2025-06-06 Bill Ackman's Key to Long Term Investment Success
Speaker 1:
Thank you for joining us, Bill.
谢谢你抽空来参加我们的访谈，比尔。
Bill Ackman:
Of course.
当然。
Speaker 1:
A little background. Even before the word entrepreneur was widely used when you were growing up, you wanted to do things on your own, do business. And one of the things you did at Harvard, for example, there was a travel guide there.
一点背景介绍。在你成长的年代，“企业家”这个词还不常见，但你早就想自己干一番事业、做点生意。举个例子，你在哈佛读书时就参与了一本旅行指南的项目。
Tell us about how you went in a Harvard basement and made what for a college kid was real money.
能不能谈谈你当时是如何在哈佛的地下室里赚到对大学生来说相当可观的收入？
Bill Ackman:
Sure. So I went to work for Let's Go Travel Guides that were produced by Harvard students. And I was a advertising salesperson. And they had designed the commission structure for less motivated people.
好的。我去了学生制作的《Let's Go 旅行指南》工作，负责广告销售。他们的佣金结构是为那些动力不足的人设计的。
And I made about \$14,000 working for the summer. But they did everything they could to stop me from selling more ads because they were afraid I was making more money than the person, the professional who was running.
那个暑假我赚了大约 1.4 万美元。但他们想尽办法阻止我继续卖广告，因为他们担心我赚得比那位负责运营的职业经理人还多。
So it was an interesting life experience. Then I didn't know that kids had to pay taxes. So I took the \$14,000 and I bought like the world's most incredible stereo and then the tax bill came.
这是一段有趣的人生经历。我当时不知道学生也得交税，于是拿着 1.4 万美元买了一套世界顶级音响，然后税单就寄来了。
Speaker 1:
You in favor of a flat tax?
你支持实行单一税率（统一税）吗？
Unknown Speaker:
Say yes.
说“支持”。
Bill Ackman:
For you, yes. Probably not. I'm in favor of meaningful changes in the way taxes are administered for sure.
如果是给你，那当然支持。但总体来说可能不。我肯定赞成对税收体系进行有意义的改革。
Speaker 1:
So after college, making good money before the IRS came, You got involved in a little bit learning about finance and real estate?
那么大学毕业后，在国税局找上门之前你已经赚到不少钱，你开始学习一点金融和房地产方面的知识了？
Bill Ackman:
Yes. Worked for actually my dad for a little under two years. He was in the business of arranging financing for real estate developers, investors, and pretty quickly I figured out I wanted to be the investor as opposed to the arranger.
是的。我实际上在我父亲的公司工作了不到两年。他的业务是为房地产开发商和投资者安排融资。我很快意识到，我想成为投资者，而不是融资安排人。
Speaker 1:
You wanted to be independent, so you wanted to go out on your own. How in the world does a kid raise money? How much did you raise and how did you do it?
你想要独立，因此想自己创业。一个年轻人到底如何筹到资金？你筹到了多少钱，又是怎么做到的？
Bill Ackman:
So I had a partner, a classmate from business school, and it's a bit like blind dating. You know, you can't be afraid of rejection. But you ask enough and we had a good story to tell. At least I thought of it that way.
我有一个合伙人，是商学院的同学。这有点像相亲，你不能害怕被拒绝。只要多去询问，我们有一个不错的故事可讲，至少我是这么想的。
And we went to people who had a We basically went through the Forbes 400 list and I cold called and I got meetings and Forbes 400 is comprised of a lot of entrepreneurs who like the idea of a couple of young guys starting something and they want to be part of it.
我们找到了一些……我们基本上把《福布斯 400 富豪榜》翻了一遍，我打冷电话约见面。《福布斯 400》里有很多企业家，他们喜欢几个年轻人创业的想法，愿意参与其中。
And that's how we raise the money. We asked them for, you know, half a million bucks. And I think they like the psychological benefits of being an early investor.
这就是我们筹到资金的方式。我们向他们要大约 50 万美元。我想他们喜欢作为早期投资者所获得的心理满足。
Speaker 1:
And one of the things you did was Rockefeller. Tell us about that and how you got a valuation from a firm. That was Tim Horton, but first Rockefeller.
你们做过的一件事涉及洛克菲勒中心。谈谈这个项目以及你们如何从一家机构获得估值。先说洛克菲勒中心，然后再谈 Tim Horton。
Bill Ackman:
Okay, so Rockefeller Center was a public company that owned a \$1.3 billion mortgage in Rockefeller Center. It was a time where the Japanese were walking away from U.S. real estate.
好的。洛克菲勒中心是一家上市公司，持有洛克菲勒中心 13 亿美元的抵押贷款。当时日本投资者正在撤离美国房地产。
The mortgage was going to go into default and it created an opportunity to create an interest in Rockefeller Center for really pennies on the dollar and we bought a stake and again I went to the, not to promote Forbes too much,
这笔贷款即将违约，这让我们有机会用“几美分买一美元”的价格在洛克菲勒中心获得权益。我们买进了一部分股份，再次出于不想过度宣传《福布斯》的考虑，
but I literally Called every billionaire on the list to see if we could find a partner to buy control of this mortgage which would have given us control of Rockefeller Center. I met David Rockefeller and I met Jerry Speier.
我真的给榜单上的每位亿万富翁打过电话，看看能否找到合伙人买下这笔贷款的控制权，从而掌控洛克菲勒中心。我见了大卫·洛克菲勒，也见了杰瑞·斯皮尔。
I met a guy named Joe Steinberg and it ended up becoming very important to me. So it was a great start to my career.
我还认识了乔·斯坦伯格，他后来对我意义重大。这成了我职业生涯的绝佳起点。
Speaker 1:
And the evaluation, was that Tim Horton?
那次估值，是指 Tim Horton 吗？
Bill Ackman:
Yes.
是的。
Speaker 1:
By the way, Tim Horton makes the best pod coffee, just for the record.
顺便说一句，Tim Horton 的胶囊咖啡可谓最好喝，留此记录。
Bill Ackman:
That's good to hear because we're still indirectly a shareholder. So basically, the first activist investment of Pershing Square was Wendy's.
很高兴听到这话，因为我们至今间接持有股份。基本上，潘兴广场的首笔激进投资是 Wendy’s。
Actually, it was an article in Barron saying how cheap Wendy's stock was and it owned a company called Tim Horton's. And at the time, we bought 10% of Wendy's for a valuation of about \$4.5 billion for the whole company.
事实上，《巴伦周刊》有篇文章称 Wendy’s 股价被严重低估，而它旗下拥有 Tim Hortons。当时我们买下 Wendy’s 10% 的股份，公司整体估值约 45 亿美元。
And they owned 100% of Tim Hortons that generated about \$450 million of operating income. We thought Tim Hortons was worth a lot more than all of Wendy's. And our thesis was split the two. And so we bought a stake. We called the management.
他们 100% 控股 Tim Hortons，后者年营业利润约 4.5 亿美元。我们认为 Tim Hortons 的价值远高于整个 Wendy’s，于是提出拆分两家公司的主张。我们买入股份并联系管理层。
They didn't take our call. Sent an email. They didn't respond. So I had a friend who worked at Blackstone. And I said, you know, would Blackstone I do a fairness opinion in effect of what Wendy's would be worth if they spun off Tim Hortons.
他们不接电话，邮件也无回复。我就找了在黑石工作的朋友，询问黑石能否为 Wendy’s 拆分 Tim Hortons 出具一份公平意见书来评估价值。
Speaker 1:
How did you get Blackstone to take you seriously?
你怎么让黑石认真对待你们的方案？
Bill Ackman:
Just a friend who worked there, you know, wanted to do business. Blackstone had an investment bank at the time and Steve Schwarzman actually signed off on the fairness opinion for Wendy's spinning off Tim Hortons and we mailed it in,
主要是那里的朋友想做成这笔生意。当时黑石有投行部门，史蒂夫·施瓦茨曼亲自签署了 Wendy’s 拆分 Tim Hortons 的公平意见书，我们将其寄出，
filed it in a 13-D and six weeks later they split the company, stock doubled and that was the beginning of our I have an activist career at Pershing Square.
并在 13-D 文件中提交；六周后公司拆分，股价翻倍，这标志着我在潘兴广场的激进投资生涯正式开启。
Speaker 1:
Activist. What is the criteria for your activism?
激进投资者——你们采取激进行动的标准是什么？
Bill Ackman:
Well, so today I sort of retired as I say from public company activism because you sort of have to be an activist if no one knows who you are because it's hard to influence companies when you're a startup hedge fund.
现在我算是退出了公开市场的激进投资。早期没人知道你是谁，作为初创对冲基金很难影响公司，所以不得不采取激进策略。
We've been around long enough that today we don't have to be an activist. People take our call but my activism I remember meeting a CEO actually in the 1990s in my first fund and he said,
我们成立至今已久，如今无需再做激进者，别人会接我们电话。我记得 1990 年代在第一支基金时见过一位 CEO，他说，
Bill, I think you have activist tendencies and he didn't mean it in a very positive way. I think actually activism is a very positive thing but I would say on X, I've kind of transferred my activist tendencies.
“比尔，我觉得你有激进倾向。”他的语气并不友好。我认为激进投资非常积极。现在我在 X（推特）上把这种激进倾向发挥出来。
If there's an issue I'm passionate about, I've always been a big free speech person.
若有我热衷的议题，我一直是言论自由的坚定支持者。
Speaker 1:
So you like what you call super durable companies. Yes. What you see is super durable.
你偏爱所谓“超级耐久”的公司，对吗？你怎样定义“超级耐久”？
Bill Ackman:
Well, the value of a financial asset is the present value of the cash it generates over its life. How can you build a DCF model unless you can predict those cash flows? The business has to endure.
金融资产的价值是其生命周期现金流的现值。若无法预测现金流，就无法做 DCF，企业必须长久存在。
And we try to find things we never need to sell. And we try to find businesses that can grow forever. There aren't that many of them. So that's why we own such a few companies.
我们力求找到永远无需出售的资产，寻找可以永续增长的企业。这样的公司并不多，所以我们的持仓极少。
Speaker 1:
Say you only get one good idea a year.
假设你一年只有一个好点子可投？
Bill Ackman:
One or two, if we're lucky, yes. But that's enough.
运气好就一两个。但这已经足够。
Speaker 1:
And find your royalty concepts.
谈谈你的“版税”概念吧。
Bill Ackman:
So the best business, I believe, is one that doesn't have to put up invest capital, but earns a perpetuity growth annuity, right? Asset management is a great business. If you can invest the assets well and you can get paid a fee, you know, off a base of assets of other people's money. But there are other businesses that meet that model. So Tim Hortons is a franchise restaurateur. They have a brand, they have a system, and then the franchisees put up the capital and they get a royalty on every, you know, coffee and donuts that's sold at Tim Hortons. Universal Music is a royalty on people listening to music. Hilton is a royalty on people staying in hotels.
在我看来，最好的生意是不需要投入资本，却能获取永久增长型年金。资产管理就是绝佳的生意，只要你能把资金投资好，就能按资产规模收取费用，这些资产都是别人的资金做基数。但还有其他符合这种模式的生意。比如 Tim Hortons 是一家特许经营餐饮公司，拥有品牌和体系，由加盟商出资建设，总部则对每杯咖啡、每个甜甜圈抽取版税。环球音乐从人们听音乐中抽取版税；希尔顿从人们住酒店中抽取版税。
够直接，够坦率。
They own a brand. Other people put up the capital.
他们拥有品牌，别人出资本。
So most of the companies we invest in can be thought of as annuities or growth royalties and the key is which is predicting which of these royalties will endure and that's a more complicated question.
因此，我们投资的大多数公司都可视为年金或增长型版税，关键在于预测哪些版税能够持久，这个问题更复杂。
Speaker 1:
When you think of a company like Uber, you don't think of an annuity or Amazon annuity.
当你想到 Uber 这样的公司时，你不会把它看作年金或 Amazon 式年金，对吧？
Bill Ackman:
I think Uber is precisely that. They don't pay for the cars and they don't do the driving. They have a system. They've got a platform. They've got a user interface. And they aggregate all that demand and then they get a royalty.
我恰恰认为 Uber 就是这种模式。他们不用买车，也不用开车。拥有系统、平台和用户界面，汇聚所有需求，然后抽取版税。
Let's call it 20% of the ride in exchange for delivering the demand. That's an amazing business. Again, if you can have confidence that the Uber platform will be the platform a decade from now and two decades from now.
比如说抽取每次行程 20% 的费用，作为撮合服务的报酬。这是一门了不起的生意，前提是你相信十年、二十年后 Uber 仍将是主导平台。
Speaker 1:
So you've made the point these are things that aren't easy to replicate.
所以你的观点是这些业务不容易被复制。
Bill Ackman:
Yes.
没错。
Speaker 1:
No one's going to reinvent Amazon anytime soon.
近期没人能重新发明一个 Amazon。
Bill Ackman:
That's right.
确实如此。
Speaker 1:
And sometimes you don't buy what's cheap. You think it's a good value but it doesn't look cheap. Chipotle.
有时你买的并不是看起来便宜的东西。你认为它价值高，但表面上并不便宜，比如 Chipotle。
Bill Ackman:
Yeah, so Chipotle didn't look cheap. People use kind of a rubric for valuing businesses, right, the PE ratio. It's kind of a very simple way to think about a business but a stock can be expensive at 10 times earnings,
是的，Chipotle 看起来并不便宜。人们常用市盈率这种简单指标给企业估值；10 倍市盈率的股票可能很贵，
and it can be cheap at 50 times earnings. What matters is not next year's earnings. What matters is the present value of the cash over the life of the business. At the time we bought Chipotle, they had a food safety crisis.
而 50 倍市盈率的股票也可能便宜。关键不是明年的收益，而是企业整个生命周期现金流的现值。我们买进 Chipotle 时，它正遭遇食品安全危机。
Sales were getting crushed. People thought the company was going out of business. And it didn't look cheap. But if you believe you could change the course of Chipotle's history, fix the food safety issues, it was extremely cheap.
销售额暴跌，人们以为公司要倒闭了，看起来一点都不便宜。但如果你相信能扭转 Chipotle 的历史、解决食品安全问题，那它就非常便宜。
And the stock is up probably ninefold from the time we bought it.
如今这只股票较我们买入时已上涨约九倍。
Speaker 1:
It's amazing. Chipotle is now going into Mexico. Everyone sort of assumed it was from Mexico, but anyway, bad images. So we did a cover story on you a few years ago.
太惊人了。Chipotle 现在要打入墨西哥市场。大家原以为它本来就是墨西哥品牌，不过也有负面印象。几年前我们给你做过封面报道。
Bill Ackman:
It's actually a decade ago.
那其实是十年前了。
Speaker 1:
My version is a few years ago.
在我的版本里那是在几年前。
Bill Ackman:
I'm not encouraging another one. A lot of bad things happened after that cover story. It's a bit of a curse being on the cover.
我并不鼓励再来一次。那期封面故事之后发生了很多糟糕的事。上封面有点像中了魔咒。
Speaker 1:
But Howard Hughes. That is, describe what you want to do now with Howard Hughes. You're making a big investment and so how you're dealing with it is a little different from your other aspects of Pershing.
不过说到霍华德·休斯——请你谈谈现在你想在霍华德·休斯公司做什么。你正进行一项重大投资，处理方式与潘兴广场其他投资有些不同。
Bill Ackman:
Sure, so my day job, our day job as a firm is we buy minority stakes in companies and we help make them more successful, like to own them for long periods of time. But we're not buying control.
好的，我的本职工作，也是我们公司的日常，就是买入企业的小股权，帮助它们变得更成功，并长期持有。但我们并不寻求控股权。
We're buying 5%, 10%, 2% of business, but we're pretty influential shareholder. But I've always admired Mr. Buffett. You look at the Berkshire Buffett's history. 1955, he started a small partnership.
我们会买下企业 5%、10%、2% 的股份，却能成为颇具影响力的股东。我一直敬佩巴菲特先生。看看伯克希尔的历史：1955 年他创立了一个小型合伙企业。
By 1962, he started buying a stake in this crappy textile company because it was really cheap. By 1968, he had control of a not particularly good business, and he was sort of stuck.
到 1962 年，他开始买入一家境况糟糕的纺织公司股份，因为价格实在便宜。到 1968 年，他掌控了一家并不出色的企业，并因此有些受困。
这个时间是准确的。
And he sort of got tired of managing money where the money could disappear, where people could add and subtract. And he kind of wound up his hedge fund. He was an activist hedge fund manager, if you go back and follow his history.
他逐渐厌倦了那种资金随时可能撤离、投资人进进出出的资产管理，于是结束了自己的对冲基金。如果回顾他的历史，他当时是一位激进型对冲基金经理。
And he took control of this business, and he used it initially first, he bought an insurance company. I bought a bank and then over time he built obviously a trillion dollar business and he's been an unofficial mentor of mine.
他掌控了那家企业，首先用它收购了一家保险公司；我则买下了一家银行。随着时间推移，他显然打造了一个万亿美元的帝国，他一直是我的非正式导师。
Speaker 1:
When you were a youngster you read his letters, you read Graham Dodd and you read Forbes, right?
你年轻时阅读过他的股东信，也读过《格雷厄姆与多德》和《福布斯》，对吧？
Bill Ackman:
Yes, all of them about the true story. I'm a loyal subscriber.
对，这些都是真实的经历。我是忠实订户。
Speaker 1:
Thank you. You helped pay for this today.
谢谢。今天这场活动也多亏了你的订阅费。
Bill Ackman:
The return on the subscription has been very high. It's disappointing that media companies don't do better because You know, particularly business media can be a very profitable read, I would say.
这份订阅的回报率非常高。我觉得媒体公司表现不佳令人失望，尤其是商业媒体，其实可以成为极具盈利价值的阅读内容。
Speaker 1:
So in terms of Howard Hughes...
那么说回霍华德·休斯……
Bill Ackman:
In terms of Howard Hughes, today we own 47% of the company, so like Buffett...
关于霍华德·休斯，目前我们持有公司 47% 的股权，有点像巴菲特……
Speaker 1:
But you set up a different kind of company than you did with the rest of the company.
但你成立的这家公司与潘兴广场其他公司架构不同。
Bill Ackman:
It's a bit like what we're trying to accomplish is really what Buffett's accomplished. But instead of starting with a textile business that was going out of business, Howard Hughes is a company that basically builds and owns cities.
我们想做的事情有点类似巴菲特的成就。但我们不是从一家将要倒闭的纺织厂起步，霍华德·休斯是一家基本上在建造并拥有城市的公司。
A very unusual public company, one that has not been recognized, I would say, properly by the market. Like Buffett, it's very cheap.
这是一家非常特别的上市公司，我认为市场并未给予其应有的认可。就像当年的巴菲特，它的估值非常便宜。
And so we own a big stake in the company and we're in the process of either buying or building an insurance company and the plan is over time to,
因此我们持有该公司大量股份，并在着手收购或设立一家保险公司，计划是随着时间推移，
you know, compound at a high rate over a long period of time, buy companies as opposed to buy stocks. We'll buy stocks in the insurance company portfolio. You know, one of the interesting things about Berkshire,
以较高速度长期复利增长，收购整家公司而非只是买股票。当然保险公司的投资组合里也会买股票。伯克希尔有趣的一点是，
there are insurance companies that do a good job in insurance and there are investment firms that do a good job in investing.
有些保险公司擅长保险，有些投资公司擅长投资。
What's unique about Berkshire Inside of Berkshire is one of the world's most profitable insurance companies but where the assets of the insurance company are invested in common stocks.
伯克希尔的独特之处在于：其内部拥有全球最赚钱的保险公司之一，而该保险公司的资产却主要投资于普通股。
Speaker 1:
And so this is very important that if an insurance company is on its own, it's got all sorts of regulations about how you can invest.
这点非常重要：如果一家保险公司是独立运营的，它在投资方面会受到各种监管限制。
Bill Ackman:
Yes.
没错。
Speaker 1:
But explain to us how if it's owned by a company, you have a lot more flexibility.
但如果保险公司隶属于另一家公司，就能拥有更大灵活性，这一点请给我们解释一下。
Bill Ackman:
That's true. The regulators set kind of minimum capital levels, but the relevant measure is really how the rating agencies think of the business. And that affects your ratings are critical.
确实如此。监管机构会设定最低资本要求，但真正关键的是评级机构如何看待这家公司，而评级本身至关重要。
No one's going to buy insurance from you unless you're a highly rated enterprise. If you're a pure play insurance company, you're much riskier than if you're part of a diversified holding company.
若没有高评级，没人会从你这里购买保险。单一保险公司相比多元化控股集团中的一员风险更高。
The benefit that Buffett has brought to his insurance subsidiaries is this parent company that is not directly exposed to the insurance industry and is highly diversified with the profitable kind of good businesses.
巴菲特为其保险子公司带来的优势在于母公司本身并不直接暴露于保险行业，而且拥有高度多元化、盈利良好的业务组合。
So with that kind of credit support and running a relatively low leverage insurance company, they're writing a relatively small amount of premiums relative to the equity of the insurance company.
凭借这样的信用支持，再加上低杠杆的保险运营模式，他们以相对于保险公司净资产较小的规模承保保费。
He's given a lot more flexibility investing the assets of the insurance company. And our business plan is the same. So we own 47% of Howard Hughes, Pershing Square.
这使得他在投资保险公司资产时拥有更大灵活性。我们的业务规划与此类似。潘兴广场持有霍华德‧休斯公司 47% 的股份。
And Pershing Square itself is very well capitalized, about 30 billion of assets controlling this 47% stake in the company. So Howard Hughes has the benefit of a rich parent, so to speak, supporting it.
潘兴广场自身资本充裕，约 300 亿美元资产来持有这 47% 的股份。也就是说，霍华德‧休斯得到了“财力雄厚的母公司”支持。
Howard Hughes itself is a very good business with about 5 billion of equity capital. And then we started an insurance subsidiary in the context of Howard Hughes, and we have the similar kind of flexibility as Mr.
霍华德‧休斯本身是一家优质企业，股本约 50 亿美元。随后，我们在霍华德‧休斯体系内创立了一家保险子公司，因而具备与巴菲特类似的灵活性，
Buffett does to invest the assets. If you look at the 21-year history of Pershing Square, without fees, it's been about a 23% compounded return.
可以用来投资资产。回顾潘兴广场 21 年的历史（不计费用），复合回报率约为 23%。
Since we've had permanent capital, it's been about a 27 or 28% compounded return over the last eight years. So you take our investment track record and you combine it with an insurance executive who can build a profitable insurance company,
自我们拥有永久资本以来的过去八年，复合回报率约 27% 至 28%。将我们的投资业绩与能够打造盈利性保险公司的管理团队结合起来，
and you make money on both sides. You make money on the liability side of the business, the insurance business, creating low-cost liabilities, and you make money on the asset side.
你就能双向获利——在负债端（保险业务）创造低成本负债，在资产端获取收益。
And that's how you can compound at a very nice rate over a long period of time. And we're going to use Howard Hughes to follow that playbook.
这就是实现长期高复利增长的方法，而我们将以霍华德‧休斯来执行这套策略。
为什么要通过一个房地产公司的壳？在这种场合提问的基本是个傻子。
Speaker 1:
And what's the ownership of Howard Hughes? Part of it since...
那么霍华德‧休斯的股权结构如何？其中有一部分自……
Bill Ackman:
So it's 47% held by myself, other Pershing Square affiliates and the balance is the public.
目前 47% 由我本人和潘兴广场其他实体持有，其余股份由公众股东持有。
And the stock today is going through a transition where what were pure play real estate investors are largely selling and they're being replaced by investors who I would say are more open to the idea of what we're planning to do.
目前该公司股票正处于换手期，纯粹的地产投资者大多在卖出，取而代之的是对我们计划更为开放的新投资者。
Speaker 1:
Another thing you're interested in is Fannie and Freddie.
你还对房利美和房地美很感兴趣。
Bill Ackman:
Yes.
是的。
Speaker 1:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
房利美（Fannie Mae）和房地美（Freddie Mac）。
Bill Ackman:
We've been a long-term shareholder.
我们长期持有它们的股份。
Speaker 1:
And they did go bust their build out back in the crisis of 08-09. Yes.
但在 2008-2009 年危机中，它们确实陷入了困境，对吧？
Bill Ackman:
We were actually short going into the crisis, Fannie and Freddie.
事实上，在危机爆发前我们做空了房利美和房地美。
Speaker 1:
Good for you.
那真不错。
Bill Ackman:
In 2012, we bought it back.
2012 年，我们又买回来了。
Speaker 1:
And is the government going to give it up? They get, what, \$20 billion a year they suck out of them?
那政府会放手吗？他们每年好像能从中抽走大约 200 亿美元，对吧？
Bill Ackman:
The government's not going to give it up. The good news, we're going through a time with very large government deficits and it's not clear how we're going to work our way out of \$36 trillion of debt.
政府不会放手。好消息是，我们正处在政府赤字高企的时期，至于如何摆脱 36 万亿美元的债务，目前并不明朗。
And I think Scott Besson, to his credit, has said, you know, look, we've got to focus not just on our expense side, the liability side, we've got to focus on the asset side.
我认为，值得肯定的是，斯科特·贝森曾表示，我们不能只关注支出或负债端，也必须关注资产端。
And the U.S. government today is the 80% shareholder and a preferred stockholder of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and these are two remarkable businesses.
如今，美国政府持有房利美和房地美 80% 的普通股，并且还是优先股股东；这两家公司本身是非常出色的业务。
Speaker 1:
The numbers they throw around are huge.
他们谈论的数字都非常庞大。
Bill Ackman:
Yeah, so this is, the government's interest in Fannie and Freddie is worth approaching \$300 billion.
是的，政府在房利美和房地美中的权益价值接近 3000 亿美元。
The path to the government realizing the 300 billion is today these entities are in conservatorship and conservatorship is what is meant to be a temporary place where the government puts a financial institution that gets into trouble until it can recapitalize and emerge.
要让政府兑现这 3000 亿美元，目前的路径是：这两家机构处于托管状态。所谓托管，本意是政府将陷入困境的金融机构暂时接管，直到它们完成资本重组并重新独立运营。
Speaker 1:
By the way, this temporary conservatorship is what, a generation old now?
顺便问一句，这个“临时”托管如今已经持续了多久？一代人的时间？
Bill Ackman:
Yeah, 16 years in or something like this.
是的，大约 16 年了。
And Trump has been talking about first starting with Secretary Mnuchin in his first term and now I think they're going to finish the job is the companies will come out of conservatorship and they need to come out in a way that of course protects the 30-year mortgage and make sure that the cost of mortgages doesn't go up.
特朗普政府在第一任期内就与时任财长姆努钦讨论过此事，如今我认为他们会完成这项工作：让两家公司脱离托管，并且以一种既能保障 30 年期抵押贷款、又不会提高按揭成本的方式完成。
But it can emerge...
但它们完全有可能——
Speaker 1:
How do you prevent that because one of the raps against privatizing or changing the status quo is that mortgage rates are going to go up. The guarantee fees have to go up.
你如何避免这一点？反对私有化或改变现状的理由之一就是按揭利率会攀升，担保费率也得提高。
Bill Ackman:
Not true.
并非如此。
Speaker 1:
How do you answer that?
你如何回应？
Bill Ackman:
Yeah, so Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac today are vastly better capitalized than they were for the first 60 years of their existence. They were only required to hold 0.45% equity against their guarantees.
是这样的：如今房利美和房地美的资本实力远胜它们最初 60 年里的水平。当年它们只需按担保额持有 0.45% 的资本金。
And by the way, 0.45% would have been enough during the financial crisis had they not gotten to subprime. But it was still a thin level of capital. When they emerge from conservatorship, assuming they do,
顺带说一句，如果当初不涉足次贷，0.45% 的资本金在金融危机时期也够用。不过这仍然偏薄。等它们脱离托管——假设真的脱离——
they'll emerge with at least two and a half percent of equity relative to their guarantees. And if you think about their business, it's not a bank. People are confused by this.
它们的资本金将至少达到担保额的 2.5%。要知道，它们的业务并不是银行业务，很多人对此有误解。
Fannie and Freddie's business is they buy conforming mortgages, mortgages that meet a very safe standard, first mortgages on middle-class homes from creditworthy borrowers that are not that likely to default. And if they default, there's...
房利美和房地美的业务是收购合规按揭贷款——这些贷款符合非常安全的标准，是信用良好的借款人用于购买中产阶层住房的第一顺位抵押贷款，违约概率极低。即便违约，也……
Unlikely for small losses, they buy those mortgages, they package them up in these trusts, and they sell securities backed by them, and they guarantee the securities.
他们几乎不会遭受重大损失：他们购入这些贷款，打包进信托，再发行以其为支撑的证券，并为这些证券提供担保。
But the probability default is very low on this kind of highly diversified, very safe collection of mortgages. And they collect a fee, a guaranteed fee for doing this.
这类高度分散、极为安全的抵押贷款组合出现违约的概率非常低。他们因此收取保证费。
So the protections they have against their inability to meet the guarantee is one, they start with a huge amount of capital. They are going to emerge with a couple of hundred billion dollars of equity.
防止无法兑现担保责任的第一道保护就是雄厚资本：它们脱离托管时将拥有数千亿美元的股本。
只有2.5%的资本金，安全个屁。
Speaker 1:
If they went private, would they still keep their line of credit with the treasury?
如果它们私有化了，是否还能保留财政部的信用额度？
Bill Ackman:
So they have got about seven trillion of guarantees and they have enormous cash flow that comes in from the 65 basis points per annum they charge on those guarantees.
它们目前担保规模约 7 万亿美元，每年按 65 个基点收取担保费，因此拥有巨额现金流入。
So if we went through another financial crisis, first they have to blow through all their equity. Then they have the benefit of almost 400 billion of the ability to call upon preferred, senior preferred stock from the government.
如果再次发生金融危机，首先要把它们的全部股本亏光；之后，它们还可动用政府近 4000 亿美元的优先、超优先股支持。
And they also have this enormous earning power that continues even when they go through a challenging period. So there's a belt, there's suspenders, there's another belt, there's suspenders, there's a huge amount of equity.
此外，它们即便在困难时期也有强大的盈利能力。可谓腰带、吊带再加腰带、再加吊带，外加厚实的股本多重保障。
And then beyond that, because of the systemically important nature of Fannie and Freddie, they do have an implied government backstop. And so like JP Morgan, If JP Morgan were to fail, the government will come in in some form.
再者，鉴于房利美和房地美的系统重要性，它们还拥有隐含的政府兜底。就像摩根大通，如果摩根大通倒下，政府也会以某种方式出手。
But there's a huge amount, unlike in the past where there's a relatively small amount of investor money at risk before the government stepped in, here there's massive amounts of private sector capital and there'll be more if they emerge.
不同于过去政府介入前投资者资金所占比例很小，如今有大量私人资本在前线承担风险，且若它们脱托管，这一比例还会增加。
These have been wards of the state for 16 years. They've done a very good job, but they can be run much more effectively as true profit, you know, profitable enterprise.
它们被政府托管已达 16 年，虽然表现不错，但若成为真正的盈利性企业，运营效率将会更高。
They've been limited in what they can pay their management teams because of the Congress.
由于国会限制，它们对管理层的薪酬支付受到了束缚。
Speaker 1:
And with that, so do you think politically you can overcome the obstacles? Because the critics say, oh, it's going to wreck the mortgage market. You're going to have 9% mortgages with a guarantee fee and all of that.
那在政治层面你认为能克服这些障碍吗？批评者认为这会破坏抵押贷款市场，抵押贷款利率会涨到 9%，担保费也会提高等等。
I mean, the demagoguery has already started.
我想说，民粹式的攻击已经开始了。
Bill Ackman:
Yeah. Look, I would say one, the rating agencies here have already come out and said that privatization would not lead to a downgrade. That's a pretty good indicator and investors in fixed income securities are very sophisticated.
没错。我想说的是，评级机构已经表示私有化不会导致评级下调，这是一个非常好的信号，而固定收益投资者本就极为专业。
These are among the safest.
这些证券可谓最安全的资产之一。
You could argue that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac securitizations are safer than even U.S. government guarantees because it's secured and on top of it you get the guarantee whereas we're of course unsecured when we face the U.S. government on a U.S. Treasury.
可以说，房利美和房地美的证券化产品甚至比美国政府担保还安全，因为它们既有抵押，又有担保，而国债持有人面对政府时其实并无抵押品保障。
Speaker 1:
So in terms of investing, you like the companies that can't be replicated that are in effect royalty generators. But going through your career, I think people would find it inspiring.
在投资方面，你偏好那些无法复制、实质上能持续收取“版税”的公司。但如果回顾你的职业生涯，我想人们会觉得很励志。
You've made the point, life does not go in a straight line. First, you had the Gotham experience. You quickly explained that. And then around 2014 or so, you went through an experience where They were after you.
你曾说过，人生并非一帆风顺。最初你经历了 Gotham 事件，你已简单解释过。随后在 2014 年左右，你遭遇了一次针对你的冲击。
An activist investor was out to destroy you and almost did.
一位激进投资者想要击垮你，几乎得逞。
Bill Ackman:
Sure.
确实如此。
Speaker 1:
But what came to the rescue, if you could explain it, was the structure you'd put in previously. Otherwise, it would have been over.
但最终救你于危难的是你此前设立的结构，希望你能解释一下，否则可能就完了。
Bill Ackman:
Yes, that's true.
是的，的确如此。
Speaker 1:
Walk us through how you went through that.
给我们讲讲你是如何挺过那段时期的。
Bill Ackman:
So basically, one of the points that you learn when you follow Warren Buffett is he started out his career operating a partnership where people could pull their money.
基本上，当你研究沃伦·巴菲特时会学到这样一个要点：他职业生涯初期经营的是一种合伙制基金，投资人可以随时把钱撤走。
And the problem with operating, you know, if you're a long-term investor, but your capital can leave overnight, you're like a bank where the deposits we can have a run of the bank.
问题在于，如果你是长期投资者，却面临资金随时可能撤离的情况，就好比一家银行可能遭遇存款挤兑。
And every hedge fund is largely structured that way, where within some period of time, people can kind of take their money. So we made a bad investment in a company called Valiant Pharmaceuticals. It was down 85%.
几乎所有对冲基金都是这种结构——在某个期限内，投资人都能赎回资金。我们曾在一家名为 Valiant Pharmaceuticals 的公司上犯了严重投资错误，股价跌了 85%。
And the media narrative was obviously very negative, appropriately negative. And then the industry, if you will, sort of ganged up on us, led by my friend, Mr. Icahn.
媒体报道显然非常负面，也确实该负面。随后业内人士——可以这么说——群起而攻之，带头的是我的朋友伊坎先生。
The assumption was, OK, these guys are going to get a lot of redemptions from their investors. Let's put the squeeze on them.
他们的假设是：好，这帮人肯定会遭遇大量投资人赎回，让我们来给他们施压。
Speaker 1:
Elliott, too, came after you.
埃利奥特也来找你的麻烦了。
Bill Ackman:
There were a bunch of others. And people went short the stocks we owned. And they went long a stock we were short. A company called Herbalife, which put a lot of pressure on us.
不止他们，还有其他人。他们做空我们持有的股票，同时做多我们做空的一只股票——名叫 Herbalife——给我们造成了巨大压力。
Now, we had the benefit of a few years earlier launching this public entity, our version of Warren Buffett, our first step toward permanent capital.
幸运的是，几年前我们推出了一家上市实体，这是我们的“巴菲特模式”，也是迈向永久资本的第一步。
And what we did is I borrowed a bunch of money and I bought control of our investment vehicle. And once we had control, I knew we would be fine.
我当时借了一大笔钱，买下了我们投资载体的控制权。一旦掌握控制权，我就知道我们能挺过去。
Speaker 1:
That's quite a story. Speculation is going down. Your personal life, which we'll get to in a moment, is going through, say, be polite, a transition. So you have all that kind of pressure. How are you able to get J.P. Morgan to lend you when it looks like your assets are disappearing? Was it $300 million where you could actually buy in your stock and beat back the…
真是一段传奇。市场猜测正减弱。你的个人生活——稍后我们会谈到——正在经历一种比较客气地说是“转变”的阶段，所以你承受了那样的压力。当时你的资产似乎正在蒸发，J.P. Morgan 为什么还愿意借钱给你？是不是他们借了 3 亿美元，让你回购自家股票、顶住压力……？
Bill Ackman:
Yes. So, you know, I had always—I had never defaulted on a loan. We never defaulted on a counterparty. You know, when we shook hands, we did what we said we were going to do. And I went through a time of need, OK, which is I was going through a divorce, which creates financial pressure. The fund was down 30-something percent. We had a lot of very negative press.
是的。你知道，我从未违约过任何贷款，也从未对交易对手违约。我们一旦握手，就会履行承诺。而我当时陷入困境——正经历离婚，带来财务压力；基金下跌了三十来个百分点，媒体负面报道满天飞。
But, you know, I sat down with J.P. Morgan and I don’t know if Jamie himself signed off on it, but I found out years later I was the largest unsecured borrower from J.P. Morgan as an individual for that moment.
不过，我和 J.P. Morgan 坐下来谈，我不知道是不是杰米本人批准的，但几年后我得知，当时我是 J.P. Morgan 最大的个人无抵押借款人。
Speaker 1:
Back to the original Morgan about you lend on character.
回到最初摩根银行“凭人品放贷”的传统了。
Bill Ackman:
You could say that.
可以这么说。
Speaker 1:
I’ll say it, you can’t.
我来替你说，你自己不好意思说。
Bill Ackman:
And we paid them back. And look, if everything had gone badly—you could say it continued to go badly—it would have been a risky loan, but I had significant assets and, you know, I was committed to pay them back, and it’s kind of one of those never-forget moments.
而且我们已经把钱还给他们了。说实话，如果情况继续恶化，那笔贷款确实有风险，但我有可观资产，而且我下定决心要还清——这是让我终身难忘的时刻之一。
Actually, there came a time recently where I had actually a line of credit with J.P. Morgan and the bank said, “You know what, Bill, would you mind paying us more?” And I had an agreement with J.P. Morgan where the line was good at whatever the spread was for another couple of years.
事实上，最近有一次，我在 J.P. Morgan 还保有一条信用额度，银行对我说：“比尔，你愿意多付点利息吗？”按协议，这条额度还有几年按原利差有效。
And because of changes in bank regulation or otherwise, it wasn’t a profitable line for us. And they said, “Would you mind paying us 25 basis points more?” And I said, “No, I think that sounds fair.” And so it goes both ways.
由于监管变化等原因，这条额度对他们已不赚钱。他们问：“能否多付 25 个基点？”我说：“没问题，我觉得很公平。”——合作总是双向的。
Speaker 1:
And on that, after you went through that, you described, first of all, what you call how you make progress. Walk us through, this is personal, but how you're down, don't want to look at the mountain, fallen. What did you do each day? What did you do each day?
回到这个问题，在你走过那段经历之后，你首先描述了你所谓的“进步之道”。这很私人的，但请带我们了解，当你跌到低谷、不想仰望那座大山时，你每天做了什么？你每天到底做了什么？
Bill Ackman:
I sort of teach this to students.
我也会把这套方法教给学生。
Speaker 1:
This is very Ben Franklin.
这很本·富兰克林式的。
Bill Ackman:
So basically, when you're going through a very high pressure, you know, so the fund was down 30 something percent. The press, you know, loves you on the way up and loves you even more to write about you on the way down. So there was a lot of very negative press. There was some litigation in connection with that valiant investment. And I was in the middle of divorce. So it was bad. It was about as bad as it gets. But I didn't have a health issue.
基本上，当你承受巨大压力时，比如那时基金跌了三十来个百分点。媒体在你上升时喜欢你，在你下跌时更爱写你，所以负面报道铺天盖地。与那笔 Valeant 投资相关的诉讼也有，此外我正经历离婚。情况非常糟，几乎糟到极点，但我至少没有健康问题。
So one, it's important to keep perspective. But the way you manage through that kind of stressful situation, all of us are going to have a moment like this. Unfortunately, it's going to be a health issue. It's going to be you're fired from your job. Your startup fails. And it's even harder when you've fallen from a high place to a low place. So my method was just, I'm going to make a little progress every day.
第一，保持视角很重要。而要渡过这种压力巨大的阶段——我们所有人都会遇到这样的时刻，可能是健康问题、被解雇或创业失败——尤其是从高处跌入低谷更难。我采用的方法就是每天取得一点小进步。
Compounding is the solution to the vast majority of progress in the world and personal compounding is even more powerful because you make, you know, 0.1% progress every day. It doesn't sound like a lot, but annualized, you know, it's a huge amount. And so what I said to myself going through this period is, Each day I'm going to make progress. I'm not going to look back to where I was, because if I look there, I'm going to get discouraged. I'm just going to focus on the next step and then the next step and the next step.
复利是世上大多数进步的答案，而个人复利更强大，因为你每天进步 0.1%。听起来不多，但年化后就是巨大提升。所以那段时间我对自己说，每天都要进步。我不会回头看自己曾在何处，因为那样会令我沮丧。我只专注于下一步、再下一步、再下一步。
And you don't notice any meaningful change for the first few weeks. But about 90 days in, you're like, OK, I'm here. Here's where I was. Now, I used to be up there, but I'm just going to keep compounding. And the curves of compounding, which I'm sure you know well, start like this. They don't look like much. And then they look like COVID and they sort of eventually kind of take off.
头几周你几乎感觉不到变化。但大约 90 天后，你会发现：好，我到了这里，我当初在那儿。虽然曾经更高，但我要继续复利。复利曲线一开始很平，不起眼，随后像疫情曲线一样，最终会腾飞。
And the other key success factor going through a challenging period of time is just to be really healthy. So, you know, I decided a while ago to go zero sugar. I highly recommend zero sugar. It's good for everything from mental acuity to the way you look, just everything about it is a positive. You know, exercise, nutrition, sleep, kind of the basics, and then surrounding yourself with people you love and love you.
在艰难时期的另一关键成功因素是保持真正的健康。所以我很早决定完全戒糖。我强烈推荐零糖，这对精神敏锐度、外表等方方面面都有好处。再加上运动、营养、睡眠这些基础，并让自己被爱你、你也爱的人包围。
And if you do that, I think you can work yourself through almost any problem. And I met my — I'm a wife, now wife, at the absolute bottom, almost to the day. I had my first date with her and I think love saves us all. It's very true.
如果你做到这些，我相信几乎任何难关都能挺过去。我就是在最谷底的时候遇见了现在的妻子，几乎就是那一天和她第一次约会。我想爱能救赎我们所有人，这是真的。
Speaker 1:
This gets to a, I know we're running out of time, but describe your Brad Pitt moment with your...
说到这里——我知道我们时间不多了——能不能讲讲你那段与布拉德·皮特有关的时刻……
Bill Ackman:
Sounds like you've done some due diligence. So I described like my deepest darkest moment was, you know, the fund's down 35%, investors are redeeming, you know, we got a court case that's going poorly.
听起来你做了些尽职调查。我之前说过，自己最黑暗的时刻是基金下跌了 35%，投资人不断赎回，还有一桩官司进展不利。
I'm \[jointly and] severally personally liable with Valeant Pharmaceuticals — a company going bankrupt — on the shareholder litigation. And there's not a lot of good going on. But then I meet this woman, Neri Oxman,
在股东诉讼案中，我与濒临破产的 Valeant Pharmaceuticals 负有连带个人责任，可谓一团糟。可就在这时，我遇到了 Neri Oxman——
and she's just gorgeous and brilliant and like the most loving, warm person in the world. And it's like she's my savior. And things start — and also my working through the divorce and all this mess.
她既美丽又聪慧，是世界上最有爱、最温暖的人，简直是我的救星。与此同时，我还在处理离婚等一系列烂摊子。
And I finally get through, you know, starting to make some progress and completely fall in love with her. But she's at MIT and I'm in New York, a little long-distance relationship. And then one day she calls me.
好不容易情况开始好转，我也彻底爱上了她。但她在麻省理工学院，我在纽约，是一段异地恋。然后有一天她给我打电话。
She said, “Oh, Bill, guess who's coming to visit me at my lab?” I'm like, “I don't know. Who's coming?” “Brad Pitt.” I'm like, “That's great, sweetheart. I didn't know Brad Pitt was interested in architecture.”
她说：“比尔，你猜谁要来实验室看我？”我说：“不知道，谁？”“布拉德·皮特。”我回答：“太好了，亲爱的。我都不知道布拉德·皮特对建筑感兴趣。”
She said, “No, he's really interested in architecture and design.” I said, “That's fantastic.” We would text, WhatsApp, like all the time. Brad showed up at the lab at 10 AM.
她说：“对，他真的对建筑和设计有兴趣。”我说：“那真棒。”平时我们总用 WhatsApp 发信息。布拉德上午十点到了实验室。
And then I kind of, you know, WhatsApp'd her probably at around 11, no response. Sent her another note around 12. No response.
大概十一点我给她发消息，没回；十二点又发一条，还是没回。
Unknown Speaker:
Two.
下午两点。
Bill Ackman:
No response. And it was probably for the period of time from the beginning of our relationship to that moment, it was the biggest gap — and un-respondent, not just the texts were un-responded to, you know how the checks go blue when she reads it. They didn't even go blue.
也没回。从我们开始交往到那一刻，这是她最长时间没回信息——不仅消息没人回，连已读的蓝勾都没出现。
It's now it's nine o'clock. Nothing. Ten o'clock, she calls me back. And of course, they had a great day at the lab and then went out for dinner.
一直到晚上九点，还是没消息。十点，她才回电。原来他们在实验室度过愉快的一天，还一起出去吃了晚餐。
And so, you know, again, this is like a pretty dark period for me. So I'm thinking, OK, I'm going to lose the litigation. The fund is going to get liquidated. A judge is going to find me guilty of some kind of crime.
要知道，那段时间对我而言已经够黑暗了。我心想：好吧，我会输掉官司，基金要被清算，法官可能判我有罪。
And Brad Pitt's going to steal my girlfriend. That was the bottom. OK. Oh, and yes, and Elliott Associates had built a stake in my public vehicle, which we didn't yet control, because I hadn't yet borrowed that money from J.P. Morgan.
现在布拉德·皮特还要抢走我女朋友——这就是谷底。而且别忘了，埃利奥特也买入了我上市载体的股份，我们当时还未掌控，因为我那时还没从摩根大通借到钱。
And another activist was going to put me out of business. It was like, if you make the list of horribles of a terrible way to go out, I mean, Forbes would have had an incredible field day with the story.
还有其他激进投资者想把我搞垮。如果你列一张最糟糕结局的清单——《福布斯》拿来报道肯定精彩极了。
But the whole thing was very motivational. And maybe that's why Jamie lent me the money. He just didn't want to see me go down like that.
但整件事反而成了动力。也许这就是杰米愿意借钱给我的原因——他不想看到我就这么倒下。
Speaker 1:
Talk about activism. You've become very active, obviously, on the education front at Harvard. You've described Harvard as, I think, a trust fund kid who's never had to really work.
谈谈行动主义吧。显然，你在哈佛的教育领域变得非常活跃。你曾把哈佛形容为“一个从未真正工作过的信托基金富二代”。
Describe the revelation you had after October 7th and made you realize there is rot in higher education and what you want to do about it.
请描述 10 月 7 日之后你得到的启示，让你意识到高等教育存在严重腐败，以及你想采取什么措施。
Bill Ackman:
Yeah. So, you know, I had a very positive educational experience at Harvard. I went to Harvard Business School and periodically I would go back to campus and I talked to students, but I wasn't that close to the campus.
好的。你知道，我在哈佛的教育经历非常积极。我就读于哈佛商学院，偶尔会回到校园与学生交谈，但并没有与校园保持紧密联系。
I had a daughter who graduated from Harvard, and that was sort of my first clue that the place had changed. And literally for the first year or two after she graduated, anytime something related to capitalism would come up, she'd have a very negative reaction. And I thought this was strange. And again, not everyone has to believe in all the tenets of capitalism, but she was very sort of negative on capitalism.
我的女儿从哈佛毕业，那是让我第一次意识到这个地方发生了变化。她毕业后的头一两年里，只要提到与资本主义相关的话题，她就会非常反感。我觉得很奇怪。当然，并不是所有人都必须信奉资本主义的全部原则，但她对资本主义的态度极其负面。
October 7th happened, which is a very bad day obviously, but October 8th on campus was worse because of how a meaningful subset of the students responded.
10 月 7 日发生了那场悲惨事件，但 10 月 8 日在校园里的情况更糟，因为相当一部分学生的反应让我震惊。
34 Harvard student organizations came out and said that Israel was entirely responsible for the acts of Hamas, solely responsible, at a time when the terrorists were still killing people on Israeli soil.
当恐怖分子仍在以色列领土杀害平民之际，哈佛有 34 个学生组织发表声明，称哈马斯的行为完全是以色列的责任，只有以色列需要负责。
I thought this was obviously surprising and strange. I went up to campus. I met with students, met with faculty. Why are so many students taking the side of the terrorists?
我对此既震惊又困惑。我去了校园，与学生和教师面谈：为什么这么多学生站在恐怖分子一边？
You can criticize Israel for lots of things, but this is a case where clearly, and what I heard was that this is sort of an ideology that has emerged at Harvard, but in higher education generally, that the world is a bicameral world.
你可以因为很多问题批评以色列，但这件事显然——我了解到，这源于哈佛乃至整个高等教育中兴起的一种意识形态：世界是二元对立的。
There are oppressors and there are the oppressed. You're either in one category or another and that your oppression relates to where you fit on sort of this hierarchy of intersectionality.
存在压迫者与被压迫者，你只能属于其中一类；你的受压程度取决于你在“交叉身份”等级体系中的位置。
If you're a woman, you're part of the oppressed class. If you're a person of color, if you're an LGBTQ person, if you're a successful person or you're a white male or you're Jewish or you're Asian, well, you're an oppressor because so this notion that you're only successful if you got there by, in effect, pushing down other people, where capitalism is a zero-sum game.
如果你是女性、少数族裔或 LGBTQ 群体，你就属于被压迫阶级；如果你是成功人士、白人男性、犹太人或亚裔，你就是压迫者。其核心理念是：只有踩着别人才能成功，资本主义是零和博弈。
If Jeff Bezos has 100 billion, that means that other people have 100 billion less. And this ideology is really something that has permeated certainly Harvard and other institutions.
如果杰夫·贝索斯拥有 1000 亿美元，就意味着其他人少了 1000 亿。这种意识形态显然已经渗透进哈佛和其它高校。
And it's led to, and a lot of it was driven by kind of this DEI. And I always thought of DEI as diversity being a good thing. Equity, you know, I thought of this as fairness. And inclusion, I thought, of course, we want to, you know, I want Pershing to be a place where everyone feels comfortable. I want everyone to have the same opportunity. And it's great. I think there are lots of benefits in having a diverse university, diverse workforce, et cetera.
这在很大程度上由所谓的 DEI 推动。我一直认为多元化是好事；公平意味着公正；包容意味着让潘兴成为人人舒适的地方，让每个人都有同等机会。我认可多元大学、多元团队的诸多好处。
But what this ideology became was a view of the world that I thought was a very harmful one.
但这种意识形态演变成的世界观，我认为非常有害。
Speaker 1:
And what you've discovered. About the governance so to speak of Harvard and these other institutions quickly do an endowment.
以及你所发现的——也可以说是关于哈佛及其他高校治理结构——它们迅速做大了捐赠基金。
I mean a little background back in 2008-2009 everyone had followed the Yale model and they suddenly discovered they didn't have liquidity and here we are today these institutions Go quickly through Harvard, have a lot of illiquid assets and they need cash. How do they get themselves in a position like that? They look rich, but they're cash poor.
回顾一下背景：在 2008-2009 年，大家都追随耶鲁模式，结果突然发现自己缺乏流动性。如今这些机构——尤其像哈佛这样的——持有大量非流动性资产，却急需现金。它们怎么会走到这一步？看起来富有，其实现金匮乏。
Bill Ackman:
So basically, Harvard has really mismanaged itself. You know, if you think about the two places Harvard should be investing money, one is they should be growing their student body over time.
基本上，哈佛把自己管理得一团糟。其实哈佛最该砸钱的两件事之一，是随着时间推移扩大招生规模。
I graduated, my class was 1,640. Graduating class this year was 1,700. They've grown 4% over 35, 36 years. So in terms of the service they're offering to the country,
我毕业时的班级人数是 1,640 人。今年的毕业班是 1,700 人。35、36 年来只增长了 4%。也就是说，哈佛为国家提供的教育服务——
the number of slots relative to the growth in the population has declined. Percentage of US students versus foreign students went from a small percentage of foreign students to 27% of the most recent class.
相较人口增长，其招生名额实际上在下降。美国本土学生与国际学生的比例也变了：国际生从原来的少数提高到最近一届的 27%。
The result being that in terms of Harvard being a place to educate American leaders, they're not really satisfying that. They've made no progress whatsoever.
结果就是，哈佛要培养美国领袖这个使命并未得到满足；在这方面一点进步也没有。
If you look at the growth in the administration, however, there's been massive growth in both overhead and staffing. The faculty has been flat for the last 15 years. It's not like they're growing the faculty appointments.
然而，如果看行政管理层的增长，开销和人员都大幅膨胀；过去 15 年教师规模几乎没变，并没有扩充教职。
Now, how have they been funding this? They've been funding this with an endowment, but also a huge amount of federal funding, a much larger amount over the last whatever number of years.
那么，他们靠什么来支撑这些？主要靠捐赠基金，还有巨额联邦资金——过去这些年联邦支持越来越大。
And they're very reliant on philanthropy from their alums. And what's happened is philanthropy is...
他们还高度依赖校友捐赠。而如今的情况是，捐赠……
Speaker 1:
You have $8 billion of debt. Is that true?
你们背负了 80 亿美元债务，这是真的吗？
Bill Ackman:
That is true. So anyway, so the, but they had a $53 billion endowment, everything seemed fine. The problem they have is 80% of the endowment assets are in illiquid assets, real estate, private equity, venture, and the probably most liquid of the 80% are hedge funds, but even those, they're required to lock up their capital. They rely on short-term funding from the government and from donors.
确实如此。不过他们拥有 530 亿美元的捐赠基金，一切看似良好。真正的问题在于，80% 的基金资产是不流动的：房地产、私募股权、风险投资——80% 中流动性最好的是对冲基金，但那些资金也被锁定。他们依赖政府和捐赠者的短期资金周转。
The government funding has been largely turned off. The donor funding is, you know, if you're a donor today, you know, so they've been financing their operating expenses by borrowing money.
政府资金基本被切断。至于捐赠——如果你今天是捐赠人……总之，他们靠借债来支付运营费用。
They've gone from almost no debt to now $8 billion of debt. They borrowed a couple billion in the last, I think, 18 months. I even question whether 53 billion is the accurate value.
他们的债务从几乎为零飙升到 80 亿美元。据我记得，仅在过去 18 个月就借了好几十亿。我甚至怀疑 530 亿美元的估值准不准。
If they go to sell their illiquid assets, they're not going to get par. And so they found themselves... And so why have they done this? The answer is...
如果他们现在抛售这些非流动性资产，不可能按账面价值卖出。他们之所以陷入如今境地，原因在于……
People who manage endowments don't want private equity assets look less volatile than market assets because they don't get marked to market as often. And I think really by reason of many people wanting to keep their jobs,
管理捐赠基金的人认为私募资产比公开市场资产波动小，因为不用经常市值计价。我想，很多人是为了保住饭碗才这么做，
you put assets in assets that don't mark as often, you're less likely to look stupid, at least for some period of time. And I think that's led to a lot of endowments investing in illiquid assets.
如果资产不经常重估，你短期内就不容易看起来“愚蠢”。这也导致大量基金押注不流动资产。
Speaker 1:
Since we're out of time, the whole governing structure of Harvard is done in a way, and I guess institutions do their variations of it, where you can't mount easily an outside challenge.
由于时间不多了，但还是要提一下：哈佛的整个治理结构——其他院校各有变体——都是一种外部几乎无法轻易发起挑战的体系。
Bill Ackman:
Harvard is managed by a 13-person board that elects itself.
哈佛是由一个 13 人组成、成员自我提名并自我选举的董事会管理的。
And if any other company had been mismanaged in this fashion and had dealt with the issues in the way they have and allowed ideologies to develop and eliminated free speech on campus, you know, no viewpoint diversity, etc., you know, the shareholders would have thrown them out by now, but the same chair continues to manage the institution.
如果任何一家企业像哈佛这样管理不善、以这种方式处理问题、放任极端意识形态蔓延、扼杀校园言论自由、抹杀观点多元——股东早就把管理层赶下台了。但现在，哈佛依旧由同一位董事长掌舵。
Speaker 1:
So in closing, you've taken the controversial position that what is emanating from Washington is not the barbarians. It's how you get change through money.
最后总结一下：你持有一个颇具争议的观点——来自华盛顿的并非蛮族入侵，而是通过资金来推动变革的方式。
Bill Ackman:
Look, the unfortunate thing is I don't blame the science faculty at Harvard for the problems of the institution. But ultimately, the faculty have to be responsible for themselves. It's a subset of the faculty and a subset of the students that have been taking the place down. And it's the board not stepping in and saying, look, when the administration said, look, there are a series of issues—free-speech issues, safety issues, anti-Semitism, you know, waste—and we're going to give you taxpayer dollars; we want you to fix these problems. That's what the administration said. Harvard said no.
说实话，可惜的是，我并不把哈佛出现的问题归咎于理学院的老师们。但归根结底，教职员工必须为自身负责。真正拖垮学校的是其中一小部分教师和学生，而董事会却袖手旁观。当政府表示校园存在言论自由、安全、反犹、不当开支等一系列问题，并准备拨付纳税人的钱要求校方整改时，哈佛却拒绝了。
And they sued the administration. Trump doesn't like that. And he responded, you know, as would be expected, very, very aggressively. And they've put themselves into a very self-inflicted spot, which they could get out of, but it would require the chairman of the board to resign and the president of Harvard to go to the White House and apologize and say, look, we're prepared to fix A, B, C, and D. And yes, Mr. President, you were a little overreaching on this, but let us come to an agreement that makes sense.
于是学校起诉了政府。特朗普对此非常不满，并做出了强硬反击。如今哈佛陷入自找的困境，若想脱身，就得让董事长辞职、校长亲赴白宫道歉并表态：我们准备解决 A、B、C、D 这些问题。同时也可指出“总统先生，您有些过度干预”，但让双方达成合理协议。
I think the administration would love to have…kind of a template solution. My guess is they're going to, a bit like with tariffs, they're going to announce a deal with some other university other than Harvard on issues of free speech and anti-Semitism and viewpoint diversity that aren't going to violate issues of academic freedom and it's going to make another institution look really good and they're going to get this federal funding and Harvard's going to lose it. I think that's where it's going to end up.
我认为政府巴不得拿出一个“模板式”解决方案。我猜，他们会像谈关税那样，与某所不是哈佛的大学达成协议，聚焦言论自由、反犹与观点多元，同时不触碰学术自由底线——这样那所学校看起来光彩夺目，还能获得联邦资金，而哈佛则将失去资金。我觉得最终结果会是这样。
Speaker 1:
So in closing, then, you see the same thing happening with tariffs. Are we going to get out of this nightmare where we actually know what the rules of the road are and we haven't blown up the global trading system?
那么最后你认为，同样的事情也会在关税问题上发生。我们能否摆脱如今这场噩梦，真正厘清游戏规则，并且不至于摧毁全球贸易体系？
Bill Ackman:
Yeah, I'm an optimist. Let's leave it there.
是的，我是个乐观主义者。就说到这吧。
Speaker 1:
Good. Since you're an optimist, now you can have your free lunch. Thank you.
很好。既然你这么乐观，现在可以去享用你的免费午餐了。谢谢你。
Bill Ackman:
Thank you.
谢谢。
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2003-02-21 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2003-02-21 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2004-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2004-02-27 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2005-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2005-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2004 was $8.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2006-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2006-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2005 was $5.6 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...2007-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders
Refer To：《2007-02-28 Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders》。 To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 2006 was $16.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B ...