the world, there is Coca-Cola, which is the biggest. It's far more dominant over Pepsi in Mexico than it is in the US. Mexico is its second biggest market total.

也就是“创造性破坏”、“建设世界”那种理念。可口可乐就是个例子，它是最大的。在墨西哥，它对百事的压倒性优势甚至超过美国。墨西哥是它的第二大市场。

Maybe that's out of date by now, but Vicente Fox was the head of Coke in Mexico and parlayed that into becoming the president. The Mexican equivalent of 7-Eleven, OXXO, belongs to Coke.

Michael Batnick:

So they stock the shelves with what they want.

所以他们自己决定货架上摆什么。

Speaker 1:

They have vertical integration. You don't get any Pepsi there. You get plenty of stuff that isn't Coke in terms of brands for products that they don't have a competitor to. Go to any tiny, pathetic, poor pueblo out in the countryside.

他们实现了垂直整合。你在那里根本看不到百事。在那些可口可乐没有竞争对手的产品品类上，你会看到他们自有的其他品牌。你去乡下那些破旧的小村子看看，

There will be a beautiful table outside the restaurant with the Coca-Cola logo on it. All the umbrellas have Coca-Cola written on them, etc. It's not a monopoly in the sense that nobody can compete with them. It's very hard.

你会看到饭店外有印着可口可乐商标的漂亮桌子，所有的遮阳伞也都写着 Coca-Cola。这不是“没有人能竞争”的那种垄断，但竞争确实非常困难。

But in terms of—they have built verticals from it to make themselves impossible to compete against in huge swathes of the economy, to make it very much easier for them to set their own price in many contexts.

他们通过垂直体系构建出一种“你根本无法竞争”的局面，在很多市场里让他们更容易制定自己的价格。

Now, that is monopolistic behavior—or it's totally rational behavior for a capitalist to do. And if you've got a relatively weak government like Mexico, which will let you do it, why shouldn't you do it? And they obey the law,

从某种角度说，这种行为是垄断性的——但从另一个角度讲，这也是资本家完全合理的选择。如果你处于一个像墨西哥这样监管较弱的国家，政府允许你这么做，那你为什么不这么做呢？他们也没违法，

but as somebody who cared about—you’re living in this middle-income country that is forever trying to break through to becoming a wealthy country and failing to do so.

但如果你是一个关心社会发展的人——你生活在一个永远试图迈入富裕国家行列却始终无法突破的中等收入国家，

I would have preferred a kind of capitalism that actually, you know, disrupted and creatively destructed. And Coca-Cola is one of his most famous holdings. I think that's a good example.

你可能更希望看到一种真正能“颠覆”和“创造性破坏”的资本主义。而可口可乐是巴菲特最有名的持仓之一，我觉得这是一个很典型的例子。

Yeah, I get a socialist, but I'm sure there are varieties of—there are varieties of capitalism, and that's not necessarily the one I'm happiest with, even if it's one that makes lots of money.

是的，我知道我说得有点“社会主义”倾向，但我相信资本主义是有不同形态的。而我并不一定喜欢这种形态——即便它非常赚钱。

Michael Batnick:

I guess I get the idea that that's an emblematic investment for Berkshire. It's one of the stocks they've made the most money on. It's also at an all-time high right now, which I think would surprise people.

我明白你的意思，这确实是伯克希尔的一个“象征性”投资。他们在这只股票上赚了很多钱，而且它目前还处于历史最高位，我想这会让很多人感到意外。

What's always struck me as so funny about Coca-Cola is that for most people, you sit in a restaurant and you say, I'll have a Coke or I'll have a Diet Coke. We don't have Coke. We have Pepsi. Who cares?

我一直觉得可乐这件事特别有趣——对大多数人来说，你在餐厅里点一杯可乐，说“给我来杯可口可乐”或“来杯健怡可乐”，服务员说“我们没有可口可乐，只有百事”。又有谁在乎呢？

Speaker 1:

Sure.

当然。

Michael Batnick:

I don't know, I always thought of those two things as being interchangeable and—Speak for yourself. Okay, all right, go on.

我不知道啊，我一直觉得这两个牌子是可以互换的——哦，说的是我自己，好吧，那你继续说。

Chris Davis:

But no, I'd say first, I read everything that John writes. I think he's one of the most informed, thoughtful columnists. And when you talked about, if Barry had written it, you were gonna go over and strangle him.

首先我想说，我读约翰写的每一篇文章，我认为他是最有见地、最具思考力的专栏作家之一。但你刚才说如果是巴里写了那篇文章你就要掐死他——

I was gonna go over and strangle John on this one. And the reason is, I think that the language of using a term like monopoly—it's provocative, and it's provocative in a way that the less you know,

我也想因为这篇文章掐死约翰。原因是：你用了“垄断”这样的词汇，这个词本身是有挑衅性的。而且问题在于，知道得越少的人，

so unlike the points that you're raising, the less you know, the more you think of it as something illegal, a monopoly bad.

和你提出的那些具体观点不同，这类人越不了解，就越容易把“垄断”当成违法的坏事。

Speaker 1:

I think my readers are probably reading it to the level where that may not be.

我认为我的读者大概都有一定理解能力，不至于这么片面。

Chris Davis:

Well, that's true.

好吧，这点确实如此。

Speaker 1:

I do take your point.

不过我理解你的观点。

Chris Davis:

But it's also—and then when I look at, you know, if I look at the portfolio of any successful large-cap investor, let's just start with that.

但还有一点，比如你去看任何一个成功的大盘股投资者的投资组合，我们从这个起点看起，

You're looking at a couple of hundred companies that almost by definition exist in what you would call an oligopoly because three or four companies have a big position.

你会看到那里面的几百家公司几乎“天然”处于寡头垄断结构中，因为通常就是三四家大公司主导一个行业。

Michael Batnick:

This is a power law though. This dominates everything.

Chris Davis:

It's a power law. You think about the history of Berkshire—a huge investment in Wells Fargo. They had a huge investment in Cap Cities/ABC.

没错，是幂律法则。想想伯克希尔历史上的投资：曾经对富国银行进行了大手笔投资，也重仓了Cap Cities/ABC。

I think when you think about a moat as being inherently monopolistic versus the idea of a—for example—Costco. Berkshire doesn't own Costco, but we owned Costco for a long time. And you could argue Costco has no moat whatsoever,

你可以把护城河理解为“天然的垄断性”，但也可以从另一个角度看，比如Costco。伯克希尔没有持有Costco的股票，但我们家族长期投资过它。你也可以说Costco根本没有护城河，

but I feel by the way you were writing, you might argue that, oh, it's another oligopolistic advantaged wide-moat business. And yet it's fiercely competitive—and it’s competitive because it’s low cost. GEICO. It’s competitive.

但从你文章的语气来看，你可能会认为它又是一个寡头优势型的宽护城河企业。然而它其实竞争激烈，而且激烈的原因就是成本低，比如GEICO也是一样，它就是靠低价竞争的。

Michael Batnick:

I guess moats are not a negative thing. So if you open a Walmart next to a Costco, you're probably going to take 20% of its sales away,

我觉得护城河本身不是个负面概念。比如说你在Costco旁边开一家沃尔玛，可能会抢走20%的销售额，

but you're not going to take 100% of its sales away because the shopper at Costco is paying a membership fee and that is the moat that they have built so that they still exist and Sears doesn't. Kmart doesn't.

但你不会把它的客户全抢走，因为Costco的顾客付了会员费——这就是它构建的护城河。所以它还能活着，而西尔斯百货、Kmart都已经没了。

Speaker 1:

Gillette razors, once you've got the razor, you then pay for the blades.

吉列剃须刀也是一样，一旦你有了刀架，后续就得一直买它家的刀片。

Michael Batnick:

This is my handle, therefore I buy the blades.

我已经买了刀架，所以我自然要继续买它家的刀片。

Chris Davis:

But do you want a cool Charlie Costco story just because I'm looking at him here? But if you wanted to think of something extraordinary—because you could look at that membership fee and say if instead of,

说到这儿，我刚好看到查理·芒格的照片，要不要讲一个很酷的Costco故事？这事其实挺特别的——我们可以从它的会员费来讲起，

there's certain people that will not pay a membership fee. Right. Just they are against it in principle or they're disorganized.

因为确实有些人就是不愿意为会员付费，要么出于原则反对，要么就是性格上不爱搞这些。

So there are customers that do not go to a Costco that would go to a Costco if they didn’t have to pay a membership fee.

Speaker 1:

Yes.

对。

Chris Davis:

And if Costco raised their prices, the membership fee, I think, represents about 2% of revenue.

Michael Batnick:

But it drives the rest.

但它驱动了整个商业模式的其他部分。

Chris Davis:

Well, it's their net margin is 2%. Their average markup is 10%. Now, I think I could be wrong. I think Walmart's average markup is about 28%. But here's the interesting thing that Charlie said to me once is, as he said,

Costco的净利润率是2%，平均加价幅度是10%。我记得可能有误，沃尔玛的平均加价幅度大约是28%。但查理曾经跟我说过一件很有趣的事，他说，

if you were to look at the difference in shrink, which is the fancy word for theft, shoplifting, stealing, between Costco and the average big box retailer, that would be 100% of their profit margin. So people steal less.

And remember, theft is half employees and half shoplifters. And that's an incredible thing. And of course, part of that is the membership fee.

Michael Batnick:

It's very unlikely you're going to register as a Costco member and then try to loot the place.

Chris Davis:

Well, in the same way that if you're a government employee, you are likely to be a safer driver. If you are a USAA, your army officer is less likely to commit fraud against an insurance company.

So you were intelligently choosing who you wanted as customers. But using a separate variable. And so it's an interesting part of Costco's model that I admire. But anyway, so I just felt that monopoly was a bit provocative because it,

whereas moats I think isn't, and I don't think they're the same thing. I think they are different things because of, you know, a culture can create a moat.

而“护城河”这个词则没有这种感觉。我不认为这两个词是等同的，它们是不同的概念。因为比如说，文化也可以形成护城河。

Michael Batnick:

Well, in the Middle Ages, many moats were taken.

中世纪的时候，很多护城河最终还是被攻破了。

Chris Davis:

Well, did you quote Elon Musk in your article? Or did I read that after?

你那篇文章里有没有引用马斯克的话？还是我后来自己看到的？

Speaker 1:

I quoted Elon Musk and made it fairly clear that I thought he'd been proved wrong. He said, what was it, moats and ridges?

我确实引用了马斯克的话，并且我明确表达了我觉得他错得离谱。他说过什么来着，护城河和土堤？

Chris Davis:

He said, moats are a really, really shitty way to defend a castle, you know, sooner or later.

他说，护城河是极其糟糕的防御方式，迟早都会被攻破。

Speaker 1:

Moats are lame.

护城河没用。

Michael Batnick:

Elon Musk, moats are lame.

马斯克说，护城河没用。

Chris Davis:

Moats are lame.

护城河没用。

Speaker 1:

I then made the point after what has happened to Tesla's sales in the last few months.

那我只能说，看看过去几个月特斯拉的销量变成什么样了。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah.

说得好。

Speaker 1:

Turns out he could use a moat.

看来他现在急需一条护城河了。

Michael Batnick:

He might be looking for a moat. Let's close the chapter on the Berkshire stuff. I think. I think the big story right now in the markets is obviously we just had this huge burst of volatility that came and went just as quickly.

他可能现在正在找护城河吧。我们就把伯克希尔这一段话题收一收。我觉得眼下市场的大新闻其实是：刚刚出现了一波巨大的波动，来得快去得也快。

It's one of the most remarkable things I've ever seen. One of the stats that Sean put up, I think it's the second best 27-day return for the S\&P 500 ever, from the lows of April 8th to now.

这是我见过最惊人的行情之一。Sean发了个数据，我记得是标普500指数从4月8日低点起算的27天回报率，历史上排名第二。

I forget if that's the actual stat, but it's something crazy like that.

我记不清确切数字了，但大概就是这么离谱的表现。

Speaker 1:

Yeah, I've played around with the numbers. It's up there with the four or five biggest rallies ever.

是的，我自己也算过一些数据。这轮行情可以排进历史上前四或五大反弹之一。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah, I think there was a...

对，我记得之前还有一个……

Chris Davis:

Post-COVID, there was a big one.

新冠疫情之后也有一轮大反弹。

Speaker 1:

Yes.

对的。

Michael Batnick:

I think there was a 15-day stretch of all gains, consecutive. It's just... The NASDAQ 100 is up 25% from the low in under four weeks.

我记得有连续15天全部上涨。简直就是……纳斯达克100指数从低点反弹了25%，不到四周的时间。

So in other words, the largest technology companies added back a quarter of their market cap in like a month.

换句话说，最大的科技公司在一个月内就把四分之一的市值涨了回来。

Speaker 1:

And they were the best understood, best known companies on the planet.

而且这些还是全球最被了解、最广为人知的公司。

Michael Batnick:

So that tells you how efficient the market is.

这就说明了市场的效率。

Speaker 1:

All right.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

Chris, you added some notes here about the disruption of the turbulence in the markets. I'd love to get your take on this.

Chris，你这里加了一些关于市场动荡的评论。我想听听你的看法。

Chris Davis:

Well, I think one of the most peculiar tensions in the market is that there are three massive transitions happening at the same time right now. So there's this monetary transition, right?

我认为当前市场中最奇特的紧张局面之一是，有三大变革正同时发生。首先是货币政策的转变，对吧？

We had 15 years of functionally free money, no inflation, magical thinking, made up theories that deficits don't matter, that interest rates are free, earnings 20 years from now are worth as much as earnings today.

过去15年基本上是“零成本资金”，没有通胀，充满魔幻的思维，诸如“赤字无关紧要”、“利率可以免费”、“未来20年的收益和今天一样值钱”之类的理论层出不穷。

Crazy optimistic growth rate. So obviously that began resetting about two, two and a half years ago. We saw some UK pension plans have a blip. We saw, you know, a few, you know, First Republic, Silicon Valley Bank have a blip.

疯狂的乐观增长预期。这种状况大约在两年到两年半前开始重新调整。我们看到一些英国养老金计划出现闪崩，也看到第一共和银行、硅谷银行出问题。

We've seen some commercial real estate, the SPAC boom came and went. But I would say we're in the early innings. And we're here to talk about the implications of that transition. That has a long way to go.

我们也看到一些商业地产的问题，SPAC热潮来得快去得也快。但我会说，我们还只是刚刚起步阶段。我们现在要探讨的是这场变革的深远影响。这还会持续很久。

Michael Batnick:

The return of real interest rates.

实际利率的回归。

Chris Davis:

Real interest rates and debt rolling over that was at 4% that's going to be at 10 or 11. And so there'll be big changes there. So there's a lot of hidden leverage in the system. Transition one.

对，实际利率上升，还有那些以前4%利率的债务，现在要以10%或11%的成本再融资。这会带来巨大变化。系统里还隐藏着大量杠杆。这是第一大转型。

Michael Batnick:

So that's one.

这是第一项。

Chris Davis:

Transition two is this geopolitical transition, right? My whole life has been the story of globalization. I just finished a beautiful biography on Keynes.

第二个是地缘政治转型。我的一生几乎都是全球化的故事。我刚读完一本非常棒的凯恩斯传记。

Michael Batnick:

Just in time.

读得正是时候。

Chris Davis:

And you know, everything about globalization versus national, you know, all of that is becoming unwound in a way that we don't know how it will play out, but it is a massive shift and it will shift supply chains.

关于全球主义与民族主义之间的博弈，这一切正在以一种我们无法预料的方式逐渐被拆解。这是一次巨大变局，会改变供应链。

It'll shift margins, productivity, inventories, all sorts of things, returns on capital. Third transition is, of course, we are in what will be the greatest transition price since the industrial revolution, of course, with AI.

它还会影响利润率、生产效率、库存周转、资本回报等等。第三个转型当然就是AI。这可能是自工业革命以来最大规模的一场价格与价值体系的重构。

And we are in the, not even the first inning of a match.

而我们现在可能还连“比赛的第一局”都没开始。

Michael Batnick:

The foothills.

我们还只是处在山脚阶段。

Chris Davis:

Yeah. So think of those three big transitions on one side. And then on the other side, you have the market at not an all-time high valuation, but at high valuations.

对，把那三大变革放在一边，另一边你会看到市场虽然不是处在历史最高估值，但也处在很高的水平。

Michael Batnick:

Elevated.

是高估值。

Chris Davis:

Elevated valuations.

对，是高估值。

Michael Batnick:

Top decile for sure.

肯定在前10%的估值分位上。

Chris Davis:

High concentrations. Very optimistic growth rates and essentially a belief that momentum is a good way to invest, which the idea of momentum means that what happened in the past is going to continue.

高度集中化的市场，对未来有着极度乐观的增长预期，并且普遍相信“动量”是一种有效的投资方式，也就是说，过去发生的事情还会继续。

Michael Batnick:

For a short time at least.

至少在短期内是这样的。

Chris Davis:

Massive disruption.

但背后其实是巨大的潜在动荡。

Speaker 1:

Only just after I've got out.

我一卖完就开始动荡（笑）。

Chris Davis:

Coupled with complacency and that rubber band is very, very taut. And so if you were to ask me if, you know, I think we've seen the end of volatility, I definitely don't think so.

再加上市场的自满情绪，就像一根橡皮筋被拉得很紧。所以如果你问我市场的波动是否结束，我的答案是肯定没有。

And I do think that, you know, the indexing wave has been a feedback loop, like a momentum trade. The more that works, the more it tends to work. The U.S. versus the rest of the world was a momentum trade that's worked for 20 years.

而且我认为，指数化投资形成了一个自我强化的反馈循环，跟动量交易类似：越有效就越会被继续采用。美国市场相对于全球其他地区的优异表现，本身就是一个持续了20年的动量交易。

Growth versus value, momentum wave that's worked. So I think that we are in a period of huge transition and yet we have complacency in valuation. That's pretty interesting.

成长股对价值股也是一样的动量趋势。所以我们正处在巨大的变革时期，却又面临着估值方面的自满，这很耐人寻味。

Michael Batnick:

This is what's so hard about being an investor now. John, I'd love for you to weigh in on this. You've got to hold two opposing thoughts in your head or else you will lose your career. So everything that you just said makes perfect sense.

这也是现在当投资人最难的地方。John，我想听听你的看法。你必须同时在脑子里容纳两个对立的观点，否则你就会失去饭碗。刚才你说的那些话都很有道理。

Then I look at the top stocks over the last two weeks or three weeks. And I could have blindfolded myself and recited them by heart. It's Tesla, Apple, Microsoft, Meta, Nvidia. So the more things change, the more they don't change.

但当我看过去两三周涨得最好的股票，我几乎可以闭着眼背出来：特斯拉、苹果、微软、Meta、英伟达。越是看似变化剧烈，越是万变不离其宗。

And for the investor class, this is at this point, this is all they know. They know it works. They know it works every time. And the experts keep telling them this is unnatural. It's not going to continue.

但对现在的投资者来说，这些已经成为他们唯一认知的真理。他们知道这种策略有效，每次都有效。而专家们不断地告诉他们：这不正常，它不会持续。

And then they're like, holy shit, for the 20th time in a row, it just continued.

然后他们就会说：“天啊，已经连续20次都应验了，它就是在继续。”

Chris Davis:

Capitulation works at both sides.

“投降式买入”在多头和空头两边都奏效。

Speaker 1:

What that reminds me of is my first stint covering Wall Street when I first met Chris in 1997-1998. It was in the late 1990s and as you probably remember, there was a succession of really quite scary market breaks,

这让我想起我第一次报道华尔街的时候，那是1997到1998年，也是我第一次认识Chris的时期。当时正值上世纪90年代末，你可能还记得，那时连续发生了几次相当惊人的市场崩盘，

1997-1999, the irrational exuberance, the BC crisis, LTCM, Hong Kong, the Asia crisis. And every time you were right to buy the dip and every time it was retail at that point,  the army of Schwab and Fidelity with e-trade then.

1997-1999，非理性繁荣、俄罗斯违约、长期资本管理公司（LTCM）危机、香港问题、亚洲金融危机接连不断。

And every time you were right to buy the dip and every time it was retail at that point, the army of Schwab and Fidelity with e-trade then.

但每一次下跌，你只要逢低买入就对了。当时是散户主导市场，靠的是嘉信理财、富达、E-Trade这样的平台。

And just every time they were proved right and every time they gained in confidence to keep doing it the next time and then finally it didn't work.

每次他们都买对了，每次都让他们更有信心继续这么做，直到最后一次，不灵了。

Michael Batnick:

Well, the multiples eventually became irrelevant because what's the difference? Who cares what price I'm paying? It's going up.

是啊，最后估值完全不重要了。谁还管我买的价格是多少？反正它会涨。

Speaker 1:

Yeah, which to be fair to Keynes is his definition. He has a very valuable definition of speculation is that when all you are concerned about is whether the price will rise rather than whether it's \[worth it].

没错，说句公道话，这是凯恩斯对投机的定义。他提出一个非常有价值的定义：如果你关心的只是价格会不会涨，而不是它值不值，那你就是在投机。

Michael Batnick:

Counterpoint. That period you described is a very... I was there for it. My formative years.

我来反驳一下。你刚才描述的那段时期，我也经历过。那是我成长的关键阶段。

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

It's a very compact three-year period of time from 97 through the end of 99. You're absolutely right how the way people were acting by the time it ended, it was in ludicrous mode. This has now been going on for 10 years.

那其实是一个很紧凑的三年周期，从1997年到1999年底。你说得没错，到最后人们的行为已经到了荒唐的地步。但现在这种情况已经持续了十年了。

Speaker 1:

True.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

The cloud computing era kicked off in 2015. Yeah, but 72 had a lot of these characteristics.

云计算时代是从2015年开始的。而且其实1972年也有很多类似的特征。

Chris Davis:

72 was a culmination of something that really started in the early 60s. You know, when Larry Tisch famously said, get me a kid. Like, I can't keep up with this market. I need a kid.

1972年其实是某个长期趋势的顶点，那趋势早在60年代初就开始了。你知道，当时拉里·蒂施有句著名的话：“给我找个年轻人，我跟不上市场了，我需要个小伙子。”

And you had a whole generation of investors that had gone through the crash of 29. And then you had a huge age gap and then you had the kids who had never seen anything.

那一代投资人经历过1929年的大崩盘，之后市场出现了代际断层，一批完全没经历过危机的年轻人涌入市场。

So I think the real question is that are we approaching something that's more like 72 or something that's more like 2000 and the difference between those two. Is that in 2000, you know, the market went down 9%,

所以我觉得真正的问题是，我们现在更像是走向1972年那种局面，还是更像2000年？这两者的区别在于，2000年的时候，大盘只跌了9%，

the Nasdaq went down a hell of a lot more, but investors like us and investors that were sort of, you know, active stock because we're up like 10%, 15%.

So you didn't outperform by 300 basis points, you outperformed by 2000, 3000. And that was, whereas when 72, and there wasn't much of a trigger in 2000, right? I mean, of course there was 9-11.

你不是跑赢300个基点，而是跑赢了2000到3000个基点。而且2000年其实没有什么明显的导火索。是的，后来有9·11事件。

Speaker 1:

That was later.

那是后来的事了。

Chris Davis:

That was later. And that had the psychological effect. But you didn't have sort of economic calamity. You had psychological reset and bubbles being burst. 72 marked sort of the beginning of a calamitous change in inflation. So stocks collapsed.

对，那是后来的事，它带来了心理上的冲击。但并没有发生什么真正的经济灾难。当时只是泡沫破裂后的心理重置。而1972年则是灾难性通胀变化的起点，导致股市崩溃。

We had stagflation all the way through.

之后整个70年代都是滞涨横行。

Michael Batnick:

So you're saying you see this as more potentially akin to the 72 ushering in the 70s versus the 2000s.

所以你的意思是，现在的局面更有可能像是72年开启的那个70年代，而不是2000年？

Chris Davis:

I would say those are two models that people should keep in their head.

我会说，这两个模型都值得我们放在脑海里去参考思考。

Michael Batnick:

God, let's hope it's neither.

天啊，希望两个都不是吧。

Chris Davis:

Well, but when you think of the inflationary pressures that could be unleashed, when you think of just some of what we went through in the last month in terms of geopolitical chaos, the loss of American hegemony, huge currency fluctuations, A lot unfolded very quickly. And remember, just think of the oil embargo, like something that had this huge change in. And so you could see things like that and you go back farther.

不过当你想到可能被释放的通胀压力，再想到过去一个月我们经历的地缘政治混乱、美国霸权的衰退、巨大的货币波动——一切发展得极为迅速。你只要回想一下当年的石油禁运，它曾引发巨大变局。类似的事件可能重演，只需回顾更早些的历史。

But I think those are the sort of two models that I think people can toggle between. But either way, it seems like a hell of a good time to focus on durability, valuation, Cash that you're getting up front, that gives you a much more convexity. You have much more ability to adapt. Even Mark Zuckerberg wrote that fabulous memo about four years ago where he said, you know, the great thing about cutting costs and having more money now is it allows us to adapt to a changing world. Well, that was like a ringing the bell that the end of free money was over.

不过我认为这两种模式（指1972与2000）是值得人们反复权衡参考的。但无论哪种情况，现在都是一个极其重要的时刻去关注“耐久性”、估值、以及你能立刻拿到手的现金——这会为你带来更高的“凸性”，让你拥有更强的应变能力。就连马克·扎克伯格在四年前也写过一篇很棒的备忘录，说道“削减成本、手握更多现金的最大好处就是能更好地适应一个变化中的世界”。那篇文章其实就像敲响了“免费资金时代终结”的钟声。

And I think that's where, you know, moving your portfolio, I think our portfolio is, I don't know, 14 times earnings, but yet we've got companies like Metta in there. And so I think that, that I just think the, the stuff that's got to grow 20% a year for another decade or two and have 50% margins for another decade, there's a lot of optimism in some of those.

我认为这正是你该重新调整投资组合的地方。我们目前的投资组合，市盈率大约是14倍左右，但其中也包括了像Meta这样的公司。所以我觉得，那些被市场寄望于未来十年或二十年持续保持20%年增长率、并维持50%利润率的公司，市场对它们的预期实在过于乐观。

Michael Batnick:

John, what do you think?

约翰，你怎么看？

Speaker 1:

I can't disagree. I've been banging the drum for value for God knows how long and every so often I'm proved right but mostly I'm not. I think carrying on from what Chris just said, I certainly agree that there is a distinct element,

我无法反驳这些。我已经为价值投资鼓呼了不知多少年了，偶尔我会被证明是对的，但大多数时候并不是。接着克里斯刚才的观点，我也确实认为当前存在一个很明显的趋势，

there is a vibe of Richard Nixon ending Bretton Woods, the end of the gold peg in 71 there is a sense of a bunch of different trends coming to a fruition, coming to a conclusion that in many ways what Nixon was doing then was recognizing that this couldn't last. It wasn't sort of some immense...

那就是类似于理查德·尼克松终结布雷顿森林体系、在1971年结束美元与黄金挂钩那种氛围。现在我们同样能感受到多种趋势正逐步走向终点。在某种程度上，尼克松当时的举动，是在承认某种体系已无法为继。这并不是某个宏伟举措……

Michael Batnick:

That the dollar was exchangeable for its equivalent value in gold. He said forget that, we're doing something different now.

也就是说美元曾能兑换等值黄金。他说，不要再坚持这个了，我们要另起炉灶。

Speaker 1:

And the Liberation Day tariffs It's fascinating to work out exactly how, well we still need to see exactly where the tariffs end up, but in terms of a final clear recognition.

还有“解放日关税”（拜登宣布对中国商品征收的重大关税）——很有意思的是我们还需要观察这些关税最终将如何实施，但从某种程度上来说，它是对现实的一种明确承认。

Michael Batnick:

Oh no, we know. It's 30% but everything is exempt.

不，我们已经知道了——名义上是30%的税率，但基本上都豁免了。

Speaker 1:

If they're that cynical.

如果真的这么“玩弄把戏”的话。

Michael Batnick:

That's what the stock market decided.

这就是股市给出的解读。

Speaker 1:

That's what the stock market decided. I'm prepared to leave some money on the table if necessary and let other people make that bet if they want to.

这确实是市场的看法。如果有必要，我宁愿放弃部分收益，也不会去跟随这种投机赌注。

There is a similarity of the moment in terms of the old way of doing things isn't working and we're giving up on it, which is the gold peg and fixed currencies for Nixon, which is.

当下确实有一种氛围，类似于旧的运行方式不再奏效，我们正集体放弃它的那种历史时刻——就像尼克松放弃金本位和固定汇率那样。

Michael Batnick:

So you and Chris share that insight about the end of globalization. We don't know what it means. We just know it's coming to an end.

所以你和克里斯有一个共识——全球化正在终结。我们不确定这意味着什么，但我们知道它确实正在结束。

Speaker 1:

Yeah. And it's changing direction. I mean, it's not suddenly moving to no trade at all tomorrow, but new patterns and new shapes will form in the same way that we went through some very interesting gyrations before we settled on a sort of Reagan-Thatcher model that worked very nicely after Nixon. We've got a messy decade before we were before we settled on Reagan and Thatcher.

是的，全球化正在改变方向。它不会在明天突然变成“完全没有贸易”，但确实会形成新的模式和结构，就像我们在尼克松之后经历了一段混乱的时期，最后才形成了“里根-撒切尔模式”那样。在我们走向里根和撒切尔主义之前，曾经历过一个动荡的十年。

Chris Davis:

And what's interesting about what you said about value and beating the value drum, the one caveat I give is that with all of these transitions, there are a lot of models, business models that have been carved in stone that are not going to work. So if I describe this chaotic world that we've been in, And I told you that if your portfolio was Diageo, Estee Lauder, Nike, Starbucks, like safe, reliable, you know, Anheuser-Busch, Kraft, you know. That's a nice, safe, secure portfolio. That portfolio is probably down 50, 60, 70 percent.

你刚才提到价值投资的观点很有意思，我想补充的一点是，在当前这种转型剧烈的时代，许多看似“刻在石头上的”商业模式，其实正在失效。如果我描述当下这个混乱的世界，并说你的投资组合包括帝亚吉欧（Diageo）、雅诗兰黛（Estee Lauder）、耐克、星巴克、百威、卡夫——这些看起来安全、可靠的公司组成的组合——这个组合可能已经跌了50%、60%、甚至70%。

Michael Batnick:

It's such a great point. You thought those were blue chips. Those are the most susceptible companies to the disintegration of globalization.

这个观点非常有意思。你原以为那些是蓝筹股，结果它们恰恰是最容易受到“全球化瓦解”冲击的公司。

Chris Davis:

Well, globalization and digitization and the AI stuff. You know, it used to be if you could buy a 30 second TV spot, it became, I won't say monopoly, but it became the bigger companies tended to get bigger because they could buy the ad space.

没错，是全球化、数字化，还有AI这些因素共同影响的。过去只要你能买到30秒的电视广告时段，你就几乎拥有了“垄断”地位——我不一定说它真的是垄断，但确实是“大公司越大”，因为他们买得起广告位。

Speaker 1:

It became less competitive.

市场变得不再那么有竞争力。

Chris Davis:

You know, so all beers collapsed to three beers, right? Now, how many beers are there?

Michael Batnick:

Well, I could start a brewery, start an Instagram account, a YouTube channel and I could be doing a level of sales completely outside of the traditional system. of paying supermarkets for shelf space, paying NBC and CBS for NFL commercial time. I would argue that's a great thing.

现在我可以自己开个酿酒厂，创建一个Instagram账号，一个YouTube频道——完全不依赖传统体系，比如不靠向超市买货架空间、不靠NBC和CBS投放NFL广告，我也能有不错的销售。我觉得这是个好事。

Chris Davis:

Well, you got fragmentation, but the fragmentation was driven by a change in the way technology, the way people consume information, and that changed fragmented brands that you can't imagine. Can you imagine going into a popular supermarket and they don't sell Crest, they don't sell Colgate, they don't sell Coke, they don't sell Pepsi, they don't sell Budweiser.

确实，这是碎片化的体现。但这种碎片化是由科技进步与信息获取方式的变化所推动的。这种变化打碎了你曾以为牢不可破的品牌格局。你能想象走进一家热门超市，它不卖佳洁士，不卖高露洁，不卖可口可乐，不卖百事，不卖百威吗？

Michael Batnick:

Allow me to introduce you to Trader Joe's.

让我来给你介绍一下Trader Joe’s（全美知名连锁超市品牌）。

Speaker 1:

Exactly.

完全正确。

Chris Davis:

Exactly. Or Whole Foods.

是的，或者Whole Foods也是一样。

Speaker 1:

Yeah.

没错。

Chris Davis:

So that was technology disrupted brands. Now, nobody thought of that when the internet came around like, oh boy, I have to worry about Budweiser. And I think AI will be like that. So I think the value trade of, oh, I'm just going to swing from growth to value is going to be overly simplistic this time. I think it's really going to have to be You're really going to want this active overlay, I believe, and of course I'm talking my book, but that it is going to be the ability to have both a reasonable valuation, durable growth and the ability to adapt to changing times. That's a tiny fringe of companies.

所以，这是技术对品牌的颠覆。当互联网刚刚兴起时，没有人会担心像百威这样的品牌会受到威胁。但我认为，AI也会带来类似的颠覆。因此，那种“从成长股切换到价值股”的思维在这一次将会显得过于简单粗暴。我认为，这一轮你真正需要的，是主动管理的能力——当然我是在“自卖自夸”，但确实如此——你要找到那些估值合理、增长持久、同时又有能力适应时代变化的公司。这类公司，其实只是一个很小的边缘群体。

Michael Batnick:

So I floated this theory on TV today and of course nobody likes it, which is probably why it's true. I think the stock market is the least cyclical it's ever been. The economy will always be cyclical. It's probably less cyclical than it was in the 70s because it's less reliant on bank funding and factory output. But I think the stock market has effectively become, at the high end, collections of companies whose businesses are predominantly subscription-based. And because they're not transactional companies, it's less likely that a weakening economy will have the same effect as it would have on the stock market even 10 years ago. So think about the largest market cap companies. Netflix, is anyone canceling Netflix in an economic downturn? Probably not. I would argue Starbucks has turned itself into a subscription service with the app. It's 30 million app users and your order is waiting for you. It's one button. I would argue that looks more like a subscription than a transaction. This is where all the market cap is. It's in Amazon, which is prime subscriptions, Spotify, which is music. And I guess my point is we're definitely susceptible to an economic downturn in the stock market without a doubt. But we used to look at companies like Alcoa and Caterpillar as bellwethers. I couldn't tell you when they report, what they had to say, or if anybody even reported on it.

我今天在电视上提出了一个理论，当然没人喜欢，这也许正说明它是对的。我认为现在的股市是有史以来最不具周期性的。经济永远是周期性的，虽然可能比70年代更不周期性了，因为现在对银行融资和工厂产出的依赖更少。但股市的高端部分，已经变成了由一系列订阅型公司构成的集合。因为这些公司不是“交易型”的，它们对经济放缓的反应不会像10年前那样剧烈。想想现在市值最大的公司，比如Netflix，经济下行时有人会真的取消Netflix吗？大概不会。我认为星巴克通过App也已经把自己变成了一个“订阅服务”公司了，有3000万用户，点单只需要一键。它看起来更像是一种订阅模式，而不是一次性交易。这些公司就是市值的所在：亚马逊靠Prime会员，Spotify靠音乐订阅。我想说的是，我们的确仍然会受到经济衰退的冲击，但我们过去会关注像Alcoa、Caterpillar这样的公司来判断市场节奏。现在我都不知道它们什么时候发布财报，也没人关心了。

Speaker 1:

Now Alcoa doesn't go first. They could report every week.

现在连“铝业先行指标”都不灵了。Alcoa就算每周发布财报，也没人注意。

Michael Batnick:

I don't think anyone would notice. So that observation is only important insofar as you remember that when we invest in the stock market, We're not investing in economic conditions. We're investing in corporate cash flows. We have companies that have made themselves more recession resilient by means of converting their business model from I need you to buy something today to you've already committed to buying this thing and you're probably too busy to cancel it unless things get really bad. And that's a different stock market than we've had through prior economic downturns. How crap part of a theory is that to explain modern valuation?

我觉得没人会注意。所以这个观察的重要意义在于：投资股市并不是在押注经济形势，而是在押注企业的现金流。很多公司通过把业务模式从“你今天得来买”变成“你已经承诺每月付钱买”，从而让自己在经济衰退中变得更有弹性。大多数人太忙，不会取消这些订阅，除非情况真的很糟。这跟以往经济下行时的股市结构已经完全不同了。这个理论来解释当前的高估值，有多扯？

Speaker 1:

So in terms of...

那如果从……

Michael Batnick:

John hates it.

John肯定讨厌这个说法。

Speaker 1:

No, no, I'm fascinated by it. I'm just trying to think in terms of the Warren Buffett theory of...

不不，我其实挺着迷的。我只是在想这跟巴菲特的那套理论，比如……

Michael Batnick:

Do you believe in inertia? Do you believe in inertia? Like the power of inertia? This is what the whole stock market is now based on. People not cancelling things.

你相信“惯性”吗？你相信惯性的力量吗？现在整个股市的估值基础就建立在“人们不会取消订阅”这件事上。

Speaker 1:

My bank account is still with HSBC. The reason I opened my bank account with HSBC was they had a special offer for students. I got four TDK cassette tapes. Lord knows how much money they've made out of me.

我现在的银行账户还在汇丰。当初之所以办卡，是因为他们当时对学生有个促销活动，送四盘TDK磁带。天知道他们这些年从我身上赚了多少钱。

Michael Batnick:

How bad would the economy have to get for people to turn off the services they're paying Apple for? Or turn off their Amazon Prime membership. Like really, really, really bad. An ordinary run-of-the-mill blip like 2022. That's why the stock market recovered so quickly, because it never happened. It never happened. I don't know what you do with that information, but if this were an economy based on choosing to buy a pair of Nikes or not, we would have a more cyclical stock market.

经济得糟到什么程度，人们才会停掉他们在给Apple付费的服务？或者取消Amazon Prime会员？得非常非常糟糕才会发生。像2022年那种小幅回调，根本影响不到用户行为。所以股市才恢复得那么快——就像从未下跌过。我不知道该如何用这套理论去做决策，但如果我们还是在那种“决定买不买一双Nike鞋”的经济里，那我们的股市会更具周期性。

Speaker 1:

Yeah, it's an explanation. Or a justification, I'm thinking the Buffett metric of market cap as a proportion of GDP. That would be a justification for the stock market being a higher share of the economy than usual because so much money making capacities is tied up in a way that makes it safe that you can I'm thinking it through and in about a month's time you'll see my column once I've...

是的，这确实是一种解释。或者说是一种“合理化”，让我想到巴菲特那套“股市市值占GDP比例”的指标。按照这个理论，可以说现在的股市市值比GDP高是合理的，因为赚钱能力以一种更稳定、更“安全”的方式存在……我再想想，可能一个月后你就能看到我写的专栏了。

Michael Batnick:

And it's not an anti-value argument. You know what it's an argument for? We used to argue, do I want to invest in growth companies or do I want it defensive or cyclical? That used to be the paradigm. It's a bullshit paradigm now. The largest, highest multiple companies Also, these days tend to have incredibly defensive characteristics in terms of how their cash flows come in.

这其实不是反价值投资的论点。它其实是在说什么？过去我们在投资时总在权衡：要买成长股？防御股？周期股？那是一套过时的逻辑框架。现在最大的、估值最高的公司，反而拥有极强的防御性，因为它们的现金流方式非常稳健可持续。

Chris Davis:

I agree with you, although I think you underestimate the cyclicality or sensitivity of advertising revenue, which is of course a huge driver of earnings at those companies, right? When you think of Meta, what do you think of Amazon?

我同意你的看法，不过我觉得你低估了广告收入的周期性或敏感性。而广告收入正是这些公司盈利的重要驱动因素。你一想到Meta、Amazon，不就都和广告挂钩吗？

Michael Batnick:

Here's my answer to that. I've heard this. Tell me what you think. The portion of the advertising that is now moving to Google and YouTube and Amazon's the third largest advertising platform in the world. Do you know Walmart said their advertising business was up 50% year over year?

我来回应一下，我听过这个观点。你看看是不是这样：广告现在大量流向Google和YouTube，而Amazon已经是全球第三大广告平台了。你知道Walmart说它们的广告业务同比增长了多少吗？50%。

Speaker 3:

Yeah.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

5-0. Okay. The percentage of advertising moving to those corporations Even if the overall pie is shrinking, it's good enough for the stock market. You know where it's leaving?

百分之五十。即使整个广告市场在收缩，但只要广告在向这些公司集中，对股市来说已经足够了。那广告从哪儿流出去了呢？

Speaker 1:

Mainstream media.

主流媒体。

Michael Batnick:

Comcast, newspapers.

Comcast、报纸。

Chris Davis:

Yeah, but there's not much left there.

是啊，但那边也没什么可挖的了。

Michael Batnick:

Sorry, not much left to take.

对不起，确实没什么剩下的可以抢了。

Speaker 1:

Okay, fair. Unless they sell Bloomberg to me.

说得也是。除非他们把彭博社卖给我。

Chris Davis:

But I mean, you could look back at what happened to Meta's revenue in the last sort of swoon and that caused the stock went down 70%.

但话说回来，你回头看看Meta上一次营收下滑的情形，它的股价可是跌了70%。

Michael Batnick:

Was that revenue or was that spending on the metaverse?

那是营收的问题，还是它们在元宇宙上的支出？

Chris Davis:

Well, it was both. It's that their revenue disappointed. So people saw slowing revenue and I think they actually had, they may have had negative revenue at one. And then there was the belief TikTok was rising and so on.

两个都有。营收不及预期，所以市场看到营收增长放缓，甚至在某一季度可能是负增长。同时，大家当时还觉得TikTok正在崛起，形成了竞争压力。

But you've also got in those big companies, you have Tesla, you have Nvidia. And of course, when you add up all their earnings relative to the earnings of the S\&P 500, what you would say is, well, we got, if those earnings might not be as sensitive, but what amount of the market is vulnerable? And I agree with you that the, The Nifty 50 is a good analogy because the view was, you know, it was Coke, Procter, Disney, Xerox, Polaroid.

但你看这些大公司里，还有特斯拉、英伟达。如果你把它们的盈利加总，与整个标普500的总利润相比，你就会问——即使它们的盈利没那么敏感，市场中到底有多少部分是脆弱的？我同意你的类比——“漂亮50”确实是个好比喻，当年人们认为像可口可乐、宝洁、迪士尼、施乐、宝丽来这些公司是“永远不会出事的”。

Michael Batnick:

Very disruptable, it turns out.

结果发现，这些公司其实很容易被颠覆。

Chris Davis:

And then there were growth companies in there that were 10-year-old racehorses, Tootsie Roll, Kodak and so on. But there was also Philip Morris and Coke and some others that if you bought them and held on to them, even if you went down 50% for a couple of years, you did great. And I think the adjustment that needs to be made with the tech investors is just recognizing that these have become stalwarts exactly like you say, but stalwarts don't grow 20%. And so having to figure out what is in the valuation expectations for these businesses, is it that they are high growth, you know, 20% year over the year, or is it no, they're growth stalwarts. They're the Procter and Gamble's of this generation.

当时里面还有一些成长股，像Tootsie Roll、柯达等等，看起来像是“奔跑了十年的赛马”。但也有一些公司比如菲利普莫里斯、可口可乐，如果你买了它们并持有，即使短期内下跌50%，长期来看仍然赚得很好。我觉得科技股投资者现在需要做的调整是要认识到——这些公司现在已经变成了“中流砥柱型”公司，正如你说的那样。但“中流砥柱”型公司不可能每年再增长20%。所以我们需要思考清楚，当前对这些公司的估值预期到底在押注什么？是继续高增长，还是说，它们已经是这一代的宝洁公司了？

Michael Batnick:

So this year, when I read the Netflix earnings report for this quarter and the Spotify report, I said it's both. Spotify, think of this, 700 million users. How many companies in history have ever even had 700,000, 700 million? So from my perspective, will they be able to get away with another price increase this year? Maybe not. So maybe that limits the revenue growth, but just think of the size of that. That sounds defensive to me.

所以今年，当我读到Netflix本季度的财报以及Spotify的财报时，我的反应是——两者兼具。想想Spotify，有7亿用户。历史上有多少家公司曾经拥有过7亿用户？甚至7百万都罕见。从我的角度看，他们今年还能再涨一次价吗？可能不行。所以这可能限制了它们的收入增长，但你想想那个体量。听起来很有防御性。

Speaker 3:

Yeah.

是的。

Michael Batnick:

Unless everyone cancels all at once. I want to ask you guys about inflation. We got a year over year CPI that was up 2.3% in April. It was the lowest CPI reading since February of 2021. I have a chart here.John, let's put up headline and core inflation trends.

除非所有人一起取消订阅。我想问你们关于通胀的问题。我们刚看到4月的CPI同比上涨2.3%，是自2021年2月以来最低的一次。我这儿有一张图。John，把整体CPI和核心CPI的趋势图放上来。

Chris Davis:

John wrote a good article about this.

John写了一篇很好的文章讲这个。

Speaker 3:

Thank you.

谢谢。

Michael Batnick:

Okay. Is this the last of the tame inflation reports? This seems really calm. Remarkably, right?

好。那么，这是最后一份“温和”的通胀报告吗？看起来真的很平静。是不是有点出乎意料？

Speaker 1:

By all the criteria, obviously, we all know a bit more about inflation now that we've had some big waves in the last few. By all the sensible criteria, this was as good an inflation report as you could possibly hope for coming into it.If you looked at the median, if you looked at the trimmed mean where you remove the outliers, if you looked at sticky prices, which Atlanta looks at—the ones that are very difficult to cut—everything was gently trending downwards.And the one that they were most worried about, services excluding shelter, came down really quite sharply down to 2.7%. So this was... There was nothing wrong with this. I mean, it's still a bit too high for the Fed's liking.

按所有标准来看——显然我们现在对通胀比前几年大波动前了解更多了——这份报告在所有理性标准下，几乎是你能盼到的最理想的通胀数据了。

你看中位数、去除异常值后的修正平均值、亚特兰大联储关注的“黏性价格”（很难下调的那类），这些都在温和地往下走。他们最担心的那项——剔除住房的服务价格——也显著下降，降到了2.7%。所以，这份报告没有任何问题。虽然对美联储来说还是略高。

Michael Batnick:

There's no trade war stuff in it. It's April. So what happens in May?

报告里没有体现贸易战的内容。这是4月的数据。那么5月会发生什么？

Speaker 1:

That's the problem we have with so much data because people knew that they didn't know what the tariffs are going to be, but they knew they were probably coming. So obviously, first quarter GDP, you don't really know what to do with that.PPI which we had remarkably fell. My best guess is that the next month we're going to see a bump because we can only see a bump because that's when the tariffs really were in effect, most of them.

这正是我们面对数据时的问题。人们虽然不知道具体的关税是什么，但知道它们大概率要来了。所以一季度的GDP你其实也不知道该怎么解读。PPI意外地下跌了。我的最佳猜测是，下个月我们会看到一个反弹——我们只能看到一个反弹——因为那时候大多数关税确实开始生效了。

Michael Batnick:

If we know that that embargo is over and China...

如果我们知道禁运结束了，而且中国……

Speaker 1:

We can probably look through it.

我们大概可以忽略这一次的影响。

Michael Batnick:

So that's the question. Do you think investors will look through an aberrant CPI print a month from this week?

这就是关键问题了。你觉得投资者会忽略下个月异常的CPI数据吗？

Speaker 1:

Probably.

大概会。

Michael Batnick:

Okay.

好。

Speaker 1:

I mean, again, I've been doing this too long to be certain about anything. Probably. I think the balance... I think that like you were saying earlier, I think the consensus on the market is too bullish.The overwhelming consensus on the market thinks tariffs are a bad idea and the lower they are, the happier the market is.I think my most likely final scenario for tariffs is a little higher than is currently implicitly being bet on by the markets.

就是说，我做这行太久了，不会对任何事情绝对确定。但大概会。我觉得市场的倾向……就像你刚才说的，市场现在的共识过于乐观。绝大多数人都认为关税是坏事，越低越好，市场也就越开心。我认为最终的关税情况，最可能是比目前市场隐含预期的要高一些。

Michael Batnick:

It's so funny. They said 30% tariffs at the start of the year. The stock market was rallying into February. Everybody was fine with it. And they said 145% tariffs. We had a 20% lightning fast selloff.Now they're back at 30, which is what we assumed. And the stock market has gained back everything it lost. By which you can conclude,the stock market never believed the fairy tale where we would get rid of income tax because tariffs would take care of it. Okay. That's not true. We also can conclude there's hardball and there's talking about playing hardball.

And in this case, we were just talking about playing hardball.

真搞笑。今年年初说关税是30%，股市一路上涨到2月，大家都没事。后来说变成145%，结果市场迅速暴跌20%。现在又回到了30%，也就是我们原先预期的水平，市场又把跌的全涨回来了。你可以得出一个结论：市场从未相信那个“靠关税就能取消所得税”的童话。好吧，那肯定不是真的。我们还可以得出另一个结论——“强硬出手”与“说说要强硬”是两码事。这次，只不过是说说而已。

Speaker 1:

But it really did look for a few days.

但确实有那么几天，看起来真的有些像那样。

Michael Batnick:

Yeah, I agree.

是的，我同意。

Speaker 1:

Peter Navarro coming out and saying there were a few days until the first reversal or the day of April 9th, right after the low in April. When you really did begin to think, hang on, have I been wrong about this?My column for Liberation Day channeling John McEnroe, the headline was, *you cannot be serious*.

彼得·纳瓦罗出来发话，那几天直到第一次反转前，或者说是4月9日那天——也就是4月低点之后——确实会让人开始怀疑：等等，我是不是搞错了？

我那篇“自由日”专栏用了约翰·麦肯罗的名句作标题：“你不可能是认真的。”

Unknown Speaker:

And it turns out I was right.

结果我还是对的。

Michael Batnick:

You said first takes are dangerous.

你说过“第一反应”很危险。

Speaker 1:

Yes.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

You should not go with your first instinct. I'm happy to report to you that Peter Navarro has been spotted. Yes, he is on planet Neptune negotiating trade. They've sent him to the outer rim. You may never see him again.Hey, John, give me that second inflation chart. You guys got to kick out of this. Who's going to look, who's going to look, who's going to look stupider?This is inflation expectations by political party according to University of Michigan.Democrats think 5%, independents think 4% and Republicans think 1%.

Michael Batnick：

你不该依赖第一直觉。很高兴向你们报告，我们发现了彼得·纳瓦罗。是的，他正在海王星上谈判贸易。他们把他送去了银河边缘。你们可能永远都见不到他了。John，把第二张通胀图给我。你们一定会觉得有趣。谁看起来更蠢，谁更蠢？这是密歇根大学关于按政党划分的通胀预期数据。民主党人认为是5%，独立派认为是4%，而共和党人认为是1%。

Speaker 1:

The Republicans are getting, oh, this is, for one year inflation, Republicans still think it's actually going to be negative. Yes.

共和党人的想法是……噢，这个是针对一年期通胀的，共和党人居然还认为通胀会是负的。没错。

Michael Batnick:

Republicans think there'll be negative inflation because of the beautiful trade war. The independents are going with the Democrats. That tells you a lot about how the popularity of these policies.

共和党人认为由于美妙的贸易战，会出现负通胀。独立派则偏向民主党人。这其实说明了很多，关于这些政策受欢迎的程度。

Speaker 1:

I mean, I think with these numbers, which are hilarious. I do think the independent line is the important one.It shows that roughly two-thirds of the population, half each on the left and the right, have got to the point where they're allowing their political lens to so completely obscure their judgment that they're saying things that are stupid.So the average Democrat said that was expecting inflation of 7% over the next year. Right.

Michael Batnick:

Insane.

太疯狂了。

Speaker 1:

And Republicans expected deflation.

而共和党人则预期会出现通缩。

Speaker 3:

Right.

没错。

Michael Batnick:

Equally insane.

一样疯狂。

Speaker 1:

Equally stupid. Like, come on, guys, think this one through. The fact that the independents seem to be getting that much into the bearish vibe of tariffs means inflation.It's probably one of the many good reasons why the White House is retreating from where it was.

一样愚蠢。拜托，大家动动脑子。独立派竟然也被卷入了这种对关税的悲观看法，就意味着通胀风险存在。这大概是白宫正在从之前立场后退的诸多理由之一。

Michael Batnick:

Over the last week, in addition to retreating from the tariffs, the Trump administration has been on a new tack. And I think Wall Street likes this one. He took 40 CEOs with him to the Middle East. I want to read you something.Stock investors are much happier. This is Ed Yardeni.

Stock investors are much happier now that President Donald Trump seems to be pivoting from pushing prohibitive tariffs to pushing American semiconductors and Boeing jets in the Middle East. So he said he went from tariff man to salesman.Trump used a state visit to Qatar today to announce a large purchase of Boeing jets, 160 airplanes. MBS in Saudi Arabia is talking about multi-hundred billion dollar AI investments and investments in the United States.Stock market loves this. And then as the capper, NVIDIA's CEO Jensen Wang announced that the company will sell more than 18,000 of those chips, go for a lot, 18,000 of its latest AI chips to Humane, which I guess is their big tech concern.Also announced partnerships with AMD, AWS, and Grok during the president's visit to Saudi Arabia. So this is, I guess Trump said, all right, tariffing's not great. Let's go sell some products in the Middle East.And I think Wall Street absolutely loved it.

过去这一周，除了在关税问题上后撤，特朗普政府换了一个策略。我觉得华尔街很喜欢这个。他带了40位CEO一起前往中东。我想给你们读一段话。“股市投资者现在开心多了。” 这是Ed Yardeni说的。“投资者现在更开心了，因为特朗普总统似乎从推动惩罚性关税，转向了在中东推销美国半导体和波音飞机。”他说特朗普从“关税人”变成了“推销员”。特朗普今天在卡塔尔国事访问时宣布了一笔大订单——160架波音飞机。沙特的MBS也在谈论数千亿美元的AI投资及其在美投资。股市对此反应热烈。而压轴的是，英伟达CEO黄仁勋宣布，公司将向Humane出售超过18,000颗最新AI芯片，价值不菲，Humane好像是他们关注的大型科技企业。在总统访问沙特期间，还宣布了与AMD、AWS和Grok的合作。可以说，特朗普的转向是，“好吧，搞关税不太行，那我们去中东卖东西吧”。我认为华尔街对此简直是欣喜若狂。

Speaker 1:

He's a transactional guy. He is good at transactions.

他是个交易型人物。他确实擅长做交易。

Michael Batnick:

He's good at this stuff.

他在这方面很有一套。

Speaker 1:

There's just no...

这点无可否认……

Michael Batnick:

What do you think about that?

你怎么看？

Chris Davis:

Well, who was the president who said America's business is business?Cool it was a cool energy yeah right before right before the end right before the end of the business of america is business yeah i think it all it all comes down to it's you know if you're posturing for the headline or what really happens and and.There are a lot of announcements. It's like when companies announce share repurchase. Then you look a couple of years later, you're like, what happened to that \$10 billion? But I certainly think that we have been it.I'm a free marketeer, believer in globalization. We had an enormous disconnect in our system and part of the anger is so obvious when you think about the fact that if you have a college degree in our country, you live seven years longer.That is deeply, profoundly unethical. Sort of hollowing out, it's been good for the world. It's been bad for the U.S. Finding some balance in there is certainly rational.And I think the trouble is we have such a polarized debate, which your chart showed perfectly, that you just, you know, Charlie Munger said to me, one of our last conversations,he said, there are two true statements that none of my friends can believe both of them. And one is that, you know, Trump has seriously profound character flaws, right?So he said, he said, my Republican friends just don't want to acknowledge that. And then my Democratic friends don't want to acknowledge that just because Trump says it doesn't mean it's wrong. Yeah. And that's true.

Michael Batnick:

And Buffett repeated that.

巴菲特也重复讲过这句话。

Chris Davis:

Yeah. Yeah. And I think that's, you know, that's, it's a hard thing, you know, in this world where we try hard to be rational.We're in a world that's so intensely politicized and polarized that even the good thing of getting a big contract for Boeing out of the Middle East, you know, will have people interested in putting a negative spin on that one.Obviously, that's a wonderful thing.

是的，是的。我觉得这就是问题所在——在这个我们都努力追求理性的世界里，现实却是一个极度政治化和极度分裂的环境，甚至连从中东为波音争取到一份大合同这样一件好事，也会有人试图往负面方向解读。但显然，那是一件好事。

Michael Batnick:

I would agree. And I think if this were the version of Trump's economic agenda going forward, I think the political rhetoric from the other side would be significantly lessened.We don't know if we're going to get factories out of this or what type of factories. We are now getting mergers and acquisitions though. We have our first tariff era M\&A.Dick's Sporting Goods, which is hugely reliant on sneakers, is acquiring Foot Locker, which is completely reliant on sneakers. All of those sneakers come from Vietnam and China, Nike, Adidas, you name it.Dick's Sporting Goods announced they're gonna buy Foot Locker for 2.4 billion. So this is the first of the tariff era M\&A. I don't know if this matters to voters or investors particularly,but I thought it was an interesting sign of the times.

我同意。如果这就是特朗普未来经济议程的版本，我认为来自另一方的政治攻击会明显减弱。我们还不知道这会不会带来工厂，或者会是什么类型的工厂。不过我们确实开始看到并购出现了。这是我们在关税时代的第一起并购案。Dick’s Sporting Goods，这家严重依赖运动鞋的公司，要收购Foot Locker，而Foot Locker则完全依赖运动鞋。这些运动鞋都来自越南和中国，不论是Nike还是Adidas。Dick’s宣布将以24亿美元收购Foot Locker。这是“关税时代”的首例并购。我不知道这对选民或投资者有没有实质意义，但我觉得这是一个时代特征的有趣信号。

Chris Davis:

It's hard to know what to make of that. I mean, it also, you know, I don't know Foot Locker's business in terms of the value of their location.

这事很难判断。我其实并不了解Foot Locker的业务，尤其是他们门店的地理价值。

Michael Batnick:

They make the people that work there dress like the referees.

他们让员工穿得像裁判一样。

Chris Davis:

I do.

这我知道。

Michael Batnick:

All right. That's that one.

行吧，这个就这样。

Chris Davis:

But, you know, maybe the sense of being able to put more through those footprints than just shoes. And, you know, who knows? But yeah, I agree with you. The tariffs create that sort of pressure. And I think we'll see a lot of M\&A.I think that, you know, the Justice Department under Biden had a mindset that they were going to oppose everything. Even if they thought it would eventually get through, just to slow the world down.And maybe it had gotten out of control in the other way. I'm sort of apolitical that way, but– Well, this would be a slight change.

不过也许他们是想让这些门店的“脚印”不仅仅只是卖鞋吧，谁知道呢？但我同意你说的，关税确实带来了压力。我们应该会看到更多的并购。拜登时期的司法部的思维方式是：要反对所有并购。哪怕他们知道最终还是会过，他们也会反对，目的就是减缓整个世界的节奏。也许之前是太放任了。我在这方面不太偏袒哪方，但——嗯，这可能是个细微的变化。

Michael Batnick:

We're going to have mergers, but you have to be nice to the White House. I mean, I'm not saying that's good or it's bad. That's the reality.

Shari Redstone is not getting her deal done with Ellison.Unless and until he's satisfied that the news outlets are going to cover him differently.

This is the reality on the ground. So now you have M\&A, but there are a few conditions attached to it. Maybe that's better, maybe that's worse.I want to ask you guys for just parting thoughts on the second half of this year. Hard to believe it's May 15th. We're already heading into that conversation. Okay, now we know how the first half went. What do we think in the second half?Don't give me an S\&P year-end target, but like, what do you think we will be struggling with or excited about? Or what do you think is the next shoe to drop? I'd love to hear what you think, John.

现在的并购逻辑是，你可以并购，但你得对白宫“态度好点”。我不是说这好还是不好——这是现实。Shari Redstone 和 Ellison 的交易搞不成，

除非、直到后者确信媒体会以不同的方式报道他。这就是现实。所以现在并购是可以的，但会附加一些条件。也许这更好，也许更糟。我想请你们谈谈对今年下半年的一些临别思考。真不敢相信今天已经是5月15日了，我们已经进入下半年展望的阶段了。好，现在我们知道了上半年发生了什么。你们觉得下半年我们会面临什么困难、会为哪些事感到振奋？或者你们觉得下一个重大事件会是什么？John，我特别想听听你的看法。

Speaker 1:

Short term, like for the next We're thinking in Warren Buffett time, so six months to a year to 18 months is short term.I think the chance is we have something very much like Trump 1.0 now and we're probably going to get something pretty similar to the Trump 1.0 market.The stock market did pretty nicely, then people were surprised that the tax cuts went through, then we overheated, and eventually there was a revolt. 2018? Yes, in 2018. And that, I think, is a fairly good template that, you know, there is, you know, just don't deny it, there is momentum behind stocks and that will be difficult to stop for a while. And, uh, the thing that is most likely to stop it would be, um,the bond market getting back above, you know, if, if, if you get, um, if, if, if yields break significantly above 5%, that will, whether it should, but that I think will cause enough concern.

短期来看——我们按沃伦·巴菲特的时间尺度来思考，六个月到一年到一年半算是“短期”。我认为现在的情况很像特朗普1.0时期，我们很可能会迎来一个类似于特朗普1.0时期的市场。当时股市表现相当不错，人们对减税通过感到意外，然后市场过热，最终在2018年出现了一次“反弹”或动荡。

我觉得这是一个相当可参考的模型。股市确实有动能在推动，这股动能在一段时间内很难停止。而最有可能让它停止的因素是债券市场——

Michael Batnick:

I think 5% is the ceiling for stocks.

我觉得5%的收益率是股市的“天花板”。

Speaker 1:

And, um, I can imagine if we now need to see exactly how inflationary, how fiscally loose the Trump administration turns out to be. Obviously, Doge… Mission accomplished.Well, with Doge, you can have plenty of problems about how they went around doing some of their things. These are honest people who they were firing in a way that robbed them of their dignity, which isn't okay.That said, what they were trying to do was, broadly speaking, the right thing, which is, yes, the government is spending more money than it can afford. We have to make some cuts from somewhere.Maybe the Musk approach of moving fast and breaking things might be the best way to break the lockdown. So at one point, you did look as though we were looking at some fiscal tightness.At this point, there's a worryingly big consensus that we're bound to get an even wider deficit by the end of this year. You now have a much more interesting competition from German bunds. They're going to be issuing more of them.They have much less debt outstanding, so they're a pretty safe bet. So you'll probably find that they make more of a competition for treasuries. If you do get the European defense bonds, Off the ground, again,they're not the same as treasuries but they are a really interesting value alternative. The risks that the bear market in bonds continues and ultimately is what checks the stock market,I think that's the dynamic to get used to for the next year. If there was any one factor that caused the turnaround, the walk back on tariffs when it happened, it was the bond market, the yippee bond market which is one way to describe it but boy that man has a way with words and I think we're probably now In a different era where it looks like we're getting fiscal looseness and stimulus and again the question will be when is the bond market going to call time on it?

我们现在需要观察的是特朗普政府到底会有多通胀、财政上有多宽松。显然，有些（Doge）的行为……虽然他们试图做的方向基本上是对的：政府确实花的钱比它能负担的多，必须削减开支。也许马斯克那种“快速行动，打破常规”的方式确实适合打破一些财政僵局。一度看起来我们会进入财政紧缩阶段，但现在市场有一个令人担忧的共识：今年底之前财政赤字将进一步扩大。此外，德国国债可能会成为美债更强劲的竞争者。德国债务总量远低于美国，它们相对安全，而且现在将发行更多。如果欧洲推出“防务债券”，虽然它们不能完全等同于美国国债，但作为一种有吸引力的价值型替代是非常值得关注的。债市持续的熊市可能最终才是遏制股市上涨的“终极力量”。我认为这是未来一年我们需要习惯的市场动态。如果说有什么因素促使了对关税政策的逆转，那就是债券市场的表现。债市的波动在一定程度上推动了政策退却。现在我们可能已经进入了一个新的时代，看上去财政将继续宽松、刺激措施将持续。问题只是，债市什么时候会“按下暂停键”。

Chris Davis:

I think anything that Trump can control going into the midterms, he will try his best. He will want the market high.

我认为，任何特朗普能掌控的事情，在中期选举前他都会尽最大努力去做。他当然希望股市维持高位。

Michael Batnick:

Do you think tax reform goes through by the end of this year?

你觉得税改会在今年底之前通过吗？

Chris Davis:

Things are so tight in terms of majorities. I would say I am always short term, very pessimistic. When the market's optimistic, I'm worried that we are, the belief that somehow they can control the markets. I think John's exactly right.There's a hubris in that. And the moment the market loses faith in the ability for them to control it, you could get things going badly the other way. So I always say I'm short term pessimistic and long term optimistic.And my short-term pessimism has been wrong for a long time and I'm always pretty much fully invested. So, you know, but I just think the focus on resilience and durability is where people have,they have to get away from the magical thinking that just because it's gone up, it'll keep going up and, and really think about what do they want to own that will get them through to the other side.

现在国会的多数席位太过接近，我会说，我在短期上总是非常悲观。每当市场情绪乐观时，我就开始担心：人们相信政策制定者能够掌控市场。

我认为John说得完全正确，这种信念里有一种“傲慢”。一旦市场对他们调控能力失去信心，情况可能会迅速变糟。所以我一直说自己是“短期悲观、长期乐观”。而且说实话，我的短期悲观已经错了很多年，我基本上一直是满仓状态。不过我认为，大家现在的重点必须是“抗压能力”和“韧性”。

Michael Batnick:

Guys, that was so, that was so fantastic. I just want to thank you on behalf of the viewers, the listeners for sharing your insights with us. We really appreciate it.I want to mention that Michael Batnick will be back next week and we missed Michael on the show today. Michael is out west on business, but we'll see him soon. I want to tell people where they can follow both of you, both of you guys,so that if they want to read more of what you have to say or listen to more of what you have to say. John, you're a column at Bloomberg Opinion. They could just look for John Authors and they'll find it pretty easily. OK.Are you on social media anywhere?

各位，今天你们的分享太精彩了。我想代表所有的观众和听众感谢你们分享的深刻见解。我们真的非常感激。我想顺便说一下，Michael Batnick 会在下周回归，我们今天很想念他——他这周去西部出差了，但很快就能看到他了。我也想告诉大家，如果你想了解两位嘉宾的更多观点或内容，

可以去哪里找你们。John，你是彭博专栏作家，只要搜索 John Authors，应该很容易找到你。那你现在还有用社交媒体吗？

Speaker 1:

I'm at John Authors.

我用的账号是 @JohnAuthors。

Michael Batnick:

What are you tweeting?

你最近都在发些什么内容？

Speaker 1:

I actually had my accounts I was taken over by a troll for a few weeks. I was sending out some sort of racy AI generated soft porn for a while.

其实我的账户前段时间被一个喷子入侵了几周，有段时间我那账号居然在发布一些AI生成的软色情内容……

Unknown Speaker:

That was good.

我还挺喜欢的。

Chris Davis:

I renewed my subscription.

我还因此续订了推特蓝……

Speaker 1:

There was this scam apparently where I was inviting people to interview and in the process of being interviewed by me, they would give me all the details I needed to put spyware on their computer.

后来发现是一个骗局，我那个假冒的账号假装邀请别人参加面试，在这个过程中诱骗他们提供电脑权限，然后就能植入间谍软件。

Chris Davis:

Oh my god.

天啊。

Speaker 1:

I came out of that episode not wanting to ever turn on a computer again. Anyway, that's John Authors, J-O-H-N-A-U-T-H-E-R-S.

经历完那一切，我一度不想再碰电脑了……总之，我的账号是 @JohnAuthors，J-O-H-N-A-U-T-H-E-R-S。

Michael Batnick:

And if that account, at John Authors, offers you crypto... For Softcore Porn, just say no. Chris, where can people follow you?

如果你发现这个账号 @JohnAuthors 向你推销加密货币…或者“软色情内容订阅”，请果断说“不”。Chris，大家要去哪里关注你？

Chris Davis:

I think Davis Funds has a website that they put up all sorts of useful stuff.

我觉得可以去 Davis Funds 的官网，那里发布了很多有用的资料和内容。

Speaker 1:

Awesome.

很棒。

Michael Batnick:

You guys are incredible. Thank you so much for joining me today. Huge shout out to the team this week. Daniel, John, Duncan, Nicole, Rob, Graham, Keith, Sean, Truck Kid, Matt. You guys did incredible work for us.

你们两位真的太棒了。非常感谢你们今天加入我们的节目。也要特别感谢本周我们团队的成员：Daniel、John、Duncan、Nicole、Rob、Graham、Keith、Sean、Truck Kid、Matt，你们的工作太出色了。

Speaker 1:

We appreciate it.

我们非常感激。

Michael Batnick:

Um, that's it from us this week. Thank you so much for listening and for watching. See you next time on The Compound.

好啦，这就是本周节目的全部内容。感谢大家的收听与观看。我们下期《The Compound》再见。